Harden extension URL download cache against symlink and junction races (#3869)

* fix(extensions): harden URL download cache

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* fix(extensions): retain secure archive descriptor

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* Harden extension URL cache anchor opens

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* Use descriptor-safe mkdir for cache components

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* Harden extension URL download cache

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* Align extension manifest regression expectation

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* Make download cache leaf anonymous to remove cleanup TOCTOU

Address review: the best-effort cleanup walk re-derived the downloads
directory by path, so a cache ancestor swapped after the archive was
opened could redirect os.unlink to a replacement leaf, and it silently
no-op'd (failing open) on platforms without descriptor-relative unlink.

_safe_open_download_zip now unlinks the exclusively-created leaf
immediately via the same directory descriptor, returning an fd backed by
an anonymous inode. Installation already consumes that descriptor through
archive_file, so the on-disk pathname is never reopened and no cleanup
walk is needed. The capability gate additionally requires os.unlink in
os.supports_dir_fd, so unsupported platforms fail closed. Removed the
now-unused _safe_unlink_download_zip helper and its cleanup finally, and
updated the tests accordingly.

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* Fix Windows test matrix for cache hardening tests

The hardened cache primitives fail closed on platforms without dir_fd/
O_NOFOLLOW, so on the windows-latest matrix several tests errored instead
of exercising POSIX behavior:

- test_symlinked_cache_ancestor_is_refused and
  test_cache_ancestor_resolving_outside_project_is_refused called
  _validate_safe_cache_dir directly and expected typer.Exit, but on
  Windows it raises NotImplementedError first. Guard both with
  _require_secure_dir_fd() so they skip where the primitive is unavailable.
- test_safe_open_fails_closed_without_atomic_platform_support built its
  download dir via _validate_safe_cache_dir, which itself fails closed on
  Windows; construct the directory directly so the assertion targets
  _safe_open_download_zip's platform gate in isolation.
- The _open_test_download_zip stand-in unlinked a still-open file, which
  raises PermissionError on Windows. Use O_TEMPORARY there (auto-delete on
  close) and keep immediate unlink on POSIX.

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* Support Windows in extension URL download-cache hardening

Replace the fail-closed NotImplementedError on platforms lacking dir_fd
with a portable, still-hardened download path so `specify extension add
--from <url>` works on Windows instead of rejecting the install.

- `_validate_safe_cache_dir` now dispatches to a POSIX dir_fd + O_NOFOLLOW
  walk when available, and otherwise a portable path-wise walk that rejects
  symlink/junction components before and after each mkdir and requires every
  component to resolve back under the project root.
- `_safe_open_download_zip` keeps the POSIX anonymous-inode create/unlink and
  adds a portable leaf create using O_EXCL + O_TEMPORARY (auto-delete on
  close) plus a post-open fstat/lstat inode-identity check to detect a leaf
  swapped underneath us. Installation still consumes only the open
  descriptor, so the cache pathname is never reopened.
- Detect the symlink-refusal case via errno (ELOOP/ENOTDIR/EMLINK) instead of
  FileExistsError, and add O_CLOEXEC to the descriptor-walk opens.
- Drop the now-unreachable NotImplementedError handling in the --from branch.
- Tests: cover the portable path (success, symlinked-leaf refusal, symlinked
  ancestor refusal, full --from install) and keep the POSIX-only cases guarded.

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---------

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This commit is contained in:
Manfred Riem
2026-07-30 11:59:50 -05:00
committed by GitHub
parent 0f3f2aa45e
commit 6577ffc92b
5 changed files with 852 additions and 28 deletions

View File

@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ import tempfile
from dataclasses import dataclass
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Any, Callable, Dict, List, Optional, Set
from typing import Any, BinaryIO, Callable, Dict, List, Optional, Set
import pathspec
import yaml
@@ -2428,6 +2428,8 @@ class ExtensionManager:
speckit_version: str,
priority: int = 10,
force: bool = False,
*,
archive_file: BinaryIO | None = None,
) -> ExtensionManifest:
"""Install extension from ZIP file.
@@ -2437,6 +2439,8 @@ class ExtensionManager:
priority: Resolution priority (lower = higher precedence, default 10)
force: If True and extension is already installed, remove it first
before proceeding with installation
archive_file: Already-open archive stream to consume instead of
reopening ``zip_path``
Returns:
Installed extension manifest
@@ -2452,7 +2456,12 @@ class ExtensionManager:
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpdir:
temp_path = Path(tmpdir)
safe_extract_zip(zip_path, temp_path, error_type=ValidationError)
safe_extract_zip(
zip_path,
temp_path,
archive_file=archive_file,
error_type=ValidationError,
)
# Find extension directory (may be nested)
extension_dir = temp_path

View File

@@ -8,9 +8,11 @@ which re-fetch from the parent package at call time so test monkeypatching of
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import errno
import hashlib
import os
import shutil
import stat
import tempfile
import zipfile
from pathlib import Path
@@ -437,6 +439,278 @@ def catalog_remove(
console.print("\n[dim]No catalogs remain in config. Built-in defaults will be used.[/dim]")
# Relative path, below the project root, of the extension URL download cache.
_CACHE_REL_PARTS = (".specify", "extensions", ".cache", "downloads")
def _has_secure_dir_fd() -> bool:
"""Whether this platform supports the strongest (POSIX) hardening path.
The descriptor-anchored walk needs ``O_NOFOLLOW`` plus ``dir_fd`` support
for ``os.open``/``os.mkdir``/``os.unlink``. When any of those is missing
(notably on Windows) the caller falls back to the portable path-wise walk,
which reproduces the same guarantees using symlink/reparse-point rejection,
resolve-under-root containment checks, and post-open inode-identity
verification instead of file descriptors.
"""
return bool(
getattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW", 0)
and os.open in os.supports_dir_fd
and os.mkdir in os.supports_dir_fd
and os.unlink in os.supports_dir_fd
)
def _is_symlink_refusal_errno(exc: OSError) -> bool:
"""Whether an ``os.open``/``os.mkdir`` error means a component is a symlink.
Opening an ``O_NOFOLLOW`` path whose final component is a symlink raises
``ELOOP`` on Linux and ``EMLINK`` on some BSDs, while a symlinked component
that no longer resolves to a directory surfaces as ``ENOTDIR``.
"""
return exc.errno in (errno.ELOOP, errno.ENOTDIR, getattr(errno, "EMLINK", -1))
def _verify_leaf_identity(fd: int, path: Path) -> None:
"""Confirm ``fd`` still refers to the regular file at ``path``.
Mirrors the workflow installer's staged-file check: comparing the open
descriptor's ``fstat`` against a ``lstat`` of the pathname detects a leaf
that was swapped for a symlink/reparse point between creation and use, so
the portable (dir_fd-less) path is not vulnerable to an ancestor swap race.
"""
path_stat = path.stat(follow_symlinks=False)
open_stat = os.fstat(fd)
if (
not stat.S_ISREG(path_stat.st_mode)
or path_stat.st_dev != open_stat.st_dev
or path_stat.st_ino != open_stat.st_ino
):
raise OSError(
errno.ENOTDIR, "Download file changed between creation and open"
)
def _validate_safe_cache_dir(project_root: Path) -> Path:
"""Create and validate the extension URL download cache one component at a
time, refusing symlinked/junctioned components on every supported platform."""
download_dir = project_root.joinpath(*_CACHE_REL_PARTS)
try:
if _has_secure_dir_fd():
_validate_cache_dir_via_dir_fd(project_root, download_dir)
else:
_validate_cache_dir_via_paths(project_root, download_dir)
except typer.Exit:
raise
except FileExistsError:
console.print(
"[red]Error:[/red] Refusing to use symlinked download cache directory"
)
raise typer.Exit(1)
except OSError as exc:
if _is_symlink_refusal_errno(exc):
console.print(
"[red]Error:[/red] Refusing to use symlinked download cache directory"
)
raise typer.Exit(1)
console.print(
"[red]Error:[/red] Could not prepare download cache directory: "
f"{_escape_markup(str(exc))}"
)
raise typer.Exit(1)
return download_dir
def _validate_cache_dir_via_dir_fd(project_root: Path, download_dir: Path) -> None:
"""POSIX cache-dir walk anchored on ``dir_fd`` + ``O_NOFOLLOW`` descriptors."""
o_nofollow = getattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW", 0)
o_directory = getattr(os, "O_DIRECTORY", 0)
o_cloexec = getattr(os, "O_CLOEXEC", 0)
walk_flags = os.O_RDONLY | o_directory | o_nofollow | o_cloexec
project_root_resolved = project_root.resolve()
parent_fd = os.open(project_root, walk_flags)
current_path = project_root
try:
for part in _CACHE_REL_PARTS:
current_path = current_path / part
try:
child_fd = os.open(part, walk_flags, dir_fd=parent_fd)
except FileNotFoundError:
try:
os.mkdir(part, dir_fd=parent_fd)
except FileExistsError:
pass
child_fd = os.open(part, walk_flags, dir_fd=parent_fd)
try:
current_path.resolve().relative_to(project_root_resolved)
except (OSError, ValueError):
try:
os.close(child_fd)
except OSError:
pass
console.print(
"[red]Error:[/red] Download cache directory escapes project root"
)
raise typer.Exit(1)
os.close(parent_fd)
parent_fd = child_fd
finally:
if parent_fd >= 0:
try:
os.close(parent_fd)
except OSError:
pass
def _validate_cache_dir_via_paths(project_root: Path, download_dir: Path) -> None:
"""Portable cache-dir walk for platforms without ``dir_fd`` (e.g. Windows).
Each component is created individually while a symlink/junction is rejected
both before and after creation, and every component is required to resolve
back under the project root so a mount-point alias or reparse point cannot
redirect the cache outside the project.
"""
project_root_resolved = project_root.resolve()
current_path = project_root
for part in _CACHE_REL_PARTS:
current_path = current_path / part
if current_path.is_symlink():
console.print(
"[red]Error:[/red] Refusing to use symlinked download cache directory"
)
raise typer.Exit(1)
try:
current_path.mkdir()
except FileExistsError:
pass
# Re-check after creation: a component swapped for a symlink/junction
# (or an existing non-directory) between the check and mkdir is caught
# here before the walk descends into it.
if current_path.is_symlink() or not current_path.is_dir():
console.print(
"[red]Error:[/red] Refusing to use symlinked download cache directory"
)
raise typer.Exit(1)
try:
current_path.resolve().relative_to(project_root_resolved)
except (OSError, ValueError):
console.print(
"[red]Error:[/red] Download cache directory escapes project root"
)
raise typer.Exit(1)
def _safe_open_download_zip(
project_root: Path, download_dir: Path, zip_filename: str
) -> int:
"""Exclusively create a download ZIP and return an owned descriptor.
The archive never persists as a nameable on-disk file: the POSIX path
unlinks the leaf immediately after exclusive creation (anonymous inode),
while the portable path opens it with ``O_TEMPORARY`` so the OS deletes it
when the last handle closes. Installation proceeds entirely through the
returned descriptor, removing the pathname-reopen and cleanup-walk TOCTOU
classes on every supported platform.
"""
if _has_secure_dir_fd():
return _open_download_zip_via_dir_fd(
project_root, download_dir, zip_filename
)
return _open_download_zip_via_paths(project_root, download_dir, zip_filename)
def _open_download_zip_via_dir_fd(
project_root: Path, download_dir: Path, zip_filename: str
) -> int:
"""POSIX leaf create: descriptor walk, ``O_EXCL`` create, immediate unlink."""
o_nofollow = getattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW", 0)
o_directory = getattr(os, "O_DIRECTORY", 0)
o_cloexec = getattr(os, "O_CLOEXEC", 0)
walk_flags = os.O_RDONLY | o_directory | o_nofollow | o_cloexec
rel_parts = download_dir.relative_to(project_root).parts
parent_fd = os.open(project_root, walk_flags)
try:
for part in rel_parts:
new_fd = os.open(part, walk_flags, dir_fd=parent_fd)
os.close(parent_fd)
parent_fd = new_fd
download_fd = os.open(
zip_filename,
os.O_RDWR | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | o_nofollow | o_cloexec,
0o600,
dir_fd=parent_fd,
)
try:
os.unlink(zip_filename, dir_fd=parent_fd)
except OSError:
os.close(download_fd)
raise
return download_fd
finally:
os.close(parent_fd)
def _open_download_zip_via_paths(
project_root: Path, download_dir: Path, zip_filename: str
) -> int:
"""Portable leaf create for platforms without ``dir_fd`` (e.g. Windows).
The cache directory is re-validated (real directory, under the project
root) immediately before an exclusive create. ``O_EXCL`` guarantees an
attacker cannot pre-stage the leaf as a symlink/junction, ``O_TEMPORARY``
makes the OS delete it on close, and a post-open inode-identity check
detects a leaf swapped underneath us. The returned descriptor is the only
handle installation ever uses, so the cache pathname is never reopened.
"""
zip_path = download_dir / zip_filename
project_root_resolved = project_root.resolve()
if download_dir.is_symlink() or not download_dir.is_dir():
raise OSError(
errno.ENOTDIR, "Download cache directory is not a real directory"
)
try:
download_dir.resolve().relative_to(project_root_resolved)
except (OSError, ValueError):
raise OSError(errno.ENOTDIR, "Download cache directory escapes project root")
if zip_path.is_symlink():
raise OSError(errno.ELOOP, "Refusing to write through a symlinked download file")
flags = os.O_RDWR | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL
flags |= getattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW", 0)
flags |= getattr(os, "O_CLOEXEC", 0)
flags |= getattr(os, "O_BINARY", 0)
o_temporary = getattr(os, "O_TEMPORARY", 0)
flags |= o_temporary
download_fd = os.open(zip_path, flags, 0o600)
try:
_verify_leaf_identity(download_fd, zip_path)
except OSError:
os.close(download_fd)
# Without O_TEMPORARY the leaf is not auto-deleted, so remove the file
# we just exclusively created (best effort, never through a symlink).
if not o_temporary:
try:
if not zip_path.is_symlink():
zip_path.unlink()
except OSError:
pass
raise
return download_fd
@extension_app.command("add")
def extension_add(
extension: str = typer.Argument(help="Extension name or path"),
@@ -544,16 +818,13 @@ def extension_add(
console.print(f"Downloading from {safe_url}...")
# Download ZIP to temp location
download_dir = project_root / ".specify" / "extensions" / ".cache" / "downloads"
download_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(
prefix="extension-url-download-",
suffix=".zip",
dir=download_dir,
delete=False,
) as download_file:
zip_path = Path(download_file.name)
download_dir = _validate_safe_cache_dir(project_root)
zip_filename = f"extension-url-download-{uuid4().hex}.zip"
# Only used for diagnostic messages: the real archive is a
# transient inode (unlinked on POSIX, O_TEMPORARY on Windows)
# consumed via ``archive_file`` below, so this path is never
# opened again.
zip_path = download_dir / zip_filename
try:
# Use the catalog's authenticated fetch so configured
@@ -587,20 +858,66 @@ def extension_add(
)
raise typer.Exit(1)
zip_path.write_bytes(zip_data)
download_fd = -1
download_file = None
try:
try:
download_fd = _safe_open_download_zip(
project_root, download_dir, zip_filename
)
except OSError as exc:
console.print(
"[red]Error:[/red] Could not safely create download file: "
f"{_escape_markup(str(exc))}"
)
raise typer.Exit(1)
# Install from downloaded ZIP
manifest = manager.install_from_zip(zip_path, speckit_version, priority=priority, force=force)
try:
download_file = os.fdopen(download_fd, "w+b")
download_fd = -1
download_file.write(zip_data)
download_file.flush()
download_file.seek(0)
except OSError as exc:
console.print(
"[red]Error:[/red] Could not safely write download file: "
f"{_escape_markup(str(exc))}"
)
raise typer.Exit(1)
# Consume the transient inode reserved above rather
# than reopening the cache pathname during extraction.
try:
manifest = manager.install_from_zip(
zip_path,
speckit_version,
priority=priority,
force=force,
archive_file=download_file,
)
except OSError as exc:
console.print(
"[red]Error:[/red] Could not install extension from downloaded archive: "
f"{_escape_markup(str(exc))}"
)
raise typer.Exit(1)
finally:
if download_file is not None:
try:
download_file.close()
except OSError:
pass
elif download_fd >= 0:
try:
os.close(download_fd)
except OSError:
pass
except urllib.error.URLError as e:
console.print(
f"[red]Error:[/red] Failed to download from {safe_url}: "
f"{_escape_markup(str(e))}"
)
raise typer.Exit(1)
finally:
# Clean up downloaded ZIP
if zip_path.exists():
zip_path.unlink()
else:
# Try bundled extensions first (shipped with spec-kit)