Relax the auth-sidecar proxy address policy so a remote central sidecar
reachable over TLS can be used, while keeping existing same-host plaintext
behavior unchanged.
- ValidateProxyAddr: allow https:// to any host (cross-machine); http://
and bare host:port stay same-host only; userinfo/path/query/fragment
remain rejected.
- Add ProxyScheme and route the interceptor URL rewrite through the
configured scheme (https for remote, http for same-host). ProxyScheme
parses the address so a mixed-case HTTPS:// cannot silently downgrade to
plaintext HTTP.
- Update LARKSUITE_CLI_AUTH_PROXY doc and server-demo README for the new
policy; refresh the package comment.
- Tests: case-insensitive scheme, IPv6 https, https userinfo rejection,
query/fragment rejection, ProxyHost https forms, and end-to-end
interceptor scheme selection.
* feat(sidecar): support multi-client identity isolation in server-demo
When multiple CLI sandbox environments share a single sidecar instance,
user tokens (UAT) were not isolated -- the last user to log in would
overwrite previous users' tokens, causing identity cross-contamination.
This change introduces per-client HMAC key isolation:
- Each client gets a unique client-*.key file for data-plane HMAC signing,
allowing the sidecar to identify request origin.
- A new auth_bridge.go handles management endpoints (login/poll/status)
with explicit client-to-feishuOpenId binding.
- User token resolution is strictly bound to the matched client -- no
fallback to other users' tokens when a client has no mapping.
- The shared proxy.key is reused across restarts instead of regenerated,
fixing a race condition when multiple sidecar instances start together.
Wire protocol (sidecar package) is unchanged; existing single-client
deployments are fully backward compatible.
Signed-off-by: Gao Yang <grany@yeah.net> (topwin.tech)
* fix(sidecar): address review feedback on filesystem and safety
- Replace os.ReadFile/WriteFile/ReadDir with vfs.* equivalents for test
mockability, consistent with project coding guidelines.
- Limit auth bridge request body to 64KB to prevent memory exhaustion.
- Log errors in saveUserMap instead of silently discarding them.
- Reject client keys that collide with the shared proxy key.
- Reject duplicate client keys instead of silently overwriting.
Signed-off-by: Gao Yang <grany@yeah.net> (topwin.tech)
* refactor(sidecar): remove workspace-specific naming and backward compat
- parseClientID: only accept "client_id" field, remove legacy fallback
- loadClientKeys: scan all *.key (excluding proxy.key), no prefix required
- Remove legacy file migration logic in newAuthBridge
- Update flag description to reflect generic key scanning
Signed-off-by: Gao Yang <grany@yeah.net> (topwin.tech)
* refactor(sidecar): extract multi-tenant demo and add unit tests
Address review feedback from sang-neo03:
1. Extract multi-client code into sidecar/server-multi-tenant-demo/,
keeping server-demo as the minimal single-tenant reference.
2. Add unit tests for the isolation guarantee:
- loadClientKeys: shared-key collision and duplicate keyHex are skipped
- verifyWithClientKeys: correct client matched, unknown key rejected
- loadUserMap/saveUserMap: round-trip persistence across restart
3. Cross-link READMEs between server-demo and server-multi-tenant-demo.
Signed-off-by: Gao Yang <grany@yeah.net> (topwin.tech)
* docs(sidecar): rewrite multi-tenant demo README with problem statement and client guide
- Explain the multi-app credential isolation problem (app_secret must
not be exposed to client environments)
- Document typical deployment topology with multiple sidecar instances
- Add complete client setup guide: env vars, multi-app switching, login
flow, and end-to-end workflow example
- Document design decisions and management endpoint details
Signed-off-by: Gao Yang <grany@yeah.net> (topwin.tech)
* fix(sidecar): address CodeRabbit review feedback on tests and docs
- Make TestProxyHandler_AcceptsAllowedAuthHeaders fully offline by using
httptest.NewTLSServer instead of depending on open.feishu.cn
- Isolate TestRun_RejectsSelfProxy config state with t.Setenv and temp dirs
- Check os.MkdirAll error in test fixture setup
- Add language identifiers to fenced code blocks (MD040)
- Validate user-supplied CLI paths with validate.SafeInputPath
Signed-off-by: Gao Yang <grany@yeah.net> (topwin.tech)
---------
Signed-off-by: Gao Yang <grany@yeah.net> (topwin.tech)
* feat(sidecar): add sidecar proxy for sandbox credential isolation
Keep real secrets (app_secret, access_token) out of sandbox environments.
CLI instances inside sandboxes connect to a trusted sidecar process via
HTTP; the sidecar verifies HMAC-signed requests and injects real tokens
before forwarding to the Lark API.
Key components:
- `auth proxy` subcommand to start the sidecar server (build tag: authsidecar)
- Noop credential provider returns sentinel tokens in sidecar mode
- Transport interceptor rewrites requests to sidecar with HMAC signature
- Env provider yields to sidecar provider when AUTH_PROXY is set
- Supports both feishu and lark brand endpoints
* feat(sidecar): implement priority ordering for credential providers
* feat(sidecar): strip client-supplied auth headers and improve shutdown logging
* feat(sidecar): buffer request body to prevent HMAC mismatches on read errors
* feat(sidecar): fix CI
* refactor(sidecar): publish protocol package and move server to reference demo
The sidecar server is no longer shipped as a `lark-cli auth proxy`
subcommand. Instead, the CLI provides only the standard sidecar *client*
(via `-tags authsidecar`), while the wire-protocol utilities are exposed
as a public package for integrators to implement their own server.
Changes:
- Move `internal/sidecar/` → `sidecar/` so external integrators can
import HMAC signing, headers, sentinels and address validators.
- Remove `cmd/auth/proxy.go`, `proxy_stub.go`, `proxy_test.go` and the
conditional registration in `cmd/auth/auth.go`.
- Add `sidecar/server-demo/` — a reference server implementation behind
the `authsidecar_demo` build tag. It reuses the lark-cli credential
pipeline for local development; production integrators are expected
to replace the credential layer with their own secrets source.
- Update all internal imports from `internal/sidecar` to `sidecar`.
Rationale:
- Each integrator has different secrets management / HA / multi-tenant
requirements, so a one-size-fits-all server doesn't belong in the
shipped CLI.
- Keeping the client in-tree guarantees all sandbox-side code stays
protocol-compatible without a second repo to sync.
- The public `sidecar/` package pins the wire protocol as a stable
contract third-party servers must conform to.
Build matrix after this change:
- `go build` → standard CLI, no sidecar code
- `go build -tags authsidecar` → CLI + sidecar client
- `go build -tags authsidecar_demo \
./sidecar/server-demo/` → reference server binary
No production users are affected today because the server was not yet
released; existing sidecar-client users are unchanged.
* feat(sidecar): close 5 pre-release security gaps
- Server: enforce https-only target (no path/query/userinfo), pin
forwardURL to https:// — blocks cleartext token leak
- Protocol v1: canonical now covers version/identity/auth-header,
blocks identity-flip replay within drift window
- Client: ValidateProxyAddr requires loopback or same-host alias,
rejects userinfo and https (interceptor is http-only); cross-machine
is out of scope
- Build: non-authsidecar builds exit(2) when AUTH_PROXY is set,
preventing silent fallback to env credentials
- Demo: whitelist auth-header to Authorization / X-Lark-MCP-{UAT,TAT},
blocks token injection into Cookie / UA / X-Forwarded-For exfil paths
