mirror of
https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent.git
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0d27d2ed14
The container exec-read piped the whole file through base64 with no size guard — the 50MB cap was only enforced host-side AFTER the full payload had already streamed into host memory. A prompt-injected read of a huge container file (or /dev/zero) could balloon the gateway process. head -c (cap+1) bounds the read inside the sandbox; the +1 byte lets the host distinguish at-cap from over-cap and reject with SourceTooLarge. Input redirect replaces 'base64 --' (no argv exposure at all for leading-dash paths). Docker integration tests re-verified live.
283 lines
12 KiB
Python
283 lines
12 KiB
Python
"""Tests for tools/image_source.py — the unified vision image-source resolver.
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Covers the delivery contract (data:/http/file/local/container source handling,
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size cap, magic-byte sniff) AND the terminal-backend confinement security model
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(GHSA-gpxw-6wxv-w3qq): under a non-local backend, host reads are confined to the
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media caches and every other path is read inside the sandbox via exec-read.
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"""
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import base64
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import importlib
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from pathlib import Path
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from types import SimpleNamespace
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from unittest.mock import patch
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import pytest
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PNG = b"\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\n" + b"\x00" * 64
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JPEG = b"\xff\xd8\xff" + b"\x00" * 64
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def _reload(monkeypatch, hermes_home: Path):
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monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_HOME", str(hermes_home))
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import hermes_constants
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importlib.reload(hermes_constants)
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import tools.image_source as isrc
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importlib.reload(isrc)
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return isrc
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class TestDataUrl:
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_valid_data_url_resolves_to_bytes(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
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isrc = _reload(monkeypatch, tmp_path / "hermes")
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b64 = base64.b64encode(PNG).decode()
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res = await isrc.resolve_image_source(
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f"data:image/png;base64,{b64}", isrc.ResolveContext())
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assert res.data == PNG
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assert res.mime == "image/png"
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assert res.origin == "data"
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_non_image_data_url_rejected(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
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isrc = _reload(monkeypatch, tmp_path / "hermes")
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b64 = base64.b64encode(b"not an image").decode()
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with pytest.raises(isrc.NotAnImage):
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await isrc.resolve_image_source(
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f"data:text/plain;base64,{b64}", isrc.ResolveContext())
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class TestLocalBackend:
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_local_backend_reads_any_host_path(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
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isrc = _reload(monkeypatch, tmp_path / "hermes")
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monkeypatch.setenv("TERMINAL_ENV", "local")
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img = tmp_path / "outside" / "pic.png"
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img.parent.mkdir(parents=True)
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img.write_bytes(PNG)
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res = await isrc.resolve_image_source(str(img), isrc.ResolveContext())
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assert res.data == PNG
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assert res.origin == "file"
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_file_uri_scheme_stripped(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
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isrc = _reload(monkeypatch, tmp_path / "hermes")
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monkeypatch.setenv("TERMINAL_ENV", "local")
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img = tmp_path / "pic.jpg"
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img.write_bytes(JPEG)
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res = await isrc.resolve_image_source(f"file://{img}", isrc.ResolveContext())
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assert res.mime == "image/jpeg"
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_bare_relative_path_resolves(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
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"""A cwd-relative bare filename ('pic.png') is a valid local source —
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main accepted it; the resolver must not regress it (PR review)."""
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isrc = _reload(monkeypatch, tmp_path / "hermes")
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monkeypatch.setenv("TERMINAL_ENV", "local")
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img = tmp_path / "pic.png"
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img.write_bytes(PNG)
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monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
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res = await isrc.resolve_image_source("pic.png", isrc.ResolveContext())
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assert res.data == PNG
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assert res.origin == "file"
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_unknown_url_scheme_rejected(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
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isrc = _reload(monkeypatch, tmp_path / "hermes")
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monkeypatch.setenv("TERMINAL_ENV", "local")
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with pytest.raises(isrc.UnsupportedScheme):
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await isrc.resolve_image_source(
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"ftp://example.com/pic.png", isrc.ResolveContext())
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_svg_passes_through_for_rasterization(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
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"""SVG has no raster magic bytes but is passed through with mime
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image/svg+xml so the vision call sites can rasterize it to PNG."""
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isrc = _reload(monkeypatch, tmp_path / "hermes")
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monkeypatch.setenv("TERMINAL_ENV", "local")
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svg = tmp_path / "art.svg"
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svg_bytes = b'<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"></svg>'
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svg.write_bytes(svg_bytes)
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res = await isrc.resolve_image_source(str(svg), isrc.ResolveContext())
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assert res.mime == "image/svg+xml"
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assert res.data == svg_bytes
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class TestNonLocalBackendConfinement:
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"""The security model: under a sandbox backend, host reads are confined to
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the media caches; every other path is read inside the sandbox."""
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_media_cache_path_host_read(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
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home = tmp_path / "hermes"
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isrc = _reload(monkeypatch, home)
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monkeypatch.setenv("TERMINAL_ENV", "docker")
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cached = home / "cache" / "images" / "inbound.png"
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cached.parent.mkdir(parents=True)
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cached.write_bytes(PNG)
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# No sandbox env needed — a cache path is host-read directly.
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res = await isrc.resolve_image_source(str(cached), isrc.ResolveContext())
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assert res.data == PNG
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assert res.origin == "file"
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_host_secret_outside_cache_routes_to_sandbox_not_host(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
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"""A non-cache host path (e.g. /etc/passwd) must NOT be host-read — it
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routes to the in-sandbox exec-read, which reads the CONTAINER's file."""
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home = tmp_path / "hermes"
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isrc = _reload(monkeypatch, home)
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monkeypatch.setenv("TERMINAL_ENV", "docker")
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# A real host file outside the caches, holding a "secret".
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secret = tmp_path / "id_rsa"
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secret.write_bytes(b"HOST-PRIVATE-KEY-DO-NOT-LEAK")
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# Fake sandbox env: its exec-read returns a *different* (container) image,
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# proving we read the container filesystem, not the host secret.
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container_png_b64 = base64.b64encode(PNG).decode()
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calls = {}
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def fake_execute(cmd, **kw):
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calls["cmd"] = cmd
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return {"returncode": 0, "output": container_png_b64}
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with patch("tools.image_source._get_active_env",
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return_value=SimpleNamespace(execute=fake_execute)):
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res = await isrc.resolve_image_source(str(secret), isrc.ResolveContext(task_id="t1"))
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# Read came from the sandbox exec-read, returning the container image —
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# the host secret bytes never appear.
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assert res.origin == "container"
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assert res.data == PNG
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assert b"HOST-PRIVATE-KEY" not in res.data
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assert "head -c" in calls["cmd"] and "< " in calls["cmd"] # bounded, redirect-safe form
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_non_cache_path_fails_closed_without_sandbox(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
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"""No active sandbox env -> refuse rather than fall back to a host read."""
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home = tmp_path / "hermes"
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isrc = _reload(monkeypatch, home)
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monkeypatch.setenv("TERMINAL_ENV", "docker")
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secret = tmp_path / "id_rsa"
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secret.write_bytes(b"HOST-PRIVATE-KEY")
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with patch("tools.image_source._get_active_env", return_value=None):
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with pytest.raises(isrc.SourceNotFound):
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await isrc.resolve_image_source(str(secret), isrc.ResolveContext(task_id="t1"))
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_symlink_in_cache_pointing_outside_is_not_host_read(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
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"""A symlink planted inside a cache dir that points at a host secret must
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not be host-read (resolve() escapes the cache) — it routes to sandbox."""
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home = tmp_path / "hermes"
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isrc = _reload(monkeypatch, home)
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monkeypatch.setenv("TERMINAL_ENV", "docker")
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secret = tmp_path / "outside" / "id_rsa"
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secret.parent.mkdir(parents=True)
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secret.write_bytes(b"HOST-PRIVATE-KEY")
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cache_dir = home / "cache" / "images"
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cache_dir.mkdir(parents=True)
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link = cache_dir / "sneaky.png"
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try:
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link.symlink_to(secret)
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except (OSError, NotImplementedError):
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pytest.skip("symlinks unsupported")
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# Fails closed (no sandbox) rather than host-reading the symlink target.
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with patch("tools.image_source._get_active_env", return_value=None):
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with pytest.raises(isrc.SourceNotFound):
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await isrc.resolve_image_source(str(link), isrc.ResolveContext(task_id="t1"))
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class TestExecReadSafety:
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_exec_read_is_bounded_and_redirect_safe(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
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"""Leading-dash paths go through an input redirect (no argv exposure)
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and the read is size-bounded via head -c."""
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home = tmp_path / "hermes"
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isrc = _reload(monkeypatch, home)
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monkeypatch.setenv("TERMINAL_ENV", "docker")
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captured = {}
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def fake_execute(cmd, **kw):
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captured["cmd"] = cmd
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return {"returncode": 0, "output": base64.b64encode(PNG).decode()}
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with patch("tools.image_source._get_active_env",
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return_value=SimpleNamespace(execute=fake_execute)):
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await isrc.resolve_image_source(
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"/workspace/-i-etc-shadow.png", isrc.ResolveContext(task_id="t1"))
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assert f"head -c {isrc._MAX_INGEST_BYTES + 1} < " in captured["cmd"]
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assert "'-i-etc-shadow.png'" in captured["cmd"] or "-i-etc-shadow.png" in captured["cmd"]
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_exec_read_over_cap_rejected(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
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"""A sandbox file larger than the ingest cap is rejected, not embedded."""
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home = tmp_path / "hermes"
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isrc = _reload(monkeypatch, home)
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monkeypatch.setenv("TERMINAL_ENV", "docker")
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# head -c returns cap+1 bytes for an oversized file.
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over = base64.b64encode(b"\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\n" + b"\x00" * (isrc._MAX_INGEST_BYTES - 7)).decode()
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def fake_execute(cmd, **kw):
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return {"returncode": 0, "output": over}
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with patch("tools.image_source._get_active_env",
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return_value=SimpleNamespace(execute=fake_execute)):
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with pytest.raises(isrc.SourceTooLarge):
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await isrc.resolve_image_source(
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"/workspace/huge.png", isrc.ResolveContext(task_id="t1"))
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_exec_read_nonzero_returncode_raises(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
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home = tmp_path / "hermes"
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isrc = _reload(monkeypatch, home)
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monkeypatch.setenv("TERMINAL_ENV", "docker")
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def fake_execute(cmd, **kw):
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return {"returncode": 1, "output": ""}
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with patch("tools.image_source._get_active_env",
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return_value=SimpleNamespace(execute=fake_execute)):
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with pytest.raises(isrc.SourceNotFound):
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await isrc.resolve_image_source(
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"/workspace/nope.png", isrc.ResolveContext(task_id="t1"))
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class TestSvgNormalization:
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"""SVG resolves end-to-end: the resolver passes it through as
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image/svg+xml and the vision call sites rasterize it to PNG via
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_normalize_to_supported_image (PR #52688, folded in)."""
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_svg_rasterized_when_converter_available(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
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from tools import vision_tools as vt
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isrc = _reload(monkeypatch, tmp_path / "hermes")
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monkeypatch.setenv("TERMINAL_ENV", "local")
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svg = tmp_path / "art.svg"
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svg.write_bytes(b'<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="4" height="4"/>')
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def fake_rasterize(svg_path, out_path):
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out_path.write_bytes(PNG)
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return True
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with patch.object(vt, "_rasterize_svg_to_png", side_effect=fake_rasterize):
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res = await isrc.resolve_image_source(str(svg), isrc.ResolveContext())
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assert res.mime == "image/svg+xml"
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path, mime, err = vt._normalize_to_supported_image(svg, "image/svg+xml")
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assert err is None
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assert mime == "image/png"
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assert path.read_bytes() == PNG
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path.unlink()
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def test_svg_actionable_error_when_no_converter(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
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from tools import vision_tools as vt
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_reload(monkeypatch, tmp_path / "hermes")
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svg = tmp_path / "art.svg"
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svg.write_bytes(b'<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"/>')
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with patch.object(vt, "_rasterize_svg_to_png", return_value=False):
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path, mime, err = vt._normalize_to_supported_image(svg, "image/svg+xml")
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assert path is None
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assert "rasterizer" in err
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