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Source-grounded rewrite of 529 published docs pages with per-unit information-loss verification: 1,713 factual corrections cited to src/**, generated surfaces regenerated, frontmatter titles preserved for i18n, release notes pages untouched. All docs gates green. Closes #100141
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summary, read_when, title
| summary | read_when | title | |
|---|---|---|---|
| macOS IPC architecture for OpenClaw app, gateway node transport, and PeekabooBridge |
|
macOS IPC |
OpenClaw macOS IPC architecture
A local Unix socket connects the node host service to the macOS app for exec approvals and system.run. An openclaw-mac debug CLI (apps/macos/Sources/OpenClawMacCLI) exists for discovery/connect checks; agent actions still flow through the Gateway WebSocket and node.invoke. UI automation uses PeekabooBridge.
Goals
- Single GUI app instance that owns all TCC-facing work (notifications, screen recording, mic, speech, AppleScript).
- A small surface for automation: Gateway + node commands, plus PeekabooBridge for UI automation.
- Predictable permissions: always the same signed bundle ID, launched by launchd, so TCC grants stick.
How it works
Gateway + node transport
- The app runs the Gateway (local mode) and connects to it as a node.
- Agent actions are performed via
node.invoke(e.g.system.run,system.notify,canvas.*). - Node commands include
canvas.*,camera.snap,camera.clip,screen.snapshot,screen.record,system.run, andsystem.notify. - The node reports a
permissionsmap so agents can see whether screen, camera, microphone, speech, automation, or accessibility access is available.
Node service + app IPC
- A headless node host service connects to the Gateway WebSocket.
system.runrequests are forwarded to the macOS app over a local Unix socket (ExecApprovalsSocket.swift).- The app performs the exec in UI context, prompts if needed, and returns output.
Diagram (SCI):
Agent -> Gateway -> Node Service (WS)
| IPC (UDS + token + HMAC + TTL)
v
Mac App (UI + TCC + system.run)
PeekabooBridge (UI automation)
- UI automation uses a separate UNIX socket (
~/Library/Application Support/OpenClaw/<socket>) and the PeekabooBridge JSON protocol. - Host preference order (client-side): Peekaboo.app -> Claude.app -> OpenClaw.app -> local execution.
- Security: bridge hosts require an allowlisted TeamID (the bundled
PeekabooBridgeHostCoordinatorallowlists a fixed team plus the app's own signing team); a DEBUG-only same-UID escape hatch is guarded byPEEKABOO_ALLOW_UNSIGNED_SOCKET_CLIENTS=1(Peekaboo convention). - See: PeekabooBridge usage for details.
Operational flows
- Restart/rebuild:
scripts/restart-mac.shkills existing instances, rebuilds via Swift, repackages, and relaunches. It auto-detects an available signing identity and falls back to--no-signif none is found; pass--signto require signing (fails if no key is available) or--no-signto force the unsigned path.SIGN_IDENTITYset in the environment is unset on the signed path, soscripts/codesign-mac-app.sh's own identity auto-detection picks the cert. - Single instance: the app checks
NSWorkspace.runningApplicationsfor a duplicate bundle ID and exits if more than one instance is found (isDuplicateInstance()inMenuBar.swift).
Hardening notes
- Prefer requiring a TeamID match for all privileged surfaces.
- PeekabooBridge:
PEEKABOO_ALLOW_UNSIGNED_SOCKET_CLIENTS=1(DEBUG-only) may allow same-UID callers for local development. - All communication remains local-only; no network sockets are exposed.
- TCC prompts originate only from the GUI app bundle; keep the signed bundle ID stable across rebuilds.
- Exec approvals socket hardening: file mode
0600, shared token, peer-UID check (getpeereid), HMAC-SHA256 challenge/response, and a short TTL on requests.