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AI agents running inside OpenClaw / Hermes were routinely creating a parallel
app via `config init --new` instead of binding to the agent's existing app,
because every "not configured" hint and several deny errors hard-coded
`config init` regardless of workspace. Once bound, the same agents could
silently grant themselves user identity (impersonation) without the user
ever seeing a risk message in chat.
Changes:
- Introduce `core.NotConfiguredError` / `NoActiveProfileError` /
`reconfigureHint` helpers that branch on `CurrentWorkspace()`. In agent
workspaces they point at `lark-cli config bind --help` (a help page, not
a ready-to-run command) so AI must read the binding workflow and confirm
identity preset with the user before acting. In local terminals they
preserve the previous `config init --new` guidance.
- Migrate every `config init` hint that should be workspace-aware:
RequireConfigForProfile, default credential provider, credential provider
fallback, secret-resolve mismatch, config show, strict-mode entry-point
errors, default-as, profile use/rename/remove, auth list, doctor's
config_file check (which now also wraps the OS-level "no such file"
noise into the user-shaped "not configured" message).
- Refuse `config init` when run inside an OpenClaw / Hermes workspace by
default; add `--force-init` for the rare case the user genuinely wants
a parallel app. Without this guard, hint fixes were undone the moment
AI ignored them.
- Rewrite the strict-mode deny errors in cmd/auth/login.go, cmd/prune.go,
and internal/cmdutil/factory.go. The previous "AI agents are strictly
prohibited from modifying this setting" terminated AI reasoning while
providing no real gate. New errors point at `config strict-mode --help`
with the legitimate confirmation flow and explicitly note that switching
does NOT require re-bind. Integration test envelopes updated.
- Tighten `config bind --help` and `config strict-mode --help` to encode
the user-confirmation discipline directly: identity preset semantics
(bot-only vs user-default), "DO NOT switch without explicit user
confirmation", and a cross-reference clarifying that `config bind` is
for changing the underlying app while `config strict-mode` is the
policy-only switch (resolves an ambiguity an audit run found).
- Surface user-identity (impersonation) risk at every config write that
newly grants it, by reusing the canonical IdentityEscalationMessage
string from bind_messages.go:
- `noticeUserDefaultRisk` fires on flag-mode bind landing on
user-default, including the first-time case `warnIdentityEscalation`
misses (it requires a previous bot lock).
- `setStrictMode` warns when transitioning bot → user or bot → off
(newly permits user identity); stays quiet on narrowing changes
and on off → user (off already permitted user).
- Add tests: notconfigured_test.go (workspace branches),
init_guard_test.go (refuse + --force-init bypass), bind_warning_test.go
(user-default warning fires; bot-only does not), strict_mode_warning_test.go
(5 transitions covering both warn and no-warn paths).
Two follow-ups intentionally deferred: the keychain master-key hint at
internal/keychain/keychain.go:42 still suggests `config init` because the
keychain package can't import core (would be circular); fixing requires
either parameterizing the hint via callback or extracting workspace into
its own package. The lark-shared skill doc still tells AI to run
`config init` for first-time setup; updating the skill is in scope for
a follow-up PR.
Change-Id: I02273e044d9e061d211ceaa4f3ed5a3fb28325b3
141 lines
5.6 KiB
Go
141 lines
5.6 KiB
Go
// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
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package config
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import (
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"strings"
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"testing"
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"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/cmdutil"
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"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
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)
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// runStrictMode is a small helper that runs `config strict-mode <args...>` and
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// returns the captured stderr — that's where success-path messages and the
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// new user-identity warning land.
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func runStrictMode(t *testing.T, args ...string) string {
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t.Helper()
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f, _, stderr, _ := cmdutil.TestFactory(t, &core.CliConfig{AppID: "test-app", AppSecret: "secret"})
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cmd := NewCmdConfigStrictMode(f)
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cmd.SetArgs(args)
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if err := cmd.Execute(); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("strict-mode %v failed: %v", args, err)
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}
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return stderr.String()
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}
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// expandsUserIdentity covers the only two transitions where AI gains the
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// ability to act under the user's identity, and asserts the warning fires.
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// Reuses bind_messages.go's IdentityEscalationMessage as the canonical text
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// so all three call sites (bind upgrade, fresh user-default bind, strict-mode
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// relax) stay phrased identically.
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func TestStrictMode_BotToUser_WarnsAboutIdentityRisk(t *testing.T) {
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setupStrictModeTestConfig(t)
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runStrictMode(t, "bot")
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out := runStrictMode(t, "user")
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if !strings.Contains(out, bindMsgZh.IdentityEscalationMessage) {
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t.Errorf("bot→user transition must surface IdentityEscalationMessage; got: %s", out)
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}
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}
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func TestStrictMode_BotToOff_WarnsAboutIdentityRisk(t *testing.T) {
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setupStrictModeTestConfig(t)
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runStrictMode(t, "bot")
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out := runStrictMode(t, "off")
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if !strings.Contains(out, bindMsgZh.IdentityEscalationMessage) {
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t.Errorf("bot→off transition must surface IdentityEscalationMessage; got: %s", out)
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}
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}
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// narrowingDoesNotWarn covers the cases that revoke or keep user-identity
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// scope — those should stay quiet, otherwise AI will spam users with risk
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// text on every restrictive change.
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func TestStrictMode_UserToBot_NoWarning(t *testing.T) {
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setupStrictModeTestConfig(t)
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runStrictMode(t, "user")
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out := runStrictMode(t, "bot")
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if strings.Contains(out, bindMsgZh.IdentityEscalationMessage) {
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t.Errorf("user→bot is a narrowing change; must not warn. got: %s", out)
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}
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}
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func TestStrictMode_OffToBot_NoWarning(t *testing.T) {
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setupStrictModeTestConfig(t)
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// Default starts at off; explicitly set bot — narrowing.
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out := runStrictMode(t, "bot")
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if strings.Contains(out, bindMsgZh.IdentityEscalationMessage) {
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t.Errorf("off→bot is a narrowing change; must not warn. got: %s", out)
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}
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}
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func TestStrictMode_OffToUser_NoWarning(t *testing.T) {
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// Off already permits user-identity, so off→user is not a NEW grant
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// even though it forces user identity. Don't warn.
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setupStrictModeTestConfig(t)
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out := runStrictMode(t, "user")
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if strings.Contains(out, bindMsgZh.IdentityEscalationMessage) {
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t.Errorf("off→user does not newly permit user identity; must not warn. got: %s", out)
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}
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}
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// --- --global path: comparison must use multi.StrictMode, not profile's
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// effective mode. The previous (buggy) version used resolveStrictModeStatus
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// here too, leading to both false positives (current profile has explicit
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// override unaffected by --global → still warned) and false negatives
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// (current profile has explicit override that masks an actual bot → off
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// global broadening for OTHER inheriting profiles → didn't warn).
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func TestStrictMode_GlobalBotToUser_Warns(t *testing.T) {
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setupStrictModeTestConfig(t)
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runStrictMode(t, "bot", "--global")
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out := runStrictMode(t, "user", "--global")
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if !strings.Contains(out, bindMsgZh.IdentityEscalationMessage) {
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t.Errorf("global bot→user must warn (broadens user-identity for inheriting profiles); got: %s", out)
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}
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}
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func TestStrictMode_GlobalBotToOff_Warns(t *testing.T) {
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setupStrictModeTestConfig(t)
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runStrictMode(t, "bot", "--global")
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out := runStrictMode(t, "off", "--global")
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if !strings.Contains(out, bindMsgZh.IdentityEscalationMessage) {
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t.Errorf("global bot→off must warn (newly permits user identity in inheriting profiles); got: %s", out)
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}
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}
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// FalsePositive: current profile has explicit "bot" override, global goes
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// off → user. The current profile is unaffected (still bot via override),
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// and off→user at the global level is not a new grant either. Must not warn.
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func TestStrictMode_GlobalOffToUser_WithProfileBotOverride_NoWarning(t *testing.T) {
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setupStrictModeTestConfig(t)
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runStrictMode(t, "bot") // profile-level explicit bot
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runStrictMode(t, "off", "--global") // global = off
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out := runStrictMode(t, "user", "--global")
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if strings.Contains(out, bindMsgZh.IdentityEscalationMessage) {
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t.Errorf("global off→user with profile-bot-override must not warn (profile unaffected, global wasn't bot); got: %s", out)
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}
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}
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// FalseNegative: global = bot, current profile has explicit "off" override.
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// Running --global off broadens OTHER inheriting profiles (bot → off). The
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// current profile doesn't change effective mode, but the policy still expanded
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// user-identity, so warning must fire. The pre-fix logic compared via the
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// current profile's effective mode and missed this case.
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func TestStrictMode_GlobalBotToOff_WithProfileOffOverride_Warns(t *testing.T) {
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setupStrictModeTestConfig(t)
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runStrictMode(t, "bot", "--global") // global = bot
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runStrictMode(t, "off") // profile-level explicit off (already shows the warning at profile scope)
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out := runStrictMode(t, "off", "--global")
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if !strings.Contains(out, bindMsgZh.IdentityEscalationMessage) {
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t.Errorf("global bot→off must warn even when current profile has explicit off (other profiles inherit and newly permit user identity); got: %s", out)
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}
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}
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