Commit Graph

3 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
hGrany
ffcf7781b4 feat(sidecar): support multi-client identity isolation in server-demo (#934)
* feat(sidecar): support multi-client identity isolation in server-demo

When multiple CLI sandbox environments share a single sidecar instance,
user tokens (UAT) were not isolated -- the last user to log in would
overwrite previous users' tokens, causing identity cross-contamination.

This change introduces per-client HMAC key isolation:
- Each client gets a unique client-*.key file for data-plane HMAC signing,
  allowing the sidecar to identify request origin.
- A new auth_bridge.go handles management endpoints (login/poll/status)
  with explicit client-to-feishuOpenId binding.
- User token resolution is strictly bound to the matched client -- no
  fallback to other users' tokens when a client has no mapping.
- The shared proxy.key is reused across restarts instead of regenerated,
  fixing a race condition when multiple sidecar instances start together.

Wire protocol (sidecar package) is unchanged; existing single-client
deployments are fully backward compatible.

Signed-off-by: Gao Yang <grany@yeah.net> (topwin.tech)

* fix(sidecar): address review feedback on filesystem and safety

- Replace os.ReadFile/WriteFile/ReadDir with vfs.* equivalents for test
  mockability, consistent with project coding guidelines.
- Limit auth bridge request body to 64KB to prevent memory exhaustion.
- Log errors in saveUserMap instead of silently discarding them.
- Reject client keys that collide with the shared proxy key.
- Reject duplicate client keys instead of silently overwriting.

Signed-off-by: Gao Yang <grany@yeah.net> (topwin.tech)

* refactor(sidecar): remove workspace-specific naming and backward compat

- parseClientID: only accept "client_id" field, remove legacy fallback
- loadClientKeys: scan all *.key (excluding proxy.key), no prefix required
- Remove legacy file migration logic in newAuthBridge
- Update flag description to reflect generic key scanning

Signed-off-by: Gao Yang <grany@yeah.net> (topwin.tech)

* refactor(sidecar): extract multi-tenant demo and add unit tests

Address review feedback from sang-neo03:

1. Extract multi-client code into sidecar/server-multi-tenant-demo/,
   keeping server-demo as the minimal single-tenant reference.

2. Add unit tests for the isolation guarantee:
   - loadClientKeys: shared-key collision and duplicate keyHex are skipped
   - verifyWithClientKeys: correct client matched, unknown key rejected
   - loadUserMap/saveUserMap: round-trip persistence across restart

3. Cross-link READMEs between server-demo and server-multi-tenant-demo.

Signed-off-by: Gao Yang <grany@yeah.net> (topwin.tech)

* docs(sidecar): rewrite multi-tenant demo README with problem statement and client guide

- Explain the multi-app credential isolation problem (app_secret must
  not be exposed to client environments)
- Document typical deployment topology with multiple sidecar instances
- Add complete client setup guide: env vars, multi-app switching, login
  flow, and end-to-end workflow example
- Document design decisions and management endpoint details

Signed-off-by: Gao Yang <grany@yeah.net> (topwin.tech)

* fix(sidecar): address CodeRabbit review feedback on tests and docs

- Make TestProxyHandler_AcceptsAllowedAuthHeaders fully offline by using
  httptest.NewTLSServer instead of depending on open.feishu.cn
- Isolate TestRun_RejectsSelfProxy config state with t.Setenv and temp dirs
- Check os.MkdirAll error in test fixture setup
- Add language identifiers to fenced code blocks (MD040)
- Validate user-supplied CLI paths with validate.SafeInputPath

Signed-off-by: Gao Yang <grany@yeah.net> (topwin.tech)

---------

Signed-off-by: Gao Yang <grany@yeah.net> (topwin.tech)
2026-05-22 15:25:00 +08:00
tuxedomm
fbed6beac3 refactor: split Execute into Build + Execute with explicit IO and keychain injection (#371)
* refactor(cmd): split Execute into Build with IO/Keychain injection

Introduce a public cmd.Build entry point so external consumers (cli-server,
MCP server, other embedders) can assemble the full CLI command tree without
going through os.Args or the platform keychain. Build takes an
InvocationContext plus functional BuildOptions:

  * WithIO(in, out, errOut) — inject custom streams; terminal detection
    is derived from the input's underlying *os.File when present.
  * WithKeychain(kc)        — swap the credential store.
  * HideProfile(bool)       — registered later in cmd.HideProfile.

The existing Execute() keeps using the internal buildInternal (which
still returns the Factory so error handling can attribute exit codes),
and SetDefaultFS replaces the global VFS implementation at startup.

Hardening applied up front:

  * cmdutil.NewIOStreams(in, out, errOut) centralizes terminal detection
    so SystemIO() and WithIO share one path.
  * cmdutil.NewDefault normalizes partial IOStreams — callers may pass
    &IOStreams{Out: buf} without tripping nil-writer panics in the
    RoundTripper warnings, Cobra, or the credential provider.
  * Build guards against nil functional options.
  * An API contract test (cmd/build_api_test.go) exercises Build +
    WithIO + WithKeychain + HideProfile + SetDefaultFS so the public
    surface is reachable by deadcode analysis.

Change-Id: I7c895e6019817401accbde2db3ef800da40ad319

* feat(schema): filter methods by strict mode in schema output

When strict mode is active, schema output now excludes methods that
are incompatible with the forced identity. This applies to both
pretty and JSON output formats at the resource and method levels.

Change-Id: I39647d5578466c3e23dc545bfb917ae075203ad7

* refactor: centralize strict-mode as flag registration

Change-Id: Iec11151c5002c2f58a8aa067d08747db2e4d2d8c

* fix(cmd): align strict-mode completion and build context; drop dead register shims

Thread a context.Context through RegisterShortcuts, RegisterServiceCommands,
and service.registerService/Resource/Method by introducing explicit
*WithContext variants. Pass that context into NewCmdServiceMethodWithContext
so shortcut and service command construction can honor cancellation and
strict-mode pruning consistently.

Also drop the context-less registerMethod and registerResource shims —
they became unreachable once the WithContext variants took over, and
were the source of new deadcode warnings. registerService is retained
because service_test.go still calls it directly.

Change-Id: I3fe5673aed663c7383bbbc5b0ae94d1f3491f22d

* refactor(cmd): hide --profile in single-app mode via build option

- GlobalOptions gains HideProfile; RegisterGlobalFlags stays pure and reads
  the policy off the struct. No boolean-trap parameter, one call per site.
- buildConfig holds GlobalOptions inline so HideProfile(bool) BuildOption
  mutates it directly. buildInternal stays a pure assembly function and
  requires callers to supply WithIO — no implicit os.Std* fallback.
- Add WithIO BuildOption (wrapping raw io.Reader/Writer with automatic
  *os.File TTY detection); Execute injects streams explicitly and decides
  profile visibility via HideProfile(isSingleAppMode()).
- installTipsHelpFunc force-shows hidden root flags while rendering the
  root command's own help, so single-app users still discover --profile
  via lark-cli --help without it polluting subcommand helps.

Change-Id: I7755387e993992ca969e0a4a6f54441cc1993eef

* feat(transport): extension abort hook and shared base transport

Two transport-layer changes bundled because both reshape the base
round-tripper contract used by the HTTP client, the Lark SDK client,
and the in-process updater.

1. Extension abort hook (PreRoundTripE).

   Extensions implementing exttransport.AbortableInterceptor can now
   return an error from PreRoundTripE to skip the built-in chain. The
   post hook still fires with (nil, reason) so extensions can unwind
   resources. extensionMiddleware captures the provider name so the
   returned *AbortError carries attribution.

2. Shared base transport to stop RPC leak.

   util.NewBaseTransport cloned http.DefaultTransport on every call, so
   each cmdutil.Factory produced a fresh *http.Transport whose
   persistConn readLoop/writeLoop goroutines lingered until
   IdleConnTimeout (~90s). Invisible in a single-process CLI, but the
   fork is consumed by cli-server where each RPC request constructs a
   new Factory, causing linear memory + goroutine growth under load.

   Replace NewBaseTransport with SharedTransport — returns
   http.DefaultTransport (the stdlib-wide singleton) by default, and
   a cached proxy-disabled clone only when LARK_CLI_NO_PROXY is set.
   Return type is http.RoundTripper to discourage in-place mutation of
   the shared instance. FallbackTransport is kept as a thin
   *http.Transport wrapper so existing callers in internal/auth and
   internal/cmdutil transport decorators (which were already on the
   singleton path) do not have to migrate.

   Leak-site migrations: factory_default.go (HTTP + SDK base) and
   update.go now call SharedTransport directly.

Change-Id: Ia82462134c5c5ee838be878b887860f41446a235

* fix: unblock Build() zero-opts path and sidecar demo build

Two regressions surfaced on refactor/build-execute-split:

1. cmd.Build(ctx, inv) without WithIO panicked at rootCmd.SetIn/Out/Err
   because cfg.streams stayed nil — NewDefault normalized internally
   but cmd/build.go never saw the normalized value. Default cfg.streams
   to cmdutil.SystemIO() before the root command wires them, and add a
   TestBuild_NoOptions regression guard.

2. sidecar/server-demo/main.go still called cmdutil.NewDefault(inv),
   so `go build -tags authsidecar_demo ./sidecar/server-demo` failed
   with "not enough arguments". Pass nil for the new streams parameter
   to preserve the prior behavior (NewDefault substitutes SystemIO).

Change-Id: I20227b2355cde7d19e22eba3eb841c6d8611e8a7
2026-04-21 14:48:40 +08:00
sang-neo03
5943a20e2b Feat/auth sidecar proxy (#532)
* feat(sidecar): add sidecar proxy for sandbox credential isolation

Keep real secrets (app_secret, access_token) out of sandbox environments.
CLI instances inside sandboxes connect to a trusted sidecar process via
HTTP; the sidecar verifies HMAC-signed requests and injects real tokens
before forwarding to the Lark API.

Key components:

- `auth proxy` subcommand to start the sidecar server (build tag: authsidecar)
- Noop credential provider returns sentinel tokens in sidecar mode
- Transport interceptor rewrites requests to sidecar with HMAC signature
- Env provider yields to sidecar provider when AUTH_PROXY is set
- Supports both feishu and lark brand endpoints

* feat(sidecar): implement priority ordering for credential providers

* feat(sidecar): strip client-supplied auth headers and improve shutdown logging

* feat(sidecar): buffer request body to prevent HMAC mismatches on read errors

* feat(sidecar): fix CI

* refactor(sidecar): publish protocol package and move server to reference demo

  The sidecar server is no longer shipped as a `lark-cli auth proxy`
  subcommand. Instead, the CLI provides only the standard sidecar *client*
  (via `-tags authsidecar`), while the wire-protocol utilities are exposed
  as a public package for integrators to implement their own server.

  Changes:
  - Move `internal/sidecar/` → `sidecar/` so external integrators can
    import HMAC signing, headers, sentinels and address validators.
  - Remove `cmd/auth/proxy.go`, `proxy_stub.go`, `proxy_test.go` and the
    conditional registration in `cmd/auth/auth.go`.
  - Add `sidecar/server-demo/` — a reference server implementation behind
    the `authsidecar_demo` build tag. It reuses the lark-cli credential
    pipeline for local development; production integrators are expected
    to replace the credential layer with their own secrets source.
  - Update all internal imports from `internal/sidecar` to `sidecar`.

  Rationale:
  - Each integrator has different secrets management / HA / multi-tenant
    requirements, so a one-size-fits-all server doesn't belong in the
    shipped CLI.
  - Keeping the client in-tree guarantees all sandbox-side code stays
    protocol-compatible without a second repo to sync.
  - The public `sidecar/` package pins the wire protocol as a stable
    contract third-party servers must conform to.

  Build matrix after this change:
  - `go build`                         → standard CLI, no sidecar code
  - `go build -tags authsidecar`       → CLI + sidecar client
  - `go build -tags authsidecar_demo \
      ./sidecar/server-demo/`          → reference server binary

  No production users are affected today because the server was not yet
  released; existing sidecar-client users are unchanged.

* feat(sidecar): close 5 pre-release security gaps
  - Server: enforce https-only target (no path/query/userinfo), pin
    forwardURL to https:// — blocks cleartext token leak
  - Protocol v1: canonical now covers version/identity/auth-header,
    blocks identity-flip replay within drift window
  - Client: ValidateProxyAddr requires loopback or same-host alias,
    rejects userinfo and https (interceptor is http-only); cross-machine
    is out of scope
  - Build: non-authsidecar builds exit(2) when AUTH_PROXY is set,
    preventing silent fallback to env credentials
  - Demo: whitelist auth-header to Authorization / X-Lark-MCP-{UAT,TAT},
    blocks token injection into Cookie / UA / X-Forwarded-For exfil paths
2026-04-20 20:24:51 +08:00