Files
larksuite-cli/sidecar/server-demo/forward.go
sang-neo03 5943a20e2b Feat/auth sidecar proxy (#532)
* feat(sidecar): add sidecar proxy for sandbox credential isolation

Keep real secrets (app_secret, access_token) out of sandbox environments.
CLI instances inside sandboxes connect to a trusted sidecar process via
HTTP; the sidecar verifies HMAC-signed requests and injects real tokens
before forwarding to the Lark API.

Key components:

- `auth proxy` subcommand to start the sidecar server (build tag: authsidecar)
- Noop credential provider returns sentinel tokens in sidecar mode
- Transport interceptor rewrites requests to sidecar with HMAC signature
- Env provider yields to sidecar provider when AUTH_PROXY is set
- Supports both feishu and lark brand endpoints

* feat(sidecar): implement priority ordering for credential providers

* feat(sidecar): strip client-supplied auth headers and improve shutdown logging

* feat(sidecar): buffer request body to prevent HMAC mismatches on read errors

* feat(sidecar): fix CI

* refactor(sidecar): publish protocol package and move server to reference demo

  The sidecar server is no longer shipped as a `lark-cli auth proxy`
  subcommand. Instead, the CLI provides only the standard sidecar *client*
  (via `-tags authsidecar`), while the wire-protocol utilities are exposed
  as a public package for integrators to implement their own server.

  Changes:
  - Move `internal/sidecar/` → `sidecar/` so external integrators can
    import HMAC signing, headers, sentinels and address validators.
  - Remove `cmd/auth/proxy.go`, `proxy_stub.go`, `proxy_test.go` and the
    conditional registration in `cmd/auth/auth.go`.
  - Add `sidecar/server-demo/` — a reference server implementation behind
    the `authsidecar_demo` build tag. It reuses the lark-cli credential
    pipeline for local development; production integrators are expected
    to replace the credential layer with their own secrets source.
  - Update all internal imports from `internal/sidecar` to `sidecar`.

  Rationale:
  - Each integrator has different secrets management / HA / multi-tenant
    requirements, so a one-size-fits-all server doesn't belong in the
    shipped CLI.
  - Keeping the client in-tree guarantees all sandbox-side code stays
    protocol-compatible without a second repo to sync.
  - The public `sidecar/` package pins the wire protocol as a stable
    contract third-party servers must conform to.

  Build matrix after this change:
  - `go build`                         → standard CLI, no sidecar code
  - `go build -tags authsidecar`       → CLI + sidecar client
  - `go build -tags authsidecar_demo \
      ./sidecar/server-demo/`          → reference server binary

  No production users are affected today because the server was not yet
  released; existing sidecar-client users are unchanged.

* feat(sidecar): close 5 pre-release security gaps
  - Server: enforce https-only target (no path/query/userinfo), pin
    forwardURL to https:// — blocks cleartext token leak
  - Protocol v1: canonical now covers version/identity/auth-header,
    blocks identity-flip replay within drift window
  - Client: ValidateProxyAddr requires loopback or same-host alias,
    rejects userinfo and https (interceptor is http-only); cross-machine
    is out of scope
  - Build: non-authsidecar builds exit(2) when AUTH_PROXY is set,
    preventing silent fallback to env credentials
  - Demo: whitelist auth-header to Authorization / X-Lark-MCP-{UAT,TAT},
    blocks token injection into Cookie / UA / X-Forwarded-For exfil paths
2026-04-20 20:24:51 +08:00

52 lines
1.5 KiB
Go

// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
//go:build authsidecar_demo
package main
import (
"fmt"
"net/http"
"time"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/sidecar"
)
// newForwardClient creates an HTTP client for forwarding requests to the
// Lark API. It strips Authorization on cross-host redirects and disables
// proxy to prevent real tokens from leaking through environment proxies.
func newForwardClient() *http.Client {
transport := http.DefaultTransport.(*http.Transport).Clone()
transport.Proxy = nil // never proxy the trusted hop
return &http.Client{
Transport: transport,
Timeout: 30 * time.Second,
CheckRedirect: func(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
if len(via) >= 10 {
return fmt.Errorf("too many redirects")
}
if len(via) > 0 && req.URL.Host != via[0].URL.Host {
req.Header.Del("Authorization")
req.Header.Del(sidecar.HeaderMCPUAT)
req.Header.Del(sidecar.HeaderMCPTAT)
}
return nil
},
}
}
// isProxyHeader returns true for headers specific to the sidecar protocol.
func isProxyHeader(key string) bool {
switch http.CanonicalHeaderKey(key) {
case http.CanonicalHeaderKey(sidecar.HeaderProxyTarget),
http.CanonicalHeaderKey(sidecar.HeaderProxyIdentity),
http.CanonicalHeaderKey(sidecar.HeaderProxySignature),
http.CanonicalHeaderKey(sidecar.HeaderProxyTimestamp),
http.CanonicalHeaderKey(sidecar.HeaderBodySHA256),
http.CanonicalHeaderKey(sidecar.HeaderProxyAuthHeader):
return true
}
return false
}