2 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Pascal THUET	118062eac4	harden: secure extension and preset archive downloads (#3141) ... * harden: secure extension and preset archive downloads Adopt the shared download-security primitives from #3140 across extension and preset catalog, package, direct-URL, and ZIP-install flows: - bound catalog, package, and inline manifest reads; - verify catalog SHA-256 values when present; - replace path-only extraction with bounded traversal/symlink-safe extraction; - validate malformed hosts and ports before opening download URLs; - handle normalized trailing-backslash directory entries consistently. Redirect enforcement and checksum verification remain owned by the shared helpers already on main; this commit wires them into extension and preset behavior. Assisted-by: OpenAI Codex (model: GPT-5, autonomous) * harden: close archive and catalog download edge cases Preflight ZIP central directories before ZipFile allocates them, bound both declared and actual payload sizes, and reject ambiguous or non-portable archive paths before extraction. Keep extension update manifest selection consistent with extraction, reject unsafe catalog-derived output filenames and malformed URL types, and escape untrusted values in download errors. Add regression coverage for parser differentials, collisions, platform-specific filenames, bounded call sites, and failure ordering. Assisted-by: OpenAI Codex (model: GPT-5, autonomous) * harden: address download security review feedback Assisted-by: OpenAI Codex (model: GPT-5, autonomous) * harden: close ZIP preflight review gaps Assisted-by: OpenAI Codex (model: GPT-5, autonomous) * fix: harden extension update preflight and rollback Assisted-by: OpenAI Codex (model: GPT-5, autonomous) * fix: harden extension update rollback Assisted-by: OpenAI Codex (model: GPT-5, autonomous)	2026-07-28 07:52:07 -05:00
Andrew Chen	0d780162f9	fix(bundle): surface a clean BundlerError on a malformed bundle download URL (#3586) ... `_download_manifest` and its `_require_https` helper parsed the catalog entry's `download_url` with an unguarded `urlparse(url)`. A malformed authority — e.g. an unclosed IPv6 bracket like `https://[::1` — makes `urlparse` (or `.hostname` on older Pythons) raise a raw `ValueError`. The three `bundle` CLI commands (`info`, `install`, `update`) only catch `BundlerError`, so that `ValueError` escaped as an uncaught traceback. Wrap both parse sites in the same `try/except ValueError -> BundlerError` guard already used by the sibling `_validate_remote_url` (and established by the merged catalog-URL fix #3576), so a bad `download_url` reports a clean, actionable error in every mode. Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-17 09:52:35 -05:00