Files
github-spec-kit/src/specify_cli/bundler/lib/yamlio.py
Ali jawwad be33d2a5f6 fix(bundler): degrade non-UTF-8 config reads into BundlerError (#3784)
yamlio.py is the single chokepoint for every bundler read, and its module
docstring states the contract: "All reads/writes go through these functions so
that IO failures degrade into actionable BundlerError rather than raw
tracebacks."

Both readers catch only OSError, but `Path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")` and
`json.load()` raise UnicodeDecodeError on a non-UTF-8 file --
`issubclass(UnicodeDecodeError, OSError)` is False (its MRO is UnicodeError ->
ValueError). So the decode error escaped uncaught:

    load_yaml: LEAKED UnicodeDecodeError -> 'utf-8' codec can't decode byte 0xff
    load_json: LEAKED UnicodeDecodeError -> 'utf-8' codec can't decode byte 0xff

In load_json, json.JSONDecodeError does not help: it is a *sibling* of
UnicodeDecodeError, not a parent.

This is realistic rather than theoretical -- on Windows, PowerShell 5.1's
`Out-File` and `>` default to UTF-16, so a hand-edited
`.specify/bundle-catalogs.yml` or records file hits it.

Widen both read clauses to `(OSError, UnicodeError)`, matching the sibling
catalog readers (catalogs.py:101, workflows/catalog.py:336). JSONDecodeError
deliberately stays FIRST so malformed-but-decodable JSON keeps its more
specific "Invalid JSON" message; a regression test locks that ordering.

Write paths are unaffected -- verified that dump_yaml/dump_json do not leak
UnicodeEncodeError (both escape unencodable input), so this stays scoped to the
two read paths.

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-28 17:29:27 -05:00

203 lines
7.4 KiB
Python

"""YAML/JSON read-write helpers with path confinement (Constitution Principles IV & V).
All reads/writes go through these functions so that:
- IO failures degrade into actionable :class:`~specify_cli.bundler.BundlerError`s
rather than raw tracebacks, and
- every path can be confined to an allowed root via :func:`ensure_within`.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import os
import re
import stat
import tempfile
from pathlib import Path, PurePosixPath
from typing import Any
import yaml
from .. import BundlerError
def ensure_within(root: Path, candidate: Path) -> Path:
"""Resolve *candidate* and guarantee it stays within *root*.
Refuses path-traversal payloads and symlink escapes. Returns the resolved,
confined path. Raises :class:`BundlerError` if the path escapes *root*.
"""
root_resolved = Path(root).resolve()
# Resolve symlinks so a symlinked component cannot point outside the root.
candidate_resolved = Path(candidate).resolve()
try:
candidate_resolved.relative_to(root_resolved)
except ValueError as exc:
raise BundlerError(
f"Refusing path '{candidate}' — it escapes the allowed root '{root}'."
) from exc
return candidate_resolved
def load_yaml(path: Path) -> Any:
"""Parse a YAML file, returning ``{}`` only for an *empty* document.
A non-empty document is returned exactly as parsed — including a
non-mapping such as ``[]``, ``false``, ``0``, ``''``, or an explicit null
(``null``/``~``) — so callers can validate the top-level shape (e.g. reject
a non-mapping config) instead of having it silently coerced to an empty
mapping.
``yaml.safe_load`` returns ``None`` for *both* an empty document and an
explicit null scalar, so ``yaml.compose`` (which yields no node only for a
truly empty document) is used to tell them apart: an empty document becomes
``{}`` while an explicit ``null``/``~`` is returned as ``None`` for the
caller to reject.
"""
path = Path(path)
if not path.exists():
raise BundlerError(f"File not found: {path}")
try:
text = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
except (OSError, UnicodeError) as exc:
# A non-UTF-8 file raises UnicodeDecodeError, which is a ValueError --
# NOT an OSError -- so it escaped this module's "IO failures degrade
# into actionable BundlerError" contract as a raw traceback. Realistic
# on Windows, where PowerShell 5.1's `Out-File`/`>` default to UTF-16.
# Matches the sibling catalog readers (catalogs.py, workflows/catalog.py).
raise BundlerError(f"Could not read {path}: {exc}") from exc
try:
has_node = yaml.compose(text) is not None
data = yaml.safe_load(text)
except yaml.YAMLError as exc:
raise BundlerError(f"Invalid YAML in {path}: {exc}") from exc
if data is None and not has_node:
return {}
return data
def dump_yaml(path: Path, data: Any, *, within: Path | None = None) -> Path:
"""Write *data* as YAML to *path* (optionally confined to *within*)."""
path = Path(path)
if within is not None:
path = ensure_within(within, path)
try:
path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
with path.open("w", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
yaml.safe_dump(
data,
handle,
sort_keys=False,
default_flow_style=False,
allow_unicode=True,
)
except OSError as exc:
raise BundlerError(f"Could not write {path}: {exc}") from exc
return path
def load_json(path: Path) -> Any:
"""Parse a JSON file."""
path = Path(path)
if not path.exists():
raise BundlerError(f"File not found: {path}")
try:
with path.open("r", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
return json.load(handle)
# JSONDecodeError stays FIRST: it and UnicodeDecodeError are sibling
# ValueError subclasses (neither subsumes the other), so malformed-but-
# decodable JSON keeps its more specific "Invalid JSON" message while a
# decode failure falls through to the read-error clause below.
except json.JSONDecodeError as exc:
raise BundlerError(f"Invalid JSON in {path}: {exc}") from exc
except (OSError, UnicodeError) as exc:
# See load_yaml: a non-UTF-8 file raises UnicodeDecodeError, which is
# not an OSError, and previously escaped as a raw traceback.
raise BundlerError(f"Could not read {path}: {exc}") from exc
def loads_json(text: str, *, origin: str = "<string>") -> Any:
"""Parse JSON from a string (used for catalog payloads fetched as text)."""
try:
return json.loads(text)
except json.JSONDecodeError as exc:
raise BundlerError(f"Invalid JSON from {origin}: {exc}") from exc
def dump_json(path: Path, data: Any, *, within: Path | None = None) -> Path:
"""Atomically write pretty JSON to *path* (optionally confined to *within*)."""
path = Path(path)
if within is not None:
path = ensure_within(within, path)
fd = -1
temp_path: Path | None = None
try:
path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
fd, temp_name = tempfile.mkstemp(
dir=path.parent,
prefix=f".{path.name}.",
suffix=".tmp",
)
temp_path = Path(temp_name)
with os.fdopen(os.dup(fd), "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
json.dump(data, handle, indent=2, sort_keys=False)
handle.write("\n")
try:
if path.exists():
existing = path.stat(follow_symlinks=False)
if stat.S_ISREG(existing.st_mode) and hasattr(os, "fchmod"):
os.fchmod(fd, stat.S_IMODE(existing.st_mode))
if stat.S_ISREG(existing.st_mode) and hasattr(os, "fchown"):
try:
os.fchown(fd, existing.st_uid, existing.st_gid)
except PermissionError:
pass
except OSError:
pass
staged = os.stat(temp_path, follow_symlinks=False)
opened = os.fstat(fd)
if (
not stat.S_ISREG(staged.st_mode)
or staged.st_dev != opened.st_dev
or staged.st_ino != opened.st_ino
):
raise OSError("staged JSON file changed before commit")
os.close(fd)
fd = -1
os.replace(temp_path, path)
temp_path = None
except OSError as exc:
raise BundlerError(f"Could not write {path}: {exc}") from exc
finally:
if fd >= 0:
try:
os.close(fd)
except OSError:
pass
if temp_path is not None:
try:
temp_path.unlink(missing_ok=True)
except OSError:
pass
return path
def is_safe_relpath(rel: str) -> bool:
"""Return True if *rel* is a project-relative path with no traversal/absolute parts.
Platform-independent: a POSIX-absolute path (``/abs``) or a Windows
drive-absolute path (``C:\\x``) is rejected on every OS, since these strings
can appear in untrusted catalog/manifest data regardless of the host.
"""
if not rel:
return False
normalized = rel.replace("\\", "/")
if os.path.isabs(rel) or normalized.startswith("/"):
return False
if re.match(r"^[A-Za-z]:", normalized): # Windows drive-absolute (C:/...)
return False
parts = PurePosixPath(normalized).parts
return ".." not in parts