_acquire_via_az_cli runs 'az account get-access-token' with text=True, so
subprocess.run decodes stdout with the locale encoding and raises
UnicodeDecodeError (a ValueError sibling, NOT a JSONDecodeError) when the output
can't be decoded. That escaped the except (OSError, TimeoutExpired,
JSONDecodeError, KeyError) tuple and crashed a helper whose contract is to
return str | None. Add UnicodeDecodeError to the tuple.
Test patches subprocess.run to raise UnicodeDecodeError and asserts resolve_token
returns None (fails before: the error propagated).
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
find_entries_for_url did (urlparse(url).hostname or "").lower() unguarded. a
malformed authority (e.g. an unterminated ipv6 bracket "https://[::1") makes
urlparse/hostname raise ValueError, so instead of the empty list the function
already returns for a host-less url, a raw ValueError leaked out of the shared
http client (build_request / open_url call this before any url validation).
no auth entry can match such a url, so treat it like the host-less case and
return no matches. added a regression test over an unterminated bracket and a
bracketed non-ip host; confirmed it fails on the pre-fix code.
* fix(cli): exit cleanly on malformed IPv6 URLs in extension/preset/workflow add
extension add --from, preset add --from, and workflow add <url> parsed
the user-supplied URL with a bare urlparse before their HTTPS/host
validation, so an unclosed IPv6 bracket escaped as a raw ValueError
traceback. Wrap each parse and emit the surrounding validation's clean
error style + typer.Exit(1) instead.
Fixes#3368
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(cli): convert malformed redirect URLs to URLError in shared redirect handler
Parse the redirect target once in _StripAuthOnRedirect.redirect_request
before the validator and stdlib handler run, converting ValueError into
URLError which every download path already catches. Also escape from_url
in the preset install message so IPv6 brackets don't break Rich markup.
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
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Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
* feat(auth): add github_provider_hosts() to enumerate GHES hosts from auth.json
Assisted-by: Claude Code (model: claude-sonnet-4-6, autonomous)
* fix(extensions): resolve GHES release assets via /api/v3
Generalizes resolve_github_release_asset_api_url to GitHub Enterprise
Server hosts (gated by auth.json github hosts), fixing private GHES
extension/preset downloads. github/spec-kit#3147
Assisted-by: Claude Code (model: claude-sonnet-4-6, autonomous)
* fix(extensions,presets): pass auth.json github hosts into release resolver
Assisted-by: Claude Code (model: claude-sonnet-4-6, autonomous)
* docs(auth): document GHES private catalog + release-asset auth
Assisted-by: Claude Code (model: claude-sonnet-4-6, autonomous)
* fix(presets,workflows): pass auth.json github hosts into remaining release resolvers
Wires preset add --from and workflow add through github_provider_hosts()
so private GHES release assets resolve via /api/v3 there too. github/spec-kit#3147
Assisted-by: Claude Code (model: claude-sonnet-4-6, autonomous)
* test(presets): use module-level io.BytesIO in GHES preset test
Addresses Copilot review on PR #3157: drop unnecessary __import__("io")
in test_preset_add_from_ghes_release_url_resolves_via_api_v3 since io is
already imported at module level.
* fix(github-http): pass through GHES asset API URLs by path shape
Addresses Copilot review on PR #3157. A direct GHES /api/v3 release asset
URL was only returned as already-resolved when its host was in the
allowlist; otherwise the resolver returned None and the caller downloaded
the same URL without 'Accept: application/octet-stream', fetching JSON
metadata instead of the binary.
Gate the passthrough on path shape alone, mirroring the github.com case.
This is safe: passthrough returns the input URL unchanged and the caller
fetches it either way, so no new request to an arbitrary host is induced;
the token stays independently gated by auth.json in open_url. The
allowlist remains the anti-SSRF gate on the tag-lookup resolving path.
Add test_passthrough_for_unlisted_ghes_api_asset_url.
* Harden preset URL installs against unsafe redirects
Preset URL installs already rejected non-HTTPS source URLs, but the authenticated opener follows redirects. Validate the final response URL before writing the ZIP, preserve GitHub release asset URL resolution after the preset command module split, stream the response to disk, and keep catalog config serialization on safe YAML output.
Constraint: open_url follows redirects, so source URL validation alone does not constrain the downloaded target
Rejected: Keep response.read() for simplicity | large preset downloads should not be buffered entirely in memory
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: narrow
Directive: Keep preset URL policy aligned with workflow installer redirect validation
Tested: uvx ruff check src/specify_cli/__init__.py src/specify_cli/presets/__init__.py src/specify_cli/presets/_commands.py tests/test_presets.py
Tested: uv run pytest tests/test_presets.py -q
Not-tested: Real network redirect integration against a live HTTP server
Co-authored-by: OmX <omx@oh-my-codex.dev>
* Reject malformed preset download URLs
Preset downloads should fail early when a URL lacks a hostname, even if the scheme is HTTPS. The redirect error now describes any disallowed target instead of implying that only non-HTTPS redirects are blocked.
* Prevent credentialed preset redirects from downgrading transport
Preset URL downloads already checked the final URL after urllib followed redirects, but that was too late for authenticated requests because same-host redirects could preserve Authorization during the redirect itself. The authenticated HTTP helper now supports an opt-in redirect validator, and preset downloads use it to reject disallowed redirect targets before following them. The redirect auth handlers also stop preserving credentials across HTTPS to non-HTTPS downgrades as defense in depth.
* test(presets): 修复 URL 解析测试 mock 缺少 redirect_validator 参数
重定向安全加固为 open_url 新增 redirect_validator 参数，
两处 fake_open_url mock 签名未同步导致 TypeError。
补齐参数后全部 3717 个测试通过。
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Co-authored-by: OmX <omx@oh-my-codex.dev>
