Files
larksuite-cli/sidecar/hmac.go
sang-neo03 5943a20e2b Feat/auth sidecar proxy (#532)
* feat(sidecar): add sidecar proxy for sandbox credential isolation

Keep real secrets (app_secret, access_token) out of sandbox environments.
CLI instances inside sandboxes connect to a trusted sidecar process via
HTTP; the sidecar verifies HMAC-signed requests and injects real tokens
before forwarding to the Lark API.

Key components:

- `auth proxy` subcommand to start the sidecar server (build tag: authsidecar)
- Noop credential provider returns sentinel tokens in sidecar mode
- Transport interceptor rewrites requests to sidecar with HMAC signature
- Env provider yields to sidecar provider when AUTH_PROXY is set
- Supports both feishu and lark brand endpoints

* feat(sidecar): implement priority ordering for credential providers

* feat(sidecar): strip client-supplied auth headers and improve shutdown logging

* feat(sidecar): buffer request body to prevent HMAC mismatches on read errors

* feat(sidecar): fix CI

* refactor(sidecar): publish protocol package and move server to reference demo

  The sidecar server is no longer shipped as a `lark-cli auth proxy`
  subcommand. Instead, the CLI provides only the standard sidecar *client*
  (via `-tags authsidecar`), while the wire-protocol utilities are exposed
  as a public package for integrators to implement their own server.

  Changes:
  - Move `internal/sidecar/` → `sidecar/` so external integrators can
    import HMAC signing, headers, sentinels and address validators.
  - Remove `cmd/auth/proxy.go`, `proxy_stub.go`, `proxy_test.go` and the
    conditional registration in `cmd/auth/auth.go`.
  - Add `sidecar/server-demo/` — a reference server implementation behind
    the `authsidecar_demo` build tag. It reuses the lark-cli credential
    pipeline for local development; production integrators are expected
    to replace the credential layer with their own secrets source.
  - Update all internal imports from `internal/sidecar` to `sidecar`.

  Rationale:
  - Each integrator has different secrets management / HA / multi-tenant
    requirements, so a one-size-fits-all server doesn't belong in the
    shipped CLI.
  - Keeping the client in-tree guarantees all sandbox-side code stays
    protocol-compatible without a second repo to sync.
  - The public `sidecar/` package pins the wire protocol as a stable
    contract third-party servers must conform to.

  Build matrix after this change:
  - `go build`                         → standard CLI, no sidecar code
  - `go build -tags authsidecar`       → CLI + sidecar client
  - `go build -tags authsidecar_demo \
      ./sidecar/server-demo/`          → reference server binary

  No production users are affected today because the server was not yet
  released; existing sidecar-client users are unchanged.

* feat(sidecar): close 5 pre-release security gaps
  - Server: enforce https-only target (no path/query/userinfo), pin
    forwardURL to https:// — blocks cleartext token leak
  - Protocol v1: canonical now covers version/identity/auth-header,
    blocks identity-flip replay within drift window
  - Client: ValidateProxyAddr requires loopback or same-host alias,
    rejects userinfo and https (interceptor is http-only); cross-machine
    is out of scope
  - Build: non-authsidecar builds exit(2) when AUTH_PROXY is set,
    preventing silent fallback to env credentials
  - Demo: whitelist auth-header to Authorization / X-Lark-MCP-{UAT,TAT},
    blocks token injection into Cookie / UA / X-Forwarded-For exfil paths
2026-04-20 20:24:51 +08:00

89 lines
2.9 KiB
Go

// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
package sidecar
import (
"crypto/hmac"
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/hex"
"fmt"
"math"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
)
// BodySHA256 returns the hex-encoded SHA-256 digest of body.
// An empty or nil body produces the SHA-256 of the empty string.
func BodySHA256(body []byte) string {
h := sha256.Sum256(body)
return hex.EncodeToString(h[:])
}
// CanonicalRequest is the set of fields covered by the HMAC signature.
// Clients and servers must populate every field identically for verification
// to succeed; any field that is forwarded but *not* covered by this struct can
// be tampered with inside the MaxTimestampDrift replay window without
// invalidating the signature.
//
// Version must be set to a known protocol constant (ProtocolV1). It is the
// first field in the canonical string so that a future v2 with different
// structure cannot be confused for v1 output under the same key.
type CanonicalRequest struct {
Version string // e.g. ProtocolV1
Method string // e.g. "GET", "POST"
Host string // e.g. "open.feishu.cn"
PathAndQuery string // e.g. "/open-apis/calendar/v4/events?page_size=50"
BodySHA256 string // hex-encoded SHA-256 of the request body
Timestamp string // Unix epoch seconds string
Identity string // IdentityUser or IdentityBot
AuthHeader string // header the server should inject the real token into
}
// canonicalString joins the fields with newlines. Field order is part of the
// protocol contract — do not reorder without bumping Version.
func (c CanonicalRequest) canonicalString() string {
return strings.Join([]string{
c.Version,
c.Method,
c.Host,
c.PathAndQuery,
c.BodySHA256,
c.Timestamp,
c.Identity,
c.AuthHeader,
}, "\n")
}
// Sign computes the HMAC-SHA256 signature over the canonical request string.
func Sign(key []byte, req CanonicalRequest) string {
mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, key)
mac.Write([]byte(req.canonicalString()))
return hex.EncodeToString(mac.Sum(nil))
}
// Verify checks that signature matches the HMAC-SHA256 of the canonical
// request and that the timestamp is within MaxTimestampDrift seconds of now.
// Returns nil on success.
func Verify(key []byte, req CanonicalRequest, signature string) error {
ts, err := strconv.ParseInt(req.Timestamp, 10, 64)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid timestamp %q: %w", req.Timestamp, err)
}
drift := math.Abs(float64(time.Now().Unix() - ts))
if drift > MaxTimestampDrift {
return fmt.Errorf("timestamp drift %.0fs exceeds limit %ds", drift, MaxTimestampDrift)
}
expected := Sign(key, req)
if !hmac.Equal([]byte(expected), []byte(signature)) {
return fmt.Errorf("HMAC signature mismatch")
}
return nil
}
// Timestamp returns the current Unix epoch seconds as a string.
func Timestamp() string {
return strconv.FormatInt(time.Now().Unix(), 10)
}