mirror of
https://github.com/larksuite/cli.git
synced 2026-07-03 14:02:43 +08:00
99e314fe0b
Every failure on the authentication, authorization, and configuration
path now surfaces as a typed structured error instead of an ad-hoc
envelope. Users and scripts that consume CLI output get:
- a fixed nine-category taxonomy on the wire, each mapped to a
stable shell exit code (authentication/authorization/config = 3,
network = 4, internal = 5, policy = 6, confirmation = 10)
- identity-aware detail fields (missing_scopes, requested_scopes,
granted_scopes, console_url, log_id, retryable, hint) carried
uniformly on the envelope
- a single canonical policy envelope at exit 6; the legacy
auth_error carve-out is retired
- per-subtype canonical message + hint that preserves Lark's
diagnostic phrasing and routes recovery to the right actor:
app developer (app_scope_not_applied), user (missing_scope,
token_scope_insufficient, user_unauthorized), or tenant admin
(app_unavailable, app_disabled)
- wrong app credentials classify as config/invalid_client whether
surfaced by the Open API endpoint (99991543) or the tenant
access-token mint endpoint (10003 / 10014), instead of
collapsing to a transport error or api/unknown
- local shortcut scope preflight emits the same
authorization/missing_scope envelope (identity + deterministic
missing-scope set) used by the post-call permission path, so AI
consumers read the same structured shape from precheck and from
server-returned permission denial
- streaming download/upload failures keep the same network subtype
split (timeout / TLS / DNS / transport) as the non-stream path
instead of collapsing every cause to a generic transport failure
- console_url is carried only on the bot-perspective
app_scope_not_applied envelope (where the recovery action is
"developer applies the scope at the developer console"); the
user-perspective missing_scope envelope drops the field, since
the only actionable user recovery is `lark-cli auth login --scope`
and pointing an end user at a console they cannot modify is
misleading
- bind workflows (Hermes / OpenClaw / lark-channel) flatten dynamic
Type tags to wire 'config' with the original module name kept
as a metric label
All 10 typed errors are cause-bearing, nil-safe on .Error() and
.Unwrap(), and defensively clone slice setter inputs. Four lint
rules (CheckNilSafeError / CheckBuilderImmutable / CheckUnwrapSymmetry
/ CheckBuildAPIErrorArms) lock these invariants on migrated paths.
73 lines
3.1 KiB
Go
73 lines
3.1 KiB
Go
// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
|
|
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
|
|
|
|
//go:build darwin
|
|
|
|
package config
|
|
|
|
import (
|
|
"fmt"
|
|
|
|
"github.com/larksuite/cli/errs"
|
|
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/cmdutil"
|
|
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/keychain"
|
|
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/output"
|
|
"github.com/spf13/cobra"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
// NewCmdConfigKeychainDowngrade creates the macOS-only subcommand that pins
|
|
// the master key to the local file fallback (master.key.file) so subsequent
|
|
// operations bypass the OS Keychain. Useful inside sandboxes like Codex
|
|
// where the system Keychain is unreachable.
|
|
func NewCmdConfigKeychainDowngrade(f *cmdutil.Factory) *cobra.Command {
|
|
cmd := &cobra.Command{
|
|
Use: "keychain-downgrade",
|
|
Short: "Downgrade keychain storage to a local file (macOS only)",
|
|
Long: `Materialize the master key from the macOS system Keychain into a local file
|
|
under ~/Library/Application Support/lark-cli/master.key.file, then pin all
|
|
subsequent reads to that file.
|
|
|
|
Intended workflow: run this once from an interactive Terminal session on
|
|
macOS (where the system Keychain is reachable). After it finishes,
|
|
sandboxed / automation / CI runs of lark-cli on the same machine will read
|
|
the master key from the local file and no longer need the OS Keychain.
|
|
|
|
This is the supported fix for environments like the Codex sandbox where the
|
|
system Keychain is blocked. Running keychain-downgrade from inside such a
|
|
sandbox will itself fail with "keychain access blocked" — that is expected;
|
|
run it from an interactive macOS session instead.
|
|
|
|
The OS Keychain entry is preserved as a cold backup; nothing is deleted there.
|
|
The command is idempotent: re-running it on an already-downgraded install
|
|
reports "already downgraded" and exits 0.`,
|
|
RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
|
|
return configKeychainDowngradeRun(f)
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
cmdutil.SetRisk(cmd, "write")
|
|
return cmd
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func configKeychainDowngradeRun(f *cmdutil.Factory) error {
|
|
service := keychain.LarkCliService
|
|
keyPath := keychain.MasterKeyFilePath(service)
|
|
|
|
result, err := keychain.DowngradeMasterKeyToFile(service)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return errs.NewInternalError(errs.SubtypeSDKError,
|
|
"keychain downgrade failed: %v", err).
|
|
WithHint("This command must be run from an interactive macOS session (e.g. Terminal.app or iTerm) where the system Keychain is reachable. Running it from inside a sandbox / automation context that blocks Keychain access cannot succeed by design.").
|
|
WithCause(err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch result {
|
|
case keychain.DowngradeAlreadyDone:
|
|
output.PrintSuccess(f.IOStreams.ErrOut, fmt.Sprintf("keychain already downgraded; subsequent operations read from %s", keyPath))
|
|
case keychain.DowngradeUsedKeychainKey:
|
|
output.PrintSuccess(f.IOStreams.ErrOut, fmt.Sprintf("downgraded: copied master key from system Keychain to %s. Subsequent operations will read from file, bypassing the OS Keychain (useful inside sandboxes like Codex).", keyPath))
|
|
case keychain.DowngradeCreatedNewKey:
|
|
output.PrintSuccess(f.IOStreams.ErrOut, fmt.Sprintf("system Keychain was empty; generated a new master key and wrote it to %s. The OS Keychain was not modified.", keyPath))
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|