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* feat(apps): replace +html-publish cwd hard-reject with credential-file scan The previous --path == "." block was a coarse heuristic: it caught the common foot-gun of publishing a repo root, but also rejected legitimate clean cwds, and let a ./dist with a forgotten .env ship the secret through anyway (the sensitive-paths scanner was advisory and never ran on the Execute path). Move the gate from path shape to path content: - Validate now walks --path candidates and rejects publishes that include well-known credential files (.env / .env.* / .npmrc / .netrc / .git-credentials / .aws/credentials / .gcloud/credentials* / .docker/config.json / .kube/config). Living in Validate (not DryRun) means dry-run returns non-zero on hit too, so the dry-run preview matches Execute. - Narrow the credential pattern set. .git/, SSH private keys, *.pem and *.key are out of scope -- they're not env-token files and the false-positive rate (public certs, docs about key formats) is high. - Add --allow-sensitive as the escape hatch for legitimate cases (e.g. a docs site shipping .env.example on purpose). DryRun surfaces the waived list in sensitive_waived so the caller can relay it. - Drop the cwd defense-in-depth in runHTMLPublish. A clean cwd is now a valid publish target. The lark-apps skill and the html-publish reference are updated to describe the new gate, the override flag, and the patterns now explicitly out of scope. * feat(apps): drop .gcloud/* from credential-file scan The .gcloud/credentials pattern matched a non-existent path: gcloud's actual config dir is ~/.config/gcloud/ (XDG-based), and the real credential files there are credentials.db / access_tokens.db / application_default_credentials.json -- none of which would land under a .gcloud/ segment in a publish payload. Drop the rule rather than fix it: the realistic gcloud foot-gun would require recognizing the .config/gcloud/* tree by file basename, which is a broader change than the targeted env/cred scan in this PR. The remaining 7 patterns (.env / .env.* / .npmrc / .netrc / .git-credentials / .aws/credentials / .docker/config.json / .kube/config) cover the common Node/Python/CLI-tooling foot-guns. * fix(apps): close credential-scan bypass when --path is the parent dir itself isSensitiveRelPath anchors cloud-SDK matchers on adjacent parent/file segments (.aws/credentials, .docker/config.json, .kube/config), but walker strips that parent via filepath.Rel when --path is the conventional parent dir (e.g. ./.aws), yielding a bare RelPath="credentials" that slipped through silently. Same bypass for the single-file form --path ./.aws/credentials (walker sets RelPath = Base(rootPath)). Wrap the scan in isSensitiveCandidate: keep the fast RelPath scan, and on miss fall back to filepath.Abs(AbsPath) so the parent segment is visible again. isSensitiveRelPath itself is unchanged; existing tests still pin its pure-function contract. * fix(apps): drop filepath.Abs from sensitive scan to satisfy forbidigo lint The previous fix called filepath.Abs(c.AbsPath) — banned by the repo's forbidigo rule because shortcuts must not reach into the filesystem for path resolution. Reframe the same fix without fs access: re-prepend the root's basename (or, for the single-file form, the parent dir's basename of rootPath) to RelPath and re-scan only the parent-anchored credential pairs (.aws/credentials, .docker/config.json, .kube/config). Leaf matchers (.env / .npmrc / ...) stay scoped to RelPath — incidentally closing a latent false-positive where --path /home/alice/.env/dist would have flagged every file under it just because .env appeared in the absolute path.