Files
larksuite-cli/shortcuts/apps/walk_html_publish_candidates.go
raistlin042 6cea6c9af0 feat(apps): add miaoda apps domain (6 shortcuts + dry-run e2e) (#1002)
Adds the apps domain to lark-cli for managing Miaoda (妙搭) applications: 6 shortcuts covering the full lifecycle (+create / +update / +list / +access-scope-set / +access-scope-get / +html-publish). Aligned with the OAPI v2 design — app_type enum (currently HTML), string scope enum (All / Tenant / Range), cursor pagination, in-memory tar.gz multipart publish flow. Namespace registered at /open-apis/spark/v1/ with spark:app.* scopes.

---------

Co-authored-by: wangjiangwen-gif <286006750+wangjiangwen-gif@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-05-21 20:30:42 +08:00

92 lines
2.8 KiB
Go

// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
package apps
import (
"fmt"
"io/fs"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/extension/fileio"
)
type htmlPublishCandidate struct {
RelPath string
AbsPath string
Size int64
}
// isUnsafeRelPath reports whether a forward-slash relative path contains
// anything that should never be written into a tar header or treated as
// inside-root: leading slash (absolute), .. as a path component (start /
// middle / end / whole), or an embedded null byte. Component-aware so it
// does not false-positive on legitimate filenames that contain ".." as a
// substring (e.g. "archive.tar..bak").
func isUnsafeRelPath(rel string) bool {
return strings.HasPrefix(rel, "/") ||
rel == ".." ||
strings.HasPrefix(rel, "../") ||
strings.Contains(rel, "/../") ||
strings.HasSuffix(rel, "/..") ||
strings.ContainsRune(rel, 0)
}
// walkHTMLPublishCandidates walks rootPath and returns each regular file as a
// candidate. Stat goes through fileio so SafeInputPath validation runs on the
// root; the directory walk itself uses filepath.WalkDir because runtime.FileIO
// has no WalkDir equivalent today.
func walkHTMLPublishCandidates(fio fileio.FileIO, rootPath string) ([]htmlPublishCandidate, error) {
stat, err := fio.Stat(rootPath)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("stat %s: %w", rootPath, err)
}
if !stat.IsDir() {
return []htmlPublishCandidate{{
RelPath: filepath.Base(rootPath),
AbsPath: rootPath,
Size: stat.Size(),
}}, nil
}
var out []htmlPublishCandidate
//nolint:forbidigo // fileio has no WalkDir; rootPath is already validated above via fio.Stat -> SafeInputPath.
err = filepath.WalkDir(rootPath, func(path string, d fs.DirEntry, walkErr error) error {
if walkErr != nil {
return walkErr
}
if d.IsDir() {
return nil
}
info, err := d.Info()
if err != nil {
return err
}
// 只接受 regular file —— symlink / device / pipe / socket 都跳过。
// symlink 不跟随是设计决策(避免 loop + out-of-root 引用),且 fio.Open 也会拒非 regular。
if !info.Mode().IsRegular() {
return nil
}
rel, err := filepath.Rel(rootPath, path)
if err != nil {
return err
}
relSlash := filepath.ToSlash(rel)
// Defense in depth: WalkDir + Rel inside rootPath should never yield a
// path with .. components, but a future logic change or unusual
// filesystem layout shouldn't be able to inject one into RelPath.
// Mirrors the same guard at tar entry write time.
if isUnsafeRelPath(relSlash) {
return fmt.Errorf("walker produced unsafe relative path %q for %s", relSlash, path)
}
out = append(out, htmlPublishCandidate{
RelPath: relSlash,
AbsPath: path,
Size: info.Size(),
})
return nil
})
return out, err
}