Files
larksuite-cli/shortcuts/drive
河伯 020aeb87ad feat(drive): pre-flight 10000-rune total cap for +add-comment reply_elements (#605)
* feat(drive): pre-flight per-text-element byte limit for +add-comment

The open-platform comment API returns an opaque [1069302] Invalid or
missing parameters whenever a single reply_elements[i] text exceeds
its implicit byte budget. The error does not name which element failed
or that length is the cause, so callers resort to binary-search
debugging.

Empirically: Chinese text up to ~80 chars (~240 bytes) lands; ~130
chars (~390 bytes) fails. Set the pre-flight limit to 300 bytes which
sits safely inside the known-good zone.

- parseCommentReplyElements now rejects any text element whose UTF-8
  byte length exceeds 300, with an ExitError naming the element index
  (#N, 1-based) and both the rune and byte counts, plus an ErrWithHint
  recommending the correct remediation (split into multiple text
  elements — the comment UI renders them as one contiguous comment).
- The previous 1000-rune check is removed: it was too lenient (a
  Chinese text under that cap would still fail server-side).
- skills/lark-drive/references/lark-drive-add-comment.md documents
  the per-element limit and the correct split pattern so agents
  avoid constructing oversized single elements upstream.

Addresses Case 12 in the 踩坑列表 doc.

* fix(drive): correct +add-comment hint to match actual escape coverage

`escapeCommentText` only expands `<` and `>` (each → 4 bytes via
`&lt;` / `&gt;`); `&` is intentionally left as-is. Both the over-limit
hint and the inline comment in `parseCommentReplyElements` previously
claimed `&` was also escaped, with a "4-5 bytes each" range that
implicitly assumed `&amp;` (5 bytes) — a string of 300 `&` chars
would actually fit in the budget, but a user reading the hint would
think otherwise and pre-emptively split it.

Code:
- Hint string ends with `Note: '<' and '>' are HTML-escaped and
  counted in their escaped form (4 bytes each).` (was: included `&`
  and "4-5 bytes")
- Inline comment above the budget check now matches:
  `escapeCommentText only expands '<' and '>' (each becomes 4 bytes:
  &lt; / &gt;); '&' is intentionally left as-is.`

Tests (regression):
- New `300 ampersands accepted (escapeCommentText leaves '&' as-is)`
  subtest pins that 300 `&` chars stay within budget. Without the fix
  this also passed (function was always correct), but the hint was
  lying — the test pins the budget contract loud and clear.
- New `TestParseCommentReplyElementsHintMatchesEscape` asserts the
  hint string itself: must mention `'<' and '>'` / `4 bytes`, must NOT
  mention `'&'` / `&amp;` / `4-5 bytes`. Catches a future drift if
  `escapeCommentText` is changed without updating the hint, or
  vice-versa.

The skill md (`skills/lark-drive/references/lark-drive-add-comment.md`)
already had the right wording (`每个 < 或 > 占 4 字节`), so it was the
in-Go strings that drifted; this commit aligns code with doc.

* fix(drive): rewrite +add-comment length cap to match real server behavior

The original PR set a 300-byte per-element pre-flight check, justified
by the empirical pattern "~80 Chinese chars succeeds, ~130 fails". A
fresh round of probing the live `/open-apis/drive/v1/files/{token}/
new_comments` endpoint with a real docx shows that pattern does not
reproduce, and the actual contract is very different:

  - 10000 ASCII / 10000 Chinese / 10000 '<' (escaped to 40000 bytes)
    in a single text element: all OK
  - 10001 of any of the above in a single text element: [1069302]
  - 5000 + 5000 across two text elements (total 10000): OK
  - 5000 + 5001 across two text elements (total 10001): [1069302]
  - 4000 + 4000 + 4000 across three (total 12000): [1069302]

Two consequences:

1. The cap is *10000 runes total across all reply_elements text*, not
   300 bytes per element. The old check rejected legitimate input
   anywhere from ~100 to 10000 Chinese chars (≈100x too aggressive).

2. The hint that recommended "split the content across multiple
   {\"type\":\"text\",\"text\":\"...\"} elements" was actively wrong —
   splitting doesn't bypass a total cap. A user told to split a
   10001-char message into 5000+5001 hits the same opaque [1069302].

This commit:

- Replaces `maxCommentTextElementBytes = 300` with
  `maxCommentTotalRunes = 10000`. The constant's doc comment records
  the probe matrix above so future maintainers know how it was
  derived.
- Switches the measurement from `len(escapeCommentText(input.Text))`
  to `utf8.RuneCountInString(input.Text)`. Server counts raw runes;
  byte width and post-escape form are irrelevant. The escape itself
  still happens — `<` and `>` still get rendered literally — but it
  no longer participates in the length check.
- Tracks a running `totalRunes` across the whole reply_elements array
  and bails at the first element that pushes the cumulative total
  over the 10000-rune budget, with index reporting that points at the
  offending element.
- Rewrites the over-cap hint to (a) name the actual 10000-rune budget,
  (b) explicitly say splitting does NOT help, (c) drop the wrong
  "comment UI still renders them as one contiguous comment" framing
  that implied splitting was a workaround.
- Adds a `TestParseCommentReplyElementsHintForbidsSplitAdvice`
  watchdog that fails if any future drift puts the discredited split
  advice back into the hint.

Tests: 11 cases on TestParseCommentReplyElementsTextLength covering
single-element boundary (ASCII / Chinese / angle brackets at exactly
10000 and at 10001), multi-element total cap (5000+5000 OK, 5000+5001
rejected with index pointing at element #2), early-element-overshoot
indexing (first element at 10001 reports index #1, not the trailing
element), and mention_user not double-counting toward the cap.

Skill md updated: removes the 300-byte / "split into multiple
elements" advice; documents the 10000-rune total cap with a note that
the schema currently advertises 1-1000 chars and is out of date,
plus a procedure for re-probing if the server-side limit ever moves.

Manual API verification: rebuilt binary and posted comments at
boundary lengths — all OK cases (100 / 5000 / 10000 chars, 5000+5000
split) accepted by server; over-cap cases (10001 / 10100 single, and
5000+5001 split) rejected by the new pre-flight before reaching the
network.

---------

Co-authored-by: fangshuyu <fangshuyu@bytedance.com>
2026-04-30 18:52:44 +08:00
..