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* feat(sidecar): add sidecar proxy for sandbox credential isolation
Keep real secrets (app_secret, access_token) out of sandbox environments.
CLI instances inside sandboxes connect to a trusted sidecar process via
HTTP; the sidecar verifies HMAC-signed requests and injects real tokens
before forwarding to the Lark API.
Key components:
- `auth proxy` subcommand to start the sidecar server (build tag: authsidecar)
- Noop credential provider returns sentinel tokens in sidecar mode
- Transport interceptor rewrites requests to sidecar with HMAC signature
- Env provider yields to sidecar provider when AUTH_PROXY is set
- Supports both feishu and lark brand endpoints
* feat(sidecar): implement priority ordering for credential providers
* feat(sidecar): strip client-supplied auth headers and improve shutdown logging
* feat(sidecar): buffer request body to prevent HMAC mismatches on read errors
* feat(sidecar): fix CI
* refactor(sidecar): publish protocol package and move server to reference demo
The sidecar server is no longer shipped as a `lark-cli auth proxy`
subcommand. Instead, the CLI provides only the standard sidecar *client*
(via `-tags authsidecar`), while the wire-protocol utilities are exposed
as a public package for integrators to implement their own server.
Changes:
- Move `internal/sidecar/` → `sidecar/` so external integrators can
import HMAC signing, headers, sentinels and address validators.
- Remove `cmd/auth/proxy.go`, `proxy_stub.go`, `proxy_test.go` and the
conditional registration in `cmd/auth/auth.go`.
- Add `sidecar/server-demo/` — a reference server implementation behind
the `authsidecar_demo` build tag. It reuses the lark-cli credential
pipeline for local development; production integrators are expected
to replace the credential layer with their own secrets source.
- Update all internal imports from `internal/sidecar` to `sidecar`.
Rationale:
- Each integrator has different secrets management / HA / multi-tenant
requirements, so a one-size-fits-all server doesn't belong in the
shipped CLI.
- Keeping the client in-tree guarantees all sandbox-side code stays
protocol-compatible without a second repo to sync.
- The public `sidecar/` package pins the wire protocol as a stable
contract third-party servers must conform to.
Build matrix after this change:
- `go build` → standard CLI, no sidecar code
- `go build -tags authsidecar` → CLI + sidecar client
- `go build -tags authsidecar_demo \
./sidecar/server-demo/` → reference server binary
No production users are affected today because the server was not yet
released; existing sidecar-client users are unchanged.
* feat(sidecar): close 5 pre-release security gaps
- Server: enforce https-only target (no path/query/userinfo), pin
forwardURL to https:// — blocks cleartext token leak
- Protocol v1: canonical now covers version/identity/auth-header,
blocks identity-flip replay within drift window
- Client: ValidateProxyAddr requires loopback or same-host alias,
rejects userinfo and https (interceptor is http-only); cross-machine
is out of scope
- Build: non-authsidecar builds exit(2) when AUTH_PROXY is set,
preventing silent fallback to env credentials
- Demo: whitelist auth-header to Authorization / X-Lark-MCP-{UAT,TAT},
blocks token injection into Cookie / UA / X-Forwarded-For exfil paths
89 lines
2.9 KiB
Go
89 lines
2.9 KiB
Go
// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
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package sidecar
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import (
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"crypto/hmac"
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"crypto/sha256"
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"encoding/hex"
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"fmt"
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"math"
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"strconv"
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"strings"
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"time"
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)
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// BodySHA256 returns the hex-encoded SHA-256 digest of body.
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// An empty or nil body produces the SHA-256 of the empty string.
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func BodySHA256(body []byte) string {
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h := sha256.Sum256(body)
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return hex.EncodeToString(h[:])
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}
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// CanonicalRequest is the set of fields covered by the HMAC signature.
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// Clients and servers must populate every field identically for verification
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// to succeed; any field that is forwarded but *not* covered by this struct can
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// be tampered with inside the MaxTimestampDrift replay window without
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// invalidating the signature.
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//
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// Version must be set to a known protocol constant (ProtocolV1). It is the
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// first field in the canonical string so that a future v2 with different
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// structure cannot be confused for v1 output under the same key.
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type CanonicalRequest struct {
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Version string // e.g. ProtocolV1
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Method string // e.g. "GET", "POST"
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Host string // e.g. "open.feishu.cn"
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PathAndQuery string // e.g. "/open-apis/calendar/v4/events?page_size=50"
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BodySHA256 string // hex-encoded SHA-256 of the request body
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Timestamp string // Unix epoch seconds string
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Identity string // IdentityUser or IdentityBot
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AuthHeader string // header the server should inject the real token into
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}
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// canonicalString joins the fields with newlines. Field order is part of the
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// protocol contract — do not reorder without bumping Version.
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func (c CanonicalRequest) canonicalString() string {
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return strings.Join([]string{
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c.Version,
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c.Method,
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c.Host,
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c.PathAndQuery,
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c.BodySHA256,
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c.Timestamp,
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c.Identity,
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c.AuthHeader,
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}, "\n")
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}
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// Sign computes the HMAC-SHA256 signature over the canonical request string.
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func Sign(key []byte, req CanonicalRequest) string {
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mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, key)
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mac.Write([]byte(req.canonicalString()))
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return hex.EncodeToString(mac.Sum(nil))
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}
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// Verify checks that signature matches the HMAC-SHA256 of the canonical
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// request and that the timestamp is within MaxTimestampDrift seconds of now.
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// Returns nil on success.
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func Verify(key []byte, req CanonicalRequest, signature string) error {
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ts, err := strconv.ParseInt(req.Timestamp, 10, 64)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("invalid timestamp %q: %w", req.Timestamp, err)
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}
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drift := math.Abs(float64(time.Now().Unix() - ts))
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if drift > MaxTimestampDrift {
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return fmt.Errorf("timestamp drift %.0fs exceeds limit %ds", drift, MaxTimestampDrift)
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}
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expected := Sign(key, req)
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if !hmac.Equal([]byte(expected), []byte(signature)) {
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return fmt.Errorf("HMAC signature mismatch")
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}
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return nil
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}
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// Timestamp returns the current Unix epoch seconds as a string.
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func Timestamp() string {
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return strconv.FormatInt(time.Now().Unix(), 10)
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}
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