Files
hGrany ffcf7781b4 feat(sidecar): support multi-client identity isolation in server-demo (#934)
* feat(sidecar): support multi-client identity isolation in server-demo

When multiple CLI sandbox environments share a single sidecar instance,
user tokens (UAT) were not isolated -- the last user to log in would
overwrite previous users' tokens, causing identity cross-contamination.

This change introduces per-client HMAC key isolation:
- Each client gets a unique client-*.key file for data-plane HMAC signing,
  allowing the sidecar to identify request origin.
- A new auth_bridge.go handles management endpoints (login/poll/status)
  with explicit client-to-feishuOpenId binding.
- User token resolution is strictly bound to the matched client -- no
  fallback to other users' tokens when a client has no mapping.
- The shared proxy.key is reused across restarts instead of regenerated,
  fixing a race condition when multiple sidecar instances start together.

Wire protocol (sidecar package) is unchanged; existing single-client
deployments are fully backward compatible.

Signed-off-by: Gao Yang <grany@yeah.net> (topwin.tech)

* fix(sidecar): address review feedback on filesystem and safety

- Replace os.ReadFile/WriteFile/ReadDir with vfs.* equivalents for test
  mockability, consistent with project coding guidelines.
- Limit auth bridge request body to 64KB to prevent memory exhaustion.
- Log errors in saveUserMap instead of silently discarding them.
- Reject client keys that collide with the shared proxy key.
- Reject duplicate client keys instead of silently overwriting.

Signed-off-by: Gao Yang <grany@yeah.net> (topwin.tech)

* refactor(sidecar): remove workspace-specific naming and backward compat

- parseClientID: only accept "client_id" field, remove legacy fallback
- loadClientKeys: scan all *.key (excluding proxy.key), no prefix required
- Remove legacy file migration logic in newAuthBridge
- Update flag description to reflect generic key scanning

Signed-off-by: Gao Yang <grany@yeah.net> (topwin.tech)

* refactor(sidecar): extract multi-tenant demo and add unit tests

Address review feedback from sang-neo03:

1. Extract multi-client code into sidecar/server-multi-tenant-demo/,
   keeping server-demo as the minimal single-tenant reference.

2. Add unit tests for the isolation guarantee:
   - loadClientKeys: shared-key collision and duplicate keyHex are skipped
   - verifyWithClientKeys: correct client matched, unknown key rejected
   - loadUserMap/saveUserMap: round-trip persistence across restart

3. Cross-link READMEs between server-demo and server-multi-tenant-demo.

Signed-off-by: Gao Yang <grany@yeah.net> (topwin.tech)

* docs(sidecar): rewrite multi-tenant demo README with problem statement and client guide

- Explain the multi-app credential isolation problem (app_secret must
  not be exposed to client environments)
- Document typical deployment topology with multiple sidecar instances
- Add complete client setup guide: env vars, multi-app switching, login
  flow, and end-to-end workflow example
- Document design decisions and management endpoint details

Signed-off-by: Gao Yang <grany@yeah.net> (topwin.tech)

* fix(sidecar): address CodeRabbit review feedback on tests and docs

- Make TestProxyHandler_AcceptsAllowedAuthHeaders fully offline by using
  httptest.NewTLSServer instead of depending on open.feishu.cn
- Isolate TestRun_RejectsSelfProxy config state with t.Setenv and temp dirs
- Check os.MkdirAll error in test fixture setup
- Add language identifiers to fenced code blocks (MD040)
- Validate user-supplied CLI paths with validate.SafeInputPath

Signed-off-by: Gao Yang <grany@yeah.net> (topwin.tech)

---------

Signed-off-by: Gao Yang <grany@yeah.net> (topwin.tech)
2026-05-22 15:25:00 +08:00

52 lines
1.5 KiB
Go

// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
//go:build authsidecar_multi_tenant_demo
package main
import (
"fmt"
"net/http"
"time"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/sidecar"
)
// newForwardClient creates an HTTP client for forwarding requests to the
// Lark API. It strips Authorization on cross-host redirects and disables
// proxy to prevent real tokens from leaking through environment proxies.
func newForwardClient() *http.Client {
transport := http.DefaultTransport.(*http.Transport).Clone()
transport.Proxy = nil // never proxy the trusted hop
return &http.Client{
Transport: transport,
Timeout: 30 * time.Second,
CheckRedirect: func(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
if len(via) >= 10 {
return fmt.Errorf("too many redirects")
}
if len(via) > 0 && req.URL.Host != via[0].URL.Host {
req.Header.Del("Authorization")
req.Header.Del(sidecar.HeaderMCPUAT)
req.Header.Del(sidecar.HeaderMCPTAT)
}
return nil
},
}
}
// isProxyHeader returns true for headers specific to the sidecar protocol.
func isProxyHeader(key string) bool {
switch http.CanonicalHeaderKey(key) {
case http.CanonicalHeaderKey(sidecar.HeaderProxyTarget),
http.CanonicalHeaderKey(sidecar.HeaderProxyIdentity),
http.CanonicalHeaderKey(sidecar.HeaderProxySignature),
http.CanonicalHeaderKey(sidecar.HeaderProxyTimestamp),
http.CanonicalHeaderKey(sidecar.HeaderBodySHA256),
http.CanonicalHeaderKey(sidecar.HeaderProxyAuthHeader):
return true
}
return false
}