Files
larksuite-cli/extension/transport/sidecar/interceptor.go
shanglei 07da0c8090 feat(sidecar): support remote HTTPS sidecar addresses
Relax the auth-sidecar proxy address policy so a remote central sidecar
reachable over TLS can be used, while keeping existing same-host plaintext
behavior unchanged.

- ValidateProxyAddr: allow https:// to any host (cross-machine); http://
  and bare host:port stay same-host only; userinfo/path/query/fragment
  remain rejected.
- Add ProxyScheme and route the interceptor URL rewrite through the
  configured scheme (https for remote, http for same-host). ProxyScheme
  parses the address so a mixed-case HTTPS:// cannot silently downgrade to
  plaintext HTTP.
- Update LARKSUITE_CLI_AUTH_PROXY doc and server-demo README for the new
  policy; refresh the package comment.
- Tests: case-insensitive scheme, IPv6 https, https userinfo rejection,
  query/fragment rejection, ProxyHost https forms, and end-to-end
  interceptor scheme selection.
2026-06-02 20:13:47 +08:00

187 lines
6.5 KiB
Go

// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
//go:build authsidecar
// Package sidecar provides a transport interceptor for the auth sidecar
// proxy mode. When LARKSUITE_CLI_AUTH_PROXY is set (an http:// or https://
// URL), all outgoing requests are rewritten to the sidecar address. The
// interceptor strips placeholder credentials, injects proxy headers, and
// signs each request with HMAC-SHA256. No custom DialContext is needed —
// Go's standard http.Transport connects to the sidecar via HTTP, or via
// HTTPS (TLS) when the sidecar address is an https:// URL.
package sidecar
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"os"
"strings"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/extension/transport"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/envvars"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/sidecar"
)
// Provider implements transport.Provider for the sidecar mode.
type Provider struct{}
func (p *Provider) Name() string { return "sidecar" }
// ResolveInterceptor returns a SidecarInterceptor when sidecar mode is active.
// Returns nil when sidecar mode is disabled or the proxy address is invalid;
// in the latter case a warning is emitted to stderr and requests fall back to
// the non-sidecar transport path (where the credential layer will typically
// block them for lack of a valid account).
func (p *Provider) ResolveInterceptor(ctx context.Context) transport.Interceptor {
proxyAddr := os.Getenv(envvars.CliAuthProxy)
if proxyAddr == "" {
return nil
}
if err := sidecar.ValidateProxyAddr(proxyAddr); err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "WARNING: invalid %s, sidecar interceptor disabled: %v\n", envvars.CliAuthProxy, err)
return nil
}
key := os.Getenv(envvars.CliProxyKey)
return &Interceptor{
key: []byte(key),
sidecarHost: sidecar.ProxyHost(proxyAddr),
sidecarScheme: sidecar.ProxyScheme(proxyAddr),
}
}
// Interceptor rewrites requests for the sidecar proxy.
type Interceptor struct {
key []byte // HMAC signing key
sidecarHost string // sidecar host[:port] for URL rewriting
sidecarScheme string // "http" (same-host) or "https" (remote TLS sidecar)
}
// PreRoundTrip rewrites the request for sidecar routing when it carries a
// sentinel token. Requests without a sentinel token (e.g. pre-signed download
// URLs) are passed through unmodified.
//
// Supports two auth patterns:
// - Standard OpenAPI: Authorization: Bearer <sentinel>
// - MCP protocol: X-Lark-MCP-UAT/TAT: <sentinel>
func (i *Interceptor) PreRoundTrip(req *http.Request) func(resp *http.Response, err error) {
identity, authHeader := detectSentinel(req)
if identity == "" {
return nil // not a sidecar-managed request, pass through
}
// 1. Buffer the body first, before mutating any request state. A partial
// read would sign a truncated body and cause a misleading HMAC mismatch
// on the sidecar side; bail out early and let the request fall through
// unmodified so the credential layer can surface an actionable error.
var bodyBytes []byte
if req.Body != nil {
var err error
bodyBytes, err = io.ReadAll(req.Body)
_ = req.Body.Close() // release original body (fd/pipe/etc.) after buffering
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "WARNING: sidecar interceptor failed to read request body: %v\n", err)
return nil
}
req.Body = io.NopCloser(bytes.NewReader(bodyBytes))
if req.GetBody != nil {
req.GetBody = func() (io.ReadCloser, error) {
return io.NopCloser(bytes.NewReader(bodyBytes)), nil
}
}
}
// 2. Save original target (scheme://host)
originalScheme := "https"
if req.URL.Scheme != "" {
originalScheme = req.URL.Scheme
}
originalHost := req.URL.Host
req.Header.Set(sidecar.HeaderProxyTarget, originalScheme+"://"+originalHost)
// 3. Set identity and tell sidecar which header to inject real token into
req.Header.Set(sidecar.HeaderProxyIdentity, identity)
req.Header.Set(sidecar.HeaderProxyAuthHeader, authHeader)
// 4. Strip placeholder auth header(s)
req.Header.Del("Authorization")
req.Header.Del(sidecar.HeaderMCPUAT)
req.Header.Del(sidecar.HeaderMCPTAT)
bodySHA := sidecar.BodySHA256(bodyBytes)
req.Header.Set(sidecar.HeaderBodySHA256, bodySHA)
pathAndQuery := req.URL.RequestURI()
ts := sidecar.Timestamp()
// Cover identity and authHeader in the signature so an on-path attacker
// within the replay window cannot flip the injected token's identity or
// redirect the token into a different header.
sig := sidecar.Sign(i.key, sidecar.CanonicalRequest{
Version: sidecar.ProtocolV1,
Method: req.Method,
Host: originalHost,
PathAndQuery: pathAndQuery,
BodySHA256: bodySHA,
Timestamp: ts,
Identity: identity,
AuthHeader: authHeader,
})
req.Header.Set(sidecar.HeaderProxyVersion, sidecar.ProtocolV1)
req.Header.Set(sidecar.HeaderProxyTimestamp, ts)
req.Header.Set(sidecar.HeaderProxySignature, sig)
// 5. Rewrite URL to route through sidecar. Scheme follows the configured
// proxy address: https for a remote (TLS) sidecar, http for a same-host one.
scheme := i.sidecarScheme
if scheme == "" {
scheme = "http"
}
req.URL.Scheme = scheme
req.URL.Host = i.sidecarHost
return nil // no post-hook needed
}
// detectSentinel checks both standard Authorization and MCP auth headers for
// sentinel tokens. Returns the identity ("user"/"bot") and the header name
// that carried the sentinel.
//
// Returns ("", "") when the request carries no sentinel token — typically
// requests that require no auth (e.g. pre-signed download URLs where the
// token is embedded in the URL query parameters).
func detectSentinel(req *http.Request) (identity, authHeader string) {
// Check standard Authorization: Bearer <sentinel>
if auth := req.Header.Get("Authorization"); auth != "" {
token := strings.TrimPrefix(auth, "Bearer ")
switch token {
case sidecar.SentinelUAT:
return sidecar.IdentityUser, "Authorization"
case sidecar.SentinelTAT:
return sidecar.IdentityBot, "Authorization"
}
}
// Check MCP headers: X-Lark-MCP-UAT/TAT: <sentinel>
if v := req.Header.Get(sidecar.HeaderMCPUAT); v == sidecar.SentinelUAT {
return sidecar.IdentityUser, sidecar.HeaderMCPUAT
}
if v := req.Header.Get(sidecar.HeaderMCPTAT); v == sidecar.SentinelTAT {
return sidecar.IdentityBot, sidecar.HeaderMCPTAT
}
return "", ""
}
func init() {
proxyAddr := os.Getenv(envvars.CliAuthProxy)
if proxyAddr == "" {
return
}
if err := sidecar.ValidateProxyAddr(proxyAddr); err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "WARNING: ignoring invalid %s: %v\n", envvars.CliAuthProxy, err)
return
}
transport.Register(&Provider{})
}