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50 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
luozhixiong
4769b5c3e8 docs(profile): clarify identity diagnostics heading 2026-07-27 11:10:16 +08:00
luozhixiong
c86c348fa9 fix(auth): reserve incomplete credential arbitration for env 2026-07-27 11:10:16 +08:00
luozhixiong
8587203afb test(sidecar): align fake provider with app binding 2026-07-27 10:56:13 +08:00
luozhixiong
48b0ade294 fix(profile): honor an explicit empty profile flag 2026-07-27 10:56:13 +08:00
luozhixiong
0fef0667fd fix(auth): classify invalid sidecar policy 2026-07-27 10:56:13 +08:00
luozhixiong
754f471f75 test(auth): align token fixtures with account selection 2026-07-27 10:56:13 +08:00
luozhixiong
8bcb04c830 test(auth): assert token dispatch call counts 2026-07-27 10:56:12 +08:00
luozhixiong
54428113f5 fix(auth): enforce app binding before token resolution 2026-07-27 10:56:12 +08:00
luozhixiong
01fdf2f4d6 docs(lark-shared): format profile selection guidance 2026-07-27 10:56:12 +08:00
luozhixiong
3a9cfdda93 chore: use a recognized token placeholder and trim skill routing prose
- The canned TAT test token tripped the deterministic gate's
  public-content rule; switch to the recognized your-access-token
  placeholder (no assertion semantics change).
- Drop the implementation mechanisms from the lark-shared frontmatter
  description (WHAT only; the body owns HOW) and tighten the
  clear-session-identity routing entry.
2026-07-27 10:56:12 +08:00
luozhixiong
51f3f07f44 docs(lark-shared): route pin/clear-session-identity intents from eval evidence
Two skill-eval failures on the final acceptance run, both fixed at the
smallest possible surface:

- A pure standing instruction ("run everything as tenant A from now
  on") triggers no tool call, so only the frontmatter description is
  visible — and the main description has no profile/tenant trigger
  words, leaving the body's routing table unloaded (eval case 2, agent
  answered with an unactionable promise). Add one 14-word clause:
  pinning/clearing a profile/tenant identity for a task or session.
  This partially revisits the earlier description revert, now backed by
  a concrete discovery failure rather than speculation.
- The body routing table only routed the SET direction; add the reverse
  entry: clearing the session identity -> unset LARKSUITE_CLI_PROFILE
  (session-scoped, idempotent; never profile use / profile remove)
  (eval case 4).

Skill eval rerun: 7/7 PASS.
2026-07-27 10:56:12 +08:00
luozhixiong
16ed51252e test(credential): pin the TAT mint-then-cache happy path
First resolve mints over HTTP, second is served from the sync.Once
cache with exactly one HTTP call total.
2026-07-27 10:56:12 +08:00
luozhixiong
6b80706300 fix(credential): unforgeable AccountDirect reservation, gate aligned with arbitration
- The AccountDirect reservation is enforced by concrete type
  (*envprovider.Provider), not Name() == "env" (review F2): the
  registry reserves neither names nor uniqueness, so any provider could
  previously impersonate the builtin env provider with a name string. A
  regression test proves a name-forging AccountDirect provider is
  rejected.
- The engagement probe now translates an invalid_policy block into the
  same typed validation error as formal arbitration (review F4),
  instead of skipping it and letting a later provider be reported as an
  external takeover. A multi-provider test pins probe/arbitration
  producing identical errors.
2026-07-27 10:56:12 +08:00
luozhixiong
76bd47a1c8 fix(credential): refuse mismatched tokens before any token work
The TAT path validated TokenSpec.AppID only AFTER doResolveTAT had
re-read the config, minted a token with the (possibly different) app's
secret, and cached it — so an A→B config race still produced a network
mint, quota use, and audit trail for the wrong app before the result
was refused (review F1). The account is now resolved and checked
against the request before the sync.Once mint; doResolveTAT receives
the already-checked account instead of re-reading; and the cached
result stays re-checked on every hit. The regression test asserts the
HTTP client is never even constructed for a mismatched request.

TokenSpec.AppID is now REQUIRED on the default token paths (review F3):
an empty value silently disabled the consistency guarantee. Every
production caller already passes it via NewTokenSpec.
2026-07-27 10:56:12 +08:00
luozhixiong
f6732c9afa fix(profile): keep only the renamed default field in profile list
Drop the dual-published deprecated `active` alias after review
discussion: a compat field with no removal owner becomes permanent, it
always mirrors `default` (inviting readers to hunt for a nonexistent
difference), and its historic name keeps misleading agents into reading
it as the currently effective identity — which is whoami's job. The
rename is declared as a breaking change in the PR body; no in-repo
consumer exists and no external consumer was identified.
2026-07-27 10:56:12 +08:00
luozhixiong
e28f91794a fix(credential): keep policy mistakes and saved-config inspection off the external gate
- The engagement probe no longer counts an invalid_policy block as an
  external credential takeover (review F4): auth/config commands were
  answering "credentials are provided externally" for a mistyped
  LARKSUITE_CLI_DEFAULT_AS/STRICT_MODE, while whoami correctly said
  invalid_argument. The probe skips such blocks; the command's own
  resolution then surfaces the precise typed error.
- config show overrides the parent gate entirely: it inspects the SAVED
  config only (its help promises "saved config, not current usage"),
  so the currently effective credential source must not decide whether
  it runs (review delivery finding). The blocked-commands pin drops
  show and a command-level test locks the bypass.
- AccountDirect is now an enforced contract, not a comment (review F5):
  only the builtin env provider may declare it, and gather fails fast
  otherwise instead of producing self-contradictory diagnostics. The
  SPI documents the reservation.
2026-07-27 10:56:12 +08:00
luozhixiong
dd42477a82 fix(credential): refuse cross-app tokens after a config edit
The account-level consistency check closed only half of the read-twice
race (review F2): DefaultTokenProvider re-reads the config for both UAT
and TAT, so a profile edit between account resolution and token
resolution could still hand back a token minted for a different app,
and TokenSpec.AppID was never consulted.

Validate the resolved app against TokenSpec.AppID on both token paths.
The TAT check runs on every call including cache hits, so a cached
token can never serve a request that resolved a different app. The
regression test drives the real DefaultAccountProvider +
DefaultTokenProvider with a config swap in between; the stubbed HTTP
client proves the check runs before any token work.
2026-07-27 10:56:12 +08:00
luozhixiong
fd9940ce5e fix(credential): surface the real keychain out-of-sync cause
The out-of-sync check in ResolveConfigFromMulti returned subtype
not_configured, which both the profile route and the config-default
route deliberately mask behind generic errors — so the precise
diagnosis (message naming the mismatch, hint naming the expected
keychain key and the fix command) never reached the user. This was the
review's F1: the typed-passthrough added earlier could not fire because
the real production error carried the excluded subtype, and the test
that claimed to cover it used a stub with a different subtype.

Classify the inconsistency as invalid_config at the source: the config
exists but is internally broken. Both routes now pass it through, which
matches what main surfaced before the profile feature.

The regression tests now drive the REAL DefaultAccountProvider against
an out-of-sync keychain ref on both routes and assert the precise
subtype, message, and hint; the stub-based test remains only as the
generic any-typed-error contract check with neutral wording. Test
fixtures also switch to recognized credential placeholders (the
previous literal tripped the deterministic gate).
2026-07-27 10:56:12 +08:00
luozhixiong
f01f7abbef chore: guard empty profile source and document credential wire fields
- buildCredentialProvider no longer records a phantom env profile source
  when no profile is selected.
- ERROR_CONTRACT.md documents the credential/identity-selection extension
  fields (missing_keys, required_any_of, profile, app_id,
  credential_source, profile_app_id/env_app_id).
- profile --help names the full auth status --json --verify form.
- Drop a stale out-of-repo spec reference from the CredentialSource
  comment.
2026-07-27 10:56:12 +08:00
luozhixiong
76ee4cd05e fix(config): pin saved-config commands to the saved default
- config show now resolves the saved default profile unconditionally: its
  own help (and the skill routing) promise "saved config, not current
  usage", but the output still followed --profile / LARKSUITE_CLI_PROFILE.
  A behavior test locks the boundary the help text claims.
- profile list dual-publishes the deprecated `active` field as an alias of
  `default` for one deprecation cycle, so external consumers reading
  `.active` keep working; it still marks the saved default, never the
  currently effective identity.
2026-07-27 10:56:12 +08:00
luozhixiong
cf2af70b98 fix(credential): surface precise causes instead of flattened selection errors
Four external-review findings on the arbitration's error contract:

- A typed resolver failure on the profile route (e.g. keychain key out of
  sync) now passes through with its own subtype and repair hint instead of
  being flattened into the generic profile_secret_invalid. Untyped failures
  and not_configured stay masked: their content is not guaranteed
  secret-free.
- A config that exists but cannot be read (permission denied, I/O error)
  now loads as invalid_config with the real cause preserved, so it can no
  longer degrade into profile_not_found / no_active_profile and misdirect
  the repair.
- Invalid LARKSUITE_CLI_DEFAULT_AS / LARKSUITE_CLI_STRICT_MODE values are
  classified at the env provider (BlockReasonInvalidPolicy) and translated
  into a typed validation error carrying param and a repair hint (exit 2),
  instead of falling through to the internal-error envelope (exit 5).
- execute now refuses a profile account whose app_id differs from the
  arbitration snapshot, closing the read-twice race window with a
  deterministic error instead of silently using unchecked credentials.

Also documents that identityInputs.directKeys describes only the builtin
process-env credential surface, and makes the AccountKind switch
exhaustive.
2026-07-27 10:56:12 +08:00
luozhixiong
7b32b22069 docs(lark-shared): restore the trigger description to main's version
The description broadening to profile-selection triggers exceeded the
routing fix's actual scope: the observed failure was command selection
after the skill was already engaged, not skill discovery. Routing
guidance stays in the body's profile-selection section and command
help; the frontmatter matches main again.
2026-07-27 10:56:12 +08:00
luozhixiong
0c8bf43023 test: use recognized credential placeholders 2026-07-27 10:56:12 +08:00
luozhixiong
ce00fdcce4 fix(credential): make profile arbitration explicit 2026-07-27 10:56:12 +08:00
luozhixiong
7cc881c7a3 fix(credential): surface malformed config on the config-default path
The config-default (no-profile) path loaded config via LoadMultiAppConfig
and coerced any error into NotConfiguredError, so a malformed config was
misreported as no_active_profile ("run config init") — risking overwrite
of a recoverable-but-broken config. Route both the explicit-profile and
config-default paths through core.LoadOrNotConfigured so a malformed config
consistently surfaces as invalid_config (exit 3, cause preserved), while a
genuinely absent config keeps the friendly profile_not_found / no_active_profile.
2026-07-27 10:56:12 +08:00
luozhixiong
a340417767 docs(lark-shared): write profile-selection guidance in Chinese
Match the rest of the skill document, which is in Chinese. Keep command
and env-var tokens in English. Content unchanged.
2026-07-27 10:56:12 +08:00
luozhixiong
ccc6dd3e47 feat(profile): distinguish saved default from effective identity
profile list / config show only report the saved default profile, not the
app/profile a specific invocation actually resolves to (especially under
--profile or LARKSUITE_CLI_PROFILE). Rename the misleading profile list
JSON field active -> default (it is the configured default, not the one in
effect), and point config show / profile list / profile help at
lark-cli whoami --json for the identity actually used now. Restructure the
lark-shared skill profile guidance as an intent -> command table.
2026-07-27 10:56:12 +08:00
luozhixiong
beeeb71cd6 fix(credential): propagate malformed-config error for explicit profile
When an explicit profile was requested and LoadMultiAppConfig failed, the
error was discarded and every failure reported as profile_not_found,
masking a real config problem (e.g. malformed file) behind a misleading
"run profile list" hint. Propagate the underlying error when it is a
malformed-config failure (errors.Is ErrMalformedConfig) so errors.Is /
errors.Unwrap keep working, mirroring the no-profile branch. An absent
config is not malformed and still yields the friendly profile_not_found.
2026-07-27 10:56:12 +08:00
luozhixiong
7c04a1a60e docs(lark-shared): refine profile-selection guidance
Clarify that --profile and LARKSUITE_CLI_PROFILE accept either a profile
name or an app_id, keep the effective-identity vs OAuth-token boundary
(whoami vs auth status --json --verify), and note not to set direct
app-credential env vars unless direct credentials are provided.
2026-07-27 10:56:12 +08:00
luozhixiong
eabc8558d5 test(credential): use recognized placeholders for secret fixtures
Replace credential-shaped literals in whoami and selection tests with
placeholder values recognized by the public-content quality gate
(test-secret / your-secret / your-password / your-access-token), so the
deterministic public-content scan does not flag test fixtures as generic
credentials. No behavioral change; the fixtures are only compared for
non-leakage and identity arbitration.
2026-07-27 10:56:12 +08:00
luozhixiong
9cad3ca0e1 docs: require auth status --json --verify for login/token checks 2026-07-27 10:56:12 +08:00
luozhixiong
4306f41060 docs: point to auth status --json --verify for token validity checks 2026-07-27 10:56:12 +08:00
luozhixiong
d8f877f60f docs: guide per-command LARKSUITE_CLI_PROFILE prefix for non-persistent shells 2026-07-27 10:56:12 +08:00
luozhixiong
6aa8dec967 feat: distinguish auth status from whoami identity in help and skill 2026-07-27 10:56:12 +08:00
luozhixiong
70b611ab2c docs: use imperative one-line whoami vs auth status routing boundary 2026-07-27 10:56:12 +08:00
luozhixiong
4eb068fc20 docs: clarify whoami vs auth status boundary in lark-shared profile rule 2026-07-27 10:56:12 +08:00
luozhixiong
417777ff58 docs: trim lark-shared profile rule to lark-cli scope, drop agent-shell env mechanics 2026-07-27 10:56:12 +08:00
luozhixiong
5a0f022a97 docs: broaden lark-shared trigger to profile selection and add session-env persistence guidance 2026-07-27 10:56:12 +08:00
luozhixiong
fe3d94935a docs: forbid hollow identity promises in lark-shared profile hint 2026-07-27 10:56:12 +08:00
luozhixiong
71521b967d fix(credential): add credential_source to config errors and report profile_secret_invalid for broken default secret 2026-07-27 10:56:12 +08:00
luozhixiong
1d9f48b62f docs: add profile selection entry hint to lark-shared skill 2026-07-27 10:56:12 +08:00
luozhixiong
c4f50226a4 docs: add profile selection help to profile and whoami commands 2026-07-27 10:56:11 +08:00
luozhixiong
9b1f3fa01c refactor: drop whoami suggestion field and IdentitySelection.Suggestion
whoami reports facts about the effective identity; it should not
proactively push profile-switching guidance at agents. That guidance
lives in `profile --help` / the lark-shared skill, and failure recovery
already lives in error hints. Remove the now-unused Suggestion field
from IdentitySelection and its only setter/consumer.
2026-07-27 10:56:11 +08:00
luozhixiong
866636563e feat: surface credentialSource and directCredentialEnv in whoami 2026-07-27 10:56:11 +08:00
luozhixiong
c24a38289a test(credential): lock profile_secret_invalid against secret-bearing cause
Add a case where the underlying account-resolution error itself contains a
secret marker, proving doResolveAccount's drop-the-cause design (§5.1) holds
beyond the existing noop-keychain (empty-error) test, including across the
full errors.Unwrap chain.
2026-07-27 10:56:11 +08:00
luozhixiong
e6466b9b14 fix(credential): gate success-account direct-credential treatment on env provider
Mirror the env-incomplete block-path guard on the success-account path so a
non-env extension provider (e.g. sidecar, Priority 0) that returns an account
wins outright instead of being misreported as a direct-credential env account.
This restores pre-diff behavior for such providers: no profile arbitration, no
spurious profile_app_credential_conflict, and DirectCredentialEnv.Present stays
false when no direct env vars are set. Env matrix states are unchanged.

Add TestSelection_NonEnvExtensionProviderWinsOverProfile as a regression guard.
2026-07-27 10:56:11 +08:00
luozhixiong
deb16ce1fb feat: unify credential selection with profile conflict detection 2026-07-27 10:56:11 +08:00
luozhixiong
b6c19f5d1d feat: add IdentitySelection type for explainable credential selection 2026-07-27 10:56:11 +08:00
luozhixiong
b1d4489657 feat: add profile selection error subtypes and machine-readable fields
Declares the 5 stable error subtypes (4 config + 1 validation) and the
ConfigError/ValidationError extension fields the profile-selection
credential core (Task 4) will produce, plus builder-chain and wire-pin
tests pinning their shape.
2026-07-27 10:56:11 +08:00
luozhixiong
18451622ea feat: add LARKSUITE_CLI_PROFILE session env with flag precedence
Add LARKSUITE_CLI_PROFILE env var and make BootstrapInvocationContext
fall back to it when --profile is empty, so downstream credential
resolution sees the correct profile. Also track whether the resolved
profile came from the flag or the env fallback via a new
InvocationContext.ProfileFromFlag field, needed by a later task to
report the correct credential source.
2026-07-27 10:56:11 +08:00
290 changed files with 5358 additions and 29174 deletions

3
.github/CODEOWNERS vendored
View File

@@ -1,7 +1,4 @@
/go.mod @liangshuo-1
/go.sum @liangshuo-1
/internal/ @liangshuo-1
/shortcuts/common/ @liangshuo-1
# Last match wins: existing domains below are exempt, only new skills/ entries need review.
/skills/ @liangshuo-1

View File

@@ -25,16 +25,19 @@ jobs:
with:
script: |
const run = context.payload.workflow_run;
const workflowId = Number(run.workflow_id || 0);
if (!Number.isInteger(workflowId) || workflowId <= 0) throw new Error("missing workflow id");
const { data: workflow } = await github.rest.actions.getWorkflow({
owner: context.repo.owner,
repo: context.repo.repo,
workflow_id: workflowId,
});
if (workflow.name !== "CI") throw new Error(`unexpected workflow name: ${workflow.name}`);
if (workflow.path !== ".github/workflows/ci.yml") throw new Error(`unexpected workflow path: ${workflow.path}`);
if (run.path && run.path !== workflow.path) throw new Error(`workflow path mismatch: ${run.path}`);
if (run.name !== "CI") throw new Error(`unexpected workflow name: ${run.name}`);
let workflowPath = run.path || "";
if (!workflowPath) {
const workflowId = Number(run.workflow_id || 0);
if (!Number.isInteger(workflowId) || workflowId <= 0) throw new Error("missing workflow id");
const { data: workflow } = await github.rest.actions.getWorkflow({
owner: context.repo.owner,
repo: context.repo.repo,
workflow_id: workflowId,
});
workflowPath = workflow.path || "";
}
if (workflowPath !== ".github/workflows/ci.yml") throw new Error(`unexpected workflow path: ${workflowPath}`);
if (run.event !== "pull_request") throw new Error(`unexpected event: ${run.event}`);
if (run.repository.id !== context.payload.repository.id) throw new Error("repository id mismatch");
if (run.repository.full_name !== context.payload.repository.full_name) throw new Error("repository name mismatch");
@@ -250,16 +253,19 @@ jobs:
with:
script: |
const run = context.payload.workflow_run;
const workflowId = Number(run.workflow_id || 0);
if (!Number.isInteger(workflowId) || workflowId <= 0) throw new Error("missing workflow id");
const { data: workflow } = await github.rest.actions.getWorkflow({
owner: context.repo.owner,
repo: context.repo.repo,
workflow_id: workflowId,
});
if (workflow.name !== "CI") throw new Error(`unexpected workflow name: ${workflow.name}`);
if (workflow.path !== ".github/workflows/ci.yml") throw new Error(`unexpected workflow path: ${workflow.path}`);
if (run.path && run.path !== workflow.path) throw new Error(`workflow path mismatch: ${run.path}`);
if (run.name !== "CI") throw new Error(`unexpected workflow name: ${run.name}`);
let workflowPath = run.path || "";
if (!workflowPath) {
const workflowId = Number(run.workflow_id || 0);
if (!Number.isInteger(workflowId) || workflowId <= 0) throw new Error("missing workflow id");
const { data: workflow } = await github.rest.actions.getWorkflow({
owner: context.repo.owner,
repo: context.repo.repo,
workflow_id: workflowId,
});
workflowPath = workflow.path || "";
}
if (workflowPath !== ".github/workflows/ci.yml") throw new Error(`unexpected workflow path: ${workflowPath}`);
if (run.event !== "pull_request") throw new Error(`unexpected event: ${run.event}`);
if (run.conclusion !== "success") throw new Error(`unexpected conclusion: ${run.conclusion}`);
if (run.repository.id !== context.payload.repository.id) throw new Error("repository id mismatch");

View File

@@ -2,90 +2,6 @@
All notable changes to this project will be documented in this file.
## [v1.0.81] - 2026-07-31
### Features
- support visible_rule for form questions (#1891)
- **contact**: add bot search shortcut (#2083)
- add SXSD schema validation to Slides lint (#2103)
- **drive**: add comment-operation shortcuts (#1898)
- **drive**: extend permission shortcuts for Miaoda (#2070)
- **apps**: add cache debug commands (+cache-get/-delete/-clear) (#1896)
- support source file preview artifacts (#2085)
### Bug Fixes
- **contact**: stop bot match segments carrying tags or empty entries (#2115)
- **base**: resolve Base URL block types accurately (#2099)
- **drive**: use title for default download filename (#2089)
- drop stale target version from root upgrade prompt (#2100)
### Documentation
- **calendar**: warn against container-default timezone in time conversion (#2104)
- **calendar**: confirm scope before editing recurring events (#2119)
- **base**: clarify form and file operation routing (#2110)
### Misc
- add protected public domain allowlists (#2111)
## [v1.0.80] - 2026-07-29
### Features
- **drive**: add +member-list shortcut (#1795)
- **drive**: add +permission-get-setting shortcut (#1738)
- propagate invocation metadata (#2097)
### Documentation
- **slides**: 补齐 shortcut 参数说明,修正 +xml-get --output 必填标注 (#2088)
- **slides**: +create 的参数下沉到 create.md主 skill 只留路由 (#2096)
### Tests
- **e2e**: wait for base role update visibility (#2087)
### Misc
- Feat/detect line text overlap (#2069)
## [v1.0.79] - 2026-07-28
### Features
- **slides**: update xsd (#2067)
### Bug Fixes
- **ci**: validate static workflow identity (#2015)
- **sheets**: recognize OFL0X local office tokens (#2063)
### Documentation
- **calendar**: clarify identity selection by event ownership (#2071)
- **slides**: add formula inline element syntax to quick-ref (#2077)
## [v1.0.78] - 2026-07-27
### Features
- event description support rich text (#1975)
### Bug Fixes
- **slides**: restrict canvas overflow checks
- **slides**: upgrade text overflow to error above 10px threshold
- **slides**: detect letterSpacing-driven text overflow
- **slides**: downgrade background-decoration text overflow to info
- **slides**: allow chartParsedValues roundtrip tag
- refine character width estimation for lark-slides text lint
- **slides**: preserve info lint severity
- **slides**: text may over flow shape
- exempt ghost text from slides lint
## [v1.0.77] - 2026-07-24
### Features
@@ -1751,10 +1667,6 @@ Bundled AI agent skills for intelligent assistance:
- Bilingual documentation (English & Chinese).
- CI/CD pipelines: linting, testing, coverage reporting, and automated releases.
[v1.0.81]: https://github.com/larksuite/cli/releases/tag/v1.0.81
[v1.0.80]: https://github.com/larksuite/cli/releases/tag/v1.0.80
[v1.0.79]: https://github.com/larksuite/cli/releases/tag/v1.0.79
[v1.0.78]: https://github.com/larksuite/cli/releases/tag/v1.0.78
[v1.0.77]: https://github.com/larksuite/cli/releases/tag/v1.0.77
[v1.0.75]: https://github.com/larksuite/cli/releases/tag/v1.0.75
[v1.0.74]: https://github.com/larksuite/cli/releases/tag/v1.0.74

View File

@@ -310,6 +310,10 @@ lark-cli config risk-control default
Please fully understand all usage risks. By using this tool, you are deemed to voluntarily assume all related responsibilities.
## Star History
[![Star History Chart](https://api.star-history.com/svg?repos=larksuite/cli&type=Date)](https://star-history.com/#larksuite/cli&Date)
## Contributing
Community contributions are welcome! If you find a bug or have feature suggestions, please submit an [Issue](https://github.com/larksuite/cli/issues) or [Pull Request](https://github.com/larksuite/cli/pulls).

View File

@@ -311,6 +311,10 @@ lark-cli config risk-control default
请您充分知悉全部使用风险,使用本工具即视为您自愿承担相关所有责任。
## Star History
[![Star History Chart](https://api.star-history.com/svg?repos=larksuite/cli&type=Date)](https://star-history.com/#larksuite/cli&Date)
## 贡献
欢迎社区贡献!如果你发现 bug 或有功能建议,请提交 [Issue](https://github.com/larksuite/cli/issues) 或 [Pull Request](https://github.com/larksuite/cli/pulls)。

View File

@@ -23,41 +23,6 @@ lark-cli contact +search-user --query "alice" --as user
lark-cli contact +search-user --user-ids "ou_3a8b****6a7b,me" --as user
```
## +search-bot
Search bots (apps) by keyword. Pass `--query` or `--queries`; use `--chat-ids` to search within specific chats.
### Skills
- lark-contact/references/lark-contact-search-bot.md
### Avoid when
- Looking for a person rather than a bot → use [[+search-user]]
- Running as a bot — this shortcut is user-only
### Tips
- `has_more=true` means the search is incomplete; refine the keyword or search scope instead of paginating
### Examples
**Find bots by keyword**
```bash
lark-cli contact +search-bot --query "会议助手" --as user
```
**Search inside one chat**
```bash
lark-cli contact +search-bot --query "助手" --chat-ids "oc_3a8b****6a7b" --as user
```
**Find bots you've chatted with**
```bash
lark-cli contact +search-bot --query "助手" --has-chatted --as user
```
**Search several bot keywords in one call**
```bash
lark-cli contact +search-bot --queries "会议助手,日报助手,审批助手" --as user
```
## +get-user
Fetch one user's profile by id, or your own with --user-id omitted. Use it under bot identity — `+search-user` is user-only.

View File

@@ -386,7 +386,7 @@ func TestAuthScopesRun_UsesTenantAccessTokenFromCredentialProvider(t *testing.T)
AppID: "test-app", AppSecret: "", Brand: core.BrandFeishu,
})
tokenResolver := &authScopesTokenResolver{}
f.Credential = credential.NewCredentialProvider(nil, nil, tokenResolver, nil)
f.Credential = newAuthTestCredentialProvider("test-app", tokenResolver)
appInfoStub := &httpmock.Stub{
Method: http.MethodGet,
@@ -442,7 +442,7 @@ func TestAuthScopesRun_LarkPermissionError_TypedAsPermissionError(t *testing.T)
AppID: "test-app", AppSecret: "test-secret", Brand: core.BrandFeishu,
})
tokenResolver := &authScopesTokenResolver{}
f.Credential = credential.NewCredentialProvider(nil, nil, tokenResolver, nil)
f.Credential = newAuthTestCredentialProvider("test-app", tokenResolver)
reg.Register(&httpmock.Stub{
Method: http.MethodGet,
@@ -485,6 +485,18 @@ type authScopesTokenResolver struct {
requests []credential.TokenSpec
}
type authTestAccountResolver struct {
appID string
}
func (r authTestAccountResolver) ResolveAccount(context.Context) (*credential.Account, error) {
return &credential.Account{AppID: r.appID, Brand: core.BrandFeishu}, nil
}
func newAuthTestCredentialProvider(appID string, tokenResolver credential.DefaultTokenResolver) *credential.CredentialProvider {
return credential.NewCredentialProvider(nil, authTestAccountResolver{appID: appID}, tokenResolver, nil)
}
func (r *authScopesTokenResolver) ResolveToken(ctx context.Context, req credential.TokenSpec) (*credential.TokenResult, error) {
r.requests = append(r.requests, req)
switch req.Type {

View File

@@ -27,6 +27,9 @@ func NewCmdAuthStatus(f *cmdutil.Factory, runF func(*StatusOptions) error) *cobr
cmd := &cobra.Command{
Use: "status",
Short: "View current auth status",
Long: `Show OAuth user login, token validity, and granted scopes.
For token-validity checks, run lark-cli auth status --json --verify.
This is not profile/app selection diagnostics; use lark-cli whoami for the effective app/profile identity used by an invocation.`,
RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
if runF != nil {
return runF(opts)

View File

@@ -4,15 +4,35 @@
package auth
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"net/http"
"strings"
"testing"
extcred "github.com/larksuite/cli/extension/credential"
envprovider "github.com/larksuite/cli/extension/credential/env"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/cmdutil"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/credential"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/envvars"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/httpmock"
)
func TestAuthStatusHelpDistinguishesFromWhoami(t *testing.T) {
cmd := NewCmdAuthStatus(nil, nil)
for _, want := range []string{
"OAuth user login",
"auth status --json --verify",
"not profile/app selection diagnostics",
"lark-cli whoami",
} {
if !strings.Contains(cmd.Long, want) {
t.Errorf("auth status --help Long missing %q; got:\n%s", want, cmd.Long)
}
}
}
func TestAuthStatusRun_SplitsBotAndUserIdentity(t *testing.T) {
f, stdout, _, _ := cmdutil.TestFactory(t, &core.CliConfig{
AppID: "test-app", AppSecret: "secret", Brand: core.BrandFeishu,
@@ -79,6 +99,51 @@ func TestAuthStatusRun_VerifyReportsBotIdentity(t *testing.T) {
}
}
type fixedStatusAccountResolver struct {
account *credential.Account
}
func (r *fixedStatusAccountResolver) ResolveAccount(context.Context) (*credential.Account, error) {
return r.account, nil
}
func TestAuthStatus_AllowsMatchingAppIDOnlySelectedProfile(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
t.Setenv(envvars.CliAppID, "cli_a")
t.Setenv(envvars.CliAppSecret, "")
t.Setenv(envvars.CliUserAccessToken, "")
t.Setenv(envvars.CliTenantAccessToken, "")
if err := core.SaveMultiAppConfig(&core.MultiAppConfig{
CurrentApp: "tenant_a",
Apps: []core.AppConfig{{
Name: "tenant_a",
AppId: "cli_a",
AppSecret: core.PlainSecret("test-secret"),
Brand: core.BrandFeishu,
}},
}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("SaveMultiAppConfig: %v", err)
}
config := &core.CliConfig{ProfileName: "tenant_a", AppID: "cli_a", AppSecret: "test-secret", Brand: core.BrandFeishu}
f, stdout, _, _ := cmdutil.TestFactory(t, config)
f.Credential = credential.NewCredentialProvider(
[]extcred.Provider{&envprovider.Provider{}},
&fixedStatusAccountResolver{account: credential.AccountFromCliConfig(config)},
nil,
nil,
).WithProfileFromFlag("tenant_a")
cmd := NewCmdAuth(f)
cmd.SetArgs([]string{"status", "--json"})
if err := cmd.Execute(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("auth status should use the selected built-in profile: %v", err)
}
if strings.Contains(stdout.String(), "credentials are provided externally") {
t.Fatalf("matching APP_ID-only env was misclassified as external:\n%s", stdout.String())
}
}
type statusOutput struct {
Identity string `json:"identity"`
Verified *bool `json:"verified"`

View File

@@ -6,8 +6,10 @@ package cmd
import (
"errors"
"io"
"os"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/cmdutil"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/envvars"
"github.com/spf13/pflag"
)
@@ -26,5 +28,13 @@ func BootstrapInvocationContext(args []string) (cmdutil.InvocationContext, error
if err := fs.Parse(args); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, pflag.ErrHelp) {
return cmdutil.InvocationContext{}, err
}
return cmdutil.InvocationContext{Profile: globals.Profile}, nil
profileFromFlag := fs.Changed("profile")
if !profileFromFlag {
globals.Profile = os.Getenv(envvars.CliProfile)
}
return cmdutil.InvocationContext{
Profile: globals.Profile,
ProfileFromFlag: profileFromFlag,
}, nil
}

View File

@@ -3,7 +3,11 @@
package cmd
import "testing"
import (
"testing"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/envvars"
)
func TestBootstrapInvocationContext_ProfileFlag(t *testing.T) {
inv, err := BootstrapInvocationContext([]string{"--profile", "target", "auth", "status"})
@@ -70,3 +74,58 @@ func TestBootstrapInvocationContext_HelpWithProfile(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("profile = %q, want %q", inv.Profile, "target")
}
}
func TestBootstrapProfileEnvFallback(t *testing.T) {
t.Run("flag wins over env", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv(envvars.CliProfile, "tenant_env")
inv, err := BootstrapInvocationContext([]string{"--profile", "tenant_flag", "whoami"})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected err: %v", err)
}
if inv.Profile != "tenant_flag" {
t.Errorf("got %q, want tenant_flag", inv.Profile)
}
if !inv.ProfileFromFlag {
t.Errorf("ProfileFromFlag = false, want true")
}
})
t.Run("explicit empty flag clears env selection", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv(envvars.CliProfile, "tenant_env")
inv, err := BootstrapInvocationContext([]string{"--profile=", "whoami"})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected err: %v", err)
}
if inv.Profile != "" {
t.Errorf("got %q, want empty", inv.Profile)
}
if !inv.ProfileFromFlag {
t.Errorf("ProfileFromFlag = false, want true")
}
})
t.Run("env used when flag absent", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv(envvars.CliProfile, "tenant_env")
inv, err := BootstrapInvocationContext([]string{"whoami"})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected err: %v", err)
}
if inv.Profile != "tenant_env" {
t.Errorf("got %q, want tenant_env", inv.Profile)
}
if inv.ProfileFromFlag {
t.Errorf("ProfileFromFlag = true, want false")
}
})
t.Run("empty when neither set", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv(envvars.CliProfile, "")
inv, err := BootstrapInvocationContext([]string{"whoami"})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected err: %v", err)
}
if inv.Profile != "" {
t.Errorf("got %q, want empty", inv.Profile)
}
if inv.ProfileFromFlag {
t.Errorf("ProfileFromFlag = true, want false")
}
})
}

View File

@@ -84,6 +84,16 @@ func TestConfigShowCmd_FlagParsing(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestConfigShowHelpClarifiesSavedConfig(t *testing.T) {
cmd := NewCmdConfigShow(nil, nil)
if !strings.Contains(cmd.Short, "saved config") {
t.Errorf("config show short = %q, want saved config", cmd.Short)
}
if !strings.Contains(cmd.Long, "lark-cli whoami --json") {
t.Errorf("config show help missing whoami route")
}
}
func TestConfigShowRun_NotConfiguredReturnsStructuredError(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
@@ -106,6 +116,77 @@ func TestConfigShowRun_NotConfiguredReturnsStructuredError(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// config show promises "saved config, not current usage" (help + skill
// routing): the session profile (--profile / LARKSUITE_CLI_PROFILE) must not
// change what it shows.
func TestConfigShowRun_IgnoresSessionProfile(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
multi := &core.MultiAppConfig{
CurrentApp: "tenant_a",
Apps: []core.AppConfig{
{Name: "tenant_a", AppId: "cli_a", AppSecret: core.PlainSecret("your-secret-a"), Brand: core.BrandFeishu},
{Name: "tenant_b", AppId: "cli_b", AppSecret: core.PlainSecret("your-secret-b"), Brand: core.BrandFeishu},
},
}
if err := core.SaveMultiAppConfig(multi); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("SaveMultiAppConfig: %v", err)
}
f, stdout, _, _ := cmdutil.TestFactory(t, nil)
f.Invocation.Profile = "tenant_b" // session selection must not leak in
if err := configShowRun(&ConfigShowOptions{Factory: f}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("configShowRun: %v", err)
}
out := stdout.String()
if !strings.Contains(out, `"cli_a"`) || !strings.Contains(out, `"tenant_a"`) {
t.Fatalf("output = %s, want the saved default tenant_a/cli_a", out)
}
if strings.Contains(out, `"cli_b"`) {
t.Fatalf("output = %s, session profile tenant_b must not change saved-config view", out)
}
}
// engagedEnvStub simulates a fully engaged external credential provider.
type engagedEnvStub struct{}
func (engagedEnvStub) Name() string { return "env" }
func (engagedEnvStub) Priority() int { return 10 }
func (engagedEnvStub) ResolveAccount(context.Context) (*extcred.Account, error) {
return &extcred.Account{AppID: "cli_env", AppSecret: "your-password"}, nil // managed takeover
}
func (engagedEnvStub) ResolveToken(context.Context, extcred.TokenSpec) (*extcred.Token, error) {
return nil, nil
}
// config show inspects the SAVED config only, so the parent command's
// external-credential gate must not apply: even with a fully engaged direct
// env credential, `config show` still answers from the saved config.
func TestConfigShow_BypassesExternalCredentialGate(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
multi := &core.MultiAppConfig{
CurrentApp: "tenant_a",
Apps: []core.AppConfig{{
Name: "tenant_a", AppId: "cli_a", AppSecret: core.PlainSecret("your-secret-a"), Brand: core.BrandFeishu,
}},
}
if err := core.SaveMultiAppConfig(multi); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("SaveMultiAppConfig: %v", err)
}
f, stdout, _, _ := cmdutil.TestFactory(t, nil)
f.Credential = credential.NewCredentialProvider([]extcred.Provider{engagedEnvStub{}}, nil, nil, nil)
cmd := NewCmdConfig(f)
cmd.SetArgs([]string{"show"})
if err := cmd.Execute(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("config show must bypass the external-credential gate: %v", err)
}
if out := stdout.String(); !strings.Contains(out, `"cli_a"`) {
t.Fatalf("output = %s, want the saved config shown", out)
}
}
func TestConfigShowRun_NoActiveProfileReturnsStructuredError(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
multi := &core.MultiAppConfig{
@@ -481,7 +562,8 @@ func TestConfigBlockedByExternalProvider(t *testing.T) {
}{
{"init", []string{"init", "--app-id", "x", "--app-secret-stdin"}},
{"remove", []string{"remove"}},
{"show", []string{"show"}},
// "show" is deliberately absent: it inspects the SAVED config only
// and bypasses this gate (TestConfigShow_BypassesExternalCredentialGate).
{"default-as", []string{"default-as", "user"}},
{"strict-mode", []string{"strict-mode", "off"}},
}

View File

@@ -179,8 +179,8 @@ func runCreateAppFlow(ctx context.Context, f *cmdutil.Factory, brandOverride cor
}
// Step 1: Request app registration (begin)
// Registration is platform traffic, so it must use the provider-aware
// transport as well as the shared proxy configuration.
// Use the shared proxy-plugin-aware transport so registration traffic is not
// a bypass of proxy plugin mode.
httpClient := transport.NewHTTPClient(0)
authResp, err := larkauth.RequestAppRegistration(ctx, httpClient, larkBrand, f.IOStreams.ErrOut)
if err != nil {

View File

@@ -27,7 +27,16 @@ func NewCmdConfigShow(f *cmdutil.Factory, runF func(*ConfigShowOptions) error) *
cmd := &cobra.Command{
Use: "show",
Short: "Show current configuration",
Short: "Show saved config",
Long: "Shows saved config. To see the app/profile lark-cli is using now, run `lark-cli whoami --json`.",
// Override parent's RequireBuiltinCredentialProvider check: this
// command reads the SAVED config only (its own help promises "saved
// config, not current usage"), so the currently effective credential
// source — external or otherwise — must not gate it.
PersistentPreRunE: func(c *cobra.Command, _ []string) error {
c.SilenceUsage = true
return nil
},
RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
if runF != nil {
return runF(opts)
@@ -53,7 +62,10 @@ func configShowRun(opts *ConfigShowOptions) error {
if config == nil || len(config.Apps) == 0 {
return core.NotConfiguredError()
}
app := config.CurrentAppConfig(f.Invocation.Profile)
// Saved config only: the session profile (--profile / LARKSUITE_CLI_PROFILE)
// must not change what this command shows — the help and skill routing
// promise "saved config, not current usage" (use whoami for that).
app := config.CurrentAppConfig("")
if app == nil {
return errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeNotConfigured, "no active profile").WithHint("run: lark-cli profile list")
}

View File

@@ -157,8 +157,8 @@ func networkChecks(ctx context.Context, opts *DoctorOptions, ep core.Endpoints)
}
}
// Connectivity checks are platform traffic and must exercise the same
// provider-aware route as real platform requests.
// Use the shared proxy-plugin-aware transport so connectivity checks reflect
// the real egress path (and are blocked when proxy plugin fails closed).
httpClient := transport.NewHTTPClient(0)
mcpURL := ep.MCP + "/mcp"

View File

@@ -110,8 +110,20 @@ func (failingTokenResolver) ResolveToken(_ context.Context, _ credential.TokenSp
return nil, errors.New("backend unavailable")
}
type eventTestAccountResolver struct {
appID string
}
func (r eventTestAccountResolver) ResolveAccount(context.Context) (*credential.Account, error) {
return &credential.Account{AppID: r.appID}, nil
}
func newEventTestCredentialProvider(appID string, tokenResolver credential.DefaultTokenResolver) *credential.CredentialProvider {
return credential.NewCredentialProvider(nil, eventTestAccountResolver{appID: appID}, tokenResolver, nil)
}
func factoryWithResolver(r credential.DefaultTokenResolver) *cmdutil.Factory {
return &cmdutil.Factory{Credential: credential.NewCredentialProvider(nil, nil, r, nil)}
return &cmdutil.Factory{Credential: newEventTestCredentialProvider("cli_x", r)}
}
func TestResolveTenantToken_EmptyTokenResult(t *testing.T) {

View File

@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ func newTestConsumeRuntime(rt http.RoundTripper) *consumeRuntime {
client: &client.APIClient{
SDK: sdk,
ErrOut: io.Discard,
Credential: credential.NewCredentialProvider(nil, nil, &staticTokenResolver{}, nil),
Credential: newEventTestCredentialProvider("test-app", &staticTokenResolver{}),
Config: &core.CliConfig{AppID: "test-app", AppSecret: "test-secret", Brand: core.BrandFeishu},
},
accessIdentity: core.AsBot,

View File

@@ -17,11 +17,14 @@ import (
)
// profileListItem is the JSON output for a single profile entry.
// `default` (formerly `active`, renamed in this feature as a declared
// breaking change) marks the saved default profile — never the identity
// effective for the current invocation; that is whoami's job.
type profileListItem struct {
Name string `json:"name"`
AppID string `json:"appId"`
Brand core.LarkBrand `json:"brand"`
Active bool `json:"active"`
Default bool `json:"default"`
User string `json:"user,omitempty"`
TokenStatus string `json:"tokenStatus,omitempty"`
}
@@ -30,7 +33,8 @@ type profileListItem struct {
func NewCmdProfileList(f *cmdutil.Factory) *cobra.Command {
cmd := &cobra.Command{
Use: "list",
Short: "List all profiles",
Short: "List saved profiles",
Long: "Lists saved profiles. To see the app/profile lark-cli is using now, run `lark-cli whoami --json`.",
RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
return profileListRun(f)
},
@@ -53,7 +57,7 @@ func profileListRun(f *cmdutil.Factory) error {
return nil
}
// Intentionally uses "" to show the persistent active profile, not the ephemeral --profile override.
// Intentionally uses "" to show the saved default profile, not the ephemeral --profile override.
currentApp := multi.CurrentAppConfig("")
currentName := ""
if currentApp != nil {
@@ -66,10 +70,10 @@ func profileListRun(f *cmdutil.Factory) error {
name := app.ProfileName()
item := profileListItem{
Name: name,
AppID: app.AppId,
Brand: app.Brand,
Active: name == currentName,
Name: name,
AppID: app.AppId,
Brand: app.Brand,
Default: name == currentName,
}
if len(app.Users) > 0 {

View File

@@ -14,6 +14,17 @@ func NewCmdProfile(f *cmdutil.Factory) *cobra.Command {
cmd := &cobra.Command{
Use: "profile",
Short: "Manage configuration profiles",
Long: `Profiles are named app identities managed by lark-cli.
Identity diagnostics and profile selection:
lark-cli whoami --json Show the app/profile lark-cli is using now.
lark-cli auth status --json --verify Verify OAuth login and token state.
--profile <name> Use a profile for this command only.
LARKSUITE_CLI_PROFILE Use a profile for the current shell / agent session.
config show / profile list Inspect saved config, not current usage.
unset LARKSUITE_CLI_PROFILE Clear the session profile and fall back to direct app env or configured default.
A selected profile takes precedence over matching direct env credentials and tokens.`,
}
cmdutil.DisableAuthCheck(cmd)
cmdutil.SetTips(cmd, []string{

View File

@@ -306,14 +306,24 @@ func TestProfileListRun_OutputsProfiles(t *testing.T) {
if err := json.Unmarshal(stdout.Bytes(), &got); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Unmarshal() error = %v; output=%s", err, stdout.String())
}
raw := stdout.String()
// `active` is renamed to `default` as a declared breaking change: keeping
// a permanently mirrored alias would keep misleading agents into reading
// it as the currently effective identity (whoami's job).
if strings.Contains(raw, `"active"`) {
t.Fatalf("profile list output contains renamed active field: %s", raw)
}
if !strings.Contains(raw, `"default"`) {
t.Fatalf("profile list output missing default field: %s", raw)
}
if len(got) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("len(got) = %d, want 2", len(got))
}
if got[0].Name != "default" || !got[0].Active {
t.Fatalf("got[0] = %#v, want active default profile", got[0])
if got[0].Name != "default" || !got[0].Default {
t.Fatalf("got[0] = %#v, want configured default profile", got[0])
}
if got[1].Name != "target" || got[1].Active {
t.Fatalf("got[1] = %#v, want inactive target profile", got[1])
if got[1].Name != "target" || got[1].Default {
t.Fatalf("got[1] = %#v, want non-default target profile", got[1])
}
}
@@ -627,6 +637,39 @@ func TestProfileRemoveRun_ValidationErrors(t *testing.T) {
})
}
// TestProfileHelpHasSelectionSection asserts `profile --help` documents the
// per-invocation flag and session-scoped env var for selecting a profile, so
// users and AI agents can find LARKSUITE_CLI_PROFILE without reading source.
func TestProfileHelpHasSelectionSection(t *testing.T) {
cmd := NewCmdProfile(nil)
if !strings.Contains(cmd.Long, "Identity diagnostics and profile selection:") {
t.Errorf("profile --help missing identity diagnostics and profile selection section")
}
if !strings.Contains(cmd.Long, "LARKSUITE_CLI_PROFILE") {
t.Errorf("profile --help missing LARKSUITE_CLI_PROFILE")
}
if !strings.Contains(cmd.Long, "lark-cli whoami --json") {
t.Errorf("profile --help missing whoami identity route")
}
if !strings.Contains(cmd.Long, "config show / profile list") {
t.Errorf("profile --help missing saved-config boundary")
}
const precedence = "A selected profile takes precedence over matching direct env credentials and tokens."
if !strings.Contains(cmd.Long, precedence) {
t.Errorf("profile --help missing precedence statement %q", precedence)
}
}
func TestProfileListHelpClarifiesSavedProfiles(t *testing.T) {
cmd := NewCmdProfileList(nil)
if !strings.Contains(cmd.Short, "saved profiles") {
t.Errorf("profile list short = %q, want saved profiles", cmd.Short)
}
if !strings.Contains(cmd.Long, "lark-cli whoami --json") {
t.Errorf("profile list help missing whoami route")
}
}
func TestProfileListRun_InvalidConfigReturnsValidationError(t *testing.T) {
dir := setupProfileConfigDir(t)
if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, "config.json"), []byte("{invalid json"), 0600); err != nil {

View File

@@ -65,17 +65,7 @@ func offerRootUpgrade(f *cmdutil.Factory, cmd *cobra.Command) {
if info == nil {
return
}
// Deliberately no target version here: info.Latest comes from the on-disk
// cache, which has no expiry (the 24h TTL only throttles refreshes, and a
// failed refresh leaves the old value in place), so it can name a version
// that is no longer the one npm would install. The version actually
// installed is resolved live by the update subcommand, which prints
// "Updating lark-cli <cur> -> <latest> via <pm> ..." before installing —
// that is where the user sees the real target. Keep going through the
// update subcommand rather than calling RunNpmInstall directly, otherwise
// that line disappears and the user approves a global install without ever
// being told what gets installed.
fmt.Fprintf(ios.ErrOut, "A newer lark-cli is available (current %s). Upgrade now? [y/N]: ", info.Current)
fmt.Fprintf(ios.ErrOut, "lark-cli %s available (current %s). Upgrade now? [y/N]: ", info.Latest, info.Current)
if !readYes(ios.In) {
return
}

View File

@@ -128,17 +128,6 @@ func TestOfferRootUpgrade(t *testing.T) {
if gotPrompt != tc.wantPrompt {
t.Errorf("prompt: got %v want %v (stderr=%q)", gotPrompt, tc.wantPrompt, errBuf.String())
}
// The prompt must not name a target version: info.Latest comes from
// the on-disk cache and can be stale, while the version actually
// installed is resolved live by the update subcommand.
if tc.wantPrompt {
if strings.Contains(errBuf.String(), tc.latest) {
t.Errorf("prompt must not name the cached target version %q (stderr=%q)", tc.latest, errBuf.String())
}
if !strings.Contains(errBuf.String(), build.Version) {
t.Errorf("prompt must name the current version %q (stderr=%q)", build.Version, errBuf.String())
}
}
if called != tc.wantRun {
t.Errorf("runRootUpgrade called: got %v want %v", called, tc.wantRun)
}

View File

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import (
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/cmdutil"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/credential"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/identitydiag"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/output"
)
@@ -33,6 +34,15 @@ type whoamiResult struct {
TokenStatus string `json:"tokenStatus"`
OnBehalfOf *delegatedUser `json:"onBehalfOf,omitempty"`
Hint string `json:"hint,omitempty"`
// CredentialSource, Explicit, and DirectCredentialEnv surface the cached
// credential.IdentitySelection computed during resolution (not re-inferred
// here). On the non-env extension-provider path CredentialSource is
// "extension:<provider>" (e.g. "extension:sidecar"); an empty value only
// means the selection was never resolved.
CredentialSource string `json:"credentialSource"`
Explicit bool `json:"explicit"`
DirectCredentialEnv credential.DirectCredentialEnv `json:"directCredentialEnv"`
}
// delegatedUser is the user a user-identity acts on behalf of.
@@ -58,6 +68,10 @@ func NewCmdWhoami(f *cmdutil.Factory) *cobra.Command {
cmd := &cobra.Command{
Use: "whoami",
Short: "Show the current effective identity, app, profile, and token status (JSON)",
Long: `Show the effective app identity used by this invocation. This is not OAuth login status;
use ` + "`lark-cli auth status --json`" + ` for OAuth user/token state.
The JSON output includes credentialSource, appId, brand, and whether direct app credential
env is present and matches the selected profile.`,
RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
return whoamiRun(cmd, opts)
},
@@ -97,7 +111,17 @@ func whoamiRun(cmd *cobra.Command, opts *Options) error {
f.ResolveStrictMode(ctx).ForcedIdentity(),
)
diag := identitydiag.Diagnose(ctx, f, cfg, false)
res := buildResult(cfg, as, source, diag)
// Read the cached selection computed during resolution; never re-infer it
// here. A resolution failure (e.g. under a non-env extension provider that
// doesn't populate a selection) degrades to the zero value rather than
// regressing whoami's own error/diagnostic path above.
var selection credential.IdentitySelection
if f.Credential != nil {
if sel, err := f.Credential.Selection(ctx); err == nil {
selection = sel
}
}
res := buildResult(cfg, as, source, diag, selection)
output.PrintJson(f.IOStreams.Out, res)
return nil
}
@@ -122,18 +146,23 @@ func resolveSource(changedAs bool, flagAs core.Identity, autoDetected bool, stri
// buildResult maps the resolved identity and local diagnostics into the output.
// ResolveAs only ever returns user or bot, so the default branch handles user.
func buildResult(cfg *core.CliConfig, as core.Identity, source string, diag identitydiag.Result) *whoamiResult {
// selection is the cached credential.IdentitySelection from resolution; it is
// read as-is, never recomputed.
func buildResult(cfg *core.CliConfig, as core.Identity, source string, diag identitydiag.Result, selection credential.IdentitySelection) *whoamiResult {
defaultAs := cfg.DefaultAs
if defaultAs == "" {
defaultAs = core.AsAuto
}
res := &whoamiResult{
Profile: cfg.ProfileName,
AppID: cfg.AppID,
Brand: cfg.Brand,
DefaultAs: string(defaultAs),
Identity: string(as),
IdentitySource: source,
Profile: cfg.ProfileName,
AppID: cfg.AppID,
Brand: cfg.Brand,
DefaultAs: string(defaultAs),
Identity: string(as),
IdentitySource: source,
CredentialSource: string(selection.Source),
Explicit: selection.Explicit(),
DirectCredentialEnv: selection.DirectCredentialEnv,
}
// Use the diagnosed hint as-is: it is tailored to the credential source, so
// it never says "auth login" when that is blocked under an external provider.

View File

@@ -15,10 +15,13 @@ import (
"github.com/larksuite/cli/errs"
extcred "github.com/larksuite/cli/extension/credential"
envprovider "github.com/larksuite/cli/extension/credential/env"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/cmdutil"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/credential"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/envvars"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/identitydiag"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/keychain"
)
func TestResolveSource(t *testing.T) {
@@ -52,7 +55,7 @@ func TestBuildResult_UserValid(t *testing.T) {
diag := identitydiag.Result{
User: identitydiag.Identity{Available: true, Status: "ready", TokenStatus: "valid", OpenID: "ou_x", UserName: "Alice"},
}
r := buildResult(cfg, core.AsUser, "auto_detect", diag)
r := buildResult(cfg, core.AsUser, "auto_detect", diag, credential.IdentitySelection{})
if r.Identity != "user" || r.IdentitySource != "auto_detect" {
t.Fatalf("identity/source = %q/%q", r.Identity, r.IdentitySource)
@@ -77,7 +80,7 @@ func TestBuildResult_UserMissingToken(t *testing.T) {
diag := identitydiag.Result{
User: identitydiag.Identity{Available: false, Status: "missing", Hint: "run: lark-cli auth login --help"}, // never logged in
}
r := buildResult(cfg, core.AsUser, "auto_detect", diag)
r := buildResult(cfg, core.AsUser, "auto_detect", diag, credential.IdentitySelection{})
if r.Available {
t.Fatalf("available = true, want false")
@@ -100,7 +103,7 @@ func TestBuildResult_BotReady(t *testing.T) {
diag := identitydiag.Result{
Bot: identitydiag.Identity{Available: true, Status: "ready"},
}
r := buildResult(cfg, core.AsBot, "default_as", diag)
r := buildResult(cfg, core.AsBot, "default_as", diag, credential.IdentitySelection{})
if r.Identity != "bot" || r.IdentitySource != "default_as" {
t.Fatalf("identity/source = %q/%q", r.Identity, r.IdentitySource)
@@ -121,7 +124,7 @@ func TestBuildResult_BotNotConfigured(t *testing.T) {
diag := identitydiag.Result{
Bot: identitydiag.Identity{Available: false, Status: "not_configured", Hint: "run: lark-cli config --help"},
}
r := buildResult(cfg, core.AsBot, "auto_detect", diag)
r := buildResult(cfg, core.AsBot, "auto_detect", diag, credential.IdentitySelection{})
if r.Available {
t.Fatalf("available = true, want false")
@@ -318,3 +321,94 @@ func TestWhoami_ExternalProvider_UserHintNotKeychain(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("hint should explain external management: %q", got.Hint)
}
}
// noopWhoamiKeychain is a no-op KeychainAccess; the profile below uses a
// plaintext secret, so no keychain lookup is actually required.
type noopWhoamiKeychain struct{}
func (noopWhoamiKeychain) Get(service, account string) (string, error) { return "", nil }
func (noopWhoamiKeychain) Set(service, account, value string) error { return nil }
func (noopWhoamiKeychain) Remove(service, account string) error { return nil }
// credentialSourceSecret is the profile secret written to config for
// TestWhoamiIncludesCredentialSource. It must never leak into whoami's output
// (security: never leak a secret).
const credentialSourceSecret = "test-secret"
// profileSelectionFactory builds a Factory whose CredentialProvider resolves
// an explicit profile ("tenant_a") supplied via the LARKSUITE_CLI_PROFILE env
// fallback (not --profile), so Selection().Source resolves to
// env:LARKSUITE_CLI_PROFILE and Explicit() is true, with no direct
// app-credential env vars present.
func profileSelectionFactory(t *testing.T) (*cmdutil.Factory, *bytes.Buffer) {
t.Helper()
t.Setenv(envvars.CliAppID, "")
t.Setenv(envvars.CliAppSecret, "")
t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
multi := &core.MultiAppConfig{
CurrentApp: "tenant_a",
Apps: []core.AppConfig{{
Name: "tenant_a",
AppId: "cli_a",
AppSecret: core.PlainSecret(credentialSourceSecret),
Brand: core.BrandFeishu,
}},
}
if err := core.SaveMultiAppConfig(multi); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("SaveMultiAppConfig: %v", err)
}
defaultAcct := credential.NewDefaultAccountProvider(func() keychain.KeychainAccess { return noopWhoamiKeychain{} }, "tenant_a")
cred := credential.NewCredentialProvider([]extcred.Provider{&envprovider.Provider{}}, defaultAcct, nil, nil)
cred.WithProfileFromEnv("tenant_a")
cfg := &core.CliConfig{ProfileName: "tenant_a", AppID: "cli_a", AppSecret: credentialSourceSecret, Brand: core.BrandFeishu}
out := &bytes.Buffer{}
f := &cmdutil.Factory{
Config: func() (*core.CliConfig, error) { return cfg, nil },
Credential: cred,
IOStreams: &cmdutil.IOStreams{Out: out, ErrOut: &bytes.Buffer{}},
}
return f, out
}
// TestWhoamiIncludesCredentialSource locks in the diagnostic fields surfaced
// from the cached credential.IdentitySelection: credentialSource,
// explicit, and directCredentialEnv. whoami must read the cached selection
// as-is, not re-infer it.
func TestWhoamiIncludesCredentialSource(t *testing.T) {
f, out := profileSelectionFactory(t)
cmd := NewCmdWhoami(f)
cmd.SetArgs([]string{})
if err := cmd.Execute(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Execute() error = %v", err)
}
raw := out.String()
if strings.Contains(raw, credentialSourceSecret) {
t.Fatalf("whoami output leaked the profile secret: %s", raw)
}
var got whoamiResult
if err := json.Unmarshal(out.Bytes(), &got); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("json.Unmarshal() error = %v\n%s", err, raw)
}
if got.CredentialSource != string(credential.SourceEnvProfile) {
t.Fatalf("credentialSource = %q, want %q", got.CredentialSource, credential.SourceEnvProfile)
}
if !got.Explicit {
t.Fatalf("explicit = false, want true")
}
if got.DirectCredentialEnv.Present {
t.Fatalf("directCredentialEnv.present = true, want false: %#v", got.DirectCredentialEnv)
}
if !strings.Contains(raw, `"credentialSource": "env:LARKSUITE_CLI_PROFILE"`) {
t.Fatalf("raw JSON missing credentialSource literal: %s", raw)
}
if got.DirectCredentialEnv.Present || len(got.DirectCredentialEnv.Keys) != 0 ||
got.DirectCredentialEnv.AppID != "" || got.DirectCredentialEnv.Matched || got.DirectCredentialEnv.ConflictsWithProfile {
t.Fatalf("directCredentialEnv = %#v, want only present:false set", got.DirectCredentialEnv)
}
}

View File

@@ -67,6 +67,17 @@ Typed errors render to **stderr** as one JSON object per process exit:
| `error.params` | per-Subtype-stable | per-parameter validation detail array (`ValidationError`); see **Validation parameters** |
| per-Subtype extension fields | per-Subtype-stable | e.g. `missing_scopes`, `console_url`, `challenge_url` |
Credential/identity-selection extension fields (per-Subtype-stable):
| Field | Carrier | Subtypes | Notes |
|-------|---------|----------|-------|
| `missing_keys` | `ConfigError` | `app_credential_incomplete` | env var NAMES that must all be set; never values |
| `required_any_of` | `ConfigError` | `app_credential_incomplete` | env var NAMES where any one completes the credential; mutually exclusive with `missing_keys` |
| `profile` | `ConfigError` | `profile_not_found`, `profile_secret_invalid` | requested profile name |
| `app_id` | `ConfigError` | `profile_secret_invalid` | plaintext app id; never a secret |
| `credential_source` | `ConfigError` | `profile_not_found`, `no_active_profile` | how the identity was (not) chosen: `flag:--profile` \| `env:LARKSUITE_CLI_PROFILE` \| `config` |
| `profile_app_id`, `env_app_id` | `ValidationError` | `profile_app_credential_conflict` | the two conflicting plaintext app ids |
`SecurityPolicyError` renders through the same typed envelope as every
other category. `error.type` is `"policy"`, `error.subtype` is one of
`challenge_required` / `access_denied`, and process exit is `6` via

View File

@@ -136,6 +136,79 @@ func TestConfigError_MarshalJSON(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestConfigError_ProfileFieldsMarshalJSON(t *testing.T) {
ce := NewConfigError(SubtypeAppCredentialIncomplete, "incomplete").
WithMissingKeys("LARKSUITE_CLI_APP_ID", "LARKSUITE_CLI_APP_SECRET").
WithRequiredAnyOf("LARKSUITE_CLI_APP_SECRET", "LARKSUITE_CLI_USER_ACCESS_TOKEN").
WithProfile("work").
WithAppID("cli_abc").
WithCredentialSource("flag:--profile")
b, err := json.Marshal(ce)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
s := string(b)
for _, want := range []string{
`"type":"config"`,
`"subtype":"app_credential_incomplete"`,
`"missing_keys":["LARKSUITE_CLI_APP_ID","LARKSUITE_CLI_APP_SECRET"]`,
`"required_any_of":["LARKSUITE_CLI_APP_SECRET","LARKSUITE_CLI_USER_ACCESS_TOKEN"]`,
`"profile":"work"`,
`"app_id":"cli_abc"`,
`"credential_source":"flag:--profile"`,
} {
if !strings.Contains(s, want) {
t.Errorf("missing %q in %s", want, s)
}
}
// omitempty: unset fields must not appear on the wire.
empty := NewConfigError(SubtypeProfileNotFound, "x")
b2, err := json.Marshal(empty)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
s2 := string(b2)
for _, notWant := range []string{`"missing_keys"`, `"required_any_of"`, `"profile"`, `"app_id"`, `"credential_source"`} {
if strings.Contains(s2, notWant) {
t.Errorf("%q should be omitted when empty; got %s", notWant, s2)
}
}
}
func TestValidationError_ProfileConflictMarshalJSON(t *testing.T) {
ve := NewValidationError(SubtypeProfileAppCredentialConflict, "conflict").
WithProfileAppConflict("cli_profile", "cli_env")
b, err := json.Marshal(ve)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
s := string(b)
for _, want := range []string{
`"type":"validation"`,
`"subtype":"profile_app_credential_conflict"`,
`"profile_app_id":"cli_profile"`,
`"env_app_id":"cli_env"`,
} {
if !strings.Contains(s, want) {
t.Errorf("missing %q in %s", want, s)
}
}
// omitempty: unset conflict fields must not appear on the wire.
empty := NewValidationError(SubtypeInvalidArgument, "x")
b2, err := json.Marshal(empty)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
s2 := string(b2)
for _, notWant := range []string{`"profile_app_id"`, `"env_app_id"`} {
if strings.Contains(s2, notWant) {
t.Errorf("%q should be omitted when empty; got %s", notWant, s2)
}
}
}
func TestNetworkError_MarshalJSON(t *testing.T) {
ne := &NetworkError{
Problem: Problem{Category: CategoryNetwork, Subtype: SubtypeNetworkTimeout, Message: "dial timeout"},

View File

@@ -12,8 +12,9 @@ const (
// CategoryValidation subtypes
const (
SubtypeInvalidArgument Subtype = "invalid_argument" // user-supplied flag / arg failed validation (gRPC INVALID_ARGUMENT alignment)
SubtypeFailedPrecondition Subtype = "failed_precondition" // request is valid but the system/resource state is not in the state required to execute; caller must change state (not retry) — e.g. ambiguous remote mapping (gRPC FAILED_PRECONDITION alignment)
SubtypeInvalidArgument Subtype = "invalid_argument" // user-supplied flag / arg failed validation (gRPC INVALID_ARGUMENT alignment)
SubtypeFailedPrecondition Subtype = "failed_precondition" // request is valid but the system/resource state is not in the state required to execute; caller must change state (not retry) — e.g. ambiguous remote mapping (gRPC FAILED_PRECONDITION alignment)
SubtypeProfileAppCredentialConflict Subtype = "profile_app_credential_conflict" // profile and direct app env both set but app_id differs
)
// CategoryAuthentication subtypes
@@ -41,9 +42,13 @@ const (
// CategoryConfig subtypes
const (
SubtypeInvalidClient Subtype = "invalid_client" // app_id / app_secret incorrect (RFC 6749 §5.2 alignment)
SubtypeNotConfigured Subtype = "not_configured" // local config file absent (user has not run `config init`)
SubtypeInvalidConfig Subtype = "invalid_config" // local config file present but malformed
SubtypeInvalidClient Subtype = "invalid_client" // app_id / app_secret incorrect (RFC 6749 §5.2 alignment)
SubtypeNotConfigured Subtype = "not_configured" // local config file absent (user has not run `config init`)
SubtypeInvalidConfig Subtype = "invalid_config" // local config file present but malformed
SubtypeProfileNotFound Subtype = "profile_not_found" // --profile / LARKSUITE_CLI_PROFILE points to a nonexistent profile
SubtypeNoActiveProfile Subtype = "no_active_profile" // no active identity input and no usable default profile
SubtypeAppCredentialIncomplete Subtype = "app_credential_incomplete" // direct app env missing app_id or app_secret
SubtypeProfileSecretInvalid Subtype = "profile_secret_invalid" // profile exists but its secret cannot be resolved locally
)
// CategoryNetwork subtypes

View File

@@ -61,9 +61,11 @@ type TypedError interface {
// it is intentionally not serialized.
type ValidationError struct {
Problem
Param string `json:"param,omitempty"`
Params []InvalidParam `json:"params,omitempty"`
Cause error `json:"-"`
Param string `json:"param,omitempty"`
Params []InvalidParam `json:"params,omitempty"`
ProfileAppID string `json:"profile_app_id,omitempty"`
EnvAppID string `json:"env_app_id,omitempty"`
Cause error `json:"-"`
}
// InvalidParam is one structured validation diagnostic: the parameter that
@@ -150,6 +152,12 @@ func (e *ValidationError) WithCause(cause error) *ValidationError {
return e
}
func (e *ValidationError) WithProfileAppConflict(profileAppID, envAppID string) *ValidationError {
e.ProfileAppID = profileAppID
e.EnvAppID = envAppID
return e
}
// =========================== AuthenticationError =============================
// AuthenticationError is the typed error for CategoryAuthentication.
@@ -315,8 +323,18 @@ func (e *PermissionError) WithCause(cause error) *PermissionError {
// intentionally not serialized.
type ConfigError struct {
Problem
Field string `json:"field,omitempty"`
Cause error `json:"-"`
Field string `json:"field,omitempty"`
MissingKeys []string `json:"missing_keys,omitempty"`
RequiredAnyOf []string `json:"required_any_of,omitempty"`
Profile string `json:"profile,omitempty"`
AppID string `json:"app_id,omitempty"`
// CredentialSource is the machine-readable App/credential selection source
// that produced this config error (e.g. "flag:--profile",
// "env:LARKSUITE_CLI_PROFILE", "config"). It is required on
// profile_not_found and no_active_profile so an agent can branch
// on how the identity was (or was not) chosen. It is never a secret.
CredentialSource string `json:"credential_source,omitempty"`
Cause error `json:"-"`
}
// Unwrap is nil-receiver safe; see ValidationError.Unwrap.
@@ -370,6 +388,34 @@ func (e *ConfigError) WithField(field string) *ConfigError {
return e
}
func (e *ConfigError) WithMissingKeys(keys ...string) *ConfigError {
e.MissingKeys = slices.Clone(keys)
return e
}
func (e *ConfigError) WithRequiredAnyOf(keys ...string) *ConfigError {
e.RequiredAnyOf = slices.Clone(keys)
return e
}
func (e *ConfigError) WithProfile(name string) *ConfigError {
e.Profile = name
return e
}
func (e *ConfigError) WithAppID(appID string) *ConfigError {
e.AppID = appID
return e
}
// WithCredentialSource records the machine-readable credential-selection source
// on the wire (snake_case credential_source). The value is an enum string
// (e.g. "flag:--profile", "config"), never a secret.
func (e *ConfigError) WithCredentialSource(source string) *ConfigError {
e.CredentialSource = source
return e
}
func (e *ConfigError) WithCause(cause error) *ConfigError {
e.Cause = cause
return e

View File

@@ -643,3 +643,29 @@ func TestBuilderSetter_DefensiveCopy(t *testing.T) {
}
})
}
// ======================= Profile selection error subtypes =======================
func TestConfigErrorProfileFields(t *testing.T) {
e := errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeAppCredentialIncomplete, "incomplete").
WithMissingKeys("LARKSUITE_CLI_APP_ID").
WithCredentialSource("env:LARKSUITE_CLI_PROFILE")
p, ok := errs.ProblemOf(e)
if !ok || p.Subtype != errs.SubtypeAppCredentialIncomplete {
t.Fatalf("subtype mismatch: %+v", p)
}
if len(e.MissingKeys) != 1 || e.MissingKeys[0] != "LARKSUITE_CLI_APP_ID" {
t.Errorf("missing_keys not set: %v", e.MissingKeys)
}
if e.CredentialSource != "env:LARKSUITE_CLI_PROFILE" {
t.Errorf("credential_source not set: %q", e.CredentialSource)
}
}
func TestValidationErrorProfileConflict(t *testing.T) {
e := errs.NewValidationError(errs.SubtypeProfileAppCredentialConflict, "conflict").
WithProfileAppConflict("cli_profile", "cli_env")
if e.ProfileAppID != "cli_profile" || e.EnvAppID != "cli_env" {
t.Errorf("conflict fields not set: %q %q", e.ProfileAppID, e.EnvAppID)
}
}

View File

@@ -23,63 +23,89 @@ func (p *Provider) ResolveAccount(ctx context.Context) (*credential.Account, err
appSecret := os.Getenv(envvars.CliAppSecret)
hasUAT := os.Getenv(envvars.CliUserAccessToken) != ""
hasTAT := os.Getenv(envvars.CliTenantAccessToken) != ""
if appID == "" && appSecret == "" {
switch {
case hasUAT:
return nil, &credential.BlockError{Provider: "env", Reason: envvars.CliUserAccessToken + " is set but " + envvars.CliAppID + " is missing"}
case hasTAT:
return nil, &credential.BlockError{Provider: "env", Reason: envvars.CliTenantAccessToken + " is set but " + envvars.CliAppID + " is missing"}
default:
return nil, nil
}
presentKeys := presentCredentialEnvKeys(appID, appSecret, hasUAT, hasTAT)
if len(presentKeys) == 0 {
return nil, nil
}
if appID == "" {
return nil, &credential.BlockError{Provider: "env", Reason: envvars.CliAppSecret + " is set but " + envvars.CliAppID + " is missing"}
}
if appSecret == "" && !hasUAT && !hasTAT {
return nil, &credential.BlockError{
Provider: "env",
Reason: envvars.CliAppID + " is set but no app secret or access token is available",
}
}
brand := credential.Brand(core.ParseBrand(os.Getenv(envvars.CliBrand)))
acct := &credential.Account{AppID: appID, AppSecret: appSecret, Brand: brand}
switch id := credential.Identity(os.Getenv(envvars.CliDefaultAs)); id {
case "", credential.IdentityAuto:
acct.DefaultAs = id
case credential.IdentityUser, credential.IdentityBot:
acct.DefaultAs = id
// Identity policy variables are validated whenever a direct credential
// input is present. Their errors must not be hidden by a later credential
// completeness check or profile arbitration.
defaultAs := credential.Identity(os.Getenv(envvars.CliDefaultAs))
switch defaultAs {
case "", credential.IdentityAuto, credential.IdentityUser, credential.IdentityBot:
default:
return nil, &credential.BlockError{
Provider: "env",
Reason: fmt.Sprintf("invalid %s %q (want user, bot, or auto)", envvars.CliDefaultAs, id),
Reason: fmt.Sprintf("invalid %s %q (want user, bot, or auto)", envvars.CliDefaultAs, defaultAs),
Code: credential.BlockReasonInvalidPolicy,
Param: envvars.CliDefaultAs,
}
}
// Explicit strict mode policy takes priority
switch strictMode := os.Getenv(envvars.CliStrictMode); strictMode {
strictMode := os.Getenv(envvars.CliStrictMode)
var supported credential.IdentitySupport
switch strictMode {
case "bot":
acct.SupportedIdentities = credential.SupportsBot
supported = credential.SupportsBot
case "user":
acct.SupportedIdentities = credential.SupportsUser
supported = credential.SupportsUser
case "off":
acct.SupportedIdentities = credential.SupportsAll
supported = credential.SupportsAll
case "":
// Infer from available tokens
if hasUAT {
acct.SupportedIdentities |= credential.SupportsUser
supported |= credential.SupportsUser
}
if hasTAT {
acct.SupportedIdentities |= credential.SupportsBot
supported |= credential.SupportsBot
}
default:
return nil, &credential.BlockError{
Provider: "env",
Reason: fmt.Sprintf("invalid %s %q (want bot, user, or off)", envvars.CliStrictMode, strictMode),
Code: credential.BlockReasonInvalidPolicy,
Param: envvars.CliStrictMode,
}
}
if appID == "" && appSecret == "" {
switch {
case hasUAT:
return nil, incompleteCredentialError(
appID,
envvars.CliUserAccessToken+" is set but "+envvars.CliAppID+" is missing",
[]string{envvars.CliAppID}, nil, presentKeys)
case hasTAT:
return nil, incompleteCredentialError(
appID,
envvars.CliTenantAccessToken+" is set but "+envvars.CliAppID+" is missing",
[]string{envvars.CliAppID}, nil, presentKeys)
}
}
if appID == "" {
return nil, incompleteCredentialError(
appID,
envvars.CliAppSecret+" is set but "+envvars.CliAppID+" is missing",
[]string{envvars.CliAppID}, nil, presentKeys)
}
if appSecret == "" && !hasUAT && !hasTAT {
return nil, incompleteCredentialError(
appID,
envvars.CliAppID+" is set but no app secret or access token is available",
nil,
[]string{envvars.CliAppSecret, envvars.CliUserAccessToken, envvars.CliTenantAccessToken},
presentKeys)
}
brand := credential.Brand(core.ParseBrand(os.Getenv(envvars.CliBrand)))
acct := &credential.Account{
AppID: appID,
AppSecret: appSecret,
Brand: brand,
DefaultAs: defaultAs,
SupportedIdentities: supported,
Kind: credential.AccountDirect,
}
if acct.DefaultAs == "" {
switch {
case hasUAT:
@@ -92,6 +118,35 @@ func (p *Provider) ResolveAccount(ctx context.Context) (*credential.Account, err
return acct, nil
}
func incompleteCredentialError(appID, reason string, missingKeys, requiredAnyOf, presentKeys []string) *credential.BlockError {
return &credential.BlockError{
Provider: "env",
Reason: reason,
Code: credential.BlockReasonCredentialIncomplete,
MissingKeys: missingKeys,
RequiredAnyOf: requiredAnyOf,
PresentKeys: presentKeys,
AppID: appID,
}
}
func presentCredentialEnvKeys(appID, appSecret string, hasUAT, hasTAT bool) []string {
var keys []string
if appID != "" {
keys = append(keys, envvars.CliAppID)
}
if appSecret != "" {
keys = append(keys, envvars.CliAppSecret)
}
if hasUAT {
keys = append(keys, envvars.CliUserAccessToken)
}
if hasTAT {
keys = append(keys, envvars.CliTenantAccessToken)
}
return keys
}
func (p *Provider) ResolveToken(ctx context.Context, req credential.TokenSpec) (*credential.Token, error) {
var envKey string
switch req.Type {

View File

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ package env
import (
"context"
"errors"
"slices"
"strings"
"testing"
@@ -47,6 +48,22 @@ func TestResolveAccount_OnlyIDSet(t *testing.T) {
if !errors.As(err, &blockErr) {
t.Fatalf("expected BlockError, got %v", err)
}
if blockErr.Code != credential.BlockReasonCredentialIncomplete {
t.Fatalf("Code = %q, want %q", blockErr.Code, credential.BlockReasonCredentialIncomplete)
}
want := []string{envvars.CliAppSecret, envvars.CliUserAccessToken, envvars.CliTenantAccessToken}
if !slices.Equal(blockErr.RequiredAnyOf, want) {
t.Fatalf("RequiredAnyOf = %v, want %v", blockErr.RequiredAnyOf, want)
}
if len(blockErr.MissingKeys) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("MissingKeys = %v, want empty", blockErr.MissingKeys)
}
if !slices.Equal(blockErr.PresentKeys, []string{envvars.CliAppID}) {
t.Fatalf("PresentKeys = %v, want [%s]", blockErr.PresentKeys, envvars.CliAppID)
}
if blockErr.AppID != "cli_test" {
t.Fatalf("AppID = %q, want cli_test", blockErr.AppID)
}
}
func TestResolveAccount_AppIDAndUserTokenWithoutSecret(t *testing.T) {
@@ -75,18 +92,81 @@ func TestResolveAccount_OnlySecretSet(t *testing.T) {
if !errors.As(err, &blockErr) {
t.Fatalf("expected BlockError, got %v", err)
}
if blockErr.Code != credential.BlockReasonCredentialIncomplete ||
!slices.Equal(blockErr.MissingKeys, []string{envvars.CliAppID}) ||
!slices.Equal(blockErr.PresentKeys, []string{envvars.CliAppSecret}) {
t.Fatalf("BlockError = %+v, want incomplete with missing APP_ID and present APP_SECRET", blockErr)
}
if len(blockErr.RequiredAnyOf) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("RequiredAnyOf = %v, want empty for APP_SECRET-only", blockErr.RequiredAnyOf)
}
}
func TestResolveAccount_OnlyTokenSetWithoutAppID(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv(envvars.CliUserAccessToken, "uat_test")
for _, tt := range []struct {
name string
key string
}{
{name: "UAT", key: envvars.CliUserAccessToken},
{name: "TAT", key: envvars.CliTenantAccessToken},
} {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv(envvars.CliAppID, "")
t.Setenv(envvars.CliAppSecret, "")
t.Setenv(envvars.CliUserAccessToken, "")
t.Setenv(envvars.CliTenantAccessToken, "")
t.Setenv(tt.key, "token_test")
_, err := (&Provider{}).ResolveAccount(context.Background())
var blockErr *credential.BlockError
if !errors.As(err, &blockErr) {
t.Fatalf("expected BlockError, got %v", err)
_, err := (&Provider{}).ResolveAccount(context.Background())
var blockErr *credential.BlockError
if !errors.As(err, &blockErr) {
t.Fatalf("expected BlockError, got %v", err)
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), envvars.CliAppID) {
t.Fatalf("error = %v, want mention of %s", err, envvars.CliAppID)
}
if blockErr.Code != credential.BlockReasonCredentialIncomplete ||
!slices.Equal(blockErr.MissingKeys, []string{envvars.CliAppID}) ||
!slices.Equal(blockErr.PresentKeys, []string{tt.key}) {
t.Fatalf("BlockError = %+v, want incomplete for %s", blockErr, tt.key)
}
if len(blockErr.RequiredAnyOf) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("RequiredAnyOf = %v, want empty for %s-only", blockErr.RequiredAnyOf, tt.name)
}
})
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), envvars.CliAppID) {
t.Fatalf("error = %v, want mention of %s", err, envvars.CliAppID)
}
func TestResolveAccount_InvalidPolicyRejectedBeforeIncomplete(t *testing.T) {
for _, tt := range []struct {
name string
key string
}{
{name: "DEFAULT_AS", key: envvars.CliDefaultAs},
{name: "STRICT_MODE", key: envvars.CliStrictMode},
} {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv(envvars.CliAppID, "cli_test")
t.Setenv(envvars.CliAppSecret, "")
t.Setenv(envvars.CliUserAccessToken, "")
t.Setenv(envvars.CliTenantAccessToken, "")
t.Setenv(tt.key, "banana")
_, err := (&Provider{}).ResolveAccount(context.Background())
var blockErr *credential.BlockError
if !errors.As(err, &blockErr) {
t.Fatalf("error = %T %v, want BlockError", err, err)
}
if blockErr.Code != credential.BlockReasonInvalidPolicy {
t.Fatalf("Code = %q, want %q", blockErr.Code, credential.BlockReasonInvalidPolicy)
}
if blockErr.Param != tt.key {
t.Fatalf("Param = %q, want %q", blockErr.Param, tt.key)
}
if !strings.Contains(blockErr.Reason, tt.key) {
t.Fatalf("reason = %q, want %s", blockErr.Reason, tt.key)
}
})
}
}
@@ -258,6 +338,9 @@ func TestResolveAccount_InvalidStrictModeRejected(t *testing.T) {
if !errors.As(err, &blockErr) {
t.Fatalf("expected BlockError, got %T", err)
}
if blockErr.Code != credential.BlockReasonInvalidPolicy || blockErr.Param != envvars.CliStrictMode {
t.Fatalf("BlockError = %+v, want invalid_policy with Param %s", blockErr, envvars.CliStrictMode)
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), envvars.CliStrictMode) {
t.Fatalf("error = %v, want mention of %s", err, envvars.CliStrictMode)
}
@@ -276,6 +359,9 @@ func TestResolveAccount_InvalidDefaultAsRejected(t *testing.T) {
if !errors.As(err, &blockErr) {
t.Fatalf("expected BlockError, got %T", err)
}
if blockErr.Code != credential.BlockReasonInvalidPolicy || blockErr.Param != envvars.CliDefaultAs {
t.Fatalf("BlockError = %+v, want invalid_policy with Param %s", blockErr, envvars.CliDefaultAs)
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), envvars.CliDefaultAs) {
t.Fatalf("error = %v, want mention of %s", err, envvars.CliDefaultAs)
}

View File

@@ -77,6 +77,8 @@ func (p *Provider) ResolveAccount(ctx context.Context) (*credential.Account, err
return nil, &credential.BlockError{
Provider: "sidecar",
Reason: fmt.Sprintf("invalid %s %q (want user, bot, or auto)", envvars.CliDefaultAs, id),
Code: credential.BlockReasonInvalidPolicy,
Param: envvars.CliDefaultAs,
}
}
@@ -92,6 +94,8 @@ func (p *Provider) ResolveAccount(ctx context.Context) (*credential.Account, err
return nil, &credential.BlockError{
Provider: "sidecar",
Reason: fmt.Sprintf("invalid %s %q (want bot, user, or off)", envvars.CliStrictMode, strictMode),
Code: credential.BlockReasonInvalidPolicy,
Param: envvars.CliStrictMode,
}
}

View File

@@ -7,7 +7,9 @@ package sidecar
import (
"context"
"errors"
"os"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/extension/credential"
@@ -146,6 +148,57 @@ func TestResolveAccount_StrictMode(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestResolveAccount_InvalidPolicyClassified(t *testing.T) {
setEnv(t, envvars.CliAuthProxy, "http://127.0.0.1:16384")
setEnv(t, envvars.CliProxyKey, "test-key")
setEnv(t, envvars.CliAppID, "cli_test")
tests := []struct {
name string
key string
value string
supportedText string
}{
{
name: "default as",
key: envvars.CliDefaultAs,
value: "banana",
supportedText: "want user, bot, or auto",
},
{
name: "strict mode",
key: envvars.CliStrictMode,
value: "banana",
supportedText: "want bot, user, or off",
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
unsetEnv(t, envvars.CliDefaultAs)
unsetEnv(t, envvars.CliStrictMode)
setEnv(t, tt.key, tt.value)
_, err := (&Provider{}).ResolveAccount(context.Background())
var blockErr *credential.BlockError
if !errors.As(err, &blockErr) {
t.Fatalf("error = %T %v, want BlockError", err, err)
}
if blockErr.Code != credential.BlockReasonInvalidPolicy {
t.Fatalf("Code = %q, want %q", blockErr.Code, credential.BlockReasonInvalidPolicy)
}
if blockErr.Param != tt.key {
t.Fatalf("Param = %q, want %q", blockErr.Param, tt.key)
}
if !strings.Contains(blockErr.Reason, tt.key) ||
!strings.Contains(blockErr.Reason, tt.value) ||
!strings.Contains(blockErr.Reason, tt.supportedText) {
t.Fatalf("Reason = %q, want variable, invalid value, and supported values", blockErr.Reason)
}
})
}
}
func TestResolveToken_NotActive(t *testing.T) {
unsetEnv(t, envvars.CliAuthProxy)

View File

@@ -44,6 +44,27 @@ func (s IdentitySupport) UserOnly() bool { return s == SupportsUser }
// BotOnly returns true if only bot identity is supported.
func (s IdentitySupport) BotOnly() bool { return s == SupportsBot }
// AccountKind declares how an account participates in credential arbitration.
type AccountKind int
const (
// AccountManaged means the provider owns the whole identity; winning it
// ends arbitration outright. The zero value, so existing providers are
// unchanged.
AccountManaged AccountKind = iota
// AccountDirect marks an actively supplied raw credential (the env
// provider's LARKSUITE_CLI_* variables). It participates in profile
// arbitration and conflict detection instead of winning outright.
//
// RESERVED: only the builtin env provider may declare AccountDirect
// today — the arbitration's direct-credential diagnostics are defined in
// terms of the process environment, and the caller rejects AccountDirect
// from any other provider. Third-party providers must return
// AccountManaged until the SPI carries provider-reported input
// descriptors.
AccountDirect
)
// Account holds resolved app credentials and configuration.
type Account struct {
AppID string
@@ -53,6 +74,7 @@ type Account struct {
ProfileName string
OpenID string // optional; if UAT is available, API result takes precedence
SupportedIdentities IdentitySupport // zero = provider did not declare; treat as no restriction
Kind AccountKind // AccountManaged (default) or AccountDirect
}
// Token holds a resolved access token and optional metadata.
@@ -76,11 +98,38 @@ type TokenSpec struct {
AppID string
}
// BlockReason classifies provider-originated block conditions that callers may
// safely map to a more specific public error contract.
type BlockReason string
const (
// BlockReasonCredentialIncomplete marks incomplete inputs from the builtin
// process-env credential provider. It is reserved for that provider because
// direct-credential arbitration and diagnostics currently name the fixed
// LARKSUITE_CLI_* env surface. Third-party providers must return an
// unclassified BlockError until the SPI carries provider-owned input
// descriptors. Blocks without a Code propagate unchanged.
BlockReasonCredentialIncomplete BlockReason = "credential_incomplete"
// BlockReasonInvalidPolicy marks a user-supplied policy input (e.g.
// LARKSUITE_CLI_DEFAULT_AS / LARKSUITE_CLI_STRICT_MODE) that failed
// validation. The caller maps it to a typed validation error carrying
// Param and a repair hint, so user input mistakes never surface as
// internal errors.
BlockReasonInvalidPolicy BlockReason = "invalid_policy"
)
// BlockError is returned by a Provider to actively reject a request
// and prevent subsequent providers in the chain from being consulted.
type BlockError struct {
Provider string
Reason string
Provider string
Reason string
Code BlockReason
MissingKeys []string // environment variable names only; never values
RequiredAnyOf []string // environment variable names only; never values
PresentKeys []string // environment variable names only; never values
AppID string // plaintext app identifier used only for source comparison; never a secret
Param string // name of the invalid input variable on invalid_policy blocks; never a value
}
func (e *BlockError) Error() string {

View File

@@ -12,18 +12,9 @@ import (
"net/http"
"testing"
exttransport "github.com/larksuite/cli/extension/transport"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/envvars"
internaltransport "github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/transport"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/sidecar"
)
type roundTripFunc func(*http.Request) (*http.Response, error)
func (f roundTripFunc) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
return f(req)
}
// failingBody is a ReadCloser that errors on Read and tracks Close calls.
type failingBody struct {
err error
@@ -272,55 +263,3 @@ func TestInterceptor_EmptyBody(t *testing.T) {
t.Errorf("body SHA256 = %q, want empty-string SHA256 %q", sha, expectedEmpty)
}
}
func TestLegacySidecarProviderStillHandlesForcedExternalRequests(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv(envvars.CliAuthProxy, "http://127.0.0.1:16384")
t.Setenv(envvars.CliProxyKey, "test-key")
previousProvider := exttransport.GetProvider()
exttransport.Register(&Provider{})
t.Cleanup(func() { exttransport.Register(previousProvider) })
seen := make(chan *http.Request, 2)
base := roundTripFunc(func(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
seen <- req.Clone(req.Context())
return &http.Response{StatusCode: http.StatusNoContent, Body: http.NoBody, Request: req}, nil
})
client := internaltransport.ClientForRequestClass(
&http.Client{Transport: internaltransport.NewHTTPPolicyRouter(base, base)},
exttransport.RequestClassExternal,
)
withSentinel, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "https://external.example/protected", nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
withSentinel.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+sidecar.SentinelUAT)
resp, err := client.Do(withSentinel)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
resp.Body.Close()
withoutSentinel, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "https://external.example/public", nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
resp, err = client.Do(withoutSentinel)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
resp.Body.Close()
proxied := <-seen
if proxied.URL.Scheme != "http" || proxied.URL.Host != "127.0.0.1:16384" {
t.Fatalf("sentinel request URL = %s, want sidecar route", proxied.URL)
}
if got := proxied.Header.Get(sidecar.HeaderProxyTarget); got != "https://external.example" {
t.Fatalf("sentinel request proxy target = %q", got)
}
passthrough := <-seen
if got := passthrough.URL.String(); got != "https://external.example/public" {
t.Fatalf("non-sentinel request URL = %q, want unchanged", got)
}
}

View File

@@ -15,27 +15,6 @@ type Provider interface {
ResolveInterceptor(ctx context.Context) Interceptor
}
// RequestClass describes the trust boundary of an outbound HTTP request.
// Platform requests target endpoints owned by the CLI's endpoint resolver;
// external requests target user-provided, pre-signed, CDN, registry, or other
// non-platform URLs. Redirect targets are classified again from each hop's
// logical URL; rewriting a host in an interceptor does not add that host to
// the platform endpoint catalog.
type RequestClass string
const (
RequestClassPlatform RequestClass = "platform"
RequestClassExternal RequestClass = "external"
)
// ScopedProvider optionally limits a Provider to selected request classes.
// Providers that do not implement this interface retain the original
// behavior and apply to every request class.
type ScopedProvider interface {
Provider
SupportsRequestClass(RequestClass) bool
}
// Interceptor defines network-layer customization via a pre/post hook pair.
// The built-in transport chain always executes between PreRoundTrip and the
// returned post function, and cannot be skipped or overridden by the extension.

View File

@@ -17,8 +17,6 @@ import (
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/transport"
)
var _ transport.RoundTripperDecorator = (*SecurityPolicyTransport)(nil)
// SecurityPolicyTransport is an http.RoundTripper that intercepts all responses
// and checks for security policy errors.
type SecurityPolicyTransport struct {
@@ -33,16 +31,6 @@ func (t *SecurityPolicyTransport) base() http.RoundTripper {
return transport.Fallback()
}
func (t *SecurityPolicyTransport) BaseRoundTripper() http.RoundTripper {
return t.base()
}
func (t *SecurityPolicyTransport) WithBaseRoundTripper(base http.RoundTripper) http.RoundTripper {
cloned := *t
cloned.Base = base
return &cloned
}
// RoundTrip implements http.RoundTripper.
func (t *SecurityPolicyTransport) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
resp, err := t.base().RoundTrip(req)

View File

@@ -212,9 +212,6 @@ func (c *APIClient) DoStream(ctx context.Context, req *larkcore.ApiReq, as core.
resp, err := httpClient.Do(httpReq)
if err != nil {
cancel()
if _, ok := errs.ProblemOf(err); ok {
return nil, err
}
return nil, errs.NewNetworkError(classifyNetworkSubtype(err), "stream request failed: %s", err).WithCause(err)
}
resp.Body = &cancelOnCloseBody{ReadCloser: resp.Body, cancel: cancel}

View File

@@ -48,6 +48,18 @@ func (s *staticTokenResolver) ResolveToken(_ context.Context, _ credential.Token
return &credential.TokenResult{Token: "test-token"}, nil
}
type clientTestAccountResolver struct {
appID string
}
func (r clientTestAccountResolver) ResolveAccount(context.Context) (*credential.Account, error) {
return &credential.Account{AppID: r.appID, Brand: core.BrandFeishu}, nil
}
func newClientTestCredentialProvider(appID string, tokenResolver credential.DefaultTokenResolver) *credential.CredentialProvider {
return credential.NewCredentialProvider(nil, clientTestAccountResolver{appID: appID}, tokenResolver, nil)
}
// newTestAPIClient creates an APIClient with a mock HTTP transport.
func newTestAPIClient(t *testing.T, rt http.RoundTripper) (*APIClient, *bytes.Buffer) {
t.Helper()
@@ -58,7 +70,7 @@ func newTestAPIClient(t *testing.T, rt http.RoundTripper) (*APIClient, *bytes.Bu
lark.WithLogLevel(larkcore.LogLevelError),
lark.WithHttpClient(httpClient),
)
testCred := credential.NewCredentialProvider(nil, nil, &staticTokenResolver{}, nil)
testCred := newClientTestCredentialProvider("test-app", &staticTokenResolver{})
cfg := &core.CliConfig{AppID: "test-app", AppSecret: "test-secret", Brand: core.BrandFeishu}
return &APIClient{
SDK: sdk,
@@ -463,7 +475,7 @@ func TestDoStream_IgnoresBaseHTTPClientTimeout(t *testing.T) {
ac := &APIClient{
HTTP: &http.Client{Timeout: 5 * time.Millisecond},
Credential: credential.NewCredentialProvider(nil, nil, &staticTokenResolver{}, nil),
Credential: newClientTestCredentialProvider("test-app", &staticTokenResolver{}),
Config: &core.CliConfig{AppID: "test-app", AppSecret: "test-secret", Brand: core.BrandFeishu},
}
@@ -498,7 +510,7 @@ func TestDoStream_TransportFailureSplitsSubtype(t *testing.T) {
})
ac := &APIClient{
HTTP: &http.Client{Transport: rt},
Credential: credential.NewCredentialProvider(nil, nil, &staticTokenResolver{}, nil),
Credential: newClientTestCredentialProvider("test-app", &staticTokenResolver{}),
Config: &core.CliConfig{AppID: "test-app", AppSecret: "test-secret", Brand: core.BrandFeishu},
}
@@ -518,29 +530,6 @@ func TestDoStream_TransportFailureSplitsSubtype(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestDoStream_PreservesTypedTransportError(t *testing.T) {
policyErr := errs.NewSecurityPolicyError(errs.SubtypeAccessDenied, "blocked redirect")
ac := &APIClient{
HTTP: &http.Client{Transport: roundTripFunc(func(*http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
return nil, policyErr
})},
Credential: credential.NewCredentialProvider(nil, nil, &staticTokenResolver{}, nil),
Config: &core.CliConfig{AppID: "test-app", AppSecret: "test-secret", Brand: core.BrandFeishu},
}
_, err := ac.DoStream(context.Background(), &larkcore.ApiReq{
HttpMethod: http.MethodGet,
ApiPath: "/open-apis/drive/v1/files/file_token/download",
}, core.AsBot)
problem, ok := errs.ProblemOf(err)
if !ok || problem.Category != errs.CategoryPolicy || problem.Subtype != errs.SubtypeAccessDenied {
t.Fatalf("DoStream() problem = %#v, %v; want policy/access_denied", problem, ok)
}
if !errors.Is(err, policyErr) {
t.Fatal("DoStream() did not preserve the typed transport error")
}
}
// failingTokenResolver always returns TokenUnavailableError, exercising the
// auth/credential failure path through resolveAccessToken.
type failingTokenResolver struct{}
@@ -555,7 +544,7 @@ func (f *failingTokenResolver) ResolveToken(_ context.Context, spec credential.T
func TestResolveAccessToken_NoToken_ReturnsTypedAuthenticationError(t *testing.T) {
ac := &APIClient{
HTTP: &http.Client{},
Credential: credential.NewCredentialProvider(nil, nil, &failingTokenResolver{}, nil),
Credential: newClientTestCredentialProvider("test-app", &failingTokenResolver{}),
Config: &core.CliConfig{AppID: "test-app", AppSecret: "test-secret", Brand: core.BrandFeishu},
}
@@ -595,7 +584,7 @@ func (f *needAuthTokenResolver) ResolveToken(_ context.Context, _ credential.Tok
func TestResolveAccessToken_NeedAuthorization_SurfacesAsTypedAuthentication(t *testing.T) {
ac := &APIClient{
HTTP: &http.Client{},
Credential: credential.NewCredentialProvider(nil, nil, &needAuthTokenResolver{userOpenID: "ou_test_user"}, nil),
Credential: newClientTestCredentialProvider("test-app", &needAuthTokenResolver{userOpenID: "ou_test_user"}),
Config: &core.CliConfig{AppID: "test-app", AppSecret: "test-secret", Brand: core.BrandFeishu},
}
@@ -635,7 +624,7 @@ func TestResolveAccessToken_NeedAuthorization_SurfacesAsTypedAuthentication(t *t
func TestDoSDKRequest_AuthFailureSurfacesTypedAuthenticationError(t *testing.T) {
ac := &APIClient{
HTTP: &http.Client{},
Credential: credential.NewCredentialProvider(nil, nil, &failingTokenResolver{}, nil),
Credential: newClientTestCredentialProvider("test-app", &failingTokenResolver{}),
Config: &core.CliConfig{AppID: "test-app", AppSecret: "test-secret", Brand: core.BrandFeishu},
}

View File

@@ -16,12 +16,10 @@ import (
"github.com/larksuite/cli/errs"
extcred "github.com/larksuite/cli/extension/credential"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/extension/fileio"
exttransport "github.com/larksuite/cli/extension/transport"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/client"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/credential"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/keychain"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/transport"
)
// Factory holds shared dependencies injected into every command.
@@ -29,11 +27,16 @@ import (
// In tests, replace any field to stub out external dependencies.
type InvocationContext struct {
Profile string
// ProfileFromFlag is true when Profile was set via the --profile flag,
// and false when it came from the LARKSUITE_CLI_PROFILE env fallback
// (or neither was set). Downstream credential resolution uses this to
// report the correct profile source.
ProfileFromFlag bool
}
type Factory struct {
Config func() (*core.CliConfig, error) // lazily loads app config from Credential
HttpClient func() (*http.Client, error) // policy-routed HTTP client for direct requests
HttpClient func() (*http.Client, error) // HTTP client for non-Lark API calls (with retry and security headers)
LarkClient func() (*lark.Client, error) // Lark SDK client for all Open API calls
IOStreams *IOStreams // stdin/stdout/stderr streams
@@ -50,18 +53,6 @@ type Factory struct {
SkillContent fs.FS // embedded skill tree (rooted at the skill list); nil when the build embeds no skills
}
// ExternalHTTPClient returns a clone of the existing Factory client whose
// requests are explicitly classified as external. The underlying client,
// redirect policy, timeout, proxy configuration, and legacy transport provider
// behavior are preserved.
func (f *Factory) ExternalHTTPClient() (*http.Client, error) {
client, err := f.HttpClient()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return transport.ClientForRequestClass(client, exttransport.RequestClassExternal), nil
}
// ResolveFileIO resolves a FileIO instance using the current execution context.
// The provider controls whether the returned instance is fresh or cached.
func (f *Factory) ResolveFileIO(ctx context.Context) fileio.FileIO {

View File

@@ -5,18 +5,16 @@ package cmdutil
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"os"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
lark "github.com/larksuite/oapi-sdk-go/v3"
larkcore "github.com/larksuite/oapi-sdk-go/v3/core"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/errs"
extcred "github.com/larksuite/cli/extension/credential"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/extension/fileio"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/auth"
@@ -50,19 +48,6 @@ func NewDefault(streams *IOStreams, inv InvocationContext) *Factory {
// workspace-scoped. Default is WorkspaceLocal — existing behavior unchanged.
ws := core.DetectWorkspaceFromEnv(os.Getenv)
core.SetCurrentWorkspace(ws)
workspaceConfig := core.NewConfigSnapshot()
bootstrapHostSignalSource := sync.OnceValue(func() riskcontrol.Source {
return resolveSDKHostSignalSource(workspaceConfig)
})
// Install after workspace selection so the dependency bootstrap bridge uses
// the correct shared proxy configuration. NewDefault is also used by cmd.Build
// consumers, so this keeps their request routing identical to cmd.Execute.
transport.InstallSDKTransportBridge(func(base http.RoundTripper) http.RoundTripper {
return buildSDKPlatformTransportWithBase(
base,
bootstrapHostSignalSource(),
)
})
// Inject workspace-aware dir into keychain's log system.
// This breaks the core↔keychain import cycle by using a function variable.
@@ -70,6 +55,7 @@ func NewDefault(streams *IOStreams, inv InvocationContext) *Factory {
// Phase 0: FileIO provider (no dependency)
f.FileIOProvider = fileio.GetProvider()
workspaceConfig := core.NewConfigSnapshot()
// Phase 1: HttpClient (no credential dependency)
f.HttpClient = cachedHttpClientFunc(f, workspaceConfig)
@@ -77,10 +63,11 @@ func NewDefault(streams *IOStreams, inv InvocationContext) *Factory {
// Phase 2: Credential (sole data source)
// Keychain is read via closure so callers can replace f.Keychain after construction.
f.Credential = buildCredentialProvider(credentialDeps{
Keychain: func() keychain.KeychainAccess { return f.Keychain },
Profile: inv.Profile,
HttpClient: f.HttpClient,
ErrOut: f.IOStreams.ErrOut,
Keychain: func() keychain.KeychainAccess { return f.Keychain },
Profile: inv.Profile,
ProfileFromFlag: inv.ProfileFromFlag,
HttpClient: f.HttpClient,
ErrOut: f.IOStreams.ErrOut,
})
// Phase 3: Runtime config contains resolved account data only.
@@ -101,45 +88,15 @@ func NewDefault(streams *IOStreams, inv InvocationContext) *Factory {
return f
}
// safeRedirectPolicy permits cross-origin redirects only for bodyless GET and
// HEAD requests. This allows API download redirects while preventing OAuth or
// other credential-bearing request bodies from being replayed to another
// origin. HTTPS requests can never be downgraded to HTTP.
// safeRedirectPolicy prevents credential headers from being forwarded
// when a response redirects to a different host (e.g. Lark API 302 → CDN).
// Strips Authorization, X-Lark-MCP-UAT, and X-Lark-MCP-TAT on cross-host
// redirects; other headers like X-Cli-* pass through.
func safeRedirectPolicy(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
if len(via) >= 10 {
return errs.NewNetworkError(errs.SubtypeNetworkTransport, "too many redirects")
return fmt.Errorf("too many redirects")
}
if len(via) == 0 {
return nil
}
original := via[0]
previous := via[len(via)-1]
if previous.URL != nil && req.URL != nil && strings.EqualFold(previous.URL.Scheme, "https") && !strings.EqualFold(req.URL.Scheme, "https") {
return errs.NewSecurityPolicyError(
errs.SubtypeAccessDenied,
"redirect from HTTPS to %s is not allowed",
req.URL.Scheme,
)
}
if !sameRedirectOrigin(previous.URL, req.URL) {
if req.Method != http.MethodGet && req.Method != http.MethodHead {
return errs.NewSecurityPolicyError(
errs.SubtypeAccessDenied,
"cross-origin redirect for HTTP method %s is not allowed",
req.Method,
)
}
if req.Body != nil || req.GetBody != nil {
return errs.NewSecurityPolicyError(
errs.SubtypeAccessDenied,
"cross-origin redirect with a request body is not allowed",
)
}
}
// net/http copies initial headers onto every redirect request. Continue
// stripping credentials for every hop outside the initial origin, even when
// two consecutive redirect targets share an origin.
if !sameRedirectOrigin(original.URL, req.URL) {
if len(via) > 0 && req.URL.Host != via[0].URL.Host {
req.Header.Del("Authorization")
req.Header.Del("X-Lark-MCP-UAT")
req.Header.Del("X-Lark-MCP-TAT")
@@ -147,29 +104,6 @@ func safeRedirectPolicy(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
return nil
}
func sameRedirectOrigin(left, right *url.URL) bool {
if left == nil || right == nil {
return false
}
return strings.EqualFold(left.Scheme, right.Scheme) &&
strings.EqualFold(left.Hostname(), right.Hostname()) &&
effectivePort(left) == effectivePort(right)
}
func effectivePort(candidate *url.URL) string {
if port := candidate.Port(); port != "" {
return port
}
switch strings.ToLower(candidate.Scheme) {
case "http":
return "80"
case "https":
return "443"
default:
return ""
}
}
// warnIfProxied is a test seam for the proxy-warning gate. Production wires it
// to transport.WarnIfProxied; tests swap in a spy to count invocations. It is
// needed because the real function is guarded by an internal sync.Once, so
@@ -185,12 +119,15 @@ func cachedHttpClientFunc(f *Factory, workspaceConfig workspaceConfigSource) fun
}
hostSignalSource := resolveSDKHostSignalSource(workspaceConfig)
shared := transport.Shared()
outbound := riskcontrol.NewTransport(shared, hostSignalSource)
platform := buildDirectHTTPTransport(outbound, true)
external := buildDirectHTTPTransport(outbound, false)
var rt http.RoundTripper = transport.Shared()
rt = riskcontrol.NewTransport(rt, hostSignalSource)
rt = &RetryTransport{Base: rt}
rt = &SecurityHeaderTransport{Base: rt}
rt = &auth.SecurityPolicyTransport{Base: rt} // Add our global response interceptor
rt = wrapWithExtension(rt)
client := &http.Client{
Transport: transport.NewHTTPPolicyRouter(platform, external),
Transport: rt,
Timeout: 30 * time.Second,
CheckRedirect: safeRedirectPolicy,
}
@@ -198,15 +135,6 @@ func cachedHttpClientFunc(f *Factory, workspaceConfig workspaceConfigSource) fun
})
}
func buildDirectHTTPTransport(base http.RoundTripper, platform bool) http.RoundTripper {
var builtIn http.RoundTripper = &RetryTransport{Base: base}
builtIn = &SecurityHeaderTransport{Base: builtIn}
if platform {
builtIn = &auth.SecurityPolicyTransport{Base: builtIn}
}
return builtIn
}
func cachedLarkClientFunc(f *Factory, workspaceConfig workspaceConfigSource) func() (*lark.Client, error) {
return sync.OnceValues(func() (*lark.Client, error) {
acct, err := f.Credential.ResolveAccount(context.Background())
@@ -222,8 +150,14 @@ func cachedLarkClientFunc(f *Factory, workspaceConfig workspaceConfigSource) fun
warnIfProxied(f.IOStreams.ErrOut)
}
hostSignalSource := resolveSDKHostSignalSource(workspaceConfig)
var sdkBase http.RoundTripper = transport.Shared()
// The innermost SDK boundary always strips reserved host-signal headers;
// a nil source makes it strip-only when workspace policy disables signal
// collection.
sdkBase = riskcontrol.NewTransport(sdkBase, hostSignalSource)
sdkTransport := wrapSDKTransport(sdkBase)
opts = append(opts, lark.WithHttpClient(&http.Client{
Transport: buildSDKTransport(hostSignalSource),
Transport: sdkTransport,
CheckRedirect: safeRedirectPolicy,
}))
ep := core.ResolveEndpoints(acct.Brand)
@@ -232,48 +166,20 @@ func cachedLarkClientFunc(f *Factory, workspaceConfig workspaceConfigSource) fun
})
}
func buildSDKTransport(hostSignalSource riskcontrol.Source) http.RoundTripper {
return buildSDKTransportWithBase(transport.Shared(), hostSignalSource)
}
func buildSDKPlatformTransportWithBase(
base http.RoundTripper,
hostSignalSource riskcontrol.Source,
) http.RoundTripper {
outbound := riskcontrol.NewTransport(base, hostSignalSource)
return buildSDKHTTPTransport(outbound, true)
}
func buildSDKTransportWithBase(
base http.RoundTripper,
hostSignalSource riskcontrol.Source,
) http.RoundTripper {
// Risk control is the innermost trusted boundary for both request classes.
// It therefore observes the final URL and strips extension-supplied reserved
// headers immediately before the network transport.
outbound := riskcontrol.NewTransport(base, hostSignalSource)
return transport.NewHTTPPolicyRouter(
buildSDKHTTPTransport(outbound, true),
buildSDKHTTPTransport(outbound, false),
)
}
func buildSDKHTTPTransport(base http.RoundTripper, platform bool) http.RoundTripper {
var builtIn http.RoundTripper = &RetryTransport{Base: base}
builtIn = &UserAgentTransport{Base: builtIn}
builtIn = &BuildHeaderTransport{Base: builtIn}
builtIn = &SecurityHeaderTransport{Base: builtIn}
if platform {
builtIn = &auth.SecurityPolicyTransport{Base: builtIn}
}
return builtIn
func wrapSDKTransport(next http.RoundTripper) http.RoundTripper {
var sdkTransport http.RoundTripper = &RetryTransport{Base: next}
sdkTransport = &UserAgentTransport{Base: sdkTransport}
sdkTransport = &BuildHeaderTransport{Base: sdkTransport}
sdkTransport = &auth.SecurityPolicyTransport{Base: sdkTransport}
return wrapWithExtension(sdkTransport)
}
type credentialDeps struct {
Keychain func() keychain.KeychainAccess
Profile string
HttpClient func() (*http.Client, error)
ErrOut io.Writer
Keychain func() keychain.KeychainAccess
Profile string
ProfileFromFlag bool
HttpClient func() (*http.Client, error)
ErrOut io.Writer
}
func buildCredentialProvider(deps credentialDeps) *credential.CredentialProvider {
@@ -286,5 +192,13 @@ func buildCredentialProvider(deps credentialDeps) *credential.CredentialProvider
// depend on. enrichUserInfo failures are already non-fatal (the
// provider clears unverified identity fields), so silencing the
// warning is safe.
return credential.NewCredentialProvider(providers, defaultAcct, defaultToken, deps.HttpClient)
cred := credential.NewCredentialProvider(providers, defaultAcct, defaultToken, deps.HttpClient)
if deps.Profile == "" {
// No profile selected — don't record a phantom env source.
return cred
}
if deps.ProfileFromFlag {
return cred.WithProfileFromFlag(deps.Profile)
}
return cred.WithProfileFromEnv(deps.Profile)
}

View File

@@ -4,20 +4,13 @@
package cmdutil
import (
"errors"
"io"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/errs"
exttransport "github.com/larksuite/cli/extension/transport"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
internaltransport "github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/transport"
)
func TestCachedHTTPClientFunc_ReturnsSameInstance(t *testing.T) {
func TestCachedHttpClientFunc_ReturnsSameInstance(t *testing.T) {
isEnabled := false
f, _, _, _ := TestFactory(t, &core.CliConfig{AppID: "test-app"})
f.IOStreams.ErrOut = io.Discard
@@ -40,7 +33,7 @@ func TestCachedHTTPClientFunc_ReturnsSameInstance(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestCachedHTTPClientFunc_HasTimeout(t *testing.T) {
func TestCachedHttpClientFunc_HasTimeout(t *testing.T) {
isEnabled := false
f, _, _, _ := TestFactory(t, &core.CliConfig{AppID: "test-app"})
f.IOStreams.ErrOut = io.Discard
@@ -51,7 +44,7 @@ func TestCachedHTTPClientFunc_HasTimeout(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestCachedHTTPClientFunc_HasRedirectPolicy(t *testing.T) {
func TestCachedHttpClientFunc_HasRedirectPolicy(t *testing.T) {
isEnabled := false
f, _, _, _ := TestFactory(t, &core.CliConfig{AppID: "test-app"})
f.IOStreams.ErrOut = io.Discard
@@ -61,283 +54,3 @@ func TestCachedHTTPClientFunc_HasRedirectPolicy(t *testing.T) {
t.Error("expected CheckRedirect to be set (safeRedirectPolicy)")
}
}
func TestFactoryExternalHTTPClientClonesExistingClient(t *testing.T) {
base := &http.Client{Timeout: 17, CheckRedirect: safeRedirectPolicy}
factory := &Factory{HttpClient: func() (*http.Client, error) { return base, nil }}
external, err := factory.ExternalHTTPClient()
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if external == base {
t.Fatal("ExternalHTTPClient returned the cached client instead of a clone")
}
if external.Timeout != base.Timeout || external.CheckRedirect == nil {
t.Fatal("ExternalHTTPClient did not preserve client policy")
}
if base.Transport != nil {
t.Fatal("ExternalHTTPClient mutated the cached client's transport")
}
}
type platformOnlyStubProvider struct {
*stubTransportProvider
}
func (*platformOnlyStubProvider) SupportsRequestClass(class exttransport.RequestClass) bool {
return class == exttransport.RequestClassPlatform
}
func TestFactoryHTTPClientRoutesPoliciesByRequestClass(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_NO_PROXY", "1")
interceptor := &headerCapturingInterceptor{}
exttransport.Register(&platformOnlyStubProvider{stubTransportProvider: &stubTransportProvider{interceptor: interceptor}})
t.Cleanup(func() { exttransport.Register(nil) })
received := make(chan http.Header, 2)
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
received <- req.Header.Clone()
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
}))
t.Cleanup(server.Close)
factory := &Factory{IOStreams: &IOStreams{ErrOut: io.Discard}}
client, err := cachedHttpClientFunc(factory, nil)()
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
factory.HttpClient = func() (*http.Client, error) { return client, nil }
platformClient := internaltransport.ClientForRequestClass(client, exttransport.RequestClassPlatform)
externalClient, err := factory.ExternalHTTPClient()
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
for _, client := range []*http.Client{platformClient, externalClient} {
resp, err := client.Get(server.URL)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
resp.Body.Close()
}
platformHeaders := <-received
if got := platformHeaders.Get("X-Custom-Trace"); got != "ext-trace-123" {
t.Fatalf("platform extension header = %q, want ext-trace-123", got)
}
if got := platformHeaders.Get(HeaderSource); got != SourceValue {
t.Fatalf("platform security header = %q, want %q", got, SourceValue)
}
externalHeaders := <-received
if got := externalHeaders.Get("X-Custom-Trace"); got != "" {
t.Fatalf("external request leaked extension header %q", got)
}
for header, values := range BaseSecurityHeaders() {
if len(values) == 0 {
continue
}
want := values[len(values)-1]
if got := externalHeaders.Get(header); got != want {
t.Fatalf("external security header %s = %q, want preserved value %q", header, got, want)
}
}
}
func TestFactoryExternalHTTPClientDoesNotParsePlatformErrorProtocol(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_NO_PROXY", "1")
exttransport.Register(nil)
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
_, _ = io.WriteString(w, `{"code":21000,"msg":"application-defined external response","data":{"cli_hint":"external-defined"}}`)
}))
t.Cleanup(server.Close)
factory := &Factory{IOStreams: &IOStreams{ErrOut: io.Discard}}
client, err := cachedHttpClientFunc(factory, nil)()
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
factory.HttpClient = func() (*http.Client, error) { return client, nil }
platform := internaltransport.ClientForRequestClass(client, exttransport.RequestClassPlatform)
if _, err := platform.Get(server.URL); err == nil {
t.Fatal("platform request error = nil, want security policy classification")
} else {
var policyErr *errs.SecurityPolicyError
if !errors.As(err, &policyErr) {
t.Fatalf("platform request error type = %T, want *errs.SecurityPolicyError", err)
}
}
external, err := factory.ExternalHTTPClient()
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
resp, err := external.Get(server.URL)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("external request parsed platform error protocol: %v", err)
}
resp.Body.Close()
}
func TestSafeRedirectPolicyAllowsBodylessCrossOriginGetAndStripsCredentials(t *testing.T) {
original, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "https://open.feishu.cn/start", nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
redirect, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "https://cdn.example.com/file", nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
for _, header := range []string{"Authorization", "X-Lark-MCP-UAT", "X-Lark-MCP-TAT"} {
redirect.Header.Set(header, "secret")
}
if err := safeRedirectPolicy(redirect, []*http.Request{original}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("safeRedirectPolicy() error = %v, want allowed GET redirect", err)
}
for _, header := range []string{"Authorization", "X-Lark-MCP-UAT", "X-Lark-MCP-TAT"} {
if got := redirect.Header.Get(header); got != "" {
t.Fatalf("redirect retained %s=%q", header, got)
}
}
}
func TestSafeRedirectPolicyRejectsHTTPSDowngrade(t *testing.T) {
original, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "https://open.feishu.cn/start", nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
redirect, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://open.feishu.cn/next", nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
err = safeRedirectPolicy(redirect, []*http.Request{original})
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "HTTPS") {
t.Fatalf("safeRedirectPolicy() error = %v, want HTTPS downgrade rejection", err)
}
requireRedirectProblem(t, err, errs.CategoryPolicy, errs.SubtypeAccessDenied)
}
func TestSafeRedirectPolicyRejectsCrossOriginMethod(t *testing.T) {
original, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "https://accounts.feishu.cn/token", nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
redirect, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "https://external.example/token", nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
err = safeRedirectPolicy(redirect, []*http.Request{original})
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "HTTP method POST") {
t.Fatalf("safeRedirectPolicy() error = %v, want cross-origin method rejection", err)
}
requireRedirectProblem(t, err, errs.CategoryPolicy, errs.SubtypeAccessDenied)
}
func TestSafeRedirectPolicyRejectsCrossOriginRequestBody(t *testing.T) {
original, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "https://accounts.feishu.cn/token", nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
redirect, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "https://external.example/token", strings.NewReader("client_secret=secret"))
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
err = safeRedirectPolicy(redirect, []*http.Request{original})
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "request body") {
t.Fatalf("safeRedirectPolicy() error = %v, want cross-origin body rejection", err)
}
requireRedirectProblem(t, err, errs.CategoryPolicy, errs.SubtypeAccessDenied)
}
func TestSafeRedirectPolicyRejectsTooManyRedirects(t *testing.T) {
err := safeRedirectPolicy(&http.Request{}, make([]*http.Request, 10))
if err == nil || err.Error() != "too many redirects" {
t.Fatalf("safeRedirectPolicy() error = %v, want redirect limit rejection", err)
}
requireRedirectProblem(t, err, errs.CategoryNetwork, errs.SubtypeNetworkTransport)
}
func TestSafeRedirectPolicyTreatsDefaultHTTPSPortAsSameOrigin(t *testing.T) {
original, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "https://accounts.feishu.cn/token", strings.NewReader("secret"))
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
redirect, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "https://accounts.feishu.cn:443/token-next", strings.NewReader("secret"))
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := safeRedirectPolicy(redirect, []*http.Request{original}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("safeRedirectPolicy() error = %v, want same-origin redirect", err)
}
}
func TestSafeRedirectPolicyKeepsCredentialsStrippedAcrossExternalHops(t *testing.T) {
original, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "https://open.feishu.cn/start", nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
previous, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "https://cdn.example.com/first", nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
redirect, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "https://cdn.example.com/second", nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
redirect.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer copied-from-initial-request")
if err := safeRedirectPolicy(redirect, []*http.Request{original, previous}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("safeRedirectPolicy() error = %v, want same-CDN redirect", err)
}
if got := redirect.Header.Get("Authorization"); got != "" {
t.Fatalf("redirect retained Authorization=%q outside the initial origin", got)
}
}
func TestSafeRedirectPolicyRejectsDowngradeOnLaterHop(t *testing.T) {
original, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://source.example/start", nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
previous, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "https://cdn.example.com/secure", nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
redirect, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://cdn.example.com/plain", nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
err = safeRedirectPolicy(redirect, []*http.Request{original, previous})
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "HTTPS") {
t.Fatalf("safeRedirectPolicy() error = %v, want later-hop HTTPS downgrade rejection", err)
}
requireRedirectProblem(t, err, errs.CategoryPolicy, errs.SubtypeAccessDenied)
}
func requireRedirectProblem(t *testing.T, err error, category errs.Category, subtype errs.Subtype) {
t.Helper()
problem, ok := errs.ProblemOf(err)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("error type = %T, want typed error", err)
}
if problem.Category != category || problem.Subtype != subtype {
t.Fatalf(
"error category/subtype = %s/%s, want %s/%s",
problem.Category,
problem.Subtype,
category,
subtype,
)
}
}

View File

@@ -34,9 +34,9 @@ var proxyWarnGateCases = []struct {
{"non-terminal stderr stays silent", false, 0},
}
// TestCachedHTTPClientFunc_ProxyWarnGate verifies the HTTP client init path
// TestCachedHttpClientFunc_ProxyWarnGate verifies the http-client init path
// invokes WarnIfProxied only when stderr is an interactive terminal.
func TestCachedHTTPClientFunc_ProxyWarnGate(t *testing.T) {
func TestCachedHttpClientFunc_ProxyWarnGate(t *testing.T) {
isEnabled := false
for _, tc := range proxyWarnGateCases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {

View File

@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ import (
"github.com/larksuite/cli/errs"
extcred "github.com/larksuite/cli/extension/credential"
envprovider "github.com/larksuite/cli/extension/credential/env"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/credential"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/envvars"
@@ -405,6 +406,14 @@ type stubExtProvider struct {
err error
}
type stubDefaultAccountResolver struct {
acct *credential.Account
}
func (s *stubDefaultAccountResolver) ResolveAccount(_ context.Context) (*credential.Account, error) {
return s.acct, nil
}
func (s *stubExtProvider) Name() string { return s.name }
func (s *stubExtProvider) ResolveAccount(_ context.Context) (*extcred.Account, error) {
return s.acct, s.err
@@ -448,6 +457,86 @@ func TestRequireBuiltinCredentialProvider_AllowsBuiltinProvider(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestRequireBuiltinCredentialProvider_AllowsMatchingAppIDOnlyProfile(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
t.Setenv(envvars.CliAppID, "cli_a")
t.Setenv(envvars.CliAppSecret, "")
t.Setenv(envvars.CliUserAccessToken, "")
t.Setenv(envvars.CliTenantAccessToken, "")
if err := core.SaveMultiAppConfig(&core.MultiAppConfig{
CurrentApp: "tenant_a",
Apps: []core.AppConfig{{
Name: "tenant_a",
AppId: "cli_a",
AppSecret: core.PlainSecret("test-secret"),
Brand: core.BrandFeishu,
}},
}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("SaveMultiAppConfig: %v", err)
}
cred := credential.NewCredentialProvider(
[]extcred.Provider{&envprovider.Provider{}},
&stubDefaultAccountResolver{acct: &credential.Account{AppID: "cli_a", AppSecret: "test-secret"}},
nil,
nil,
).WithProfileFromFlag("tenant_a")
f, _, _, _ := TestFactory(t, nil)
f.Credential = cred
if err := f.RequireBuiltinCredentialProvider(context.Background(), "auth"); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("matching APP_ID-only profile should use builtin credentials: %v", err)
}
}
// A stale LARKSUITE_CLI_PROFILE (profile that cannot resolve) must not lock
// the user out of the builtin setup/repair commands this gate guards: the
// probe falls back to provider engagement and lets the command run.
func TestRequireBuiltinCredentialProvider_StaleProfileDoesNotLockOut(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir()) // no config -> "ghost" cannot resolve
stub := &stubExtProvider{name: "env"} // not engaged: returns nil, nil
cred := credential.NewCredentialProvider(
[]extcred.Provider{stub},
&stubDefaultAccountResolver{},
nil,
nil,
).WithProfileFromEnv("ghost")
f, _, _, _ := TestFactory(t, nil)
f.Credential = cred
if err := f.RequireBuiltinCredentialProvider(context.Background(), "config"); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("stale profile must not lock out builtin auth/config commands: %v", err)
}
}
// An invalid policy variable (e.g. LARKSUITE_CLI_DEFAULT_AS=banana) is a user
// input error, not an external credential takeover: the gate surfaces the
// same typed validation error as formal arbitration instead of a misleading
// "provided externally" refusal.
func TestRequireBuiltinCredentialProvider_InvalidPolicySurfacesTypedError(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
stub := &stubExtProvider{name: "env", err: &extcred.BlockError{
Provider: "env",
Reason: "invalid LARKSUITE_CLI_DEFAULT_AS \"banana\" (want user, bot, or auto)",
Code: extcred.BlockReasonInvalidPolicy,
Param: envvars.CliDefaultAs,
}}
cred := credential.NewCredentialProvider([]extcred.Provider{stub}, &stubDefaultAccountResolver{}, nil, nil)
f, _, _, _ := TestFactory(t, nil)
f.Credential = cred
err := f.RequireBuiltinCredentialProvider(context.Background(), "auth")
prob, ok := errs.ProblemOf(err)
if !ok || prob.Subtype != errs.SubtypeInvalidArgument {
t.Fatalf("err = %v, want typed invalid_argument (same as formal arbitration)", err)
}
if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "provided externally") {
t.Fatalf("err = %v, must not read as external takeover", err)
}
}
func TestRequireBuiltinCredentialProvider_NilCredential(t *testing.T) {
f, _, _, _ := TestFactory(t, nil)
f.Credential = nil

View File

@@ -26,7 +26,6 @@ const (
HeaderShortcut = "X-Cli-Shortcut"
HeaderExecutionId = "X-Cli-Execution-Id"
HeaderAgentTrace = "X-Agent-Trace"
HeaderAgentName = "X-Agent-Name"
SourceValue = "lark-cli"
@@ -56,9 +55,6 @@ func BaseSecurityHeaders() http.Header {
if v := envvars.AgentTrace(); v != "" {
h.Set(HeaderAgentTrace, v)
}
if v := envvars.AgentName(); v != "" {
h.Set(HeaderAgentName, v)
}
return h
}

View File

@@ -263,34 +263,9 @@ func TestBaseSecurityHeaders_AllRequiredHeaders(t *testing.T) {
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Agent headers injected via BaseSecurityHeaders
// HeaderAgentTrace injection (via BaseSecurityHeaders)
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
func TestBaseSecurityHeaders_NoAgentNameHeaderWhenEnvUnset(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv(envvars.CliAgentName, "")
h := BaseSecurityHeaders()
if v := h.Get(HeaderAgentName); v != "" {
t.Fatalf("BaseSecurityHeaders() included %s = %q, want absent when env unset", HeaderAgentName, v)
}
}
func TestBaseSecurityHeaders_IncludesAgentNameHeaderWhenEnvSet(t *testing.T) {
const agentName = "sample-agent"
t.Setenv(envvars.CliAgentName, agentName)
h := BaseSecurityHeaders()
if v := h.Get(HeaderAgentName); v != agentName {
t.Fatalf("BaseSecurityHeaders()[%s] = %q, want %q", HeaderAgentName, v, agentName)
}
}
func TestBaseSecurityHeaders_NoAgentNameHeaderWhenEnvInvalid(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv(envvars.CliAgentName, "agent\r\nX-Evil: attack")
h := BaseSecurityHeaders()
if v := h.Get(HeaderAgentName); v != "" {
t.Fatalf("BaseSecurityHeaders() included %s = %q, want absent for invalid input", HeaderAgentName, v)
}
}
func TestBaseSecurityHeaders_NoAgentTraceHeaderWhenEnvUnset(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv(envvars.CliAgentTrace, "")
h := BaseSecurityHeaders()

View File

@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ func TestTestFactory_ReplacesGlobals(t *testing.T) {
URL: "/test",
Body: "ok",
})
// Use the stub via Factory HttpClient.
// Use the stub via Factory HttpClient
httpClient, err := f.HttpClient()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("HttpClient() error: %v", err)

View File

@@ -4,19 +4,14 @@
package cmdutil
import (
"context"
"net/http"
"time"
exttransport "github.com/larksuite/cli/extension/transport"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/transport"
)
var (
_ transport.RoundTripperDecorator = (*RetryTransport)(nil)
_ transport.RoundTripperDecorator = (*UserAgentTransport)(nil)
_ transport.RoundTripperDecorator = (*BuildHeaderTransport)(nil)
_ transport.RoundTripperDecorator = (*SecurityHeaderTransport)(nil)
)
// RetryTransport is an http.RoundTripper that retries on 5xx responses
// and network errors. MaxRetries defaults to 0 (no retries).
type RetryTransport struct {
@@ -32,16 +27,6 @@ func (t *RetryTransport) base() http.RoundTripper {
return transport.Fallback()
}
func (t *RetryTransport) BaseRoundTripper() http.RoundTripper {
return t.base()
}
func (t *RetryTransport) WithBaseRoundTripper(base http.RoundTripper) http.RoundTripper {
cloned := *t
cloned.Base = base
return &cloned
}
func (t *RetryTransport) delay() time.Duration {
if t.Delay > 0 {
return t.Delay
@@ -78,19 +63,6 @@ type UserAgentTransport struct {
Base http.RoundTripper
}
func (t *UserAgentTransport) BaseRoundTripper() http.RoundTripper {
if t.Base != nil {
return t.Base
}
return transport.Fallback()
}
func (t *UserAgentTransport) WithBaseRoundTripper(base http.RoundTripper) http.RoundTripper {
cloned := *t
cloned.Base = base
return &cloned
}
func (t *UserAgentTransport) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
req = req.Clone(req.Context())
req.Header.Set(HeaderUserAgent, UserAgentValue())
@@ -101,25 +73,14 @@ func (t *UserAgentTransport) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error
}
// BuildHeaderTransport is an http.RoundTripper that force-writes the
// X-Cli-Build header before every request. It remains in the SDK transport
// chain as a narrow defense-in-depth layer alongside SecurityHeaderTransport.
// X-Cli-Build header before every request. Used in the SDK transport chain,
// where SecurityHeaderTransport is not installed, to prevent extensions from
// tampering with the build classification. The direct HTTP chain is already
// covered by SecurityHeaderTransport iterating BaseSecurityHeaders.
type BuildHeaderTransport struct {
Base http.RoundTripper
}
func (t *BuildHeaderTransport) BaseRoundTripper() http.RoundTripper {
if t.Base != nil {
return t.Base
}
return transport.Fallback()
}
func (t *BuildHeaderTransport) WithBaseRoundTripper(base http.RoundTripper) http.RoundTripper {
cloned := *t
cloned.Base = base
return &cloned
}
func (t *BuildHeaderTransport) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
req = req.Clone(req.Context())
req.Header.Set(HeaderBuild, DetectBuildKind())
@@ -142,16 +103,6 @@ func (t *SecurityHeaderTransport) base() http.RoundTripper {
return transport.Fallback()
}
func (t *SecurityHeaderTransport) BaseRoundTripper() http.RoundTripper {
return t.base()
}
func (t *SecurityHeaderTransport) WithBaseRoundTripper(base http.RoundTripper) http.RoundTripper {
cloned := *t
cloned.Base = base
return &cloned
}
// RoundTrip implements http.RoundTripper.
func (t *SecurityHeaderTransport) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
req = req.Clone(req.Context())
@@ -169,3 +120,67 @@ func (t *SecurityHeaderTransport) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response,
}
return t.base().RoundTrip(req)
}
// extensionMiddleware wraps the built-in transport chain with pre/post hooks.
// The built-in chain always executes unless the extension is an
// exttransport.AbortableInterceptor and its PreRoundTripE returns a non-nil
// error; it cannot otherwise be skipped or overridden.
//
// The original request context is restored after the pre hook to prevent
// extensions from tampering with cancellation, deadlines, or built-in values.
// Cloning the request isolates header/URL/etc. mutations from the caller's
// request object; req.Body is intentionally shared — extensions that consume
// it are responsible for rewinding (see Interceptor doc).
type extensionMiddleware struct {
Base http.RoundTripper
Ext exttransport.Interceptor
ExtName string // Provider.Name(), captured at wrap time for *AbortError.Extension
}
// RoundTrip invokes the interceptor pre hook, restores the original context,
// executes the built-in chain (unless aborted), then calls the post hook if
// non-nil. When the extension implements AbortableInterceptor and returns a
// non-nil error from PreRoundTripE, the built-in chain is skipped and an
// *exttransport.AbortError is returned; the post hook is still invoked with
// (nil, reason) so extensions can unwind resources.
func (m *extensionMiddleware) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
origCtx := req.Context()
req = req.Clone(origCtx)
var (
post func(*http.Response, error)
abortEr error
)
if a, ok := m.Ext.(exttransport.AbortableInterceptor); ok {
post, abortEr = a.PreRoundTripE(req)
} else {
post = m.Ext.PreRoundTrip(req)
}
if abortEr != nil {
if post != nil {
post(nil, abortEr)
}
return nil, &exttransport.AbortError{Extension: m.ExtName, Reason: abortEr}
}
req = req.WithContext(origCtx) // restore original context
resp, err := m.Base.RoundTrip(req)
if post != nil {
post(resp, err)
}
return resp, err
}
// wrapWithExtension wraps transport with the registered extension middleware.
// If no extension is registered, returns transport unchanged.
func wrapWithExtension(transport http.RoundTripper) http.RoundTripper {
p := exttransport.GetProvider()
if p == nil {
return transport
}
tr := p.ResolveInterceptor(context.Background())
if tr == nil {
return transport
}
return &extensionMiddleware{Base: transport, Ext: tr, ExtName: p.Name()}
}

View File

@@ -14,8 +14,8 @@ import (
"time"
exttransport "github.com/larksuite/cli/extension/transport"
internalauth "github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/auth"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/riskcontrol"
internaltransport "github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/transport"
)
type roundTripFunc func(*http.Request) (*http.Response, error)
@@ -91,107 +91,94 @@ func TestRetryTransport_DefaultNoRetry(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// buildSDKTransport policy behavior
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// wrapSDKTransport chain composition
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
func TestBuildSDKTransportAppliesSecurityHeadersToEveryRequestClass(t *testing.T) {
exttransport.Register(nil)
received := make(chan http.Header, 2)
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
received <- req.Header.Clone()
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
}))
t.Cleanup(server.Close)
func TestWrapSDKTransport_IncludesRetryTransport(t *testing.T) {
transport := wrapSDKTransport(riskcontrol.NewTransport(http.DefaultTransport, nil))
for _, class := range []exttransport.RequestClass{
exttransport.RequestClassPlatform,
exttransport.RequestClassExternal,
} {
client := internaltransport.ClientForRequestClass(
&http.Client{Transport: buildSDKTransport(nil)},
class,
)
resp, err := client.Get(server.URL)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
resp.Body.Close()
headers := <-received
for header, values := range BaseSecurityHeaders() {
if len(values) == 0 {
continue
}
want := values[len(values)-1]
if got := headers.Get(header); got != want {
t.Fatalf("SDK %s header %s = %q, want %q", class, header, got, want)
}
}
}
}
func TestBuildSDKTransport_WithExtension(t *testing.T) {
previous := exttransport.GetProvider()
interceptor := &headerCapturingInterceptor{}
exttransport.Register(&platformOnlyStubProvider{
stubTransportProvider: &stubTransportProvider{interceptor: interceptor},
})
t.Cleanup(func() { exttransport.Register(previous) })
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
}))
t.Cleanup(server.Close)
client := internaltransport.ClientForRequestClass(
&http.Client{Transport: buildSDKTransport(nil)},
exttransport.RequestClassPlatform,
)
resp, err := client.Get(server.URL)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
resp.Body.Close()
if !interceptor.preCalled || !interceptor.postCalled {
t.Fatal("SDK platform request did not execute extension pre/post hooks")
}
}
func TestBuildSDKTransport_WithoutExtension(t *testing.T) {
previous := exttransport.GetProvider()
exttransport.Register(nil)
t.Cleanup(func() { exttransport.Register(previous) })
if _, ok := buildSDKTransport(nil).(*internaltransport.HTTPPolicyRouter); !ok {
t.Fatalf(
"buildSDKTransport() type = %T, want *transport.HTTPPolicyRouter",
buildSDKTransport(nil),
)
}
}
func TestBuildSDKTransportSupportsPolicyLeafCloning(t *testing.T) {
previous := exttransport.GetProvider()
exttransport.Register(nil)
t.Cleanup(func() { exttransport.Register(previous) })
base := &http.Transport{}
client := internaltransport.ClientForRequestClass(
&http.Client{Transport: buildSDKTransportWithBase(base, nil)},
exttransport.RequestClassExternal,
)
source, ok := client.Transport.(interface {
CloneHTTPTransport() (http.RoundTripper, *http.Transport, bool)
})
// Chain: SecurityPolicy → BuildHeader → UserAgent → Retry → RiskControl → Base
sec, ok := transport.(*internalauth.SecurityPolicyTransport)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("SDK request-class transport type = %T, want clone capability", client.Transport)
t.Fatalf("outer transport type = %T, want *auth.SecurityPolicyTransport", transport)
}
rebuilt, concrete, ok := source.CloneHTTPTransport()
if !ok || rebuilt == nil || concrete == nil {
t.Fatal("SDK policy graph could not clone its HTTP transport leaf")
bh, ok := sec.Base.(*BuildHeaderTransport)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("layer after SecurityPolicy = %T, want *BuildHeaderTransport", sec.Base)
}
if concrete == base {
t.Fatal("SDK policy graph reused the original HTTP transport")
ua, ok := bh.Base.(*UserAgentTransport)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("layer after BuildHeader = %T, want *UserAgentTransport", bh.Base)
}
retry, ok := ua.Base.(*RetryTransport)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("inner transport type = %T, want *RetryTransport", ua.Base)
}
if _, ok := retry.Base.(*riskcontrol.Transport); !ok {
t.Fatalf("layer after Retry = %T, want *riskcontrol.Transport", retry.Base)
}
}
func TestWrapSDKTransport_WithExtension(t *testing.T) {
previous := exttransport.GetProvider()
exttransport.Register(&stubTransportProvider{})
t.Cleanup(func() { exttransport.Register(previous) })
transport := wrapSDKTransport(riskcontrol.NewTransport(http.DefaultTransport, nil))
// Chain: extensionMiddleware → SecurityPolicy → BuildHeader → UserAgent → Retry → RiskControl → Base
mid, ok := transport.(*extensionMiddleware)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("outer transport type = %T, want *extensionMiddleware", transport)
}
sec, ok := mid.Base.(*internalauth.SecurityPolicyTransport)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("transport type = %T, want *auth.SecurityPolicyTransport", mid.Base)
}
bh, ok := sec.Base.(*BuildHeaderTransport)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("layer after SecurityPolicy = %T, want *BuildHeaderTransport", sec.Base)
}
ua, ok := bh.Base.(*UserAgentTransport)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("layer after BuildHeader = %T, want *UserAgentTransport", bh.Base)
}
retry, ok := ua.Base.(*RetryTransport)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("innermost transport type = %T, want *RetryTransport", ua.Base)
}
if _, ok := retry.Base.(*riskcontrol.Transport); !ok {
t.Fatalf("layer after Retry = %T, want *riskcontrol.Transport", retry.Base)
}
}
func TestWrapSDKTransport_WithoutExtension(t *testing.T) {
previous := exttransport.GetProvider()
exttransport.Register(nil)
t.Cleanup(func() { exttransport.Register(previous) })
transport := wrapSDKTransport(riskcontrol.NewTransport(http.DefaultTransport, nil))
// Chain: SecurityPolicy → BuildHeader → UserAgent → Retry → RiskControl → Base
sec, ok := transport.(*internalauth.SecurityPolicyTransport)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("outer transport type = %T, want *auth.SecurityPolicyTransport", transport)
}
bh, ok := sec.Base.(*BuildHeaderTransport)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("layer after SecurityPolicy = %T, want *BuildHeaderTransport", sec.Base)
}
ua, ok := bh.Base.(*UserAgentTransport)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("layer after BuildHeader = %T, want *UserAgentTransport", bh.Base)
}
retry, ok := ua.Base.(*RetryTransport)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("inner transport type = %T, want *RetryTransport", ua.Base)
}
if _, ok := retry.Base.(*riskcontrol.Transport); !ok {
t.Fatalf("layer after Retry = %T, want *riskcontrol.Transport", retry.Base)
}
}
@@ -251,7 +238,7 @@ func TestExtensionInterceptor_ExecutionOrder(t *testing.T) {
var base http.RoundTripper = http.DefaultTransport
base = &RetryTransport{Base: base}
base = &SecurityHeaderTransport{Base: base}
transport := internaltransport.WrapWithExtension(base)
transport := wrapWithExtension(base)
client := &http.Client{Transport: transport}
req, _ := http.NewRequest("GET", srv.URL, nil)
@@ -279,16 +266,14 @@ func TestExtensionInterceptor_ExecutionOrder(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// buildTamperingInterceptor tries to delete and spoof security headers via
// PreRoundTrip. The SDK built-in chain must restore the real values before the
// request leaves the process.
// buildTamperingInterceptor tries to delete and spoof X-Cli-Build via
// PreRoundTrip. The SDK chain's BuildHeaderTransport must restore the real
// value before the request leaves the process.
type buildTamperingInterceptor struct{}
func (buildTamperingInterceptor) PreRoundTrip(req *http.Request) func(*http.Response, error) {
req.Header.Del(HeaderBuild)
req.Header.Set(HeaderBuild, "ext-tampered-build")
req.Header.Del(HeaderSource)
req.Header.Set(HeaderSource, "ext-tampered-source")
return nil
}
@@ -300,74 +285,7 @@ func (riskHeaderTamperingInterceptor) PreRoundTrip(req *http.Request) func(*http
return nil
}
type bootstrapPolicyTamperingInterceptor struct{}
func (bootstrapPolicyTamperingInterceptor) PreRoundTrip(req *http.Request) func(*http.Response, error) {
req.Header.Set(HeaderSource, "extension-value")
req.Header.Set(riskcontrol.HeaderOSType, "extension-value")
return nil
}
func TestNewDefaultInstallsSDKBootstrapSecurityPolicy(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
oldTransport := http.DefaultClient.Transport
oldCheckRedirect := http.DefaultClient.CheckRedirect
t.Cleanup(func() {
http.DefaultClient.Transport = oldTransport
http.DefaultClient.CheckRedirect = oldCheckRedirect
})
previous := exttransport.GetProvider()
exttransport.Register(&platformOnlyStubProvider{
stubTransportProvider: &stubTransportProvider{
interceptor: bootstrapPolicyTamperingInterceptor{},
},
})
t.Cleanup(func() { exttransport.Register(previous) })
var received http.Header
network := roundTripFunc(func(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
received = req.Header.Clone()
return &http.Response{
StatusCode: http.StatusNoContent,
Body: http.NoBody,
Request: req,
}, nil
})
http.DefaultClient.Transport = network
http.DefaultClient.CheckRedirect = nil
_ = NewDefault(nil, InvocationContext{})
req, err := http.NewRequest(
http.MethodPost,
"https://open.feishu.cn/callback/ws/endpoint",
strings.NewReader(`{"app_secret":"secret"}`),
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
resp.Body.Close()
if got := received.Get(HeaderSource); got != SourceValue {
t.Fatalf("%s = %q, want trusted value %q", HeaderSource, got, SourceValue)
}
if got := received.Get(riskcontrol.HeaderOSType); got != "" {
t.Fatalf("%s = %q, want extension value stripped", riskcontrol.HeaderOSType, got)
}
if got := received.Get(HeaderBuild); got != DetectBuildKind() {
t.Fatalf("%s = %q, want %q", HeaderBuild, got, DetectBuildKind())
}
if got := received.Get(HeaderUserAgent); got != UserAgentValue() {
t.Fatalf("%s = %q, want %q", HeaderUserAgent, got, UserAgentValue())
}
}
func TestBuildSDKTransport_StripsExtensionRiskHeaders(t *testing.T) {
func TestWrapSDKTransport_StripsExtensionRiskHeaders(t *testing.T) {
previous := exttransport.GetProvider()
exttransport.Register(&stubTransportProvider{interceptor: riskHeaderTamperingInterceptor{}})
t.Cleanup(func() { exttransport.Register(previous) })
@@ -383,11 +301,7 @@ func TestBuildSDKTransport_StripsExtensionRiskHeaders(t *testing.T) {
}
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer token")
client := internaltransport.ClientForRequestClass(
&http.Client{Transport: buildSDKTransportWithBase(network, nil)},
exttransport.RequestClassPlatform,
)
resp, err := client.Do(req)
resp, err := wrapSDKTransport(riskcontrol.NewTransport(network, nil)).RoundTrip(req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
@@ -398,13 +312,14 @@ func TestBuildSDKTransport_StripsExtensionRiskHeaders(t *testing.T) {
}
// TestBuildHeaderTransport_SDKChain_OverridesTamperedHeader verifies that the
// SDK chain restores both the build classification and the full security
// header set after an extension runs.
// X-Cli-Build header is force-written by BuildHeaderTransport in the SDK
// transport chain, even when an extension tries to delete or spoof it. This
// closes the gap where the SDK chain had no equivalent of
// SecurityHeaderTransport (see design doc §3.3.3).
func TestBuildHeaderTransport_SDKChain_OverridesTamperedHeader(t *testing.T) {
var receivedBuild, receivedSource string
var receivedBuild string
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
receivedBuild = r.Header.Get(HeaderBuild)
receivedSource = r.Header.Get(HeaderSource)
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
}))
defer srv.Close()
@@ -412,13 +327,12 @@ func TestBuildHeaderTransport_SDKChain_OverridesTamperedHeader(t *testing.T) {
exttransport.Register(&stubTransportProvider{interceptor: buildTamperingInterceptor{}})
t.Cleanup(func() { exttransport.Register(nil) })
// Replicate the SDK built-in chain inside buildSDKTransport.
// Replicate the SDK chain layering used by wrapSDKTransport.
var base http.RoundTripper = http.DefaultTransport
base = &RetryTransport{Base: base}
base = &UserAgentTransport{Base: base}
base = &BuildHeaderTransport{Base: base}
base = &SecurityHeaderTransport{Base: base}
transport := internaltransport.WrapWithExtension(base)
transport := wrapWithExtension(base)
client := &http.Client{Transport: transport}
req, _ := http.NewRequest("GET", srv.URL, nil)
@@ -435,9 +349,6 @@ func TestBuildHeaderTransport_SDKChain_OverridesTamperedHeader(t *testing.T) {
if receivedBuild != want {
t.Fatalf("%s = %q, want %q", HeaderBuild, receivedBuild, want)
}
if receivedSource != SourceValue {
t.Fatalf("%s = %q, want %q", HeaderSource, receivedSource, SourceValue)
}
}
// TestBuildHeaderTransport_OverridesEvenWithoutTamper verifies that even if
@@ -527,7 +438,7 @@ func TestExtensionInterceptor_ContextTamperPrevented(t *testing.T) {
return nil
})
mid := &internaltransport.ExtensionMiddleware{Base: capturer, Ext: tamperIC}
mid := &extensionMiddleware{Base: capturer, Ext: tamperIC}
origCtx := context.WithValue(context.Background(), testKey, "original")
req, _ := http.NewRequestWithContext(origCtx, "GET", srv.URL, nil)
@@ -589,7 +500,7 @@ func TestExtensionMiddleware_PreRoundTripEAbort(t *testing.T) {
return &http.Response{StatusCode: http.StatusOK, Body: http.NoBody}, nil
})
mid := &internaltransport.ExtensionMiddleware{Base: base, Ext: ic, ExtName: "stub"}
mid := &extensionMiddleware{Base: base, Ext: ic, ExtName: "stub"}
req, _ := http.NewRequest("GET", "http://example.invalid/", nil)
resp, err := mid.RoundTrip(req)
@@ -630,7 +541,7 @@ func TestExtensionMiddleware_PreRoundTripEAbort(t *testing.T) {
return nil, nil
})
mid := &internaltransport.ExtensionMiddleware{Base: base, Ext: ic, ExtName: "stub"}
mid := &extensionMiddleware{Base: base, Ext: ic, ExtName: "stub"}
req, _ := http.NewRequest("GET", "http://example.invalid/", nil)
_, err := mid.RoundTrip(req)
@@ -649,7 +560,7 @@ func TestExtensionMiddleware_PreRoundTripEHappyPath(t *testing.T) {
return &http.Response{StatusCode: http.StatusOK, Body: http.NoBody}, nil
})
mid := &internaltransport.ExtensionMiddleware{Base: base, Ext: ic, ExtName: "stub"}
mid := &extensionMiddleware{Base: base, Ext: ic, ExtName: "stub"}
req, _ := http.NewRequest("GET", "http://example.invalid/", nil)
resp, err := mid.RoundTrip(req)
if err != nil {

View File

@@ -255,7 +255,11 @@ func ResolveConfigFromMulti(raw *MultiAppConfig, kc keychain.KeychainAccess, pro
}
if err := ValidateSecretKeyMatch(app.AppId, app.AppSecret); err != nil {
return nil, errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeNotConfigured, "appId and appSecret keychain key are out of sync").
// invalid_config, not not_configured: the config exists but is
// internally inconsistent. not_configured would let callers degrade
// this into a generic "secret invalid" answer and destroy the precise
// repair hint (which names the expected keychain key — never a value).
return nil, errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeInvalidConfig, "appId and appSecret keychain key are out of sync").
WithHint("%s", err.Error()).
WithCause(err)
}

View File

@@ -36,16 +36,13 @@ func LoadOrNotConfigured() (*MultiAppConfig, error) {
if errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) {
return nil, NotConfiguredError()
}
// Surface the real cause (parse error, permission denied, etc.)
// so the user can fix the broken file. A malformed file is
// invalid_config; anything else (permission denied, etc.) is
// not_configured. Both stay on the typed structured-envelope path
// at the root command's error sink.
subtype := errs.SubtypeNotConfigured
if isMalformedConfigError(err) {
subtype = errs.SubtypeInvalidConfig
}
return nil, errs.NewConfigError(subtype, "failed to load config: %v", err).WithCause(err)
// Surface the real cause so the user can fix the broken file. Every
// non-ENOENT load failure — malformed JSON, permission denied, I/O
// error — means a config EXISTS but cannot be used: invalid_config.
// Only a genuinely absent config is not_configured; anything else
// classified as not_configured would let callers degrade it into
// profile_not_found / no_active_profile and hide the real cause.
return nil, errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeInvalidConfig, "failed to load config: %v", err).WithCause(err)
}
if multi == nil || len(multi.Apps) == 0 {
return nil, NotConfiguredError()

View File

@@ -3,10 +3,7 @@
package core
import (
"net/url"
"strings"
)
import "strings"
// LarkBrand represents the Lark platform brand.
// "feishu" targets China-mainland, "lark" targets international.
@@ -66,39 +63,3 @@ func ResolveEndpoints(brand LarkBrand) Endpoints {
func ResolveOpenBaseURL(brand LarkBrand) string {
return ResolveEndpoints(brand).Open
}
var platformEndpointHosts = func() map[string]struct{} {
hosts := make(map[string]struct{})
for _, brand := range []LarkBrand{BrandFeishu, BrandLark} {
endpoints := ResolveEndpoints(brand)
for _, rawURL := range []string{endpoints.Open, endpoints.Accounts, endpoints.MCP, endpoints.AppLink} {
parsed, err := url.Parse(rawURL)
if err == nil && parsed.Hostname() != "" {
hosts[strings.ToLower(parsed.Hostname())] = struct{}{}
}
}
}
return hosts
}()
// IsPlatformEndpointHost reports whether hostname exactly matches one of the
// endpoint hosts produced by ResolveEndpoints. It intentionally does not use a
// suffix match: lookalike external domains must never enter the platform
// transport extension.
func IsPlatformEndpointHost(hostname string) bool {
_, ok := platformEndpointHosts[strings.ToLower(hostname)]
return ok
}
// IsPlatformEndpointURL reports whether candidate uses a secure origin for a
// configured platform endpoint. Non-TLS and non-standard-port lookalikes are
// excluded even when their hostname matches.
func IsPlatformEndpointURL(candidate *url.URL) bool {
if candidate == nil || !strings.EqualFold(candidate.Scheme, "https") {
return false
}
if port := candidate.Port(); port != "" && port != "443" {
return false
}
return IsPlatformEndpointHost(candidate.Hostname())
}

View File

@@ -3,11 +3,7 @@
package core
import (
"net/url"
"reflect"
"testing"
)
import "testing"
func TestResolveEndpoints_Feishu(t *testing.T) {
ep := ResolveEndpoints(BrandFeishu)
@@ -95,85 +91,3 @@ func TestResolveEndpoints_NormalizesBrand(t *testing.T) {
t.Errorf("ResolveEndpoints(unexpected).Open = %q, want the feishu default", got)
}
}
func TestIsPlatformEndpointHost_ExactMatchOnly(t *testing.T) {
for _, host := range []string{
"open.feishu.cn",
"accounts.feishu.cn",
"mcp.feishu.cn",
"applink.feishu.cn",
"open.larksuite.com",
"accounts.larksuite.com",
"mcp.larksuite.com",
"applink.larksuite.com",
} {
if !IsPlatformEndpointHost(host) {
t.Errorf("IsPlatformEndpointHost(%q) = false, want true", host)
}
}
for _, host := range []string{
"example.com",
"open.feishu.cn.example.com",
"notopen.feishu.cn",
"",
} {
if IsPlatformEndpointHost(host) {
t.Errorf("IsPlatformEndpointHost(%q) = true, want false", host)
}
}
}
func TestIsPlatformEndpointHost_CoversEveryResolvedEndpoint(t *testing.T) {
for _, brand := range []LarkBrand{BrandFeishu, BrandLark} {
endpoints := reflect.ValueOf(ResolveEndpoints(brand))
for i := 0; i < endpoints.NumField(); i++ {
rawURL := endpoints.Field(i).String()
parsed, err := url.Parse(rawURL)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ResolveEndpoints(%q) field %d URL %q: %v", brand, i, rawURL, err)
}
if !IsPlatformEndpointHost(parsed.Hostname()) {
t.Errorf("ResolveEndpoints(%q) field %d host %q is missing from the platform transport boundary", brand, i, parsed.Hostname())
}
}
}
}
func TestIsPlatformEndpointURL_RequiresSecureStandardOrigin(t *testing.T) {
if IsPlatformEndpointURL(nil) {
t.Error("IsPlatformEndpointURL(nil) = true, want false")
}
uppercaseScheme := &url.URL{Scheme: "HTTPS", Host: "open.feishu.cn", Path: "/path"}
if !IsPlatformEndpointURL(uppercaseScheme) {
t.Error("IsPlatformEndpointURL() rejected uppercase HTTPS scheme")
}
for _, rawURL := range []string{
"http://open.feishu.cn/path",
"https://open.feishu.cn:8443/path",
"https://open.feishu.cn.example.com/path",
} {
candidate, err := url.Parse(rawURL)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if IsPlatformEndpointURL(candidate) {
t.Errorf("IsPlatformEndpointURL(%q) = true, want false", rawURL)
}
}
for _, rawURL := range []string{
"https://open.feishu.cn/path",
"https://open.feishu.cn:443/path",
"https://OPEN.FEISHU.CN/path",
} {
candidate, err := url.Parse(rawURL)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if !IsPlatformEndpointURL(candidate) {
t.Errorf("IsPlatformEndpointURL(%q) = false, want true", rawURL)
}
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
//go:build authsidecar
package credential_test
import (
"context"
"errors"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/errs"
extcred "github.com/larksuite/cli/extension/credential"
sidecarprovider "github.com/larksuite/cli/extension/credential/sidecar"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/credential"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/envvars"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/output"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/sidecar"
)
func newRealSidecarCredentialProvider(t *testing.T) *credential.CredentialProvider {
t.Helper()
t.Setenv(envvars.CliAuthProxy, "http://127.0.0.1:16384")
t.Setenv(envvars.CliProxyKey, "test-key")
t.Setenv(envvars.CliAppID, "cli_sidecar")
t.Setenv(envvars.CliAppSecret, "")
t.Setenv(envvars.CliUserAccessToken, "")
t.Setenv(envvars.CliTenantAccessToken, "")
t.Setenv(envvars.CliDefaultAs, "")
t.Setenv(envvars.CliStrictMode, "")
t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
return credential.NewCredentialProvider(
[]extcred.Provider{&sidecarprovider.Provider{}},
nil,
nil,
nil,
)
}
func TestAuthSidecarInvalidPolicyUsesValidationContract(t *testing.T) {
for _, tt := range []struct {
name string
key string
}{
{name: "default as", key: envvars.CliDefaultAs},
{name: "strict mode", key: envvars.CliStrictMode},
} {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
cp := newRealSidecarCredentialProvider(t)
t.Setenv(tt.key, "banana")
_, err := cp.ResolveAccount(context.Background())
problem, ok := errs.ProblemOf(err)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("error = %T %v, want typed validation error", err, err)
}
if problem.Category != errs.CategoryValidation || problem.Subtype != errs.SubtypeInvalidArgument {
t.Fatalf("problem = %s/%s, want %s/%s", problem.Category, problem.Subtype, errs.CategoryValidation, errs.SubtypeInvalidArgument)
}
var validationErr *errs.ValidationError
if !errors.As(err, &validationErr) {
t.Fatalf("error = %T %v, want ValidationError", err, err)
}
if validationErr.Param != tt.key {
t.Fatalf("param = %q, want %q", validationErr.Param, tt.key)
}
if got := output.ExitCodeOf(err); got != output.ExitValidation {
t.Fatalf("exit code = %d, want %d", got, output.ExitValidation)
}
if !strings.Contains(problem.Hint, tt.key) {
t.Fatalf("hint = %q, want variable name %s", problem.Hint, tt.key)
}
var blockErr *extcred.BlockError
if !errors.As(err, &blockErr) ||
blockErr.Code != extcred.BlockReasonInvalidPolicy ||
blockErr.Param != tt.key {
t.Fatalf("cause = %T %v, want classified BlockError for %s", err, err, tt.key)
}
})
}
}
func TestAuthSidecarGateProbeUsesValidationContract(t *testing.T) {
cp := newRealSidecarCredentialProvider(t)
t.Setenv(envvars.CliStrictMode, "banana")
name, err := cp.ActiveExtensionProviderName(context.Background())
if name != "" {
t.Fatalf("provider name = %q, want empty on invalid policy", name)
}
problem, ok := errs.ProblemOf(err)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("error = %T %v, want typed validation error", err, err)
}
var validationErr *errs.ValidationError
if !errors.As(err, &validationErr) {
t.Fatalf("error = %T %v, want ValidationError", err, err)
}
if problem.Category != errs.CategoryValidation ||
problem.Subtype != errs.SubtypeInvalidArgument ||
validationErr.Param != envvars.CliStrictMode {
t.Fatalf("problem = %+v param = %q, want validation/invalid_argument param %s", problem, validationErr.Param, envvars.CliStrictMode)
}
}
func TestAuthSidecarTokenHonorsSelectedAppID(t *testing.T) {
t.Run("matching app returns sentinel", func(t *testing.T) {
cp := newRealSidecarCredentialProvider(t)
result, err := cp.ResolveToken(context.Background(), credential.TokenSpec{
Type: credential.TokenTypeUAT,
AppID: "cli_sidecar",
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ResolveToken: %v", err)
}
if result == nil || result.Token != sidecar.SentinelUAT {
t.Fatalf("result = %+v, want sidecar UAT sentinel", result)
}
})
for _, tt := range []struct {
name string
appID string
}{
{name: "empty app id", appID: ""},
{name: "conflicting app id", appID: "cli_other"},
} {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
cp := newRealSidecarCredentialProvider(t)
result, err := cp.ResolveToken(context.Background(), credential.TokenSpec{
Type: credential.TokenTypeUAT,
AppID: tt.appID,
})
if result != nil {
t.Fatalf("result = %+v, want no sidecar sentinel", result)
}
problem, ok := errs.ProblemOf(err)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("error = %T %v, want typed internal error", err, err)
}
if problem.Category != errs.CategoryInternal || problem.Subtype != errs.SubtypeUnknown {
t.Fatalf("problem = %s/%s, want %s/%s", problem.Category, problem.Subtype, errs.CategoryInternal, errs.SubtypeUnknown)
}
if strings.Contains(err.Error(), sidecar.SentinelUAT) {
t.Fatalf("error leaked sidecar sentinel: %v", err)
}
})
}
}

View File

@@ -9,11 +9,17 @@ import (
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"os"
"slices"
"strings"
"sync"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/errs"
extcred "github.com/larksuite/cli/extension/credential"
envprovider "github.com/larksuite/cli/extension/credential/env"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/auth"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/envvars"
)
// DefaultAccountResolver is implemented by the default account provider.
@@ -136,10 +142,21 @@ type CredentialProvider struct {
httpClient func() (*http.Client, error)
warnOut io.Writer
// profile is the active profile (from --profile or LARKSUITE_CLI_PROFILE);
// profileSrc records which of the two supplied it, for the reported
// selection and error attribution.
profile string
profileSrc CredentialSourceKind
accountOnce sync.Once
account *Account
accountErr error
selectedSource credentialSource
// selection is the explainable credential-selection result, populated by
// doResolveAccount under accountOnce. It never carries a secret.
selection IdentitySelection
enrichOnce sync.Once
hintOnce sync.Once
hint *IdentityHint
@@ -161,49 +178,521 @@ func (p *CredentialProvider) SetWarnOut(warnOut io.Writer) *CredentialProvider {
return p
}
// WithProfileFromFlag records the --profile flag value as the active profile.
// It governs credential arbitration and the reported selection source.
func (p *CredentialProvider) WithProfileFromFlag(profile string) *CredentialProvider {
p.profile = profile
p.profileSrc = SourceFlagProfile
return p
}
// WithProfileFromEnv records the LARKSUITE_CLI_PROFILE env fallback as the
// active profile. It governs credential arbitration and the reported
// selection source.
func (p *CredentialProvider) WithProfileFromEnv(profile string) *CredentialProvider {
p.profile = profile
p.profileSrc = SourceEnvProfile
return p
}
// ResolveAccount resolves app credentials. Result is cached after first call.
// NOTE: Uses sync.Once — only the context from the first call is used for resolution.
// Subsequent calls return the cached result regardless of their context.
// This is acceptable for CLI (single invocation per process) but not for long-running servers.
func (p *CredentialProvider) ResolveAccount(ctx context.Context) (*Account, error) {
acct, err := p.resolveAccountSelection(ctx)
if err != nil || acct == nil {
return acct, err
}
if _, ok := p.selectedSource.(extensionTokenSource); ok {
p.enrichOnce.Do(func() {
p.enrichOrClearIdentity(ctx, acct, p.selectedSource)
})
}
return acct, nil
}
// resolveAccountSelection performs and caches only credential selection. It
// deliberately does not resolve tokens or user_info, so callers can validate
// the selected app before any token work begins.
func (p *CredentialProvider) resolveAccountSelection(ctx context.Context) (*Account, error) {
p.accountOnce.Do(func() {
p.account, p.accountErr = p.doResolveAccount(ctx)
})
return p.account, p.accountErr
}
// doResolveAccount arbitrates the credential/App selection in three phases:
// gather all arbitration inputs in a single I/O pass, decide the route with a
// pure function, then execute the remaining I/O for the chosen route.
//
// Resolution order (encoded in decideIdentity): a managed extension provider
// (e.g. sidecar) wins outright; then an explicit profile (--profile /
// LARKSUITE_CLI_PROFILE) arbitrates against the direct env credential
// (matching app_id → profile supplies credential and tokens; mismatch → hard
// conflict; incomplete env without a usable app_id → repair error); then a
// complete direct env credential; then the config default (currentApp →
// firstApp).
//
// It populates p.selection (never carries a secret) and p.selectedSource on
// every success path.
func (p *CredentialProvider) doResolveAccount(ctx context.Context) (*Account, error) {
in, err := p.gatherIdentityInputs(ctx)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
d, err := decideIdentity(in)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
acct, source, err := p.execute(ctx, d, in)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
p.selectedSource = source
// Assigned only after full success: error paths can never leave a
// partial selection behind.
p.selection = d.selection
return acct, nil
}
// providerAccount pairs an extension-provider account with its token source.
type providerAccount struct {
acct *Account
source extensionTokenSource
}
// identityInputs is one invocation's complete arbitration input, gathered in
// a single pass by gatherIdentityInputs. It is read-only after gathering;
// decideIdentity consumes it without further I/O.
type identityInputs struct {
profile string
profileSrc CredentialSourceKind
managed *providerAccount // managed extension account; wins arbitration outright
direct *providerAccount // complete direct env credential
// directBlock is a provider's explicit incomplete-direct-credential
// classification (BlockError.Code == credential_incomplete). It
// participates in profile arbitration instead of failing outright.
directBlock *extcred.BlockError
// directKeys / conflictKeys describe the BUILTIN process-env direct
// credential surface (LARKSUITE_CLI_* variable NAMES, never values).
// They annotate DirectCredentialEnv and conflict hints; a third-party
// AccountDirect provider reports its own inputs via BlockError metadata
// (PresentKeys/AppID), not through these.
directKeys []string
conflictKeys []string
config *core.MultiAppConfig
configErr error
}
// gatherIdentityInputs performs the arbitration's read phase: it consults the
// extension providers and snapshots the config. Providers classify their own
// failures at the source (BlockError.Code); this layer must not infer them by
// re-reading environment variables or parsing Reason.
func (p *CredentialProvider) gatherIdentityInputs(ctx context.Context) (identityInputs, error) {
in := identityInputs{
profile: p.profile,
profileSrc: p.profileSrc,
directKeys: presentDirectCredentialKeys(),
conflictKeys: presentDirectCredentialInputKeys(),
}
for _, prov := range p.providers {
acct, err := prov.ResolveAccount(ctx)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if acct != nil {
internal := convertAccount(acct)
source := extensionTokenSource{provider: prov}
if err := p.enrichUserInfo(ctx, internal, source); err != nil {
if p.warnOut != nil {
_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(p.warnOut, "warning: unable to verify user identity from credential source %q: %v\n", source.Name(), err)
var blockErr *extcred.BlockError
if errors.As(err, &blockErr) {
switch blockErr.Code {
case extcred.BlockReasonCredentialIncomplete:
// app_credential_incomplete, profile matching, and
// DirectCredentialEnv diagnostics are defined in terms of
// the builtin LARKSUITE_CLI_* env surface. Until the SPI
// carries provider-owned input descriptors, accepting this
// classification from another provider would produce
// contradictory arbitration and repair hints.
if _, builtin := prov.(*envprovider.Provider); !builtin {
return in, newCredentialIncompleteProviderContractError(prov)
}
in.directBlock = blockErr
case extcred.BlockReasonInvalidPolicy:
// A user-supplied policy value failed validation; that is
// a validation error, never an internal one.
return in, newInvalidPolicyError(blockErr)
default:
// Blocks without a recognized Code preserve their
// original attribution.
return in, err
}
// enrichUserInfo failure is non-fatal: SupportedIdentities
// (used for strict mode) is already set by the provider.
// Clear unverified user identity for safety.
internal.UserOpenId = ""
internal.UserName = ""
break
}
p.selectedSource = source
return internal, nil
// Any other provider error preserves its original attribution.
return in, err
}
if acct == nil {
continue
}
pa := &providerAccount{acct: convertAccount(acct), source: extensionTokenSource{provider: prov}}
switch acct.Kind {
case extcred.AccountDirect:
// The arbitration's direct-credential surface — DirectCredentialEnv,
// the env:LARKSUITE_CLI_APP_ID selection source, conflict-hint
// keys — is defined in terms of the builtin process-env variables.
// Until the SPI carries provider-reported input descriptors, only
// the builtin env provider may declare AccountDirect; accepting it
// from anyone else would produce self-contradictory diagnostics
// (e.g. credentialSource "env:LARKSUITE_CLI_APP_ID" with
// directCredentialEnv.present=false). The check is by concrete
// type: the registry reserves neither names nor uniqueness, so a
// Name() comparison would be forgeable.
if _, builtin := prov.(*envprovider.Provider); !builtin {
return in, errs.NewInternalError(errs.SubtypeUnknown,
"credential provider %q declared AccountDirect, which is reserved for the builtin env provider", prov.Name())
}
in.direct = pa
case extcred.AccountManaged:
in.managed = pa
default:
return in, errs.NewInternalError(errs.SubtypeUnknown,
"credential provider %q returned unknown AccountKind %d", prov.Name(), acct.Kind)
}
break // the first engaged provider ends the scan (registry priority order)
}
// The config snapshot backs profile lookup, the config-default route, and
// config-default failure attribution. A winning managed or direct-env
// identity without a profile never needs it — and managed identities must
// keep working when the config is absent or malformed.
if in.managed == nil && (in.profile != "" || in.direct == nil) {
in.config, in.configErr = core.LoadOrNotConfigured()
}
return in, nil
}
// credentialRoute names which source serves the selected account and tokens.
type credentialRoute int
const (
routeManaged credentialRoute = iota
routeProfile
routeDirectEnv
routeConfigDefault
)
// decision is decideIdentity's complete verdict. Nothing in it touched I/O.
type decision struct {
route credentialRoute
selection IdentitySelection
// profileAppID is set on routeProfile; app_id is plaintext and safe to
// echo in the secret-invalid error.
profileAppID string
}
// decideIdentity holds every selection rule in one place: precedence
// (managed > profile > direct env > config default), profile/direct-env
// conflict detection, and error attribution. It is pure — same inputs, same
// verdict — so the full selection matrix is table-testable without env vars
// or config fixtures.
func decideIdentity(in identityInputs) (decision, error) {
// DirectCredentialEnv reports the direct env vars truthfully on every
// route: Present always means "direct credential env vars are set".
directEnv := DirectCredentialEnv{Present: len(in.directKeys) > 0, Keys: in.directKeys}
if in.direct != nil {
directEnv.AppID = in.direct.acct.AppID
}
switch {
case in.managed != nil:
return decision{route: routeManaged, selection: IdentitySelection{
Source: SourceExtension(in.managed.source.Name()),
DirectCredentialEnv: directEnv,
}}, nil
case in.profile != "":
return decideProfile(in, directEnv)
case in.directBlock != nil:
return decision{}, newAppCredentialIncompleteError(in.directBlock, false)
case in.direct != nil:
return decision{route: routeDirectEnv, selection: IdentitySelection{
Source: SourceEnvAppID,
DirectCredentialEnv: directEnv,
}}, nil
default:
return decision{route: routeConfigDefault, selection: IdentitySelection{
Source: selectionSourceForDefault(in.config),
DirectCredentialEnv: directEnv,
}}, nil
}
}
// decideProfile arbitrates an explicit profile against the direct env
// credential state.
func decideProfile(in identityInputs, directEnv DirectCredentialEnv) (decision, error) {
app, err := findProfile(in)
if err != nil {
return decision{}, err
}
if in.directBlock != nil {
// APP_ID-only is sufficient to compare sources: a matching selected
// profile supplies the credential and tokens; a mismatch is the same
// hard conflict as a complete direct env. Anything less than a usable
// app_id keeps the provider's repair error, extended with the
// unset-to-use-the-profile path.
if in.directBlock.AppID == "" || !slices.Contains(in.directBlock.PresentKeys, envvars.CliAppID) {
return decision{}, newAppCredentialIncompleteError(in.directBlock, true)
}
if app.AppId != in.directBlock.AppID {
return decision{}, newProfileAppCredentialConflict(
in.profile, app.AppId, in.directBlock.AppID, in.directBlock.PresentKeys)
}
directEnv.AppID = in.directBlock.AppID
directEnv.Matched = true
}
if in.direct != nil {
// E == complete: the direct env app_id must match the profile.
if app.AppId != in.direct.acct.AppID {
return decision{}, newProfileAppCredentialConflict(
in.profile, app.AppId, in.direct.acct.AppID, in.conflictKeys)
}
directEnv.Matched = true
}
return decision{
route: routeProfile,
selection: IdentitySelection{Source: in.profileSrc, DirectCredentialEnv: directEnv},
profileAppID: app.AppId,
}, nil
}
// findProfile resolves the requested profile against the config snapshot.
// A malformed config must surface its real typed cause (invalid_config):
// reporting it as profile_not_found would send the user to `profile list`
// and hide the broken file. Only a genuinely absent config degrades to
// profile_not_found, because the profile then cannot exist anywhere. Both
// deliberately outrank an incomplete direct env: fixing the profile side is
// what makes the selected profile usable.
func findProfile(in identityInputs) (*core.AppConfig, error) {
if in.configErr != nil {
if prob, ok := errs.ProblemOf(in.configErr); !ok || prob.Subtype != errs.SubtypeNotConfigured {
return nil, in.configErr
}
}
if p.defaultAcct != nil {
if in.config != nil {
if app := in.config.FindApp(in.profile); app != nil {
return app, nil
}
}
return nil, errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeProfileNotFound,
"profile %q not found", in.profile).
WithProfile(in.profile).
WithCredentialSource(string(in.profileSrc)).
WithHint("run `lark-cli profile list` to see available profiles.")
}
// execute performs the remaining I/O for the decided route and returns the
// account together with its token source.
func (p *CredentialProvider) execute(ctx context.Context, d decision, in identityInputs) (*Account, credentialSource, error) {
switch d.route {
case routeManaged:
return in.managed.acct, in.managed.source, nil
case routeDirectEnv:
return in.direct.acct, in.direct.source, nil
case routeProfile:
// Resolve the profile's own (keychain-backed) credential locally.
acct, err := p.defaultAcct.ResolveAccount(ctx)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
// A typed failure other than not_configured carries its own
// precise, secret-free diagnosis (typed errors never embed secret
// material per the error contract) — pass it through instead of
// flattening it into the generic secret error. Untyped failures
// and a config that vanished mid-resolution stay masked: their
// content is not guaranteed secret-free.
if prob, ok := errs.ProblemOf(err); ok && prob.Subtype != errs.SubtypeNotConfigured {
return nil, nil, err
}
return nil, nil, newProfileSecretInvalidError(in.profile, d.profileAppID)
}
p.selectedSource = defaultTokenSource{resolver: p.defaultToken}
return acct, nil
// The resolver re-reads the config; a concurrent profile edit between
// gather and here could hand back a different app. Refuse the mismatch
// instead of silently using credentials the arbitration never checked.
if acct.AppID != d.profileAppID {
return nil, nil, errs.NewInternalError(errs.SubtypeUnknown,
"config changed during resolution: profile %q resolved to a different app", in.profile).
WithHint("retry the command.")
}
return acct, defaultTokenSource{resolver: p.defaultToken}, nil
default: // routeConfigDefault
if p.defaultAcct == nil {
return nil, nil, core.NotConfiguredError()
}
acct, err := p.defaultAcct.ResolveAccount(ctx)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, translateConfigDefaultFailure(err, in.config)
}
return acct, defaultTokenSource{resolver: p.defaultToken}, nil
}
return nil, core.NotConfiguredError()
}
// translateConfigDefaultFailure attributes a config-default failure from the
// snapshot: a default profile that EXISTS (has an app_id) but whose secret
// cannot be resolved locally is profile_secret_invalid — "identity is
// configured, its secret is broken" is more actionable than "no active
// profile". Only when there is genuinely no usable default profile do we
// report no_active_profile. Other typed failures pass through unchanged.
func translateConfigDefaultFailure(err error, multi *core.MultiAppConfig) error {
if prob, ok := errs.ProblemOf(err); !ok || prob.Subtype != errs.SubtypeNotConfigured {
return err
}
if multi != nil {
if app := multi.CurrentAppConfig(""); app != nil && app.AppId != "" {
return newProfileSecretInvalidError(app.ProfileName(), app.AppId)
}
}
return errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeNoActiveProfile, "no active profile").
WithCredentialSource(noActiveProfileCredentialSource).
WithHint("run `lark-cli config init` / `lark-cli profile add`, or set %s.", envvars.CliProfile)
}
func newProfileAppCredentialConflict(profile, profileAppID, envAppID string, presentKeys []string) error {
err := errs.NewValidationError(errs.SubtypeProfileAppCredentialConflict,
"profile %q app_id does not match %s", profile, envvars.CliAppID).
WithProfileAppConflict(profileAppID, envAppID)
if len(presentKeys) > 0 {
return err.WithHint("unset %s, or select a profile whose app_id matches the environment.",
humanList(presentKeys, "and"))
}
return err.WithHint("unset the direct credential environment variables, or select a profile whose app_id matches the environment.")
}
func newAppCredentialIncompleteError(blockErr *extcred.BlockError, selectedProfileAvailable bool) *errs.ConfigError {
err := errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeAppCredentialIncomplete, "%s", blockErr.Reason).
WithCause(blockErr)
if len(blockErr.MissingKeys) > 0 {
err.WithMissingKeys(blockErr.MissingKeys...)
}
if len(blockErr.RequiredAnyOf) > 0 {
err.WithRequiredAnyOf(blockErr.RequiredAnyOf...)
}
hint := credentialRepairHint(blockErr)
if selectedProfileAvailable && len(blockErr.PresentKeys) > 0 {
hint += fmt.Sprintf(", or unset %s to use the selected profile", humanList(blockErr.PresentKeys, "and"))
}
return err.WithHint("%s.", hint)
}
func credentialRepairHint(blockErr *extcred.BlockError) string {
if len(blockErr.RequiredAnyOf) > 0 {
return "set " + humanList(blockErr.RequiredAnyOf, "or")
}
return "set " + humanList(blockErr.MissingKeys, "and")
}
func humanList(items []string, conjunction string) string {
switch len(items) {
case 0:
return "the missing direct credential variables"
case 1:
return items[0]
case 2:
return items[0] + " " + conjunction + " " + items[1]
default:
return strings.Join(items[:len(items)-1], ", ") + ", " + conjunction + " " + items[len(items)-1]
}
}
// newInvalidPolicyError translates a provider's invalid-policy block into the
// typed validation contract: the failed variable name travels in param, the
// repair path in the hint, and the original block stays on the cause chain.
// Reason carries only the variable name and its non-secret value.
func newInvalidPolicyError(blockErr *extcred.BlockError) error {
return errs.NewValidationError(errs.SubtypeInvalidArgument, "%s", blockErr.Reason).
WithParam(blockErr.Param).
WithCause(blockErr).
WithHint("set %s to a supported value or unset it.", blockErr.Param)
}
func newCredentialIncompleteProviderContractError(prov extcred.Provider) error {
return errs.NewInternalError(errs.SubtypeUnknown,
"credential provider %q returned credential_incomplete, which is reserved for the builtin env provider", prov.Name())
}
// newProfileSecretInvalidError is deliberately generic (SECURITY): the
// underlying cause may carry secret material, so neither it nor its message
// may reach the envelope. app_id is plaintext and safe to echo.
func newProfileSecretInvalidError(profile, appID string) error {
return errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeProfileSecretInvalid,
"profile %q credential could not be resolved locally", profile).
WithProfile(profile).
WithAppID(appID).
WithHint("verify the profile's app secret or re-add the profile with `lark-cli config`.")
}
// enrichOrClearIdentity verifies a provider-supplied user identity via
// enrichUserInfo. Verification failure is non-fatal — SupportedIdentities
// (used for strict mode) is already set by the provider — but an unverified
// identity must not survive it: a stale OpenID would attribute calls to a
// user the token can no longer act for.
func (p *CredentialProvider) enrichOrClearIdentity(ctx context.Context, acct *Account, source credentialSource) {
err := p.enrichUserInfo(ctx, acct, source)
if err == nil {
return
}
if p.warnOut != nil {
_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(p.warnOut, "warning: unable to verify user identity from credential source %q: %v\n", source.Name(), err)
}
acct.UserOpenId = ""
acct.UserName = ""
}
// noActiveProfileCredentialSource is the credential_source reported on the
// no_active_profile error. The error contract fixes this to the literal "config": there is
// no resolved default profile at all, so the more specific config:currentApp /
// config:firstApp source values (used on successful config-default selections)
// would be misleading. It is an enum string, never a secret.
const noActiveProfileCredentialSource = "config"
// selectionSourceForDefault reports whether the config default resolved to the
// explicit currentApp or fell back to the first app.
func selectionSourceForDefault(multi *core.MultiAppConfig) CredentialSourceKind {
if multi != nil && multi.CurrentApp != "" {
return SourceConfigCurrentApp
}
return SourceConfigFirstApp
}
// presentDirectCredentialKeys returns the NAMES (never values) of the direct
// app credential env vars that are set. Used to annotate DirectCredentialEnv.
func presentDirectCredentialKeys() []string {
var keys []string
if os.Getenv(envvars.CliAppID) != "" {
keys = append(keys, envvars.CliAppID)
}
if os.Getenv(envvars.CliAppSecret) != "" {
keys = append(keys, envvars.CliAppSecret)
}
return keys
}
// presentDirectCredentialInputKeys returns all direct env input names that
// must be cleared together to remove a profile/app_id conflict. Values are
// never returned.
func presentDirectCredentialInputKeys() []string {
keys := presentDirectCredentialKeys()
if os.Getenv(envvars.CliUserAccessToken) != "" {
keys = append(keys, envvars.CliUserAccessToken)
}
if os.Getenv(envvars.CliTenantAccessToken) != "" {
keys = append(keys, envvars.CliTenantAccessToken)
}
return keys
}
// Selection resolves the account (once) and returns the cached, secret-free
// explanation of how the credential/App was selected. It mirrors
// selectedCredentialSource: resolve-then-return.
func (p *CredentialProvider) Selection(ctx context.Context) (IdentitySelection, error) {
if _, err := p.ResolveAccount(ctx); err != nil {
return IdentitySelection{}, err
}
return p.selection, nil
}
// enrichUserInfo resolves user identity when extension provides a UAT.
@@ -239,17 +728,13 @@ func (p *CredentialProvider) enrichUserInfo(ctx context.Context, acct *Account,
}
func (p *CredentialProvider) selectedCredentialSource(ctx context.Context) (credentialSource, error) {
if p.selectedSource != nil {
return p.selectedSource, nil
}
if p.defaultAcct == nil {
return nil, nil
}
if _, err := p.ResolveAccount(ctx); err != nil {
if _, err := p.resolveAccountSelection(ctx); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if p.selectedSource == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("credential provider resolved an account without selecting a token source")
return nil, errs.NewInternalError(errs.SubtypeUnknown,
"credential provider resolved an account without selecting a token source").
WithHint("retry the command.")
}
return p.selectedSource, nil
}
@@ -302,51 +787,88 @@ func (p *CredentialProvider) doResolveIdentityHint(ctx context.Context) (*Identi
// ResolveToken resolves an access token.
func (p *CredentialProvider) ResolveToken(ctx context.Context, req TokenSpec) (*TokenResult, error) {
source, err := p.selectedCredentialSource(ctx)
acct, err := p.resolveAccountSelection(ctx)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if source != nil {
return resolveTokenFromSource(ctx, source, req)
if acct == nil {
return nil, errs.NewInternalError(errs.SubtypeUnknown,
"credential provider resolved no account before %s token resolution", req.Type).
WithHint("retry the command.")
}
for _, prov := range p.providers {
source := extensionTokenSource{provider: prov}
result, found, err := source.TryResolveToken(ctx, req)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if found {
return result, nil
}
source := p.selectedSource
if source == nil {
return nil, errs.NewInternalError(errs.SubtypeUnknown,
"credential provider resolved app %q without selecting a token source", acct.AppID).
WithHint("retry the command.")
}
source = defaultTokenSource{resolver: p.defaultToken}
result, found, err := source.TryResolveToken(ctx, req)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
if req.AppID == "" {
return nil, errs.NewInternalError(errs.SubtypeUnknown,
"TokenSpec.AppID is required for %s token resolution", req.Type).
WithHint("retry the command.")
}
if found {
return result, nil
if req.AppID != acct.AppID {
return nil, errs.NewInternalError(errs.SubtypeUnknown,
"token requested for app %q but the selected account belongs to app %q", req.AppID, acct.AppID).
WithHint("retry the command.")
}
return nil, &TokenUnavailableError{Type: req.Type}
return resolveTokenFromSource(ctx, source, req)
}
// ActiveExtensionProviderName reports whether an extension provider is managing
// credentials. It probes p.providers (extension providers only, not defaultAcct)
// and returns the name of the first engaged provider.
// the credentials that actually win selection. With an explicit profile that
// resolves successfully it reuses ResolveAccount's cached arbitration result;
// otherwise it probes extension providers directly and returns the first
// engaged provider.
//
// "Engaged" means: ResolveAccount returns a non-nil account, OR returns a
// *extcred.BlockError (provider configured but misconfigured — still counts as
// external). Any other error is propagated to the caller.
// external). Any other probe error is propagated to the caller.
//
// A failed profile resolution (profile not found, broken secret, malformed
// config, incomplete direct env, ...) deliberately does NOT propagate: this
// probe guards the builtin setup/repair commands (auth, config), and an
// unresolvable credential must never lock the user out of the commands that
// fix it. It falls back to the engagement probe, which answers the only
// question this function owns: is an extension provider holding credentials?
//
// Returns ("", nil) when no extension provider is active (built-in keychain path).
// Safe to call multiple times — probes providers directly without the sync.Once cache.
// Safe to call multiple times: explicit-profile resolution uses sync.Once, while
// the probe path only consults providers.
func (p *CredentialProvider) ActiveExtensionProviderName(ctx context.Context) (string, error) {
// With an explicit profile, report the source that actually won the same
// arbitration used by commands. A matching APP_ID-only env block is not an
// external takeover once the selected profile supplies credentials/tokens.
if p.profile != "" {
if _, err := p.ResolveAccount(ctx); err == nil {
if p.selectedSource == nil {
return "", nil
}
if _, builtin := p.selectedSource.(defaultTokenSource); builtin {
return "", nil
}
return p.selectedSource.Name(), nil
}
// Resolution failed — fall through to the engagement probe.
}
for _, prov := range p.providers {
acct, err := prov.ResolveAccount(ctx)
if err != nil {
var blockErr *extcred.BlockError
if errors.As(err, &blockErr) {
// Align with formal arbitration: a misconfigured policy
// variable is the same typed validation error everywhere —
// not an external takeover of the provider that reported it,
// and not license to keep scanning and blame a later
// provider instead.
if blockErr.Code == extcred.BlockReasonInvalidPolicy {
return "", newInvalidPolicyError(blockErr)
}
if blockErr.Code == extcred.BlockReasonCredentialIncomplete {
if _, builtin := prov.(*envprovider.Provider); !builtin {
return "", newCredentialIncompleteProviderContractError(prov)
}
}
name := blockErr.Provider
if name == "" {
name = prov.Name()

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

View File

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import (
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/errs"
extcred "github.com/larksuite/cli/extension/credential"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/auth"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
@@ -23,6 +24,7 @@ type mockExtProvider struct {
err error
accountErr error
tokenErr error
tokenCalls int
}
func (m *mockExtProvider) Name() string { return m.name }
@@ -33,6 +35,7 @@ func (m *mockExtProvider) ResolveAccount(ctx context.Context) (*extcred.Account,
return m.account, m.err
}
func (m *mockExtProvider) ResolveToken(ctx context.Context, req extcred.TokenSpec) (*extcred.Token, error) {
m.tokenCalls++
if m.tokenErr != nil {
return nil, m.tokenErr
}
@@ -49,11 +52,13 @@ func (m *mockDefaultAcct) ResolveAccount(ctx context.Context) (*Account, error)
}
type mockDefaultToken struct {
result *TokenResult
err error
result *TokenResult
err error
tokenCalls int
}
func (m *mockDefaultToken) ResolveToken(ctx context.Context, req TokenSpec) (*TokenResult, error) {
m.tokenCalls++
return m.result, m.err
}
@@ -116,35 +121,45 @@ func TestCredentialProvider_AccountCached(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestCredentialProvider_TokenFromExtension(t *testing.T) {
cp := NewCredentialProvider(
[]extcred.Provider{&mockExtProvider{
name: "env",
account: &extcred.Account{AppID: "ext_app", Brand: "feishu"},
token: &extcred.Token{Value: "ext_tok", Source: "env"},
}},
&mockDefaultAcct{}, &mockDefaultToken{result: &TokenResult{Token: "default_tok"}}, nil,
)
result, err := cp.ResolveToken(context.Background(), TokenSpec{Type: TokenTypeUAT})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if result.Token != "ext_tok" {
t.Errorf("expected ext_tok, got %s", result.Token)
for _, sourceName := range []string{"env", "authsidecar"} {
t.Run(sourceName, func(t *testing.T) {
cp := NewCredentialProvider(
[]extcred.Provider{&mockExtProvider{
name: sourceName,
account: &extcred.Account{AppID: "ext_app", Brand: "feishu"},
token: &extcred.Token{Value: "ext_tok", Source: sourceName},
}},
&mockDefaultAcct{account: &Account{AppID: "default_app"}},
&mockDefaultToken{result: &TokenResult{Token: "default_tok"}}, nil,
)
result, err := cp.ResolveToken(context.Background(), TokenSpec{Type: TokenTypeUAT, AppID: "ext_app"})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if result.Token != "ext_tok" {
t.Errorf("expected ext_tok, got %s", result.Token)
}
})
}
}
func TestCredentialProvider_TokenFallsToDefault(t *testing.T) {
defaultToken := &mockDefaultToken{result: &TokenResult{Token: "default_tok"}}
cp := NewCredentialProvider(
[]extcred.Provider{&mockExtProvider{name: "skip"}},
&mockDefaultAcct{}, &mockDefaultToken{result: &TokenResult{Token: "default_tok"}}, nil,
&mockDefaultAcct{account: &Account{AppID: "default_app"}},
defaultToken, nil,
)
result, err := cp.ResolveToken(context.Background(), TokenSpec{Type: TokenTypeUAT})
result, err := cp.ResolveToken(context.Background(), TokenSpec{Type: TokenTypeUAT, AppID: "default_app"})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if result.Token != "default_tok" {
t.Errorf("expected default_tok, got %s", result.Token)
}
if defaultToken.tokenCalls != 1 {
t.Fatalf("default ResolveToken() calls = %d, want 1", defaultToken.tokenCalls)
}
}
func TestCredentialProvider_TokenDoesNotMixSourcesAfterDefaultAccountSelection(t *testing.T) {
@@ -159,7 +174,7 @@ func TestCredentialProvider_TokenDoesNotMixSourcesAfterDefaultAccountSelection(t
t.Fatalf("ResolveAccount() error = %v", err)
}
result, err := cp.ResolveToken(context.Background(), TokenSpec{Type: TokenTypeUAT})
result, err := cp.ResolveToken(context.Background(), TokenSpec{Type: TokenTypeUAT, AppID: "default_app"})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ResolveToken() error = %v", err)
}
@@ -181,7 +196,7 @@ func TestCredentialProvider_SelectedSourceWithoutTokenReturnsUnavailableError(t
t.Fatalf("ResolveAccount() error = %v", err)
}
_, err := cp.ResolveToken(context.Background(), TokenSpec{Type: TokenTypeUAT})
_, err := cp.ResolveToken(context.Background(), TokenSpec{Type: TokenTypeUAT, AppID: "ext_app"})
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("ResolveToken() error = nil, want unavailable error")
}
@@ -202,7 +217,7 @@ func TestCredentialProvider_ResolveTokenPropagatesNonBlockExtensionError(t *test
nil,
)
_, err := cp.ResolveToken(context.Background(), TokenSpec{Type: TokenTypeUAT})
_, err := cp.ResolveToken(context.Background(), TokenSpec{Type: TokenTypeUAT, AppID: "ext_app"})
if err == nil || err.Error() != "provider exploded" {
t.Fatalf("ResolveToken() error = %v, want provider exploded", err)
}
@@ -312,12 +327,12 @@ func TestCredentialProvider_ResolveIdentityHint_CachesResult(t *testing.T) {
func TestCredentialProvider_ResolveTokenTreatsEmptyDefaultTokenAsMalformed(t *testing.T) {
cp := NewCredentialProvider(
nil,
nil,
&mockDefaultAcct{account: &Account{AppID: "default_app"}},
&mockDefaultToken{result: &TokenResult{Token: ""}},
nil,
)
_, err := cp.ResolveToken(context.Background(), TokenSpec{Type: TokenTypeUAT})
_, err := cp.ResolveToken(context.Background(), TokenSpec{Type: TokenTypeUAT, AppID: "default_app"})
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "empty token") {
t.Fatalf("ResolveToken() error = %v, want malformed empty token error", err)
}
@@ -410,17 +425,189 @@ func TestCredentialProvider_ResolveAccountWarnsWhenExtensionIdentityVerification
}
func TestCredentialProvider_ResolveTokenDoesNotBypassFailedDefaultAccountResolution(t *testing.T) {
defaultToken := &mockDefaultToken{result: &TokenResult{Token: "default_tok"}}
cp := NewCredentialProvider(
nil,
&mockDefaultAcct{err: errors.New("config unavailable")},
&mockDefaultToken{result: &TokenResult{Token: "default_tok"}},
defaultToken,
nil,
)
_, err := cp.ResolveToken(context.Background(), TokenSpec{Type: TokenTypeUAT})
_, err := cp.ResolveToken(context.Background(), TokenSpec{Type: TokenTypeUAT, AppID: "default_app"})
if err == nil || err.Error() != "config unavailable" {
t.Fatalf("ResolveToken() error = %v, want config unavailable", err)
}
if defaultToken.tokenCalls != 0 {
t.Fatalf("default ResolveToken() calls = %d, want 0", defaultToken.tokenCalls)
}
}
func TestCredentialProvider_ResolveTokenRejectsUnboundAppBeforeExtensionIO(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
appID string
}{
{name: "empty app id"},
{name: "different app id", appID: "other_app"},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
for _, sourceName := range []string{"env", "authsidecar"} {
t.Run(tt.name+"/"+sourceName, func(t *testing.T) {
provider := &mockExtProvider{
name: sourceName,
account: &extcred.Account{AppID: "ext_app", Brand: "feishu"},
token: &extcred.Token{Value: "ext_tok", Source: sourceName},
}
httpClientCalls := 0
cp := NewCredentialProvider(
[]extcred.Provider{provider},
&mockDefaultAcct{account: &Account{AppID: "default_app"}},
&mockDefaultToken{result: &TokenResult{Token: "default_tok"}},
func() (*http.Client, error) {
httpClientCalls++
return nil, errors.New("unexpected user_info call")
},
)
_, err := cp.ResolveToken(context.Background(), TokenSpec{Type: TokenTypeUAT, AppID: tt.appID})
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("ResolveToken() error = nil, want app binding error")
}
assertInternalUnknownWithRetryHint(t, err)
if provider.tokenCalls != 0 {
t.Fatalf("extension ResolveToken() calls = %d, want 0", provider.tokenCalls)
}
if httpClientCalls != 0 {
t.Fatalf("httpClient() calls = %d, want 0", httpClientCalls)
}
})
}
}
}
func TestCredentialProvider_ResolveTokenRejectsUnboundAppBeforeDefaultIO(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
appID string
}{
{name: "empty app id"},
{name: "different app id", appID: "other_app"},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
defaultToken := &mockDefaultToken{result: &TokenResult{Token: "default_tok"}}
cp := NewCredentialProvider(
nil,
&mockDefaultAcct{account: &Account{AppID: "default_app"}},
defaultToken,
nil,
)
_, err := cp.ResolveToken(context.Background(), TokenSpec{Type: TokenTypeUAT, AppID: tt.appID})
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("ResolveToken() error = nil, want app binding error")
}
assertInternalUnknownWithRetryHint(t, err)
if defaultToken.tokenCalls != 0 {
t.Fatalf("default ResolveToken() calls = %d, want 0", defaultToken.tokenCalls)
}
})
}
}
func TestCredentialProvider_ResolveTokenRejectsNilAccountBeforeTokenIO(t *testing.T) {
defaultToken := &mockDefaultToken{result: &TokenResult{Token: "default_tok"}}
cp := NewCredentialProvider(
nil,
&mockDefaultAcct{},
defaultToken,
nil,
)
_, err := cp.ResolveToken(context.Background(), TokenSpec{Type: TokenTypeUAT, AppID: "requested_app"})
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("ResolveToken() error = nil, want nil account error")
}
assertInternalUnknownWithRetryHint(t, err)
if defaultToken.tokenCalls != 0 {
t.Fatalf("default ResolveToken() calls = %d, want 0", defaultToken.tokenCalls)
}
}
func TestCredentialProvider_ResolveTokenRejectsMissingSelectedSourceWithoutFallback(t *testing.T) {
extension := &mockExtProvider{
name: "env",
token: &extcred.Token{Value: "ext_tok", Source: "env"},
}
defaultToken := &mockDefaultToken{result: &TokenResult{Token: "default_tok"}}
cp := NewCredentialProvider(
[]extcred.Provider{extension},
&mockDefaultAcct{account: &Account{AppID: "default_app"}},
defaultToken,
nil,
)
cp.account = &Account{AppID: "selected_app"}
cp.accountOnce.Do(func() {})
_, err := cp.ResolveToken(context.Background(), TokenSpec{Type: TokenTypeUAT, AppID: "selected_app"})
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("ResolveToken() error = nil, want missing selected source error")
}
assertInternalUnknownWithRetryHint(t, err)
if extension.tokenCalls != 0 {
t.Fatalf("extension ResolveToken() calls = %d, want 0", extension.tokenCalls)
}
if defaultToken.tokenCalls != 0 {
t.Fatalf("default ResolveToken() calls = %d, want 0", defaultToken.tokenCalls)
}
}
func TestCredentialProvider_ResolveTokenMatchingExtensionDoesNotEnrichIdentity(t *testing.T) {
provider := &mockExtProvider{
name: "env",
account: &extcred.Account{AppID: "ext_app", Brand: "feishu"},
token: &extcred.Token{Value: "ext_tok", Source: "env"},
}
httpClientCalls := 0
cp := NewCredentialProvider(
[]extcred.Provider{provider},
nil,
nil,
func() (*http.Client, error) {
httpClientCalls++
return nil, errors.New("unexpected user_info call")
},
)
result, err := cp.ResolveToken(context.Background(), TokenSpec{Type: TokenTypeUAT, AppID: "ext_app"})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ResolveToken() error = %v", err)
}
if result.Token != "ext_tok" {
t.Fatalf("ResolveToken() token = %q, want %q", result.Token, "ext_tok")
}
if provider.tokenCalls != 1 {
t.Fatalf("extension ResolveToken() calls = %d, want 1", provider.tokenCalls)
}
if httpClientCalls != 0 {
t.Fatalf("httpClient() calls = %d, want 0", httpClientCalls)
}
}
func assertInternalUnknownWithRetryHint(t *testing.T, err error) {
t.Helper()
problem, ok := errs.ProblemOf(err)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("error type = %T, want typed internal error", err)
}
if problem.Category != errs.CategoryInternal || problem.Subtype != errs.SubtypeUnknown {
t.Fatalf("error problem = %+v, want internal/unknown", problem)
}
if problem.Hint != "retry the command." {
t.Fatalf("error hint = %q, want retry hint", problem.Hint)
}
}
func TestActiveExtensionProviderName_ExtActive(t *testing.T) {

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
package credential
import (
"context"
"testing"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/errs"
extcred "github.com/larksuite/cli/extension/credential"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/envvars"
)
// stubDecideProvider satisfies extcred.Provider for building providerAccount
// literals; decideIdentity only ever calls Name() on it.
type stubDecideProvider struct{ name string }
func (s stubDecideProvider) Name() string { return s.name }
func (s stubDecideProvider) Priority() int { return 0 }
func (s stubDecideProvider) ResolveAccount(context.Context) (*extcred.Account, error) {
return nil, nil
}
func (s stubDecideProvider) ResolveToken(context.Context, extcred.TokenSpec) (*extcred.Token, error) {
return nil, nil
}
func pa(providerName, appID string) *providerAccount {
return &providerAccount{
acct: &Account{AppID: appID},
source: extensionTokenSource{provider: stubDecideProvider{name: providerName}},
}
}
func appIDOnlyBlock(appID string) *extcred.BlockError {
return &extcred.BlockError{
Provider: "env",
Reason: envvars.CliAppID + " is set but no app secret or access token is available",
Code: extcred.BlockReasonCredentialIncomplete,
RequiredAnyOf: []string{envvars.CliAppSecret, envvars.CliUserAccessToken, envvars.CliTenantAccessToken},
PresentKeys: []string{envvars.CliAppID},
AppID: appID,
}
}
func uatOnlyBlock() *extcred.BlockError {
return &extcred.BlockError{
Provider: "env",
Reason: envvars.CliUserAccessToken + " is set but " + envvars.CliAppID + " is missing",
Code: extcred.BlockReasonCredentialIncomplete,
MissingKeys: []string{envvars.CliAppID},
PresentKeys: []string{envvars.CliUserAccessToken},
}
}
// TestDecideIdentity exercises the selection matrix as data: decideIdentity is
// pure, so every rule (precedence, conflict detection, error attribution) is
// table-testable without env vars or config fixtures.
func TestDecideIdentity(t *testing.T) {
tenantA := &core.MultiAppConfig{
CurrentApp: "tenant_a",
Apps: []core.AppConfig{{Name: "tenant_a", AppId: "cli_a"}},
}
noCurrent := &core.MultiAppConfig{
Apps: []core.AppConfig{{Name: "tenant_a", AppId: "cli_a"}},
}
invalidConfigErr := errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeInvalidConfig, "invalid config format")
notConfiguredErr := core.NotConfiguredError()
cases := []struct {
name string
in identityInputs
route credentialRoute
source CredentialSourceKind
matched bool
subtype errs.Subtype // "" = success expected
}{
{
name: "managed provider wins over explicit profile",
in: identityInputs{profile: "tenant_a", profileSrc: SourceFlagProfile, managed: pa("sidecar", "sidecar_app"), config: tenantA},
route: routeManaged,
source: SourceExtension("sidecar"),
},
{
name: "profile conflicts with complete direct env app_id",
in: identityInputs{profile: "tenant_a", profileSrc: SourceFlagProfile, direct: pa("env", "cli_x"), directKeys: []string{envvars.CliAppID, envvars.CliAppSecret}, config: tenantA},
subtype: errs.SubtypeProfileAppCredentialConflict,
},
{
name: "matched complete direct env yields profile route",
in: identityInputs{profile: "tenant_a", profileSrc: SourceEnvProfile, direct: pa("env", "cli_a"), directKeys: []string{envvars.CliAppID, envvars.CliAppSecret}, config: tenantA},
route: routeProfile,
source: SourceEnvProfile,
matched: true,
},
{
name: "APP_ID-only block matching the profile yields profile route",
in: identityInputs{profile: "tenant_a", profileSrc: SourceFlagProfile, directBlock: appIDOnlyBlock("cli_a"), directKeys: []string{envvars.CliAppID}, config: tenantA},
route: routeProfile,
source: SourceFlagProfile,
matched: true,
},
{
name: "APP_ID-only block mismatching the profile is a hard conflict",
in: identityInputs{profile: "tenant_a", profileSrc: SourceFlagProfile, directBlock: appIDOnlyBlock("cli_x"), directKeys: []string{envvars.CliAppID}, config: tenantA},
subtype: errs.SubtypeProfileAppCredentialConflict,
},
{
name: "UAT-only block with a valid profile keeps the repair error",
in: identityInputs{profile: "tenant_a", profileSrc: SourceFlagProfile, directBlock: uatOnlyBlock(), config: tenantA},
subtype: errs.SubtypeAppCredentialIncomplete,
},
{
name: "block without profile is app_credential_incomplete",
in: identityInputs{directBlock: appIDOnlyBlock("cli_a"), directKeys: []string{envvars.CliAppID}},
subtype: errs.SubtypeAppCredentialIncomplete,
},
{
name: "complete direct env without profile wins",
in: identityInputs{direct: pa("env", "cli_env"), directKeys: []string{envvars.CliAppID, envvars.CliAppSecret}},
route: routeDirectEnv,
source: SourceEnvAppID,
},
{
name: "malformed config is not masked as profile_not_found",
in: identityInputs{profile: "tenant_a", profileSrc: SourceFlagProfile, configErr: invalidConfigErr},
subtype: errs.SubtypeInvalidConfig,
},
{
name: "absent config degrades to profile_not_found",
in: identityInputs{profile: "ghost", profileSrc: SourceEnvProfile, configErr: notConfiguredErr},
subtype: errs.SubtypeProfileNotFound,
},
{
name: "profile missing from a valid config is profile_not_found even with incomplete env",
in: identityInputs{profile: "ghost", profileSrc: SourceEnvProfile, directBlock: appIDOnlyBlock("cli_a"), directKeys: []string{envvars.CliAppID}, config: tenantA},
subtype: errs.SubtypeProfileNotFound,
},
{
name: "config default reports currentApp",
in: identityInputs{config: tenantA},
route: routeConfigDefault,
source: SourceConfigCurrentApp,
},
{
name: "config default without currentApp reports firstApp",
in: identityInputs{config: noCurrent},
route: routeConfigDefault,
source: SourceConfigFirstApp,
},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
d, err := decideIdentity(tc.in)
if tc.subtype != "" {
if err == nil {
t.Fatalf("decideIdentity = %+v, want error subtype %q", d, tc.subtype)
}
prob, ok := errs.ProblemOf(err)
if !ok || prob.Subtype != tc.subtype {
t.Fatalf("error = %v, want subtype %q", err, tc.subtype)
}
return
}
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decideIdentity: %v", err)
}
if d.route != tc.route {
t.Errorf("route = %d, want %d", d.route, tc.route)
}
if d.selection.Source != tc.source {
t.Errorf("source = %q, want %q", d.selection.Source, tc.source)
}
if d.selection.DirectCredentialEnv.Matched != tc.matched {
t.Errorf("matched = %v, want %v", d.selection.DirectCredentialEnv.Matched, tc.matched)
}
})
}
}

View File

@@ -74,9 +74,13 @@ func NewDefaultAccountProvider(kc func() keychain.KeychainAccess, profile string
func (p *DefaultAccountProvider) ResolveAccount(ctx context.Context) (*Account, error) {
// Load config once — used for both credentials and strict mode.
multi, err := core.LoadMultiAppConfig()
// LoadOrNotConfigured distinguishes an absent config (→ not_configured)
// from a malformed/unreadable one (→ invalid_config with cause), so a
// broken config is never masked as "run config init" — matching the
// explicit-profile path in doResolveAccount.
multi, err := core.LoadOrNotConfigured()
if err != nil {
return nil, core.NotConfiguredError()
return nil, err
}
cfg, err := core.ResolveConfigFromMulti(multi, p.keychain(), p.profile)
@@ -116,6 +120,7 @@ type DefaultTokenProvider struct {
tatOnce sync.Once
tatResult *TokenResult
tatAppID string
tatErr error
}
@@ -126,21 +131,42 @@ func NewDefaultTokenProvider(defaultAcct *DefaultAccountProvider, httpClient fun
func (p *DefaultTokenProvider) ResolveToken(ctx context.Context, req TokenSpec) (*TokenResult, error) {
switch req.Type {
case TokenTypeUAT:
return p.resolveUAT(ctx)
return p.resolveUAT(ctx, req)
case TokenTypeTAT:
return p.resolveTAT(ctx)
return p.resolveTAT(ctx, req)
default:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unsupported token type: %s", req.Type)
}
}
// checkTokenAppID refuses to hand out a token for a different app than the
// caller resolved. The token provider re-reads the config, so a concurrent
// profile edit between account resolution and token resolution could otherwise
// cross tokens between apps. TokenSpec.AppID is REQUIRED here: an empty value
// would silently disable the guarantee, so it is rejected rather than skipped.
func checkTokenAppID(req TokenSpec, resolvedAppID string) error {
if req.AppID == "" {
return errs.NewInternalError(errs.SubtypeUnknown,
"TokenSpec.AppID is required for %s token resolution", req.Type)
}
if req.AppID == resolvedAppID {
return nil
}
return errs.NewInternalError(errs.SubtypeUnknown,
"config changed during resolution: token requested for app %q but the saved profile now resolves to a different app", req.AppID).
WithHint("retry the command.")
}
// resolveUAT resolves a user access token. Not cached (unlike TAT) because UAT
// may be refreshed between calls and GetValidAccessToken handles its own caching.
func (p *DefaultTokenProvider) resolveUAT(ctx context.Context) (*TokenResult, error) {
func (p *DefaultTokenProvider) resolveUAT(ctx context.Context, req TokenSpec) (*TokenResult, error) {
acct, err := p.defaultAcct.ResolveAccount(ctx)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if err := checkTokenAppID(req, acct.AppID); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
httpClient, err := p.httpClient()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
@@ -157,20 +183,36 @@ func (p *DefaultTokenProvider) resolveUAT(ctx context.Context) (*TokenResult, er
return &TokenResult{Token: token, Scopes: scopes}, nil
}
// resolveTAT resolves a tenant access token. The result is cached after the first
// call via sync.Once — only the context from the first call is used.
func (p *DefaultTokenProvider) resolveTAT(ctx context.Context) (*TokenResult, error) {
p.tatOnce.Do(func() {
p.tatResult, p.tatErr = p.doResolveTAT(ctx)
})
return p.tatResult, p.tatErr
}
func (p *DefaultTokenProvider) doResolveTAT(ctx context.Context) (*TokenResult, error) {
// resolveTAT resolves a tenant access token. The result is cached after the
// first mint via sync.Once — only the context from that call is used.
//
// The account is resolved and checked against the request BEFORE any token
// work: a mismatched request must not trigger a token mint (network call,
// quota, audit trail) for the wrong app. The cached result is additionally
// re-checked on every hit, so a token minted for one app is never served to
// a request that resolved another.
func (p *DefaultTokenProvider) resolveTAT(ctx context.Context, req TokenSpec) (*TokenResult, error) {
acct, err := p.defaultAcct.ResolveAccount(ctx)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if err := checkTokenAppID(req, acct.AppID); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
p.tatOnce.Do(func() {
p.tatResult, p.tatErr = p.doResolveTAT(ctx, acct)
p.tatAppID = acct.AppID
})
if p.tatErr != nil {
return nil, p.tatErr
}
if err := checkTokenAppID(req, p.tatAppID); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return p.tatResult, nil
}
func (p *DefaultTokenProvider) doResolveTAT(ctx context.Context, acct *Account) (*TokenResult, error) {
httpClient, err := p.httpClient()
if err != nil {
return nil, err

View File

@@ -4,10 +4,15 @@
package credential
import (
"context"
"errors"
"io"
"net/http"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/errs"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
)
func TestDefaultTokenProvider_Dispatches(t *testing.T) {
@@ -92,3 +97,136 @@ func TestClassifyTATResponseCode_CodeZeroOtherError_StillTyped(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("code-0 invalid_scope must not be a ConfigError, got %T", err)
}
}
func TestCheckTokenAppID(t *testing.T) {
if err := checkTokenAppID(TokenSpec{Type: TokenTypeUAT}, "cli_a"); err == nil {
t.Fatal("empty requested app must be rejected: it would silently disable the guarantee")
}
if err := checkTokenAppID(TokenSpec{AppID: "cli_a"}, "cli_a"); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("matching app must pass: %v", err)
}
err := checkTokenAppID(TokenSpec{AppID: "cli_a"}, "cli_b")
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("mismatched app must be refused")
}
var ie *errs.InternalError
if !errors.As(err, &ie) {
t.Fatalf("error type = %T, want *errs.InternalError", err)
}
}
// REAL-path regression for review F2: the token provider re-reads the config,
// so a profile edit between account resolution and token resolution must not
// hand a token minted for the new app to a caller that resolved the old one.
// Uses the real DefaultAccountProvider + DefaultTokenProvider; the HTTP stub
// makes the network step unreachable, so reaching it proves the app check ran
// and passed first.
func TestDefaultTokenProvider_RefusesTokenAfterConfigSwap(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
writeCfg := func(appID string) {
t.Helper()
multi := &core.MultiAppConfig{CurrentApp: "tenant_a", Apps: []core.AppConfig{{
Name: "tenant_a", AppId: appID, AppSecret: core.PlainSecret("your-secret"), Brand: core.BrandFeishu,
}}}
if err := core.SaveMultiAppConfig(multi); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("SaveMultiAppConfig: %v", err)
}
}
writeCfg("cli_a")
httpSentinel := errors.New("http client sentinel: unreachable in test")
tp := NewDefaultTokenProvider(
NewDefaultAccountProvider(nil, "tenant_a"),
func() (*http.Client, error) { return nil, httpSentinel },
nil,
)
// Matching app: the consistency check passes and resolution proceeds to
// the (stubbed) HTTP step.
_, err := tp.ResolveToken(context.Background(), TokenSpec{Type: TokenTypeUAT, AppID: "cli_a"})
if !errors.Is(err, httpSentinel) {
t.Fatalf("err = %v, want the HTTP sentinel (check must pass for a matching app)", err)
}
// The profile now resolves to a different app: the token request that was
// arbitrated for cli_a must be refused before any token work happens.
writeCfg("cli_b")
_, err = tp.ResolveToken(context.Background(), TokenSpec{Type: TokenTypeUAT, AppID: "cli_a"})
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "config changed during resolution") {
t.Fatalf("err = %v, want config-changed refusal", err)
}
}
// F1 regression: a TAT request for a mismatched app must be refused BEFORE
// any token work starts — no HTTP client construction, no mint, no cache —
// otherwise the CLI mints (and caches) a token for the wrong app and only
// then refuses to return it, leaving auth audit/quota side effects behind.
func TestDefaultTokenProvider_TATChecksAppBeforeAnyTokenWork(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
multi := &core.MultiAppConfig{CurrentApp: "tenant_a", Apps: []core.AppConfig{{
Name: "tenant_a", AppId: "cli_b", AppSecret: core.PlainSecret("your-secret"), Brand: core.BrandFeishu,
}}}
if err := core.SaveMultiAppConfig(multi); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("SaveMultiAppConfig: %v", err)
}
httpCalled := false
tp := NewDefaultTokenProvider(
NewDefaultAccountProvider(nil, "tenant_a"),
func() (*http.Client, error) { httpCalled = true; return nil, errors.New("http sentinel") },
nil,
)
// The profile resolves to cli_b, but the caller arbitrated cli_a.
_, err := tp.ResolveToken(context.Background(), TokenSpec{Type: TokenTypeTAT, AppID: "cli_a"})
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "config changed during resolution") {
t.Fatalf("err = %v, want config-changed refusal", err)
}
if httpCalled {
t.Fatal("token work started for a mismatched app: the check must run before any HTTP client is built")
}
}
// countingTATTripper serves a canned successful TAT response and counts calls.
type countingTATTripper struct{ calls int }
func (c *countingTATTripper) RoundTrip(*http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
c.calls++
return &http.Response{
StatusCode: http.StatusOK,
Body: io.NopCloser(strings.NewReader(`{"code":0,"access_token":"your-access-token"}`)),
Header: http.Header{"Content-Type": []string{"application/json"}},
}, nil
}
// TAT happy path: the first request mints the token over HTTP, the second is
// served from the sync.Once cache without another HTTP call.
func TestDefaultTokenProvider_TATSuccessAndCacheHit(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
multi := &core.MultiAppConfig{CurrentApp: "tenant_a", Apps: []core.AppConfig{{
Name: "tenant_a", AppId: "cli_a", AppSecret: core.PlainSecret("your-secret"), Brand: core.BrandFeishu,
}}}
if err := core.SaveMultiAppConfig(multi); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("SaveMultiAppConfig: %v", err)
}
tripper := &countingTATTripper{}
tp := NewDefaultTokenProvider(
NewDefaultAccountProvider(nil, "tenant_a"),
func() (*http.Client, error) { return &http.Client{Transport: tripper}, nil },
nil,
)
req := TokenSpec{Type: TokenTypeTAT, AppID: "cli_a"}
first, err := tp.ResolveToken(context.Background(), req)
if err != nil || first.Token != "your-access-token" {
t.Fatalf("first resolve = %+v, %v; want minted token", first, err)
}
second, err := tp.ResolveToken(context.Background(), req)
if err != nil || second.Token != "your-access-token" {
t.Fatalf("second resolve = %+v, %v; want cached token", second, err)
}
if tripper.calls != 1 {
t.Fatalf("HTTP calls = %d, want exactly 1 (second resolve must hit the cache)", tripper.calls)
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
package credential
// CredentialSourceKind is the wire-stable App/credential selection source.
type CredentialSourceKind string
const (
SourceFlagProfile CredentialSourceKind = "flag:--profile"
SourceEnvProfile CredentialSourceKind = "env:LARKSUITE_CLI_PROFILE"
SourceEnvAppID CredentialSourceKind = "env:LARKSUITE_CLI_APP_ID"
SourceConfigCurrentApp CredentialSourceKind = "config:currentApp"
SourceConfigFirstApp CredentialSourceKind = "config:firstApp"
// SourceExtensionPrefix prefixes the name of a managed extension provider
// that won selection outright (e.g. "extension:sidecar"). With it, an
// empty Source is left with exactly one meaning: not resolved.
SourceExtensionPrefix CredentialSourceKind = "extension:"
)
// SourceExtension reports the selection source for a managed extension
// provider by name.
func SourceExtension(name string) CredentialSourceKind {
return SourceExtensionPrefix + CredentialSourceKind(name)
}
// DirectCredentialEnv describes the state of direct app credential env vars.
// It never carries a secret value — only names and the non-sensitive app_id.
type DirectCredentialEnv struct {
Present bool `json:"present"`
Keys []string `json:"keys,omitempty"`
AppID string `json:"appId,omitempty"`
Matched bool `json:"matched,omitempty"`
ConflictsWithProfile bool `json:"conflictsWithProfile,omitempty"`
}
// IdentitySelection is the explainable result of credential selection.
// It carries NO secret value.
type IdentitySelection struct {
Source CredentialSourceKind
DirectCredentialEnv DirectCredentialEnv
}
// Explicit reports whether the identity was actively specified by the
// user/agent (flag or env), which governs no-fallback behavior.
func (s IdentitySelection) Explicit() bool {
switch s.Source {
case SourceFlagProfile, SourceEnvProfile, SourceEnvAppID:
return true
default:
return false
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
package credential
import "testing"
func TestIdentitySelectionExplicit(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
src CredentialSourceKind
explicit bool
}{
{SourceFlagProfile, true},
{SourceEnvProfile, true},
{SourceEnvAppID, true},
{SourceConfigCurrentApp, false},
{SourceConfigFirstApp, false},
}
for _, c := range cases {
sel := IdentitySelection{Source: c.src}
if sel.Explicit() != c.explicit {
t.Errorf("source %q: Explicit()=%v want %v", c.src, sel.Explicit(), c.explicit)
}
}
}

View File

@@ -52,6 +52,24 @@ func TestFullChain_EnvWins(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestFullChain_EnvRejectsDifferentApp(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv(envvars.CliAppID, "env_app")
t.Setenv(envvars.CliAppSecret, "env_secret")
t.Setenv(envvars.CliUserAccessToken, "env_uat")
cp := credential.NewCredentialProvider(
[]extcred.Provider{&envprovider.Provider{}},
nil, nil, nil,
)
_, err := cp.ResolveToken(context.Background(), credential.TokenSpec{
Type: credential.TokenTypeUAT, AppID: "other_app",
})
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("ResolveToken() error = nil, want app binding error")
}
}
func TestFullChain_Fallthrough(t *testing.T) {
// env provider returns nil (no env vars set), falls through to default token
ep := &envprovider.Provider{}
@@ -59,7 +77,8 @@ func TestFullChain_Fallthrough(t *testing.T) {
cp := credential.NewCredentialProvider(
[]extcred.Provider{ep},
nil, mock, nil,
&mockDefaultAccountProvider{account: &credential.Account{AppID: "app1"}},
mock, nil,
)
result, err := cp.ResolveToken(context.Background(), credential.TokenSpec{
Type: credential.TokenTypeUAT, AppID: "app1",
@@ -72,6 +91,14 @@ func TestFullChain_Fallthrough(t *testing.T) {
}
}
type mockDefaultAccountProvider struct {
account *credential.Account
}
func (m *mockDefaultAccountProvider) ResolveAccount(context.Context) (*credential.Account, error) {
return m.account, nil
}
type mockDefaultTokenProvider struct {
token string
scopes string

View File

@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ const (
CliAgentName = "LARKSUITE_CLI_AGENT_NAME"
CliAgentTrace = "LARKSUITE_CLI_AGENT_TRACE"
CliProfile = "LARKSUITE_CLI_PROFILE"
CliProxyEnable = "LARKSUITE_CLI_PROXY_ENABLE"
CliProxyAddress = "LARKSUITE_CLI_PROXY_ADDRESS"

View File

@@ -16,18 +16,16 @@ func TestAgentName_EmptyWhenEnvUnset(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestAgentName_ReturnsCleanValue(t *testing.T) {
const agentName = "sample-agent"
t.Setenv(CliAgentName, agentName)
if got := AgentName(); got != agentName {
t.Fatalf("AgentName() = %q, want %q", got, agentName)
t.Setenv(CliAgentName, "claude-code")
if got := AgentName(); got != "claude-code" {
t.Fatalf("AgentName() = %q, want %q", got, "claude-code")
}
}
func TestAgentName_TrimsWhitespace(t *testing.T) {
const agentName = "sample-agent"
t.Setenv(CliAgentName, " "+agentName+" ")
if got := AgentName(); got != agentName {
t.Fatalf("AgentName() = %q, want %q (whitespace trimmed)", got, agentName)
t.Setenv(CliAgentName, " cursor ")
if got := AgentName(); got != "cursor" {
t.Fatalf("AgentName() = %q, want %q (whitespace trimmed)", got, "cursor")
}
}

View File

@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
package errclass
import "github.com/larksuite/cli/errs"
var baseCodeMeta = map[int]CodeMeta{
// Copy Table domain errors (technical design chapter 18.2).
800020304: {Category: errs.CategoryAuthorization, Subtype: errs.SubtypePermissionDenied},
800010102: {Category: errs.CategoryValidation, Subtype: errs.SubtypeFailedPrecondition},
800080105: {Category: errs.CategoryAPI, Subtype: errs.SubtypeQuotaExceeded},
800040819: {Category: errs.CategoryAPI, Subtype: errs.SubtypeConflict},
800070003: {Category: errs.CategoryAPI, Subtype: errs.SubtypeUnknown},
800100112: {Category: errs.CategoryInternal, Subtype: errs.SubtypeUnknown},
800100113: {Category: errs.CategoryInternal, Subtype: errs.SubtypeUnknown},
800040114: {Category: errs.CategoryAPI, Subtype: errs.SubtypeConflict, Retryable: true},
800070115: {Category: errs.CategoryAPI, Subtype: errs.SubtypeUnknown},
800010109: {Category: errs.CategoryValidation, Subtype: errs.SubtypeInvalidArgument},
800030110: {Category: errs.CategoryAPI, Subtype: errs.SubtypeNotFound},
800070111: {Category: errs.CategoryAPI, Subtype: errs.SubtypeUnknown},
// Shared RPC errors used by Copy Table (technical design chapter 18.3).
800040802: {Category: errs.CategoryAPI, Subtype: errs.SubtypeQuotaExceeded},
800040803: {Category: errs.CategoryAPI, Subtype: errs.SubtypeQuotaExceeded},
800020812: {Category: errs.CategoryAuthorization, Subtype: errs.SubtypePermissionDenied},
800040832: {Category: errs.CategoryAPI, Subtype: errs.SubtypeQuotaExceeded},
800040817: {Category: errs.CategoryAPI, Subtype: errs.SubtypeQuotaExceeded},
800080821: {Category: errs.CategoryPolicy, Subtype: errs.SubtypeAccessDenied},
800070831: {Category: errs.CategoryAPI, Subtype: errs.SubtypeUnknown},
}
func init() {
mergeCodeMeta(baseCodeMeta, "base")
}

View File

@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
package errclass
import (
"fmt"
"testing"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/errs"
)
func TestLookupCodeMetaBaseTableCopyCodes(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
code int
category errs.Category
subtype errs.Subtype
retryable bool
}{
// Copy Table domain errors documented in chapter 18.2.
{code: 800020304, category: errs.CategoryAuthorization, subtype: errs.SubtypePermissionDenied},
{code: 800010102, category: errs.CategoryValidation, subtype: errs.SubtypeFailedPrecondition},
{code: 800080105, category: errs.CategoryAPI, subtype: errs.SubtypeQuotaExceeded},
{code: 800040819, category: errs.CategoryAPI, subtype: errs.SubtypeConflict},
{code: 800070003, category: errs.CategoryAPI, subtype: errs.SubtypeUnknown},
{code: 800100112, category: errs.CategoryInternal, subtype: errs.SubtypeUnknown},
{code: 800100113, category: errs.CategoryInternal, subtype: errs.SubtypeUnknown},
{code: 800040114, category: errs.CategoryAPI, subtype: errs.SubtypeConflict, retryable: true},
{code: 800070115, category: errs.CategoryAPI, subtype: errs.SubtypeUnknown},
{code: 800010109, category: errs.CategoryValidation, subtype: errs.SubtypeInvalidArgument},
{code: 800030110, category: errs.CategoryAPI, subtype: errs.SubtypeNotFound},
{code: 800070111, category: errs.CategoryAPI, subtype: errs.SubtypeUnknown},
// Shared RPC errors used by Copy Table, documented in chapter 18.3.
{code: 800040802, category: errs.CategoryAPI, subtype: errs.SubtypeQuotaExceeded},
{code: 800040803, category: errs.CategoryAPI, subtype: errs.SubtypeQuotaExceeded},
{code: 800020812, category: errs.CategoryAuthorization, subtype: errs.SubtypePermissionDenied},
{code: 800040832, category: errs.CategoryAPI, subtype: errs.SubtypeQuotaExceeded},
{code: 800040817, category: errs.CategoryAPI, subtype: errs.SubtypeQuotaExceeded},
{code: 800080821, category: errs.CategoryPolicy, subtype: errs.SubtypeAccessDenied},
{code: 800070831, category: errs.CategoryAPI, subtype: errs.SubtypeUnknown},
}
for _, test := range tests {
t.Run(fmt.Sprint(test.code), func(t *testing.T) {
meta, ok := LookupCodeMeta(test.code)
if !ok || meta.Category != test.category || meta.Subtype != test.subtype || meta.Retryable != test.retryable {
t.Fatalf("LookupCodeMeta(%d) = %#v, %v", test.code, meta, ok)
}
})
}
}

View File

@@ -23,7 +23,6 @@ type Stub struct {
RawBody []byte // raw bytes (takes precedence over Body when non-nil)
ContentType string // override Content-Type header (default: application/json)
Headers http.Header // optional full response headers (takes precedence over ContentType)
Error error // optional transport error returned after OnMatch
matched bool
// BodyFilter (optional): match only when the captured request body satisfies
@@ -39,10 +38,6 @@ type Stub struct {
// matches after the first hit. Each match appends to CapturedBodies.
Reusable bool
// Optional (optional): when true, Verify does not require this stub to be
// matched. Useful for negative assertions via OnMatch.
Optional bool
// CapturedHeaders records the request headers of the matched request.
// Populated after RoundTrip matches this stub.
CapturedHeaders http.Header
@@ -94,9 +89,6 @@ func (r *Registry) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
if matched.OnMatch != nil {
matched.OnMatch(req)
}
if matched.Error != nil {
return nil, matched.Error
}
resp, err := stubResponse(matched)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("httpmock: stub %s %s: %w", matched.Method, matched.URL, err)
@@ -145,9 +137,6 @@ func (r *Registry) Verify(t testing.TB) {
if s.matched {
continue
}
if s.Optional {
continue
}
// Reusable stubs never set s.matched; treat any captured hit as a match.
if s.Reusable && len(s.CapturedBodies) > 0 {
continue

View File

@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@
package httpmock
import (
"errors"
"io"
"net/http"
"testing"
@@ -113,21 +112,3 @@ func TestRegistry_CustomStatus(t *testing.T) {
t.Errorf("want status 500, got %d", resp.StatusCode)
}
}
func TestRegistry_TransportError(t *testing.T) {
wantErr := errors.New("connection reset")
reg := &Registry{}
reg.Register(&Stub{
Method: "POST",
URL: "/transport-error",
Error: wantErr,
})
client := NewClient(reg)
req, _ := http.NewRequest("POST", "https://example.com/transport-error", nil)
_, err := client.Do(req)
if !errors.Is(err, wantErr) {
t.Fatalf("error = %v, want transport error %v", err, wantErr)
}
reg.Verify(t)
}

View File

@@ -45,18 +45,6 @@ Adding a new row requires approval from the matching CODEOWNERS or quality gate
`legacy-commands.txt` only covers hand-authored legacy commands. Generated OpenAPI service commands are intentionally excluded from `command-manifest.json`; they are included in `command-index.json` only so command references can be checked against the real CLI surface.
## Public Domain Allowlists
`internal/qualitygate/config/allowlists/public-domains.txt` contains supported public hostnames approved for Go source. `fixture-domains.txt` contains test-only hostnames used by `*_test.go`, the repository-root `tests/` directory, or any `testdata/` directory; fixture entries do not apply to production Go files or `skills/`.
Keep one lowercase exact hostname per line, sorted alphabetically. Wildcards, suffix rules, duplicates, schemes, ports, and paths are rejected; approving `larkoffice.com` does not approve its subdomains.
RFC 2606 reserves the `.test`, `.example`, `.invalid`, and `.localhost` namespaces plus the exact names `example.com`, `example.net`, and `example.org`. These names are accepted without an allowlist entry and must not be listed.
Every public entry needs a current non-fixture Go use, evidence that it is a supported public endpoint, and CODEOWNER approval. Other test-only hostnames belong in the fixture list. Tenant-specific, private-control-plane, and internal API hostnames are not eligible.
`lint/domaincontract` validates both lists and scans complete Go files. In CI, unapproved-host findings are limited to values whose expressions intersect added lines; list validation and unused-entry checks remain repository-wide. See `lint/README.md` for scanner semantics.
## Semantic Blocker Policy
The semantic reviewer can propose findings, but the local gatekeeper recomputes whether each finding is reproducible from `facts.json`. A finding blocks only when all of these are true:

View File

@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
# Exact test-only hostnames. Keep sorted.
abc.feishu.cn
attacker.example.com
bytedance.feishu.cn
cdn.feishu.cn
evil.example.com
example.feishu.cn
example.larkoffice.com
example.larksuite.com
feishu.cn
feishu.doubao.com
gateway.docker.internal
host.containers.internal
host.docker.internal
host.lima.internal
lf3-static.bytednsdoc.com
meetings.feishu.cn
meetings.larksuite.com
p3-lark-file.byteimg.com
passport.feishu.cn
sample.feishu.cn
x.feishu.cn
xxx.feishu.cn
xxx.larksuite.com

View File

@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
# Exact public hostnames. Keep sorted.
accounts.feishu.cn
accounts.larksuite.com
applink.feishu.cn
applink.larksuite.com
ark.ap-southeast.bytepluses.com
github.com
larkoffice.com
lf-larkemail.bytetos.com
mcp.feishu.cn
mcp.larksuite.com
open.feishu.cn
open.larksuite.com
registry.npmjs.org
registry.npmmirror.com
sf16-sg.tiktokcdn.com
www.feishu.cn
www.larksuite.com

View File

@@ -180,8 +180,8 @@ func saveCachedMerged(data []byte, cm CacheMeta) error {
// localVersion is sent as data_version query param for server-side version comparison.
// Returns (data, reg, err). A nil reg means the version is unchanged (not modified).
func fetchRemoteMerged(localVersion string) (data []byte, reg *MergedRegistry, err error) {
// Remote metadata is platform traffic and must honor both the shared proxy
// configuration and the registered platform transport extension.
// Route through the shared proxy-plugin-aware transport so remote API
// definition fetches honor proxy plugin mode instead of bypassing it.
client := transport.NewHTTPClient(fetchTimeout)
req, err := http.NewRequest("GET", remoteMetaURL(localVersion), nil)
if err != nil {

View File

@@ -12,8 +12,6 @@ import (
internaltransport "github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/transport"
)
var _ internaltransport.RoundTripperDecorator = (*Transport)(nil)
const (
HeaderProductModel = "X-Agent-Device-Type"
HeaderOSType = "X-Agent-Os-Type"
@@ -42,28 +40,6 @@ func NewTransport(next http.RoundTripper, source Source) *Transport {
}
}
// BaseRoundTripper exposes the network transport so policy routers can clone
// and rebuild the complete decorator graph without dropping risk control.
func (t *Transport) BaseRoundTripper() http.RoundTripper {
if t == nil || t.next == nil {
return internaltransport.Fallback()
}
return t.next
}
// WithBaseRoundTripper returns an equivalent risk-control boundary over base.
func (t *Transport) WithBaseRoundTripper(base http.RoundTripper) http.RoundTripper {
if t == nil {
return NewTransport(base, nil)
}
cloned := *t
if base == nil {
base = internaltransport.Fallback()
}
cloned.next = base
return &cloned
}
// RoundTrip implements http.RoundTripper.
func (t *Transport) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
req = req.Clone(req.Context())

View File

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
// Package transport owns how the CLI assembles its outbound HTTP transport: the
// shared base RoundTripper (Shared/Fallback and the HTTP client constructors), the LARK_CLI_NO_PROXY
// shared base RoundTripper (Shared/Fallback/NewHTTPClient), the LARK_CLI_NO_PROXY
// direct-egress clone, and the ~/.lark-cli/proxy_config.json proxy-plugin mode.
//
// Proxy-plugin mode forces all outbound HTTP(S) requests through a fixed loopback

View File

@@ -1,258 +0,0 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
package transport
import (
"context"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"strings"
"sync"
larkws "github.com/larksuite/oapi-sdk-go/v3/ws"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/errs"
exttransport "github.com/larksuite/cli/extension/transport"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
)
type requestMatcher func(*http.Request) bool
type transportPolicyBuilder func(http.RoundTripper) http.RoundTripper
type sdkBootstrapRedirectContextKey struct{}
var (
// larkws pins this client during package initialization.
sdkBootstrapHTTPClient = http.DefaultClient
installDefaultClientMu sync.Mutex
)
// sdkBootstrapTransport applies the platform HTTP policy only to dependency
// bootstrap requests selected by match. Unmatched DefaultClient traffic is
// delegated directly to the previous transport.
type sdkBootstrapTransport struct {
base http.RoundTripper
match requestMatcher
buildPlatformPolicy transportPolicyBuilder
policyMu sync.RWMutex
}
func (t *sdkBootstrapTransport) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
if !t.isBootstrapRequest(req) {
return t.fallbackTransport().RoundTrip(req)
}
base := t.base
if base == nil {
// Resolve Shared lazily so bridge installation never initializes
// workspace-scoped proxy state ahead of workspace selection.
base = Shared()
}
buildPlatformPolicy := t.platformPolicyBuilder()
if buildPlatformPolicy == nil {
return nil, errs.NewInternalError(
errs.SubtypeUnknown,
"SDK bootstrap transport policy is not configured",
)
}
base = buildPlatformPolicy(base)
if base == nil {
return nil, errs.NewInternalError(
errs.SubtypeUnknown,
"SDK bootstrap transport policy returned a nil transport",
)
}
// Resolve extensions per hop so redirects retain platform policy.
extended := WrapWithExtensionForClass(base, exttransport.RequestClassPlatform)
guarded := &sameOriginRedirectTransport{base: extended}
return guarded.RoundTrip(req)
}
func (t *sdkBootstrapTransport) platformPolicyBuilder() transportPolicyBuilder {
t.policyMu.RLock()
defer t.policyMu.RUnlock()
return t.buildPlatformPolicy
}
func (t *sdkBootstrapTransport) setPlatformPolicyBuilder(build transportPolicyBuilder) {
t.policyMu.Lock()
t.buildPlatformPolicy = build
t.policyMu.Unlock()
}
func (t *sdkBootstrapTransport) isBootstrapRequest(req *http.Request) bool {
if req == nil {
return false
}
if _, redirected := req.Context().Value(sdkBootstrapRedirectContextKey{}).(struct{}); redirected {
return true
}
return t.match != nil && t.match(req)
}
func (t *sdkBootstrapTransport) fallbackTransport() http.RoundTripper {
if t.base != nil {
return t.base
}
// Preserve net/http's dynamic nil-Transport fallback.
return http.DefaultTransport
}
// sameOriginRedirectTransport rejects redirects before net/http can replay a
// bootstrap request to a different logical origin.
type sameOriginRedirectTransport struct {
base http.RoundTripper
}
func (t *sameOriginRedirectTransport) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
resp, err := t.base.RoundTrip(req)
if err != nil || resp == nil || !isFollowedRedirect(resp.StatusCode) {
return resp, err
}
location := resp.Header.Get("Location")
if location == "" {
return resp, nil
}
target, parseErr := req.URL.Parse(location)
if parseErr != nil {
if resp.Body != nil {
_ = resp.Body.Close()
}
return nil, errs.NewInternalError(
errs.SubtypeInvalidResponse,
"platform request returned an invalid redirect location: %v",
parseErr,
).WithCause(parseErr)
}
if sameOrigin(req.URL, target) {
return resp, nil
}
if resp.Body != nil {
_ = resp.Body.Close()
}
return nil, errs.NewSecurityPolicyError(
errs.SubtypeAccessDenied,
"platform bootstrap blocked cross-origin redirect from %q to %q",
originName(req.URL),
originName(target),
)
}
// sdkBootstrapRedirectPolicy preserves the prior hook and marks each redirect hop.
func sdkBootstrapRedirectPolicy(
match requestMatcher,
previous func(*http.Request, []*http.Request) error,
) func(*http.Request, []*http.Request) error {
return func(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
if previous != nil {
if err := previous(req, via); err != nil {
return err
}
} else if len(via) >= 10 {
// Retain net/http's default redirect limit.
return errs.NewNetworkError(
errs.SubtypeNetworkTransport,
"stopped after 10 redirects",
)
}
if req == nil || len(via) == 0 || match == nil || !match(via[0]) {
return nil
}
ctx := context.WithValue(req.Context(), sdkBootstrapRedirectContextKey{}, struct{}{})
*req = *req.WithContext(ctx)
return nil
}
}
func originName(candidate *url.URL) string {
if candidate == nil {
return ""
}
return strings.ToLower(candidate.Scheme) + "://" + candidate.Host
}
func sameOrigin(left, right *url.URL) bool {
if left == nil || right == nil {
return false
}
return strings.EqualFold(left.Scheme, right.Scheme) &&
strings.EqualFold(left.Hostname(), right.Hostname()) &&
originPort(left) == originPort(right)
}
func originPort(candidate *url.URL) string {
if port := candidate.Port(); port != "" {
return port
}
switch strings.ToLower(candidate.Scheme) {
case "http":
return "80"
case "https":
return "443"
default:
return ""
}
}
func isFollowedRedirect(status int) bool {
switch status {
case http.StatusMovedPermanently,
http.StatusFound,
http.StatusSeeOther,
http.StatusTemporaryRedirect,
http.StatusPermanentRedirect:
return true
default:
return false
}
}
// InstallSDKTransportBridge wraps larkws's captured HTTP bootstrap client. All
// requests through that client hit the bridge, but only matched bootstrap
// traffic uses platform policy. The SDK owns the subsequent WebSocket dial,
// which does not use this net/http transport.
func InstallSDKTransportBridge(buildPlatformPolicy func(http.RoundTripper) http.RoundTripper) {
installDefaultClientMu.Lock()
defer installDefaultClientMu.Unlock()
installSDKTransportBridge(
sdkBootstrapHTTPClient,
isSDKWebSocketBootstrapRequest,
buildPlatformPolicy,
)
}
func isSDKWebSocketBootstrapRequest(req *http.Request) bool {
return req != nil &&
req.Method == http.MethodPost &&
core.IsPlatformEndpointURL(req.URL) &&
req.URL.Path == larkws.GenEndpointUri
}
func installSDKTransportBridge(
client *http.Client,
match requestMatcher,
buildPlatformPolicy transportPolicyBuilder,
) {
if client == nil {
return
}
if existing, ok := client.Transport.(*sdkBootstrapTransport); ok {
existing.setPlatformPolicyBuilder(buildPlatformPolicy)
return
}
base := client.Transport
previousRedirect := client.CheckRedirect
client.Transport = &sdkBootstrapTransport{
base: base,
match: match,
buildPlatformPolicy: buildPlatformPolicy,
}
client.CheckRedirect = sdkBootstrapRedirectPolicy(match, previousRedirect)
}

View File

@@ -1,120 +0,0 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
package transport
import (
"context"
"net/http"
exttransport "github.com/larksuite/cli/extension/transport"
)
var _ RoundTripperDecorator = (*ExtensionMiddleware)(nil)
type resolvedExtension struct {
provider exttransport.Provider
interceptor exttransport.Interceptor
}
func resolveExtension() *resolvedExtension {
p := exttransport.GetProvider()
if p == nil {
return nil
}
interceptor := p.ResolveInterceptor(context.Background())
if interceptor == nil {
return nil
}
return &resolvedExtension{provider: p, interceptor: interceptor}
}
func (e *resolvedExtension) wrap(base http.RoundTripper, class exttransport.RequestClass, enforceScope bool) http.RoundTripper {
if base == nil {
base = Shared()
}
if e == nil {
return base
}
if enforceScope {
if scoped, ok := e.provider.(exttransport.ScopedProvider); ok && !scoped.SupportsRequestClass(class) {
return base
}
}
return &ExtensionMiddleware{Base: base, Ext: e.interceptor, ExtName: e.provider.Name()}
}
// ExtensionMiddleware wraps the built-in transport chain with extension
// pre/post hooks. The built-in chain always executes unless an
// exttransport.AbortableInterceptor rejects the request.
//
// The original request context is restored after the pre hook to prevent an
// extension from replacing cancellation, deadlines, or built-in values. The
// request is cloned so URL and header mutations do not alter the caller's
// request object. The body remains shared; interceptors that consume it must
// restore it before returning.
type ExtensionMiddleware struct {
Base http.RoundTripper
Ext exttransport.Interceptor
ExtName string
}
// BaseRoundTripper returns the wrapped built-in transport chain.
func (m *ExtensionMiddleware) BaseRoundTripper() http.RoundTripper {
if m.Base == nil {
return Shared()
}
return m.Base
}
// WithBaseRoundTripper clones the middleware over base.
func (m *ExtensionMiddleware) WithBaseRoundTripper(base http.RoundTripper) http.RoundTripper {
cloned := *m
cloned.Base = base
return &cloned
}
// RoundTrip invokes the extension pre hook, the wrapped transport, and then
// the optional post hook. Abortable interceptors can stop the request before
// the wrapped transport is called.
func (m *ExtensionMiddleware) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
origCtx := req.Context()
req = req.Clone(origCtx)
var (
post func(*http.Response, error)
abortErr error
)
if a, ok := m.Ext.(exttransport.AbortableInterceptor); ok {
post, abortErr = a.PreRoundTripE(req)
} else {
post = m.Ext.PreRoundTrip(req)
}
if abortErr != nil {
if post != nil {
post(nil, abortErr)
}
return nil, &exttransport.AbortError{Extension: m.ExtName, Reason: abortErr}
}
req = req.WithContext(origCtx)
resp, err := m.BaseRoundTripper().RoundTrip(req)
if post != nil {
post(resp, err)
}
return resp, err
}
// WrapWithExtension wraps base with the currently registered transport
// extension. With no registered provider or no resolved interceptor, base is
// returned unchanged.
func WrapWithExtension(base http.RoundTripper) http.RoundTripper {
return resolveExtension().wrap(base, "", false)
}
// WrapWithExtensionForClass wraps base only when the registered provider
// supports class. Providers without the optional ScopedProvider interface keep
// their historical all-request behavior.
func WrapWithExtensionForClass(base http.RoundTripper, class exttransport.RequestClass) http.RoundTripper {
return resolveExtension().wrap(base, class, true)
}

View File

@@ -1,924 +0,0 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
package transport
import (
"context"
"errors"
"io"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/url"
"strconv"
"strings"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
larkws "github.com/larksuite/oapi-sdk-go/v3/ws"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/errs"
exttransport "github.com/larksuite/cli/extension/transport"
)
type testProvider struct {
interceptor exttransport.Interceptor
resolveCalls *int
}
func (p testProvider) Name() string { return "test-provider" }
func (p testProvider) ResolveInterceptor(context.Context) exttransport.Interceptor {
if p.resolveCalls != nil {
*p.resolveCalls++
}
return p.interceptor
}
type scopedTestProvider struct {
testProvider
supported exttransport.RequestClass
}
func (p scopedTestProvider) SupportsRequestClass(class exttransport.RequestClass) bool {
return class == p.supported
}
type testHeaderInterceptor struct {
calls int
}
func (i *testHeaderInterceptor) PreRoundTrip(req *http.Request) func(*http.Response, error) {
i.calls++
req.Header.Set("X-Test-Platform", "routed")
return nil
}
type abortingTestInterceptor struct {
reason error
post func(*http.Response, error)
}
func (i *abortingTestInterceptor) PreRoundTrip(*http.Request) func(*http.Response, error) {
panic("PreRoundTrip called for abortable interceptor")
}
func (i *abortingTestInterceptor) PreRoundTripE(*http.Request) (func(*http.Response, error), error) {
return i.post, i.reason
}
func TestLegacyProviderKeepsAllRequestBehavior(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
unsetProxyPluginEnv(t)
resetProxyPluginState()
t.Setenv(EnvNoProxy, "")
interceptor := &testHeaderInterceptor{}
previousProvider := exttransport.GetProvider()
exttransport.Register(testProvider{interceptor: interceptor})
t.Cleanup(func() { exttransport.Register(previousProvider) })
received := make(chan string, 2)
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
received <- req.Header.Get("X-Test-Platform")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
}))
t.Cleanup(server.Close)
for _, client := range []*http.Client{
ClientForRequestClass(NewHTTPClient(0), exttransport.RequestClassPlatform),
NewExternalHTTPClient(0),
} {
resp, err := client.Get(server.URL)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
resp.Body.Close()
}
if got := <-received; got != "routed" {
t.Fatalf("platform request header = %q, want routed", got)
}
if got := <-received; got != "routed" {
t.Fatalf("external request header = %q, want routed for legacy provider", got)
}
if interceptor.calls != 2 {
t.Fatalf("extension calls = %d, want exactly 2", interceptor.calls)
}
}
func TestScopedProviderOnlyRunsForSupportedRequestClass(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
unsetProxyPluginEnv(t)
resetProxyPluginState()
t.Setenv(EnvNoProxy, "")
interceptor := &testHeaderInterceptor{}
previousProvider := exttransport.GetProvider()
exttransport.Register(scopedTestProvider{
testProvider: testProvider{interceptor: interceptor},
supported: exttransport.RequestClassPlatform,
})
t.Cleanup(func() { exttransport.Register(previousProvider) })
received := make(chan string, 2)
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
received <- req.Header.Get("X-Test-Platform")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
}))
t.Cleanup(server.Close)
clients := []*http.Client{
ClientForRequestClass(NewHTTPClient(0), exttransport.RequestClassPlatform),
NewExternalHTTPClient(0),
}
for _, client := range clients {
resp, err := client.Get(server.URL)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
resp.Body.Close()
}
if got := <-received; got != "routed" {
t.Fatalf("platform request header = %q, want routed", got)
}
if got := <-received; got != "" {
t.Fatalf("external request received scoped provider header %q", got)
}
if interceptor.calls != 1 {
t.Fatalf("extension calls = %d, want exactly 1", interceptor.calls)
}
}
func TestHTTPPolicyRouterResolvesProviderOnce(t *testing.T) {
resolveCalls := 0
previousProvider := exttransport.GetProvider()
exttransport.Register(testProvider{
interceptor: &testHeaderInterceptor{},
resolveCalls: &resolveCalls,
})
t.Cleanup(func() { exttransport.Register(previousProvider) })
base := roundTripFunc(func(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
return &http.Response{StatusCode: http.StatusNoContent, Body: http.NoBody, Request: req}, nil
})
_ = NewHTTPPolicyRouter(base, base)
if resolveCalls != 1 {
t.Fatalf("ResolveInterceptor() calls = %d, want 1 per router", resolveCalls)
}
}
func TestSDKBootstrapBridgeBlocksCrossOriginRedirectAfterSameOriginHop(t *testing.T) {
var externalCalls atomic.Int32
var relayBody string
base := roundTripFunc(func(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
if req.URL.Host == "external.example" {
externalCalls.Add(1)
return noContentResponse(req), nil
}
switch req.URL.Path {
case "/bootstrap":
return redirectResponse(req, http.StatusTemporaryRedirect, "/relay"), nil
case "/relay":
body, err := io.ReadAll(req.Body)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
relayBody = string(body)
return redirectResponse(
req,
http.StatusPermanentRedirect,
"https://external.example/target",
), nil
default:
return noContentResponse(req), nil
}
})
client := &http.Client{Transport: base}
installSDKTransportBridge(client, func(req *http.Request) bool {
return req.URL != nil && req.URL.Path == "/bootstrap"
}, identityTransportPolicy)
const secret = "app_secret=secret"
req, err := http.NewRequest(
http.MethodPost,
"https://platform.example/bootstrap",
strings.NewReader(secret),
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if resp != nil && resp.Body != nil {
resp.Body.Close()
}
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "cross-origin redirect") {
t.Fatalf("Do() error = %v, want cross-origin redirect rejection", err)
}
if problem, ok := errs.ProblemOf(err); !ok ||
problem.Category != errs.CategoryPolicy ||
problem.Subtype != errs.SubtypeAccessDenied {
t.Fatalf("Do() problem = %#v, %v; want policy/access_denied", problem, ok)
}
if relayBody != secret {
t.Fatalf("same-origin relay body = %q, want %q", relayBody, secret)
}
if got := externalCalls.Load(); got != 0 {
t.Fatalf("cross-origin target calls = %d, want 0", got)
}
}
func TestSDKBootstrapRedirectGuardClassifiesInvalidLocation(t *testing.T) {
base := roundTripFunc(func(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
return redirectResponse(req, http.StatusFound, "%"), nil
})
client := &http.Client{Transport: &sameOriginRedirectTransport{base: base}}
resp, err := client.Get("https://platform.example/bootstrap")
if resp != nil && resp.Body != nil {
resp.Body.Close()
}
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "invalid redirect location") {
t.Fatalf("Do() error = %v, want invalid redirect rejection", err)
}
problem, ok := errs.ProblemOf(err)
if !ok || problem.Category != errs.CategoryInternal || problem.Subtype != errs.SubtypeInvalidResponse {
t.Fatalf("Do() problem = %#v, %v; want internal/invalid_response", problem, ok)
}
}
type redirectPolicyInterceptor struct {
calls int
}
func (i *redirectPolicyInterceptor) PreRoundTrip(req *http.Request) func(*http.Response, error) {
i.calls++
req.Header.Set("X-Extension-Hop", strconv.Itoa(i.calls))
req.Header.Set("X-Reserved", "extension")
return nil
}
func TestSDKBootstrapBridgeRetainsPoliciesAcrossSameOriginRedirect(t *testing.T) {
previousProvider := exttransport.GetProvider()
interceptor := &redirectPolicyInterceptor{}
exttransport.Register(scopedTestProvider{
testProvider: testProvider{interceptor: interceptor},
supported: exttransport.RequestClassPlatform,
})
t.Cleanup(func() { exttransport.Register(previousProvider) })
var finalHeaders http.Header
base := roundTripFunc(func(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
switch req.URL.Path {
case "/bootstrap":
return redirectResponse(req, http.StatusTemporaryRedirect, "/next"), nil
case "/next":
finalHeaders = req.Header.Clone()
return noContentResponse(req), nil
default:
return noContentResponse(req), nil
}
})
builtInCalls := 0
client := &http.Client{Transport: base}
installSDKTransportBridge(
client,
func(req *http.Request) bool {
return req.URL != nil && req.URL.Path == "/bootstrap"
},
func(base http.RoundTripper) http.RoundTripper {
return roundTripFunc(func(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
builtInCalls++
req = req.Clone(req.Context())
req.Header.Set("X-Builtin-Hop", strconv.Itoa(builtInCalls))
req.Header.Set("X-Reserved", "trusted")
return base.RoundTrip(req)
})
},
)
req, err := http.NewRequest(
http.MethodPost,
"https://platform.example/bootstrap",
strings.NewReader("body"),
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
resp.Body.Close()
if finalHeaders == nil {
t.Fatal("same-origin redirect target was not called")
}
if interceptor.calls != 2 {
t.Fatalf("extension calls = %d, want 2", interceptor.calls)
}
if builtInCalls != 2 {
t.Fatalf("built-in policy calls = %d, want 2", builtInCalls)
}
if got := finalHeaders.Get("X-Extension-Hop"); got != "2" {
t.Fatalf("final X-Extension-Hop = %q, want 2", got)
}
if got := finalHeaders.Get("X-Builtin-Hop"); got != "2" {
t.Fatalf("final X-Builtin-Hop = %q, want 2", got)
}
if got := finalHeaders.Get("X-Reserved"); got != "trusted" {
t.Fatalf("final X-Reserved = %q, want trusted built-in value", got)
}
}
type redirectRewriteInterceptor struct {
target *url.URL
postLocation string
calls int
}
func (i *redirectRewriteInterceptor) PreRoundTrip(req *http.Request) func(*http.Response, error) {
i.calls++
req.URL.Scheme = i.target.Scheme
req.URL.Host = i.target.Host
if i.postLocation == "" {
return nil
}
return func(resp *http.Response, err error) {
if err == nil && resp != nil && isFollowedRedirect(resp.StatusCode) {
resp.Header.Set("Location", i.postLocation)
}
}
}
func TestSDKBootstrapRedirectGuardUsesLogicalURLAfterExtensionRewrite(t *testing.T) {
sidecarURL, err := url.Parse("https://sidecar.example")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
sidecarCalls := 0
base := roundTripFunc(func(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
if req.URL.Host != sidecarURL.Host {
t.Fatalf("network host = %q, want extension target %q", req.URL.Host, sidecarURL.Host)
}
sidecarCalls++
switch req.URL.Path {
case "/bootstrap":
return redirectResponse(
req,
http.StatusTemporaryRedirect,
"https://platform.example/next",
), nil
case "/next":
return noContentResponse(req), nil
default:
return noContentResponse(req), nil
}
})
previousProvider := exttransport.GetProvider()
interceptor := &redirectRewriteInterceptor{target: sidecarURL}
exttransport.Register(scopedTestProvider{
testProvider: testProvider{interceptor: interceptor},
supported: exttransport.RequestClassPlatform,
})
t.Cleanup(func() { exttransport.Register(previousProvider) })
client := &http.Client{Transport: base}
installSDKTransportBridge(client, func(req *http.Request) bool {
return req.URL != nil && req.URL.Path == "/bootstrap"
}, identityTransportPolicy)
req, err := http.NewRequest(
http.MethodPost,
"https://platform.example/bootstrap",
strings.NewReader("body"),
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
resp.Body.Close()
if sidecarCalls != 2 {
t.Fatalf("sidecar calls = %d, want 2", sidecarCalls)
}
if interceptor.calls != 2 {
t.Fatalf("extension calls = %d, want 2", interceptor.calls)
}
}
func TestSDKBootstrapRedirectGuardChecksLocationAfterExtensionPostHook(t *testing.T) {
var externalCalls atomic.Int32
sidecarURL, err := url.Parse("https://sidecar.example")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
base := roundTripFunc(func(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
if req.URL.Host == "external.example" {
externalCalls.Add(1)
return noContentResponse(req), nil
}
return redirectResponse(
req,
http.StatusTemporaryRedirect,
"https://platform.example/next",
), nil
})
previousProvider := exttransport.GetProvider()
exttransport.Register(scopedTestProvider{
testProvider: testProvider{interceptor: &redirectRewriteInterceptor{
target: sidecarURL,
postLocation: "https://external.example/target",
}},
supported: exttransport.RequestClassPlatform,
})
t.Cleanup(func() { exttransport.Register(previousProvider) })
client := &http.Client{Transport: base}
installSDKTransportBridge(client, func(req *http.Request) bool {
return req.URL != nil && req.URL.Path == "/bootstrap"
}, identityTransportPolicy)
req, err := http.NewRequest(
http.MethodPost,
"https://platform.example/bootstrap",
strings.NewReader("secret"),
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if resp != nil && resp.Body != nil {
resp.Body.Close()
}
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "cross-origin redirect") {
t.Fatalf("Do() error = %v, want post-hook Location rejection", err)
}
if problem, ok := errs.ProblemOf(err); !ok ||
problem.Category != errs.CategoryPolicy ||
problem.Subtype != errs.SubtypeAccessDenied {
t.Fatalf("Do() problem = %#v, %v; want policy/access_denied", problem, ok)
}
if got := externalCalls.Load(); got != 0 {
t.Fatalf("post-hook redirect target calls = %d, want 0", got)
}
}
func TestSameOriginNormalizesDefaultPort(t *testing.T) {
left, err := url.Parse("https://platform.example/bootstrap")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
right, err := url.Parse("https://platform.example:443/next")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if !sameOrigin(left, right) {
t.Fatal("sameOrigin() = false for equivalent default HTTPS ports")
}
}
func TestDefaultClientBridgeCoversWebSocketSDKBootstrap(t *testing.T) {
preserveHTTPClientState(t, sdkBootstrapHTTPClient)
t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
unsetProxyPluginEnv(t)
resetProxyPluginState()
t.Setenv(EnvNoProxy, "1")
previousProvider := exttransport.GetProvider()
interceptor := &testHeaderInterceptor{}
exttransport.Register(scopedTestProvider{
testProvider: testProvider{interceptor: interceptor},
supported: exttransport.RequestClassPlatform,
})
t.Cleanup(func() { exttransport.Register(previousProvider) })
seenHeader := make(chan string, 1)
server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
seenHeader <- req.Header.Get("X-Test-Platform")
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
_, _ = io.WriteString(w, `{"code":400,"msg":"stop after bootstrap"}`)
}))
t.Cleanup(server.Close)
installSDKTransportBridge(sdkBootstrapHTTPClient, func(req *http.Request) bool {
return req.URL != nil && req.URL.Host == strings.TrimPrefix(server.URL, "http://")
}, identityTransportPolicy)
client := larkws.NewClient(
"test-app",
"test-secret",
larkws.WithDomain(server.URL),
larkws.WithAutoReconnect(false),
)
if err := client.Start(context.Background()); err == nil {
t.Fatal("WebSocket SDK Start() error = nil, want bootstrap failure")
}
if got := <-seenHeader; got != "routed" {
t.Fatalf("WebSocket bootstrap header = %q, want routed", got)
}
if interceptor.calls != 1 {
t.Fatalf("extension calls = %d, want exactly 1 bootstrap call", interceptor.calls)
}
}
func TestSDKTransportBridgeUsesPinnedClientAfterGlobalReplacement(t *testing.T) {
preserveHTTPClientState(t, sdkBootstrapHTTPClient)
oldDefaultClient := http.DefaultClient
t.Cleanup(func() { http.DefaultClient = oldDefaultClient })
var pinnedCalls atomic.Int32
pinnedHeader := make(chan string, 1)
sdkBootstrapHTTPClient.Transport = roundTripFunc(func(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
pinnedCalls.Add(1)
pinnedHeader <- req.Header.Get("X-Pinned-Bridge")
return &http.Response{
StatusCode: http.StatusBadRequest,
Header: http.Header{"Content-Type": []string{"application/json"}},
Body: io.NopCloser(strings.NewReader(`{"code":400,"msg":"stop"}`)),
Request: req,
}, nil
})
sdkBootstrapHTTPClient.CheckRedirect = nil
var replacementCalls atomic.Int32
http.DefaultClient = &http.Client{Transport: roundTripFunc(func(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
replacementCalls.Add(1)
return &http.Response{
StatusCode: http.StatusBadRequest,
Body: http.NoBody,
Request: req,
}, nil
})}
InstallSDKTransportBridge(func(base http.RoundTripper) http.RoundTripper {
return roundTripFunc(func(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
req = req.Clone(req.Context())
req.Header.Set("X-Pinned-Bridge", "routed")
return base.RoundTrip(req)
})
})
client := larkws.NewClient(
"test-app",
"test-secret",
larkws.WithAutoReconnect(false),
)
if err := client.Start(context.Background()); err == nil {
t.Fatal("WebSocket SDK Start() error = nil, want bootstrap failure")
}
if got := pinnedCalls.Load(); got != 1 {
t.Fatalf("SDK-pinned client calls = %d, want 1", got)
}
if got := <-pinnedHeader; got != "routed" {
t.Fatalf("SDK-pinned bridge header = %q, want routed", got)
}
if got := replacementCalls.Load(); got != 0 {
t.Fatalf("replacement DefaultClient calls = %d, want 0", got)
}
}
func TestSDKWebSocketBootstrapMatcherIsNarrow(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
method string
url string
want bool
}{
{
name: "platform bootstrap",
method: http.MethodPost,
url: "https://open.feishu.cn/callback/ws/endpoint",
want: true,
},
{
name: "other platform path",
method: http.MethodPost,
url: "https://open.feishu.cn/open-apis/test",
},
{
name: "wrong bootstrap method",
method: http.MethodGet,
url: "https://open.feishu.cn/callback/ws/endpoint",
},
{
name: "external lookalike",
method: http.MethodPost,
url: "https://external.example/callback/ws/endpoint",
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
req, err := http.NewRequest(tt.method, tt.url, nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if got := isSDKWebSocketBootstrapRequest(req); got != tt.want {
t.Fatalf("isSDKWebSocketBootstrapRequest() = %v, want %v", got, tt.want)
}
})
}
}
func TestSDKTransportBridgeLeavesOtherPlatformPathsUntouched(t *testing.T) {
previousProvider := exttransport.GetProvider()
interceptor := &testHeaderInterceptor{}
exttransport.Register(scopedTestProvider{
testProvider: testProvider{interceptor: interceptor},
supported: exttransport.RequestClassPlatform,
})
t.Cleanup(func() { exttransport.Register(previousProvider) })
baseCalls := 0
client := &http.Client{Transport: roundTripFunc(func(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
baseCalls++
return &http.Response{StatusCode: http.StatusNoContent, Body: http.NoBody, Request: req}, nil
})}
installSDKTransportBridge(client, isSDKWebSocketBootstrapRequest, nil)
req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "https://open.feishu.cn/open-apis/test", nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
resp.Body.Close()
if baseCalls != 1 {
t.Fatalf("base calls = %d, want 1", baseCalls)
}
if interceptor.calls != 0 {
t.Fatalf("extension calls = %d, want 0 for unmatched DefaultClient traffic", interceptor.calls)
}
}
func TestSDKTransportBridgeNilBasePreservesDefaultTransportForUnmatchedRequest(t *testing.T) {
oldDefaultTransport := http.DefaultTransport
t.Cleanup(func() { http.DefaultTransport = oldDefaultTransport })
unsetProxyPluginEnv(t)
resetProxyPluginState()
t.Setenv(EnvNoProxy, "1")
var firstCalls atomic.Int32
http.DefaultTransport = roundTripFunc(func(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
firstCalls.Add(1)
return &http.Response{StatusCode: http.StatusNoContent, Body: http.NoBody, Request: req}, nil
})
client := &http.Client{}
installSDKTransportBridge(client, func(*http.Request) bool { return false }, nil)
var currentCalls atomic.Int32
http.DefaultTransport = roundTripFunc(func(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
currentCalls.Add(1)
return &http.Response{StatusCode: http.StatusNoContent, Body: http.NoBody, Request: req}, nil
})
req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://127.0.0.1:1/unmatched", nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
resp.Body.Close()
if got := firstCalls.Load(); got != 0 {
t.Fatalf("install-time DefaultTransport calls = %d, want 0", got)
}
if got := currentCalls.Load(); got != 1 {
t.Fatalf("request-time DefaultTransport calls = %d, want 1", got)
}
}
func TestSDKTransportBridgeUpdatesPlatformPolicy(t *testing.T) {
client := &http.Client{Transport: roundTripFunc(func(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
return noContentResponse(req), nil
})}
var firstCalls, secondCalls int
build := func(calls *int) transportPolicyBuilder {
return func(base http.RoundTripper) http.RoundTripper {
*calls++
return base
}
}
match := func(*http.Request) bool { return true }
installSDKTransportBridge(client, match, build(&firstCalls))
installSDKTransportBridge(client, match, build(&secondCalls))
req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "https://platform.example/bootstrap", nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
resp.Body.Close()
if firstCalls != 0 || secondCalls != 1 {
t.Fatalf("policy calls = (%d, %d), want (0, 1)", firstCalls, secondCalls)
}
}
func TestSDKBootstrapTransportFailsClosedWithoutPlatformPolicy(t *testing.T) {
var baseCalls atomic.Int32
client := &http.Client{Transport: roundTripFunc(func(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
baseCalls.Add(1)
return &http.Response{
StatusCode: http.StatusNoContent,
Body: http.NoBody,
Request: req,
}, nil
})}
installSDKTransportBridge(client, func(*http.Request) bool { return true }, nil)
req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "https://platform.example/bootstrap", nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if resp != nil && resp.Body != nil {
resp.Body.Close()
}
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "policy is not configured") {
t.Fatalf("Do() error = %v, want missing policy rejection", err)
}
if problem, ok := errs.ProblemOf(err); !ok ||
problem.Category != errs.CategoryInternal ||
problem.Subtype != errs.SubtypeUnknown {
t.Fatalf("Do() problem = %#v, %v; want internal/unknown", problem, ok)
}
if got := baseCalls.Load(); got != 0 {
t.Fatalf("base transport calls = %d, want 0", got)
}
}
func TestSDKBootstrapTransportFailsClosedForNilPlatformTransport(t *testing.T) {
var baseCalls atomic.Int32
client := &http.Client{Transport: roundTripFunc(func(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
baseCalls.Add(1)
return &http.Response{
StatusCode: http.StatusNoContent,
Body: http.NoBody,
Request: req,
}, nil
})}
installSDKTransportBridge(client, func(*http.Request) bool { return true }, func(http.RoundTripper) http.RoundTripper {
return nil
})
req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "https://platform.example/bootstrap", nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if resp != nil && resp.Body != nil {
resp.Body.Close()
}
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "nil transport") {
t.Fatalf("Do() error = %v, want nil policy transport rejection", err)
}
if problem, ok := errs.ProblemOf(err); !ok ||
problem.Category != errs.CategoryInternal ||
problem.Subtype != errs.SubtypeUnknown {
t.Fatalf("Do() problem = %#v, %v; want internal/unknown", problem, ok)
}
if got := baseCalls.Load(); got != 0 {
t.Fatalf("base transport calls = %d, want 0", got)
}
}
func TestSDKBootstrapRedirectPolicyRetainsDefaultLimit(t *testing.T) {
policy := sdkBootstrapRedirectPolicy(nil, nil)
via := make([]*http.Request, 10)
err := policy(&http.Request{}, via)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("redirect policy error = nil after 10 redirects")
}
if problem, ok := errs.ProblemOf(err); !ok ||
problem.Category != errs.CategoryNetwork ||
problem.Subtype != errs.SubtypeNetworkTransport {
t.Fatalf("redirect problem = %#v, %v; want network/transport", problem, ok)
}
}
func TestExtensionMiddlewareUsesFallbackWhenBaseIsNil(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
unsetProxyPluginEnv(t)
resetProxyPluginState()
t.Setenv(EnvNoProxy, "")
previous := http.DefaultTransport
var calls atomic.Int32
http.DefaultTransport = roundTripFunc(func(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
calls.Add(1)
return &http.Response{
StatusCode: http.StatusNoContent,
Body: http.NoBody,
Request: req,
}, nil
})
t.Cleanup(func() { http.DefaultTransport = previous })
req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "https://external.example/file", nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
resp, err := (&ExtensionMiddleware{Ext: &testHeaderInterceptor{}}).RoundTrip(req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
resp.Body.Close()
if got := calls.Load(); got != 1 {
t.Fatalf("fallback transport calls = %d, want 1", got)
}
}
func TestExtensionMiddlewareAbortsBeforeBase(t *testing.T) {
reason := errors.New("blocked")
baseCalled := false
postCalled := false
interceptor := &abortingTestInterceptor{
reason: reason,
post: func(resp *http.Response, err error) {
postCalled = true
if resp != nil || err != reason {
t.Errorf("post arguments = (%v, %v), want (nil, reason)", resp, err)
}
},
}
middleware := &ExtensionMiddleware{
Base: roundTripFunc(func(*http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
baseCalled = true
return nil, nil
}),
Ext: interceptor,
ExtName: "test-provider",
}
resp, err := middleware.RoundTrip(httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "https://example.com", nil))
if resp != nil {
t.Fatalf("response = %v, want nil", resp)
}
var abortErr *exttransport.AbortError
if !errors.As(err, &abortErr) {
t.Fatalf("error = %T, want *transport.AbortError", err)
}
if abortErr.Extension != "test-provider" || abortErr.Reason != reason {
t.Fatalf("abort error = %#v, want provider and reason", abortErr)
}
if baseCalled {
t.Fatal("base transport was called")
}
if !postCalled {
t.Fatal("post hook was not called")
}
}
func preserveHTTPClientState(t *testing.T, client *http.Client) {
t.Helper()
oldTransport := client.Transport
oldCheckRedirect := client.CheckRedirect
t.Cleanup(func() {
client.Transport = oldTransport
client.CheckRedirect = oldCheckRedirect
})
}
func identityTransportPolicy(base http.RoundTripper) http.RoundTripper {
return base
}
func redirectResponse(req *http.Request, status int, location string) *http.Response {
return &http.Response{
StatusCode: status,
Header: http.Header{"Location": []string{location}},
Body: http.NoBody,
Request: req,
}
}
func noContentResponse(req *http.Request) *http.Response {
return &http.Response{
StatusCode: http.StatusNoContent,
Body: http.NoBody,
Request: req,
}
}
type roundTripFunc func(*http.Request) (*http.Response, error)
func (f roundTripFunc) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
return f(req)
}

View File

@@ -1,232 +0,0 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
package transport
import (
"context"
"net/http"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/errs"
exttransport "github.com/larksuite/cli/extension/transport"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
)
type requestClassContextKey struct{}
type forcedRequestClassContextKey struct{}
// HTTPPolicyRouter selects an HTTP transport policy from request intent and
// the endpoint catalog. Explicit request intent takes precedence; otherwise
// known platform endpoints use the platform policy and all other URLs use the
// external policy.
type HTTPPolicyRouter struct {
platform http.RoundTripper
external http.RoundTripper
}
// RoundTripperDecorator describes a transport layer that can be rebuilt over
// a cloned base transport. Connection-policy helpers use this contract to
// preserve retry, response, and extension layers while safely customizing the
// innermost *http.Transport.
type RoundTripperDecorator interface {
BaseRoundTripper() http.RoundTripper
WithBaseRoundTripper(http.RoundTripper) http.RoundTripper
}
// NewHTTPPolicyRouter constructs a router over two policy chains. A nil chain
// falls back to the shared proxy-aware transport. The currently registered
// extension provider is resolved once and applied according to its optional
// ScopedProvider contract.
func NewHTTPPolicyRouter(platform, external http.RoundTripper) *HTTPPolicyRouter {
if platform == nil {
platform = Shared()
}
if external == nil {
external = Shared()
}
extension := resolveExtension()
return &HTTPPolicyRouter{
platform: extension.wrap(platform, exttransport.RequestClassPlatform, true),
external: extension.wrap(external, exttransport.RequestClassExternal, true),
}
}
// RoundTrip dispatches the request to its selected policy chain.
func (r *HTTPPolicyRouter) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
if req == nil {
return nil, errs.NewInternalError(
errs.SubtypeUnknown,
"HTTP policy router received a nil request",
)
}
class, err := classifyRequest(req)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if class == exttransport.RequestClassPlatform {
return r.platform.RoundTrip(req)
}
return r.external.RoundTrip(req)
}
func (r *HTTPPolicyRouter) transportForClass(class exttransport.RequestClass) (http.RoundTripper, bool) {
switch class {
case exttransport.RequestClassPlatform:
return r.platform, true
case exttransport.RequestClassExternal:
return r.external, true
default:
return nil, false
}
}
func classifyRequest(req *http.Request) (exttransport.RequestClass, error) {
if explicit, ok := req.Context().Value(requestClassContextKey{}).(exttransport.RequestClass); ok {
switch explicit {
case exttransport.RequestClassPlatform, exttransport.RequestClassExternal:
return explicit, nil
default:
return "", errs.NewInternalError(
errs.SubtypeUnknown,
"unsupported HTTP request class %q",
explicit,
)
}
}
if core.IsPlatformEndpointURL(req.URL) {
return exttransport.RequestClassPlatform, nil
}
return exttransport.RequestClassExternal, nil
}
// WithRequestClass returns a shallow copy of req with explicit routing intent.
func WithRequestClass(req *http.Request, class exttransport.RequestClass) *http.Request {
if req == nil {
return nil
}
ctx := context.WithValue(req.Context(), requestClassContextKey{}, class)
return req.WithContext(ctx)
}
func withForcedRequestClass(req *http.Request, class exttransport.RequestClass) *http.Request {
if req == nil {
return nil
}
if _, forced := req.Context().Value(forcedRequestClassContextKey{}).(struct{}); forced {
return req
}
ctx := context.WithValue(req.Context(), requestClassContextKey{}, class)
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, forcedRequestClassContextKey{}, struct{}{})
return req.WithContext(ctx)
}
type requestClassTransport struct {
base http.RoundTripper
class exttransport.RequestClass
}
func (t *requestClassTransport) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
return t.base.RoundTrip(withForcedRequestClass(req, t.class))
}
// CloneHTTPTransport exposes a structural cloning capability without requiring
// higher-level safety helpers to import this package. The explicit request
// class selects the policy branch that must be rebuilt.
func (t *requestClassTransport) CloneHTTPTransport() (http.RoundTripper, *http.Transport, bool) {
return CloneHTTPTransportForRequestClass(t.base, t.class)
}
// TransformHTTPTransport clones the selected policy branch and replaces its
// concrete transport in place. Keeping the replacement at the graph leaf is
// important for policies that must observe requests after outer decorators
// have run, such as proxy selection.
func (t *requestClassTransport) TransformHTTPTransport(transform func(*http.Transport) (http.RoundTripper, bool)) (http.RoundTripper, bool) {
return transformHTTPTransportForRequestClass(t.base, t.class, transform, 0)
}
// ClientForRequestClass clones client and forces all of its requests through a
// specific policy class. The original client is never mutated.
func ClientForRequestClass(client *http.Client, class exttransport.RequestClass) *http.Client {
if client == nil {
client = &http.Client{}
}
cloned := *client
base := client.Transport
if base == nil {
base = Shared()
}
cloned.Transport = &requestClassTransport{base: base, class: class}
return &cloned
}
// CloneHTTPTransportForRequestClass selects one policy branch, clones its
// innermost *http.Transport, and rebuilds every composable decorator around
// the clone. Callers can customize concrete before using rebuilt. The original
// transport graph is never mutated.
func CloneHTTPTransportForRequestClass(base http.RoundTripper, class exttransport.RequestClass) (rebuilt http.RoundTripper, concrete *http.Transport, ok bool) {
rebuilt, ok = transformHTTPTransportForRequestClass(base, class, func(cloned *http.Transport) (http.RoundTripper, bool) {
concrete = cloned
return cloned, true
}, 0)
if !ok {
return nil, nil, false
}
return rebuilt, concrete, true
}
func transformHTTPTransportForRequestClass(
base http.RoundTripper,
class exttransport.RequestClass,
transform func(*http.Transport) (http.RoundTripper, bool),
depth int,
) (http.RoundTripper, bool) {
if depth > 32 {
return nil, false
}
if base == nil || transform == nil {
if transform == nil {
return nil, false
}
base = Shared()
}
switch current := base.(type) {
case *http.Transport:
cloned := cloneHTTPTransport(current)
rebuilt, valid := transform(cloned)
return rebuilt, valid && rebuilt != nil
case *requestClassTransport:
return transformHTTPTransportForRequestClass(current.base, class, transform, depth+1)
case *HTTPPolicyRouter:
selected, valid := current.transportForClass(class)
if !valid {
return nil, false
}
return transformHTTPTransportForRequestClass(selected, class, transform, depth+1)
case RoundTripperDecorator:
inner := current.BaseRoundTripper()
if inner == nil || inner == base {
return nil, false
}
rebuiltInner, valid := transformHTTPTransportForRequestClass(inner, class, transform, depth+1)
if !valid {
return nil, false
}
rebuilt := current.WithBaseRoundTripper(rebuiltInner)
return rebuilt, rebuilt != nil
default:
return nil, false
}
}
func cloneHTTPTransport(source *http.Transport) *http.Transport {
cloned := source.Clone()
// Clone leaves an auto-configured h2 handler on source.
if cloned.TLSNextProto == nil {
if _, ok := source.TLSNextProto["h2"]; ok {
cloned.ForceAttemptHTTP2 = true
}
}
return cloned
}

View File

@@ -1,351 +0,0 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
package transport
import (
"errors"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/url"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/errs"
exttransport "github.com/larksuite/cli/extension/transport"
)
type cloneTestDecorator struct {
base http.RoundTripper
}
func (d *cloneTestDecorator) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
return d.base.RoundTrip(req)
}
func (d *cloneTestDecorator) BaseRoundTripper() http.RoundTripper {
return d.base
}
func (d *cloneTestDecorator) WithBaseRoundTripper(base http.RoundTripper) http.RoundTripper {
return &cloneTestDecorator{base: base}
}
type headerCloneTestDecorator struct {
base http.RoundTripper
}
func (d *headerCloneTestDecorator) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
req = req.Clone(req.Context())
req.Header.Set("X-Decorator", "applied")
return d.base.RoundTrip(req)
}
func (d *headerCloneTestDecorator) BaseRoundTripper() http.RoundTripper {
return d.base
}
func (d *headerCloneTestDecorator) WithBaseRoundTripper(base http.RoundTripper) http.RoundTripper {
return &headerCloneTestDecorator{base: base}
}
func TestHTTPPolicyRouterClassifiesFromEndpointCatalog(t *testing.T) {
exttransport.Register(nil)
platformCalls := 0
externalCalls := 0
router := NewHTTPPolicyRouter(
roundTripFunc(func(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
platformCalls++
return &http.Response{StatusCode: http.StatusNoContent, Body: http.NoBody, Request: req}, nil
}),
roundTripFunc(func(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
externalCalls++
return &http.Response{StatusCode: http.StatusNoContent, Body: http.NoBody, Request: req}, nil
}),
)
for _, rawURL := range []string{
"https://open.feishu.cn/open-apis/test",
"https://example.com/file",
} {
req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, rawURL, nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
resp, err := router.RoundTrip(req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
resp.Body.Close()
}
if platformCalls != 1 || externalCalls != 1 {
t.Fatalf("platform calls = %d, external calls = %d; want 1 each", platformCalls, externalCalls)
}
}
func TestHTTPPolicyRouterExplicitClassOverridesCatalog(t *testing.T) {
exttransport.Register(nil)
platformCalls := 0
externalCalls := 0
router := NewHTTPPolicyRouter(
roundTripFunc(func(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
platformCalls++
return &http.Response{StatusCode: http.StatusNoContent, Body: http.NoBody, Request: req}, nil
}),
roundTripFunc(func(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
externalCalls++
return &http.Response{StatusCode: http.StatusNoContent, Body: http.NoBody, Request: req}, nil
}),
)
req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "https://open.feishu.cn/open-apis/test", nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
req = WithRequestClass(req, exttransport.RequestClassExternal)
resp, err := router.RoundTrip(req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
resp.Body.Close()
if platformCalls != 0 || externalCalls != 1 {
t.Fatalf("platform calls = %d, external calls = %d; want 0 and 1", platformCalls, externalCalls)
}
}
func TestClientForRequestClassOutermostIntentWins(t *testing.T) {
exttransport.Register(nil)
platformCalls := 0
externalCalls := 0
router := NewHTTPPolicyRouter(
roundTripFunc(func(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
platformCalls++
return &http.Response{StatusCode: http.StatusNoContent, Body: http.NoBody, Request: req}, nil
}),
roundTripFunc(func(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
externalCalls++
return &http.Response{StatusCode: http.StatusNoContent, Body: http.NoBody, Request: req}, nil
}),
)
platform := ClientForRequestClass(&http.Client{Transport: router}, exttransport.RequestClassPlatform)
external := ClientForRequestClass(platform, exttransport.RequestClassExternal)
resp, err := external.Get("https://open.feishu.cn/open-apis/test")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
resp.Body.Close()
if platformCalls != 0 || externalCalls != 1 {
t.Fatalf("platform calls = %d, external calls = %d; want outer external intent to win", platformCalls, externalCalls)
}
}
func TestHTTPPolicyRouterRejectsInvalidExplicitClass(t *testing.T) {
exttransport.Register(nil)
router := NewHTTPPolicyRouter(nil, nil)
req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "https://example.com", nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
req = WithRequestClass(req, exttransport.RequestClass("invalid"))
if _, err := router.RoundTrip(req); err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "unsupported HTTP request class") {
t.Fatalf("RoundTrip() error = %v, want unsupported request class", err)
} else if problem, ok := errs.ProblemOf(err); !ok ||
problem.Category != errs.CategoryInternal ||
problem.Subtype != errs.SubtypeUnknown {
t.Fatalf("RoundTrip() problem = %#v, %v; want internal/unknown", problem, ok)
}
}
func TestHTTPPolicyRouterRejectsNilRequest(t *testing.T) {
router := NewHTTPPolicyRouter(nil, nil)
_, err := router.RoundTrip(nil)
problem, ok := errs.ProblemOf(err)
if !ok || problem.Category != errs.CategoryInternal || problem.Subtype != errs.SubtypeUnknown {
t.Fatalf("RoundTrip() problem = %#v, %v; want internal/unknown", problem, ok)
}
}
func TestHTTPPolicyRouterReclassifiesRedirectTargets(t *testing.T) {
interceptor := &testHeaderInterceptor{}
exttransport.Register(scopedTestProvider{
testProvider: testProvider{interceptor: interceptor},
supported: exttransport.RequestClassPlatform,
})
t.Cleanup(func() { exttransport.Register(nil) })
receivedHeader := make(chan string, 1)
external := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
receivedHeader <- req.Header.Get("X-Test-Platform")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
}))
t.Cleanup(external.Close)
router := NewHTTPPolicyRouter(
roundTripFunc(func(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
return &http.Response{
StatusCode: http.StatusFound,
Header: http.Header{"Location": []string{external.URL}},
Body: http.NoBody,
Request: req,
}, nil
}),
http.DefaultTransport,
)
client := &http.Client{Transport: router}
req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "https://open.feishu.cn/start", nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
resp.Body.Close()
if got := <-receivedHeader; got != "" {
t.Fatalf("redirect target received platform-scoped header %q", got)
}
if interceptor.calls != 1 {
t.Fatalf("extension calls = %d, want only the initial platform request", interceptor.calls)
}
}
func TestCloneHTTPTransportForRequestClassRebuildsDecorators(t *testing.T) {
wantErr := errors.New("preserved proxy policy")
base := &http.Transport{
Proxy: func(*http.Request) (*url.URL, error) {
return nil, wantErr
},
}
decorated := &cloneTestDecorator{base: base}
router := NewHTTPPolicyRouter(decorated, decorated)
rebuilt, concrete, ok := CloneHTTPTransportForRequestClass(router, exttransport.RequestClassExternal)
if !ok {
t.Fatal("CloneHTTPTransportForRequestClass() ok = false")
}
if concrete == base {
t.Fatal("CloneHTTPTransportForRequestClass() reused the original *http.Transport")
}
if _, ok := rebuilt.(*cloneTestDecorator); !ok {
t.Fatalf("rebuilt transport type = %T, want *cloneTestDecorator", rebuilt)
}
req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "https://external.example/file", nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if _, err := rebuilt.RoundTrip(req); !errors.Is(err, wantErr) {
t.Fatalf("RoundTrip() error = %v, want %v", err, wantErr)
}
}
func TestCloneHTTPTransportForRequestClassPreservesAutomaticHTTP2(t *testing.T) {
previousProvider := exttransport.GetProvider()
exttransport.Register(nil)
t.Cleanup(func() { exttransport.Register(previousProvider) })
source := &http.Transport{
Proxy: http.ProxyURL(&url.URL{Scheme: "http", Host: "proxy.example:8080"}),
}
router := NewHTTPPolicyRouter(&http.Transport{}, source)
_, cloned, ok := CloneHTTPTransportForRequestClass(router, exttransport.RequestClassExternal)
if !ok {
t.Fatal("CloneHTTPTransportForRequestClass() ok = false")
}
if !cloned.ForceAttemptHTTP2 {
t.Fatal("ForceAttemptHTTP2 = false, want true")
}
if cloned.TLSNextProto != nil {
t.Fatal("TLSNextProto is non-nil, want automatic HTTP/2")
}
}
func TestCloneHTTPTransportForRequestClassKeepsOutermostIntent(t *testing.T) {
platformErr := errors.New("platform transport")
externalErr := errors.New("external transport")
newBlocked := func(reason error) *http.Transport {
return &http.Transport{Proxy: func(*http.Request) (*url.URL, error) { return nil, reason }}
}
router := NewHTTPPolicyRouter(newBlocked(platformErr), newBlocked(externalErr))
platform := ClientForRequestClass(&http.Client{Transport: router}, exttransport.RequestClassPlatform)
external := ClientForRequestClass(platform, exttransport.RequestClassExternal)
source, ok := external.Transport.(interface {
CloneHTTPTransport() (http.RoundTripper, *http.Transport, bool)
})
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("transport type %T has no clone capability", external.Transport)
}
rebuilt, _, ok := source.CloneHTTPTransport()
if !ok {
t.Fatal("CloneHTTPTransport() ok = false")
}
req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "https://open.feishu.cn/open-apis/test", nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if _, err := rebuilt.RoundTrip(req); !errors.Is(err, externalErr) {
t.Fatalf("RoundTrip() error = %v, want outer external transport error %v", err, externalErr)
}
}
func TestClientForRequestClassOverridesCallerIntent(t *testing.T) {
platformErr := errors.New("platform transport")
externalErr := errors.New("external transport")
newBlocked := func(reason error) *http.Transport {
return &http.Transport{Proxy: func(*http.Request) (*url.URL, error) { return nil, reason }}
}
router := NewHTTPPolicyRouter(newBlocked(platformErr), newBlocked(externalErr))
client := ClientForRequestClass(&http.Client{Transport: router}, exttransport.RequestClassExternal)
req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "https://external.example/file", nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
req = WithRequestClass(req, exttransport.RequestClassPlatform)
if _, err := client.Do(req); !errors.Is(err, externalErr) {
t.Fatalf("Do() error = %v, want forced external transport error %v", err, externalErr)
}
}
func TestTransformHTTPTransportReplacesLeafInsideDecorators(t *testing.T) {
exttransport.Register(nil)
decorated := &headerCloneTestDecorator{base: &http.Transport{}}
router := NewHTTPPolicyRouter(decorated, decorated)
client := ClientForRequestClass(&http.Client{Transport: router}, exttransport.RequestClassExternal)
source, ok := client.Transport.(interface {
TransformHTTPTransport(func(*http.Transport) (http.RoundTripper, bool)) (http.RoundTripper, bool)
})
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("transport type %T has no transform capability", client.Transport)
}
rebuilt, ok := source.TransformHTTPTransport(func(*http.Transport) (http.RoundTripper, bool) {
return roundTripFunc(func(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
if got := req.Header.Get("X-Decorator"); got != "applied" {
t.Fatalf("leaf received X-Decorator = %q, want applied", got)
}
return &http.Response{StatusCode: http.StatusNoContent, Body: http.NoBody, Request: req}, nil
}), true
})
if !ok {
t.Fatal("TransformHTTPTransport() ok = false")
}
req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "https://external.example/file", nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
resp, err := rebuilt.RoundTrip(req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
resp.Body.Close()
}

View File

@@ -8,8 +8,6 @@ import (
"os"
"sync"
"time"
exttransport "github.com/larksuite/cli/extension/transport"
)
// Shared returns the base http.RoundTripper for all CLI HTTP clients.
@@ -57,29 +55,21 @@ func Fallback() *http.Transport {
return noProxyTransport()
}
// NewHTTPClient returns a policy-routed client over the shared proxy-aware
// transport. Known platform endpoints use the platform request class; all
// other URLs use the external request class. Existing unscoped transport
// providers continue to apply to both classes.
// NewHTTPClient returns an *http.Client whose Transport is the shared,
// proxy-plugin-aware base (see Shared). Prefer this over a bare &http.Client{}
// for outbound requests: a bare client falls back to http.DefaultTransport and
// therefore silently bypasses proxy plugin mode (fixed proxy + trusted CA, or
// fail-closed), creating an audit blind spot.
//
// A zero timeout means no client-level timeout (callers relying on context
// deadlines pass 0).
func NewHTTPClient(timeout time.Duration) *http.Client {
base := Shared()
return &http.Client{
Transport: NewHTTPPolicyRouter(base, base),
Transport: Shared(),
Timeout: timeout,
}
}
// NewExternalHTTPClient returns a client for user-provided, pre-signed, CDN,
// package-registry, and other non-platform URLs. It forces the external policy
// while preserving the shared proxy configuration and the historical behavior
// of unscoped transport providers. A zero timeout means no client-level timeout.
func NewExternalHTTPClient(timeout time.Duration) *http.Client {
return ClientForRequestClass(NewHTTPClient(timeout), exttransport.RequestClassExternal)
}
// noProxyTransport is a proxy-disabled clone of http.DefaultTransport, lazily
// built the first time LARK_CLI_NO_PROXY is observed set.
var noProxyTransport = sync.OnceValue(func() *http.Transport {

View File

@@ -88,24 +88,23 @@ func TestShared_NoProxyOverridesSystemProxy(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestHTTPClientConstructors verifies both the policy-routed client and its
// forced-external view retain explicit transports and configured timeouts.
func TestHTTPClientConstructors(t *testing.T) {
// TestNewHTTPClient verifies the factory wires the shared proxy-plugin-aware
// transport (instead of a bare client that bypasses proxy plugin mode).
func TestNewHTTPClient(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
unsetProxyPluginEnv(t)
resetProxyPluginState()
t.Setenv(EnvNoProxy, "")
for name, client := range map[string]*http.Client{
"routed": NewHTTPClient(7 * time.Second),
"external": NewExternalHTTPClient(7 * time.Second),
} {
if client.Transport == nil {
t.Fatalf("%s client transport is nil", name)
}
if client.Timeout != 7*time.Second {
t.Errorf("%s client timeout = %v, want 7s", name, client.Timeout)
}
c := NewHTTPClient(7 * time.Second)
if c.Transport == nil {
t.Fatal("NewHTTPClient transport is nil; want shared transport")
}
if c.Transport != Shared() {
t.Errorf("NewHTTPClient transport = %v, want Shared()", c.Transport)
}
if c.Timeout != 7*time.Second {
t.Errorf("NewHTTPClient timeout = %v, want 7s", c.Timeout)
}
}
@@ -154,32 +153,4 @@ func TestShared_MalformedConfigFailsClosedEvenWithNoProxy(t *testing.T) {
if err == nil {
t.Fatalf("RoundTrip() err = nil (resp=%v); malformed config must fail closed", resp)
}
for name, test := range map[string]struct {
client *http.Client
url string
}{
"platform": {
client: NewHTTPClient(time.Second),
url: "https://open.feishu.cn/open-apis/test",
},
"external": {
client: NewHTTPClient(time.Second),
url: "https://external.example/test",
},
"forced external": {
client: NewExternalHTTPClient(time.Second),
url: "https://external.example/test",
},
} {
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
resp, err := test.client.Get(test.url)
if err == nil {
if resp != nil && resp.Body != nil {
resp.Body.Close()
}
t.Fatalf("policy-routed client succeeded with malformed proxy config")
}
})
}
}

View File

@@ -62,7 +62,10 @@ func httpClient() *http.Client {
if DefaultClient != nil {
return DefaultClient
}
return transport.NewExternalHTTPClient(fetchTimeout)
return &http.Client{
Timeout: fetchTimeout,
Transport: transport.Shared(),
}
}
// updateState is persisted to disk for caching.

View File

@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@
package update
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
@@ -13,8 +12,6 @@ import (
"path/filepath"
"testing"
"time"
exttransport "github.com/larksuite/cli/extension/transport"
)
// roundTripFunc adapts a function to http.RoundTripper.
@@ -22,30 +19,6 @@ type roundTripFunc func(*http.Request) (*http.Response, error)
func (f roundTripFunc) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) { return f(req) }
type updateExternalProvider struct {
interceptor exttransport.Interceptor
}
func (p updateExternalProvider) Name() string { return "update-external-test" }
func (p updateExternalProvider) ResolveInterceptor(context.Context) exttransport.Interceptor {
return p.interceptor
}
func (updateExternalProvider) SupportsRequestClass(class exttransport.RequestClass) bool {
return class == exttransport.RequestClassExternal
}
type updateExternalInterceptor struct {
calls int
}
func (i *updateExternalInterceptor) PreRoundTrip(req *http.Request) func(*http.Response, error) {
i.calls++
req.Header.Set("X-External-Route", "1")
return nil
}
// clearSkipEnv unsets all env vars that shouldSkip checks,
// preventing the host environment (e.g. CI=true) from polluting test results.
func clearSkipEnv(t *testing.T) {
@@ -269,46 +242,6 @@ func TestRefreshCache(t *testing.T) {
RefreshCache("1.0.0")
}
func TestHTTPClientUsesExternalRequestClass(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
t.Setenv("LARK_CLI_NO_PROXY", "")
previousClient := DefaultClient
DefaultClient = nil
t.Cleanup(func() { DefaultClient = previousClient })
previousProvider := exttransport.GetProvider()
interceptor := &updateExternalInterceptor{}
exttransport.Register(updateExternalProvider{interceptor: interceptor})
t.Cleanup(func() { exttransport.Register(previousProvider) })
previousTransport := http.DefaultTransport
var receivedHeader string
http.DefaultTransport = roundTripFunc(func(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
receivedHeader = req.Header.Get("X-External-Route")
return &http.Response{
StatusCode: http.StatusNoContent,
Header: make(http.Header),
Body: http.NoBody,
Request: req,
}, nil
})
t.Cleanup(func() { http.DefaultTransport = previousTransport })
req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "https://open.feishu.cn/npm/latest", nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
resp, err := httpClient().Do(req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
resp.Body.Close()
if interceptor.calls != 1 || receivedHeader != "1" {
t.Fatalf("external route = calls %d, header %q; want 1, %q", interceptor.calls, receivedHeader, "1")
}
}
func TestPendingAtomicAccess(t *testing.T) {
// Initially nil
if got := GetPending(); got != nil {

View File

@@ -5,15 +5,11 @@ package validate
import (
"context"
"crypto/tls"
"fmt"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"strings"
"sync"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/errs"
)
const (
@@ -38,9 +34,6 @@ func isRestrictedDownloadIP(ip net.IP) bool {
return true
}
if v4 := ip.To4(); v4 != nil {
if v4[0] == 0 { // RFC 1122 "this network"
return true
}
if v4[0] == 10 || v4[0] == 127 {
return true
}
@@ -59,9 +52,6 @@ func isRestrictedDownloadIP(ip net.IP) bool {
if v4[0] == 198 && (v4[1] == 18 || v4[1] == 19) { // RFC2544 benchmarking
return true
}
if v4[0] >= 240 {
return true
}
return false
}
if ip.IsPrivate() {
@@ -86,42 +76,32 @@ func ValidateDownloadSourceURL(ctx context.Context, rawURL string) error {
if u.Scheme != "http" && u.Scheme != "https" {
return fmt.Errorf("only http/https URLs are supported")
}
_, err = resolveDownloadHost(ctx, u.Hostname(), net.DefaultResolver.LookupIP)
return err
}
type downloadLookupIPFunc func(context.Context, string, string) ([]net.IP, error)
func resolveDownloadHost(ctx context.Context, rawHost string, lookupIP downloadLookupIPFunc) ([]net.IP, error) {
host := strings.TrimSpace(strings.ToLower(rawHost))
host := strings.TrimSpace(strings.ToLower(u.Hostname()))
if host == "" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("URL host is required")
return fmt.Errorf("URL host is required")
}
if host == "localhost" || strings.HasSuffix(host, ".localhost") {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("local/internal host is not allowed")
return fmt.Errorf("local/internal host is not allowed")
}
if ip := net.ParseIP(host); ip != nil {
if isRestrictedDownloadIP(ip) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("local/internal host is not allowed")
return fmt.Errorf("local/internal host is not allowed")
}
return []net.IP{ip}, nil
return nil
}
if lookupIP == nil {
lookupIP = net.DefaultResolver.LookupIP
}
ips, err := lookupIP(ctx, "ip", host)
ips, err := net.DefaultResolver.LookupIP(ctx, "ip", host)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to resolve host")
return fmt.Errorf("failed to resolve host")
}
if len(ips) == 0 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to resolve host")
return fmt.Errorf("failed to resolve host")
}
for _, ip := range ips {
if isRestrictedDownloadIP(ip) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("local/internal host is not allowed")
return fmt.Errorf("local/internal host is not allowed")
}
}
return ips, nil
return nil
}
// NewDownloadHTTPClient clones base client and enforces download-safe redirect
@@ -135,10 +115,7 @@ func NewDownloadHTTPClient(base *http.Client, opts DownloadHTTPClientOptions) *h
}
cloned := *base
cloned.Transport = &downloadSchemeTransport{
base: cloneDownloadTransport(base.Transport),
allowHTTP: opts.AllowHTTP,
}
cloned.Transport = cloneDownloadTransport(base.Transport)
cloned.CheckRedirect = func(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
if len(via) >= opts.MaxRedirects {
return fmt.Errorf("too many redirects")
@@ -161,310 +138,18 @@ func NewDownloadHTTPClient(base *http.Client, opts DownloadHTTPClientOptions) *h
return &cloned
}
type downloadSchemeTransport struct {
base http.RoundTripper
allowHTTP bool
}
func (t *downloadSchemeTransport) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
if req == nil || req.URL == nil {
return nil, errs.NewInternalError(
errs.SubtypeUnknown,
"download transport received a nil request",
)
}
switch {
case strings.EqualFold(req.URL.Scheme, "https"):
case t.allowHTTP && strings.EqualFold(req.URL.Scheme, "http"):
default:
return nil, errs.NewSecurityPolicyError(
errs.SubtypeAccessDenied,
"only https URLs are supported",
)
}
return t.base.RoundTrip(req)
}
type selectedDownloadProxyKey struct{}
type proxyAwareDownloadTransport struct {
selectProxy func(*http.Request) (*url.URL, error)
direct http.RoundTripper
proxied *http.Transport
lookupIP downloadLookupIPFunc
mu sync.Mutex
proxiedByTLSServer map[string]*http.Transport
}
func (t *proxyAwareDownloadTransport) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
if req == nil || req.URL == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("download transport received a nil request")
}
proxyURL, err := t.selectProxy(req)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if proxyURL == nil {
return t.direct.RoundTrip(req)
}
targetIPs, err := resolveDownloadHost(req.Context(), req.URL.Hostname(), t.lookupIP)
if err != nil {
return nil, errs.NewSecurityPolicyError(
errs.SubtypeAccessDenied,
"blocked download target: %v",
err,
).WithCause(err)
}
if strings.EqualFold(req.URL.Scheme, "http") && net.ParseIP(req.URL.Hostname()) == nil {
// HTTP proxies cannot pin the target IP separately from the Host header.
return nil, errs.NewSecurityPolicyError(
errs.SubtypeAccessDenied,
"plain HTTP hostname downloads through a proxy are not allowed",
).WithHint("use HTTPS or a literal public IP")
}
selected := *proxyURL
proxied := t.proxied
if strings.EqualFold(req.URL.Scheme, "https") {
proxied = t.proxiedTransportForTLSServer(req.URL.Hostname())
}
var lastErr error
for index, targetIP := range targetIPs {
proxiedReq, pinErr := pinDownloadRequestTargetToIP(req, targetIP)
if pinErr != nil {
return nil, pinErr
}
ctx := context.WithValue(proxiedReq.Context(), selectedDownloadProxyKey{}, &selected)
proxiedReq = proxiedReq.WithContext(ctx)
resp, roundTripErr := proxied.RoundTrip(proxiedReq)
if roundTripErr == nil {
if resp != nil {
// Hide the internal pinned URL from redirect handling.
resp.Request = req
}
return resp, nil
}
lastErr = roundTripErr
if resp != nil && resp.Body != nil {
resp.Body.Close()
}
if req.Context().Err() != nil {
break
}
if index+1 < len(targetIPs) && !canRetryDownloadTarget(req) {
break
func cloneDownloadTransport(base http.RoundTripper) *http.Transport {
var cloned *http.Transport
if src, ok := base.(*http.Transport); ok && src != nil {
cloned = src.Clone()
} else {
if def, ok := http.DefaultTransport.(*http.Transport); ok && def != nil {
cloned = def.Clone()
} else {
cloned = &http.Transport{}
}
}
return nil, lastErr
}
func (t *proxyAwareDownloadTransport) CloseIdleConnections() {
if closer, ok := t.direct.(interface{ CloseIdleConnections() }); ok {
closer.CloseIdleConnections()
}
t.proxied.CloseIdleConnections()
t.mu.Lock()
defer t.mu.Unlock()
for _, transport := range t.proxiedByTLSServer {
transport.CloseIdleConnections()
}
}
func (t *proxyAwareDownloadTransport) proxiedTransportForTLSServer(serverName string) *http.Transport {
if configured := t.proxied.TLSClientConfig; configured != nil && configured.ServerName != "" {
serverName = configured.ServerName
}
t.mu.Lock()
defer t.mu.Unlock()
if transport := t.proxiedByTLSServer[serverName]; transport != nil {
return transport
}
transport := t.proxied.Clone()
targetTLSConfig := cloneDownloadTLSConfig(transport.TLSClientConfig)
targetTLSConfig.ServerName = serverName
transport.TLSClientConfig = targetTLSConfig
configureHTTPSProxyTLSDialer(transport, t.proxied)
if t.proxiedByTLSServer == nil {
t.proxiedByTLSServer = make(map[string]*http.Transport)
}
t.proxiedByTLSServer[serverName] = transport
return transport
}
type blockedDownloadTransport struct {
err error
}
func (t *blockedDownloadTransport) RoundTrip(*http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
return nil, t.err
}
func cloneDownloadTransport(base http.RoundTripper) http.RoundTripper {
if base == nil {
base = http.DefaultTransport
}
if source, ok := base.(interface {
TransformHTTPTransport(func(*http.Transport) (http.RoundTripper, bool)) (http.RoundTripper, bool)
}); ok {
rebuilt, transformed := source.TransformHTTPTransport(newDownloadTransportLeaf)
if transformed && rebuilt != nil {
return rebuilt
}
}
if source, ok := base.(*http.Transport); ok && source != nil {
rebuilt, transformed := newDownloadTransportLeaf(source)
if transformed && rebuilt != nil {
return rebuilt
}
}
return &blockedDownloadTransport{err: errs.NewInternalError(
errs.SubtypeUnknown,
"cannot safely clone download transport %T",
base,
)}
}
func newDownloadTransportLeaf(source *http.Transport) (http.RoundTripper, bool) {
return newDownloadTransportLeafWithResolver(source, net.DefaultResolver.LookupIP)
}
func newDownloadTransportLeafWithResolver(source *http.Transport, lookupIP downloadLookupIPFunc) (http.RoundTripper, bool) {
if source == nil {
return nil, false
}
selectProxy := source.Proxy
direct := cloneDownloadHTTPTransport(source)
direct.Proxy = nil
configureDirectDownloadTransport(direct)
if selectProxy == nil {
return direct, true
}
// The proxied branch validates the requested URL before construction and
// on every redirect. Its TCP peer is the selected proxy, so applying the
// direct-origin IP guard there would incorrectly reject trusted loopback or
// private-network proxies. Freeze the selected proxy in request context so
// a stateful selector cannot switch the second lookup to direct egress.
proxied := cloneDownloadHTTPTransport(source)
proxied.Proxy = func(req *http.Request) (*url.URL, error) {
selected, ok := req.Context().Value(selectedDownloadProxyKey{}).(*url.URL)
if !ok || selected == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("download proxy selection is missing")
}
cloned := *selected
return &cloned, nil
}
return &proxyAwareDownloadTransport{
selectProxy: selectProxy,
direct: direct,
proxied: proxied,
lookupIP: lookupIP,
proxiedByTLSServer: make(map[string]*http.Transport),
}, true
}
func cloneDownloadHTTPTransport(source *http.Transport) *http.Transport {
cloned := source.Clone()
if cloned.TLSNextProto == nil {
if _, ok := source.TLSNextProto["h2"]; ok {
cloned.ForceAttemptHTTP2 = true
}
}
return cloned
}
func pinDownloadRequestTargetToIP(req *http.Request, targetIP net.IP) (*http.Request, error) {
if req == nil || req.URL == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("download request URL is missing")
}
if targetIP == nil || isRestrictedDownloadIP(targetIP) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("blocked download target: local/internal host is not allowed")
}
originalHost := req.URL.Host
pinnedHost := targetIP.String()
if port := req.URL.Port(); port != "" {
pinnedHost = net.JoinHostPort(pinnedHost, port)
} else if strings.Contains(pinnedHost, ":") {
pinnedHost = "[" + pinnedHost + "]"
}
pinned := req.Clone(req.Context())
pinnedURL := *req.URL
pinnedURL.Host = pinnedHost
pinned.URL = &pinnedURL
pinned.Host = originalHost
return pinned, nil
}
func canRetryDownloadTarget(req *http.Request) bool {
if req == nil || req.Body != nil {
return false
}
return req.Method == http.MethodGet || req.Method == http.MethodHead
}
func cloneDownloadTLSConfig(config *tls.Config) *tls.Config {
if config == nil {
return &tls.Config{MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS12}
}
return config.Clone()
}
func configureHTTPSProxyTLSDialer(transport, source *http.Transport) {
if transport.DialTLSContext != nil || transport.DialTLS != nil {
return
}
proxyTLSConfig := cloneDownloadTLSConfig(source.TLSClientConfig)
transport.DialTLSContext = func(ctx context.Context, network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) {
rawConn, err := dialDownloadProxy(ctx, source, network, addr)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
config := proxyTLSConfig.Clone()
serverName, _, splitErr := net.SplitHostPort(addr)
if splitErr != nil {
rawConn.Close()
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid HTTPS proxy address: %w", splitErr)
}
config.ServerName = serverName
tlsConn := tls.Client(rawConn, config)
handshakeCtx := ctx
cancel := func() {}
if source.TLSHandshakeTimeout > 0 {
handshakeCtx, cancel = context.WithTimeout(ctx, source.TLSHandshakeTimeout)
}
defer cancel()
if err := tlsConn.HandshakeContext(handshakeCtx); err != nil {
rawConn.Close()
return nil, err
}
return tlsConn, nil
}
}
func dialDownloadProxy(ctx context.Context, source *http.Transport, network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) {
if source.DialContext != nil {
return source.DialContext(ctx, network, addr)
}
if source.Dial != nil {
return source.Dial(network, addr)
}
var dialer net.Dialer
return dialer.DialContext(ctx, network, addr)
}
func configureDirectDownloadTransport(cloned *http.Transport) {
origDial := cloned.DialContext
cloned.DialContext = func(ctx context.Context, network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) {
conn, err := dialConn(ctx, origDial, network, addr)
@@ -473,7 +158,7 @@ func configureDirectDownloadTransport(cloned *http.Transport) {
}
if err := validateConnRemoteIP(conn); err != nil {
conn.Close()
return nil, downloadTargetPolicyError(err)
return nil, err
}
return conn, nil
}
@@ -487,26 +172,13 @@ func configureDirectDownloadTransport(cloned *http.Transport) {
}
if err := validateConnRemoteIP(conn); err != nil {
conn.Close()
return nil, downloadTargetPolicyError(err)
}
return conn, nil
}
}
if cloned.DialTLS != nil {
origDialTLS := cloned.DialTLS
cloned.DialTLS = func(network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) {
conn, err := origDialTLS(network, addr)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if err := validateConnRemoteIP(conn); err != nil {
conn.Close()
return nil, downloadTargetPolicyError(err)
}
return conn, nil
}
}
return cloned
}
// DialContextFunc is the signature for DialContext / DialTLSContext.
@@ -522,7 +194,7 @@ func WrapDialContextWithIPCheck(origDial DialContextFunc) DialContextFunc {
}
if err := validateConnRemoteIP(conn); err != nil {
conn.Close()
return nil, downloadTargetPolicyError(err)
return nil, err
}
return conn, nil
}
@@ -536,14 +208,6 @@ func dialConn(ctx context.Context, dialFn func(context.Context, string, string)
return d.DialContext(ctx, network, addr)
}
func downloadTargetPolicyError(err error) error {
return errs.NewSecurityPolicyError(
errs.SubtypeAccessDenied,
"blocked download target: %v",
err,
).WithCause(err)
}
func validateConnRemoteIP(conn net.Conn) error {
if conn == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("nil connection")

View File

@@ -1,529 +0,0 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
package validate
import (
"context"
"crypto/tls"
"crypto/x509"
"errors"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/url"
"strings"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/errs"
)
func TestProxiedHTTPSDownloadPinsValidatedTargetIP(t *testing.T) {
const (
targetHost = "rebind.example"
targetIP = "203.0.113.10"
)
proxyCalled := make(chan struct{}, 1)
proxy := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
proxyCalled <- struct{}{}
if req.Method != http.MethodConnect {
t.Errorf("proxy request method = %q, want CONNECT", req.Method)
}
if got := req.Host; got != targetIP+":443" {
t.Errorf("proxy CONNECT target = %q, want validated IP %q", got, targetIP+":443")
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadGateway)
}))
t.Cleanup(proxy.Close)
proxyURL, err := url.Parse(proxy.URL)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
lookupIP := func(context.Context, string, string) ([]net.IP, error) {
return []net.IP{net.ParseIP(targetIP)}, nil
}
transport, ok := newDownloadTransportLeafWithResolver(
&http.Transport{Proxy: http.ProxyURL(proxyURL)},
lookupIP,
)
if !ok {
t.Fatal("newDownloadTransportLeafWithResolver() did not rebuild transport")
}
req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "https://"+targetHost+"/file", nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
pinned, err := pinDownloadRequestTargetToIP(req, net.ParseIP(targetIP))
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if pinned.Host != targetHost {
t.Fatalf("pinned request Host = %q, want %q", pinned.Host, targetHost)
}
if _, err := transport.RoundTrip(req); err == nil {
t.Fatal("RoundTrip() error = nil, want proxy rejection after CONNECT")
}
select {
case <-proxyCalled:
default:
t.Fatal("proxy was not called")
}
}
func TestRestrictedDownloadIPBlocksReservedIPv4(t *testing.T) {
for _, rawIP := range []string{"0.1.2.3", "240.0.0.1"} {
if !isRestrictedDownloadIP(net.ParseIP(rawIP)) {
t.Fatalf("%s was classified as safe", rawIP)
}
}
if isRestrictedDownloadIP(net.ParseIP("1.1.1.1")) {
t.Fatal("1.1.1.1 was classified as restricted")
}
}
func TestCloneDownloadTLSConfigSetsMinimumVersion(t *testing.T) {
if got := cloneDownloadTLSConfig(nil).MinVersion; got != tls.VersionTLS12 {
t.Fatalf("MinVersion = %d, want TLS 1.2", got)
}
configured := &tls.Config{MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS13}
if got := cloneDownloadTLSConfig(configured).MinVersion; got != tls.VersionTLS13 {
t.Fatalf("cloned MinVersion = %d, want TLS 1.3", got)
}
}
func TestCloneDownloadHTTPTransportPreservesHTTP2Policy(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
source *http.Transport
wantForce bool
wantH2Handler bool
wantProtocolMap bool
}{
{
name: "automatic",
source: &http.Transport{
Proxy: http.ProxyURL(&url.URL{Scheme: "http", Host: "proxy.example:8080"}),
},
wantForce: true,
},
{
name: "custom TLS without opt-in",
source: &http.Transport{
TLSClientConfig: &tls.Config{MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS12},
},
},
{
name: "custom dial without opt-in",
source: &http.Transport{
DialContext: func(context.Context, string, string) (net.Conn, error) {
return nil, errors.New("unused")
},
},
},
{
name: "explicit opt-in",
source: &http.Transport{ForceAttemptHTTP2: true},
wantForce: true,
},
{
name: "explicit h2 handler",
source: &http.Transport{
TLSNextProto: map[string]func(string, *tls.Conn) http.RoundTripper{
"h2": func(string, *tls.Conn) http.RoundTripper { return nil },
},
},
wantH2Handler: true,
wantProtocolMap: true,
},
{
name: "explicit opt-out",
source: &http.Transport{
TLSNextProto: map[string]func(string, *tls.Conn) http.RoundTripper{},
},
wantProtocolMap: true,
},
}
for _, test := range tests {
t.Run(test.name, func(t *testing.T) {
cloned := cloneDownloadHTTPTransport(test.source)
if cloned.ForceAttemptHTTP2 != test.wantForce {
t.Fatalf("ForceAttemptHTTP2 = %v, want %v", cloned.ForceAttemptHTTP2, test.wantForce)
}
_, hasH2Handler := cloned.TLSNextProto["h2"]
if hasH2Handler != test.wantH2Handler {
t.Fatalf("h2 handler = %v, want %v", hasH2Handler, test.wantH2Handler)
}
if hasProtocolMap := cloned.TLSNextProto != nil; hasProtocolMap != test.wantProtocolMap {
t.Fatalf("TLSNextProto is non-nil = %v, want %v", hasProtocolMap, test.wantProtocolMap)
}
})
}
}
func TestCloneDownloadTransportPreservesAutomaticHTTP2(t *testing.T) {
source := &http.Transport{
Proxy: http.ProxyURL(&url.URL{Scheme: "http", Host: "proxy.example:8080"}),
}
rebuilt := cloneDownloadTransport(source)
proxyAware, ok := rebuilt.(*proxyAwareDownloadTransport)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("transport type = %T, want *proxyAwareDownloadTransport", rebuilt)
}
direct, ok := proxyAware.direct.(*http.Transport)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("direct transport type = %T, want *http.Transport", proxyAware.direct)
}
for name, transport := range map[string]*http.Transport{
"direct": direct,
"proxied": proxyAware.proxied,
} {
if !transport.ForceAttemptHTTP2 {
t.Fatalf("%s ForceAttemptHTTP2 = false, want true", name)
}
}
}
func TestProxiedDownloadRejectsRestrictedResolvedTarget(t *testing.T) {
var proxyCalled atomic.Bool
proxy := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
proxyCalled.Store(true)
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
}))
t.Cleanup(proxy.Close)
proxyURL, err := url.Parse(proxy.URL)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
lookupIP := func(context.Context, string, string) ([]net.IP, error) {
return []net.IP{net.ParseIP("127.0.0.1")}, nil
}
transport, ok := newDownloadTransportLeafWithResolver(
&http.Transport{Proxy: http.ProxyURL(proxyURL)},
lookupIP,
)
if !ok {
t.Fatal("newDownloadTransportLeafWithResolver() did not rebuild transport")
}
req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://rebind.example/file", nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
_, err = transport.RoundTrip(req)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("RoundTrip() error = nil, want restricted target rejection")
}
if problem, ok := errs.ProblemOf(err); !ok ||
problem.Category != errs.CategoryPolicy ||
problem.Subtype != errs.SubtypeAccessDenied {
t.Fatalf("RoundTrip() problem = %#v, %v; want policy/access_denied", problem, ok)
}
if proxyCalled.Load() {
t.Fatal("proxy was called for a restricted resolved target")
}
}
func TestProxiedPlainHTTPHostnameRejectsLocalProxy(t *testing.T) {
var proxyCalled atomic.Bool
proxy := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
proxyCalled.Store(true)
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
}))
t.Cleanup(proxy.Close)
proxyURL, err := url.Parse(proxy.URL)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
lookupIP := func(ctx context.Context, _, host string) ([]net.IP, error) {
if host == "public.example" {
return []net.IP{net.ParseIP("203.0.113.10")}, nil
}
return net.DefaultResolver.LookupIP(ctx, "ip", host)
}
transport, ok := newDownloadTransportLeafWithResolver(
&http.Transport{Proxy: http.ProxyURL(proxyURL)},
lookupIP,
)
if !ok {
t.Fatal("newDownloadTransportLeafWithResolver() did not rebuild transport")
}
req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://public.example/file", nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
_, err = transport.RoundTrip(req)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("RoundTrip() error = nil, want plain HTTP hostname rejection")
}
if problem, ok := errs.ProblemOf(err); !ok ||
problem.Category != errs.CategoryPolicy ||
problem.Subtype != errs.SubtypeAccessDenied {
t.Fatalf("RoundTrip() problem = %#v, %v; want policy/access_denied", problem, ok)
} else if problem.Hint != "use HTTPS or a literal public IP" {
t.Fatalf("RoundTrip() hint = %q, want recovery guidance", problem.Hint)
}
if proxyCalled.Load() {
t.Fatal("proxy was called for a plain HTTP hostname target")
}
}
func TestProxiedHTTPSDownloadTriesEveryValidatedTargetIP(t *testing.T) {
connectTargets := make(chan string, 2)
proxy := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
connectTargets <- req.Host
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadGateway)
}))
t.Cleanup(proxy.Close)
proxyURL, err := url.Parse(proxy.URL)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
transport, ok := newDownloadTransportLeafWithResolver(
&http.Transport{Proxy: http.ProxyURL(proxyURL)},
func(context.Context, string, string) ([]net.IP, error) {
return []net.IP{
net.ParseIP("203.0.113.10"),
net.ParseIP("203.0.113.11"),
}, nil
},
)
if !ok {
t.Fatal("newDownloadTransportLeafWithResolver() did not rebuild transport")
}
req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "https://multi.example/file", nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if _, err := transport.RoundTrip(req); err == nil {
t.Fatal("RoundTrip() error = nil, want proxy rejection")
}
for _, want := range []string{"203.0.113.10:443", "203.0.113.11:443"} {
select {
case got := <-connectTargets:
if got != want {
t.Fatalf("proxy CONNECT target = %q, want %q", got, want)
}
default:
t.Fatalf("proxy did not receive CONNECT target %q", want)
}
}
}
func TestCanRetryDownloadTargetOnlyAllowsBodylessReads(t *testing.T) {
for _, test := range []struct {
method string
body string
want bool
}{
{method: http.MethodGet, want: true},
{method: http.MethodHead, want: true},
{method: http.MethodPost},
{method: http.MethodGet, body: "body"},
} {
req, err := http.NewRequest(test.method, "https://download.example/file", strings.NewReader(test.body))
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if test.body == "" {
req.Body = nil
}
if got := canRetryDownloadTarget(req); got != test.want {
t.Fatalf("canRetryDownloadTarget(%s, body=%q) = %v, want %v", test.method, test.body, got, test.want)
}
}
}
func TestProxiedHTTPSTargetPreservesOriginalTLSServerName(t *testing.T) {
transport, ok := newDownloadTransportLeafWithResolver(
&http.Transport{Proxy: http.ProxyURL(&url.URL{Scheme: "http", Host: "proxy.example:8080"})},
func(context.Context, string, string) ([]net.IP, error) {
return []net.IP{net.ParseIP("203.0.113.10")}, nil
},
)
if !ok {
t.Fatal("newDownloadTransportLeafWithResolver() did not rebuild transport")
}
proxyAware, ok := transport.(*proxyAwareDownloadTransport)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("transport type = %T, want *proxyAwareDownloadTransport", transport)
}
pinned := proxyAware.proxiedTransportForTLSServer("download.example")
if pinned.TLSClientConfig == nil {
t.Fatal("TLSClientConfig = nil")
}
if pinned.TLSClientConfig.ServerName != "download.example" {
t.Fatalf("TLS ServerName = %q, want download.example", pinned.TLSClientConfig.ServerName)
}
if proxyAware.proxied.TLSClientConfig != nil && proxyAware.proxied.TLSClientConfig.ServerName != "" {
t.Fatalf("base proxy TLS ServerName = %q, want unchanged", proxyAware.proxied.TLSClientConfig.ServerName)
}
}
func TestHTTPSProxyTLSDialerUsesLegacyDial(t *testing.T) {
wantErr := errors.New("legacy dial used")
source := &http.Transport{
Dial: func(string, string) (net.Conn, error) {
return nil, wantErr
},
}
target := source.Clone()
configureHTTPSProxyTLSDialer(target, source)
if target.DialTLSContext == nil {
t.Fatal("DialTLSContext = nil")
}
if _, err := target.DialTLSContext(context.Background(), "tcp", "proxy.example:443"); !errors.Is(err, wantErr) {
t.Fatalf("DialTLSContext() error = %v, want %v", err, wantErr)
}
}
func TestDirectDownloadLegacyDialTLSClosesRestrictedConnection(t *testing.T) {
clientConn, serverConn := net.Pipe()
t.Cleanup(func() { serverConn.Close() })
conn := &trackedDownloadConn{
Conn: clientConn,
remoteAddr: &net.TCPAddr{IP: net.ParseIP("127.0.0.1"), Port: 443},
}
rebuilt, ok := newDownloadTransportLeaf(&http.Transport{
DialTLS: func(string, string) (net.Conn, error) {
return conn, nil
},
})
if !ok {
t.Fatal("newDownloadTransportLeaf() did not rebuild transport")
}
transport, ok := rebuilt.(*http.Transport)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("rebuilt transport = %T, want *http.Transport", rebuilt)
}
_, err := transport.DialTLS("tcp", "public.example:443")
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "local/internal host is not allowed") {
t.Fatalf("DialTLS() error = %v, want restricted target rejection", err)
}
if problem, ok := errs.ProblemOf(err); !ok ||
problem.Category != errs.CategoryPolicy ||
problem.Subtype != errs.SubtypeAccessDenied {
t.Fatalf("DialTLS() problem = %#v, %v; want policy/access_denied", problem, ok)
}
if !conn.closed {
t.Fatal("restricted connection was not closed")
}
}
func TestDirectDownloadLegacyDialTLSPreservesDialError(t *testing.T) {
wantErr := errors.New("dial failed")
rebuilt, ok := newDownloadTransportLeaf(&http.Transport{
DialTLS: func(string, string) (net.Conn, error) {
return nil, wantErr
},
})
if !ok {
t.Fatal("newDownloadTransportLeaf() did not rebuild transport")
}
transport, ok := rebuilt.(*http.Transport)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("rebuilt transport = %T, want *http.Transport", rebuilt)
}
if _, err := transport.DialTLS("tcp", "public.example:443"); !errors.Is(err, wantErr) {
t.Fatalf("DialTLS() error = %v, want %v", err, wantErr)
}
}
func TestHTTPSProxyTLSDialerRetainsHandshakeTimeout(t *testing.T) {
clientConn, serverConn := net.Pipe()
t.Cleanup(func() {
clientConn.Close()
serverConn.Close()
})
source := &http.Transport{
DialContext: func(context.Context, string, string) (net.Conn, error) {
return clientConn, nil
},
TLSHandshakeTimeout: 50 * time.Millisecond,
}
target := source.Clone()
configureHTTPSProxyTLSDialer(target, source)
started := time.Now()
if _, err := target.DialTLSContext(context.Background(), "tcp", "proxy.example:443"); err == nil {
t.Fatal("DialTLSContext() error = nil, want TLS handshake timeout")
}
if elapsed := time.Since(started); elapsed > time.Second {
t.Fatalf("TLS handshake timeout took %s, want under 1s", elapsed)
}
}
func TestHTTPSProxyTLSDialerUsesProxyServerName(t *testing.T) {
server := httptest.NewTLSServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(http.ResponseWriter, *http.Request) {}))
t.Cleanup(server.Close)
clientConn, serverConn := net.Pipe()
t.Cleanup(func() {
clientConn.Close()
serverConn.Close()
})
proxySNI := make(chan string, 1)
serverTLSConfig := server.TLS.Clone()
serverTLSConfig.GetConfigForClient = func(info *tls.ClientHelloInfo) (*tls.Config, error) {
proxySNI <- info.ServerName
return nil, nil
}
serverErr := make(chan error, 1)
go func() {
serverErr <- tls.Server(serverConn, serverTLSConfig).Handshake()
}()
roots := x509.NewCertPool()
roots.AddCert(server.Certificate())
source := &http.Transport{
DialContext: func(context.Context, string, string) (net.Conn, error) {
return clientConn, nil
},
TLSClientConfig: &tls.Config{
RootCAs: roots,
ServerName: "target.example.com",
},
}
target := source.Clone()
configureHTTPSProxyTLSDialer(target, source)
conn, err := target.DialTLSContext(context.Background(), "tcp", "example.com:443")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
conn.Close()
if err := <-serverErr; err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if got := <-proxySNI; got != "example.com" {
t.Fatalf("proxy TLS ServerName = %q, want example.com", got)
}
}
type trackedDownloadConn struct {
net.Conn
remoteAddr net.Addr
closed bool
}
func (c *trackedDownloadConn) RemoteAddr() net.Addr {
return c.remoteAddr
}
func (c *trackedDownloadConn) Close() error {
c.closed = true
return c.Conn.Close()
}

View File

@@ -1,222 +0,0 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
package validate_test
import (
"context"
"crypto/tls"
"errors"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"net/url"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/errs"
exttransport "github.com/larksuite/cli/extension/transport"
internaltransport "github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/transport"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/validate"
)
type opaqueRoundTripper struct {
called bool
}
func (t *opaqueRoundTripper) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
t.called = true
return &http.Response{StatusCode: http.StatusNoContent, Body: http.NoBody, Request: req}, nil
}
type downloadTestProvider struct {
interceptor exttransport.Interceptor
}
func (p downloadTestProvider) Name() string { return "download-test" }
func (p downloadTestProvider) ResolveInterceptor(context.Context) exttransport.Interceptor {
return p.interceptor
}
type downloadHeaderInterceptor struct{}
func (downloadHeaderInterceptor) PreRoundTrip(req *http.Request) func(*http.Response, error) {
req.Header.Set("X-Use-Proxy", "1")
return nil
}
func TestNewDownloadHTTPClientPreservesPolicyRouterBaseTransport(t *testing.T) {
wantErr := errors.New("proxy policy blocked request")
base := &http.Transport{
Proxy: func(*http.Request) (*url.URL, error) {
return nil, wantErr
},
}
router := internaltransport.NewHTTPPolicyRouter(base, base)
client := internaltransport.ClientForRequestClass(
&http.Client{Transport: router},
exttransport.RequestClassExternal,
)
download := validate.NewDownloadHTTPClient(client, validate.DownloadHTTPClientOptions{AllowHTTP: true})
req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "https://external.example/file", nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
resp, err := download.Transport.RoundTrip(req)
if resp != nil && resp.Body != nil {
resp.Body.Close()
}
if !errors.Is(err, wantErr) {
t.Fatalf("RoundTrip() error = %v, want preserved proxy error %v", err, wantErr)
}
}
func TestNewDownloadHTTPClientRejectsInitialHTTPBeforeTransport(t *testing.T) {
base := &opaqueRoundTripper{}
download := validate.NewDownloadHTTPClient(
&http.Client{Transport: base},
validate.DownloadHTTPClientOptions{},
)
req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://203.0.113.10/file", nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
_, err = download.Transport.RoundTrip(req)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("RoundTrip() error = nil, want initial HTTP rejection")
}
problem, ok := errs.ProblemOf(err)
if !ok || problem.Category != errs.CategoryPolicy || problem.Subtype != errs.SubtypeAccessDenied {
t.Fatalf("RoundTrip() problem = %#v, %v; want policy/access_denied", problem, ok)
}
if base.called {
t.Fatal("base transport was called for a disallowed initial HTTP request")
}
}
func TestNewDownloadHTTPClientAllowsSelectedLoopbackProxy(t *testing.T) {
proxy := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
if req.URL.Host != "203.0.113.10" {
t.Errorf("proxy request target = %q, want 203.0.113.10", req.URL.Host)
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
}))
t.Cleanup(proxy.Close)
proxyURL, err := url.Parse(proxy.URL)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
base := &http.Transport{Proxy: http.ProxyURL(proxyURL)}
router := internaltransport.NewHTTPPolicyRouter(base, base)
client := internaltransport.ClientForRequestClass(
&http.Client{Transport: router},
exttransport.RequestClassExternal,
)
download := validate.NewDownloadHTTPClient(client, validate.DownloadHTTPClientOptions{AllowHTTP: true})
req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://203.0.113.10/file", nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
resp, err := download.Do(req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("download through selected loopback proxy: %v", err)
}
resp.Body.Close()
}
func TestNewDownloadHTTPClientSelectsProxyAfterOuterDecorators(t *testing.T) {
proxy := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
if got := req.Header.Get("X-Use-Proxy"); got != "1" {
t.Errorf("proxy received X-Use-Proxy = %q, want 1", got)
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
}))
t.Cleanup(proxy.Close)
proxyURL, err := url.Parse(proxy.URL)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
wantErr := errors.New("proxy selector ran before decorators")
base := &http.Transport{Proxy: func(req *http.Request) (*url.URL, error) {
if req.Header.Get("X-Use-Proxy") != "1" {
return nil, wantErr
}
return proxyURL, nil
}}
previousProvider := exttransport.GetProvider()
exttransport.Register(downloadTestProvider{interceptor: downloadHeaderInterceptor{}})
t.Cleanup(func() { exttransport.Register(previousProvider) })
router := internaltransport.NewHTTPPolicyRouter(base, base)
client := internaltransport.ClientForRequestClass(
&http.Client{Transport: router},
exttransport.RequestClassExternal,
)
download := validate.NewDownloadHTTPClient(client, validate.DownloadHTTPClientOptions{AllowHTTP: true})
req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://203.0.113.10/file", nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
resp, err := download.Do(req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("download through decorator-selected proxy: %v", err)
}
resp.Body.Close()
}
func TestNewDownloadHTTPClientGuardsLegacyDialTLS(t *testing.T) {
server := httptest.NewTLSServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
}))
t.Cleanup(server.Close)
base := &http.Transport{DialTLS: func(_, _ string) (net.Conn, error) {
return tls.Dial("tcp", server.Listener.Addr().String(), &tls.Config{InsecureSkipVerify: true}) //nolint:gosec // local TLS server verifies the connection guard.
}}
download := validate.NewDownloadHTTPClient(&http.Client{Transport: base}, validate.DownloadHTTPClientOptions{AllowHTTP: true})
req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "https://public.example/file", nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
_, err = download.Transport.RoundTrip(req)
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "local/internal host is not allowed") {
t.Fatalf("RoundTrip() error = %v, want legacy DialTLS IP guard", err)
}
problem, ok := errs.ProblemOf(err)
if !ok || problem.Category != errs.CategoryPolicy || problem.Subtype != errs.SubtypeAccessDenied {
t.Fatalf("RoundTrip() problem = %#v, %v; want policy/access_denied", problem, ok)
}
var policyErr *errs.SecurityPolicyError
if !errors.As(err, &policyErr) || policyErr.Cause == nil {
t.Fatalf("RoundTrip() error = %T, want policy error with cause", err)
}
}
func TestNewDownloadHTTPClientFailsClosedForOpaqueTransport(t *testing.T) {
opaque := &opaqueRoundTripper{}
client := internaltransport.ClientForRequestClass(
&http.Client{Transport: opaque},
exttransport.RequestClassExternal,
)
download := validate.NewDownloadHTTPClient(client, validate.DownloadHTTPClientOptions{AllowHTTP: true})
req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "https://public.example/file", nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
_, err = download.Transport.RoundTrip(req)
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "cannot safely clone download transport") {
t.Fatalf("RoundTrip() error = %v, want fail-closed clone error", err)
}
problem, ok := errs.ProblemOf(err)
if !ok || problem.Category != errs.CategoryInternal || problem.Subtype != errs.SubtypeUnknown {
t.Fatalf("RoundTrip() problem = %#v, %v; want internal/unknown", problem, ok)
}
if opaque.called {
t.Fatal("opaque transport was called after safe cloning failed")
}
}

View File

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ lint/
├── lintapi/ # shared types every domain returns
│ └── violation.go # Violation, Action, ActionReject / ActionLabel / ActionWarning
└── errscontract/ # first domain: typed-error contract guards
├── scan.go # ScanRepoWithOptions(root, opts) ← public entry
├── scan.go # ScanRepo(root) ([]lintapi.Violation, error) ← public entry
├── runner.go
├── typecheck.go
├── violation.go # local type aliases to lintapi
@@ -30,19 +30,16 @@ lint/
├── rule_subtype_classifier.go
├── rule_typed_error_completeness.go
└── *_test.go
└── domaincontract/ # resolver ownership + approved public hostname policy
├── scan.go # ScanRepoWithOptions(root, opts) ← public entry
── unapproved.go # Go AST/type-aware hostname extraction
├── policy.go # exact public/fixture allowlist validation
├── diff.go # added-line attribution
└── *_test.go
└── domaincontract/ # endpoint domain contract: no hardcoded resolver hosts
├── scan.go # ScanRepo(root) ([]lintapi.Violation, error) ← public entry
── scan_test.go
```
## Endpoint domain contract (`domaincontract`)
`domaincontract` contains two complementary Go source guards.
The resolver-ownership guard rejects:
`domaincontract` is a syntax-level regression guard for the resolver-owned
Open, Accounts, MCP, and AppLink hosts used by the Go CLI. In production `.go`
files it rejects:
- string literals containing a resolver-owned host FQDN
(`{open,accounts,mcp,applink}.{feishu.cn,larksuite.com}`), and
@@ -62,54 +59,17 @@ parse-level guard). The forbidden-host list is bound to the resolver source by
`TestForbiddenHostsMatchResolver`, so adding a resolver domain without updating
the guard fails the lint module's tests.
The approved-domain guard parses every Git-tracked Go file in full. In CI,
unapproved-host findings are limited to values whose expressions intersect an
added line; policy validation and unused-entry checks remain repository-wide.
It rejects an exact hostname unless it is present in one of:
This is not a general outbound-URL or data-flow analyzer. It does not inspect
non-Go assets, hosts assembled from string fragments, SDK constructor option
flow, or previously unknown Feishu/Lark hosts. The literal rule and code review
remain the backstop for those cases.
- `internal/qualitygate/config/allowlists/public-domains.txt`, for production
and test code; or
- `internal/qualitygate/config/allowlists/fixture-domains.txt`, only for
`*_test.go`, the repository-root `tests/`, and any `testdata/` (never
`skills/`).
RFC 2606 example/test names are accepted independently of those lists. This
includes the reserved `.test`, `.example`, `.invalid`, and `.localhost`
namespaces and the exact names `example.com`, `example.net`, and `example.org`;
they are safe placeholders rather than supported public endpoints.
High-confidence evidence is deliberately limited to static string expressions
assigned to `host`, `hostname`, or `domain` semantic names (including common
case/plural forms and collections), plus static strings whose entire value is
an absolute `http`, `https`, `ws`, or `wss` URL. It supports Go literals,
escapes, compile-time concatenation, constant references, grouped declarations,
multi-value assignments, and multiline expressions. Bare domain-shaped strings
without hostname semantics are not blocked.
Sequence values are scanned individually. For a hostname-semantic map, a key or
value is evidence only when it is the sole hostname-shaped side of that entry;
ambiguous string-to-string entries are not guessed. Struct fields use Go type
information so known non-network `Host` / `Domain` fields do not become hostname
evidence merely because an enum or command category contains a dot.
Allowlist matching is lowercase and exact: there are no wildcard, suffix, DNS,
or public-suffix exceptions. Entries must be sorted and unique, use ASCII
hostnames, and have a current in-scope use. See
`internal/qualitygate/config/README.md` for admission and approval rules.
This is not a general outbound-URL or cross-language data-flow analyzer. It does
not inspect non-Go assets or dynamically constructed values.
To add or change a resolver-owned Feishu/Lark endpoint, edit the resolver rather
than hardcoding the host elsewhere.
To add or change an outbound endpoint, edit the resolver — never hardcode a host.
## Running
```bash
# PR-scoped scan from the repo root (one level above lint/)
go run -C lint . --changed-from <base-revision> ..
# Full inventory (also reports historical unapproved hostnames)
# from the repo root (one level above lint/)
go run -C lint . ..
```
@@ -140,14 +100,10 @@ Exit codes follow `lint/main.go`:
import "github.com/larksuite/cli/lint/lintapi"
type ScanOptions struct {
ChangedFrom string
}
// ScanRepoWithOptions walks root and returns every violation produced
// by this domain's checks. Domains MUST return []lintapi.Violation so
// the top-level dispatcher can aggregate uniformly.
func ScanRepoWithOptions(root string, opts ScanOptions) ([]lintapi.Violation, error) { ... }
// ScanRepo walks root and returns every violation produced by this
// domain's checks. Domains MUST return []lintapi.Violation so the
// top-level dispatcher can aggregate uniformly.
func ScanRepo(root string) ([]lintapi.Violation, error) { ... }
```
3. Per-rule files are named `rule_<name>.go` with sibling
@@ -158,12 +114,8 @@ Exit codes follow `lint/main.go`:
```go
var scanners = []scanner{
{name: "errscontract", fn: errscontract.ScanRepoWithOptions},
{name: "<domain>", fn: func(root string, opts errscontract.ScanOptions) ([]lintapi.Violation, error) {
return <domain>.ScanRepoWithOptions(root, <domain>.ScanOptions{
ChangedFrom: opts.ChangedFrom,
})
}},
{name: "errscontract", fn: errscontract.ScanRepo},
{name: "<domain>", fn: <domain>.ScanRepo}, // ← add here
}
```

View File

@@ -1,171 +0,0 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
package domaincontract
import (
"bytes"
"fmt"
"os/exec"
"path/filepath"
"regexp"
"strconv"
"strings"
)
type addedLineRange struct {
Start int
End int
}
type changedGoPath struct {
Old string
New string
}
var unifiedHunkRE = regexp.MustCompile(`^@@ -[0-9]+(?:,[0-9]+)? \+([0-9]+)(?:,([0-9]+))? @@`)
func changedGoLineRanges(root, from string) (map[string][]addedLineRange, error) {
if from == "" {
return nil, nil
}
names, err := gitCommandOutput(
root,
"diff",
"--name-status",
"-z",
"--find-renames",
"--diff-filter=ACMR",
from+"...HEAD",
"--",
)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("list changed Go files: %w", err)
}
paths, err := parseChangedGoPaths(names)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("parse changed Go files: %w", err)
}
out := map[string][]addedLineRange{}
for _, path := range paths {
args := []string{
"diff",
"--unified=0",
"--no-color",
"--no-ext-diff",
"--find-renames",
"--diff-filter=ACMR",
from + "...HEAD",
"--",
}
if path.Old != path.New {
args = append(args, path.Old)
}
args = append(args, path.New)
patch, err := gitCommandOutput(root, args...)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("read diff for %s: %w", path.New, err)
}
ranges, err := parseAddedLineRanges(patch)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("parse diff for %s: %w", path.New, err)
}
out[path.New] = ranges
}
return out, nil
}
func parseChangedGoPaths(raw []byte) ([]changedGoPath, error) {
fields := bytes.Split(raw, []byte{0})
var out []changedGoPath
for i := 0; i < len(fields); {
status := string(fields[i])
i++
if status == "" {
break
}
if i >= len(fields) || len(fields[i]) == 0 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("truncated name-status record")
}
oldPath := filepath.ToSlash(string(fields[i]))
i++
newPath := oldPath
if status[0] == 'R' || status[0] == 'C' {
if i >= len(fields) || len(fields[i]) == 0 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("truncated rename/copy record for %q", oldPath)
}
newPath = filepath.ToSlash(string(fields[i]))
i++
if status[0] == 'C' {
// A copy introduces every destination line. Diff only the new
// path so Git presents it as an added file rather than a
// metadata-only copy with no added-line ranges.
oldPath = newPath
}
}
if !strings.HasSuffix(newPath, ".go") {
continue
}
out = append(out, changedGoPath{Old: oldPath, New: newPath})
}
return out, nil
}
func parseAddedLineRanges(patch []byte) ([]addedLineRange, error) {
var out []addedLineRange
for _, raw := range bytes.Split(patch, []byte{'\n'}) {
line := string(raw)
if !strings.HasPrefix(line, "@@") {
continue
}
match := unifiedHunkRE.FindStringSubmatch(line)
if match == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unsupported unified hunk header %q", line)
}
start, err := strconv.Atoi(match[1])
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("parse added start line in %q: %w", line, err)
}
count := 1
if match[2] != "" {
count, err = strconv.Atoi(match[2])
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("parse added line count in %q: %w", line, err)
}
}
if count == 0 {
continue
}
out = append(out, addedLineRange{Start: start, End: start + count - 1})
}
return out, nil
}
func firstAddedLineInSpan(ranges []addedLineRange, start, end int) (int, bool) {
for _, r := range ranges {
if start <= r.End && end >= r.Start {
if start > r.Start {
return start, true
}
return r.Start, true
}
}
return 0, false
}
func gitCommandOutput(root string, args ...string) ([]byte, error) {
cmd := exec.Command("git", args...)
cmd.Dir = root
out, err := cmd.Output()
if err == nil {
return out, nil
}
if exitErr, ok := err.(*exec.ExitError); ok {
stderr := strings.TrimSpace(string(exitErr.Stderr))
if stderr != "" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", err, stderr)
}
}
return nil, err
}

View File

@@ -1,96 +0,0 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
package domaincontract
import "testing"
func TestParseChangedGoPaths(t *testing.T) {
raw := []byte("M\x00changed.go\x00R100\x00old.go\x00renamed.go\x00C100\x00source.go\x00copied.go\x00A\x00README.md\x00")
got, err := parseChangedGoPaths(raw)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
want := []changedGoPath{
{Old: "changed.go", New: "changed.go"},
{Old: "old.go", New: "renamed.go"},
{Old: "copied.go", New: "copied.go"},
}
if len(got) != len(want) {
t.Fatalf("paths = %#v, want %#v", got, want)
}
for i := range got {
if got[i] != want[i] {
t.Fatalf("paths = %#v, want %#v", got, want)
}
}
}
func TestParseChangedGoPathsRejectsTruncatedRename(t *testing.T) {
if _, err := parseChangedGoPaths([]byte("R100\x00old.go\x00")); err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected truncated rename error")
}
}
func TestParseAddedLineRanges(t *testing.T) {
patch := []byte(`diff --git a/x.go b/x.go
index 1111111..2222222 100644
--- a/x.go
+++ b/x.go
@@ -2,0 +3,2 @@
+first
+second
@@ -10 +12 @@
-old
+new
@@ -20 +21,0 @@
-deleted
`)
got, err := parseAddedLineRanges(patch)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
want := []addedLineRange{{Start: 3, End: 4}, {Start: 12, End: 12}}
if len(got) != len(want) {
t.Fatalf("ranges = %#v, want %#v", got, want)
}
for i := range got {
if got[i] != want[i] {
t.Fatalf("ranges = %#v, want %#v", got, want)
}
}
}
func TestParseAddedLineRangesRejectsUnknownHunk(t *testing.T) {
if _, err := parseAddedLineRanges([]byte("@@@ unsupported @@@\n")); err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected unsupported hunk error")
}
}
func TestFirstAddedLineInSpan(t *testing.T) {
ranges := []addedLineRange{{Start: 5, End: 7}, {Start: 10, End: 10}}
tests := []struct {
start, end int
line int
ok bool
}{
{start: 1, end: 4, ok: false},
{start: 4, end: 6, line: 5, ok: true},
{start: 6, end: 9, line: 6, ok: true},
{start: 8, end: 12, line: 10, ok: true},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
line, ok := firstAddedLineInSpan(ranges, tc.start, tc.end)
if line != tc.line || ok != tc.ok {
t.Errorf(
"firstAddedLineInSpan(%d, %d) = (%d, %v), want (%d, %v)",
tc.start,
tc.end,
line,
ok,
tc.line,
tc.ok,
)
}
}
}

View File

@@ -1,126 +0,0 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
package domaincontract
import (
"bufio"
"fmt"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
)
const (
publicDomainsPath = "internal/qualitygate/config/allowlists/public-domains.txt"
fixtureDomainsPath = "internal/qualitygate/config/allowlists/fixture-domains.txt"
)
type domainPolicyEntry struct {
Host string
File string
Line int
}
type domainPolicy struct {
Public map[string]domainPolicyEntry
Fixtures map[string]domainPolicyEntry
}
// isReservedExampleHostname recognizes only names reserved by RFC 2606 for
// examples, testing, invalid-name examples, and localhost use. These names are
// safe source placeholders and are policy exceptions, not supported public
// endpoints.
func isReservedExampleHostname(host string) bool {
host = strings.TrimSuffix(strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(host)), ".")
switch host {
case "example.com", "example.net", "example.org":
return true
}
labels := strings.Split(host, ".")
switch labels[len(labels)-1] {
case "test", "example", "invalid", "localhost":
return true
default:
return false
}
}
func loadDomainPolicy(root string) (domainPolicy, error) {
public, err := loadDomainList(root, publicDomainsPath)
if err != nil {
return domainPolicy{}, err
}
fixtures, err := loadDomainList(root, fixtureDomainsPath)
if err != nil {
return domainPolicy{}, err
}
for host, entry := range fixtures {
if publicEntry, ok := public[host]; ok {
return domainPolicy{}, fmt.Errorf(
"%s:%d: hostname %q is already listed at %s:%d",
entry.File, entry.Line, host, publicEntry.File, publicEntry.Line,
)
}
}
return domainPolicy{Public: public, Fixtures: fixtures}, nil
}
func loadDomainList(root, rel string) (map[string]domainPolicyEntry, error) {
path := filepath.Join(root, filepath.FromSlash(rel))
file, err := os.Open(path)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("open domain allowlist %s: %w", rel, err)
}
defer file.Close()
entries := map[string]domainPolicyEntry{}
var previous string
scanner := bufio.NewScanner(file)
for line := 1; scanner.Scan(); line++ {
host := strings.TrimSpace(scanner.Text())
if host == "" || strings.HasPrefix(host, "#") {
continue
}
if host != strings.ToLower(host) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s:%d: hostname must be lowercase: %q", rel, line, host)
}
if err := validatePolicyHostname(host); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s:%d: %w", rel, line, err)
}
if previous != "" && host <= previous {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s:%d: hostnames must be unique and sorted: %q", rel, line, host)
}
entries[host] = domainPolicyEntry{Host: host, File: rel, Line: line}
previous = host
}
if err := scanner.Err(); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("read domain allowlist %s: %w", rel, err)
}
if len(entries) == 0 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s: domain list must not be empty", rel)
}
return entries, nil
}
func validatePolicyHostname(host string) error {
if len(host) > 253 || !strings.Contains(host, ".") || strings.HasSuffix(host, ".") {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid exact hostname %q", host)
}
labels := strings.Split(host, ".")
for _, label := range labels {
if len(label) == 0 || len(label) > 63 || label[0] == '-' || label[len(label)-1] == '-' {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid exact hostname %q", host)
}
for _, r := range label {
if (r >= 'a' && r <= 'z') || (r >= '0' && r <= '9') || r == '-' {
continue
}
return fmt.Errorf("invalid exact hostname %q", host)
}
}
if !strings.ContainsAny(labels[len(labels)-1], "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz") {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid exact hostname %q", host)
}
return nil
}

View File

@@ -1,120 +0,0 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
package domaincontract
import (
"strings"
"testing"
)
func TestLoadDomainPolicy(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
writeFile(t, root, publicDomainsPath, "# public\napi.example.com\nwww.example.com\n")
writeFile(t, root, fixtureDomainsPath, "# fixtures\nfixture.example.com\n")
policy, err := loadDomainPolicy(root)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(policy.Public) != 2 || len(policy.Fixtures) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("unexpected policy sizes: public=%d fixtures=%d", len(policy.Public), len(policy.Fixtures))
}
if policy.Public["api.example.com"].Line != 2 {
t.Fatalf("api.example.com line = %d, want 2", policy.Public["api.example.com"].Line)
}
}
func TestLoadDomainPolicyRejectsInvalidLists(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
public string
fixtures string
want string
}{
{
name: "uppercase",
public: "API.example.com\n",
fixtures: "fixture.example.com\n",
want: "must be lowercase",
},
{
name: "unsorted",
public: "www.example.com\napi.example.com\n",
fixtures: "fixture.example.com\n",
want: "unique and sorted",
},
{
name: "duplicate",
public: "api.example.com\napi.example.com\n",
fixtures: "fixture.example.com\n",
want: "unique and sorted",
},
{
name: "wildcard",
public: "*.example.com\n",
fixtures: "fixture.example.com\n",
want: "invalid exact hostname",
},
{
name: "scheme",
public: "https://example.com\n",
fixtures: "fixture.example.com\n",
want: "invalid exact hostname",
},
{
name: "path",
public: "api.example.com/v1\n",
fixtures: "fixture.example.com\n",
want: "invalid exact hostname",
},
{
name: "port",
public: "api.example.com:443\n",
fixtures: "fixture.example.com\n",
want: "invalid exact hostname",
},
{
name: "cross-list duplicate",
public: "api.example.com\n",
fixtures: "api.example.com\n",
want: "already listed",
},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
writeFile(t, root, publicDomainsPath, tc.public)
writeFile(t, root, fixtureDomainsPath, tc.fixtures)
_, err := loadDomainPolicy(root)
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), tc.want) {
t.Fatalf("loadDomainPolicy() error = %v, want substring %q", err, tc.want)
}
})
}
}
func TestReservedExampleHostname(t *testing.T) {
for _, host := range []string{
"example.com",
"example.net",
"example.org",
"example.test",
"docs.example",
"missing.invalid",
"service.localhost",
} {
if !isReservedExampleHostname(host) {
t.Errorf("%q should be a reserved example hostname", host)
}
}
for _, host := range []string{
"attacker.example.com",
"example.dev",
"private.corp.internal",
} {
if isReservedExampleHostname(host) {
t.Errorf("%q must still require policy approval", host)
}
}
}

View File

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
// Package domaincontract guards resolver ownership and rejects newly introduced
// static Go hostnames that are not covered by the repository domain policy.
// Package domaincontract guards the Go CLI against direct reuse of the current
// resolver-owned host FQDNs outside core.ResolveEndpoints.
package domaincontract
import (
@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ import (
"go/token"
"io/fs"
"path/filepath"
"sort"
"strconv"
"strings"
@@ -76,40 +75,10 @@ func skipDir(name string) bool {
return false
}
// ScanRepo runs the resolver-owned endpoint guard and a full repository domain
// inventory. CI should use ScanRepoWithOptions with a changed-from revision so
// historical unapproved domains are not attributed to an unrelated change.
// ScanRepo walks production .go files under root and flags string literals
// containing a forbidden resolver host outside the allowlist. Comments and
// _test.go files are not scanned.
func ScanRepo(root string) ([]lintapi.Violation, error) {
return ScanRepoWithOptions(root, ScanOptions{})
}
type ScanOptions struct {
ChangedFrom string
}
func ScanRepoWithOptions(root string, opts ScanOptions) ([]lintapi.Violation, error) {
out, err := scanHardcodedEndpoints(root)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
domainViolations, err := scanUnapprovedDomains(root, opts)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
out = append(out, domainViolations...)
sort.SliceStable(out, func(i, j int) bool {
if out[i].File != out[j].File {
return out[i].File < out[j].File
}
if out[i].Line != out[j].Line {
return out[i].Line < out[j].Line
}
return out[i].Rule < out[j].Rule
})
return out, nil
}
func scanHardcodedEndpoints(root string) ([]lintapi.Violation, error) {
var out []lintapi.Violation
err := filepath.WalkDir(root, func(path string, d fs.DirEntry, err error) error {
if err != nil {

View File

@@ -1,911 +0,0 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
package domaincontract
import (
"fmt"
"go/ast"
"go/constant"
"go/parser"
"go/token"
"go/types"
"net"
"net/url"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strconv"
"strings"
"unicode"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/lint/lintapi"
"golang.org/x/tools/go/packages"
)
const (
unapprovedDomainRule = "unapproved-domain"
unusedDomainRule = "domain-allowlist-unused"
incompleteDomainRule = "domain-scan-incomplete"
)
type typedGoFile struct {
File *ast.File
Fset *token.FileSet
Info *types.Info
}
type domainEvidence struct {
Host string
Kind string
Expr ast.Expr
}
type evidenceKey struct {
Host string
Start, End token.Pos
}
type fileDomainScan struct {
File *ast.File
Fset *token.FileSet
Info *types.Info
Evidence []domainEvidence
TypeInfoRequired []ast.Expr
seen map[evidenceKey]bool
parents map[ast.Node]ast.Node
}
type collectionCompositeKind uint8
const (
notCollectionComposite collectionCompositeKind = iota
sequenceComposite
mapComposite
)
type hostnameFieldID struct {
Type string
Field string
}
var nonNetworkHostnameFields = map[hostnameFieldID]bool{
{Type: "github.com/larksuite/cli/events/im.CardActionTriggerOutput", Field: "Host"}: true,
{Type: "github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/cmdmeta.Meta", Field: "Domain"}: true,
}
func scanUnapprovedDomains(root string, opts ScanOptions) ([]lintapi.Violation, error) {
root, err := filepath.Abs(root)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("resolve repository root: %w", err)
}
publicPath := filepath.Join(root, filepath.FromSlash(publicDomainsPath))
if _, err := os.Stat(publicPath); err != nil {
if os.IsNotExist(err) {
if _, goModErr := os.Stat(filepath.Join(root, "go.mod")); os.IsNotExist(goModErr) {
return nil, nil
}
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("domain policy unavailable: %w", err)
}
policy, err := loadDomainPolicy(root)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
added, err := changedGoLineRanges(root, opts.ChangedFrom)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
typed, typeLoadErr := loadTypedGoFiles(root)
goFiles, err := trackedGoFiles(root)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
observedPublic := map[string]bool{}
observedFixtures := map[string]bool{}
inventoryComplete := typeLoadErr == nil
var out []lintapi.Violation
parseFailureReported := false
typeInfoGapReported := false
for _, rel := range goFiles {
path := filepath.Join(root, filepath.FromSlash(rel))
parsedFset := token.NewFileSet()
parsedFile, parseErr := parser.ParseFile(parsedFset, path, nil, 0)
if parseErr != nil {
inventoryComplete = false
if opts.ChangedFrom == "" {
out = append(out, incompleteDomainViolation(rel, parseErr))
parseFailureReported = true
} else if _, changed := added[rel]; changed {
out = append(out, incompleteDomainViolation(rel, parseErr))
parseFailureReported = true
}
continue
}
tf, ok := typed[filepath.Clean(path)]
if !ok {
tf = typedGoFile{File: parsedFile, Fset: parsedFset}
}
scan := newFileDomainScan(tf)
scan.collectSemanticEvidence()
scan.collectAbsoluteURLEvidence()
if len(scan.TypeInfoRequired) > 0 {
// Inventory completeness is a property of the whole HEAD. Whether
// this PR owns an incomplete-scan diagnostic is decided separately
// by the added-line intersection below.
inventoryComplete = false
}
for _, expr := range scan.TypeInfoRequired {
start := tf.Fset.Position(expr.Pos()).Line
end := tf.Fset.Position(expr.End()).Line
line := start
if opts.ChangedFrom != "" {
var intersects bool
line, intersects = firstAddedLineInSpan(added[rel], start, end)
if !intersects {
continue
}
}
typeInfoGapReported = true
out = append(out, incompleteDomainViolationAt(
rel,
line,
fmt.Errorf("Go type information unavailable for hostname-oriented field evidence"),
))
break
}
fixture := isDomainFixturePath(rel)
// The detector's own policy literals and contract corpus may be
// scanned, but they cannot justify keeping an allowlist entry.
policyOwner := strings.HasPrefix(rel, "lint/domaincontract/")
for _, evidence := range scan.Evidence {
if isReservedExampleHostname(evidence.Host) {
continue
}
if _, ok := policy.Public[evidence.Host]; ok {
if !fixture && !policyOwner {
observedPublic[evidence.Host] = true
}
continue
}
if _, ok := policy.Fixtures[evidence.Host]; ok && fixture {
if !policyOwner {
observedFixtures[evidence.Host] = true
}
continue
}
start := tf.Fset.Position(evidence.Expr.Pos()).Line
end := tf.Fset.Position(evidence.Expr.End()).Line
line := start
if opts.ChangedFrom != "" {
var intersects bool
line, intersects = firstAddedLineInSpan(added[rel], start, end)
if !intersects {
continue
}
}
suggestion := "remove the hostname or replace it with an approved public endpoint; " +
"public allowlist additions require evidence and CODEOWNER approval"
if _, fixtureOnly := policy.Fixtures[evidence.Host]; fixtureOnly && !fixture {
suggestion = "remove the fixture-only hostname or move this use into an approved fixture scope; " +
"fixture entries are not approved for production Go code or skills"
}
out = append(out, lintapi.Violation{
Rule: unapprovedDomainRule,
Action: lintapi.ActionReject,
File: rel,
Line: line,
Message: fmt.Sprintf(
"unapproved hostname %q found in %s",
evidence.Host,
evidence.Kind,
),
Suggestion: suggestion,
})
}
}
// A syntax error is also surfaced by go/packages. Prefer the file-specific
// parse diagnostic when one was already reported; otherwise make a
// repository-wide type-loading failure explicit instead of silently
// continuing without the type information required by field evidence.
if typeLoadErr != nil && !parseFailureReported && !typeInfoGapReported {
out = append(out, incompleteDomainViolation("go.mod", typeLoadErr))
}
if inventoryComplete {
for host, entry := range policy.Public {
if !observedPublic[host] {
out = append(out, unusedDomainViolation(entry))
}
}
for host, entry := range policy.Fixtures {
if !observedFixtures[host] {
out = append(out, unusedDomainViolation(entry))
}
}
}
return out, nil
}
func trackedGoFiles(root string) ([]string, error) {
out, err := gitCommandOutput(root, "ls-files", "-z", "--", "*.go")
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("list tracked Go files: %w", err)
}
var files []string
for _, raw := range strings.Split(string(out), "\x00") {
if raw == "" {
continue
}
rel := filepath.ToSlash(raw)
if strings.HasPrefix(rel, "vendor/") || strings.HasPrefix(rel, "node_modules/") {
continue
}
files = append(files, rel)
}
return files, nil
}
func loadTypedGoFiles(root string) (map[string]typedGoFile, error) {
moduleDirs, err := trackedGoModuleDirs(root)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
out := map[string]typedGoFile{}
var firstLoadErr error
var loadErrCount int
for _, moduleDir := range moduleDirs {
moduleRoot := root
if moduleDir != "." {
moduleRoot = filepath.Join(root, filepath.FromSlash(moduleDir))
}
files, err := loadTypedGoModule(moduleRoot)
for path, file := range files {
out[path] = file
}
if err != nil {
loadErrCount++
if firstLoadErr == nil {
firstLoadErr = err
}
}
}
if loadErrCount == 1 {
return out, firstLoadErr
}
if loadErrCount > 1 {
return out, fmt.Errorf("%w (and %d more module errors)", firstLoadErr, loadErrCount-1)
}
return out, nil
}
func trackedGoModuleDirs(root string) ([]string, error) {
raw, err := gitCommandOutput(root, "ls-files", "-z")
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("list tracked Go modules: %w", err)
}
var dirs []string
for _, path := range strings.Split(string(raw), "\x00") {
path = filepath.ToSlash(path)
if path != "go.mod" && !strings.HasSuffix(path, "/go.mod") {
continue
}
dir := filepath.ToSlash(filepath.Dir(path))
dirs = append(dirs, dir)
}
return dirs, nil
}
func loadTypedGoModule(moduleRoot string) (map[string]typedGoFile, error) {
fset := token.NewFileSet()
cfg := &packages.Config{
Mode: packages.NeedName |
packages.NeedFiles |
packages.NeedCompiledGoFiles |
packages.NeedImports |
packages.NeedDeps |
packages.NeedTypes |
packages.NeedSyntax |
packages.NeedTypesInfo,
Dir: moduleRoot,
Fset: fset,
Tests: true,
}
pkgs, err := packages.Load(cfg, "./...")
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("load Go type information: %w", err)
}
out := map[string]typedGoFile{}
var firstPackageErr string
var packageErrCount int
packages.Visit(pkgs, nil, func(pkg *packages.Package) {
if pkg == nil {
return
}
for _, pkgErr := range pkg.Errors {
packageErrCount++
if firstPackageErr == "" {
firstPackageErr = pkgErr.Error()
}
}
if pkg.TypesInfo == nil || pkg.Fset == nil {
return
}
for i, file := range pkg.Syntax {
if i >= len(pkg.CompiledGoFiles) {
break
}
path := filepath.Clean(pkg.CompiledGoFiles[i])
if _, exists := out[path]; exists {
continue
}
out[path] = typedGoFile{File: file, Fset: pkg.Fset, Info: pkg.TypesInfo}
}
})
if packageErrCount == 1 {
return out, fmt.Errorf("load Go type information: %s", firstPackageErr)
}
if packageErrCount > 1 {
return out, fmt.Errorf(
"load Go type information: %s (and %d more package errors)",
firstPackageErr,
packageErrCount-1,
)
}
return out, nil
}
func newFileDomainScan(file typedGoFile) *fileDomainScan {
return &fileDomainScan{
File: file.File,
Fset: file.Fset,
Info: file.Info,
seen: map[evidenceKey]bool{},
parents: astParentMap(file.File),
}
}
func (s *fileDomainScan) collectSemanticEvidence() {
ast.Inspect(s.File, func(node ast.Node) bool {
switch n := node.(type) {
case *ast.AssignStmt:
if len(n.Lhs) != len(n.Rhs) {
return true
}
for i, lhs := range n.Lhs {
if s.Info == nil &&
potentialHostnameSelectorTarget(lhs) &&
s.hasStaticBareHostnameValue(n.Rhs[i]) {
s.requireTypeInfo(n.Rhs[i])
}
if index, ok := stripParens(lhs).(*ast.IndexExpr); ok {
switch {
case s.isHostnameTarget(index.X):
s.addMapPair(index.Index, n.Rhs[i])
case s.isHostnameMapKey(index.Index):
s.addHostValue(n.Rhs[i], "host assignment")
}
continue
}
if s.isHostnameTarget(lhs) {
s.addHostValue(n.Rhs[i], "host assignment")
}
}
case *ast.ValueSpec:
if len(n.Names) != len(n.Values) {
return true
}
for i, name := range n.Names {
if isHostnameSemanticName(name.Name) {
s.addHostValue(n.Values[i], "host assignment")
}
}
case *ast.KeyValueExpr:
if s.Info == nil && s.keyValueNeedsTypeInfo(n) {
s.requireTypeInfo(n.Value)
}
if s.isHostnameKeyValue(n) {
s.addHostValue(n.Value, "host assignment")
}
}
return true
})
}
func (s *fileDomainScan) requireTypeInfo(expr ast.Expr) {
for _, existing := range s.TypeInfoRequired {
if existing.Pos() == expr.Pos() && existing.End() == expr.End() {
return
}
}
s.TypeInfoRequired = append(s.TypeInfoRequired, expr)
}
func (s *fileDomainScan) hasStaticBareHostnameValue(expr ast.Expr) bool {
value, ok := staticStringValue(expr, s.Info, nil)
if !ok {
return false
}
host, ok := semanticHostname(value)
return ok && !isReservedExampleHostname(host)
}
func (s *fileDomainScan) keyValueNeedsTypeInfo(pair *ast.KeyValueExpr) bool {
composite, ok := s.parents[pair].(*ast.CompositeLit)
if !ok {
return false
}
if _, explicitMap := composite.Type.(*ast.MapType); explicitMap {
return false
}
key, ok := pair.Key.(*ast.Ident)
return ok && isHostnameSemanticName(key.Name) && s.hasStaticBareHostnameValue(pair.Value)
}
func potentialHostnameSelectorTarget(expr ast.Expr) bool {
switch n := stripParens(expr).(type) {
case *ast.SelectorExpr:
return isHostnameSemanticName(n.Sel.Name)
case *ast.StarExpr:
return potentialHostnameSelectorTarget(n.X)
case *ast.IndexExpr:
return potentialHostnameSelectorTarget(n.X)
default:
return false
}
}
func (s *fileDomainScan) collectAbsoluteURLEvidence() {
ast.Inspect(s.File, func(node ast.Node) bool {
expr, ok := node.(ast.Expr)
if !ok {
return true
}
if ident, ok := expr.(*ast.Ident); ok && s.Info != nil && s.Info.Defs[ident] != nil {
// A declaration name may carry the constant value in types.Info,
// but it is not a second source expression.
return true
}
value, ok := staticStringValue(expr, s.Info, nil)
if !ok {
return true
}
if s.hasStaticStringContainer(expr) {
return true
}
host, ok := absoluteURLHostname(value)
if ok {
s.addEvidence(host, "absolute URL", expr)
}
return true
})
}
func (s *fileDomainScan) hasStaticStringContainer(expr ast.Expr) bool {
parent, ok := s.parents[expr].(ast.Expr)
if !ok {
return false
}
switch parent.(type) {
case *ast.BinaryExpr, *ast.ParenExpr:
_, ok := staticStringValue(parent, s.Info, nil)
return ok
default:
return false
}
}
func (s *fileDomainScan) addHostValue(expr ast.Expr, kind string) {
expr = stripParens(expr)
if composite, ok := expr.(*ast.CompositeLit); ok {
switch s.collectionCompositeKind(composite) {
case sequenceComposite:
for _, element := range composite.Elts {
if valueExpr, ok := element.(ast.Expr); ok {
s.addHostValue(valueExpr, "host collection")
}
}
case mapComposite:
for _, element := range composite.Elts {
pair, ok := element.(*ast.KeyValueExpr)
if !ok {
continue
}
keyExpr, ok := pair.Key.(ast.Expr)
if !ok {
continue
}
s.addMapPair(keyExpr, pair.Value)
}
default:
if s.Info == nil {
s.requireTypeInfoForUnclassifiedCollection(composite)
}
return
}
return
}
if evidence, ok := s.hostnameEvidence(expr, kind); ok {
s.addEvidence(evidence.Host, evidence.Kind, evidence.Expr)
}
}
func (s *fileDomainScan) requireTypeInfoForUnclassifiedCollection(composite *ast.CompositeLit) {
for _, element := range composite.Elts {
if pair, ok := element.(*ast.KeyValueExpr); ok {
keyExpr, ok := pair.Key.(ast.Expr)
if !ok {
continue
}
keyIsHost := s.hasStaticBareHostnameValue(keyExpr)
valueIsHost := s.hasStaticBareHostnameValue(pair.Value)
if keyIsHost == valueIsHost {
continue
}
if keyIsHost {
s.requireTypeInfo(keyExpr)
} else {
s.requireTypeInfo(pair.Value)
}
continue
}
valueExpr, ok := element.(ast.Expr)
if ok && s.hasStaticBareHostnameValue(valueExpr) {
s.requireTypeInfo(valueExpr)
}
}
}
// addMapPair reports a map side only when it is the sole hostname-shaped
// static value. A semantic map name does not establish whether a string map
// is hostname->metadata or alias->hostname, so reporting both sides would turn
// filenames such as client.pem into blocking hostname evidence.
func (s *fileDomainScan) addMapPair(key, value ast.Expr) {
keyEvidence, keyOK := s.hostnameEvidence(key, "host collection")
valueEvidence, valueOK := s.hostnameEvidence(value, "host collection")
if keyOK == valueOK {
return
}
if keyOK {
s.addEvidence(keyEvidence.Host, keyEvidence.Kind, keyEvidence.Expr)
return
}
s.addEvidence(valueEvidence.Host, valueEvidence.Kind, valueEvidence.Expr)
}
func (s *fileDomainScan) hostnameEvidence(expr ast.Expr, kind string) (domainEvidence, bool) {
expr = stripParens(expr)
value, ok := staticStringValue(expr, s.Info, nil)
if !ok {
return domainEvidence{}, false
}
if host, ok := absoluteURLHostname(value); ok {
return domainEvidence{Host: host, Kind: "absolute URL", Expr: expr}, true
}
if host, ok := semanticHostname(value); ok {
return domainEvidence{Host: host, Kind: kind, Expr: expr}, true
}
return domainEvidence{}, false
}
func (s *fileDomainScan) collectionCompositeKind(expr *ast.CompositeLit) collectionCompositeKind {
if s.Info != nil {
if tv, ok := s.Info.Types[expr]; ok && tv.Type != nil {
switch tv.Type.Underlying().(type) {
case *types.Array, *types.Slice:
return sequenceComposite
case *types.Map:
return mapComposite
}
}
}
switch expr.Type.(type) {
case *ast.ArrayType:
return sequenceComposite
case *ast.MapType:
return mapComposite
default:
return notCollectionComposite
}
}
func (s *fileDomainScan) addEvidence(host, kind string, expr ast.Expr) {
key := evidenceKey{Host: host, Start: expr.Pos(), End: expr.End()}
if s.seen[key] {
return
}
s.seen[key] = true
s.Evidence = append(s.Evidence, domainEvidence{Host: host, Kind: kind, Expr: expr})
}
func staticStringValue(expr ast.Expr, info *types.Info, seen map[*ast.Object]bool) (string, bool) {
if info != nil {
if tv, ok := info.Types[expr]; ok && tv.Value != nil && tv.Value.Kind() == constant.String {
return constant.StringVal(tv.Value), true
}
}
switch n := expr.(type) {
case *ast.BasicLit:
if n.Kind != token.STRING {
return "", false
}
value, err := strconv.Unquote(n.Value)
return value, err == nil
case *ast.ParenExpr:
return staticStringValue(n.X, info, seen)
case *ast.BinaryExpr:
if n.Op != token.ADD {
return "", false
}
left, ok := staticStringValue(n.X, info, seen)
if !ok {
return "", false
}
right, ok := staticStringValue(n.Y, info, seen)
if !ok {
return "", false
}
return left + right, true
case *ast.Ident:
if info != nil {
if obj := info.ObjectOf(n); obj != nil {
if c, ok := obj.(*types.Const); ok {
if c.Val().Kind() == constant.String {
return constant.StringVal(c.Val()), true
}
}
}
}
if n.Obj == nil || n.Obj.Kind != ast.Con {
return "", false
}
if seen == nil {
seen = map[*ast.Object]bool{}
}
if seen[n.Obj] {
return "", false
}
seen[n.Obj] = true
defer delete(seen, n.Obj)
spec, ok := n.Obj.Decl.(*ast.ValueSpec)
if !ok {
return "", false
}
for i, name := range spec.Names {
if name.Name == n.Name && i < len(spec.Values) {
return staticStringValue(spec.Values[i], info, seen)
}
}
}
return "", false
}
func absoluteURLHostname(value string) (string, bool) {
value = strings.TrimSpace(value)
parsed, err := url.Parse(value)
if err != nil || parsed.Host == "" {
return "", false
}
switch strings.ToLower(parsed.Scheme) {
case "http", "https", "ws", "wss":
default:
return "", false
}
return normalizeCandidateHostname(parsed.Hostname())
}
func semanticHostname(value string) (string, bool) {
value = strings.TrimSpace(value)
if value == "" || strings.ContainsAny(value, `/\?#@`) || strings.ContainsAny(value, " \t\r\n") {
return "", false
}
parsed, err := url.Parse("//" + value)
if err != nil || parsed.Host == "" || parsed.Path != "" {
return "", false
}
return normalizeCandidateHostname(parsed.Hostname())
}
func normalizeCandidateHostname(host string) (string, bool) {
host = strings.TrimSuffix(strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(host)), ".")
if host == "" || !strings.Contains(host, ".") || net.ParseIP(host) != nil {
return "", false
}
labels := strings.Split(host, ".")
for _, label := range labels {
if label == "" || strings.HasPrefix(label, "-") || strings.HasSuffix(label, "-") {
return "", false
}
for _, r := range label {
if unicode.IsLetter(r) || unicode.IsDigit(r) || r == '-' {
continue
}
return "", false
}
}
return host, true
}
func (s *fileDomainScan) isHostnameTarget(expr ast.Expr) bool {
switch n := stripParens(expr).(type) {
case *ast.Ident:
return isHostnameSemanticName(n.Name)
case *ast.SelectorExpr:
return s.isHostnameSelector(n)
case *ast.StarExpr:
return s.isHostnameTarget(n.X)
default:
return false
}
}
func (s *fileDomainScan) isHostnameKeyValue(pair *ast.KeyValueExpr) bool {
composite, ok := s.parents[pair].(*ast.CompositeLit)
if !ok {
return false
}
switch s.collectionCompositeKind(composite) {
case mapComposite:
key, ok := pair.Key.(ast.Expr)
return ok && s.isHostnameMapKey(key)
case notCollectionComposite:
ident, ok := pair.Key.(*ast.Ident)
return ok && s.isHostnameStructField(composite, ident.Name)
default:
return false
}
}
func (s *fileDomainScan) isHostnameMapKey(expr ast.Expr) bool {
value, ok := staticStringValue(expr, s.Info, nil)
return ok && isHostnameSemanticName(value)
}
func (s *fileDomainScan) isHostnameSelector(selector *ast.SelectorExpr) bool {
if s.Info == nil || !isHostnameSemanticName(selector.Sel.Name) {
return false
}
selection := s.Info.Selections[selector]
if selection == nil || selection.Kind() != types.FieldVal {
return false
}
return !nonNetworkHostnameFields[hostnameFieldID{
Type: namedTypeID(selection.Recv()),
Field: selector.Sel.Name,
}]
}
func (s *fileDomainScan) isHostnameStructField(composite *ast.CompositeLit, field string) bool {
if s.Info == nil || !isHostnameSemanticName(field) {
return false
}
typeID := namedTypeID(s.Info.TypeOf(composite))
if typeID == "" {
return false
}
return !nonNetworkHostnameFields[hostnameFieldID{Type: typeID, Field: field}]
}
func namedTypeID(typ types.Type) string {
for {
switch t := typ.(type) {
case *types.Pointer:
typ = t.Elem()
case *types.Named:
obj := t.Obj()
if obj == nil || obj.Pkg() == nil {
return ""
}
return obj.Pkg().Path() + "." + obj.Name()
default:
return ""
}
}
}
func isHostnameSemanticName(name string) bool {
lower := strings.ToLower(name)
switch lower {
case "host", "hosts", "hostname", "hostnames", "domain", "domains":
return true
}
for _, marker := range []string{
"HostBy", "HostsBy", "HostnameBy", "HostnamesBy", "DomainBy", "DomainsBy",
} {
if i := strings.Index(name, marker); i >= 0 {
end := i + len(marker)
if end < len(name) && unicode.IsUpper(rune(name[end])) {
return true
}
}
}
for _, prefix := range []string{
"hostBy", "hostsBy", "hostnameBy", "hostnamesBy", "domainBy", "domainsBy",
} {
if strings.HasPrefix(name, prefix) &&
len(name) > len(prefix) &&
unicode.IsUpper(rune(name[len(prefix)])) {
return true
}
}
if i := strings.LastIndexAny(name, "_-"); i >= 0 {
return isHostnameSemanticName(name[i+1:])
}
for _, suffix := range []string{"Hostnames", "Hostname", "Domains", "Domain", "Hosts", "Host"} {
if strings.HasSuffix(name, suffix) && len(name) > len(suffix) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
func stripParens(expr ast.Expr) ast.Expr {
for {
paren, ok := expr.(*ast.ParenExpr)
if !ok {
return expr
}
expr = paren.X
}
}
func astParentMap(root ast.Node) map[ast.Node]ast.Node {
parents := map[ast.Node]ast.Node{}
var stack []ast.Node
ast.Inspect(root, func(node ast.Node) bool {
if node == nil {
stack = stack[:len(stack)-1]
return false
}
if len(stack) > 0 {
parents[node] = stack[len(stack)-1]
}
stack = append(stack, node)
return true
})
return parents
}
func isDomainFixturePath(rel string) bool {
rel = filepath.ToSlash(rel)
if strings.HasPrefix(rel, "skills/") {
return false
}
if strings.HasSuffix(rel, "_test.go") || strings.HasPrefix(rel, "tests/") {
return true
}
for _, part := range strings.Split(rel, "/") {
if part == "testdata" {
return true
}
}
return false
}
func unusedDomainViolation(entry domainPolicyEntry) lintapi.Violation {
return lintapi.Violation{
Rule: unusedDomainRule,
Action: lintapi.ActionReject,
File: entry.File,
Line: entry.Line,
Message: fmt.Sprintf("domain allowlist entry %q has no in-scope Go reference", entry.Host),
Suggestion: "remove the unused entry; allowlist entries must be justified by a current in-scope reference",
}
}
func incompleteDomainViolation(file string, err error) lintapi.Violation {
return incompleteDomainViolationAt(file, 1, err)
}
func incompleteDomainViolationAt(file string, line int, err error) lintapi.Violation {
return lintapi.Violation{
Rule: incompleteDomainRule,
Action: lintapi.ActionReject,
File: file,
Line: line,
Message: "domain scan incomplete: " + err.Error(),
Suggestion: "fix the Go parse or type-loading error so hostname analysis can complete",
}
}

View File

@@ -1,462 +0,0 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
package domaincontract
import (
"os/exec"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/lint/lintapi"
)
func gitTestCommand(t *testing.T, root string, args ...string) string {
t.Helper()
cmd := exec.Command("git", args...)
cmd.Dir = root
out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("git %s: %v\n%s", strings.Join(args, " "), err, out)
}
return strings.TrimSpace(string(out))
}
func setupDomainDiffRepo(t *testing.T, target string) (root, base string) {
t.Helper()
root = t.TempDir()
writeFile(t, root, "go.mod", "module example.com/domainfixture\n\ngo 1.23.0\n")
writeFile(t, root, publicDomainsPath, "# public\npublic.example.com\n")
writeFile(t, root, fixtureDomainsPath, "# fixtures\nfixture.example.com\n")
writeFile(t, root, "policy_refs.go", "package sample\n\nvar APIHost = \"public.example.com\"\n")
writeFile(t, root, "policy_refs_test.go", "package sample\n\nvar FixtureHost = \"fixture.example.com\"\n")
writeFile(t, root, "target.go", target)
gitTestCommand(t, root, "init", "-q")
gitTestCommand(t, root, "config", "user.name", "Domain Contract Test")
gitTestCommand(t, root, "config", "user.email", "domain-contract@example.com")
gitTestCommand(t, root, "add", ".")
gitTestCommand(t, root, "-c", "commit.gpgsign=false", "commit", "-qm", "base")
return root, gitTestCommand(t, root, "rev-parse", "HEAD")
}
func commitDomainDiff(t *testing.T, root, message string) {
t.Helper()
gitTestCommand(t, root, "add", "-A")
gitTestCommand(t, root, "-c", "commit.gpgsign=false", "commit", "-qm", message)
}
func violationsForRule(vs []lintapi.Violation, rule string) []lintapi.Violation {
var out []lintapi.Violation
for _, v := range vs {
if v.Rule == rule {
out = append(out, v)
}
}
return out
}
func scanDomainDiff(t *testing.T, root, base string) []lintapi.Violation {
t.Helper()
vs, err := ScanRepoWithOptions(root, ScanOptions{ChangedFrom: base})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
return vs
}
func TestUnapprovedDomainDiffContract(t *testing.T) {
t.Run("new PR 1975 case", func(t *testing.T) {
root, base := setupDomainDiffRepo(t, "package sample\n\nvar unrelated = 1\n")
writeFile(t, root, "target.go",
"package sample\n\nvar unrelated = 1\nvar APIHost = \"internal-api-drive-stream.larkoffice.com\"\n")
commitDomainDiff(t, root, "add internal host")
got := violationsForRule(scanDomainDiff(t, root, base), unapprovedDomainRule)
if len(got) != 1 || !strings.Contains(got[0].Message, "internal-api-drive-stream.larkoffice.com") {
t.Fatalf("violations = %+v, want PR 1975 hostname", got)
}
})
t.Run("hostname field in nested Go module", func(t *testing.T) {
root, base := setupDomainDiffRepo(t, "package sample\n\nvar unrelated = 1\n")
writeFile(t, root, "nested/go.mod", "module example.com/nested\n\ngo 1.23.0\n")
writeFile(t, root, "nested/target.go",
"package nested\n\ntype Config struct{ Host string }\n\n"+
"var config = Config{Host: \"private.corp.internal\"}\n")
commitDomainDiff(t, root, "add nested module hostname")
all := scanDomainDiff(t, root, base)
got := violationsForRule(all, unapprovedDomainRule)
if len(got) != 1 || filepath.ToSlash(got[0].File) != "nested/target.go" ||
!strings.Contains(got[0].Message, "private.corp.internal") {
t.Fatalf("violations = %+v, want nested-module hostname rejection", got)
}
if incomplete := violationsForRule(all, incompleteDomainRule); len(incomplete) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("nested module must have complete type information: %+v", incomplete)
}
})
t.Run("changed excluded field reports incomplete scan", func(t *testing.T) {
root, base := setupDomainDiffRepo(t, "package sample\n\nvar unrelated = 1\n")
writeFile(t, root, "excluded.go",
"//go:build domaincontract_never && !domaincontract_never\n\npackage sample\n\n"+
"type Config struct{ Host string }\n\n"+
"var config = Config{Host: \"private.corp.internal\"}\n")
commitDomainDiff(t, root, "add excluded hostname field")
all := scanDomainDiff(t, root, base)
got := violationsForRule(all, incompleteDomainRule)
if len(got) != 1 || filepath.Base(got[0].File) != "excluded.go" || got[0].Line != 7 {
t.Fatalf("violations = %+v, want changed field scan-incomplete at line 7", got)
}
if unapproved := violationsForRule(all, unapprovedDomainRule); len(unapproved) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("untyped field must not produce an unverified hostname finding: %+v", unapproved)
}
})
t.Run("changed excluded selector reports incomplete scan", func(t *testing.T) {
root, base := setupDomainDiffRepo(t, "package sample\n\nvar unrelated = 1\n")
writeFile(t, root, "excluded.go",
"//go:build domaincontract_never && !domaincontract_never\n\npackage sample\n\n"+
"type Config struct{ Host string }\n\n"+
"func configure(config *Config) { config.Host = \"private.corp.internal\" }\n")
commitDomainDiff(t, root, "add excluded hostname selector")
got := violationsForRule(scanDomainDiff(t, root, base), incompleteDomainRule)
if len(got) != 1 || filepath.Base(got[0].File) != "excluded.go" || got[0].Line != 7 {
t.Fatalf("violations = %+v, want changed selector scan-incomplete at line 7", got)
}
})
t.Run("changed excluded named slice reports incomplete scan", func(t *testing.T) {
root, base := setupDomainDiffRepo(t, "package sample\n\nvar unrelated = 1\n")
writeFile(t, root, "excluded.go",
"//go:build domaincontract_never && !domaincontract_never\n\npackage sample\n\n"+
"type HostList []string\n\n"+
"var AllowedHosts = HostList{\n\t\"attacker.zip\",\n}\n")
commitDomainDiff(t, root, "add excluded hostname slice")
all := scanDomainDiff(t, root, base)
got := violationsForRule(all, incompleteDomainRule)
if len(got) != 1 || filepath.Base(got[0].File) != "excluded.go" || got[0].Line != 8 {
t.Fatalf("violations = %+v, want named-slice scan-incomplete at line 8", got)
}
if unapproved := violationsForRule(all, unapprovedDomainRule); len(unapproved) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("untyped named slice must not produce an unverified hostname finding: %+v", unapproved)
}
})
t.Run("changed excluded named map reports incomplete scan", func(t *testing.T) {
root, base := setupDomainDiffRepo(t, "package sample\n\nvar unrelated = 1\n")
writeFile(t, root, "excluded.go",
"//go:build domaincontract_never && !domaincontract_never\n\npackage sample\n\n"+
"type HostSet map[string]struct{}\n\n"+
"var AllowedHosts = HostSet{\n\t\"attacker.zip\": {},\n}\n")
commitDomainDiff(t, root, "add excluded hostname map")
all := scanDomainDiff(t, root, base)
got := violationsForRule(all, incompleteDomainRule)
if len(got) != 1 || filepath.Base(got[0].File) != "excluded.go" || got[0].Line != 8 {
t.Fatalf("violations = %+v, want named-map scan-incomplete at line 8", got)
}
if unapproved := violationsForRule(all, unapprovedDomainRule); len(unapproved) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("untyped named map must not produce an unverified hostname finding: %+v", unapproved)
}
})
t.Run("changed excluded unrelated code stays allowed", func(t *testing.T) {
root, base := setupDomainDiffRepo(t, "package sample\n\nvar unrelated = 1\n")
writeFile(t, root, "excluded.go",
"//go:build domaincontract_never && !domaincontract_never\n\npackage sample\n\nvar unrelated = 2\n")
commitDomainDiff(t, root, "add excluded unrelated code")
if got := violationsForRule(scanDomainDiff(t, root, base), incompleteDomainRule); len(got) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("unrelated excluded code must not require hostname type information: %+v", got)
}
})
t.Run("new element in existing collection", func(t *testing.T) {
root, base := setupDomainDiffRepo(t,
"package sample\n\nvar ExtraHosts = []string{\n\t\"public.example.com\",\n}\n")
writeFile(t, root, "target.go",
"package sample\n\nvar ExtraHosts = []string{\n\t\"public.example.com\",\n\t\"attacker.zip\",\n}\n")
commitDomainDiff(t, root, "add collection host")
got := violationsForRule(scanDomainDiff(t, root, base), unapprovedDomainRule)
if len(got) != 1 || !strings.Contains(got[0].Message, "attacker.zip") {
t.Fatalf("violations = %+v, want attacker.zip", got)
}
if got[0].Line != 5 {
t.Fatalf("violation line = %d, want 5", got[0].Line)
}
})
t.Run("multiline expression changed segment", func(t *testing.T) {
root, base := setupDomainDiffRepo(t,
"package sample\n\nvar ExtraHost = \"private.corp.\" +\n\t\"example.com\"\n")
writeFile(t, root, "target.go",
"package sample\n\nvar ExtraHost = \"private.corp.\" +\n\t\"internal\"\n")
commitDomainDiff(t, root, "change concatenated host")
got := violationsForRule(scanDomainDiff(t, root, base), unapprovedDomainRule)
if len(got) != 1 || !strings.Contains(got[0].Message, "private.corp.internal") {
t.Fatalf("violations = %+v, want private.corp.internal", got)
}
if got[0].Line != 4 {
t.Fatalf("violation line = %d, want changed line 4", got[0].Line)
}
})
t.Run("unrelated change beside historical hostname", func(t *testing.T) {
root, base := setupDomainDiffRepo(t,
"package sample\n\nvar HistoricalHost = \"historical.private.internal\"\n")
writeFile(t, root, "target.go",
"package sample\n\nvar HistoricalHost = \"historical.private.internal\"\nvar unrelated = 1\n")
commitDomainDiff(t, root, "add unrelated value")
if got := violationsForRule(scanDomainDiff(t, root, base), unapprovedDomainRule); len(got) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("unexpected historical-domain violation: %+v", got)
}
})
t.Run("historical hostname expression changed", func(t *testing.T) {
root, base := setupDomainDiffRepo(t,
"package sample\n\nvar HistoricalHost = \"historical.private.internal\"\n")
writeFile(t, root, "target.go",
"package sample\n\nvar HistoricalHost = \"replacement.private.internal\"\n")
commitDomainDiff(t, root, "change historical host")
got := violationsForRule(scanDomainDiff(t, root, base), unapprovedDomainRule)
if len(got) != 1 || !strings.Contains(got[0].Message, "replacement.private.internal") {
t.Fatalf("violations = %+v, want replacement.private.internal", got)
}
})
t.Run("new assignment references existing constant", func(t *testing.T) {
root, base := setupDomainDiffRepo(t,
"package sample\n\nconst existingConst = \"private.corp.internal\"\n")
writeFile(t, root, "target.go",
"package sample\n\nconst existingConst = \"private.corp.internal\"\nvar APIHost = existingConst\n")
commitDomainDiff(t, root, "use existing hostname constant")
got := violationsForRule(scanDomainDiff(t, root, base), unapprovedDomainRule)
if len(got) != 1 || !strings.Contains(got[0].Message, "private.corp.internal") {
t.Fatalf("violations = %+v, want private.corp.internal", got)
}
if got[0].Line != 4 {
t.Fatalf("violation line = %d, want 4", got[0].Line)
}
})
t.Run("allowlisted hostname", func(t *testing.T) {
root, base := setupDomainDiffRepo(t, "package sample\n\nvar unrelated = 1\n")
writeFile(t, root, "target.go",
"package sample\n\nvar unrelated = 1\nvar BackupHost = \"public.example.com\"\n")
commitDomainDiff(t, root, "add public host")
if got := violationsForRule(scanDomainDiff(t, root, base), unapprovedDomainRule); len(got) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("unexpected public-domain violation: %+v", got)
}
})
t.Run("reserved example URL", func(t *testing.T) {
root, base := setupDomainDiffRepo(t, "package sample\n\nvar unrelated = 1\n")
writeFile(t, root, "target.go",
"package sample\n\nvar unrelated = 1\nfunc fakeValue() string { return \"https://example.test/resource\" }\n")
commitDomainDiff(t, root, "add safe example URL")
if got := violationsForRule(scanDomainDiff(t, root, base), unapprovedDomainRule); len(got) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("unexpected reserved-example violation: %+v", got)
}
})
t.Run("historical type gap suppresses unused policy diagnostics", func(t *testing.T) {
root, _ := setupDomainDiffRepo(t, "package sample\n\nvar unrelated = 1\n")
writeFile(t, root, publicDomainsPath,
"# public\nplatform.example.com\npublic.example.com\n")
writeFile(t, root, "excluded.go",
"//go:build domaincontract_never && !domaincontract_never\n\npackage sample\n\n"+
"type Config struct{ Host string }\n\n"+
"var config = Config{Host: \"platform.example.com\"}\n")
commitDomainDiff(t, root, "add historical platform hostname")
base := gitTestCommand(t, root, "rev-parse", "HEAD")
writeFile(t, root, "target.go", "package sample\n\nvar unrelated = 2\n")
commitDomainDiff(t, root, "change unrelated code")
all := scanDomainDiff(t, root, base)
if got := violationsForRule(all, incompleteDomainRule); len(got) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("historical type gap must not be attributed to this change: %+v", got)
}
if got := violationsForRule(all, unusedDomainRule); len(got) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("incomplete inventory must not produce unused-policy diagnostics: %+v", got)
}
})
t.Run("allowlist does not approve subdomains", func(t *testing.T) {
root, base := setupDomainDiffRepo(t, "package sample\n\nvar unrelated = 1\n")
writeFile(t, root, "target.go",
"package sample\n\nvar unrelated = 1\nvar BackupHost = \"evil.public.example.com\"\n")
commitDomainDiff(t, root, "add unapproved public subdomain")
got := violationsForRule(scanDomainDiff(t, root, base), unapprovedDomainRule)
if len(got) != 1 || !strings.Contains(got[0].Message, "evil.public.example.com") {
t.Fatalf("violations = %+v, want evil.public.example.com", got)
}
})
t.Run("multi assignment pairs names and values", func(t *testing.T) {
root, base := setupDomainDiffRepo(t, "package sample\n\nvar unrelated = 1\n")
writeFile(t, root, publicDomainsPath,
"# public\nopen.larksuite.com\npublic.example.com\n")
writeFile(t, root, "target.go",
"package sample\n\nvar unrelated = 1\nvar APIHost, BackupHost = \"open.larksuite.com\", \"attacker.zip\"\n")
commitDomainDiff(t, root, "add multiple hosts")
got := violationsForRule(scanDomainDiff(t, root, base), unapprovedDomainRule)
if len(got) != 1 || !strings.Contains(got[0].Message, "attacker.zip") {
t.Fatalf("violations = %+v, want only attacker.zip", got)
}
})
t.Run("IDN hostname is rejected", func(t *testing.T) {
root, base := setupDomainDiffRepo(t, "package sample\n\nvar unrelated = 1\n")
writeFile(t, root, "target.go",
"package sample\n\nvar unrelated = 1\nvar BackupHost = \"例子.公司.cn\"\n")
commitDomainDiff(t, root, "add IDN hostname")
got := violationsForRule(scanDomainDiff(t, root, base), unapprovedDomainRule)
if len(got) != 1 || !strings.Contains(got[0].Message, "例子.公司.cn") {
t.Fatalf("violations = %+v, want IDN hostname", got)
}
})
t.Run("fixture limited to test files", func(t *testing.T) {
root, base := setupDomainDiffRepo(t, "package sample\n\nvar unrelated = 1\n")
writeFile(t, root, "target.go",
"package sample\n\nvar unrelated = 1\nvar ProductionHost = \"fixture.example.com\"\n")
commitDomainDiff(t, root, "use fixture in production")
got := violationsForRule(scanDomainDiff(t, root, base), unapprovedDomainRule)
if len(got) != 1 || !strings.Contains(got[0].Message, "fixture.example.com") {
t.Fatalf("violations = %+v, want production fixture rejection", got)
}
if !strings.Contains(got[0].Suggestion, "fixture-only hostname") ||
strings.Contains(got[0].Suggestion, "public allowlist") {
t.Fatalf("suggestion = %q, want fixture-scope guidance", got[0].Suggestion)
}
})
t.Run("fixture accepted in test file", func(t *testing.T) {
root, base := setupDomainDiffRepo(t, "package sample\n\nvar unrelated = 1\n")
writeFile(t, root, "new_target_test.go",
"package sample\n\nvar BackupHost = \"fixture.example.com\"\n")
commitDomainDiff(t, root, "use fixture in test")
if got := violationsForRule(scanDomainDiff(t, root, base), unapprovedDomainRule); len(got) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("unexpected fixture-domain violation: %+v", got)
}
})
t.Run("fixture allowlist does not approve subdomains", func(t *testing.T) {
root, base := setupDomainDiffRepo(t, "package sample\n\nvar unrelated = 1\n")
writeFile(t, root, "new_target_test.go",
"package sample\n\nvar BackupHost = \"evil.fixture.example.com\"\n")
commitDomainDiff(t, root, "use unapproved fixture subdomain")
got := violationsForRule(scanDomainDiff(t, root, base), unapprovedDomainRule)
if len(got) != 1 || !strings.Contains(got[0].Message, "evil.fixture.example.com") {
t.Fatalf("violations = %+v, want exact fixture match", got)
}
})
t.Run("fixture rejected in skills", func(t *testing.T) {
root, base := setupDomainDiffRepo(t, "package sample\n\nvar unrelated = 1\n")
writeFile(t, root, "skills/example/example_test.go",
"package example\n\nvar BackupHost = \"fixture.example.com\"\n")
commitDomainDiff(t, root, "use fixture in skill")
got := violationsForRule(scanDomainDiff(t, root, base), unapprovedDomainRule)
if len(got) != 1 || !strings.Contains(got[0].Message, "fixture.example.com") {
t.Fatalf("violations = %+v, want skill fixture rejection", got)
}
})
t.Run("pure rename", func(t *testing.T) {
root, base := setupDomainDiffRepo(t,
"package sample\n\nvar HistoricalHost = \"historical.private.internal\"\n")
gitTestCommand(t, root, "mv", "target.go", "renamed.go")
commitDomainDiff(t, root, "rename file")
if got := violationsForRule(scanDomainDiff(t, root, base), unapprovedDomainRule); len(got) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("unexpected rename violation: %+v", got)
}
})
}
func TestUnapprovedDomainPolicyAndFailurePaths(t *testing.T) {
t.Run("unused policy entry", func(t *testing.T) {
root, base := setupDomainDiffRepo(t, "package sample\n\nvar unrelated = 1\n")
writeFile(t, root, publicDomainsPath,
"# public\npublic.example.com\nunused.example.com\n")
commitDomainDiff(t, root, "add unused policy")
got := violationsForRule(scanDomainDiff(t, root, base), unusedDomainRule)
if len(got) != 1 || !strings.Contains(got[0].Message, "unused.example.com") {
t.Fatalf("violations = %+v, want unused.example.com", got)
}
})
t.Run("public entry used only by fixture", func(t *testing.T) {
root, base := setupDomainDiffRepo(t, "package sample\n\nvar unrelated = 1\n")
writeFile(t, root, publicDomainsPath,
"# public\npublic.example.com\ntest-only.example.com\n")
writeFile(t, root, "public_only_test.go",
"package sample\n\nvar BackupHost = \"test-only.example.com\"\n")
commitDomainDiff(t, root, "add test-only public policy")
got := violationsForRule(scanDomainDiff(t, root, base), unusedDomainRule)
if len(got) != 1 || !strings.Contains(got[0].Message, "test-only.example.com") {
t.Fatalf("violations = %+v, want test-only.example.com", got)
}
})
t.Run("changed Go parse failure", func(t *testing.T) {
root, base := setupDomainDiffRepo(t, "package sample\n\nvar unrelated = 1\n")
writeFile(t, root, "target.go", "package sample\n\nfunc broken(\n")
commitDomainDiff(t, root, "break source")
all := scanDomainDiff(t, root, base)
got := violationsForRule(all, incompleteDomainRule)
if len(got) != 1 || filepath.Base(got[0].File) != "target.go" {
t.Fatalf("violations = %+v, want target.go scan-incomplete", got)
}
if unused := violationsForRule(all, unusedDomainRule); len(unused) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("parse failure must not produce unreliable unused-policy diagnostics: %+v", unused)
}
})
t.Run("repository type loading failure", func(t *testing.T) {
root, base := setupDomainDiffRepo(t, "package sample\n\nvar unrelated = 1\n")
writeFile(t, root, "go.mod", "module example.com/domainfixture\n\ngo 1.23.0\n\n"+
"require example.com/missing v0.0.0\n\nreplace example.com/missing => ./missing\n")
writeFile(t, root, "target.go",
"package sample\n\nimport _ \"example.com/missing\"\n\n"+
"type Config struct{ Host string }\nvar config = Config{Host: \"malicious.corp.internal\"}\n")
commitDomainDiff(t, root, "break type loading")
all := scanDomainDiff(t, root, base)
got := violationsForRule(all, incompleteDomainRule)
if len(got) != 1 || filepath.Base(got[0].File) != "go.mod" {
t.Fatalf("violations = %+v, want go.mod scan-incomplete", got)
}
if !strings.Contains(got[0].Message, "load Go type information") {
t.Fatalf("message = %q, want type-loading failure", got[0].Message)
}
if unused := violationsForRule(all, unusedDomainRule); len(unused) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("type-loading failure must not produce unreliable unused-policy diagnostics: %+v", unused)
}
})
}

View File

@@ -1,380 +0,0 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
package domaincontract
import (
"go/ast"
"go/parser"
"go/token"
"go/types"
"sort"
"testing"
)
func scanDomainEvidence(t *testing.T, source string) []domainEvidence {
t.Helper()
fset := token.NewFileSet()
file, err := parser.ParseFile(fset, "fixture.go", source, 0)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("parse fixture: %v\n%s", err, source)
}
scan := newFileDomainScan(typedGoFile{File: file, Fset: fset})
scan.collectSemanticEvidence()
scan.collectAbsoluteURLEvidence()
sort.Slice(scan.Evidence, func(i, j int) bool {
if scan.Evidence[i].Host != scan.Evidence[j].Host {
return scan.Evidence[i].Host < scan.Evidence[j].Host
}
return scan.Evidence[i].Expr.Pos() < scan.Evidence[j].Expr.Pos()
})
return scan.Evidence
}
func scanTypedDomainEvidence(t *testing.T, source string) []domainEvidence {
t.Helper()
return scanTypedDomainEvidenceInPackage(t, "fixture", source)
}
func scanTypedDomainEvidenceInPackage(t *testing.T, packagePath, source string) []domainEvidence {
t.Helper()
fset := token.NewFileSet()
file, err := parser.ParseFile(fset, "fixture.go", source, 0)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("parse fixture: %v\n%s", err, source)
}
info := &types.Info{
Types: map[ast.Expr]types.TypeAndValue{},
Defs: map[*ast.Ident]types.Object{},
Uses: map[*ast.Ident]types.Object{},
Selections: map[*ast.SelectorExpr]*types.Selection{},
}
if _, err := (&types.Config{}).Check(packagePath, fset, []*ast.File{file}, info); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("type-check fixture: %v\n%s", err, source)
}
scan := newFileDomainScan(typedGoFile{File: file, Fset: fset, Info: info})
scan.collectSemanticEvidence()
scan.collectAbsoluteURLEvidence()
sort.Slice(scan.Evidence, func(i, j int) bool {
if scan.Evidence[i].Host != scan.Evidence[j].Host {
return scan.Evidence[i].Host < scan.Evidence[j].Host
}
return scan.Evidence[i].Expr.Pos() < scan.Evidence[j].Expr.Pos()
})
return scan.Evidence
}
func evidenceHosts(evidence []domainEvidence) []string {
hosts := make([]string, 0, len(evidence))
for _, item := range evidence {
hosts = append(hosts, item.Host)
}
return hosts
}
func TestTypedAbsoluteURLDeclarationProducesOneFinding(t *testing.T) {
evidence := scanTypedDomainEvidence(t,
"package p\nconst DomainContractE2EURL = \"https://private.corp.internal/v1\"\n")
if got := evidenceHosts(evidence); len(got) != 1 || got[0] != "private.corp.internal" {
t.Fatalf("hosts = %v, want [private.corp.internal]", got)
}
}
func TestGoDomainEvidenceTruePositives(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
source string
want []string
}{
{
name: "PR 1975 Feishu assignment",
source: "package p\nfunc f() { host := \"internal-api-drive-stream.feishu.cn\"; _ = host }\n",
want: []string{"internal-api-drive-stream.feishu.cn"},
},
{
name: "PR 1975 Lark assignment",
source: "package p\nfunc f() { var host string; host = \"internal-api-drive-stream.larksuite.com\"; _ = host }\n",
want: []string{"internal-api-drive-stream.larksuite.com"},
},
{
name: "uppercase snake target",
source: "package p\nfunc f() { API_HOST := \"private.corp.internal\"; _ = API_HOST }\n",
want: []string{"private.corp.internal"},
},
{
name: "typed declaration",
source: "package p\nconst APIHost string = \"attacker.zip\"\n",
want: []string{"attacker.zip"},
},
{
name: "grouped const declaration",
source: "package p\nconst (\n APIHost string = \"attacker.zip\"\n)\n",
want: []string{"attacker.zip"},
},
{
name: "grouped var declaration",
source: "package p\nvar (\n APIHost string = \"attacker.zip\"\n)\n",
want: []string{"attacker.zip"},
},
{
name: "multi assignment",
source: "package p\nfunc f() {\n" +
" APIHost, BackupHost := \"public.example.com\", \"attacker.zip\"\n" +
" _, _ = APIHost, BackupHost\n}\n",
want: []string{"attacker.zip", "public.example.com"},
},
{
name: "map semantic key",
source: "package p\nvar c = map[string]string{\"host\": \"private.corp.internal\"}\n",
want: []string{"private.corp.internal"},
},
{
name: "map semantic key assignment",
source: "package p\nfunc f() { c := map[string]string{}; c[\"host\"] = \"private.corp.internal\" }\n",
want: []string{"private.corp.internal"},
},
{
name: "host collection values",
source: "package p\nvar ALLOWED_HOSTS = []string{\"private.corp.internal\", \"attacker.zip\"}\n",
want: []string{"attacker.zip", "private.corp.internal"},
},
{
name: "host collection map keys",
source: "package p\nvar allowedHosts = map[string]struct{}{\"attacker.zip\": {}}\n",
want: []string{"attacker.zip"},
},
{
name: "host collection bool map keys",
source: "package p\nvar AllowedHosts = map[string]bool{\"api.example.com\": true}\n",
want: []string{"api.example.com"},
},
{
name: "host collection map values",
source: "package p\nvar HostsByRegion = map[string]string{\"sg\": \"api.example.com\"}\n",
want: []string{"api.example.com"},
},
{
name: "host collection map value assignment",
source: "package p\nfunc f() {\n" +
" HostsByRegion := map[string]string{}\n" +
" HostsByRegion[\"sg\"] = \"api.example.com\"\n" +
"}\n",
want: []string{"api.example.com"},
},
{
name: "static concatenation",
source: "package p\nvar APIHost = \"attacker.\" + \"zip\"\n",
want: []string{"attacker.zip"},
},
{
name: "multiline assignment",
source: "package p\nfunc f() {\n APIHost :=\n \"attacker.zip\"\n _ = APIHost\n}\n",
want: []string{"attacker.zip"},
},
{
name: "escaped hostname",
source: "package p\nvar APIHost = \"private\\u002ecorp\\u002einternal\"\n",
want: []string{"private.corp.internal"},
},
{
name: "hex escaped hostname",
source: "package p\nvar APIHost = \"private\\x2ecorp\\x2einternal\"\n",
want: []string{"private.corp.internal"},
},
{
name: "octal escaped hostname",
source: "package p\nvar APIHost = \"private\\056corp\\056internal\"\n",
want: []string{"private.corp.internal"},
},
{
name: "raw hostname",
source: "package p\nvar APIHost = `private.corp.internal`\n",
want: []string{"private.corp.internal"},
},
{
name: "same-file constant reference",
source: "package p\nconst existingConst = \"private.corp.internal\"\n" +
"func f() { APIHost := existingConst; _ = APIHost }\n",
want: []string{"private.corp.internal"},
},
{
name: "absolute URL",
source: "package p\nvar message = \"https://private.corp.internal/v1\"\n",
want: []string{"private.corp.internal"},
},
{
name: "websocket URL with port",
source: "package p\nvar endpoint = \"wss://private.corp.internal:443/v1\"\n",
want: []string{"private.corp.internal"},
},
{
name: "URL userinfo query and fragment",
source: "package p\nvar endpoint = \" https://user:pass@private.corp.internal:8443/v1?q=1#result \"\n",
want: []string{"private.corp.internal"},
},
{
name: "IDN hostname",
source: "package p\nvar APIHost = \"例子.公司.cn\"\n",
want: []string{"例子.公司.cn"},
},
{
name: "case port and trailing dot normalization",
source: "package p\nvar APIHost = \"EXAMPLE.COM.:443\"\n",
want: []string{"example.com"},
},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
got := evidenceHosts(scanDomainEvidence(t, tc.source))
if len(got) != len(tc.want) {
t.Fatalf("hosts = %v, want %v", got, tc.want)
}
for i := range got {
if got[i] != tc.want[i] {
t.Fatalf("hosts = %v, want %v", got, tc.want)
}
}
})
}
}
func TestGoDomainEvidenceTrueNegatives(t *testing.T) {
source := `package p
import _ "github.com/larksuite/oapi-sdk-go/v3"
var file = "archive.zip"
var event = "card.action.trigger"
var schema = "im.messages.list"
var configFile = "service.prod.json"
var version = "v1.2.3"
var email = "name@example.com"
var lowConfidence = "attacker.zip"
var downloadURL = "archive.zip/file"
var prose = "See https://private.corp.internal/v1 for details"
// https://private.corp.internal/v1
var ghost = "private.corp.internal"
var hostnameParser = "private.corp.internal"
var domainError = "private.corp.internal"
var APIHost = "localhost"
var BackupHost = "127.0.0.1"
var hosts = struct{ File string }{File: "archive.zip"}
var AllowedHosts = map[string]string{"api.example.com": "client.pem"}
func dynamicValue() string { return "private.corp.internal" }
var DynamicHost = dynamicValue()
func setAmbiguousHostMetadata() {
AllowedHosts["api.example.com"] = "client.pem"
}
`
if got := scanDomainEvidence(t, source); len(got) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("unexpected evidence: %+v", got)
}
}
func TestTypedStructFieldHostnameSemantics(t *testing.T) {
t.Run("network fields", func(t *testing.T) {
source := `package source
type Config struct { Host string }
type FeishuSource struct { Domain string }
var config = Config{Host: "api.example.com"}
var source = FeishuSource{Domain: "events.example.com"}
`
got := evidenceHosts(scanTypedDomainEvidenceInPackage(
t,
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/event/source",
source,
))
want := []string{"api.example.com", "events.example.com"}
if len(got) != len(want) || got[0] != want[0] || got[1] != want[1] {
t.Fatalf("hosts = %v, want %v", got, want)
}
})
t.Run("command metadata domain", func(t *testing.T) {
source := `package cmdmeta
type Meta struct { Domain string }
var meta = Meta{Domain: "im.messages"}
func update(meta *Meta) { meta.Domain = "docs.pages" }
`
if got := scanTypedDomainEvidenceInPackage(
t,
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/cmdmeta",
source,
); len(got) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("unexpected command metadata evidence: %+v", got)
}
})
t.Run("card action host", func(t *testing.T) {
source := `package im
type CardActionTriggerOutput struct { Host string }
var output = CardActionTriggerOutput{Host: "card.action"}
func update(output *CardActionTriggerOutput) { output.Host = "im.message" }
`
if got := scanTypedDomainEvidenceInPackage(
t,
"github.com/larksuite/cli/events/im",
source,
); len(got) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("unexpected card host evidence: %+v", got)
}
})
t.Run("unknown field ownership is conservative", func(t *testing.T) {
source := "package p\ntype Config struct { Host string }\nvar c = Config{Host: \"api.example.com\"}\n"
if got := scanDomainEvidence(t, source); len(got) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("unexpected untyped field evidence: %+v", got)
}
})
}
func TestHostnameSemanticNames(t *testing.T) {
for _, name := range []string{
"host", "HOST", "hosts", "hostname", "domains",
"api_host", "API_HOST", "ALLOWED_HOSTS",
"apiHost", "APIHost", "backupHostname",
"HostsByRegion", "APIHostsByRegion", "hostsByRegion",
} {
if !isHostnameSemanticName(name) {
t.Errorf("%q should be hostname-semantic", name)
}
}
for _, name := range []string{
"ghost", "hostnameParser", "domainError", "hostValue", "downloadURL", "endpoint", "origin",
"HostBypass", "APIHostBypass",
} {
if isHostnameSemanticName(name) {
t.Errorf("%q must not be hostname-semantic", name)
}
}
}
func TestDomainFixturePaths(t *testing.T) {
for _, path := range []string{
"internal/x/x_test.go",
"tests/cli_e2e/x.go",
"internal/x/testdata/sample.go",
} {
if !isDomainFixturePath(path) {
t.Errorf("%q should be fixture scope", path)
}
}
for _, path := range []string{
"internal/x/test_helper.go",
"examples/demo.go",
"skills/example/testdata/sample.go",
"skills/example/example_test.go",
} {
if isDomainFixturePath(path) {
t.Errorf("%q must not be fixture scope", path)
}
}
}

View File

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
// Command lintcheck runs repository source-contract guards that golangci-lint
// cannot express directly. It currently covers typed-error contracts and the
// resolver-owned endpoint and approved-domain contracts.
// resolver-owned endpoint contract.
//
// lintcheck lives in its own Go module under lint/ so its build-time
// dependency on golang.org/x/tools/go/packages does not leak into the
@@ -43,10 +43,8 @@ type scanner struct {
var scanners = []scanner{
{name: "errscontract", fn: errscontract.ScanRepoWithOptions},
{name: "domaincontract", fn: func(root string, opts errscontract.ScanOptions) ([]lintapi.Violation, error) {
return domaincontract.ScanRepoWithOptions(root, domaincontract.ScanOptions{
ChangedFrom: opts.ChangedFrom,
})
{name: "domaincontract", fn: func(root string, _ errscontract.ScanOptions) ([]lintapi.Violation, error) {
return domaincontract.ScanRepo(root)
}},
}
@@ -59,7 +57,7 @@ func main() {
"Runs every registered lint domain against repo-root (default: current directory).\n")
flag.PrintDefaults()
}
flag.StringVar(&changedFrom, "changed-from", "", "base revision for incremental source-contract checks")
flag.StringVar(&changedFrom, "changed-from", "", "base revision for incremental boundary-error checks")
flag.BoolVar(&printLegacyCommandErrorCandidates, "print-legacy-command-error-candidates", false, "print existing command boundary bare errors as allowlist candidates")
flag.Parse()

4
package-lock.json generated
View File

@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
{
"name": "@larksuite/cli",
"version": "1.0.81",
"version": "1.0.77",
"lockfileVersion": 3,
"requires": true,
"packages": {
"": {
"name": "@larksuite/cli",
"version": "1.0.81",
"version": "1.0.77",
"cpu": [
"x64",
"arm64",

View File

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"name": "@larksuite/cli",
"version": "1.0.81",
"version": "1.0.77",
"description": "The official CLI for Lark/Feishu open platform",
"bin": {
"lark-cli": "scripts/run.js"

View File

@@ -176,15 +176,7 @@ if ! grep -Fq "if: always() && github.event.workflow_run.conclusion == 'success'
exit 1
fi
if grep -Fq 'run.name !== "CI"' "$workflow"; then
echo "semantic-review must not use the dynamic workflow run name as workflow identity" >&2
exit 1
fi
require_in_step "$summary_verify_step" 'github.rest.actions.getWorkflow' "PR quality summary must resolve static workflow metadata"
require_in_step "$summary_verify_step" 'workflow.name !== "CI"' "PR quality summary must verify the static workflow name"
require_in_step "$summary_verify_step" 'workflow.path !== ".github/workflows/ci.yml"' "PR quality summary must verify the static workflow path"
require_in_step "$summary_verify_step" 'run.path && run.path !== workflow.path' "PR quality summary must reject workflow path metadata mismatches"
require_in_step "$summary_verify_step" 'workflowPath !== ".github/workflows/ci.yml"' "PR quality summary must verify the triggering workflow path"
require_in_step "$summary_verify_step" 'run.event !== "pull_request"' "PR quality summary must only handle pull_request workflow_run events"
require_in_step "$summary_verify_step" 'run.repository.id !== context.payload.repository.id' "PR quality summary must verify workflow_run repository id"
require_in_step "$summary_verify_step" 'const targetHeadSha = run.head_sha' "PR quality summary must use the CI run head SHA as the verified PR head"
@@ -209,10 +201,7 @@ require_in_step "$summary_publish_step" 'CI_QUALITY_SUMMARY_BASE_SHA' "PR qualit
require_in_step "$summary_publish_step" 'CI_QUALITY_SUMMARY_RUN_ID' "PR quality summary publisher must receive verified workflow run id"
require_in_step "$summary_publish_step" 'require("./scripts/ci-quality-summary-publish.js")' "PR quality summary publisher must use the shared CI publisher script"
require_in_step "$verify_step" 'github.rest.actions.getWorkflow' "semantic-review must resolve static workflow metadata"
require_in_step "$verify_step" 'workflow.name !== "CI"' "semantic-review must verify the static workflow name"
require_in_step "$verify_step" 'workflow.path !== ".github/workflows/ci.yml"' "semantic-review must verify the static workflow path"
require_in_step "$verify_step" 'run.path && run.path !== workflow.path' "semantic-review must reject workflow path metadata mismatches"
require_in_step "$verify_step" 'workflowPath !== ".github/workflows/ci.yml"' "semantic-review must verify the triggering workflow path"
require_in_step "$verify_step" 'run.repository.id !== context.payload.repository.id' "semantic-review must verify workflow_run repository id"
require_in_step "$verify_step" 'run.event !== "pull_request"' "semantic-review must only handle pull_request workflow_run events"
require_in_step "$verify_step" 'run.conclusion !== "success"' "semantic-review must only consume successful CI runs"

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