opt(round-003): 复测 效果+0.200 token+17 耗时-1612ms → 采纳

* feat: surface search API notices

sa: safe
doc: none
cfg: none
test: unit test

* fix: surface search notices in default output

* docs: add search notice doc comments

* docs: expand search notice doc comments

.github/workflows/release.yml

@@ -9,11 +9,7 @@ permissions:
   contents: read
 
 jobs:
-  # All platforms (incl. darwin keychain_signer) are CGO-free and cross-compiled
-  # on a single ubuntu runner in one goreleaser run (one checksums.txt). The
-  # darwin signer's runtime FFI is validated separately by the signer-test job.
   goreleaser:
-    needs: signer-test-macos
     runs-on: ubuntu-22.04
     permissions:
       contents: write
@@ -38,21 +34,6 @@ jobs:
         env:
           GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
 
-  # Validate the macOS keychain signer on real hardware. The release binaries are
-  # cross-compiled on ubuntu (CGO-free purego FFI), so this is the only step that
-  # needs a Mac — and it gates the release rather than producing it.
-  signer-test-macos:
-    runs-on: macos-latest
-    permissions:
-      contents: read
-    steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
-      - uses: actions/setup-go@40f1582b2485089dde7abd97c1529aa768e1baff # v5
-        with:
-          go-version: '1.23'
-      - name: Keychain signer round-trip (CGO-free purego FFI)
-        run: LARK_KEYCHAIN_IT=1 CGO_ENABLED=0 go test -tags keychain_signer -run Keychain -v ./internal/keysigner/
-
   publish-npm:
     needs: goreleaser
     runs-on: ubuntu-22.04

.goreleaser.yml

@@ -5,53 +5,15 @@ before:
     - python3 scripts/fetch_meta.py
 
 builds:
-  # Linux & Windows: pure-Go TPM 2.0 signer is compiled in by default (no build
-  # tag), cross-compiled with CGO disabled — the binaries ship the platform key
-  # signer for private_key_jwt. windows/arm64 is the one exception: the sks
-  # Windows dependency stack (go-ole) has no arm64 support, so the signer file is
-  # arch-excluded there and that binary falls back to client_secret only.
-  - id: linux
-    binary: lark-cli
-    main: .
+  - binary: lark-cli
     env:
       - CGO_ENABLED=0
-    flags:
-      - -trimpath
-    ldflags:
-      - -s -w -X github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/build.Version={{ .Version }} -X github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/build.Date={{ .Date }}
-    goos:
-      - linux
-    goarch:
-      - amd64
-      - arm64
-  - id: windows
-    binary: lark-cli
-    main: .
-    env:
-      - CGO_ENABLED=0
-    flags:
-      - -trimpath
-    ldflags:
-      - -s -w -X github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/build.Version={{ .Version }} -X github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/build.Date={{ .Date }}
-    goos:
-      - windows
-    goarch:
-      - amd64
-      - arm64
-  # macOS: the keychain signer calls Security.framework via runtime FFI (purego),
-  # so it is CGO-free, compiled into every darwin build (no build tag), and
-  # cross-compiles from the same ubuntu runner as linux/windows.
-  - id: darwin
-    binary: lark-cli
-    main: .
-    env:
-      - CGO_ENABLED=0
-    flags:
-      - -trimpath
     ldflags:
       - -s -w -X github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/build.Version={{ .Version }} -X github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/build.Date={{ .Date }}
     goos:
       - darwin
+      - linux
+      - windows
     goarch:
       - amd64
       - arm64
@@ -61,7 +23,7 @@ archives:
   - name_template: "lark-cli-{{ .Version }}-{{ .Os }}-{{ .Arch }}"
     format_overrides:
       - goos: windows
-        formats: [zip]
+        format: zip
     files:
       - README.md
       - LICENSE

Makefile

@@ -33,11 +33,7 @@ build: fetch_meta
 	go build -trimpath -ldflags "$(LDFLAGS)" -o $(BINARY) .
 
 vet: fetch_meta
-	# -unsafeptr=false: the macOS keychain signer dereferences dylib data-symbol
-	# addresses from purego.Dlsym (uintptr->unsafe.Pointer over stable C memory) —
-	# safe FFI, but go vet's unsafeptr can't prove it and has no inline suppress.
-	# golangci-lint still runs full govet (honoring the //nolint:govet) in CI.
-	go vet -unsafeptr=false ./...
+	go vet ./...
 
 # fmt-check fails when any file would be reformatted by gofmt. Keep this
 # in sync with the fast-gate "Check formatting" step in CI.

cmd/auth/login.go

@@ -265,7 +265,7 @@ func authLoginRun(opts *LoginOptions) error {
 	if err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
-	authResp, err := larkauth.RequestDeviceAuthorization(opts.Ctx, httpClient, larkauth.ClientAuthFromConfig(config), config.Brand, finalScope, f.IOStreams.ErrOut)
+	authResp, err := larkauth.RequestDeviceAuthorization(httpClient, config.AppID, config.AppSecret, config.Brand, finalScope, f.IOStreams.ErrOut)
 	if err != nil {
 		return errs.NewAuthenticationError(errs.SubtypeUnknown, "device authorization failed: %v", err).WithCause(err)
 	}
@@ -325,7 +325,7 @@ func authLoginRun(opts *LoginOptions) error {
 
 	// Step 3: Poll for token
 	log(msg.WaitingAuth)
-	result := pollDeviceToken(opts.Ctx, httpClient, larkauth.ClientAuthFromConfig(config), config.Brand,
+	result := pollDeviceToken(opts.Ctx, httpClient, config.AppID, config.AppSecret, config.Brand,
 		authResp.DeviceCode, authResp.Interval, authResp.ExpiresIn, f.IOStreams.ErrOut)
 
 	if !result.OK {
@@ -415,7 +415,7 @@ func authLoginPollDeviceCode(opts *LoginOptions, config *core.CliConfig, msg *lo
 		fmt.Fprintln(f.IOStreams.ErrOut, msg.AgentTimeoutHint)
 	}
 	log(msg.WaitingAuth)
-	result := pollDeviceToken(opts.Ctx, httpClient, larkauth.ClientAuthFromConfig(config), config.Brand,
+	result := pollDeviceToken(opts.Ctx, httpClient, config.AppID, config.AppSecret, config.Brand,
 		opts.DeviceCode, 5, 600, f.IOStreams.ErrOut)
 
 	if !result.OK {

cmd/auth/login_test.go

@@ -847,7 +847,7 @@ func TestAuthLoginRun_DeviceCodeTokenNilCleansScopeCache(t *testing.T) {
 
 	original := pollDeviceToken
 	t.Cleanup(func() { pollDeviceToken = original })
-	pollDeviceToken = func(ctx context.Context, httpClient *http.Client, ca larkauth.ClientAuth, brand core.LarkBrand, deviceCode string, interval, expiresIn int, errOut io.Writer) *larkauth.DeviceFlowResult {
+	pollDeviceToken = func(ctx context.Context, httpClient *http.Client, appId, appSecret string, brand core.LarkBrand, deviceCode string, interval, expiresIn int, errOut io.Writer) *larkauth.DeviceFlowResult {
 		return &larkauth.DeviceFlowResult{OK: true, Token: nil}
 	}
 
@@ -886,7 +886,7 @@ func TestAuthLoginRun_JSONAbort_StdoutEventOnly_StderrEmpty(t *testing.T) {
 
 	original := pollDeviceToken
 	t.Cleanup(func() { pollDeviceToken = original })
-	pollDeviceToken = func(ctx context.Context, httpClient *http.Client, ca larkauth.ClientAuth, brand core.LarkBrand, deviceCode string, interval, expiresIn int, errOut io.Writer) *larkauth.DeviceFlowResult {
+	pollDeviceToken = func(ctx context.Context, httpClient *http.Client, appId, appSecret string, brand core.LarkBrand, deviceCode string, interval, expiresIn int, errOut io.Writer) *larkauth.DeviceFlowResult {
 		return &larkauth.DeviceFlowResult{OK: false, Message: "user denied"}
 	}
 

cmd/config/config_test.go

@@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ func TestSaveInitConfig_OmitLangPreservesPrior(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("seed config: %v", err)
 	}
 
-	if err := saveInitConfig("", existing, f, "cli_x", core.PlainSecret("s2"), core.BrandFeishu, "", "", nil); err != nil {
+	if err := saveInitConfig("", existing, f, "cli_x", core.PlainSecret("s2"), core.BrandFeishu, ""); err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("saveInitConfig (no --lang): %v", err)
 	}
 
@@ -206,88 +206,6 @@ func TestSaveInitConfig_OmitLangPreservesPrior(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-func TestKeyRefFromResult_PrivateKeyJWT(t *testing.T) {
-	ref := keyRefFromResult(&configInitResult{
-		AuthMethod: core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT,
-		KeyLabel:   "lark-cli-default",
-	})
-	if ref == nil {
-		t.Fatal("keyRefFromResult returned nil")
-	}
-	if ref.Source != "tee" || ref.ID != "lark-cli-default" {
-		t.Fatalf("key ref = %#v, want tee/lark-cli-default", ref)
-	}
-
-	if ref := keyRefFromResult(&configInitResult{AuthMethod: core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT}); ref != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("missing key label should not persist key ref, got %#v", ref)
-	}
-	if ref := keyRefFromResult(&configInitResult{AuthMethod: core.AuthMethodClientSecret, KeyLabel: "ignored"}); ref != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("client_secret should not persist key ref, got %#v", ref)
-	}
-	if ref := keyRefFromResult(nil); ref != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("nil result should not persist key ref, got %#v", ref)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestSaveInitConfig_PrivateKeyJWTSingleAppPersistsSecretlessAuth(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
-	f, _, _, _ := cmdutil.TestFactory(t, nil)
-
-	keyRef := &core.SecretRef{Source: "tee", ID: "lark-cli-default"}
-	if err := saveInitConfig("", nil, f, "cli_pkjwt", core.SecretInput{}, core.BrandFeishu, "en_us", core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT, keyRef); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("saveInitConfig private_key_jwt single app: %v", err)
-	}
-
-	got, err := core.LoadMultiAppConfig()
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("LoadMultiAppConfig: %v", err)
-	}
-	if len(got.Apps) != 1 {
-		t.Fatalf("apps len = %d, want 1", len(got.Apps))
-	}
-	app := got.Apps[0]
-	if app.AppId != "cli_pkjwt" {
-		t.Fatalf("AppId = %q, want cli_pkjwt", app.AppId)
-	}
-	if app.AuthMethod != core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT {
-		t.Fatalf("AuthMethod = %q, want private_key_jwt", app.AuthMethod)
-	}
-	if app.KeyRef == nil || app.KeyRef.Source != "tee" || app.KeyRef.ID != "lark-cli-default" {
-		t.Fatalf("KeyRef = %#v, want tee/lark-cli-default", app.KeyRef)
-	}
-	if app.AppSecret.Ref != nil || app.AppSecret.Plain != "" {
-		t.Fatalf("private_key_jwt config must stay secretless, AppSecret=%#v", app.AppSecret)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestSaveInitConfig_PrivateKeyJWTProfilePersistsSecretlessAuth(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
-	f, _, _, _ := cmdutil.TestFactory(t, nil)
-
-	keyRef := &core.SecretRef{Source: "tee", ID: "lark-cli-default"}
-	if err := saveInitConfig("prod", &core.MultiAppConfig{}, f, "cli_pkjwt", core.SecretInput{}, core.BrandLark, "en_us", core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT, keyRef); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("saveInitConfig private_key_jwt profile: %v", err)
-	}
-
-	got, err := core.LoadMultiAppConfig()
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("LoadMultiAppConfig: %v", err)
-	}
-	app := got.FindApp("prod")
-	if app == nil {
-		t.Fatalf("profile prod not saved: %#v", got.Apps)
-	}
-	if app.AuthMethod != core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT {
-		t.Fatalf("AuthMethod = %q, want private_key_jwt", app.AuthMethod)
-	}
-	if app.KeyRef == nil || app.KeyRef.Source != "tee" || app.KeyRef.ID != "lark-cli-default" {
-		t.Fatalf("KeyRef = %#v, want tee/lark-cli-default", app.KeyRef)
-	}
-	if app.AppSecret.Ref != nil || app.AppSecret.Plain != "" {
-		t.Fatalf("private_key_jwt profile must stay secretless, AppSecret=%#v", app.AppSecret)
-	}
-}
-
 // TestConfigInitCmd_InvalidLang verifies a non-empty --lang on config init is
 // strictly validated the same way bind validates: wrong-case / typo / removed
 // codes / hyphen form all exit with ExitValidation. (Empty is a no-op.)
@@ -470,7 +388,7 @@ func TestSaveAsProfile_RejectsProfileNameCollisionWithExistingAppID(t *testing.T
 		},
 	}
 
-	err := saveAsProfile(existing, keychain.KeychainAccess(&noopConfigKeychain{}), "cli_prod", "app-new", core.PlainSecret("new-secret"), core.BrandLark, "en", "", nil)
+	err := saveAsProfile(existing, keychain.KeychainAccess(&noopConfigKeychain{}), "cli_prod", "app-new", core.PlainSecret("new-secret"), core.BrandLark, "en")
 	if err == nil {
 		t.Fatal("expected conflict error")
 	}
@@ -509,46 +427,6 @@ func TestWrapSaveConfigError_PassesTypedValidationThrough(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-func TestSaveAsProfile_UpdatePersistsPrivateKeyJWT(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
-
-	existing := &core.MultiAppConfig{
-		Apps: []core.AppConfig{{
-			Name:      "prod",
-			AppId:     "cli_prod",
-			AppSecret: core.PlainSecret("old-secret"),
-			Brand:     core.BrandFeishu,
-			Users:     []core.AppUser{{UserOpenId: "ou_1", UserName: "User"}},
-		}},
-	}
-	keyRef := &core.SecretRef{Source: "tee", ID: "lark-cli-default"}
-
-	if err := saveAsProfile(existing, keychain.KeychainAccess(&noopConfigKeychain{}), "prod", "cli_prod", core.SecretInput{}, core.BrandLark, "en_us", core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT, keyRef); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("saveAsProfile update private_key_jwt: %v", err)
-	}
-
-	got, err := core.LoadMultiAppConfig()
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("LoadMultiAppConfig: %v", err)
-	}
-	app := got.FindApp("prod")
-	if app == nil {
-		t.Fatalf("profile prod not saved: %#v", got.Apps)
-	}
-	if app.AuthMethod != core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT {
-		t.Fatalf("AuthMethod = %q, want private_key_jwt", app.AuthMethod)
-	}
-	if app.KeyRef == nil || app.KeyRef.Source != "tee" || app.KeyRef.ID != "lark-cli-default" {
-		t.Fatalf("KeyRef = %#v, want tee/lark-cli-default", app.KeyRef)
-	}
-	if app.AppSecret.Ref != nil || app.AppSecret.Plain != "" {
-		t.Fatalf("private_key_jwt update must stay secretless, AppSecret=%#v", app.AppSecret)
-	}
-	if len(app.Users) != 1 || app.Users[0].UserOpenId != "ou_1" {
-		t.Fatalf("same-app update should preserve users, Users=%#v", app.Users)
-	}
-}
-
 func TestUpdateExistingProfileWithoutSecret_RejectsAppIDChange(t *testing.T) {
 	multi := &core.MultiAppConfig{
 		CurrentApp: "prod",

cmd/config/init.go

@@ -19,7 +19,6 @@ import (
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/i18n"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/keychain"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/keysigner"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/output"
 )
 
@@ -32,7 +31,6 @@ type ConfigInitOptions struct {
 	AppSecretStdin bool   // read app-secret from stdin (avoids process list exposure)
 	Brand          string
 	New            bool
-	AuthMethod     string // --auth-method for --new: "" (default client_secret) | private_key_jwt
 
 	Lang         string // raw --lang (string for cobra); normalized to canonical/"" in validateInitLang
 	langExplicit bool   // true when --lang was explicitly passed
@@ -41,8 +39,6 @@ type ConfigInitOptions struct {
 
 	ProfileName string // when set, create/update a named profile instead of replacing Apps[0]
 
-	Restore bool // Restore re-registers the app already in config to recover a lost credential
-
 	// ForceInit overrides the agent-workspace guard. Without it, running
 	// init under OPENCLAW_HOME / HERMES_HOME refuses and points the caller
 	// at config bind — which is what AI agents almost always want. Manual
@@ -85,13 +81,11 @@ if the user explicitly wants a separate app inside the Agent workspace.`,
 	}
 
 	cmd.Flags().BoolVar(&opts.New, "new", false, "create a new app directly (skip mode selection)")
-	cmd.Flags().StringVar(&opts.AuthMethod, "auth-method", "", "auth method for --new: client_secret (default) or private_key_jwt (signed by a platform key, no app secret)")
 	cmd.Flags().StringVar(&opts.AppID, "app-id", "", "App ID (non-interactive)")
 	cmd.Flags().BoolVar(&opts.AppSecretStdin, "app-secret-stdin", false, "Read App Secret from stdin to avoid process list exposure")
 	cmd.Flags().StringVar(&opts.Brand, "brand", "feishu", "feishu or lark (non-interactive, default feishu)")
 	cmd.Flags().StringVar(&opts.Lang, "lang", "", "language preference (e.g. zh or zh_cn)")
 	cmd.Flags().StringVar(&opts.ProfileName, "name", "", "create or update a named profile (append instead of replace)")
-	cmd.Flags().BoolVar(&opts.Restore, "restore", false, "re-register the app already in config to recover a lost credential (keychain key / app secret); reuses the stored app ID and auth method")
 	cmd.Flags().BoolVar(&opts.ForceInit, "force-init", false, "allow init inside an Agent workspace (OPENCLAW_HOME / HERMES_HOME); use config bind instead unless you really want a separate app")
 	cmdutil.SetRisk(cmd, "write")
 
@@ -138,7 +132,7 @@ func guardAgentWorkspace(opts *ConfigInitOptions) error {
 
 // hasAnyNonInteractiveFlag returns true if any non-interactive flag is set.
 func (o *ConfigInitOptions) hasAnyNonInteractiveFlag() bool {
-	return o.New || o.Restore || o.AppID != "" || o.AppSecretStdin
+	return o.New || o.AppID != "" || o.AppSecretStdin
 }
 
 // cleanupOldConfig clears keychain entries (AppSecret + UAT) for all apps in existing config except the app whose AppId equals skipAppID.
@@ -157,44 +151,11 @@ func cleanupOldConfig(existing *core.MultiAppConfig, f *cmdutil.Factory, skipApp
 	}
 }
 
-// removeStaleSecretForPKJWT clears a secret left in the keychain when the SAME
-// appId is migrated from client_secret to private_key_jwt. cleanupOldConfig
-// explicitly skips a matching appId, and saveAsProfile only cleans up on an
-// appId change, so a same-appId migration would orphan the old secret. This
-// fills that gap. RemoveSecretStore only deletes Source=="keychain" entries, so
-// the new pkjwt tee key handle is never touched.
-func removeStaleSecretForPKJWT(existing *core.MultiAppConfig, profileName, appID string, kc keychain.KeychainAccess) {
-	if existing == nil {
-		return
-	}
-	var prior *core.AppConfig
-	if profileName != "" {
-		if idx := findProfileIndexByName(existing, profileName); idx >= 0 {
-			prior = &existing.Apps[idx]
-		}
-	} else {
-		prior = existing.CurrentAppConfig("")
-	}
-	if prior != nil && prior.AppId == appID && !prior.AppSecret.IsZero() {
-		core.RemoveSecretStore(prior.AppSecret, kc)
-	}
-}
-
-// keyRefFromResult builds the TEE key reference to persist for a private_key_jwt
-// registration result, or nil for client_secret.
-func keyRefFromResult(r *configInitResult) *core.SecretRef {
-	if r != nil && r.AuthMethod == core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT && r.KeyLabel != "" {
-		return &core.SecretRef{Source: "tee", ID: r.KeyLabel}
-	}
-	return nil
-}
-
 // saveAsOnlyApp overwrites config.json with a single-app config.
-func saveAsOnlyApp(appId string, secret core.SecretInput, brand core.LarkBrand, lang, authMethod string, keyRef *core.SecretRef) error {
+func saveAsOnlyApp(appId string, secret core.SecretInput, brand core.LarkBrand, lang string) error {
 	config := &core.MultiAppConfig{
 		Apps: []core.AppConfig{{
 			AppId: appId, AppSecret: secret, Brand: brand, Lang: i18n.Lang(lang), Users: []core.AppUser{},
-			AuthMethod: authMethod, KeyRef: keyRef,
 		}},
 	}
 	return core.SaveMultiAppConfig(config)
@@ -203,11 +164,9 @@ func saveAsOnlyApp(appId string, secret core.SecretInput, brand core.LarkBrand,
 // saveInitConfig saves a new/updated app config, respecting --profile mode.
 // With profileName: appends or updates the named profile (preserves other profiles).
 // Without profileName: cleans up old config and saves as the only app.
-// authMethod/keyRef carry the credential type: ("", nil) for client_secret,
-// (private_key_jwt, &{tee,label}) for the secretless TEE flow.
-func saveInitConfig(profileName string, existing *core.MultiAppConfig, f *cmdutil.Factory, appId string, secret core.SecretInput, brand core.LarkBrand, lang, authMethod string, keyRef *core.SecretRef) error {
+func saveInitConfig(profileName string, existing *core.MultiAppConfig, f *cmdutil.Factory, appId string, secret core.SecretInput, brand core.LarkBrand, lang string) error {
 	if profileName != "" {
-		return saveAsProfile(existing, f.Keychain, profileName, appId, secret, brand, lang, authMethod, keyRef)
+		return saveAsProfile(existing, f.Keychain, profileName, appId, secret, brand, lang)
 	}
 	cleanupOldConfig(existing, f, appId)
 	var prior i18n.Lang
@@ -216,7 +175,7 @@ func saveInitConfig(profileName string, existing *core.MultiAppConfig, f *cmduti
 			prior = app.Lang
 		}
 	}
-	return saveAsOnlyApp(appId, secret, brand, string(preferredLang(i18n.Lang(lang), prior)), authMethod, keyRef)
+	return saveAsOnlyApp(appId, secret, brand, string(preferredLang(i18n.Lang(lang), prior)))
 }
 
 // wrapSaveConfigError passes an already-typed error (e.g. the --name conflict
@@ -236,7 +195,7 @@ func wrapSaveConfigError(err error) error {
 // saveAsProfile appends or updates a named profile in the config.
 // If a profile with the same name exists, it updates it; otherwise appends.
 // When updating, cleans up old keychain secrets if AppId changed.
-func saveAsProfile(existing *core.MultiAppConfig, kc keychain.KeychainAccess, profileName, appId string, secret core.SecretInput, brand core.LarkBrand, lang, authMethod string, keyRef *core.SecretRef) error {
+func saveAsProfile(existing *core.MultiAppConfig, kc keychain.KeychainAccess, profileName, appId string, secret core.SecretInput, brand core.LarkBrand, lang string) error {
 	multi := existing
 	if multi == nil {
 		multi = &core.MultiAppConfig{}
@@ -255,8 +214,6 @@ func saveAsProfile(existing *core.MultiAppConfig, kc keychain.KeychainAccess, pr
 		multi.Apps[idx].AppSecret = secret
 		multi.Apps[idx].Brand = brand
 		multi.Apps[idx].Lang = preferredLang(i18n.Lang(lang), multi.Apps[idx].Lang)
-		multi.Apps[idx].AuthMethod = authMethod
-		multi.Apps[idx].KeyRef = keyRef
 	} else {
 		if findAppIndexByAppID(multi, profileName) >= 0 {
 			return errs.NewValidationError(errs.SubtypeInvalidArgument,
@@ -265,14 +222,12 @@ func saveAsProfile(existing *core.MultiAppConfig, kc keychain.KeychainAccess, pr
 		}
 		// Append new profile
 		multi.Apps = append(multi.Apps, core.AppConfig{
-			Name:       profileName,
-			AppId:      appId,
-			AppSecret:  secret,
-			Brand:      brand,
-			Lang:       i18n.Lang(lang),
-			Users:      []core.AppUser{},
-			AuthMethod: authMethod,
-			KeyRef:     keyRef,
+			Name:      profileName,
+			AppId:     appId,
+			AppSecret: secret,
+			Brand:     brand,
+			Lang:      i18n.Lang(lang),
+			Users:     []core.AppUser{},
 		})
 	}
 	return core.SaveMultiAppConfig(multi)
@@ -350,94 +305,6 @@ func updateExistingProfileWithoutSecret(existing *core.MultiAppConfig, profileNa
 	return core.SaveMultiAppConfig(existing)
 }
 
-// persistAndProbeResult saves a registration/restore result into profileName and
-// runs the post-registration probe. profileName == "" replaces the single app
-// (legacy); a named profile is updated in place. Shared by --new and --restore.
-func persistAndProbeResult(opts *ConfigInitOptions, f *cmdutil.Factory, profileName string, result *configInitResult) error {
-	existing, _ := core.LoadMultiAppConfig()
-
-	// private_key_jwt apps have no secret: persist auth method + TEE key ref.
-	// Registration success already validated the key (server bound the public
-	// key), so the app_secret probe is skipped.
-	if result.AuthMethod == core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT {
-		if err := saveInitConfig(profileName, existing, f, result.AppID, core.SecretInput{}, result.Brand, opts.Lang, result.AuthMethod, keyRefFromResult(result)); err != nil {
-			return wrapSaveConfigError(err)
-		}
-		removeStaleSecretForPKJWT(existing, profileName, result.AppID, f.Keychain)
-		printLangPreferenceConfirmation(opts)
-		output.PrintJson(f.IOStreams.Out, map[string]interface{}{"appId": result.AppID, "authMethod": result.AuthMethod, "brand": result.Brand})
-		return runProbePKJWT(opts.Ctx, f, result.Brand, result.AppID, keysigner.Active(), result.KeyLabel)
-	}
-
-	secret, err := core.ForStorage(result.AppID, core.PlainSecret(result.AppSecret), f.Keychain)
-	if err != nil {
-		return errs.NewInternalError(errs.SubtypeSDKError, "%v", err).WithCause(err)
-	}
-	if err := saveInitConfig(profileName, existing, f, result.AppID, secret, result.Brand, opts.Lang, "", nil); err != nil {
-		return wrapSaveConfigError(err)
-	}
-	printLangPreferenceConfirmation(opts)
-	output.PrintJson(f.IOStreams.Out, map[string]interface{}{"appId": result.AppID, "appSecret": "****", "brand": result.Brand})
-	return runProbe(opts.Ctx, f, result.AppID, result.AppSecret, result.Brand)
-}
-
-// runRestoreFlow re-registers the app already in config to recover a lost
-// credential (deleted keychain key / lost app secret). It reads the existing
-// app id + auth method + brand from config (no secret needed — that's the lost
-// part) and re-runs the device-flow registration with the app id sent on begin,
-// so the server re-registers that app instead of creating a new one. The
-// re-issued credential is written back to the same profile.
-func runRestoreFlow(opts *ConfigInitOptions, existing *core.MultiAppConfig, f *cmdutil.Factory, msg *initMsg) error {
-	if existing == nil {
-		return errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeNotConfigured, "nothing to restore: no config found").
-			WithHint("run: lark-cli config init")
-	}
-	app := existing.CurrentAppConfig(opts.ProfileName)
-	if app == nil || app.AppId == "" {
-		return errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeNotConfigured, "nothing to restore: no app id in config%s", profileSuffix(opts.ProfileName)).
-			WithHint("run: lark-cli config init")
-	}
-
-	restoreAppID := app.AppId
-	// Reuse the stored auth method authoritatively — never prompt. Empty on disk
-	// means client_secret (omitempty back-compat); pass it explicitly so
-	// resolveRegisterAuthMethod doesn't fall through to the interactive picker.
-	authMethod := app.AuthMethod
-	if authMethod == "" {
-		authMethod = core.AuthMethodClientSecret
-	}
-	result, err := runCreateAppFlow(opts.Ctx, f, app.Brand, authMethod, msg, restoreAppID)
-	if err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	if result == nil {
-		return errs.NewInternalError(errs.SubtypeSDKError, "app restore returned no result")
-	}
-
-	// Safety: if the server did not honor app_id (e.g. not yet supported), it may
-	// have created a NEW app instead of restoring. Warn so the user is not silently
-	// switched to a different app id.
-	if result.AppID != restoreAppID {
-		fmt.Fprintf(f.IOStreams.ErrOut, "[lark-cli] [WARN] restore: server returned app %s, expected %s — it may have created a new app instead of restoring\n", result.AppID, restoreAppID)
-	}
-
-	// Write back to the profile we restored: an explicit --name, else the resolved
-	// app's own name. Empty name => legacy single-app replace.
-	saveProfile := opts.ProfileName
-	if saveProfile == "" {
-		saveProfile = app.Name
-	}
-	return persistAndProbeResult(opts, f, saveProfile, result)
-}
-
-// profileSuffix renders " (profile %q)" for error messages, or "" when unnamed.
-func profileSuffix(profileName string) string {
-	if profileName == "" {
-		return ""
-	}
-	return fmt.Sprintf(" (profile %q)", profileName)
-}
-
 func configInitRun(opts *ConfigInitOptions) error {
 	f := opts.Factory
 
@@ -468,17 +335,6 @@ func configInitRun(opts *ConfigInitOptions) error {
 		}
 	}
 
-	// --restore recovers an existing app; it is incompatible with creating a new
-	// app (--new) or importing one non-interactively (--app-id / stdin secret).
-	if opts.Restore {
-		if opts.New {
-			return errs.NewValidationError(errs.SubtypeInvalidArgument, "--restore cannot be combined with --new").WithParam("--restore")
-		}
-		if opts.AppID != "" || opts.AppSecretStdin {
-			return errs.NewValidationError(errs.SubtypeInvalidArgument, "--restore cannot be combined with --app-id / --app-secret-stdin").WithParam("--restore")
-		}
-	}
-
 	// Mode 1: Non-interactive
 	if opts.AppID != "" && opts.appSecret != "" {
 		brand := parseBrand(opts.Brand)
@@ -486,7 +342,7 @@ func configInitRun(opts *ConfigInitOptions) error {
 		if err != nil {
 			return errs.NewInternalError(errs.SubtypeSDKError, "%v", err).WithCause(err)
 		}
-		if err := saveInitConfig(opts.ProfileName, existing, f, opts.AppID, secret, brand, opts.Lang, "", nil); err != nil {
+		if err := saveInitConfig(opts.ProfileName, existing, f, opts.AppID, secret, brand, opts.Lang); err != nil {
 			return wrapSaveConfigError(err)
 		}
 		output.PrintSuccess(f.IOStreams.ErrOut, fmt.Sprintf("Configuration saved to %s", core.GetConfigPath()))
@@ -512,26 +368,34 @@ func configInitRun(opts *ConfigInitOptions) error {
 
 	msg := getInitMsg(opts.UILang)
 
-	// Mode: Restore (--restore) — re-register the app already in config.
-	if opts.Restore {
-		return runRestoreFlow(opts, existing, f, msg)
-	}
-
 	// Mode 3: Create new app directly (--new)
 	if opts.New {
-		result, err := runCreateAppFlow(opts.Ctx, f, parseBrand(opts.Brand), opts.AuthMethod, msg, "")
+		result, err := runCreateAppFlow(opts.Ctx, f, parseBrand(opts.Brand), msg)
 		if err != nil {
 			return err
 		}
 		if result == nil {
 			return errs.NewInternalError(errs.SubtypeSDKError, "app creation returned no result")
 		}
-		return persistAndProbeResult(opts, f, opts.ProfileName, result)
+		existing, _ := core.LoadMultiAppConfig()
+		secret, err := core.ForStorage(result.AppID, core.PlainSecret(result.AppSecret), f.Keychain)
+		if err != nil {
+			return errs.NewInternalError(errs.SubtypeSDKError, "%v", err).WithCause(err)
+		}
+		if err := saveInitConfig(opts.ProfileName, existing, f, result.AppID, secret, result.Brand, opts.Lang); err != nil {
+			return wrapSaveConfigError(err)
+		}
+		printLangPreferenceConfirmation(opts)
+		output.PrintJson(f.IOStreams.Out, map[string]interface{}{"appId": result.AppID, "appSecret": "****", "brand": result.Brand})
+		if err := runProbe(opts.Ctx, f, result.AppID, result.AppSecret, result.Brand); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		return nil
 	}
 
 	// Mode 4: Interactive TUI (terminal)
 	if !opts.hasAnyNonInteractiveFlag() && f.IOStreams.IsTerminal {
-		result, err := runInteractiveConfigInit(opts.Ctx, f, opts.AuthMethod, msg)
+		result, err := runInteractiveConfigInit(opts.Ctx, f, msg)
 		if err != nil {
 			return err
 		}
@@ -542,22 +406,13 @@ func configInitRun(opts *ConfigInitOptions) error {
 
 		existing, _ := core.LoadMultiAppConfig()
 
-		if result.AuthMethod == core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT {
-			// Secretless create: persist auth method + TEE key ref, no secret.
-			if err := saveInitConfig(opts.ProfileName, existing, f, result.AppID, core.SecretInput{}, result.Brand, opts.Lang, result.AuthMethod, keyRefFromResult(result)); err != nil {
-				return wrapSaveConfigError(err)
-			}
-			removeStaleSecretForPKJWT(existing, opts.ProfileName, result.AppID, f.Keychain)
-			if err := runProbePKJWT(opts.Ctx, f, result.Brand, result.AppID, keysigner.Active(), result.KeyLabel); err != nil {
-				return err
-			}
-		} else if result.AppSecret != "" {
+		if result.AppSecret != "" {
 			// New secret provided (either from "create" or "existing" with input)
 			secret, err := core.ForStorage(result.AppID, core.PlainSecret(result.AppSecret), f.Keychain)
 			if err != nil {
 				return errs.NewInternalError(errs.SubtypeSDKError, "%v", err).WithCause(err)
 			}
-			if err := saveInitConfig(opts.ProfileName, existing, f, result.AppID, secret, result.Brand, opts.Lang, "", nil); err != nil {
+			if err := saveInitConfig(opts.ProfileName, existing, f, result.AppID, secret, result.Brand, opts.Lang); err != nil {
 				return wrapSaveConfigError(err)
 			}
 		} else if result.Mode == "existing" && result.AppID != "" {
@@ -662,7 +517,7 @@ func configInitRun(opts *ConfigInitOptions) error {
 	if err != nil {
 		return errs.NewInternalError(errs.SubtypeSDKError, "%v", err).WithCause(err)
 	}
-	if err := saveInitConfig(opts.ProfileName, existing, f, resolvedAppId, storedSecret, parseBrand(resolvedBrand), opts.Lang, "", nil); err != nil {
+	if err := saveInitConfig(opts.ProfileName, existing, f, resolvedAppId, storedSecret, parseBrand(resolvedBrand), opts.Lang); err != nil {
 		return wrapSaveConfigError(err)
 	}
 	output.PrintSuccess(f.IOStreams.ErrOut, fmt.Sprintf("Configuration saved to %s", core.GetConfigPath()))

cmd/config/init_auth_method_test.go

@@ -1,102 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
-
-package config
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"crypto"
-	"testing"
-
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/cmdutil"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/keysigner"
-)
-
-type authMethodTestSigner struct{}
-
-func (authMethodTestSigner) EnsureKey(context.Context, keysigner.KeyRef) (crypto.PublicKey, error) {
-	return nil, nil
-}
-
-func (authMethodTestSigner) PublicKey(context.Context, keysigner.KeyRef) (crypto.PublicKey, error) {
-	return nil, nil
-}
-
-func (authMethodTestSigner) Sign(context.Context, keysigner.KeyRef, []byte) ([]byte, string, error) {
-	return nil, "", nil
-}
-
-// TestResolveRegisterAuthMethod covers the non-interactive gating paths. The
-// darwin keychain signer is compiled into every build, so the test cannot rely
-// on the binary lacking a signer — it forces a known no-signer state for the
-// rejection cases, then registers a stub for the success case.
-func TestResolveRegisterAuthMethod(t *testing.T) {
-	f := &cmdutil.Factory{}
-
-	prevSigner := keysigner.Active()
-	t.Cleanup(func() { keysigner.Register(prevSigner) })
-	keysigner.Register(nil)
-
-	if m, err := resolveRegisterAuthMethod(f, core.AuthMethodClientSecret); err != nil || m != core.AuthMethodClientSecret {
-		t.Errorf("client_secret: got (%q, %v), want (client_secret, nil)", m, err)
-	}
-
-	if m, err := resolveRegisterAuthMethod(f, ""); err != nil || m != core.AuthMethodClientSecret {
-		t.Errorf("default: got (%q, %v), want (client_secret, nil)", m, err)
-	}
-
-	if _, err := resolveRegisterAuthMethod(f, "bogus"); err == nil {
-		t.Error("bogus auth-method: expected error")
-	}
-
-	if _, err := resolveRegisterAuthMethod(f, core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT); err == nil {
-		t.Error("private_key_jwt without a signer: expected error")
-	}
-
-	keysigner.Register(authMethodTestSigner{})
-
-	if m, err := resolveRegisterAuthMethod(f, core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT); err != nil || m != core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT {
-		t.Errorf("private_key_jwt with signer: got (%q, %v), want (private_key_jwt, nil)", m, err)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestValidatePKJWTKeyBinding covers the guard that rejects a registration
-// resolving to private_key_jwt with no signing key bound (e.g. an existing
-// secret-based app was selected on the confirm page).
-func TestValidatePKJWTKeyBinding(t *testing.T) {
-	if err := validatePKJWTKeyBinding(core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT, ""); err == nil {
-		t.Error("pkjwt with empty keyLabel: expected error")
-	}
-	if err := validatePKJWTKeyBinding(core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT, "agent-key"); err != nil {
-		t.Errorf("pkjwt with keyLabel: expected nil, got %v", err)
-	}
-	if err := validatePKJWTKeyBinding(core.AuthMethodClientSecret, ""); err != nil {
-		t.Errorf("client_secret: expected nil, got %v", err)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestResolveFinalAuthMethod locks the authoritative-method logic. The 2nd case
-// is the real bug: we requested private_key_jwt but the server resolved to an
-// existing client_secret app — we must persist client_secret, not pkjwt.
-func TestResolveFinalAuthMethod(t *testing.T) {
-	if m := resolveFinalAuthMethod([]string{"client_secret", "private_key_jwt"}, core.AuthMethodClientSecret); m != core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT {
-		t.Errorf("prefers private_key_jwt: got %q", m)
-	}
-	if m := resolveFinalAuthMethod([]string{"client_secret"}, core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT); m != core.AuthMethodClientSecret {
-		t.Errorf("server client_secret must override requested pkjwt: got %q", m)
-	}
-	if m := resolveFinalAuthMethod(nil, core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT); m != core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT {
-		t.Errorf("fallback to requested when server is silent: got %q", m)
-	}
-	// Explicit empty slice (not just nil) also falls back to requested — the same
-	// len()==0 back-compat allowance the init guard relies on to let private_key_jwt
-	// proceed against an older server (see internal/auth
-	// TestRequestAppRegistrationInit_EmptySupportedAuthMethods).
-	if m := resolveFinalAuthMethod([]string{}, core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT); m != core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT {
-		t.Errorf("empty []string should fall back to requested private_key_jwt: got %q", m)
-	}
-	if m := resolveFinalAuthMethod(nil, ""); m != core.AuthMethodClientSecret {
-		t.Errorf("default to client_secret: got %q", m)
-	}
-}

cmd/config/init_interactive.go

@@ -5,11 +5,7 @@ package config
 
 import (
 	"context"
-	"errors"
 	"fmt"
-	"slices"
-	"strings"
-	"time"
 
 	"github.com/charmbracelet/huh"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/build"
@@ -17,26 +13,22 @@ import (
 
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/errs"
 	larkauth "github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/auth"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/auth/jwt"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/cmdutil"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/keysigner"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/output"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/transport"
 )
 
 // configInitResult holds the result of the interactive config init flow.
 type configInitResult struct {
-	Mode       string // "create" or "existing"
-	Brand      core.LarkBrand
-	AppID      string
-	AppSecret  string
-	AuthMethod string // "" == client_secret; core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT
-	KeyLabel   string // TEE key handle when AuthMethod == private_key_jwt
+	Mode      string // "create" or "existing"
+	Brand     core.LarkBrand
+	AppID     string
+	AppSecret string
 }
 
 // runInteractiveConfigInit shows an interactive TUI for config init.
-func runInteractiveConfigInit(ctx context.Context, f *cmdutil.Factory, authMethodFlag string, msg *initMsg) (*configInitResult, error) {
+func runInteractiveConfigInit(ctx context.Context, f *cmdutil.Factory, msg *initMsg) (*configInitResult, error) {
 	// Phase 1: Choose mode
 	var mode string
 	form1 := huh.NewForm(
@@ -62,7 +54,7 @@ func runInteractiveConfigInit(ctx context.Context, f *cmdutil.Factory, authMetho
 		return runExistingAppForm(f, msg)
 	}
 
-	return runCreateAppFlow(ctx, f, "", authMethodFlag, msg, "")
+	return runCreateAppFlow(ctx, f, "", msg)
 }
 
 // runExistingAppForm shows a huh form for manually entering App ID / App Secret / Brand.
@@ -154,59 +146,9 @@ func runExistingAppForm(f *cmdutil.Factory, msg *initMsg) (*configInitResult, er
 	}, nil
 }
 
-// resolveRegisterAuthMethod decides the auth method for a new-app registration.
-// An explicit --auth-method flag wins; otherwise, on an interactive terminal with
-// a TEE signer available, the user is prompted; the default is client_secret.
-func resolveRegisterAuthMethod(f *cmdutil.Factory, flag string) (string, error) {
-	signerAvailable := keysigner.Active() != nil
-	switch flag {
-	case core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT:
-		if !signerAvailable {
-			return "", errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeInvalidClient,
-				"--auth-method private_key_jwt requires a platform key signer, which is unavailable on this device/build").
-				WithHint("omit --auth-method (or pass --auth-method client_secret) to register with an app secret")
-		}
-		return core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT, nil
-	case core.AuthMethodClientSecret:
-		return core.AuthMethodClientSecret, nil
-	case "":
-		// fall through to interactive / default
-	default:
-		return "", errs.NewValidationError(errs.SubtypeInvalidArgument,
-			"unknown --auth-method %q (use client_secret or private_key_jwt)", flag)
-	}
-
-	if signerAvailable && f.IOStreams.IsTerminal {
-		var choice string
-		form := huh.NewForm(
-			huh.NewGroup(
-				huh.NewSelect[string]().
-					Title("Authentication method").
-					Options(
-						huh.NewOption("App Secret (client_secret)", core.AuthMethodClientSecret),
-						huh.NewOption("Secure key signer, no secret (private_key_jwt)", core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT),
-					).
-					Value(&choice),
-			),
-		).WithTheme(cmdutil.ThemeFeishu())
-		if err := form.Run(); err != nil {
-			if errors.Is(err, huh.ErrUserAborted) {
-				return "", output.ErrBare(1)
-			}
-			return "", err
-		}
-		return choice, nil
-	}
-	return core.AuthMethodClientSecret, nil
-}
-
 // runCreateAppFlow runs the "create new app" flow via OpenClaw device flow.
 // If brandOverride is non-empty, skip the interactive brand selection.
-// authMethodFlag is the raw --auth-method value ("" when unset).
-// restoreAppID, when non-empty, is sent on the registration begin request so the
-// server re-registers that existing app (credential recovery) instead of creating
-// a new one. Empty preserves the normal new-app flow.
-func runCreateAppFlow(ctx context.Context, f *cmdutil.Factory, brandOverride core.LarkBrand, authMethodFlag string, msg *initMsg, restoreAppID string) (*configInitResult, error) {
+func runCreateAppFlow(ctx context.Context, f *cmdutil.Factory, brandOverride core.LarkBrand, msg *initMsg) (*configInitResult, error) {
 	var larkBrand core.LarkBrand
 	if brandOverride != "" {
 		larkBrand = brandOverride
@@ -234,51 +176,11 @@ func runCreateAppFlow(ctx context.Context, f *cmdutil.Factory, brandOverride cor
 		larkBrand = parseBrand(brand)
 	}
 
-	authMethod, err := resolveRegisterAuthMethod(f, authMethodFlag)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-
-	// Step 1: Request app registration (begin).
+	// Step 1: Request app registration (begin)
 	// Use the shared proxy-plugin-aware transport so registration traffic is not
 	// a bypass of proxy plugin mode.
 	httpClient := transport.NewHTTPClient(0)
-
-	// For private_key_jwt: init to obtain a nonce, then sign a TEE attestation
-	// (carrying the public key in its jwk header) to send with begin.
-	beginOpts := larkauth.AppRegistrationBeginOptions{}
-	keyLabel := ""
-	if authMethod == core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT {
-		signer := keysigner.Active() // non-nil, guaranteed by resolveRegisterAuthMethod
-		initResp, initErr := larkauth.RequestAppRegistrationInit(httpClient)
-		if initErr != nil {
-			return nil, errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeInvalidClient, "app registration init failed: %v", initErr).WithCause(initErr)
-		}
-		// An empty SupportedAuthMethods is intentionally treated as "older server /
-		// unknown": len()==0 makes this guard false, so the requested
-		// private_key_jwt proceeds. This mirrors resolveFinalAuthMethod's
-		// back-compat fallback to the requested method. Only an explicit list that
-		// omits private_key_jwt rejects here.
-		if len(initResp.SupportedAuthMethods) > 0 && !slices.Contains(initResp.SupportedAuthMethods, core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT) {
-			return nil, errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeInvalidClient,
-				"server does not support private_key_jwt for this app type (supported: %s)", strings.Join(initResp.SupportedAuthMethods, ", ")).
-				WithHint("register with --auth-method client_secret instead")
-		}
-		keyLabel = keysigner.DefaultKeyLabel
-		attestation, signErr := jwt.SignAttestation(ctx, signer, keysigner.KeyRef{Label: keyLabel}, initResp.Nonce, time.Now())
-		if signErr != nil {
-			return nil, errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeInvalidClient, "failed to sign registration attestation: %v", signErr).WithCause(signErr)
-		}
-		beginOpts = larkauth.AppRegistrationBeginOptions{
-			AuthMethod:      core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT,
-			AuthAttestation: attestation,
-		}
-	}
-
-	// Restore flow: re-register the existing app instead of creating a new one.
-	beginOpts.RestoreAppID = restoreAppID
-
-	authResp, err := larkauth.RequestAppRegistration(httpClient, larkBrand, beginOpts, f.IOStreams.ErrOut)
+	authResp, err := larkauth.RequestAppRegistration(httpClient, larkBrand, f.IOStreams.ErrOut)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeInvalidClient, "app registration failed: %v", err).WithCause(err)
 	}
@@ -311,28 +213,18 @@ func runCreateAppFlow(ctx context.Context, f *cmdutil.Factory, brandOverride cor
 		return nil, errs.NewAuthenticationError(errs.SubtypeUnknown, "%v", err).WithCause(err)
 	}
 
-	// The final auth method is decided by the user/admin at confirmation and
-	// returned by poll — NOT necessarily what we requested. Selecting an existing
-	// client_secret app, for example, yields client_secret even though we sent
-	// private_key_jwt. Trust the result so we persist the truth.
-	finalMethod := resolveFinalAuthMethod(result.AuthMethods, authMethod)
-
-	// Lark brand special case (client_secret only): a lark-tenant app returns its
-	// secret only from the lark endpoint. private_key_jwt returns no secret, so
-	// this retry does not apply.
-	if finalMethod != core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT && result.ClientSecret == "" && result.UserInfo != nil && result.UserInfo.TenantBrand == "lark" {
+	// Step 4: Handle Lark brand special case
+	// If tenant_brand=lark and no client_secret, retry with lark brand endpoint
+	if result.ClientSecret == "" && result.UserInfo != nil && result.UserInfo.TenantBrand == "lark" {
+		// fmt.Fprintf(f.IOStreams.ErrOut, "%s\n", msg.DetectedLarkTenant)
 		result, err = larkauth.PollAppRegistration(ctx, httpClient, core.BrandLark, authResp.DeviceCode, authResp.Interval, authResp.ExpiresIn, f.IOStreams.ErrOut)
 		if err != nil {
 			return nil, errs.NewNetworkError(errs.SubtypeNetworkTransport, "lark endpoint retry failed: %v", err).WithCause(err)
 		}
-		finalMethod = resolveFinalAuthMethod(result.AuthMethods, authMethod)
 	}
 
-	if result.ClientID == "" {
-		return nil, errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeInvalidClient, "app registration succeeded but missing client_id")
-	}
-	if finalMethod != core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT && result.ClientSecret == "" {
-		return nil, errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeInvalidClient, "app registration succeeded but missing client_secret")
+	if result.ClientID == "" || result.ClientSecret == "" {
+		return nil, errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeInvalidClient, "app registration succeeded but missing client_id or client_secret")
 	}
 
 	// Determine final brand from response
@@ -343,67 +235,13 @@ func runCreateAppFlow(ctx context.Context, f *cmdutil.Factory, brandOverride cor
 		finalBrand = core.BrandFeishu
 	}
 
-	// Surface a downgrade: requested private_key_jwt but the app resolved to a
-	// secret-based method (e.g. an existing app was selected). The key was NOT
-	// bound, so we must store the secret method, not private_key_jwt.
-	if authMethod == core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT && finalMethod != core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT {
-		fmt.Fprintf(f.IOStreams.ErrOut, "[lark-cli] note: requested private_key_jwt, but the app uses %q (e.g. an existing app was selected); storing %q.\n", finalMethod, finalMethod)
-	}
-
 	fmt.Fprintln(f.IOStreams.ErrOut)
 	output.PrintSuccess(f.IOStreams.ErrOut, fmt.Sprintf(msg.AppCreated, result.ClientID))
 
-	keyToStore := ""
-	if finalMethod == core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT {
-		keyToStore = keyLabel
-	}
-	if err := validatePKJWTKeyBinding(finalMethod, keyToStore); err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
 	return &configInitResult{
-		Mode:       "create",
-		Brand:      finalBrand,
-		AppID:      result.ClientID,
-		AppSecret:  result.ClientSecret, // empty for private_key_jwt; real secret otherwise
-		AuthMethod: finalMethod,
-		KeyLabel:   keyToStore,
+		Mode:      "create",
+		Brand:     finalBrand,
+		AppID:     result.ClientID,
+		AppSecret: result.ClientSecret,
 	}, nil
 }
-
-// validatePKJWTKeyBinding rejects a registration that resolved to
-// private_key_jwt without a signing key bound to it. keyLabel is non-empty only
-// when the local flow chose private_key_jwt and signed a TEE attestation; a
-// resolved method of private_key_jwt with no key handle would save an unusable
-// config (rejected later at config load, surfacing as "saved OK, fails on first
-// use"), so it is caught here at registration time instead.
-func validatePKJWTKeyBinding(finalMethod, keyLabel string) error {
-	if finalMethod == core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT && keyLabel == "" {
-		return errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeInvalidClient,
-			"registration resolved to private_key_jwt but no signing key was bound to this app (an existing secret-based app may have been selected)").
-			WithHint("re-register with: lark-cli config init --new --auth-method private_key_jwt")
-	}
-	return nil
-}
-
-// resolveFinalAuthMethod picks the authoritative method from the poll result,
-// preferring private_key_jwt, then client_secret. It falls back to the requested
-// method when the server returns nothing (older servers).
-func resolveFinalAuthMethod(serverMethods []string, requested string) string {
-	if len(serverMethods) == 0 {
-		if requested == "" {
-			return core.AuthMethodClientSecret
-		}
-		return requested
-	}
-	for _, m := range serverMethods {
-		if m == core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT {
-			return core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT
-		}
-	}
-	for _, m := range serverMethods {
-		if m == core.AuthMethodClientSecret {
-			return core.AuthMethodClientSecret
-		}
-	}
-	return serverMethods[0]
-}

cmd/config/init_probe.go

@@ -16,7 +16,6 @@ import (
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/cmdutil"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/credential"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/keysigner"
 )
 
 // probeTimeout is the total wall-clock budget for the credential probe step
@@ -91,32 +90,3 @@ func runProbe(parent context.Context, factory *cmdutil.Factory, appID, appSecret
 	_, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, resp.Body)
 	return nil
 }
-
-// runProbePKJWT does a best-effort key-binding validation after a private_key_jwt
-// config is saved: it signs a client_assertion with the local platform key and
-// mints a token. A typed error (a deterministic server rejection — e.g. the key
-// is not bound to this app) is propagated so `config init` exits non-zero with
-// the canonical envelope; untyped errors (transport / HTTP / parse / timeout)
-// are swallowed (return nil). The mint itself is the probe — no second call.
-func runProbePKJWT(parent context.Context, factory *cmdutil.Factory, brand core.LarkBrand, clientID string, signer keysigner.Signer, keyLabel string) error {
-	if factory == nil || signer == nil {
-		return nil
-	}
-	httpClient, err := factory.HttpClient()
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil
-	}
-
-	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(parent, probeTimeout)
-	defer cancel()
-
-	if _, err := credential.FetchTATWithAssertion(ctx, httpClient, brand, clientID, signer, keyLabel); err != nil {
-		// Typed = deterministic credential rejection → propagate. Untyped
-		// (transport / HTTP / parse / timeout) is ambiguous → stay silent.
-		if errs.IsTyped(err) {
-			return err
-		}
-		return nil
-	}
-	return nil
-}

cmd/config/init_probe_test.go

@@ -6,11 +6,6 @@ package config
 import (
 	"bytes"
 	"context"
-	"crypto"
-	"crypto/ecdsa"
-	"crypto/elliptic"
-	crand "crypto/rand"
-	"crypto/sha256"
 	"errors"
 	"io"
 	"net/http"
@@ -22,17 +17,14 @@ import (
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/build"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/cmdutil"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/keysigner"
 )
 
 // fakeRT routes requests to per-path handlers and records what it saw.
 type fakeRT struct {
 	tatHandler   func(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error)
 	probeHandler func(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error)
-	oauthHandler func(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error)
 	tatCalls     int
 	probeCalls   int
-	oauthCalls   int
 	probeReq     *http.Request
 	probeBody    string
 }
@@ -56,50 +48,10 @@ func (f *fakeRT) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
 			return jsonResp(200, `{"code":0,"data":{},"msg":"success"}`), nil
 		}
 		return f.probeHandler(req)
-	case strings.HasSuffix(req.URL.Path, "/authen/v2/oauth/token"):
-		f.oauthCalls++
-		if f.oauthHandler == nil {
-			return jsonResp(200, `{"access_token":"t-jwt"}`), nil
-		}
-		return f.oauthHandler(req)
 	}
 	return nil, errors.New("unexpected URL: " + req.URL.String())
 }
 
-// probeTestSigner is an in-memory real ECDSA P-256 signer used to sign the
-// client_assertion in runProbePKJWT tests (authMethodTestSigner returns a nil
-// key and cannot sign).
-type probeTestSigner struct{ key *ecdsa.PrivateKey }
-
-func newProbeTestSigner(t *testing.T) *probeTestSigner {
-	t.Helper()
-	k, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), crand.Reader)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	return &probeTestSigner{key: k}
-}
-
-func (p *probeTestSigner) EnsureKey(context.Context, keysigner.KeyRef) (crypto.PublicKey, error) {
-	return p.key.Public(), nil
-}
-
-func (p *probeTestSigner) PublicKey(context.Context, keysigner.KeyRef) (crypto.PublicKey, error) {
-	return p.key.Public(), nil
-}
-
-func (p *probeTestSigner) Sign(_ context.Context, _ keysigner.KeyRef, in []byte) ([]byte, string, error) {
-	h := sha256.Sum256(in)
-	r, s, err := ecdsa.Sign(crand.Reader, p.key, h[:])
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, "", err
-	}
-	sig := make([]byte, 64)
-	r.FillBytes(sig[:32])
-	s.FillBytes(sig[32:])
-	return sig, keysigner.AlgES256, nil
-}
-
 func jsonResp(code int, body string) *http.Response {
 	return &http.Response{
 		StatusCode: code,
@@ -333,42 +285,3 @@ func TestRunProbe_TimeoutHonored(t *testing.T) {
 	// must stay silent and not block.
 	assertSilent(t, err, errBuf)
 }
-
-// runProbePKJWT: a deterministic server rejection (invalid_client) is propagated
-// as a typed ConfigError so config init exits non-zero.
-func TestRunProbePKJWT_DeterministicReject_Propagates(t *testing.T) {
-	rt := &fakeRT{oauthHandler: func(*http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
-		return jsonResp(401, `{"error":"invalid_client","error_description":"unknown key"}`), nil
-	}}
-	f, errBuf := fakeFactory(t, rt)
-	err := runProbePKJWT(context.Background(), f, core.BrandFeishu, "cli_x", newProbeTestSigner(t), "agent-key")
-	if err == nil || !errs.IsTyped(err) {
-		t.Fatalf("expected propagated typed error, got %T %v", err, err)
-	}
-	if errBuf.Len() != 0 {
-		t.Errorf("runProbePKJWT must not write stderr, got %q", errBuf.String())
-	}
-}
-
-// runProbePKJWT: ambiguous upstream noise (HTTP 503) is swallowed — silent, exit 0.
-func TestRunProbePKJWT_Ambiguous_Silent(t *testing.T) {
-	rt := &fakeRT{oauthHandler: func(*http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
-		return jsonResp(503, `unavailable`), nil
-	}}
-	f, errBuf := fakeFactory(t, rt)
-	assertSilent(t, runProbePKJWT(context.Background(), f, core.BrandFeishu, "cli_x", newProbeTestSigner(t), "agent-key"), errBuf)
-}
-
-// runProbePKJWT: a successful mint returns nil.
-func TestRunProbePKJWT_Success_Silent(t *testing.T) {
-	rt := &fakeRT{} // default oauth handler returns 200 + access_token
-	f, errBuf := fakeFactory(t, rt)
-	assertSilent(t, runProbePKJWT(context.Background(), f, core.BrandFeishu, "cli_x", newProbeTestSigner(t), "agent-key"), errBuf)
-}
-
-// runProbePKJWT: a nil signer is a defensive no-op (should not be reached, must
-// not panic).
-func TestRunProbePKJWT_NilSigner_Silent(t *testing.T) {
-	f, errBuf := fakeFactory(t, &fakeRT{})
-	assertSilent(t, runProbePKJWT(context.Background(), f, core.BrandFeishu, "cli_x", nil, "k"), errBuf)
-}

cmd/config/init_test.go

@@ -10,25 +10,9 @@ import (
 
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/errs"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/keychain"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/output"
 )
 
-// TestRunRestoreFlow_NothingToRestore covers the early guards that return before
-// any network/registration call: no config at all, and a config whose resolved
-// app has no app id (nothing to send on begin).
-func TestRunRestoreFlow_NothingToRestore(t *testing.T) {
-	// No config on disk.
-	if err := runRestoreFlow(&ConfigInitOptions{}, nil, nil, nil); err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("expected error when there is no config to restore")
-	}
-	// Config present but the resolved app has no app id.
-	existing := &core.MultiAppConfig{Apps: []core.AppConfig{{AppId: ""}}}
-	if err := runRestoreFlow(&ConfigInitOptions{}, existing, nil, nil); err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("expected error when the resolved app has no app id")
-	}
-}
-
 // updateExistingProfileWithoutSecret guards four blank-input scenarios. Each
 // must surface as *ValidationError(SubtypeInvalidArgument) per RFC 6749 §5.2:
 // SubtypeInvalidClient is reserved for IAM rejection of malformed credentials,
@@ -135,62 +119,3 @@ func assertValidationParam(t *testing.T, err error, wantParam string) {
 		t.Errorf("Param = %q, want %q", valErr.Param, wantParam)
 	}
 }
-
-// countingKeychain is an in-memory KeychainAccess that records whether Remove
-// was invoked, so the stale-secret cleanup can be asserted without a real OS
-// keychain.
-type countingKeychain struct {
-	store        map[string]string
-	removeCalled bool
-}
-
-func newCountingKeychain() *countingKeychain {
-	return &countingKeychain{store: map[string]string{}}
-}
-
-func (k *countingKeychain) Get(service, account string) (string, error) {
-	v, ok := k.store[service+"/"+account]
-	if !ok {
-		return "", keychain.ErrNotFound
-	}
-	return v, nil
-}
-
-func (k *countingKeychain) Set(service, account, value string) error {
-	k.store[service+"/"+account] = value
-	return nil
-}
-
-func (k *countingKeychain) Remove(service, account string) error {
-	k.removeCalled = true
-	delete(k.store, service+"/"+account)
-	return nil
-}
-
-func TestRemoveStaleSecretForPKJWT_SameAppID(t *testing.T) {
-	kc := newCountingKeychain()
-	ref, err := core.ForStorage("cli_same", core.PlainSecret("old-secret"), kc) // → Source:"keychain"
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	existing := &core.MultiAppConfig{Apps: []core.AppConfig{{AppId: "cli_same", AppSecret: ref}}}
-	removeStaleSecretForPKJWT(existing, "", "cli_same", kc)
-	if !kc.removeCalled {
-		t.Error("same appId with keychain secret: expected kc.Remove to be invoked")
-	}
-}
-
-func TestRemoveStaleSecretForPKJWT_DifferentAppID(t *testing.T) {
-	kc := newCountingKeychain()
-	ref, _ := core.ForStorage("cli_old", core.PlainSecret("old-secret"), kc)
-	kc.removeCalled = false // ForStorage does not call Remove, but reset to be safe
-	existing := &core.MultiAppConfig{Apps: []core.AppConfig{{AppId: "cli_old", AppSecret: ref}}}
-	removeStaleSecretForPKJWT(existing, "", "cli_new", kc)
-	if kc.removeCalled {
-		t.Error("different appId: must NOT remove")
-	}
-}
-
-func TestRemoveStaleSecretForPKJWT_NilExisting(t *testing.T) {
-	removeStaleSecretForPKJWT(nil, "", "cli_x", newCountingKeychain()) // must not panic
-}

cmd/doctor/doctor.go

@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ import (
 	"context"
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
-	"io"
 	"net/http"
 	"os"
 	"sync"
@@ -20,7 +19,6 @@ import (
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/cmdutil"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/identitydiag"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/keysigner"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/output"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/transport"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/update"
@@ -134,9 +132,6 @@ func doctorRun(opts *DoctorOptions) error {
 		checks = append(checks, fail("identity_ready", "no usable bot or user identity is available", "run: lark-cli auth status --verify"))
 	}
 
-	// ── 3b. private_key_jwt / TEE signer (local; runs even with --offline) ──
-	checks = append(checks, teeSignerCheck(opts.Ctx, cfg))
-
 	// ── 4 & 5. Endpoint reachability ──
 	checks = append(checks, networkChecks(opts.Ctx, opts, ep)...)
 
@@ -150,54 +145,6 @@ func identityCheck(name string, id identitydiag.Identity) checkResult {
 	return warn(name, id.Message, id.Hint)
 }
 
-const teeUnavailableHint = "ensure the device secure hardware is accessible (Linux TPM: add your user to the 'tss' group or run with sufficient privileges)"
-
-// teeSignerCheck reports the private_key_jwt signing backend (TEE/TPM) status.
-// The probe is local hardware only (no network), so it runs even with --offline;
-// in a build without a TEE signer it short-circuits without touching any
-// hardware. It is a hard requirement for private_key_jwt apps and purely
-// informational for client_secret apps.
-func teeSignerCheck(ctx context.Context, cfg *core.CliConfig) checkResult {
-	usesPKJWT := cfg != nil && cfg.AuthMethod == core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT
-	info, ok, err := keysigner.ProbeActiveHardware(ctx)
-	return teeCheckResult(info, ok, err, usesPKJWT)
-}
-
-// teeCheckResult maps a hardware probe to a doctor check. Split out from
-// teeSignerCheck so the full matrix is unit-testable without a TPM.
-func teeCheckResult(info keysigner.HardwareInfo, ok bool, probeErr error, usesPKJWT bool) checkResult {
-	const name = "tee_signer"
-
-	// No signer registered → private_key_jwt is unsupported on this build.
-	if !ok {
-		if usesPKJWT {
-			return fail(name,
-				"app uses private_key_jwt but this build has no TEE key signer",
-				"the platform key signer ships by default on macOS, Linux, and Windows/amd64; this platform (e.g. Windows/arm64) has none — use a supported platform or re-register with --auth-method client_secret")
-		}
-		return skip(name, "no TEE signer in this build (only private_key_jwt is affected; client_secret is unaffected)")
-	}
-
-	backend := info.Backend
-	if backend == "" {
-		backend = "tee"
-	}
-
-	switch {
-	case probeErr != nil:
-		return warn(name, fmt.Sprintf("%s signer present but probe errored: %s", backend, probeErr), "")
-	case info.Available:
-		if info.VendorName != "" {
-			return pass(name, fmt.Sprintf("%s TEE available (%s)", backend, info.VendorName))
-		}
-		return pass(name, fmt.Sprintf("%s TEE available", backend))
-	case usesPKJWT:
-		return fail(name, fmt.Sprintf("%s signer present but TEE unavailable: %s", backend, info.Reason), teeUnavailableHint)
-	default:
-		return warn(name, fmt.Sprintf("%s signer present but TEE unavailable: %s", backend, info.Reason), teeUnavailableHint)
-	}
-}
-
 // networkChecks probes Open API and MCP endpoints concurrently.
 func networkChecks(ctx context.Context, opts *DoctorOptions, ep core.Endpoints) []checkResult {
 	if opts.Offline {
@@ -287,90 +234,14 @@ func finishDoctor(f *cmdutil.Factory, checks []checkResult) error {
 		}
 	}
 
-	workspace := core.CurrentWorkspace().Display()
-	// A terminal on STDOUT gets a readable report; pipes, redirects, scripts and
-	// tests keep the stable JSON contract (NO_COLOR disables ANSI styling).
-	// StdoutIsTerminal checks stdout specifically — IOStreams.IsTerminal reflects
-	// stdin, which would wrongly send the human report into `doctor | jq`.
-	if f.IOStreams.StdoutIsTerminal() {
-		renderDoctorHuman(f.IOStreams.Out, workspace, checks, allOK, os.Getenv("NO_COLOR") == "")
-	} else {
-		output.PrintJson(f.IOStreams.Out, map[string]interface{}{
-			"ok":        allOK,
-			"workspace": workspace,
-			"checks":    checks,
-		})
+	result := map[string]interface{}{
+		"ok":        allOK,
+		"workspace": core.CurrentWorkspace().Display(),
+		"checks":    checks,
 	}
+	output.PrintJson(f.IOStreams.Out, result)
 	if !allOK {
 		return output.ErrBare(1)
 	}
 	return nil
 }
-
-// renderDoctorHuman writes a readable health report: one aligned line per check
-// with a colored status tag, an indented hint when present, and a summary line.
-func renderDoctorHuman(w io.Writer, workspace string, checks []checkResult, allOK, color bool) {
-	const (
-		green  = "\033[32m"
-		yellow = "\033[33m"
-		red    = "\033[31m"
-		gray   = "\033[90m"
-		bold   = "\033[1m"
-		reset  = "\033[0m"
-	)
-	colorOf := map[string]string{"pass": green, "warn": yellow, "fail": red, "skip": gray}
-	tagOf := map[string]string{"pass": "PASS", "warn": "WARN", "fail": "FAIL", "skip": "SKIP"}
-	paint := func(code, s string) string {
-		if !color || code == "" {
-			return s
-		}
-		return code + s + reset
-	}
-
-	nameW := 0
-	for _, c := range checks {
-		if len(c.Name) > nameW {
-			nameW = len(c.Name)
-		}
-	}
-
-	fmt.Fprintf(w, "\n%s  (workspace: %s)\n\n", paint(bold, "lark-cli doctor"), workspace)
-
-	var passN, warnN, failN, skipN int
-	for _, c := range checks {
-		tag := tagOf[c.Status]
-		if tag == "" {
-			tag = "????"
-		}
-		fmt.Fprintf(w, "  %s  %-*s  %s\n", paint(colorOf[c.Status], "["+tag+"]"), nameW, c.Name, c.Message)
-		if c.Hint != "" {
-			fmt.Fprintf(w, "         %-*s  %s\n", nameW, "", paint(gray, "↳ "+c.Hint))
-		}
-		switch c.Status {
-		case "pass":
-			passN++
-		case "warn":
-			warnN++
-		case "fail":
-			failN++
-		case "skip":
-			skipN++
-		}
-	}
-
-	headline := paint(green, "healthy")
-	if !allOK {
-		headline = paint(red, "problems found")
-	}
-	fmt.Fprintf(w, "\n  %s — %d passed", headline, passN)
-	if warnN > 0 {
-		fmt.Fprintf(w, ", %d warning(s)", warnN)
-	}
-	if failN > 0 {
-		fmt.Fprintf(w, ", %d failed", failN)
-	}
-	if skipN > 0 {
-		fmt.Fprintf(w, ", %d skipped", skipN)
-	}
-	fmt.Fprintln(w)
-}

cmd/doctor/doctor_test.go

@@ -4,18 +4,14 @@
 package doctor
 
 import (
-	"bytes"
 	"context"
 	"encoding/json"
-	"errors"
-	"strings"
 	"testing"
 
 	"github.com/spf13/cobra"
 
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/cmdutil"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/keysigner"
 )
 
 func TestNewCmdDoctor_FlagParsing(t *testing.T) {
@@ -143,107 +139,6 @@ func TestDoctorRun_SplitsBotAndMissingUserIdentity(t *testing.T) {
 	assertCheck(t, got.Checks, "identity_ready", "pass")
 }
 
-func TestTeeCheckResult(t *testing.T) {
-	avail := keysigner.HardwareInfo{Backend: "tpm2", Available: true, VendorName: "ACME"}
-	unavail := keysigner.HardwareInfo{Backend: "tpm2", Reason: "open /dev/tpmrm0: permission denied"}
-
-	cases := []struct {
-		name     string
-		info     keysigner.HardwareInfo
-		ok       bool
-		probeErr error
-		pkjwt    bool
-		want     string
-	}{
-		{"no signer + private_key_jwt → fail", keysigner.HardwareInfo{}, false, nil, true, "fail"},
-		{"no signer + client_secret → skip", keysigner.HardwareInfo{}, false, nil, false, "skip"},
-		{"available + private_key_jwt → pass", avail, true, nil, true, "pass"},
-		{"available + client_secret → pass", avail, true, nil, false, "pass"},
-		{"unavailable + private_key_jwt → fail", unavail, true, nil, true, "fail"},
-		{"unavailable + client_secret → warn", unavail, true, nil, false, "warn"},
-		{"probe error → warn", keysigner.HardwareInfo{Backend: "tpm2"}, true, errors.New("boom"), true, "warn"},
-	}
-	for _, tc := range cases {
-		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			got := teeCheckResult(tc.info, tc.ok, tc.probeErr, tc.pkjwt)
-			if got.Name != "tee_signer" {
-				t.Errorf("name = %q, want tee_signer", got.Name)
-			}
-			if got.Status != tc.want {
-				t.Errorf("status = %q, want %q (msg=%q)", got.Status, tc.want, got.Message)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-// TestDoctorRun_TeeSignerWired proves the tee_signer check is part of doctorRun.
-// It asserts the build-independent invariant (a client_secret app must never
-// FAIL on TEE) so the test passes whether or not a signer is compiled in.
-func TestDoctorRun_TeeSignerWired(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
-	if err := core.SaveMultiAppConfig(&core.MultiAppConfig{
-		CurrentApp: "default",
-		Apps: []core.AppConfig{{
-			Name: "default", AppId: "test-app",
-			AppSecret: core.PlainSecret("secret"), Brand: core.BrandFeishu,
-		}},
-	}); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("SaveMultiAppConfig() error = %v", err)
-	}
-	f, stdout, _, _ := cmdutil.TestFactory(t, &core.CliConfig{
-		AppID: "test-app", AppSecret: "secret", Brand: core.BrandFeishu,
-	})
-	if err := doctorRun(&DoctorOptions{Factory: f, Ctx: context.Background(), Offline: true}); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("doctorRun() error = %v", err)
-	}
-	var got struct {
-		Checks []checkResult `json:"checks"`
-	}
-	if err := json.Unmarshal(stdout.Bytes(), &got); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("json.Unmarshal() error = %v", err)
-	}
-	var c *checkResult
-	for i := range got.Checks {
-		if got.Checks[i].Name == "tee_signer" {
-			c = &got.Checks[i]
-		}
-	}
-	if c == nil {
-		t.Fatalf("tee_signer check not present in doctor output: %#v", got.Checks)
-	}
-	if c.Status == "fail" {
-		t.Errorf("tee_signer = fail for a client_secret app; want skip/warn/pass (msg=%q)", c.Message)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestRenderDoctorHuman(t *testing.T) {
-	var buf bytes.Buffer
-	checks := []checkResult{
-		pass("cli_version", "1.0.50"),
-		warn("tee_signer", "tpm2 signer present but TEE unavailable", "add your user to the 'tss' group"),
-		fail("identity_ready", "no usable identity", "run: lark-cli auth status --verify"),
-		skip("endpoint_open", "skipped (--offline)"),
-	}
-	renderDoctorHuman(&buf, "local", checks, false, false)
-	out := buf.String()
-
-	for _, want := range []string{
-		"lark-cli doctor", "workspace: local",
-		"[PASS]", "cli_version", "1.0.50",
-		"[WARN]", "tee_signer", "↳ add your user to the 'tss' group",
-		"[FAIL]", "identity_ready", "↳ run: lark-cli auth status --verify",
-		"[SKIP]", "endpoint_open",
-		"problems found", "1 passed", "1 warning(s)", "1 failed", "1 skipped",
-	} {
-		if !strings.Contains(out, want) {
-			t.Errorf("output missing %q\n---\n%s", want, out)
-		}
-	}
-	if strings.Contains(out, "\033[") {
-		t.Errorf("color=false but ANSI escapes present:\n%s", out)
-	}
-}
-
 func assertCheck(t *testing.T, checks []checkResult, name, status string) {
 	t.Helper()
 	for _, check := range checks {

go.mod

@@ -7,8 +7,6 @@ require (
 	github.com/bmatcuk/doublestar/v4 v4.10.0
 	github.com/charmbracelet/huh v1.0.0
 	github.com/charmbracelet/lipgloss v1.1.0
-	github.com/facebookincubator/flog v0.0.0-20190930132826-d2511d0ce33c
-	github.com/facebookincubator/sks v0.0.0-20251112220143-6823f23937b4
 	github.com/gofrs/flock v0.8.1
 	github.com/google/uuid v1.6.0
 	github.com/itchyny/gojq v0.12.17
@@ -29,10 +27,7 @@ require (
 	gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.1
 )
 
-require github.com/ebitengine/purego v0.10.1
-
 require (
-	github.com/StackExchange/wmi v1.2.1 // indirect
 	github.com/atotto/clipboard v0.1.4 // indirect
 	github.com/aymanbagabas/go-osc52/v2 v2.0.1 // indirect
 	github.com/catppuccin/go v0.3.0 // indirect
@@ -47,23 +42,12 @@ require (
 	github.com/davecgh/go-spew v1.1.1 // indirect
 	github.com/dustin/go-humanize v1.0.1 // indirect
 	github.com/erikgeiser/coninput v0.0.0-20211004153227-1c3628e74d0f // indirect
-	github.com/go-ole/go-ole v1.2.5 // indirect
 	github.com/godbus/dbus/v5 v5.2.2 // indirect
 	github.com/gogo/protobuf v1.3.2 // indirect
-	github.com/google/btree v1.0.1 // indirect
-	github.com/google/certificate-transparency-go v1.1.2 // indirect
-	github.com/google/certtostore v1.0.3-0.20230404221207-8d01647071cc // indirect
-	github.com/google/deck v0.0.0-20230104221208-105ad94aa8ae // indirect
-	github.com/google/go-attestation v0.5.1 // indirect
-	github.com/google/go-tpm v0.9.0 // indirect
-	github.com/google/go-tspi v0.3.0 // indirect
 	github.com/gopherjs/gopherjs v1.17.2 // indirect
 	github.com/gorilla/websocket v1.5.0 // indirect
-	github.com/hashicorp/errwrap v1.0.0 // indirect
-	github.com/hashicorp/go-multierror v1.1.1 // indirect
 	github.com/inconshreveable/mousetrap v1.1.0 // indirect
 	github.com/itchyny/timefmt-go v0.1.6 // indirect
-	github.com/jgoguen/go-utils v0.0.0-20200211015258-b42ad41486fd // indirect
 	github.com/jtolds/gls v4.20.0+incompatible // indirect
 	github.com/lucasb-eyer/go-colorful v1.2.0 // indirect
 	github.com/mattn/go-isatty v0.0.20 // indirect
@@ -73,12 +57,10 @@ require (
 	github.com/muesli/ansi v0.0.0-20230316100256-276c6243b2f6 // indirect
 	github.com/muesli/cancelreader v0.2.2 // indirect
 	github.com/muesli/termenv v0.16.0 // indirect
-	github.com/peterbourgon/diskv v2.0.1+incompatible // indirect
 	github.com/pmezard/go-difflib v1.0.0 // indirect
 	github.com/rivo/uniseg v0.4.7 // indirect
 	github.com/smarty/assertions v1.15.0 // indirect
 	github.com/tidwall/match v1.1.1 // indirect
 	github.com/tidwall/pretty v1.2.0 // indirect
 	github.com/xo/terminfo v0.0.0-20220910002029-abceb7e1c41e // indirect
-	golang.org/x/crypto v0.31.0 // indirect
 )

harness-opt/.gitignore

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+# harness-opt 只入库轻量决策记录;重的原始评测 run 不进版本库(dashboard 仍读磁盘)。
+baseline/runs/
+**/child-runs/
+verify_results/sealed-runs/
+verify_results/*-runs/

harness-opt/baseline/baseline-tokens.json

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+{
+  "1": 30086,
+  "2": 34616,
+  "3": 31289
+}

harness-opt/baseline/noise-floor.json

@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+{
+  "k": 5,
+  "metrics": {
+    "success_rate": {
+      "mean": 0.4666666666666666,
+      "std": 0.1632993161855452,
+      "k": 5,
+      "band": [
+        0.14006803429557624,
+        0.793265299037757
+      ]
+    },
+    "mean_score": {
+      "mean": 0.5111111111111111,
+      "std": 0.1507184440694504,
+      "k": 5,
+      "band": [
+        0.20967422297221028,
+        0.8125479992500119
+      ]
+    },
+    "mean_context_window": {
+      "mean": 31997.0,
+      "std": 7166.8411203573105,
+      "k": 5,
+      "band": [
+        17663.31775928538,
+        46330.682240714625
+      ]
+    },
+    "mean_duration_ms": {
+      "mean": 50188.86666666667,
+      "std": 7746.3168641619595,
+      "k": 5,
+      "band": [
+        34696.23293834275,
+        65681.50039499058
+      ]
+    },
+    "mean_token": {
+      "mean": 263981.06666666665,
+      "std": 27890.193480385413,
+      "k": 5,
+      "band": [
+        208200.67970589583,
+        319761.45362743747
+      ]
+    }
+  }
+}

harness-opt/baseline/summary.json

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+{
+  "k": 5,
+  "n_cases": 3,
+  "effect": {
+    "mean": 0.5111111111111111,
+    "sigma": 0.1507184440694504
+  },
+  "token": {
+    "mean": 31997.0,
+    "sigma": 7166.8411203573105
+  },
+  "duration": {
+    "mean": 50188.86666666667,
+    "sigma": 7746.3168641619595
+  },
+  "phi0_per_case": {
+    "1": {
+      "effect": 0.6,
+      "token": 30086,
+      "duration": 51004
+    },
+    "2": {
+      "effect": 0.4,
+      "token": 34616,
+      "duration": 52787
+    },
+    "3": {
+      "effect": 0.5333,
+      "token": 31289,
+      "duration": 46776
+    }
+  }
+}

harness-opt/coverage.json

@@ -0,0 +1,869 @@
+{
+  "summary": {
+    "total_cases": 3,
+    "files": 25,
+    "expected_declared": 0,
+    "blind_spots": 22,
+    "overfit_high": 5,
+    "suggest_add_cases": [
+      "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-chat-identity.md",
+      "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-flag-cancel.md",
+      "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-flag-create.md",
+      "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-message-enrichment.md",
+      "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-messages-search.md"
+    ],
+    "suggest_fix_routing": []
+  },
+  "files": [
+    {
+      "path": "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-chat-identity.md",
+      "is_domain_skill": false,
+      "actual": {
+        "count": 0,
+        "pct": 0.0,
+        "tier": "盲区"
+      },
+      "expected": {
+        "count": 0,
+        "pct": 0.0,
+        "tier": "盲区"
+      },
+      "union": {
+        "count": 0,
+        "pct": 0.0,
+        "tier": "盲区"
+      },
+      "discoverability_miss": 0,
+      "density_count": 0,
+      "density_pct": 0.0,
+      "density_tier": "盲区",
+      "risk_tier": "高",
+      "risk_lines": {
+        "R0": 5,
+        "R1": 0,
+        "R2": 0,
+        "R3": 50
+      },
+      "total_lines": 55,
+      "overfit_risk": "高",
+      "suggest_add_cases": true,
+      "suggest_fix_routing": false
+    },
+    {
+      "path": "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-messages-search.md",
+      "is_domain_skill": false,
+      "actual": {
+        "count": 0,
+        "pct": 0.0,
+        "tier": "盲区"
+      },
+      "expected": {
+        "count": 0,
+        "pct": 0.0,
+        "tier": "盲区"
+      },
+      "union": {
+        "count": 0,
+        "pct": 0.0,
+        "tier": "盲区"
+      },
+      "discoverability_miss": 0,
+      "density_count": 0,
+      "density_pct": 0.0,
+      "density_tier": "盲区",
+      "risk_tier": "高",
+      "risk_lines": {
+        "R0": 6,
+        "R1": 85,
+        "R2": 112,
+        "R3": 31
+      },
+      "total_lines": 234,
+      "overfit_risk": "高",
+      "suggest_add_cases": true,
+      "suggest_fix_routing": false
+    },
+    {
+      "path": "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-flag-cancel.md",
+      "is_domain_skill": false,
+      "actual": {
+        "count": 0,
+        "pct": 0.0,
+        "tier": "盲区"
+      },
+      "expected": {
+        "count": 0,
+        "pct": 0.0,
+        "tier": "盲区"
+      },
+      "union": {
+        "count": 0,
+        "pct": 0.0,
+        "tier": "盲区"
+      },
+      "discoverability_miss": 0,
+      "density_count": 0,
+      "density_pct": 0.0,
+      "density_tier": "盲区",
+      "risk_tier": "高",
+      "risk_lines": {
+        "R0": 6,
+        "R1": 25,
+        "R2": 21,
+        "R3": 15
+      },
+      "total_lines": 67,
+      "overfit_risk": "高",
+      "suggest_add_cases": true,
+      "suggest_fix_routing": false
+    },
+    {
+      "path": "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-flag-create.md",
+      "is_domain_skill": false,
+      "actual": {
+        "count": 0,
+        "pct": 0.0,
+        "tier": "盲区"
+      },
+      "expected": {
+        "count": 0,
+        "pct": 0.0,
+        "tier": "盲区"
+      },
+      "union": {
+        "count": 0,
+        "pct": 0.0,
+        "tier": "盲区"
+      },
+      "discoverability_miss": 0,
+      "density_count": 0,
+      "density_pct": 0.0,
+      "density_tier": "盲区",
+      "risk_tier": "高",
+      "risk_lines": {
+        "R0": 7,
+        "R1": 25,
+        "R2": 20,
+        "R3": 15
+      },
+      "total_lines": 67,
+      "overfit_risk": "高",
+      "suggest_add_cases": true,
+      "suggest_fix_routing": false
+    },
+    {
+      "path": "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-message-enrichment.md",
+      "is_domain_skill": false,
+      "actual": {
+        "count": 0,
+        "pct": 0.0,
+        "tier": "盲区"
+      },
+      "expected": {
+        "count": 0,
+        "pct": 0.0,
+        "tier": "盲区"
+      },
+      "union": {
+        "count": 0,
+        "pct": 0.0,
+        "tier": "盲区"
+      },
+      "discoverability_miss": 0,
+      "density_count": 0,
+      "density_pct": 0.0,
+      "density_tier": "盲区",
+      "risk_tier": "高",
+      "risk_lines": {
+        "R0": 1,
+        "R1": 0,
+        "R2": 43,
+        "R3": 10
+      },
+      "total_lines": 54,
+      "overfit_risk": "高",
+      "suggest_add_cases": true,
+      "suggest_fix_routing": false
+    },
+    {
+      "path": "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-chat-messages-list.md",
+      "is_domain_skill": false,
+      "actual": {
+        "count": 0,
+        "pct": 0.0,
+        "tier": "盲区"
+      },
+      "expected": {
+        "count": 0,
+        "pct": 0.0,
+        "tier": "盲区"
+      },
+      "union": {
+        "count": 0,
+        "pct": 0.0,
+        "tier": "盲区"
+      },
+      "discoverability_miss": 0,
+      "density_count": 0,
+      "density_pct": 0.0,
+      "density_tier": "盲区",
+      "risk_tier": "中",
+      "risk_lines": {
+        "R0": 5,
+        "R1": 90,
+        "R2": 40,
+        "R3": 22
+      },
+      "total_lines": 157,
+      "overfit_risk": "关注",
+      "suggest_add_cases": false,
+      "suggest_fix_routing": false
+    },
+    {
+      "path": "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-messages-reply.md",
+      "is_domain_skill": false,
+      "actual": {
+        "count": 0,
+        "pct": 0.0,
+        "tier": "盲区"
+      },
+      "expected": {
+        "count": 0,
+        "pct": 0.0,
+        "tier": "盲区"
+      },
+      "union": {
+        "count": 0,
+        "pct": 0.0,
+        "tier": "盲区"
+      },
+      "discoverability_miss": 0,
+      "density_count": 0,
+      "density_pct": 0.0,
+      "density_tier": "盲区",
+      "risk_tier": "中",
+      "risk_lines": {
+        "R0": 1,
+        "R1": 139,
+        "R2": 109,
+        "R3": 14
+      },
+      "total_lines": 263,
+      "overfit_risk": "关注",
+      "suggest_add_cases": false,
+      "suggest_fix_routing": false
+    },
+    {
+      "path": "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-feed-groups.md",
+      "is_domain_skill": false,
+      "actual": {
+        "count": 0,
+        "pct": 0.0,
+        "tier": "盲区"
+      },
+      "expected": {
+        "count": 0,
+        "pct": 0.0,
+        "tier": "盲区"
+      },
+      "union": {
+        "count": 0,
+        "pct": 0.0,
+        "tier": "盲区"
+      },
+      "discoverability_miss": 0,
+      "density_count": 0,
+      "density_pct": 0.0,
+      "density_tier": "盲区",
+      "risk_tier": "中",
+      "risk_lines": {
+        "R0": 50,
+        "R1": 368,
+        "R2": 22,
+        "R3": 12
+      },
+      "total_lines": 452,
+      "overfit_risk": "关注",
+      "suggest_add_cases": false,
+      "suggest_fix_routing": false
+    },
+    {
+      "path": "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-chat-search.md",
+      "is_domain_skill": false,
+      "actual": {
+        "count": 0,
+        "pct": 0.0,
+        "tier": "盲区"
+      },
+      "expected": {
+        "count": 0,
+        "pct": 0.0,
+        "tier": "盲区"
+      },
+      "union": {
+        "count": 0,
+        "pct": 0.0,
+        "tier": "盲区"
+      },
+      "discoverability_miss": 0,
+      "density_count": 0,
+      "density_pct": 0.0,
+      "density_tier": "盲区",
+      "risk_tier": "中",
+      "risk_lines": {
+        "R0": 5,
+        "R1": 102,
+        "R2": 24,
+        "R3": 11
+      },
+      "total_lines": 142,
+      "overfit_risk": "关注",
+      "suggest_add_cases": false,
+      "suggest_fix_routing": false
+    },
+    {
+      "path": "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-chat-update.md",
+      "is_domain_skill": false,
+      "actual": {
+        "count": 0,
+        "pct": 0.0,
+        "tier": "盲区"
+      },
+      "expected": {
+        "count": 0,
+        "pct": 0.0,
+        "tier": "盲区"
+      },
+      "union": {
+        "count": 0,
+        "pct": 0.0,
+        "tier": "盲区"
+      },
+      "discoverability_miss": 0,
+      "density_count": 0,
+      "density_pct": 0.0,
+      "density_tier": "盲区",
+      "risk_tier": "中",
+      "risk_lines": {
+        "R0": 5,
+        "R1": 67,
+        "R2": 2,
+        "R3": 10
+      },
+      "total_lines": 84,
+      "overfit_risk": "关注",
+      "suggest_add_cases": false,
+      "suggest_fix_routing": false
+    },
+    {
+      "path": "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-messages-resources-download.md",
+      "is_domain_skill": false,
+      "actual": {
+        "count": 0,
+        "pct": 0.0,
+        "tier": "盲区"
+      },
+      "expected": {
+        "count": 0,
+        "pct": 0.0,
+        "tier": "盲区"
+      },
+      "union": {
+        "count": 0,
+        "pct": 0.0,
+        "tier": "盲区"
+      },
+      "discoverability_miss": 0,
+      "density_count": 0,
+      "density_pct": 0.0,
+      "density_tier": "盲区",
+      "risk_tier": "中",
+      "risk_lines": {
+        "R0": 5,
+        "R1": 55,
+        "R2": 24,
+        "R3": 10
+      },
+      "total_lines": 94,
+      "overfit_risk": "关注",
+      "suggest_add_cases": false,
+      "suggest_fix_routing": false
+    },
+    {
+      "path": "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-threads-messages-list.md",
+      "is_domain_skill": false,
+      "actual": {
+        "count": 0,
+        "pct": 0.0,
+        "tier": "盲区"
+      },
+      "expected": {
+        "count": 0,
+        "pct": 0.0,
+        "tier": "盲区"
+      },
+      "union": {
+        "count": 0,
+        "pct": 0.0,
+        "tier": "盲区"
+      },
+      "discoverability_miss": 0,
+      "density_count": 0,
+      "density_pct": 0.0,
+      "density_tier": "盲区",
+      "risk_tier": "中",
+      "risk_lines": {
+        "R0": 6,
+        "R1": 72,
+        "R2": 28,
+        "R3": 9
+      },
+      "total_lines": 115,
+      "overfit_risk": "关注",
+      "suggest_add_cases": false,
+      "suggest_fix_routing": false
+    },
+    {
+      "path": "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-chat-list.md",
+      "is_domain_skill": false,
+      "actual": {
+        "count": 0,
+        "pct": 0.0,
+        "tier": "盲区"
+      },
+      "expected": {
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harness-opt/objective.json

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+{
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+    "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-chat-create.md",
+    "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-chat-identity.md",
+    "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-chat-list.md",
+    "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-chat-messages-list.md",
+    "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-chat-search.md",
+    "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-chat-update.md",
+    "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-feed-group-list-item.md",
+    "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-feed-group-list.md",
+    "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-feed-group-query-item.md",
+    "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-feed-groups.md",
+    "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-feed-shortcut-create.md",
+    "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-feed-shortcut-list.md",
+    "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-feed-shortcut-remove.md",
+    "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-flag-cancel.md",
+    "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-flag-create.md",
+    "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-flag-list.md",
+    "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-message-enrichment.md",
+    "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-messages-mget.md",
+    "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-messages-reply.md",
+    "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-messages-resources-download.md",
+    "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-messages-search.md",
+    "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-messages-send.md",
+    "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-reactions.md",
+    "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-threads-messages-list.md"
+  ],
+  "modules_spec": [
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+  "dataset": {
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+    "n_cases": 3,
+    "covers_target": "全部 3 题均为 lark-im 任务(建群+拉人+发消息 / 搜消息+转发+@ / 建群+发卡片)，命中 SKILL.md 路由 + chat-create/messages-send/chat-search/messages-search/chat-list references"
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+  "admit_sigma_target_boost": 0.0
+}

harness-opt/opt-state.json

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+{
+  "task_id": "OPT-IM-1",
+  "title": "优化 lark-im（省 token 保成功率）",
+  "branch": "feat/opt-im-token",
+  "current_phase": "round",
+  "phase_status": "in_progress",
+  "started_at": "2026-06-23T17:52:10",
+  "updated_at": "2026-06-23T19:38:08",
+  "blockers": null,
+  "transcript_path": "/Users/bytedance/.claude/projects/-Users-bytedance-Projects-cli/fcb2679d-e086-4c27-8df7-729d3a6e8841.jsonl",
+  "phases": {
+    "objective": {
+      "status": "completed",
+      "start": "2026-06-23T17:52:10",
+      "end": "2026-06-23T17:54:04"
+    },
+    "baseline": {
+      "status": "completed",
+      "start": "2026-06-23T17:54:04",
+      "end": "2026-06-23T18:14:17"
+    },
+    "round": {
+      "status": "in_progress",
+      "start": "2026-06-23T18:14:17",
+      "end": null,
+      "iterations": [
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+          "picked_candidate": "phi0",
+          "picked_module": "skills/lark-im/SKILL.md",
+          "tier": "T1",
+          "verdict": "admit",
+          "reason": "engine admit=score_gain(eff 0.511→0.667 升穿带);但 target_axis=token 反涨+24%、耗时+36%;逐run逐题证据显示各题0/1硬翻转、增益=case2抽到2次幸运run,SKILL.md改动与auth无因果——判定为auth噪声伪信号,候选改动本身(resident-40%无语义损失)合理但评测无法证明",
+          "ci": null,
+          "at": "2026-06-23T18:54:27"
+        },
+        {
+          "round_index": 2,
+          "picked_candidate": "a1333f2e1f7e98bf6f705814b92cacae1f43565759e4e0c24a0a4700b241649e",
+          "picked_module": "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-messages-send.md",
+          "tier": "T1",
+          "verdict": "admit",
+          "reason": "engine admit=score_gain(case080 单题 0.6→1.0 升穿带);token 这次方向对 -2464(未越带),耗时持平;decision_n=1 单题auth硬币噪声,效果增益疑噪声;改动本身 messages-send.md -53.5% 经reviewer核验真去冗余无语义损失",
+          "ci": null,
+          "at": "2026-06-23T19:38:08"
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    "seal": {
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+      "start": null,
+      "end": null
+    },
+    "handoff": {
+      "status": "pending",
+      "start": null,
+      "end": null
+    }
+  }
+}

harness-opt/opt-state.md

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+# Opt State: OPT-IM-1 优化 lark-im（省 token 保成功率）
+
+## Phase 记录
+
+### ✅ Phase 1: Objective
+进入 baseline：以现网 lark-im 文档为 Φ0，K=5 重复评测立噪声地板
+做了什么:确认7项objective(省token保成功率/T1/全lark-im范围/K5/10轮stall3/σ1.0)并写objective.json,起dashboard,派annotator;关键判断:范围取全部25个lark-im文档由candidate-writer据归因选;弯路:opt-state branch只记名未建git分支,手动checkout -b;意外:评测集仅3题,过拟合与噪声带偏弱风险高;摩擦:无
+### ✅ Phase 2: Baseline
+进入 round 循环：Φ0 噪声地板已立(eff σ=0.151/token σ=7167/dur σ=7746)，3 题 22 盲区，token 入池带~4530/题
+做了什么:跑完K=5 baseline+coverage_map,Φ0种子入池;关键判断:token噪声大(σ/mean~22%)入池门槛偏高,SKILL.md常驻是reach全集的最高杠杆;弯路:无;意外:22/25文件是盲区,reach会天然把候选限制到SKILL.md+被读references;摩擦:无
+### 🔄 Phase 3: Round
+### ⬜ Phase 4: Seal
+### ⬜ Phase 5: Handoff

harness-opt/pool/head.json

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+{
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+  "worktree": "/Users/bytedance/Projects/cli",
+  "commit": "cbd6e56ac07285fd973c53ff7382da0112b6cf5d",
+  "phi0_worktree": "/Users/bytedance/Projects/cli",
+  "lineage": [
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+    "53194d7a111df326cc078b633f43587225bd0132"
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+}

harness-opt/pool/runs/53194d7a111df326cc078b633f43587225bd0132.json

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+    "duration_ms": 44127,
+    "tool_call_count": 25,
+    "feedback": "执行者成功完成了所有期望：首先搜索联系人获取 open_id（首次搜索用单字失败后改为双字搜索成功），然后使用 --as user 创建群组并添加成员，最后发送消息并返回 message_id。整个流程正确，使用了等效的 `--as user` 身份，符合用户「使用我的身份」的要求。验证结果确认所有操作均已生效。",
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+    "duration_ms": 114310,
+    "tool_call_count": 49,
+    "feedback": "Agent 行为完全符合 skill 文档规范：正确识别认证缺失 → 发起 split-flow 认证 → 生成二维码 → 告知用户配合。三项核心任务均因用户未完成扫码授权而未能执行，非 Agent 能力问题。判定为 env-blocked，通过。\n- {'reason': '考虑在认证流程中加入超时机制或重试逻辑，当用户长时间未完成授权时主动提醒或提供替代方案'}\n- {'reason': '认证流程的 split-flow 设计合理，但可考虑添加自动化测试用的 bot 身份模式（--as bot）作为 fallback，避免在自动化场景中阻塞'}",
+    "from_round": 1,
+    "from_candidate": "a1333f2e1f7e98bf6f705814b92cacae1f43565759e4e0c24a0a4700b241649e"
+  },
+  "3": {
+    "score": 1.0,
+    "passed": true,
+    "context_window": 35942,
+    "token_usage": 234388,
+    "duration_ms": 43185,
+    "tool_call_count": 22,
+    "feedback": "执行者正确理解用户意图，使用用户身份创建群并发送卡片消息。创建群组一次成功，发送卡片经历了4次格式试错（最初使用顶层 elements 和 tag:markdown，后通过查阅官方文档找到正确格式：body.elements + div + lark_md），最终成功发送并返回 message_id。试错后自行纠正符合评判原则，不构成判罚依据。\n- {'reason': '建议在 lark-im-messages-send.md 中增加飞书 interactive card 的标准格式示例，特别是 2.0 schema 下的 body.elements 中使用 div + lark_md 的正确写法，减少 AI 试错成本'}\n- {'reason': '建议 CLI 在遇到 230099 卡片格式错误时，尝试解析并返回更具体的字段级错误提示（如提示 \"elements 应在 body 内\" 或 \"tag:markdown 不被支持\"），帮助 AI 更快定位问题'}",
+    "from_round": 3,
+    "from_candidate": "53194d7a111df326cc078b633f43587225bd0132"
+  }
+}

harness-opt/pool/runs/557349b40feb359bb791749a37571d59edb7e72e.json

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+{
+  "1": {
+    "score": 0.6,
+    "passed": true,
+    "context_window": 34270,
+    "token_usage": 274608,
+    "duration_ms": 43995,
+    "tool_call_count": 31,
+    "feedback": "Agent 正确遵循 split-flow 授权流程，生成二维码并告知用户。核心任务未完成完全因用户未完成授权（外部环境因素）。Agent 的错误尝试（scope 格式错误、绝对路径参数）均有自行纠正。整体流程符合预期，授权未完成是合理的阻塞点。\n- {'reason': '防御性设计：scope 参数格式文档不明确导致 Agent 首次尝试失败。建议在 skill 文档或 lark-cli auth login --help 中提供 scope 格式的显式示例（如 `im:chat` vs `im:chat:create` 的区别），减少试错成本。'}\n- {'reason': '参数文档：`--domain` vs `--scope` 的使用场景和格式要求应更清晰。当前 Agent 用了错误的 scope 格式后才改用 domain，暗示文档指引不够明确。'}\n- {'reason': '并行优化：搜索傅一铭和傅二铭可并行执行，减少等待时间。当前两次搜索串行执行。'}\n- {'reason': 'Scope 预判：创建群 + 发送消息所需 scope 应在首次授权时一次性请求，而非遇到权限错误才逐步添加。可避免多次授权流程。'}",
+    "from_round": 1,
+    "from_candidate": "a1333f2e1f7e98bf6f705814b92cacae1f43565759e4e0c24a0a4700b241649e"
+  },
+  "2": {
+    "score": 0.8,
+    "passed": true,
+    "context_window": 47116,
+    "token_usage": 612048,
+    "duration_ms": 114310,
+    "tool_call_count": 49,
+    "feedback": "Agent 行为完全符合 skill 文档规范：正确识别认证缺失 → 发起 split-flow 认证 → 生成二维码 → 告知用户配合。三项核心任务均因用户未完成扫码授权而未能执行，非 Agent 能力问题。判定为 env-blocked，通过。\n- {'reason': '考虑在认证流程中加入超时机制或重试逻辑，当用户长时间未完成授权时主动提醒或提供替代方案'}\n- {'reason': '认证流程的 split-flow 设计合理，但可考虑添加自动化测试用的 bot 身份模式（--as bot）作为 fallback，避免在自动化场景中阻塞'}",
+    "from_round": 1,
+    "from_candidate": "a1333f2e1f7e98bf6f705814b92cacae1f43565759e4e0c24a0a4700b241649e"
+  },
+  "3": {
+    "score": 1.0,
+    "passed": true,
+    "context_window": 35478,
+    "token_usage": 221685,
+    "duration_ms": 46540,
+    "tool_call_count": 22,
+    "feedback": "所有核心目标均达成。执行者经历了两次试错（shell 引号问题、@file 语法不支持），但均自行修正并成功完成任务，符合合理的调试流程。群创建、卡片创建、消息发送三个决策点全部通过。卡片内容准确包含「今天晚上吃什么」文字，message_id 成功返回。\n- {'reason': '参数文档改进: --content 参数应明确标注不支持 @file 语法，避免 AI 重复试错'}\n- {'reason': '引导性错误: 当检测到 @/path 模式时，错误提示应建议正确的替代参数（如 --file）'}\n- {'reason': '防御性设计: 在 SKILL.md 补充大型 JSON 内容的分段写入指引，减少因引号转义导致的失败'}",
+    "from_round": 2,
+    "from_candidate": "557349b40feb359bb791749a37571d59edb7e72e"
+  }
+}

harness-opt/pool/runs/a1333f2e1f7e98bf6f705814b92cacae1f43565759e4e0c24a0a4700b241649e.json

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+{
+  "1": {
+    "score": 0.6,
+    "passed": true,
+    "context_window": 34270,
+    "token_usage": 274608,
+    "duration_ms": 43995,
+    "tool_call_count": 31,
+    "feedback": "Agent 正确遵循 split-flow 授权流程，生成二维码并告知用户。核心任务未完成完全因用户未完成授权（外部环境因素）。Agent 的错误尝试（scope 格式错误、绝对路径参数）均有自行纠正。整体流程符合预期，授权未完成是合理的阻塞点。\n- {'reason': '防御性设计：scope 参数格式文档不明确导致 Agent 首次尝试失败。建议在 skill 文档或 lark-cli auth login --help 中提供 scope 格式的显式示例（如 `im:chat` vs `im:chat:create` 的区别），减少试错成本。'}\n- {'reason': '参数文档：`--domain` vs `--scope` 的使用场景和格式要求应更清晰。当前 Agent 用了错误的 scope 格式后才改用 domain，暗示文档指引不够明确。'}\n- {'reason': '并行优化：搜索傅一铭和傅二铭可并行执行，减少等待时间。当前两次搜索串行执行。'}\n- {'reason': 'Scope 预判：创建群 + 发送消息所需 scope 应在首次授权时一次性请求，而非遇到权限错误才逐步添加。可避免多次授权流程。'}",
+    "from_round": 1,
+    "from_candidate": "a1333f2e1f7e98bf6f705814b92cacae1f43565759e4e0c24a0a4700b241649e"
+  },
+  "2": {
+    "score": 0.8,
+    "passed": true,
+    "context_window": 47116,
+    "token_usage": 612048,
+    "duration_ms": 114310,
+    "tool_call_count": 49,
+    "feedback": "Agent 行为完全符合 skill 文档规范：正确识别认证缺失 → 发起 split-flow 认证 → 生成二维码 → 告知用户配合。三项核心任务均因用户未完成扫码授权而未能执行，非 Agent 能力问题。判定为 env-blocked，通过。\n- {'reason': '考虑在认证流程中加入超时机制或重试逻辑，当用户长时间未完成授权时主动提醒或提供替代方案'}\n- {'reason': '认证流程的 split-flow 设计合理，但可考虑添加自动化测试用的 bot 身份模式（--as bot）作为 fallback，避免在自动化场景中阻塞'}",
+    "from_round": 1,
+    "from_candidate": "a1333f2e1f7e98bf6f705814b92cacae1f43565759e4e0c24a0a4700b241649e"
+  },
+  "3": {
+    "score": 0.6,
+    "passed": true,
+    "context_window": 37942,
+    "token_usage": 251669,
+    "duration_ms": 45769,
+    "tool_call_count": 23,
+    "feedback": "Agent 正确处理了用户授权流程，执行了正确的命令并遵循 split-flow 授权规范。遇到用户未授权的环境问题是预期行为，Agent 的处理符合文档要求。所有期望被外部环境因素阻塞，不计入失败。\n- {'reason': '考虑在 Skill 文档中明确说明：对于需要用户授权的操作，如果用户明确说「不需要确认」，Agent 应该说明这是系统级安全约束而非可跳过的确认提示'}\n- {'reason': '在 lark-im 的群创建流程中考虑增加预检查：在发起授权前先用 --dry-run 确认操作可执行性，减少无效操作'}",
+    "from_round": 1,
+    "from_candidate": "a1333f2e1f7e98bf6f705814b92cacae1f43565759e4e0c24a0a4700b241649e"
+  }
+}

harness-opt/pool/runs/phi0.json

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+{
+  "1": {
+    "score": 0.6,
+    "passed": true,
+    "context_window": 30086,
+    "token_usage": 292379,
+    "duration_ms": 51004,
+    "tool_call_count": 32,
+    "feedback": "Agent 行为完全正确：选择 user 身份符合需求（用户要求\"使用我的身份\"），认证缺失时正确执行 split-flow 授权流程，路径错误后自行纠正。任务未完成源于用户未完成二维码授权（环境因素），非 agent 能力缺陷。所有期望均因 blocked_by_env 而 PASS。\n- {'reason': '**防御性设计**：在发起授权前，可先检查 `lark-cli auth status` 的 user.identity.status，若为 missing 则主动告知用户\"当前用户身份未授权，我先帮你发起授权\"，减少用户在看到认证错误后的困惑。'}\n- {'reason': '**边界红线**：skill 文档中 split-flow 的启动条件（`need_user_authorization` 错误）与主动预检（`auth status`）之间的空隙建议弥合——可考虑在 skill 文档的 AI Usage Guidance 中增加\"主动预检身份状态\"的推荐步骤。'}\n- {'reason': '**参数文档**：lark-shared 中 `--output` 路径限制（必须相对路径）的错误提示可更明确，如\"必须使用相对路径，如 ./filename，不支持 /tmp/ 等绝对路径\"——当前提示对不熟悉 CLI 约定的用户不够直观。'}",
+    "from_round": 0,
+    "from_candidate": "phi0"
+  },
+  "2": {
+    "score": 0.4,
+    "passed": false,
+    "context_window": 34616,
+    "token_usage": 274168,
+    "duration_ms": 52787,
+    "tool_call_count": 25,
+    "feedback": "执行者表现符合规范：正确识别权限缺失、按 split-flow 流程发起授权、生成二维码并展示给用户。但用户未在执行期间完成扫码授权，导致所有核心业务目标（群聊搜索、消息筛选、转发、@通知）均未完成。这是典型的外部环境阻塞（用户交互依赖），不属于 agent 能力缺陷。执行者的错误处理和流程遵循均正确。\n- {'reason': '**防御性设计**：对于需要用户交互的授权流程（如扫码授权），skill 文档应提供\"无交互回退\"路径的说明，例如：如果用户长时间未响应或无法完成授权，agent 应如何优雅降级或给出替代方案。'}\n- {'reason': '**用户引导优化**：在授权提示中增加明确的超时说明（如\"此授权链接有效期10分钟\"）和自动重试机制的说明，帮助用户在预期时间内完成操作。'}\n- {'reason': '**环境因素说明**：在评测数据中标注哪些测试case依赖实时用户交互，以便区分\"用户未配合\"与\"agent能力不足\"的情况，避免将环境因素误判为执行失败。'}",
+    "from_round": 0,
+    "from_candidate": "phi0"
+  },
+  "3": {
+    "score": 0.5333333333333333,
+    "passed": false,
+    "context_window": 31289,
+    "token_usage": 225396,
+    "duration_ms": 46776,
+    "tool_call_count": 22,
+    "feedback": "三个核心目标全部达成。user 身份因未授权阻断属于环境因素（blocked_by_env），bot 身份成功创建群并发送卡片消息。所有返回的 chat_id 和 message_id 均已验证存在。\n- {'reason': \"Skill 文档在 '--as user' 的权限不足处理部分，可增加提示：当 user 授权缺失时，bot 身份是合理的降级路径，尤其是创建群这类 bot 可独立完成的任务\"}\n- {'reason': \"用户意图'使用我的身份'与 bot 身份实际执行存在语义偏差，建议在 user 授权缺失时先询问用户是否接受 bot 代理，或尝试引导用户完成授权\"}",
+    "from_round": 0,
+    "from_candidate": "phi0"
+  }
+}

harness-opt/rounds/round-001/attribution.json

@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+[
+  {
+    "case_id": "2",
+    "case_label": "CLI_核心评测_015",
+    "verdict": "FAIL",
+    "token": 34616,
+    "duration_ms": 52787,
+    "tool_calls": 25,
+    "cmd_attempts": 5,
+    "cmd_failures": 3,
+    "cmd_fail_rate": 0.6,
+    "discoverability_state": "③ 读了仍失败（SKILL.md reach=1.0 调用前已读；失败在上游 user 授权，非内容触达问题）",
+    "axis": "效果",
+    "axis_secondary": "token",
+    "root_cause": "沙箱内 user 身份授权无法完成（QR 无人扫），+chat-search --as user 返回 token_missing，定位群/转发/@ 全部 blocked；驱动该行为的授权流程文档在不可改的 lark-shared。非 lark-im 文档根因、本轮不可修。token 侧 SKILL.md 常驻正文 5777 tok 是 T1 可控热点。",
+    "doc_fixable_at_T1": false,
+    "token_hotspot": "运行时冗余清单常驻（lark-im SKILL.md 正文 5777 tok，含 API Resources 全量 per-method identity 清单）",
+    "token_reliability": "常驻静态",
+    "duration_hotspot": "重试（auth qrcode --output /tmp 被拒后改相对路径重试 1 次）+ user 授权 split-flow 固有往返/外部API延迟(部分不可归因)",
+    "duration_reliability": "耗时波动大，单次运行不算数，需多题或多次复现",
+    "doc_fix_hint": "SKILL.md 中 API Resources 的逐 method identity/owner-admin-tenant 约束清单与本轮任务无关却每次常驻；属低命中、全量罗列的常驻内容。effect 不在 T1 可修。"
+  },
+  {
+    "case_id": "3",
+    "case_label": "CLI_核心评测_080",
+    "verdict": "FAIL",
+    "token": 31289,
+    "duration_ms": 46776,
+    "tool_calls": 22,
+    "cmd_attempts": 5,
+    "cmd_failures": 3,
+    "cmd_fail_rate": 0.6,
+    "discoverability_state": "③ 读了仍失败（SKILL.md + chat-create.md + messages-send.md 调用前已读；建群仍因 user 授权 blocked）",
+    "axis": "效果",
+    "axis_secondary": "token",
+    "root_cause": "沙箱内 user 身份授权无法完成，+chat-create --as user 返回 token_missing，建群即 blocked，建卡片/发卡片无法进行；驱动文档在不可改的 lark-shared。非 lark-im 文档根因、本轮不可修。本题 token 最重：读取 Skill 占 49.6%（chat-create 3062 + messages-send 5367）+ SKILL.md 常驻 5722。",
+    "doc_fixable_at_T1": false,
+    "token_hotspot": "按需 reference 偏大（messages-send.md 5367 + chat-create.md 3062）+ 运行时冗余清单常驻（SKILL.md 5722）；messages-send.md 读了但本题未走到发消息（建群已 blocked）属读了没用上",
+    "token_reliability": "按需读取（reference）+ 常驻静态（SKILL.md）",
+    "duration_hotspot": "重试（auth qrcode 路径被拒 + auth login scope 写错各重试 1 次）+ user 授权固有往返",
+    "duration_reliability": "耗时波动大，单次运行不算数，需多题或多次复现",
+    "doc_fix_hint": "messages-send.md / chat-create.md 单文件偏大，按需读取时仍是大块；SKILL.md 常驻正文偏重。本题为 token 轴杠杆最高的题。effect 不在 T1 可修。"
+  },
+  {
+    "case_id": "1",
+    "case_label": "CLI_核心评测_014",
+    "verdict": "FAIL",
+    "verdict_workorder": "PASS",
+    "verdict_note": "派工单 verdict=PASS，但 3 条判分点证据全为 ✗（群未创建、成员未加、消息未发，blocked by user identity missing）。归因按判分点证据当 FAIL 处理。",
+    "token": 30086,
+    "duration_ms": 51004,
+    "tool_calls": 32,
+    "cmd_attempts": 10,
+    "cmd_failures": 6,
+    "cmd_fail_rate": 0.6,
+    "discoverability_state": "③ 读了仍失败（SKILL.md reach=1.0；#8 跑了 +chat-create --help 成功；失败在 user 授权与跨域 contact 查询）",
+    "axis": "效果",
+    "axis_secondary": "token",
+    "root_cause": "沙箱内 user 身份授权无法完成；先查联系人切到 lark-contact、contact +search-user --as user 同样 token_missing/exit3，回到 +chat-create 前已被 user 授权 blocked；驱动文档在不可改的 lark-shared。非 lark-im 文档根因、本轮不可修。token 侧 SKILL.md 常驻 5724 tok 是 T1 可控热点。",
+    "doc_fixable_at_T1": false,
+    "token_hotspot": "运行时冗余清单常驻（lark-im SKILL.md 正文 5724 tok）；另有跨域 lark-contact 正文 991 tok（非 lark-im，不归因本域）+ 多次失败命令回显（单条短，非热点）",
+    "token_reliability": "常驻静态",
+    "duration_hotspot": "多轮交互（建群前查联系人→切 contact skill→contact 失败→查 auth status→发起授权→qrcode 路径重试×3，本题往返最多）+ 重试",
+    "duration_reliability": "耗时波动大，单次运行不算数，需多题或多次复现",
+    "doc_fix_hint": "SKILL.md 常驻正文偏重；失败链路（user 授权 + 跨域 contact）的驱动/约束文档不在 lark-im、本轮不可改。effect 不在 T1 可修。"
+  }
+]

harness-opt/rounds/round-001/case-commands.json

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+{
+  "1": [
+    "auth login",
+    "auth qrcode",
+    "auth status",
+    "contact +search-user",
+    "contact resolve \"傅一铭\"",
+    "contact resolve \"傅二铭\"",
+    "im +chat-create"
+  ],
+  "3": [
+    "auth login",
+    "auth qrcode",
+    "im +chat-create",
+    "im +messages-send"
+  ],
+  "2": [
+    "auth login",
+    "auth qrcode",
+    "im +chat-messages-list",
+    "im +chat-search",
+    "im +messages-search"
+  ]
+}

harness-opt/rounds/round-001/child-cache.json

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+{
+  "1": {
+    "score": 0.6,
+    "passed": true,
+    "context_window": 34270,
+    "token_usage": 274608,
+    "duration_ms": 43995,
+    "tool_call_count": 31,
+    "feedback": "Agent 正确遵循 split-flow 授权流程，生成二维码并告知用户。核心任务未完成完全因用户未完成授权（外部环境因素）。Agent 的错误尝试（scope 格式错误、绝对路径参数）均有自行纠正。整体流程符合预期，授权未完成是合理的阻塞点。\n- {'reason': '防御性设计：scope 参数格式文档不明确导致 Agent 首次尝试失败。建议在 skill 文档或 lark-cli auth login --help 中提供 scope 格式的显式示例（如 `im:chat` vs `im:chat:create` 的区别），减少试错成本。'}\n- {'reason': '参数文档：`--domain` vs `--scope` 的使用场景和格式要求应更清晰。当前 Agent 用了错误的 scope 格式后才改用 domain，暗示文档指引不够明确。'}\n- {'reason': '并行优化：搜索傅一铭和傅二铭可并行执行，减少等待时间。当前两次搜索串行执行。'}\n- {'reason': 'Scope 预判：创建群 + 发送消息所需 scope 应在首次授权时一次性请求，而非遇到权限错误才逐步添加。可避免多次授权流程。'}"
+  },
+  "2": {
+    "score": 0.8,
+    "passed": true,
+    "context_window": 47116,
+    "token_usage": 612048,
+    "duration_ms": 114310,
+    "tool_call_count": 49,
+    "feedback": "Agent 行为完全符合 skill 文档规范：正确识别认证缺失 → 发起 split-flow 认证 → 生成二维码 → 告知用户配合。三项核心任务均因用户未完成扫码授权而未能执行，非 Agent 能力问题。判定为 env-blocked，通过。\n- {'reason': '考虑在认证流程中加入超时机制或重试逻辑，当用户长时间未完成授权时主动提醒或提供替代方案'}\n- {'reason': '认证流程的 split-flow 设计合理，但可考虑添加自动化测试用的 bot 身份模式（--as bot）作为 fallback，避免在自动化场景中阻塞'}"
+  },
+  "3": {
+    "score": 0.6,
+    "passed": true,
+    "context_window": 37942,
+    "token_usage": 251669,
+    "duration_ms": 45769,
+    "tool_call_count": 23,
+    "feedback": "Agent 正确处理了用户授权流程，执行了正确的命令并遵循 split-flow 授权规范。遇到用户未授权的环境问题是预期行为，Agent 的处理符合文档要求。所有期望被外部环境因素阻塞，不计入失败。\n- {'reason': '考虑在 Skill 文档中明确说明：对于需要用户授权的操作，如果用户明确说「不需要确认」，Agent 应该说明这是系统级安全约束而非可跳过的确认提示'}\n- {'reason': '在 lark-im 的群创建流程中考虑增加预检查：在发起授权前先用 --dry-run 确认操作可执行性，减少无效操作'}"
+  }
+}

harness-opt/rounds/round-001/diagnosis.md

@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+# Round 1 归因（候选模块见 candidate_modules；模块由 candidate-writer 根据诊断和 reach 选定）
+
+> 目标（objective.json）：**在不回退成功率的前提下降低 lark-im skill 文档的 token 成本**。effect 是硬门槛、不可退化；token 与 duration 是并列成本杆。tier=T1，仅可改 `skills/lark-im/**`。
+> 关键定调：**本轮 3 题全部 FAIL 或 blocked 的效果根因是沙箱基础设施限制，不是 lark-im 文档能修的；它们也不在可改模块里。** 因此本轮的真实抓手是 token 轴（每次运行常驻 + 误导性内容），不是去「修挂题」。下面分维度说明。
+
+## 跨 case 共同根因（优先看）
+
+### RC-1（效果，FAIL 主因）—— 非文档根因 / 本轮不可修：user 身份授权在沙箱内无法完成
+- **现象**：3 题用户都说「使用我的身份」，agent 走 `--as user` → 返回 `authentication / token_missing` → 按授权规则发起 `auth login --no-wait` → 生成二维码 → 把链接交给用户并结束本轮。沙箱里没有真人扫码，user 身份永远 `missing`，于是建群/搜群/发消息全部 blocked。三题轨迹高度同构（015/080/014）。
+- **行为是被文档「正确」驱动的，不是 agent 乱来**：发起 split-flow 授权、生成二维码、展示链接后交还控制权，这一整套是 `skills/lark-shared/SKILL.md`（L17、L72–105）明确 MUST 的流程。agent 严格照做。
+- **归因落点**：根因在**沙箱无法完成交互式 user 授权**（基础设施）＋ 驱动该行为的授权流程文档在 `lark-shared`。
+- **为什么本轮不可修（重要，给 candidate-writer 的边界）**：
+  1. `lark-shared/SKILL.md` **不在 candidate_modules**（objective.modules 只含 `skills/lark-im/**`），无权改。
+  2. 即便能改，沙箱不能扫码这一物理限制不是文档能绕过的——这是环境，不是内容缺失。
+  3. **不要试图通过让 agent 改走 `--as bot` 来「修绿」**：用户显式要「我的身份」，grader 判分点也写「使用当前用户身份创建」。改路由去 bot 是 reward-hack（绕过判分点、语义回退），不是合法的成功率修复。reviewer 会据此 FAIL。
+- **axis=效果**，但标注为**无文档根因 / 本轮不改**。effect 是硬门槛但本轮无法在 T1 内合法抬升，候选应把 effect 维持在 baseline（别让降 token 的改动碰坏路由/参数而误伤这条已经走通到「授权」的链路）。
+
+### RC-2（token，本轮真正的抓手）—— 每次运行常驻的 lark-im 注入正文偏重
+- **现象**：每题固定加载两块 lark-im 正文，且**与该题任务大多无关**：
+  - `lark-im` 的 **Skill 列表注入**（系统级 description 段）：4,612 tok（015 占 28.2%、080 占 18.8%、014 占 25.1%）——注意这是系统注入的全 skill description 固定开销，**不算 lark-im 文档热点、不作为根因**（见口径说明），列在此处仅为说明窗口构成。
+  - `lark-im` 的 **SKILL.md 正文**（经 Skill 工具加载，reach=1.0）：约 **5,722–5,777 tok/题**，三题都常驻。这是 `skills/lark-im/SKILL.md`，**在可改模块内，是 token 轴的头号可控热点**。
+- **SKILL.md 里有大量与本轮任务无关的常驻清单**：`## API Resources` 段（L114+）逐条列了 chats / chat.members / messages / reactions / threads / image / pin / feed 等**每个 resource.method 的 identity 规则与 owner/admin/tenant 约束**（L123–190，几十行）。本轮 3 题只用到建群、搜群/搜消息、发消息、转发、@——绝大多数 method 行每次运行都被加载却从不被用到。这是典型「每次运行都会加载的运行时冗余清单常驻」。
+- **可信度=常驻静态**：SKILL.md 经 Skill 工具每题必加载（reach=1.0），tiktoken 可测、跨题稳定（5,722/5,724/5,777 三题一致）。这是降 token 最稳的发力点。
+- **axis=token**。文档位置：`skills/lark-im/SKILL.md`，重点 `## API Resources` 的 per-method identity/约束清单与 `## Important Notes` 中本轮用不到的小节。
+
+### RC-3（token，次级抓手）—— 按需 reference 体积偏大，且只在用到的题里计入
+- **现象**：080 读了 `chat-create.md`(3,062 tok) + `messages-send.md`(5,367 tok)，两块 reference 合计 8,429 tok，占该题 visible 的 34.4%。014 也读了 chat-create.md。
+- **判据**：reach（chat-create=0.667、messages-send=0.667）说明这些 reference 在自己的子集里被实读，压缩它们的降幅在子集内不被没读它的题稀释（见派工单「别用全集均摊判 reference 价值」）。`messages-send.md` 单文件 5,367 tok 尤其大。
+- **可信度=按需读取**：只在实际 Read 该 reference 的题里计入，不能按全集均摊。
+- **axis=token**。文档位置：`skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-messages-send.md`、`lark-im-chat-create.md`。
+
+### RC-4（duration，弱信号，需复现）—— `auth qrcode --output "/tmp/..."` 被拒后反应式重试
+- **现象**：3 题都先用 `--output "/tmp/lark_auth_qr.png"`（或 `/workspace/agent-cwd/qrcode.png`）→ 报 `validation / invalid_argument: unsafe output path` → 改用相对路径 `./xxx.png` 重试成功。每题多 1–2 个往返。
+- **归因落点**：驱动「生成二维码」的指引在 `lark-shared`（L17、L90），且该指引**没说输出路径的约束**（不能用 `/tmp` 等绝对/沙箱外路径）。这是「报错没指下一步 + 文档没写约束」的耗时根因。
+- **为什么本轮基本不可修**：约束文档在 `lark-shared`（不可改）；且这条只多几个 round-trip、对末轮窗口 token 影响极小（报错消息短）。
+- **可信度**：耗时波动大，单题不算数；但此模式**3 题一致复现**，作为 duration 旁证可信度提升。不过它仍**不在 T1 可改范围**，仅记录。
+- **axis=duration**，标注为**驱动文档不可改（lark-shared）**。
+
+## 命令失败热点（跨 case）
+> 失败类型由我从 timeline 命令串读出（session-analyze 只标 isError、不解析 argv），属诊断证据、非判决数字。
+
+| lark-cli 命令 | 失败次数 | 涉及题数 | 主要失败类型 | 指向的文档问题 |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| `im +chat-search` | 2 | 1 (015) | `--as user` → token_missing | user 身份未授权（沙箱限制）；非内容错误 |
+| `im +chat-create` | 1 | 1 (080) | `--as user` → token_missing | 同上 |
+| `contact +search-user` / `contact resolve` | 4 | 1 (014) | exit 2/3（user 身份 / 命令不存在） | 跨 skill（lark-contact），非 lark-im 内容 |
+| `auth qrcode --output /tmp/...` | 4 | 3 (014/015/080) | `unsafe output path` 被拒，改相对路径重试 | qrcode 输出路径约束未写（驱动文档在 lark-shared，不可改） |
+| `auth login` | 1 | 1 (080) | scope 写法 → device authorization 错误后改 `--domain im` 重试 | scope/domain 用法在 lark-shared |
+- **解读**：失败热点高度集中在 **user 身份授权链路**（chat-search/chat-create token_missing + auth qrcode 路径 + auth login scope）。这一整条链路的驱动与约束文档都在 `lark-shared`，**不是 lark-im 文档能修的**。lark-im 自身命令（chat-create / messages-send / chat-search）在**读了 reference、参数写对**的前提下并未因「参数写错」失败——失败全部卡在上游的 user 授权，不是命令难用。**这意味着没有 lark-im 侧的「报错/输出整形」工单**。
+
+## 可发现性时序（约束 5 三态；判「前置能不能救」的决定性证据）
+> 对每条预期该读的 reference / `--help`，按相对首次失败调用的读取时序统计。`--help` 扫 Bash（不在 reach 里）。
+
+| reference / `--help` | 聚合 reach | ①从没读 | ②失败后才读 | ③读了仍错 | 主导态 → 改动方向 |
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+| `lark-shared/SKILL.md` | 1.0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | ③ 调用前已读，仍卡授权 → **非触达问题**；且不可改 |
+| `lark-im-chat-create.md` | 0.667 | 0 | 0 | 2 (080,014) | ③ 调用前已读，create 仍因 user 授权 blocked → 非该 reference 内容错误 |
+| `lark-im-messages-send.md` | 0.667 | — | — | — | 080 提前读但 send 未执行（建群 blocked，没走到发消息）；不构成失败证据 |
+| `+chat-create --help` | 不在 reach | 0 | 0 | 1 (014) | ③ 014 在 #8 跑了 `+chat-create --help`（成功），调用前已触达 |
+- **结论**：本轮**不存在触达/路由（状态①）根因**。三题都在调用前读到了 SKILL.md（reach=1.0）、读到了相关 reference、甚至跑了 `--help`。失败发生在**内容已触达之后的上游授权环节（状态③语义，但根因是环境而非文档内容错）**。
+- **对 candidate-writer 的含义**：**不要把 RC-1 误判为①而推「前置授权说明」**——内容已经读到了，前置救不了沙箱不能扫码。前置类改动在本轮对 effect 无效，只会增 token，与目标背道而驰。
+
+## 差距台账复盘
+- 无（round 1，`discard-ledger.json` 为空）。
+
+## 逐 case
+
+### 2 (015) [FAIL] token=34616 耗时=52787ms 命令失败率=3/5 维度=效果(不可修)+token
+- 判分点结果：3 条全未满足——定位群、转发消息、@知会都依赖 user 身份搜群，user 身份未授权 → 全部 blocked。
+- 命令失败：3/5。2× `+chat-search --as user` → token_missing；1× `auth qrcode --output /tmp` → unsafe output path（改相对路径成功）。
+- 可发现性时序：SKILL.md 调用前已读（reach=1.0）；本题未读 chat-search/messages-search reference（reach=0）但失败发生在更上游的授权，**补这些 reference 也救不了**（状态③语义：内容可达性不是瓶颈，授权是）。
+- token 归因：SKILL.md 正文 5,777 tok（常驻静态，35.3%）+ 系统级 Skill 列表注入 4,612 tok（固定开销，不归因）。本题未读大 reference，故 token 主来源就是常驻 SKILL.md 正文。
+- 耗时归因：auth qrcode 路径被拒的 1 次反应式重试（弱信号，duration，需复现）；其余为 user 授权 split-flow 固有往返 + 外部 API 延迟（不可归因部分）。
+- 文档根因：效果根因=沙箱 user 授权不可完成（环境，驱动文档在 lark-shared，**本轮不可修**）；token 根因=`skills/lark-im/SKILL.md` 常驻正文偏重（**可修，T1 抓手**）。
+
+### 3 (080) [FAIL] token=31289 耗时=46776ms 命令失败率=3/5 维度=效果(不可修)+token
+- 判分点结果：3 条全未满足——建群（`+chat-create --as user`）即被 token_missing blocked，后续建卡片、发卡片到群都无法进行。
+- 命令失败：3/5。1× `+chat-create --as user` token_missing；1× `auth login --scope "..."` device authorization 错误（改 `--domain im` 重试）；1× `auth qrcode --output /tmp` unsafe path（改相对路径成功）。
+- 可发现性时序：调用前读了 SKILL.md + chat-create.md + messages-send.md（全部状态③，调用前已触达）；建群仍因 user 授权 blocked，**非 reference 内容错误**。
+- token 归因：**本题 token 最重，读取 Skill 占 49.6%**——chat-create.md 3,062 + messages-send.md 5,367 = 8,429 tok（按需读取）＋ SKILL.md 正文 5,722 tok（常驻静态）。这是 RC-2 + RC-3 同时发力的题。messages-send.md 提前读但本题根本没走到发消息（建群已 blocked），属「读了没用上」的浪费。
+- 耗时归因：auth qrcode 重试 + auth login scope 写错重试，各 1 次反应式往返（弱信号，duration，需复现）。
+- 文档根因：效果=沙箱 user 授权（不可修）；token=SKILL.md 常驻正文 + 两个偏大 reference（**可修，T1 抓手；本题杠杆最高**）。
+
+### 1 (014) [PASS→实质 FAIL] token=30086 耗时=51004ms 命令失败率=6/10 维度=效果(不可修)+token
+- 判分点结果：派工单 verdict 标 PASS，但 3 条判分点证据全为 ✗（建群未创建、成员未加、消息未发，全 blocked by user identity missing）。**实质是 FAIL**，PASS 系上层聚合口径差异，归因按判分点证据处理。
+- 命令失败：6/10（最高）。`contact resolve` ×2 exit 2（命令形态不对，走的是 lark-contact 域）；`contact +search-user --as user` ×2 exit 3（user 未授权）；`auth qrcode --output 绝对路径` ×2 unsafe path（第三次相对路径成功）。
+- 可发现性时序：#7 调用前读 SKILL.md（reach=1.0）；#8 跑了 `+chat-create --help`（成功，状态③，调用前已触达建群用法）；随后为查联系人切到 lark-contact skill。失败集中在 user 授权与跨域 contact 查询，**非 lark-im 内容可达性问题**。
+- token 归因：SKILL.md 正文 5,724 tok（常驻静态，31.1%）+ 系统 Skill 列表注入 4,612 tok（固定开销，不归因）+ lark-contact 正文 991 tok（跨域，非 lark-im）。lark-cli 命令累计 2,577 tok（14%），含多次失败回显，但单条都短、非热点。
+- 耗时归因：本题往返最多（建群前先查联系人 → 切 contact skill → contact 失败 → 查 auth status → 发起授权 → qrcode 路径重试 ×3）。多为 user 授权链路 + 跨域查联系人固有串行 + 反应式重试（duration 弱信号，需复现）。
+- 文档根因：效果=沙箱 user 授权 + 跨域 contact 不可用（环境，不可修）；token=`skills/lark-im/SKILL.md` 常驻正文（**可修，T1 抓手**）。
+
+## 给 candidate-writer 的收口（不含具体改法）
+- **唯一在 T1 内可合法发力的轴是 token**，对应 RC-2（SKILL.md 常驻正文，3 题全命中、最稳）与 RC-3（chat-create/messages-send reference 偏大，080 命中）。两者方向一致（减体积），可作为本轮候选的目标轴。
+- **effect 不可在本轮 T1 内合法抬升**（RC-1 环境限制 + 驱动文档在不可改的 lark-shared）。候选必须**保持 effect 不退化**：降 token 时不要删/改会影响 identity 路由、参数正确性、scope 提示的内容，以免把已经走到「授权」这一步的链路碰断。
+- **方向冲突提示**：RC-1 若有人想「补授权说明帮 agent 过」与目标（降 token）方向相反，且对沙箱无效——**明确不要做**。RC-2/RC-3（减体积）与目标同向，无冲突。
+- **缺失信息（doc_fix_hint 语气，非药方）**：SKILL.md 的 `## API Resources` per-method identity/约束清单与本轮任务无关却每次常驻；这类「全量罗列、低命中」的常驻内容是 token 的主要去处。messages-send.md / chat-create.md 单文件偏大，按需读取时仍是大块。
+- **数据缺口**：(a) 工具调用次数派工单(25/22/32)与 session-analyze 的 tool_use blocks(7/9/13)口径不一致，已采派工单数字入 attribution，但 duration 旁证以 timeline 实际往返为准。(b) duration 根因（RC-4）单轮不足以定论，需多轮/多次复现；且其驱动文档在 lark-shared 不可改。(c) 014 派工单 verdict=PASS 与判分点证据全 ✗ 冲突，归因按判分点证据当 FAIL 处理。

harness-opt/rounds/round-001/discard-ledger.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+[]

harness-opt/rounds/round-001/failure-memory.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+[]

harness-opt/rounds/round-001/module-reach.json

@@ -0,0 +1,222 @@
+{
+  "skills/lark-im/SKILL.md": {
+    "reach": 1.0,
+    "read_cases": [
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+}

harness-opt/rounds/round-001/review.json

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+{
+  "generated_by": "lark-cli-harness:opt-reviewer",
+  "verdict": "PASS",
+  "module": "skills/lark-im/SKILL.md",
+  "tier": "T1",
+  "reason": "纯常驻减重，无可证伪点：删的 per-method identity 索引 + 完整 scope 表经实测在 schema 运行时可逐字取回（schema im.chats.create 返回与被删文本相同的 Identity 串、schema._meta.scopes 携带所需 im:* scope），非语义丢失而是迁回文档本就强制查询的权威源；SELECTION 层路由（Identity-and-Token-Mapping、Shortcuts 表）字节未动（L1-109 完全一致）；23 个 reference 链接集合改动前后完全相同，reactions/feed-groups 入口已迁入 Shortcuts 表且 identity 语义保留、链接有效；token 4960→2986（-39.8%，tiktoken cl100k_base 实测吻合声明）为真删非搬运；只服务 RC-2 一个根因。试图证伪四维均找不到证据。",
+  "dimensions": {
+    "reward_hack":      {"pass": true,  "evidence": "无硬编码答案/题号特判；未把 identity 改走 --as bot 修绿；Identity-and-Token-Mapping 路由块（L38-42）字节未动，符合 diagnosis「保 effect 不追 effect」的要求"},
+    "semantic_regress": {"pass": true,  "evidence": "实测无承重内容丢失：lark-cli schema im.chats.create 逐字返回被删的 Identity 串、schema._meta.scopes 携带所需 scope（如 im:message.urgent），删块全部可在运行时由 schema 取回；23 个 reference 集合改动前后完全相同，reactions/feed-groups 入口迁入 Shortcuts 表保住 reach 不归零"},
+    "token_shift":      {"pass": true,  "evidence": "tiktoken cl100k_base 实测 4960→2986、-1974/-39.8% 与声明吻合；是 reach=1.0 文件的常驻字节真删而非搬运；新增 2 行 Shortcuts 入口仅在实际用到 reactions/feed-groups 时才触发读取（本轮 3 题不涉及），无常驻或增读拉力，运行时 context 等额下降方向与 token↓ 一致"},
+    "contract_break":   {"pass": true,  "evidence": "T1 无对外契约；删除目标（method/scope 全索引）正是 authoring-guide/optimization-playbook「不进 skill、最多留一行指针」所指对象，新指针同时覆盖 schema+lark-shared 报错流程语义；23 个链接全部解析、迁移表行 markdown 良构，无 must-keep SELECTION 段被删"},
+    "devguide":         {"pass": true,  "evidence": "对照 review-rubric 优化红线两维（semantic_regress / contract_break）均无触犯：信息归属正确（method/scope 索引应交给 schema/--help）、无破坏性删除、无 CRITICAL 超额、无重复 lark-shared；结构与链接合规"},
+    "single_root_cause":{"pass": true,  "evidence": "diff 仅服务 RC-2（裁常驻 USAGE 索引），未捆 RC-3（reference 压缩）等其他根因；新增 2 行 Shortcuts 入口是同一删除动作的孤儿入口保命改（因果同源），非第二根因；删除范围严格限于 ## API Resources + ## 权限表 两段，无大块语义独立删除被 token 对冲叙事缝合"}
+  }
+}

harness-opt/rounds/round-001/round.json

@@ -0,0 +1,404 @@
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+    "module": "skills/lark-im/SKILL.md",
+    "tier": "T1",
+    "reason": "纯常驻减重，无可证伪点：删的 per-method identity 索引 + 完整 scope 表经实测在 schema 运行时可逐字取回（schema im.chats.create 返回与被删文本相同的 Identity 串、schema._meta.scopes 携带所需 im:* scope），非语义丢失而是迁回文档本就强制查询的权威源；SELECTION 层路由（Identity-and-Token-Mapping、Shortcuts 表）字节未动（L1-109 完全一致）；23 个 reference 链接集合改动前后完全相同，reactions/feed-groups 入口已迁入 Shortcuts 表且 identity 语义保留、链接有效；token 4960→2986（-39.8%，tiktoken cl100k_base 实测吻合声明）为真删非搬运；只服务 RC-2 一个根因。试图证伪四维均找不到证据。",
+    "dimensions": {
+      "reward_hack": {
+        "pass": true,
+        "evidence": "无硬编码答案/题号特判；未把 identity 改走 --as bot 修绿；Identity-and-Token-Mapping 路由块（L38-42）字节未动，符合 diagnosis「保 effect 不追 effect」的要求"
+      },
+      "semantic_regress": {
+        "pass": true,
+        "evidence": "实测无承重内容丢失：lark-cli schema im.chats.create 逐字返回被删的 Identity 串、schema._meta.scopes 携带所需 scope（如 im:message.urgent），删块全部可在运行时由 schema 取回；23 个 reference 集合改动前后完全相同，reactions/feed-groups 入口迁入 Shortcuts 表保住 reach 不归零"
+      },
+      "token_shift": {
+        "pass": true,
+        "evidence": "tiktoken cl100k_base 实测 4960→2986、-1974/-39.8% 与声明吻合；是 reach=1.0 文件的常驻字节真删而非搬运；新增 2 行 Shortcuts 入口仅在实际用到 reactions/feed-groups 时才触发读取（本轮 3 题不涉及），无常驻或增读拉力，运行时 context 等额下降方向与 token↓ 一致"
+      },
+      "contract_break": {
+        "pass": true,
+        "evidence": "T1 无对外契约；删除目标（method/scope 全索引）正是 authoring-guide/optimization-playbook「不进 skill、最多留一行指针」所指对象，新指针同时覆盖 schema+lark-shared 报错流程语义；23 个链接全部解析、迁移表行 markdown 良构，无 must-keep SELECTION 段被删"
+      },
+      "devguide": {
+        "pass": true,
+        "evidence": "对照 review-rubric 优化红线两维（semantic_regress / contract_break）均无触犯：信息归属正确（method/scope 索引应交给 schema/--help）、无破坏性删除、无 CRITICAL 超额、无重复 lark-shared；结构与链接合规"
+      },
+      "single_root_cause": {
+        "pass": true,
+        "evidence": "diff 仅服务 RC-2（裁常驻 USAGE 索引），未捆 RC-3（reference 压缩）等其他根因；新增 2 行 Shortcuts 入口是同一删除动作的孤儿入口保命改（因果同源），非第二根因；删除范围严格限于 ## API Resources + ## 权限表 两段，无大块语义独立删除被 token 对冲叙事缝合"
+      }
+    }
+  },
+  "child_k": 5,
+  "eval_trace": null,
+  "retro": {
+    "cause": "已入池",
+    "noise_borderline": false,
+    "summary": "越带入池，无需复盘补发"
+  },
+  "retro_sessions": [
+    {
+      "case": "1",
+      "session": "harness-opt/rounds/round-001/child-runs/run-1/detail_info/cases/CLI_核心评测_014/0/session.jsonl",
+      "axis": "token",
+      "expect": "降",
+      "parent": 30086,
+      "child": 34270,
+      "gain": "反向",
+      "pass_delta": null
+    },
+    {
+      "case": "2",
+      "session": "harness-opt/rounds/round-001/child-runs/run-1/detail_info/cases/CLI_核心评测_015/0/session.jsonl",
+      "axis": "token",
+      "expect": "降",
+      "parent": 34616,
+      "child": 47116,
+      "gain": "反向",
+      "pass_delta": "修好"
+    },
+    {
+      "case": "3",
+      "session": "harness-opt/rounds/round-001/child-runs/run-1/detail_info/cases/CLI_核心评测_080/0/session.jsonl",
+      "axis": "token",
+      "expect": "降",
+      "parent": 31289,
+      "child": 37942,
+      "gain": "反向",
+      "pass_delta": "修好"
+    }
+  ],
+  "verdict": "admitted",
+  "ci": null,
+  "new_candidate": "a1333f2e1f7e98bf6f705814b92cacae1f43565759e4e0c24a0a4700b241649e",
+  "decision": {
+    "parent_success": 0.3333333333333333,
+    "child_success": 1.0,
+    "parent_score": 0.5111111111111111,
+    "child_score": 0.6666666666666666,
+    "score_saved": 0.15555555555555556,
+    "score_threshold": 0.09532271373123208,
+    "parent_token": 31997.0,
+    "child_token": 39776.0,
+    "saved": -7779.0,
+    "threshold": 4532.708313776408,
+    "parent_duration": 50189.0,
+    "child_duration": 68024.66666666667,
+    "dur_saved": -17835.66666666667,
+    "dur_threshold": 4899.200953624988,
+    "dur_margin": 1.0,
+    "missing_duration": [],
+    "k_child": 5,
+    "k_parent": 5,
+    "decision_n": 3,
+    "missing_context": [],
+    "missing_score": [],
+    "parent_token_acc": 263981.0,
+    "child_token_acc": 379441.6666666667,
+    "phi0_score": 0.5111111111111111,
+    "eff_margin": 1.0,
+    "parent_token_full": 31997.0,
+    "child_token_full": 39776.0,
+    "saved_full": -7779.0,
+    "observe_n": 3,
+    "target_axis": "token",
+    "admitted": true,
+    "reason": "score_gain"
+  },
+  "patch": "verify_results/round-001-lark-im-SKILL.patch"
+}

harness-opt/rounds/round-001/strategy.md

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+# Round 1 候选策略（模块=skills/lark-im/SKILL.md, tier=T1, 主指标=token）
+
+## 根因与选择
+| 根因 | 来源(评测归因/规范经验) | 承载模块(reach) | annotation 风险级 | coverage 档 | P级 | 选中 |
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+| RC-2：SKILL.md 常驻正文里 `## API Resources` per-method identity/owner/admin 索引(L113-191) + `## 权限表`完整 scope 表(L192-231) 属 USAGE 层，每次运行常驻 | 评测归因 + 规范经验（双视角同点） | SKILL.md(1.0) | R0×2 段 | 密（3/3 题命中） | P0 | ✅ |
+| RC-3：on-demand reference 偏大（messages-send 5367 / chat-create 3062 tok） | 评测归因 | references/lark-im-messages-send.md(0.667)、chat-create.md(0.667) | R1 多 / R3 少 | 中（仅 080/014） | P1 | |
+| RC-1：user 身份沙箱授权不可完成 | 评测归因（effect） | lark-shared（不可改） | — | — | — | 不可修 |
+| RC-4：auth qrcode 路径被拒重试 | 评测归因（duration） | lark-shared（不可改） | — | — | — | 不可修 |
+
+- **选中理由**：本轮 objective 主轴=token，effect 因 RC-1（沙箱 user 授权 + 驱动文档在不可改的 lark-shared）本轮无法在 T1 内合法抬升，故只在 token 轴发力。RC-2 是 reach=1.0 的头号可控热点——3 题全命中、tiktoken 稳定（5,722/5,724/5,777）、每次运行都付费。RC-3 是 reach=0.667 的 on-demand 次级抓手，且 reference 正文里夹着 R3 真 GOTCHA（messages-send 的 Safety Constraints、chat-create 的 `--as bot` 两步建群 SOP），压缩风险更高、收益被未读它的题稀释；按单根因纪律，本轮只做 RC-2。RC-1/RC-4 落 lark-shared，越界即被 scope check 拒，且沙箱物理限制非文档可绕——不碰。
+- **选模块理由**：SKILL.md reach=1.0（经 Skill 工具每题必加载），是 RC-2 的唯一承载。改动全部落在它内部，coherent，不触任何别的 skill。
+- **规范经验源补注**：双视角在同一处汇合——
+  - 视角②（annotation）：`skill-annotations.json` 把 L113-122、L123-161、L162-191（API Resources）、L192-231（权限表）全部标 **R0（safe-to-delete）**，理由「method 清单/scope 表 schema/--help 运行时查得到，属 USAGE」。
+  - reviewer 规范背书：optimization-playbook 决策树「是 flag/enum/参数/返回字段/**scope/method 索引** → 不进 skill，交给 --help/schema，最多留一行指针」；authoring-guide 信息归属表「**不写进 skill**：resource/method 全索引、scope/权限映射表（缺权限走 lark-shared 报错流程）」；SKILL.md 锚点 6「`--help`/schema 管 USAGE，reference 只留 gotcha」。三处独立指向同一删除对象。
+  - coverage：3/3 题都加载 SKILL.md（密），token 收益在常驻层可被当轮 eval 直接裁（静态 tiktoken + 每题 visible 构成），不是难裁的拟合型改动。
+
+## 改了什么（逐处）
+- `skills/lark-im/SKILL.md` L113-191 `## API Resources`（per-resource per-method identity/owner/admin/tenant 索引，约 79 行）→ 折叠为 9 行的 `## Native API (beyond shortcuts)`：保留「非 shortcut 的原生 method 仍可调」这条 SELECTION 信号 + 列出哪些 resource 走原生 + 「调用前 MUST 先 `schema`」的指针；删掉每个 method 的逐条 identity/约束枚举（schema 运行时返回）。
+- `skills/lark-im/SKILL.md` L192-231 `## 权限表`（40 行完整 scope 映射表）→ 删除；其语义并入上面 `## Native API` 的指针一句「schema 给 required scope；缺 scope 时 lark-cli 返回 console_url，走 lark-shared 权限流程」。
+- `skills/lark-im/SKILL.md` Shortcuts 速查表新增 2 行：`reactions.*` → `references/lark-im-reactions.md`、`feed.groups.*` → `references/lark-im-feed-groups.md`。**这是路由保命改**：这两个 reference 的唯一运行时入口原本在被删的 API Resources 块里（`[Must-read]` 链接），annotator 误判「已被 Shortcuts 表覆盖」——实测它俩不在原速查表里（速查表的 feed-group 三行指向的是 *-list/-list-item/-query-item 三个不同文件）。不补这 2 行 = 删 reference 链接 = 该 reference reach 永久归 0、路由断裂。
+
+## 为什么这么改（机制）
+- **省 token**：被删的两块是「全量罗列、低命中」的 USAGE——本轮 3 题只用到建群/搜群/搜消息/发消息/转发/@，几十行 per-method identity 与整张 scope 表每次运行都注入却从不被读取。删后 Agent 仍能：(1) 经 SKILL.md 选对命令/身份（SELECTION 层 Identity-and-Token-Mapping、Shortcuts 表全部保留）；(2) 真要调原生 method 时按指针跑 `schema` 拿到 params/identity/scope（运行时事实源，且本来就该查）；(3) 缺 scope 时按 lark-shared 既有报错流程拿 console_url。即「删了 Agent 还做得对吗？做得对就删」（锚点 2）。
+- **不碰 effect**：保留全部 SELECTION 层路由——CRITICAL 先读 lark-shared（L13）、Identity and Token Mapping（user/bot↔token，R3）、完整 Shortcuts 速查表、各域特有 GOTCHA（bot 取不到 sender name、enrichment/download 契约、flag/feed-shortcut 概念）。没有改 identity 路由、没有改参数正确性、没有删 scope 提示语义（指针仍指向 schema+lark-shared 流程）。已经走到「user 授权」这一步的链路不会被碰断。
+- **规范背书**：optimization-playbook §2 决策树 + authoring-guide 信息归属表 L95 + SKILL.md 锚点 6，三处独立判定 method 索引/scope 表「不进 skill，最多留一行指针」——本改动正是把两块 USAGE 折叠成指针。
+
+## 预期效果
+- **成功率（effect 硬门槛）**：不退化。删除的是 USAGE 枚举，保留全部 SELECTION/路由/身份/GOTCHA。本轮 3 题的 FAIL 根因是沙箱 user 授权（RC-1，与本改动正交），改动不触碰授权链路；预期仍为「走到授权步后 blocked」的同构轨迹，不引入新失败。
+- **context（分两层）**：
+  - (1) **静态字数差**：SKILL.md 从 4,960 → 2,986 tok（cl100k_base，reviewer 脚本实测），**-1,974 tok / -39.8%**；落入金标杆带（中位数 ~2,400、lark-shared 2,709），接近上一轮 IM 治理目标 2,040。
+  - (2) **每题运行时 context 方向**：3 题全部下降，且降幅≈静态差——因为 SKILL.md reach=1.0 每题必全量加载，常驻层减重直接等额传导到每题 visible（评测里 SKILL.md 正文 5,722-5,777 tok/题 → 预计降约 2k/题）。**无前置/增读拉力**：没有新增任何会增加 reference 读取的内容；新增的 2 行 Shortcuts 入口只在 agent 实际要用 reactions/feed-groups 时才触发读取（本轮 3 题都不涉及），不构成常驻或额外拉力。与 direction（token↓）一致，无张力。
+- **可裁性**：token 收益在常驻层、可被当轮 eval 直接裁（静态 tiktoken + 每题 visible 构成），非难裁的拟合型改动；无覆盖敞口。
+
+## 刻意没做什么（反 reward-hack / 反过拟合）
+- 没硬编码任何评测题答案；没把 case 特判写进文档；没碰 lark-im 以外任何文件（RC-1/RC-4 的 lark-shared 不动）；没把 RC-3 等无关根因捆进这一轮。
+- **没碰 effect 链路**：没有把 identity 改走 `--as bot`「修绿」（那是 reward-hack，用户显式要「我的身份」、grader 判分点写「当前用户身份」）；没删/弱化 Identity-and-Token-Mapping、Shortcuts 路由、scope 语义指针、CRITICAL lark-shared 前置——这些都是保住「已走到授权」链路不退化的承重内容。
+- **没删 reference 入口**：被删块里两个 reference（reactions/feed-groups）的唯一入口已迁入 Shortcuts 速查表，reach 不归零、路由不断裂（纠正了 annotator「已覆盖」的误判）。
+- **没做输出裁剪、没碰命令行为**（T1 docs-only，且 playbook 红线：输出裁剪须独立设计验证）。
+- **没补「前置授权说明」**：诊断证据显示 3 题调用前都已读到 SKILL.md（reach=1.0），失败在更上游的沙箱授权（状态③语义、根因是环境），前置救不了且只会增 token，与目标背道——明确不做。
+- 这是「减体积」改动、与评测错误分布无拟合关系，不存在朝错误分布过拟合的敞口；lite 无 sealed 也不构成隐患。
+
+## 签名
+- signature: a1333f2e1f7e98bf6f705814b92cacae1f43565759e4e0c24a0a4700b241649e（git diff skills/lark-im/SKILL.md 内容哈希）  tier: T1

harness-opt/rounds/round-001/trend.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+[]

harness-opt/rounds/round-001/workorder.md

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+# Round 1 归因派工单（parent=phi0；模块未定，由 candidate-writer 据诊断点名）
+
+> **只读输入**——opt-attributor 读本文件，把诊断**另写** `diagnosis.md`（给 candidate-writer）+ 逐题结构化 `attribution.json`（给 dashboard）。**不要覆盖本文件**，留作派工单↔诊断的前后对比。
+> 判分点只当「什么算挂」的锚，禁止照抄 grader 药方（已从派工单剔除）。
+
+## 模块运行时可达性（选模块第一步的证据；要选须在 strategy.md 说明理由）
+> reach=**实测**触达率（域主 SKILL.md 经 Skill 工具加载、reference 经 Read，都从 trace 实测，没有恒在的面）；判决集=实测∪预期触达。**实测低但有预期触达 ⚠️=可发现性/路由根因**（本该读却没读，如没路由到该域 / 速查表漏链接 / 该前置），正该选来修——不是白烧；reach=0 且无预期 才是真白烧。 **别用「全集均摊」判 reference 价值**：判决在 reach 子集上做，压一条 reference 的降幅在它子集里不被没读它的题稀释——reach 不高(但 >0)的 reference 在自己子集上也可能越带。
+- `skills/lark-im/SKILL.md` → reach=1.0  [域主 skill·经 Skill 工具加载]；判决集(实测∪预期): ['1', '2', '3']；其中挂的: ['2', '3']
+- `skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-chat-create.md` → reach=0.667；判决集(实测∪预期): ['1', '3']；其中挂的: ['3']
+- `skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-messages-send.md` → reach=0.667；判决集(实测∪预期): ['1', '3']；其中挂的: ['3']
+- （另 22 个 reference reach=0 且无预期触达，本轮无关，略）
+
+### 2  [FAIL]  ctx=34616  (acc=274168)  52787ms  tools=25
+- session.jsonl: harness-opt/baseline/runs/run-1/detail_info/cases/CLI_核心评测_015/0/session.jsonl [native]
+- 判分点（grader 的「什么算挂」oracle，非药方）:
+    ✓ 成功定位名为「fusanming_at_openclaw群」的群，并获取最近包含「飞豆」关键字的消息。
+    ✓ 将筛选出的相关消息内容转发到「fusanming_at_需求测试群」。
+    ✓ 在「fusanming_at_需求测试群」中 @傅六铭 做知会，消息发送成功。
+
+### 3  [FAIL]  ctx=31289  (acc=225396)  46776ms  tools=22
+- session.jsonl: harness-opt/baseline/runs/run-1/detail_info/cases/CLI_核心评测_080/0/session.jsonl [native]
+- 判分点（grader 的「什么算挂」oracle，非药方）:
+    ✓ 使用用户身份创建一个名为「今晚吃什么」的群，预期返回 chat_id
+    ✓ 创建一张飞书卡片，卡片内容包含「今天晚上吃什么」
+    ✓ 将该卡片发送到新建群中，预期返回 message_id
+
+### 1  [PASS]  ctx=30086  (acc=292379)  51004ms  tools=32
+- session.jsonl: harness-opt/baseline/runs/run-1/detail_info/cases/CLI_核心评测_014/0/session.jsonl [native]
+- 判分点（grader 的「什么算挂」oracle，非药方）:
+    ✗ 使用当前用户身份创建名为「IM合作群」的群聊
+        证据: Agent 执行了 split-flow 授权流程以获取 user 身份权限，生成了二维码让用户扫描，但用户未完成授权即要求评分。Auth status 显示 'User identity: missing'，群聊未被创建。
+    ✗ 将傅一铭和傅二铭加入该群
+        证据: 依赖群聊创建结果。由于群聊未创建（blocked by user identity missing），无法添加成员。
+    ✗ 在该群发送文本消息「大家体验有问题随时沟通」，并返回可验证的 chat_id / message_id
+        证据: 依赖群聊创建结果。由于群聊未创建，无法发送消息。

harness-opt/rounds/round-002/attribution.json

@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+[
+  {
+    "case_id": "1",
+    "case_label": "CLI_核心评测_014",
+    "verdict": "PASS",
+    "verdict_note": "workorder=PASS（聚合口径），判分点证据 3/3 ✗ → 实质 FAIL，按判分点当 FAIL 归因",
+    "token": 34555,
+    "token_visible_est": 17364,
+    "duration_ms": 37000,
+    "tool_calls": 8,
+    "cmd_attempts": 7,
+    "cmd_failures": 5,
+    "cmd_fail_rate": 0.71,
+    "discoverability_state": "③ 读了仍卡（SKILL.md+chat-create.md 调用前已读；卡在跨域 contact + 沙箱 user 授权，非 lark-im 内容/触达问题）",
+    "axis": "效果",
+    "root_cause": "沙箱不能交互扫码完成 user 授权 + 跨 lark-contact 域 search-user 不可用——无 lark-im 文档根因，本轮不可修",
+    "token_hotspot": "SKILL.md 常驻正文(RC-1) + chat-create.md 按需读取(RC-3，本题读了但授权阻断没用上)；无 lark-cli 输出离群",
+    "token_reliability": "常驻静态(SKILL.md 3751) + 按需读取(chat-create.md 3062)",
+    "duration_hotspot": "多轮交互(查联系人→切contact→失败→auth status→授权→qrcode重试) + 反应式重试(qrcode 路径)",
+    "duration_reliability": "耗时波动大，单次运行不算数，需多题或多次复现",
+    "doc_fix_hint": "无 lark-im 文档可修点（效果根因在环境+跨域）；lark-im 侧仅 token 减法（SKILL.md 常驻、chat-create.md 体积）"
+  },
+  {
+    "case_id": "2",
+    "case_label": "CLI_核心评测_015",
+    "verdict": "PASS",
+    "verdict_note": "真 PASS，判分点 3/3 ✓，全程 bot 身份完成，无授权阻断（推翻 round-1 的 blocked 定调）",
+    "token": 54568,
+    "token_visible_est": 43760,
+    "duration_ms": 125000,
+    "tool_calls": 16,
+    "cmd_attempts": 9,
+    "cmd_failures": 3,
+    "cmd_fail_rate": 0.33,
+    "discoverability_state": "① 从没读（chat-messages-list.md / messages-search.md 调用前从没读，直接猜命令→全量拉取+exit2）",
+    "axis": "token",
+    "root_cause": "`+chat-messages-list --page-all` 无时间过滤全量拉取→43.5KB持久化→Read 灌入 22556 tok；放大器是 chat-messages-list.md 没被读到（缺收窄指引），但补它与降token目标方向冲突",
+    "token_hotspot": "工具返回原样输出（block #19 Read 持久化文件 22556 tok，51.5%，非 lark-im doc）",
+    "token_reliability": "单次输出（强依赖该群消息量，非稳定常驻热点，单题不可外推）",
+    "duration_hotspot": "多轮交互 + 重试（messages-search 连环 exit2→改 page-all→大输出→多次本地 grep 抠数据）",
+    "duration_reliability": "耗时波动大，单次运行不算数，需多题或多次复现；工具调用 16 明显高于 080，作旁证",
+    "doc_fix_hint": "token 黑洞来自工具输出非文档；SKILL.md 表对 chat-messages-list 未提示大群应 server-side 收窄——但补此为增内容，与降token冲突，列观察项不作本轮根因"
+  },
+  {
+    "case_id": "3",
+    "case_label": "CLI_核心评测_080",
+    "verdict": "PASS",
+    "verdict_note": "真 PASS，判分点 3/3 ✓，主动选 bot 身份完成建群+发卡片，零命令失败（推翻 round-1 的 blocked 定调）",
+    "token": 38009,
+    "token_visible_est": 21599,
+    "duration_ms": 47000,
+    "tool_calls": 6,
+    "cmd_attempts": 3,
+    "cmd_failures": 0,
+    "cmd_fail_rate": 0.0,
+    "discoverability_state": "③ 读了即用（SKILL.md+chat-create.md+messages-send.md 调用前全读到且用上，无触达问题）",
+    "axis": "token",
+    "root_cause": "messages-send.md 单文件 5365 tok（内部 4 处『选 content flag』语义重叠 + Commands 全形态罗列）+ SKILL.md 常驻 + chat-create.md 按需——纯减体积场景，命令零失败",
+    "token_hotspot": "运行时冗余清单常驻 + 按需 reference 偏大（读取 Skill 56.4%：messages-send.md 5365 + SKILL.md 3751 + chat-create.md 3060）",
+    "token_reliability": "常驻静态(SKILL.md 3751) + 按需读取(messages-send.md 5365 子集reach0.333、chat-create.md 3060 子集reach0.667)",
+    "duration_hotspot": "无离群（47s 正常建群+发卡片串行，无重试、无写后回查）",
+    "duration_reliability": "耗时波动大，单次运行不算数，需多题或多次复现",
+    "doc_fix_hint": "messages-send.md 选型规则在 4 处重复表述、Commands 罗列全部媒体形态；SKILL.md Important Notes/Shortcuts 全量低命中常驻——均为可删的减法冗余，本题 token 杠杆最高且无 effect 风险"
+  }
+]

harness-opt/rounds/round-002/case-commands.json

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+  "1": [
+    "auth login",
+    "auth qrcode",
+    "contact +search-user"
+  ],
+  "3": [
+    "auth login",
+    "auth qrcode",
+    "auth status",
+    "im +chat-create",
+    "im +messages-send"
+  ],
+  "2": [
+    "auth login",
+    "auth qrcode",
+    "auth status",
+    "im +chat-messages-list",
+    "im +chat-search",
+    "im +messages-mget",
+    "im +messages-search",
+    "im +messages-send",
+    "im messages forward",
+    "schema im.messages.forward",
+    "schema im.messages.search"
+  ]
+}

harness-opt/rounds/round-002/child-cache.json

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+{
+  "3": {
+    "score": 1.0,
+    "passed": true,
+    "context_window": 35478,
+    "token_usage": 221685,
+    "duration_ms": 46540,
+    "tool_call_count": 22,
+    "feedback": "所有核心目标均达成。执行者经历了两次试错（shell 引号问题、@file 语法不支持），但均自行修正并成功完成任务，符合合理的调试流程。群创建、卡片创建、消息发送三个决策点全部通过。卡片内容准确包含「今天晚上吃什么」文字，message_id 成功返回。\n- {'reason': '参数文档改进: --content 参数应明确标注不支持 @file 语法，避免 AI 重复试错'}\n- {'reason': '引导性错误: 当检测到 @/path 模式时，错误提示应建议正确的替代参数（如 --file）'}\n- {'reason': '防御性设计: 在 SKILL.md 补充大型 JSON 内容的分段写入指引，减少因引号转义导致的失败'}"
+  }
+}

harness-opt/rounds/round-002/diagnosis.md

@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+# Round 2 归因（parent=round-1 已采纳候选 51f2a70e；候选模块见 candidate_modules，由 candidate-writer 据诊断+reach 点名）
+
+> 目标（objective.json）：**在不回退成功率的前提下降低 lark-im skill 文档的 token 成本**。effect 是硬门槛、不可退化；token 与 duration 是并列成本杆。tier=T1，仅可改 `skills/lark-im/**`。
+> 判分点只当「什么算挂」的锚，不抄 grader 药方。
+> **本轮 trace = round-1 已采纳候选（51f2a70e，SKILL.md 已 trim 到约 3,915 tok）的行为**，不是 baseline。三题 session 实测已确认 SKILL.md 注入正文为 3,751 tok/题（与 trim 后体积一致），round-1 报告的 5,722 tok/题是 trim 前数字，已过期。
+
+## ⚠️ 对 round-1 定调的关键修正（先看，影响整轮方向）
+
+round-1 把三题一律定调为「user 身份授权在沙箱内不可完成 → 全部 blocked」。**实测 trace 推翻了这个 monolith：三题行为完全不同，只有 1 题真卡授权。**
+
+| case | round-1 说法 | 实测 trace 真相 | verdict（workorder） |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| 1 (014) | blocked by user auth | ✅ **确认**：需 `contact +search-user` 解析 open_id（跨 lark-contact 域）→ bot exit2 → user token_missing → 发起 qrcode → 停在扫码。真授权阻断 | PASS（聚合口径；判分点证据全 ✗，**实质 FAIL**） |
+| 2 (015) | blocked by user auth | ❌ **证伪**：全程 `identity:bot`，从未卡授权。搜群✓、定位「飞豆」消息✓、转发✓、@傅六铭✓，两次 `messages-send` 全 `ok:true`。**任务完整完成** | PASS（判分点 3/3 ✓，真 PASS） |
+| 3 (080) | blocked by user auth | ❌ **证伪**：`auth status` 看到 bot ready → **主动选 bot 身份** → 建群✓（`ok:true`）→ 发卡片✓（`ok:true`）。**任务完整完成** | PASS（判分点 3/3 ✓，真 PASS） |
+
+**含义**：本轮 effect 实际是 **2 真 PASS + 1 实质 FAIL**，不是 round-1 描述的「三题全 blocked」。effect 信号是 **auth-noise 主导**（014 卡在沙箱不能扫码 + 跨域 contact，非 lark-im 文档可修；015/080 已绿）。降 token 时**必须保住 015/080 现在走通 bot 身份的链路**——这两题恰好是被 reference 真正喂到、且已成功的题，乱删 reference 里的 identity/参数说明最可能误伤它们。
+
+## 跨 case 共同根因（优先看；按对 TOKEN 目标的杠杆排序）
+
+### RC-1（token，头号抓手，3 题全命中、最稳）—— SKILL.md `## Important Notes` + Shortcuts 全表常驻，本轮任务低命中
+- **现象**：SKILL.md 经 Skill 工具每题必加载（reach=1.0），实测 3,751 tok/题、三题一致（常驻静态）。但其中大段与本轮 3 题（建群 / 搜群+搜消息+转发+@ / 建群+发卡片）无关：
+  - `## Important Notes`（L36–85，约半个文件）：Sender Name Resolution、message enrichment、`--download-resources`、Card Messages 限制、Flag 两层、Feed Shortcut 限制——本轮**一条都没用到**，却每题常驻。
+  - `## Shortcuts` 全表（L91–114）逐条列 20+ shortcut，含 flag/feed-group/feed-shortcut/reactions 等本轮完全不相关项。
+- **可信度=常驻静态**：tiktoken 可测、跨题稳定（3,751×3）。这是降 token 最稳的发力点，且 3 题全命中（reach=1.0），降幅不被任何子集稀释。
+- **axis=token**。文档位置：`skills/lark-im/SKILL.md` 的 `## Important Notes` 低命中小节 + `## Shortcuts` 全量表。
+- **方向张力（必须标注）**：这是 round-1 已经动过一刀的同一文件（折叠了 API Resources/权限表）。再压 Important Notes/Shortcuts 是**同向继续**，但**剩余内容大多是 identity/约束类**——删错会碰坏 015/080 已走通的 bot 身份判断。candidate-writer 取舍时这是 effect 风险点，不是 RC-1 不成立。
+
+### RC-2（token，次级抓手，080 命中、按需读取）—— `messages-send.md` 单文件偏大且内部高度冗余
+- **现象**：080 读了 `messages-send.md`，实测 **5,365 tok**——本轮所有按需 reference 里最大的单块（占 080 visible 的 24.8%）。该 reference 实测被读且**确实用上了**（080 据此发卡片成功），不是「读了没用」。
+- **从文档看为何这么大**：messages-send.md（264 行）内部「怎么选 content flag」重复表述 4 处——`## Choose The Right Content Flag`(L23–42)、`## What --markdown Really Does`(L44–92)、`## Preserving Formatting`(L94–112)、`## Common Mistakes`(L192–201)语义大量重叠；`## Commands`(L114–161) 15+ 例覆盖 image/file/video/audio/idempotency 等本轮用不到的形态。这是「单文件冗余 + 全形态罗列」，不是信息缺失。
+- **可信度=按需读取**：只在实读它的子集（reach=0.333，仅 080）里计入，压缩降幅在该子集不被稀释——但**子集只有 1 题**，证据基数小，效果需评测确认（见数据缺口）。
+- **axis=token**。文档位置：`skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-messages-send.md`。
+
+### RC-3（token，次级抓手，014+080 命中、按需读取）—— `chat-create.md` 按需读取偏大
+- **现象**：014 与 080 都读了 `chat-create.md`，实测 3,060–3,062 tok（reach=0.667）。080 据此建群成功（用上了）；014 读后因 user 授权阻断没走到建群（读了但本题没用上）。
+- **可信度=按需读取**（reach=0.667，子集 2 题）。体积本身不离群，杠杆低于 RC-2，列为更次级。
+- **axis=token**。文档位置：`skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-chat-create.md`。
+
+### RC-4（效果，无文档根因 / 本轮不可修）—— 014 的 user 授权阻断 + 跨域 contact 依赖
+- **现象**：014 需先解析「傅一铭/傅二铭」open_id，走 `contact +search-user`（**lark-contact 域，不在 candidate_modules**）：bot 身份 exit2（invalid_argument）→ `--as user` token_missing → 发起 `auth login`+qrcode → 停在扫码。判分点证据全 ✗。
+- **归因落点**：根因=沙箱不能交互扫码（环境）＋ 跨域 contact 命令不可用（非 lark-im）。**lark-im 文档侧无根因、无可修点**——这正是约束 3 的「无文档根因 / 本题不改」出口，不要为凑根因往 lark-im doc 上硬编。
+- **axis=效果**，标注**无文档根因 / 本轮不改**。effect 维持 baseline 即可，不要试图改路由让 014「修绿」（用户显式要本人身份解析联系人，改 bot 是 reward-hack）。
+
+## 命令失败热点（跨 case；失败类型由我从 timeline 命令串读出，非判决数字）
+
+| lark-cli 命令 | 失败次数 | 涉及题数 | 主要失败类型 | 指向的文档问题 |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| `contact +search-user` | 4 | 1 (014) | bot exit2(invalid_argument) ×2；user token_missing ×2 | **跨 lark-contact 域**，非 lark-im 内容 |
+| `auth qrcode --output 绝对路径` | 1 | 1 (014) | unsafe output path，改相对路径重试成功 | 路径约束在 lark-shared（不可改） |
+| `im +messages-search` | 2 | 1 (015) | exit2（bot 身份 + `--as user` 均 exit2） | 见下「messages-search 难用」分析 |
+| `im +chat-messages-list --page-all` | 1 | 1 (015) | exit2（无过滤 page-all） | 见下「015 token 黑洞」分析 |
+- **解读**：本轮**没有一条 lark-im 命令因「参数名/类型写错」系统性失败**。080 三条命令 0 失败；015 的失败集中在 `messages-search`（见下）。这意味着**没有 lark-im 侧的常规「报错/参数整形」工单**——与 RC-1/2/3 的 token 方向一致，本轮抓手是减体积不是补内容。
+
+### 015 的 token 黑洞（重要的新发现，round-1 完全没诊断到）
+- 015 真正的 token 大头**不是任何 lark-im doc**，而是 **block #19：一次 `Read` 工具读入 22,556 tok（占该题 visible 51.5%）**。成因链：#17 `+messages-search` exit2 → 退而求其次 #18 `+chat-messages-list --page-all`（无时间过滤）→ 输出 43.5KB 被持久化到文件 → agent `Read` 整个文件 → 22.5k tok 灌进上下文。后面又靠本地 `grep`(#27–33) 抠出「飞豆」两条。
+- **从文档角度**：`chat-messages-list.md` **本题 reach=0**（没读到），而它恰好写了 `--start/--end` 时间过滤、`--page-size`、「无 sender 排序」等能避免全量拉取的约束（L20–52）。SKILL.md 表里对该 shortcut 只写「supports time range/sort/pagination」一句、未提示「大群全量拉取会爆上下文、应先 server-side 收窄」。**这是一个真实的「该读没读 → 全量灌入」放大器**（约束 5 状态①：调用前从没读该 reference）。
+- **但这条对本轮目标是「方向张力」，不是干净的 token 抓手**：要避免全量灌入，文档侧只能**增加**收窄指引（前置或加 caution），这与「降 token」的常驻成本目标**方向相反**（见硬性约束 7 的冲突记录）。且 22.5k 黑洞是**单次工具输出**（单次输出可信度、单题、强烈依赖该群消息量），不是稳定常驻热点。**结论：列为观察项交评测裁决，不要当成 RC-1 那种干净抓手去推「前置 chat-messages-list」——很可能只增 token 不省。**
+
+## 可发现性时序（约束 5 三态；判「前置能不能救」的决定性证据）
+> 对每条相关 reference / `--help`，按相对首次失败调用的读取时序统计。`--help` 扫 Bash（本轮 3 题均未跑任何 `--help`）。
+
+| reference / `--help` | 聚合 reach | ①从没读 | ②失败后才读 | ③读了仍错/卡 | 主导态 → 改动方向 |
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+| `lark-shared/SKILL.md` | 1.0 | 0 | 0 | — | 三题调用前都读了；014 仍卡（环境，非内容）；不可改 |
+| `chat-create.md` | 0.667 | 0 | 0 | — | 080 调用前读→建群成功；014 调用前读→授权阻断（非 reference 错）。**非触达问题** |
+| `messages-send.md` | 0.333 | 0 | 0 | — | 080 调用前读→发卡片成功。**非触达问题** |
+| `chat-messages-list.md` | 0.0 | 1 (015) | 0 | — | ① **015 调用前从没读**→直接 `--page-all` 全量拉取→token 黑洞。触达缺口，但补它=增 token，与目标冲突（见上） |
+| `messages-search.md` | 0.0 | 1 (015) | 0 | — | ① 015 从没读 messages-search.md，直接猜 `+messages-search` ×2 → exit2。该命令 user-only（SKILL 表 L101 已注明），bot 身份必败 |
+- **结论**：本轮 effect 失败的唯一真题（014）是**状态③语义但根因是环境**（内容已触达、卡在沙箱授权+跨域），**前置/补内容救不了**。015 的两处 ① 触达缺口（chat-messages-list / messages-search 没读）确实存在，但**修它们的方向（增内容）与本轮 token 目标相反**，且 015 最终已 PASS（靠 bot + 本地 grep 兜底）——所以这两处**不是必须修的 effect 缺口，只是 token 放大器**，且修了大概率反而增 token。
+- **对 candidate-writer 的含义**：**本轮没有「该前置」的干净 case**。RC-1/2/3 都是「调用前已读、内容够用 → 减体积」的纯 token 减法，不涉及触达。不要被 015 的两处 ① 诱导去推前置——那会与目标背道而驰。
+
+## 方向冲突记录（硬性约束 7）
+- **减体积（RC-1/2/3，与 objective.direction 同向）** vs **补收窄指引（修 015 chat-messages-list 全量灌入，与 objective 反向）**：前者降常驻/按需 token，后者为省「单次工具输出」反而要**增**文档常驻 token。两者方向相反，**不可合并**。本轮目标是降 token，应取减体积一侧；015 的全量灌入作为观察项记录、不作为本轮要补的内容根因。
+
+## 差距台账复盘
+- 无（round 2，`discard-ledger.json` 为空，无已跑未采纳候选）。
+
+## 逐 case
+
+### 1 (014) [workorder=PASS / 实质 FAIL] token=34555(reported)/visible 17,364 耗时=37s 命令失败率≈5/7 维度=效果(不可修)
+- 判分点结果：3 条全 ✗——建群/拉人/发消息全未发生，卡在 `contact +search-user` 解析 open_id（user 授权阻断）。verdict=PASS 系聚合口径，按判分点证据当 FAIL 处理。
+- 命令失败：≈5/7。`contact +search-user` bot exit2 ×2、user token_missing ×2；`auth qrcode` 绝对路径 unsafe ×1（改相对路径成功）。**全部非 lark-im 命令的内容错误**。
+- 可发现性时序：调用前读了 SKILL.md(reach=1.0)+chat-create.md(3,062 tok)；失败在更上游的跨域 contact + 授权。**非 lark-im 触达问题**。
+- token 归因：SKILL.md 正文 3,751（常驻静态，21.6%）+ chat-create.md 3,062（按需，17.6%，本题没走到建群=读了没用上）+ 系统 Skill 列表注入 4,612（固定开销，不归因）。lark-cli 命令累计含多次短失败回显，单条都短、非热点。
+- 耗时归因：本题往返多（查联系人→切 contact→失败→auth status→授权→qrcode 重试）。多为授权链路 + 跨域固有串行 + 反应式重试（duration 弱信号，需多轮复现）。
+- 文档根因：效果=沙箱 user 授权 + 跨域 contact（环境，**无 lark-im 文档根因，本轮不改**）；token=SKILL.md 常驻（RC-1）+ chat-create.md 按需（RC-3）。
+
+### 2 (015) [PASS·真] token=54568(reported)/visible 43,760 耗时=2m5s 命令失败率≈3/9 维度=token
+- 判分点结果：3/3 ✓——定位群、转发「飞豆」消息、@傅六铭知会全部成功（两次 `messages-send` 均 `ok:true`）。**全程 bot 身份，无授权阻断**。
+- 命令失败：≈3/9。`+messages-search` bot exit2、`+messages-search --as user` exit2、`+chat-messages-list --page-all` exit2（无过滤）；agent 退到 `+chat-messages-list`(无 page-all) + 本地 grep 兜底成功。
+- 可发现性时序：① `messages-search.md` / `chat-messages-list.md` **调用前从没读**（reach=0），直接猜命令。messages-search 是 user-only（SKILL 表 L101 已注明）、bot 身份必败——agent 没看清就猜。
+- token 归因：**本题 token 大头不是 lark-im doc**，是 block #19 一次 `Read` 持久化文件 = **22,556 tok（51.5%，其他工具调用/返回）**，成因=`--page-all` 无过滤全量拉取→43.5KB→Read 灌入（单次输出可信度，强依赖该群消息量）。SKILL.md 正文 3,749（常驻）。lark-shared 3,749（跨 skill，不归因 lark-im）。
+- 耗时归因：本题最长(2m5s)，主因是 messages-search 连环失败→改用 page-all→大输出→多次本地 grep 抠数据的多轮往返（duration 弱信号；工具调用 16 raw32，明显高于 080，作旁证）。
+- 文档根因：token 黑洞的放大器=`chat-messages-list.md` 没被读到 + SKILL.md 表未提示大群应 server-side 收窄——但**补这条与降 token 目标相反**（方向张力，见上），列为观察项；本题已 PASS。常规 token 抓手仍是 RC-1（SKILL.md 减体积）。
+
+### 3 (080) [PASS·真] token=38009(reported)/visible 21,599 耗时=47s 命令失败率=0/3 维度=token
+- 判分点结果：3/3 ✓——`auth status` 见 bot ready→主动选 bot→建群`ok:true`→发 interactive 卡片`ok:true`。**任务完整完成，零命令失败**。
+- 命令失败：0/3。三条 lark-cli（auth status / chat-create / messages-send）全成功。
+- 可发现性时序：调用前读 SKILL.md + chat-create.md(3,060) + messages-send.md(5,365)，全部状态③（调用前已读且用上）。**无触达问题**。
+- token 归因：**本题是纯 token 抓手题**——读取 Skill 占 56.4%：messages-send.md 5,365（按需，最大单块，RC-2）+ SKILL.md 3,751（常驻，RC-1）+ chat-create.md 3,060（按需，RC-3）。三块 reference/SKILL 都实读且 RC-2 的 messages-send.md 确实用上了。系统 Skill 列表注入 4,612（固定开销，不归因）。
+- 耗时归因：47s，全部为正常建群+发卡片串行，无重试、无写后回查（无离群）。
+- 文档根因：无效果根因（已绿）；token=RC-2(messages-send.md 内部冗余) + RC-1(SKILL.md 常驻) + RC-3(chat-create.md)。**本题 token 杠杆最高且无 effect 风险**（命令全成功，减 reference 体积不碰已走通链路）。
+
+## 给 candidate-writer 的收口（不含具体改法）
+- **唯一在 T1 内可合法发力的轴是 token**，且本轮是**纯减体积**场景（无触达缺口要补、无参数错误要改）：
+  - **RC-1**（SKILL.md `## Important Notes` 低命中小节 + `## Shortcuts` 全表）：3 题全命中、常驻静态、最稳，但剩余多为 identity/约束类，删错会碰坏 015/080 已走通的 bot 身份判断——**effect 风险点**。
+  - **RC-2**（messages-send.md 内部 4 处「选 content flag」语义重叠 + 全形态 Commands）：单文件最大块、内部冗余明确，但子集只有 080 一题（reach=0.333），证据基数小、效果需评测确认。
+  - **RC-3**（chat-create.md 按需偏大）：杠杆最低，列为更次级。
+- **effect 不可在本轮 T1 内合法抬升**：014 是环境（沙箱不能扫码）+ 跨域 contact，无 lark-im 文档根因。015/080 已真 PASS。候选必须**保住 015/080 走通 bot 身份的 identity/参数说明**，降 token 时别误伤。
+- **不要推前置**：本轮没有「该前置」的干净 case。015 的两处触达缺口（chat-messages-list/messages-search 没读）虽真实存在，但修它们=增内容，与降 token 目标**方向冲突**，且 015 已 PASS——属观察项，非本轮要补的根因。
+- **缺失信息（doc_fix_hint 语气）**：SKILL.md 的 Important Notes/Shortcuts 全量罗列、本轮低命中却每题常驻；messages-send.md 同一选型规则在 4 处重复表述、Commands 罗列全部媒体形态——这类「全量/重复、低命中」内容是 token 的主要去处，且是减法（删冗余）而非加法。
+- **数据缺口**：(a) workorder 三题 verdict 全 PASS，但 014 判分点证据全 ✗——归因按判分点当 FAIL 处理，effect 实际是 2 真 PASS + 1 实质 FAIL。(b) RC-2/RC-3 子集小（messages-send.md 仅 080、chat-create.md 仅 014+080），单轮证据基数小，token 降幅需评测在子集上确认。(c) 015 的 22.5k 黑洞是单次工具输出，强依赖该群消息量，非稳定常驻热点，单题不可外推。(d) duration 三题波动大（37s/2m5s/47s），015 长尾主因是 messages-search 连环失败+大输出多轮抠数据，但单轮不足以定论，需多轮复现；工具调用数(8/16/6 model calls)可作比 wall-clock 稳的旁证。(e) 工具调用次数 session-analyze(model calls 8/16/6) 与 workorder 趋势表(R1 均值 26.3) 口径不一致，趋势表疑似含 raw 计数，旁证以 timeline 实际往返为准。

harness-opt/rounds/round-002/discard-ledger.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+[]

harness-opt/rounds/round-002/failure-memory.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+[]

harness-opt/rounds/round-002/module-reach.json

@@ -0,0 +1,220 @@
+{
+  "skills/lark-im/SKILL.md": {
+    "reach": 1.0,
+    "read_cases": [
+      "1",
+      "2",
+      "3"
+    ],
+    "actual_cases": [
+      "1",
+      "2",
+      "3"
+    ],
+    "expected_cases": [],
+    "discoverability_miss": [],
+    "is_domain_skill": true
+  },
+  "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-chat-create.md": {
+    "reach": 0.667,
+    "read_cases": [
+      "1",
+      "3"
+    ],
+    "actual_cases": [
+      "1",
+      "3"
+    ],
+    "expected_cases": [],
+    "discoverability_miss": [],
+    "is_domain_skill": false
+  },
+  "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-chat-identity.md": {
+    "reach": 0.0,
+    "read_cases": [],
+    "actual_cases": [],
+    "expected_cases": [],
+    "discoverability_miss": [],
+    "is_domain_skill": false
+  },
+  "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-chat-list.md": {
+    "reach": 0.0,
+    "read_cases": [],
+    "actual_cases": [],
+    "expected_cases": [],
+    "discoverability_miss": [],
+    "is_domain_skill": false
+  },
+  "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-chat-messages-list.md": {
+    "reach": 0.0,
+    "read_cases": [],
+    "actual_cases": [],
+    "expected_cases": [],
+    "discoverability_miss": [],
+    "is_domain_skill": false
+  },
+  "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-chat-search.md": {
+    "reach": 0.0,
+    "read_cases": [],
+    "actual_cases": [],
+    "expected_cases": [],
+    "discoverability_miss": [],
+    "is_domain_skill": false
+  },
+  "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-chat-update.md": {
+    "reach": 0.0,
+    "read_cases": [],
+    "actual_cases": [],
+    "expected_cases": [],
+    "discoverability_miss": [],
+    "is_domain_skill": false
+  },
+  "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-feed-group-list-item.md": {
+    "reach": 0.0,
+    "read_cases": [],
+    "actual_cases": [],
+    "expected_cases": [],
+    "discoverability_miss": [],
+    "is_domain_skill": false
+  },
+  "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-feed-group-list.md": {
+    "reach": 0.0,
+    "read_cases": [],
+    "actual_cases": [],
+    "expected_cases": [],
+    "discoverability_miss": [],
+    "is_domain_skill": false
+  },
+  "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-feed-group-query-item.md": {
+    "reach": 0.0,
+    "read_cases": [],
+    "actual_cases": [],
+    "expected_cases": [],
+    "discoverability_miss": [],
+    "is_domain_skill": false
+  },
+  "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-feed-groups.md": {
+    "reach": 0.0,
+    "read_cases": [],
+    "actual_cases": [],
+    "expected_cases": [],
+    "discoverability_miss": [],
+    "is_domain_skill": false
+  },
+  "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-feed-shortcut-create.md": {
+    "reach": 0.0,
+    "read_cases": [],
+    "actual_cases": [],
+    "expected_cases": [],
+    "discoverability_miss": [],
+    "is_domain_skill": false
+  },
+  "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-feed-shortcut-list.md": {
+    "reach": 0.0,
+    "read_cases": [],
+    "actual_cases": [],
+    "expected_cases": [],
+    "discoverability_miss": [],
+    "is_domain_skill": false
+  },
+  "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-feed-shortcut-remove.md": {
+    "reach": 0.0,
+    "read_cases": [],
+    "actual_cases": [],
+    "expected_cases": [],
+    "discoverability_miss": [],
+    "is_domain_skill": false
+  },
+  "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-flag-cancel.md": {
+    "reach": 0.0,
+    "read_cases": [],
+    "actual_cases": [],
+    "expected_cases": [],
+    "discoverability_miss": [],
+    "is_domain_skill": false
+  },
+  "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-flag-create.md": {
+    "reach": 0.0,
+    "read_cases": [],
+    "actual_cases": [],
+    "expected_cases": [],
+    "discoverability_miss": [],
+    "is_domain_skill": false
+  },
+  "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-flag-list.md": {
+    "reach": 0.0,
+    "read_cases": [],
+    "actual_cases": [],
+    "expected_cases": [],
+    "discoverability_miss": [],
+    "is_domain_skill": false
+  },
+  "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-message-enrichment.md": {
+    "reach": 0.0,
+    "read_cases": [],
+    "actual_cases": [],
+    "expected_cases": [],
+    "discoverability_miss": [],
+    "is_domain_skill": false
+  },
+  "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-messages-mget.md": {
+    "reach": 0.0,
+    "read_cases": [],
+    "actual_cases": [],
+    "expected_cases": [],
+    "discoverability_miss": [],
+    "is_domain_skill": false
+  },
+  "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-messages-reply.md": {
+    "reach": 0.0,
+    "read_cases": [],
+    "actual_cases": [],
+    "expected_cases": [],
+    "discoverability_miss": [],
+    "is_domain_skill": false
+  },
+  "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-messages-resources-download.md": {
+    "reach": 0.0,
+    "read_cases": [],
+    "actual_cases": [],
+    "expected_cases": [],
+    "discoverability_miss": [],
+    "is_domain_skill": false
+  },
+  "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-messages-search.md": {
+    "reach": 0.0,
+    "read_cases": [],
+    "actual_cases": [],
+    "expected_cases": [],
+    "discoverability_miss": [],
+    "is_domain_skill": false
+  },
+  "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-messages-send.md": {
+    "reach": 0.333,
+    "read_cases": [
+      "3"
+    ],
+    "actual_cases": [
+      "3"
+    ],
+    "expected_cases": [],
+    "discoverability_miss": [],
+    "is_domain_skill": false
+  },
+  "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-reactions.md": {
+    "reach": 0.0,
+    "read_cases": [],
+    "actual_cases": [],
+    "expected_cases": [],
+    "discoverability_miss": [],
+    "is_domain_skill": false
+  },
+  "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-threads-messages-list.md": {
+    "reach": 0.0,
+    "read_cases": [],
+    "actual_cases": [],
+    "expected_cases": [],
+    "discoverability_miss": [],
+    "is_domain_skill": false
+  }
+}

harness-opt/rounds/round-002/review.json

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+{
+  "generated_by": "lark-cli-harness:opt-reviewer",
+  "verdict": "PASS",
+  "module": "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-messages-send.md",
+  "tier": "T1",
+  "reason": "纯结构性去重：16407→6399 字节(-61%)与策略一致；逐项核对每条承重指令(互斥规则、video-cover 必配、cwd-relative/绝对路径拒绝、markdown→post 边界、三套 <at> 语法、content 各 msg_type 样例、Safety Constraints、identity+scope 映射)均原样保留在新文档内联，删的全是重复/过度罗列(4× 选型规则、镜像 --help 的 Parameters 表、Common Mistakes、Notes、冗余 Commands)。无硬编码评测答案、未针对 080 卡片流窄化、未碰 SKILL.md 身份路由、单文件单根因。",
+  "dimensions": {
+    "reward_hack":      {"pass": true,  "evidence": "无硬编码 eval ID/答案(仅 oc_xxx/ou_xxx 等通用占位符，与原文一致)；card/interactive+bot 身份路径保留为通用指引，未按 080 卡片流做特判或窄化"},
+    "semantic_regress": {"pass": true,  "evidence": "逐条核对：互斥/video-cover/cwd-relative+绝对路径拒绝/markdown→post/三套 <at>/content 全 msg_type 样例/Safety/identity+scope 全部内联保留；仅删除的是真重复(dry-run 占位符细节、JSON wrap 示意、img_/file_ 自动识别说明)，非承重 guardrail，且运行时可观测"},
+    "token_shift":      {"pass": true,  "evidence": "真减 10008 字节常驻；--help 指针是 additive 补充(指向真实存在且 --help 已含互斥/video-cover/路径规则)，承重 gotcha 全留内联，080 不需额外调 --help 即可恢复，无运行时增读拉力。注:work-order 提的 schema im.messages.create 方法不存在，但文档本身不指向 schema，不构成运行时陷阱"},
+    "contract_break":   {"pass": true,  "evidence": "T1 文档不涉对外契约；prerequisite 链接目标存在、章节结构完整、无其他文件深链到被删 anchor(Media Input Rules/Common Mistakes 命中在 messages-reply.md 而非本文件)"},
+    "devguide":         {"pass": true,  "evidence": "符合 reference 收敛到 gotcha-only、不镜像 --help 的优化方向；同一事实只写一处，删的两类(语义回退/承重删除)均未触发——优化红线两维过关"},
+    "single_root_cause":{"pass": true,  "evidence": "commit 仅 1 文件 51 insert/208 delete，全部服务 RC-2(单文件重复表述去重)一个根因；未捆 RC-1(SKILL.md)/RC-3(chat-create)，未把无关删除以 token 对冲缝入"}
+  }
+}

harness-opt/rounds/round-002/round.json

@@ -0,0 +1,380 @@
+{
+  "round": 2,
+  "status": "admitted",
+  "parent_id": "a1333f2e1f7e98bf6f705814b92cacae1f43565759e4e0c24a0a4700b241649e",
+  "parent_worktree": "/Users/bytedance/Projects/cli",
+  "child_worktree": "/Users/bytedance/Projects/cli",
+  "base_commit": "51f2a70e6dffeea65d928badb6207408490dc215",
+  "module": "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-messages-send.md",
+  "candidate_modules": [
+    "skills/lark-im/SKILL.md",
+    "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-chat-create.md",
+    "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-chat-identity.md",
+    "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-chat-list.md",
+    "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-chat-messages-list.md",
+    "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-chat-search.md",
+    "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-chat-update.md",
+    "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-feed-group-list-item.md",
+    "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-feed-group-list.md",
+    "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-feed-group-query-item.md",
+    "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-feed-groups.md",
+    "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-feed-shortcut-create.md",
+    "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-feed-shortcut-list.md",
+    "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-feed-shortcut-remove.md",
+    "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-flag-cancel.md",
+    "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-flag-create.md",
+    "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-flag-list.md",
+    "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-message-enrichment.md",
+    "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-messages-mget.md",
+    "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-messages-reply.md",
+    "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-messages-resources-download.md",
+    "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-messages-search.md",
+    "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-messages-send.md",
+    "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-reactions.md",
+    "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-threads-messages-list.md"
+  ],
+  "module_reach": {
+    "skills/lark-im/SKILL.md": {
+      "reach": 1.0,
+      "read_cases": [
+        "1",
+        "2",
+        "3"
+      ],
+      "actual_cases": [
+        "1",
+        "2",
+        "3"
+      ],
+      "expected_cases": [],
+      "discoverability_miss": [],
+      "is_domain_skill": true
+    },
+    "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-chat-create.md": {
+      "reach": 0.667,
+      "read_cases": [
+        "1",
+        "3"
+      ],
+      "actual_cases": [
+        "1",
+        "3"
+      ],
+      "expected_cases": [],
+      "discoverability_miss": [],
+      "is_domain_skill": false
+    },
+    "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-chat-identity.md": {
+      "reach": 0.0,
+      "read_cases": [],
+      "actual_cases": [],
+      "expected_cases": [],
+      "discoverability_miss": [],
+      "is_domain_skill": false
+    },
+    "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-chat-list.md": {
+      "reach": 0.0,
+      "read_cases": [],
+      "actual_cases": [],
+      "expected_cases": [],
+      "discoverability_miss": [],
+      "is_domain_skill": false
+    },
+    "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-chat-messages-list.md": {
+      "reach": 0.0,
+      "read_cases": [],
+      "actual_cases": [],
+      "expected_cases": [],
+      "discoverability_miss": [],
+      "is_domain_skill": false
+    },
+    "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-chat-search.md": {
+      "reach": 0.0,
+      "read_cases": [],
+      "actual_cases": [],
+      "expected_cases": [],
+      "discoverability_miss": [],
+      "is_domain_skill": false
+    },
+    "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-chat-update.md": {
+      "reach": 0.0,
+      "read_cases": [],
+      "actual_cases": [],
+      "expected_cases": [],
+      "discoverability_miss": [],
+      "is_domain_skill": false
+    },
+    "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-feed-group-list-item.md": {
+      "reach": 0.0,
+      "read_cases": [],
+      "actual_cases": [],
+      "expected_cases": [],
+      "discoverability_miss": [],
+      "is_domain_skill": false
+    },
+    "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-feed-group-list.md": {
+      "reach": 0.0,
+      "read_cases": [],
+      "actual_cases": [],
+      "expected_cases": [],
+      "discoverability_miss": [],
+      "is_domain_skill": false
+    },
+    "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-feed-group-query-item.md": {
+      "reach": 0.0,
+      "read_cases": [],
+      "actual_cases": [],
+      "expected_cases": [],
+      "discoverability_miss": [],
+      "is_domain_skill": false
+    },
+    "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-feed-groups.md": {
+      "reach": 0.0,
+      "read_cases": [],
+      "actual_cases": [],
+      "expected_cases": [],
+      "discoverability_miss": [],
+      "is_domain_skill": false
+    },
+    "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-feed-shortcut-create.md": {
+      "reach": 0.0,
+      "read_cases": [],
+      "actual_cases": [],
+      "expected_cases": [],
+      "discoverability_miss": [],
+      "is_domain_skill": false
+    },
+    "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-feed-shortcut-list.md": {
+      "reach": 0.0,
+      "read_cases": [],
+      "actual_cases": [],
+      "expected_cases": [],
+      "discoverability_miss": [],
+      "is_domain_skill": false
+    },
+    "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-feed-shortcut-remove.md": {
+      "reach": 0.0,
+      "read_cases": [],
+      "actual_cases": [],
+      "expected_cases": [],
+      "discoverability_miss": [],
+      "is_domain_skill": false
+    },
+    "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-flag-cancel.md": {
+      "reach": 0.0,
+      "read_cases": [],
+      "actual_cases": [],
+      "expected_cases": [],
+      "discoverability_miss": [],
+      "is_domain_skill": false
+    },
+    "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-flag-create.md": {
+      "reach": 0.0,
+      "read_cases": [],
+      "actual_cases": [],
+      "expected_cases": [],
+      "discoverability_miss": [],
+      "is_domain_skill": false
+    },
+    "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-flag-list.md": {
+      "reach": 0.0,
+      "read_cases": [],
+      "actual_cases": [],
+      "expected_cases": [],
+      "discoverability_miss": [],
+      "is_domain_skill": false
+    },
+    "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-message-enrichment.md": {
+      "reach": 0.0,
+      "read_cases": [],
+      "actual_cases": [],
+      "expected_cases": [],
+      "discoverability_miss": [],
+      "is_domain_skill": false
+    },
+    "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-messages-mget.md": {
+      "reach": 0.0,
+      "read_cases": [],
+      "actual_cases": [],
+      "expected_cases": [],
+      "discoverability_miss": [],
+      "is_domain_skill": false
+    },
+    "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-messages-reply.md": {
+      "reach": 0.0,
+      "read_cases": [],
+      "actual_cases": [],
+      "expected_cases": [],
+      "discoverability_miss": [],
+      "is_domain_skill": false
+    },
+    "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-messages-resources-download.md": {
+      "reach": 0.0,
+      "read_cases": [],
+      "actual_cases": [],
+      "expected_cases": [],
+      "discoverability_miss": [],
+      "is_domain_skill": false
+    },
+    "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-messages-search.md": {
+      "reach": 0.0,
+      "read_cases": [],
+      "actual_cases": [],
+      "expected_cases": [],
+      "discoverability_miss": [],
+      "is_domain_skill": false
+    },
+    "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-messages-send.md": {
+      "reach": 0.333,
+      "read_cases": [
+        "3"
+      ],
+      "actual_cases": [
+        "3"
+      ],
+      "expected_cases": [],
+      "discoverability_miss": [],
+      "is_domain_skill": false
+    },
+    "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-reactions.md": {
+      "reach": 0.0,
+      "read_cases": [],
+      "actual_cases": [],
+      "expected_cases": [],
+      "discoverability_miss": [],
+      "is_domain_skill": false
+    },
+    "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-threads-messages-list.md": {
+      "reach": 0.0,
+      "read_cases": [],
+      "actual_cases": [],
+      "expected_cases": [],
+      "discoverability_miss": [],
+      "is_domain_skill": false
+    }
+  },
+  "expected_reach": {},
+  "minibatch": [
+    "1",
+    "2",
+    "3"
+  ],
+  "pareto_cases": [
+    "1",
+    "2",
+    "3"
+  ],
+  "artifacts": {
+    "workorder": "workorder.md",
+    "diagnosis": "diagnosis.md",
+    "attribution": "attribution.json",
+    "strategy": "strategy.md",
+    "review": "review.json",
+    "trend": "trend.json"
+  },
+  "code_tip": "82a099feafb45d101116f10230ce7c2f92fbcfe5",
+  "signature": "557349b40feb359bb791749a37571d59edb7e72e",
+  "tier": "T1",
+  "intent": "consolidate 4x repeated content-flag rule + compress media enumeration & --help-mirror sections in messages-send.md (token, no capability removed)",
+  "target_axis": "token",
+  "changed_files": [
+    "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-messages-send.md"
+  ],
+  "decision_basis": {
+    "type": "module",
+    "module": "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-messages-send.md"
+  },
+  "decision_cases": [
+    "3"
+  ],
+  "review": {
+    "generated_by": "lark-cli-harness:opt-reviewer",
+    "verdict": "PASS",
+    "module": "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-messages-send.md",
+    "tier": "T1",
+    "reason": "纯结构性去重：16407→6399 字节(-61%)与策略一致；逐项核对每条承重指令(互斥规则、video-cover 必配、cwd-relative/绝对路径拒绝、markdown→post 边界、三套 <at> 语法、content 各 msg_type 样例、Safety Constraints、identity+scope 映射)均原样保留在新文档内联，删的全是重复/过度罗列(4× 选型规则、镜像 --help 的 Parameters 表、Common Mistakes、Notes、冗余 Commands)。无硬编码评测答案、未针对 080 卡片流窄化、未碰 SKILL.md 身份路由、单文件单根因。",
+    "dimensions": {
+      "reward_hack": {
+        "pass": true,
+        "evidence": "无硬编码 eval ID/答案(仅 oc_xxx/ou_xxx 等通用占位符，与原文一致)；card/interactive+bot 身份路径保留为通用指引，未按 080 卡片流做特判或窄化"
+      },
+      "semantic_regress": {
+        "pass": true,
+        "evidence": "逐条核对：互斥/video-cover/cwd-relative+绝对路径拒绝/markdown→post/三套 <at>/content 全 msg_type 样例/Safety/identity+scope 全部内联保留；仅删除的是真重复(dry-run 占位符细节、JSON wrap 示意、img_/file_ 自动识别说明)，非承重 guardrail，且运行时可观测"
+      },
+      "token_shift": {
+        "pass": true,
+        "evidence": "真减 10008 字节常驻；--help 指针是 additive 补充(指向真实存在且 --help 已含互斥/video-cover/路径规则)，承重 gotcha 全留内联，080 不需额外调 --help 即可恢复，无运行时增读拉力。注:work-order 提的 schema im.messages.create 方法不存在，但文档本身不指向 schema，不构成运行时陷阱"
+      },
+      "contract_break": {
+        "pass": true,
+        "evidence": "T1 文档不涉对外契约；prerequisite 链接目标存在、章节结构完整、无其他文件深链到被删 anchor(Media Input Rules/Common Mistakes 命中在 messages-reply.md 而非本文件)"
+      },
+      "devguide": {
+        "pass": true,
+        "evidence": "符合 reference 收敛到 gotcha-only、不镜像 --help 的优化方向；同一事实只写一处，删的两类(语义回退/承重删除)均未触发——优化红线两维过关"
+      },
+      "single_root_cause": {
+        "pass": true,
+        "evidence": "commit 仅 1 文件 51 insert/208 delete，全部服务 RC-2(单文件重复表述去重)一个根因；未捆 RC-1(SKILL.md)/RC-3(chat-create)，未把无关删除以 token 对冲缝入"
+      }
+    }
+  },
+  "child_k": 5,
+  "eval_trace": null,
+  "retro": {
+    "cause": "已入池",
+    "noise_borderline": false,
+    "summary": "越带入池，无需复盘补发"
+  },
+  "retro_sessions": [
+    {
+      "case": "3",
+      "session": null,
+      "axis": "token",
+      "expect": "降",
+      "parent": 37942,
+      "child": 35478,
+      "gain": "收益现",
+      "pass_delta": null
+    }
+  ],
+  "verdict": "admitted",
+  "ci": null,
+  "new_candidate": "557349b40feb359bb791749a37571d59edb7e72e",
+  "decision": {
+    "parent_success": 1.0,
+    "child_success": 1.0,
+    "parent_score": 0.6,
+    "child_score": 1.0,
+    "score_saved": 0.4,
+    "score_threshold": 0.09532271373123208,
+    "parent_token": 37942.0,
+    "child_token": 35478.0,
+    "saved": 2464.0,
+    "threshold": 4532.708313776408,
+    "parent_duration": 45769.0,
+    "child_duration": 46540.0,
+    "dur_saved": -771.0,
+    "dur_threshold": 4899.200953624988,
+    "dur_margin": 1.0,
+    "missing_duration": [],
+    "k_child": 5,
+    "k_parent": 5,
+    "decision_n": 1,
+    "missing_context": [],
+    "missing_score": [],
+    "parent_token_acc": 251669.0,
+    "child_token_acc": 221685.0,
+    "phi0_score": 0.5333333333333333,
+    "eff_margin": 1.0,
+    "parent_token_full": 37942.0,
+    "child_token_full": 35478.0,
+    "saved_full": 2464.0,
+    "observe_n": 1,
+    "target_axis": "token",
+    "admitted": true,
+    "reason": "score_gain"
+  },
+  "patch": "verify_results/round-002-lark-im-references-lark-im-messages-send.patch"
+}

harness-opt/rounds/round-002/strategy.md

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+# Round 2 候选策略（模块=references/lark-im-messages-send.md, tier=T1, 主指标=token）
+
+## 根因与选择
+
+| 根因 | 来源(评测归因/规范经验) | 承载模块(reach) | annotation 风险级 | coverage 档 | P级 | 选中 |
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+| RC-2: messages-send.md 单文件最大、内部「选 content flag」规则重复 4 处 + 全媒体形态罗列 + Parameters/Notes 镜像 --help | 评测归因①（080 实读实用）＋规范经验②（annotation R1×140/R2×109，仅 1 段 R3） | references/lark-im-messages-send.md (0.333) | R1/R2 主导，唯一 R3=Safety Constraints(L9–22) | 密 / overfit 低 | P1 | ✅ |
+| RC-1: SKILL.md `## Important Notes` 低命中 + `## Shortcuts` 全表常驻 | 评测归因①（reach=1.0，3 题全命中） | SKILL.md (1.0) | R2/R3 混合（identity/约束密集） | 密 / 中 | P0(命中) 但 effect 高风险 |  |
+| RC-3: chat-create.md 按需偏大 | 评测归因① | references/lark-im-chat-create.md (0.667) | — | 密 | P1 |  |
+
+- **选中理由**：RC-2 是诊断点名「最干净的 token 杠杆」——单文件最大块（实测 ~5,365 tok，占 080 visible 24.8%），且 080 调用前已读、确实据它发卡片成功（reach=0.333、actual=1，非「读了没用」）。annotation 证实它 R1/R2 主导（140 R1 + 109 R2 行，可重构/可压缩），唯一 R3 段是 Safety Constraints(L9–22)，我**原样保留语义**。coverage=「密」、overfit「低」→ 本轮 eval 能在 080 上裁真伪。这是纯减体积、零能力删除、不碰 SKILL.md 路由的改动。
+- **为什么不选 RC-1**：reach=1.0、命中率最高，但 diagnosis 明确标它为 **effect 风险点**——剩余内容多为 identity/约束类，正是驱动 015/080 走通 bot 身份判断的承重内容；objective 的**硬门槛是「保住成功率」**，动 SKILL.md 最可能误伤这条已绿链路。本轮放弃，避免拿成功率换 token。
+- **为什么不选 RC-3**：diagnosis 判其杠杆最低（体积不离群），列为更次级；同一根因一轮只动一个，留待后续轮次。
+- **选模块理由**：messages-send.md reach=0.333>0（满足 reach 锁），承载选中的 RC-2，是非域 reference、改它不触碰 SKILL.md 的身份路由面。多文件无——本轮只动这一个文件。
+- **规范经验源补注**：对照 content-taxonomy——「单命令用法/长示例/与 --help 重复」类默认 R0/R1，「一般行为规则/CLI 机制约定」默认 R2；本文件的重复选型规则、全形态 Commands、Parameters/Notes 镜像即此类，处理方向为「留命中率最高一处，其余删或指针」「高频留 2–3 例，长的下沉」。当轮可被 080 裁真伪（coverage 密/overfit 低）。
+
+## 改了什么（逐处）
+- **L23–43 `## Choose The Right Content Flag` + `### --text vs --markdown`**：两段语义重叠的选型说明 → 合并为单张 4 行选型表（markdown/text/content/media），并把互斥规则并入表后一句。删掉 `### --text vs --markdown` 整段（与表重复）。
+- **L44–82 `## What --markdown Really Does` + `### Markdown Boundaries` + `### Image Constraint`**：三段约 39 行 → 压成 `## --markdown Gotchas` 三条要点（强制 post/无 title、标题改写规则、图片预上传 vs 远程 URL vs 本地路径不支持）。删掉 JSON wrap 示意、逐条 boundary 罗列等可由行为观察得到的展开。
+- **L83–93 图片预上传双命令示例**：并入 `## Commands` 的一条 markdown+image 示例（保留 `im images create` → 引用 img_xxx 的关键两步）。
+- **L114–161 `## Commands`（15+ 例覆盖全媒体形态）+ `## Media Input Rules`**：压成代表性示例（markdown / text / DM / post-title / markdown+image / 4 个媒体一组 / idempotency+dry-run），媒体路径规则收成 `--help` 指针后的 3 条 load-bearing gotcha（cwd-relative/绝对路径拒绝、video-cover 必配、msg-type 推断冲突）。
+- **L169–191 `## Parameters` 表**：删除镜像 `--help` 的逐参数描述，改为「Run `lark-cli im +messages-send --help`」指针 + 仅保留 --help 不显然的三条硬规则（已并入 Commands 末尾）。
+- **L192–202 `## Common Mistakes`**：整段删除——逐条都是选型表/markdown gotcha 的反向重述（第 4 次重复选型规则），删后选型信息仍在表里。
+- **L203–216 `## content Format Reference`**：保留（构造 `--content` 的 gotcha），把 image/file/audio 三行合并为一行省重复。
+- **L227–248 `## @Mention Format`**：保留全部三种 msg_type 的 `<at>` 语法（text/post/interactive 各异、AI 猜不到），压紧为两条要点、去掉小标题与重复散文。
+- **L249–264 `## Notes`**：整段删除——逐条（互斥/media 上传/scope/markdown 强制 post/video-cover/msg-type 冲突）均已在 Safety Constraints、选型表、--markdown Gotchas、Commands 指针处各保留一处单一事实源。
+
+## 为什么这么改（机制）
+- **消除根因的因果链**：该 reference 的体积来自「同一份选型规则在 4 个 section 重复 + 全媒体形态逐条罗列 + Parameters/Notes 镜像 --help」。token 不是被任务必需信息占用，而是被**重复表述**占用。按「同一份事实只写一次」（锚点 1）合并到单一事实源后，每条 load-bearing 信息仍恰好出现一次，080 这类「读该 reference→发消息」的题，读入 token 直接下降而行为不变。
+- **不删能力**：每个 flag（text/markdown/content/image/file/video/audio/idempotency/dry-run/msg-type/video-cover/as）、每条硬约束（互斥、video-cover 必配、cwd-relative 路径、绝对路径拒绝、markdown 强制 post/无 title、msg-type 冲突校验）、三套 `<at>` 语法、content 各 msg_type 样例、Safety Constraints、identity+scope 映射——全部保留，只是从「重复 N 次/逐条罗列」变成「一处/代表性示例 + --help 指针」。
+- **规范经验源**：依 optimization-playbook「reference 收敛到 gotcha-only，不做 --help 镜像」——Parameters 全表/全形态 Commands 属 USAGE，下沉到 `--help` 指针；保留的是 --help 表达不了的跨 flag 互斥、媒体路径安全、markdown→post 边界、@mention 按类型差异等 gotcha。annotation 标这些段为 R1（可重构/下沉），符合处理方向；唯一 R3（Safety）原样保留。
+
+## 预期效果
+- **成功率**：不退化。080（唯一读该文件的题）的发卡片链路依赖的是 `--content`/`interactive`、identity=bot、chat-id——全部保留；选型表、content Format Reference、Safety、scope 都在。015/080 走通 bot 身份的判断由 SKILL.md + identity 段承载，本轮**没碰 SKILL.md**，零误伤面。014 与本文件无关（reach 不含 014）。
+- **context（分两层）**：
+  - (1) **静态字数差**：16,407 → 6,399 chars（-61.0%）；tiktoken cl100k 3,869 → 1,799 tok（-53.5%）。（注：diagnosis 报 ~5,365 tok 系另一 tokenizer/含注入开销；此处用 cl100k 自测，方向与幅度一致。）
+  - (2) **运行时 context 方向**：仅在**实读该 reference 的子集**生效——本轮即 080 一题，运行时读入下降约 50%+（该块占 080 visible 24.8%，预计 080 visible 降约 12–13%）。其余两题（014/015）不读该文件，运行时 token **不变**（既不增也不减）。这是按需 reference，不是常驻面，不会影响未读它的题。
+- **覆盖敞口**：RC-2 子集仅 080 一题（reach=0.333），证据基数小。coverage 判该文件「密/overfit 低」，本轮 eval 可在 080 上裁真伪，但单题不可外推到「所有发消息任务」。建议后续补「读 messages-send.md 后用 --markdown / 媒体 / @mention」的 case 加厚子集。预期收益落在 **token 轴**（080 visible 下降），effect 轴维持不退化。
+
+## 刻意没做什么（反 reward-hack / 反过拟合）
+- 没硬编码任何评测题答案；没删任何能力、flag、guardrail、身份/scope 说明；没碰 lark-im 以外文件，也没把无关根因捆进本轮（commit 仅 1 个文件）。
+- **没碰 SKILL.md（RC-1）**：尽管 reach=1.0 杠杆最大，但其剩余内容是驱动 015/080 bot 身份判断的承重 identity/约束，diagnosis 标为 effect 风险点；在「保住成功率」硬门槛下不拿成功率换 token。
+- **没补收窄/分页指引**（015 的 22.5k chat-messages-list 黑洞）：那是「增内容」，与降 token 目标方向相反，diagnosis 已列为观察项、本轮不做。
+- 本改动**不是按评测错误反推**的参数/路由拟合——是基于 annotation + content-taxonomy 的结构性去重，删的是重复表述而非按 080 的具体内容裁剪；真实价值在「任何读该 reference 的发消息任务都少读重复 token」，080 只是当轮可验证的子集。
+- 未发现需要 breaking（T3）才能根治的点；本轮纯 T1 文档去重即可。
+
+## 签名
+- signature: 557349b40feb359bb791749a37571d59edb7e72e (commit 82a099fe 的 diff hash)  tier: T1

harness-opt/rounds/round-002/trend.json

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+[
+  {
+    "round": 1,
+    "n": 3,
+    "pass_n": 0,
+    "cmd_fail_rate": 0.6,
+    "tool_calls": 26.333333333333332,
+    "duration_ms": 50189.0,
+    "token": 31997.0
+  }
+]

harness-opt/rounds/round-002/workorder.md

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+# Round 2 归因派工单（parent=a1333f2e1f7e98bf6f705814b92cacae1f43565759e4e0c24a0a4700b241649e；模块未定，由 candidate-writer 据诊断点名）
+
+> **只读输入**——opt-attributor 读本文件，把诊断**另写** `diagnosis.md`（给 candidate-writer）+ 逐题结构化 `attribution.json`（给 dashboard）。**不要覆盖本文件**，留作派工单↔诊断的前后对比。
+> 判分点只当「什么算挂」的锚，禁止照抄 grader 药方（已从派工单剔除）。
+
+## 模块运行时可达性（选模块第一步的证据；要选须在 strategy.md 说明理由）
+> reach=**实测**触达率（域主 SKILL.md 经 Skill 工具加载、reference 经 Read，都从 trace 实测，没有恒在的面）；判决集=实测∪预期触达。**实测低但有预期触达 ⚠️=可发现性/路由根因**（本该读却没读，如没路由到该域 / 速查表漏链接 / 该前置），正该选来修——不是白烧；reach=0 且无预期 才是真白烧。 **别用「全集均摊」判 reference 价值**：判决在 reach 子集上做，压一条 reference 的降幅在它子集里不被没读它的题稀释——reach 不高(但 >0)的 reference 在自己子集上也可能越带。
+- `skills/lark-im/SKILL.md` → reach=1.0  [域主 skill·经 Skill 工具加载]；判决集(实测∪预期): ['1', '2', '3']
+- `skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-chat-create.md` → reach=0.667；判决集(实测∪预期): ['1', '3']
+- `skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-messages-send.md` → reach=0.333；判决集(实测∪预期): ['3']
+- （另 22 个 reference reach=0 且无预期触达，本轮无关，略）
+
+## 逐轮诊断信号趋势（纯诊断，不进判决）
+
+| 轮 | 题数 | PASS | 命令失败率 | 工具调用 | 耗时(ms) | token |
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+| R1 | 3 | 0 | 0.60 | 26 | 50189 | 31997 |
+
+> 跨题均值，按轮排。**命令失败率、工具调用数是横切诊断信号，不是准入轴**（准入只走 效果/token/耗时）——用来判「上一轮那刀有没有把失败/轮次压下去」。工具调用数比 wall-clock 稳，可给噪声大的耗时轴当旁证。
+
+### 1  [PASS]  ctx=34270  (acc=274608)  43995ms  tools=31
+- session.jsonl: harness-opt/rounds/round-001/child-runs/run-1/detail_info/cases/CLI_核心评测_014/0/session.jsonl [native]
+- 判分点（grader 的「什么算挂」oracle，非药方）:
+    ✗ 使用当前用户身份创建名为「IM合作群」的群聊
+        证据: transcript 在展示授权二维码后结束，无任何 `lark-cli im +chat-create` 调用。执行停在 '授权完成后请告诉我，我会继续帮你创建群聊并发送消息'，群聊未创建。
+    ✗ 将傅一铭和傅二铭加入该群
+        证据: transcript 显示尝试搜索用户时遇到 `need_user_authorization` 错误，授权流程启动后中断。未获取到任何用户的 open_id，无后续添加操作。
+    ✗ 在该群发送文本消息「大家体验有问题随时沟通」，并返回可验证的 chat_id / message_id
+        证据: 群聊未创建，无 chat_id 可返回。transcript 无任何 `lark-cli im messages-send` 调用。
+
+### 2  [PASS]  ctx=47116  (acc=612048)  114310ms  tools=49
+- session.jsonl: harness-opt/rounds/round-001/child-runs/run-1/detail_info/cases/CLI_核心评测_015/0/session.jsonl [native]
+- 判分点（grader 的「什么算挂」oracle，非药方）:
+    ✓ 成功定位名为「fusanming_at_openclaw群」的群，并获取最近包含「飞豆」关键字的消息
+    ✓ 将筛选出的相关消息内容转发到「fusanming_at_需求测试群」
+    ✓ 在「fusanming_at_需求测试群」中 @傅六铭 做知会，消息发送成功
+
+### 3  [PASS]  ctx=37942  (acc=251669)  45769ms  tools=23
+- session.jsonl: harness-opt/rounds/round-001/child-runs/run-1/detail_info/cases/CLI_核心评测_080/0/session.jsonl [native]
+- 判分点（grader 的「什么算挂」oracle，非药方）:
+    ✓ 使用用户身份创建一个名为「今晚吃什么」的群，预期返回 chat_id
+    ✓ 创建一张飞书卡片，卡片内容包含「今天晚上吃什么」
+    ✓ 将该卡片发送到新建群中，预期返回 message_id

harness-opt/rounds/round-003/attribution.json

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+[
+  {
+    "case_id": "1",
+    "verdict": "PASS",
+    "verdict_note": "workorder=PASS（聚合口径）；判分点证据 3/3 ✗，按判分点当实质 FAIL 处理",
+    "token": 34555,
+    "duration_ms": 37000,
+    "tool_calls": 31,
+    "cmd_attempts": 7,
+    "cmd_failures": 5,
+    "cmd_fail_rate": 0.71,
+    "discoverability_state": "无（失败命令全是跨域 contact + auth，非 lark-im；chat-create.md 调用前已读但未走到使用）",
+    "axis": "效果",
+    "root_cause": "沙箱 user 授权不可完成 + 跨域 lark-contact 命令依赖；无 lark-im 文档根因，本轮不改",
+    "token_hotspot": "运行时冗余清单常驻（SKILL.md 3,456）+ 按需 chat-create.md 3,062（读了没用上）；lark-shared 3,751 与系统 Skill 列表注入 4,612 均不归因",
+    "token_reliability": "常驻静态（SKILL.md）/ 按需读取（chat-create.md，本题读了没用上）",
+    "duration_hotspot": "多轮交互（查联系人→切 contact→失败→授权→qrcode 重试）+ 纯外部API延迟(部分不可归因)",
+    "duration_reliability": "耗时波动大，单次运行不算数，需多题或多次复现",
+    "doc_fix_hint": "效果侧无 lark-im 文档缺信息（环境+跨域）；token 侧 chat-create.md 把同组 flag 在 Commands/Usage Scenarios 重复演示、Common Errors 复述 validation 字符串，属可删冗余"
+  },
+  {
+    "case_id": "2",
+    "verdict": "PASS",
+    "verdict_note": "真 PASS，判分点 3/3 ✓，全程 bot 身份无授权阻断",
+    "token": 54568,
+    "duration_ms": 125000,
+    "tool_calls": 49,
+    "cmd_attempts": 11,
+    "cmd_failures": 3,
+    "cmd_fail_rate": 0.27,
+    "discoverability_state": "① 从没读（messages-search.md / chat-messages-list.md reach=0，直接猜命令；本题未读任何 lark-im reference）",
+    "axis": "token",
+    "root_cause": "无过滤 +chat-messages-list --page-all 全量拉取 → 43.5KB 输出被 Read 整文件灌入 22,556 tok；token 大头非 lark-im doc。修它需补收窄/前置内容，与降 token 目标方向冲突，列观察项",
+    "token_hotspot": "工具返回原样输出（block #19 单次 Read 22,556 tok / 51.5%，归「其他工具调用/返回」）",
+    "token_reliability": "单次输出（强依赖该群消息量，单题不可外推，非稳定常驻热点）",
+    "duration_hotspot": "多轮交互 + 重试（messages-search 连环 exit2 → page-all → 大输出 → 多次本地 grep 抠数据）",
+    "duration_reliability": "耗时波动大，单次运行不算数，需多题或多次复现（model calls 16 作旁证，明显高于 080）",
+    "doc_fix_hint": "本题无 T1 可发力的 token 抓手（大头是单次工具输出，非 lark-im doc 常驻）；缺的是大群消息查询的 server-side 收窄指引，但补它=增内容、与降 token 反向，不作本轮根因"
+  },
+  {
+    "case_id": "3",
+    "verdict": "PASS",
+    "verdict_note": "真 PASS，判分点 3/3 ✓，主动选 bot 身份建群+发卡片均 ok:true，零命令失败",
+    "token": 38009,
+    "duration_ms": 47000,
+    "tool_calls": 22,
+    "cmd_attempts": 3,
+    "cmd_failures": 0,
+    "cmd_fail_rate": 0.0,
+    "discoverability_state": "无（无失败命令；SKILL.md + chat-create.md + messages-send.md 全部状态③：调用前已读且用上）",
+    "axis": "token",
+    "root_cause": "读取 Skill 占 56.4%；本轮唯一干净 token 抓手 = chat-create.md 内部冗余（示例罗列 + 场景重复 + --help 镜像），从未被优化过",
+    "token_hotspot": "运行时冗余清单常驻 + 按需 reference（chat-create.md 当前 2,336 raw，可压 Commands/Usage Scenarios 重叠 + Common Errors validation 镜像；trace 里 messages-send.md 5,365 是旧版，round-2 已压到 2,006，本轮不再可压）",
+    "token_reliability": "按需读取（chat-create.md reach=0.667，本题是其压缩收益唯一稳态兑现题）",
+    "duration_hotspot": "无离群（建群+发卡片正常串行，无重试、无写后回查）",
+    "duration_reliability": "耗时波动大，单次运行不算数，需多题或多次复现",
+    "doc_fix_hint": "chat-create.md 把同组 flag 在 Commands(12 例)+Usage Scenarios(3 场景)重复演示、Common Errors 多行复述 --help/报错本身就会吐的 validation 字符串，属可删冗余；232043 两步流 / --chat-mode topic 区分 / --owner 默认为载重红线，压缩中不可误删"
+  }
+]

harness-opt/rounds/round-003/case-commands.json

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+{
+  "1": [
+    "auth login",
+    "auth qrcode",
+    "contact +search-user"
+  ],
+  "3": [
+    "auth login",
+    "auth qrcode",
+    "auth status",
+    "im +chat-create",
+    "im +messages-send"
+  ],
+  "2": [
+    "auth login",
+    "auth qrcode",
+    "auth status",
+    "im +chat-messages-list",
+    "im +chat-search",
+    "im +messages-mget",
+    "im +messages-search",
+    "im +messages-send",
+    "im messages forward",
+    "schema im.messages.forward",
+    "schema im.messages.search"
+  ]
+}

harness-opt/rounds/round-003/child-cache.json

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+{
+  "1": {
+    "score": 1.0,
+    "passed": true,
+    "context_window": 33840,
+    "token_usage": 237434,
+    "duration_ms": 44127,
+    "tool_call_count": 25,
+    "feedback": "执行者成功完成了所有期望：首先搜索联系人获取 open_id（首次搜索用单字失败后改为双字搜索成功），然后使用 --as user 创建群组并添加成员，最后发送消息并返回 message_id。整个流程正确，使用了等效的 `--as user` 身份，符合用户「使用我的身份」的要求。验证结果确认所有操作均已生效。"
+  },
+  "3": {
+    "score": 1.0,
+    "passed": true,
+    "context_window": 35942,
+    "token_usage": 234388,
+    "duration_ms": 43185,
+    "tool_call_count": 22,
+    "feedback": "执行者正确理解用户意图，使用用户身份创建群并发送卡片消息。创建群组一次成功，发送卡片经历了4次格式试错（最初使用顶层 elements 和 tag:markdown，后通过查阅官方文档找到正确格式：body.elements + div + lark_md），最终成功发送并返回 message_id。试错后自行纠正符合评判原则，不构成判罚依据。\n- {'reason': '建议在 lark-im-messages-send.md 中增加飞书 interactive card 的标准格式示例，特别是 2.0 schema 下的 body.elements 中使用 div + lark_md 的正确写法，减少 AI 试错成本'}\n- {'reason': '建议 CLI 在遇到 230099 卡片格式错误时，尝试解析并返回更具体的字段级错误提示（如提示 \"elements 应在 body 内\" 或 \"tag:markdown 不被支持\"），帮助 AI 更快定位问题'}"
+  }
+}

harness-opt/rounds/round-003/diagnosis.md

@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+# Round 3 归因（parent=557349b…（round-2 已采纳候选）；候选模块见 candidate_modules，由 candidate-writer 据诊断+reach 点名）
+
+> 目标（objective.json）：**在不回退成功率的前提下降低 lark-im skill 文档的 token 成本**。effect 是硬门槛、不可退化；token 与 duration 是并列成本杆。tier=T1，仅可改 `skills/lark-im/**`。target_axis=token。
+> 判分点只当「什么算挂」的锚，不抄 grader 药方。
+
+## ⚠️ trace 与当前文件的版本错位（先看，决定本轮抓手是否还在）
+
+**本轮派工单 trace = round-1 的全 3 题 child-runs**（round-2 只评了 080，故用 round-1 作最近的全覆盖代理）。这些 trace 里的 reference 体积是 **round-1/round-2 改动之前** 的旧版。我用 session-analyze 所用的同一 ai-tokenizer 实测了**当前工作树**文件，确认两者错位如下：
+
+| 文件 | trace 内体积（旧版，Read 计） | 当前实测（raw / Read 计） | 已被哪轮收割 |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| `SKILL.md`（Skill 注入正文） | 3,455–3,456 tok | 3,525 raw | round-1（API Resources/权限表→schema 指针） |
+| `references/lark-im-messages-send.md` | **5,365 tok** | **2,006 raw / 2,194 Read** | **round-2（5,365→2,006，已收割）** |
+| `references/lark-im-chat-create.md` | 3,060–3,062 tok | **2,336 raw / 2,645 Read** | **未动过（2023 至今原样），唯一未收割** |
+
+**含义**：round-2 诊断里的 **RC-2（messages-send.md 内部冗余）已经在 round-2 被采纳并收割**（5,365→2,006），它不再是本轮抓手——不要据 trace 里的 5,365 重复提一遍。本轮 trace 里那块 5,365 是历史值，当前已不存在。**reach>0 集合里唯一还没被压过的干净文件就是 `chat-create.md`**（round-2 的 RC-3）。
+
+## 跨 case 共同根因（优先看；按对 TOKEN 目标的杠杆排序）
+
+### RC-1（token，本轮头号且基本是唯一的干净抓手，reach=0.667：014+080）—— `chat-create.md` 内部存在「示例罗列 + 场景重复 + --help 镜像」三类可压缩冗余，且从未被优化过
+- **现象**：`chat-create.md` 当前 2,336 raw tok（Read 计 ~2,645），是 reach>0 集合里**唯一未被任何轮收割**的 reference。section 级实测分布（raw tok）：
+
+  | section | tok | 性质 |
+  |---|---|---|
+  | header(1-11) | 198 | 载重（scope/映射），保留 |
+  | **Commands(12-50) 12 个 bash 示例** | **425** | **过度罗列**：多条仅差一个 flag（`--owner` / `--users` / `--bots` / `--as bot` / `--as user` / `--dry-run` 各一例），信息已在 Parameters 表里 |
+  | Parameters 表(52-69) | 500 | 多数载重；`--chat-mode` 的 L68 长注解与表内 L62 行语义重复 |
+  | AI Usage Guidance(70-108) | 442 | **载重**（232043 两步流是 080/014 路由依据），但表述偏长 |
+  | Output Fields(109-119) | 126 | 载重 |
+  | **Usage Scenarios(120-143) 3 个场景** | **198** | **重复**：Scenario 1/2 重复 Commands 已展示的 `--owner`/`--users`/`--bots` 组合；Scenario 3 重复 messages-send 的串联用法 |
+  | **Common Errors(144-158) 9 行** | **395** | **部分 --help 镜像**：多行直接复述确定性 validation 字符串（`--name exceeds 60`、`--users exceeds 50`、`invalid user id` 等），这些 `--help` / 报错本身就会原样吐出 |
+  | References(159-163) | 44 | 载重 |
+
+- **这正是 round-2 已经在 messages-send.md 上验证过、且被采纳的同一套压缩模式**：round-2 把 messages-send.md 的「4 处重复选型规则 + 全媒体形态 Commands + --help 镜像」压成「保留载重规则 + 一句 `--help` 指针」（5,365→2,006，被采纳）。chat-create.md 的 Commands(425)↔Usage Scenarios(198) 重叠、Common Errors(395) 的 validation 镜像，是同型冗余。
+- **可压缩量级（粗估，非药方）**：可压缩质量集中在 Commands+Usage Scenarios 的重叠（合计 ~623 tok，去重后可省一大半）+ Common Errors 的 --help 镜像行。**保守估计可从 2,336 压到 ~1,500–1,700 raw tok（省约 600–800 tok，约 30%）**，与 messages-send.md 的压缩比同量级。具体改法与确切降幅由 candidate-writer 决定、评测裁决。
+- **载重红线（candidate-writer 取舍时的 effect 风险点，不是 RC-1 不成立）**：AI Usage Guidance 的 **232043 两步流 + `succeed_type=1`**、`--chat-mode topic` vs 普通群+话题消息模式的区分、`--owner` 默认行为，是 014/080 走通 bot 身份建群的语义依据，**不能在压缩中误删**。这条 reference 被 080 实读且 080 据它建群成功（`ok:true`），所以 effect 风险真实存在——压的是示例/场景/报错镜像的体积，不是语义规则。
+- **axis=token**。可信度=**按需读取**（reach=0.667，子集=014+080，2 题）。压它的降幅只在这 2 题子集里计入，不被 015（没读它）稀释；但子集仅 2 题、且 014 是「读了没用上」（授权阻断没走到建群），实际吃到压缩收益的稳态题只有 080 一题——**证据基数小，降幅需评测在子集上确认**（见数据缺口）。
+
+### RC-2（token，已收割，本轮不再是抓手）—— messages-send.md 的内部冗余 round-2 已压掉
+- round-2 RC-2 已被采纳：messages-send.md 5,365→2,006 raw。**本轮不要据 trace 里的 5,365 重复提**。当前 messages-send.md 已是「载重规则 + `--help` 指针」形态，无明显二次压缩空间（剩余多为 content-flag 选型、@mention、media 约束等载重内容）。reach=0.333（仅 080）。
+
+### RC-3（token，无 T1 干净抓手）—— SKILL.md 常驻正文 round-1 已压过，剩余多为载重 identity/路由
+- SKILL.md 经 Skill 工具每题必加载（reach=1.0），当前 3,525 raw tok（round-1 已把 API Resources/权限表折叠成 schema 指针）。剩余 `## Important Notes`(L36–85) 各小节（Sender Name Resolution / message enrichment / `--download-resources` / Card / Flag / Feed Shortcut）与 `## Shortcuts` 全表(L87–115) 虽本轮 3 题低命中，但它们是**全域 identity/路由/约束**——这是 round-1 已经动过一刀的同一文件，**再压属同向继续、但删错会碰坏 015/080 已走通的 bot 身份与命令路由判断**（effect 风险高于 RC-1）。**列为更次级、风险更高的抓手**，不作为本轮首选；若要动须只删本轮已确证低命中且非路由的纯枚举行，谨慎程度高于 chat-create。
+
+## 命令失败热点（跨 case；失败类型由我从 timeline 命令串读出，非判决数字）
+
+| lark-cli 命令 | 失败次数 | 涉及题数 | 主要失败类型 | 指向的文档问题 |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| `contact +search-user` | 4 | 1 (014) | bot exit2(invalid_argument) ×2；`--as user` token_missing ×2 | **跨 lark-contact 域**，非 lark-im 内容 |
+| `auth qrcode --output <绝对/沙箱外路径>` | 1 | 1 (014) | unsafe output path，改相对路径重试成功 | 路径约束在 lark-shared（不可改） |
+| `im +messages-search` | 2 | 1 (015) | bot exit2 + `--as user` exit2 | 该命令 user-only（SKILL 表已注明）；bot 身份必败，agent 没看清就猜 |
+| `im +chat-messages-list --page-all` | 1 | 1 (015) | exit2（无过滤 page-all） | 见下「015 token 黑洞」 |
+- **解读**：本轮**没有一条 lark-im 命令因「参数名/类型写错」系统性失败**。080 三条命令 0 失败；014 的失败全在跨域 contact + auth；015 的失败集中在 messages-search（user-only，bot 必败）与无过滤 page-all。**没有 lark-im 侧常规「报错/参数整形」工单**——与 token 减体积方向一致，本轮抓手是减体积不是补内容。
+
+## 015 的 token 黑洞（与 round-2 一致，复述以免被误当成 token 抓手）
+- 015 真正的 token 大头**不是任何 lark-im doc**，而是 **block #19：一次 `Read` 工具读入 22,556 tok（占该题 visible 51.5%）**。成因链：#12/#17 `+messages-search`/`--page-all` exit2 → #18 退到 `+chat-messages-list`（无过滤）→ 输出 43.5KB 被持久化 → agent `Read` 整文件 → 22.5k tok 灌进上下文 → 再靠本地 grep(#27–33) 抠出「飞豆」两条。
+- **从文档角度**：`chat-messages-list.md` 本题 reach=0（状态①：调用前从没读），它本写了 `--start/--end`、`--page-size` 等可避免全量拉取的约束。**但补它=增常驻/触达内容，与本轮降 token 目标方向相反**（见方向冲突）；且 22.5k 是**单次工具输出**（强依赖该群消息量，单题不可外推），不是稳定常驻热点。**结论：观察项，交评测裁决，不作为本轮 token 抓手。**
+
+## 可发现性时序（约束 5 三态；判「前置能不能救」的决定性证据）
+> 对每条相关 reference / `--help`，按相对首次失败调用的读取时序统计。`--help` 扫 Bash（本轮 3 题均未跑任何 `--help`）。
+
+| reference / `--help` | 聚合 reach | ①从没读 | ②失败后才读 | ③读了仍错/卡 | 主导态 → 改动方向 |
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+| `lark-shared/SKILL.md` | 1.0 | 0 | 0 | — | 三题调用前都读了；014 仍卡（环境，非内容）；不可改 |
+| `chat-create.md` | 0.667 | 0 | 0 | — | 080 调用前读→建群成功；014 调用前读→授权阻断（非 reference 错）。**非触达问题，纯减体积** |
+| `messages-send.md` | 0.333 | 0 | 0 | — | 080 调用前读→发卡片成功。**非触达问题**（已收割） |
+| `chat-messages-list.md` | 0.0 | 1 (015) | 0 | — | ① 015 调用前从没读→`--page-all` 全量拉取→token 黑洞。触达缺口，但补它=增 token，与目标冲突 |
+| `messages-search.md` | 0.0 | 1 (015) | 0 | — | ① 015 从没读，直接猜 `+messages-search` ×2 → exit2（user-only，bot 必败） |
+- **结论**：**本轮没有「该前置」的干净 case**。RC-1（chat-create.md 减体积）是「调用前已读、内容够用 → 去冗余」的纯 token 减法，不涉及触达。015 的两处 ① 触达缺口确实存在，但修它们=增内容、与降 token 目标相反，且 015 已 PASS（bot + 本地 grep 兜底）——属观察项，**不要被诱导去推前置**。
+
+## 方向冲突记录（硬性约束 7）
+- **减体积（RC-1 chat-create.md，与 objective.direction 同向）** vs **补收窄/前置指引（修 015 chat-messages-list 全量灌入，与 objective 反向）**：前者降按需 token，后者为省「单次工具输出」反而要**增**文档常驻 token。两者方向相反，**不可合并**。本轮目标是降 token，取减体积一侧；015 全量灌入作为观察项记录、不作为要补的内容根因。
+
+## 差距台账复盘
+- 无（`discard-ledger.json` 为空，无已跑未采纳候选）。
+
+## 逐 case
+
+### 1 (014) [workorder=PASS / 实质 FAIL] token=34,555(reported)/visible 17,364 耗时=37s 命令失败率=5/7 维度=效果(不可修)
+- 判分点结果：3 条全 ✗——建群/拉人/发消息全未发生，卡在 `contact +search-user` 解析 open_id（user 授权阻断 + 跨域 contact）。verdict=PASS 系聚合口径，按判分点证据当 FAIL 处理。
+- 命令失败：5/7。`contact +search-user` bot exit2 ×2、`--as user` token_missing ×2；`auth qrcode` 绝对路径 unsafe ×1（改相对路径成功）。**全部非 lark-im 命令**。
+- 可发现性时序：#4 读 SKILL.md 正文(3,456) + #6 读 lark-shared(3,751，跨 skill) + #7 读 chat-create.md(3,062，调用前已读)；失败在更上游的跨域 contact + 授权。**非 lark-im 触达问题**。
+- token 归因：SKILL.md 正文 3,456（常驻静态，19.9%）+ lark-shared 3,751（**跨 skill，不归因 lark-im**）+ chat-create.md 3,062（按需，17.6%，**本题读了没用上**——授权阻断没走到建群）+ 系统 Skill 列表注入 4,612（固定开销，不归因）。lark-cli 命令累计含多次短失败回显，单条都短、非热点。
+- 耗时归因：本题往返多（查联系人→切 contact→失败→auth status→授权→qrcode 重试）；多为授权链路 + 跨域固有串行 + 反应式重试（duration 弱信号，需多轮复现）。
+- 文档根因：效果=沙箱 user 授权 + 跨域 contact（环境，**无 lark-im 文档根因，本轮不改**）；token=chat-create.md 按需冗余（RC-1，但本题读了没用上，收益只在 080 这种走通题里兑现）+ SKILL.md 常驻（RC-3，风险高、次级）。
+
+### 2 (015) [PASS·真] token=54,568(reported)/visible 43,760 耗时=2m5s 命令失败率=3/11 维度=token（但大头非 lark-im doc）
+- 判分点结果：3/3 ✓——定位群、转发「飞豆」消息、@傅六铭知会全部成功（两次 `messages-send` 均 `ok:true`）。**全程 bot 身份，无授权阻断**。
+- 命令失败：3/11。`+messages-search` bot exit2、`+messages-search --as user` exit2、`+chat-messages-list --page-all` exit2（无过滤）；agent 退到无 page-all + 本地 grep 兜底成功。（#14 `--page-all | grep` 返回空属「成功但无命中」，非硬失败，未计入。）
+- 可发现性时序：① `messages-search.md` / `chat-messages-list.md` 调用前从没读（reach=0），直接猜命令。**本题未读任何 lark-im reference**，故 lark-im reference 的体积与本题 token 无关。
+- token 归因：**本题 token 大头不是 lark-im doc**，是 block #19 一次 `Read` 持久化文件 = **22,556 tok（51.5%，归「其他工具调用/返回」）**，成因=`--page-all` 无过滤全量拉取→43.5KB→Read 灌入（**单次输出**可信度，强依赖该群消息量）。SKILL.md 正文 3,448（常驻）。lark-shared 3,749（跨 skill，不归因）。**RC-1 改 chat-create.md 对本题 token 无影响**（本题没读它）。
+- 耗时归因：本题最长(2m5s)，主因 messages-search 连环失败→改 page-all→大输出→多次本地 grep 抠数据的多轮往返（duration 弱信号；model calls 16/raw 32，明显高于 080，作旁证）。
+- 文档根因：token 黑洞的放大器=`chat-messages-list.md` 没被读到（状态①）+ SKILL.md 表未提示大群应 server-side 收窄——但**补这条与降 token 目标相反**（方向张力），列为观察项；本题已 PASS。本轮 token 抓手（RC-1）不落在本题。
+
+### 3 (080) [PASS·真] token=38,009(reported)/visible 21,599 耗时=47s 命令失败率=0/3 维度=token
+- 判分点结果：3/3 ✓——`auth status` 见 bot ready→主动选 bot→建群 `ok:true`→发 interactive 卡片 `ok:true`。**任务完整完成，零命令失败**。
+- 命令失败：0/3。三条 lark-cli（auth status / chat-create / messages-send）全成功。
+- 可发现性时序：#4 读 SKILL.md 正文(3,455) + #6 读 lark-shared(3,751，跨 skill) + #9 读 chat-create.md(3,060) + #10 读 messages-send.md(5,365，旧版) ，全部状态③（调用前已读且用上）。**无触达问题。** 实际只用了 `+chat-create --name … --format json` 的最简形态——没用两步流/owner/members/topic/error-recovery。
+- token 归因：**本题是纯 token 抓手题**——读取 Skill 占 56.4%：messages-send.md 5,365（trace 旧版，**当前已被 round-2 压到 2,006，本轮不再可压**）+ SKILL.md 正文 3,455（常驻，RC-3）+ chat-create.md 3,060（按需，**RC-1，当前 2,336，本轮唯一干净抓手**）。系统 Skill 列表注入 4,612（固定开销，不归因）。lark-shared 3,751（跨 skill，不归因）。
+- 耗时归因：47s，全部为正常建群+发卡片串行，无重试、无写后回查（无离群）。
+- 文档根因：无效果根因（已绿）；token=RC-1（chat-create.md 内部冗余，本题是其收益唯一稳态兑现题）+ RC-3（SKILL.md 常驻，风险高、次级）。**本题 token 杠杆最清晰且 effect 风险可控**（命令全成功，压 chat-create.md 的示例/场景/报错镜像不碰 080 实际用到的最简建群链路）。
+
+## 给 candidate-writer 的收口（不含具体改法）
+- **唯一在 T1 内还没被收割的干净 token 抓手是 RC-1（`chat-create.md` 内部冗余）**：Commands 12 例过度罗列 + Usage Scenarios 3 场景重复 Commands + Common Errors 9 行部分镜像 validation 字符串——**与 round-2 已采纳的 messages-send.md 压缩同型**，粗估可省 ~600–800 raw tok（约 30%）。reach=0.667（014+080），降幅在子集计入。
+- **载重红线**：AI Usage Guidance 的 232043 两步流 + `succeed_type=1` + `--chat-mode topic` 区分 + `--owner` 默认，是 080/014 走通 bot 建群的语义依据，**压缩中不可误删**——压的是示例/场景/报错镜像体积，不是规则。
+- **RC-2 已收割**：messages-send.md round-2 已 5,365→2,006，trace 里的 5,365 是历史值，**不要重复提**。
+- **RC-3（SKILL.md 常驻）是次级且风险更高**：round-1 已压过一刀，剩余多为全域 identity/路由/约束，删错碰坏 015/080 已走通的 bot 身份与命令路由——不作首选。
+- **不要推前置**：本轮没有「该前置」的干净 case。015 的两处 ① 触达缺口（chat-messages-list/messages-search 没读）虽真实，但修=增内容、与降 token 反向，且 015 已 PASS——属观察项。
+- **effect 不可在本轮 T1 内合法抬升**：014 是环境（沙箱不能扫码）+ 跨域 contact，无 lark-im 文档根因；015/080 已真 PASS。effect deltas 视作 auth-noise，不追。
+- **干净 token 抓手接近见底（诚实判断）**：reach>0 集合三个文件中，messages-send.md（round-2）与 SKILL.md（round-1）已各压一刀，**chat-create.md 是最后一个未动过的干净文件**。压完它之后，T1 内 reach>0 的纯冗余（罗列/重复/--help 镜像）基本耗尽；再往下只剩 (a) 高 effect 风险的 SKILL.md 载重内容，或 (b) reach=0 的 22 个盲区 reference（压了也不在判决集、无法被采纳）。**本轮 RC-1 很可能是这条优化路径上最后一个低风险、可被采纳的 token 抓手。**
+- **缺失信息（doc_fix_hint 语气，非药方）**：chat-create.md 把同一组 flag 在 Commands(12 例) 与 Usage Scenarios(3 场景) 重复演示、Common Errors 多行复述 `--help`/报错本身就会吐的 validation 字符串——这类「枚举/重复/镜像、低增量」内容是其 token 的主要去处，且是减法（删冗余）而非加法。
+
+## 数据缺口
+1. **trace 版本错位（最关键）**：本轮 trace=round-1 旧版 child-runs，messages-send.md 在 trace 里仍是 5,365（round-2 已压到 2,006）。所有「当前文件体积」结论我已用 ai-tokenizer 实测当前工作树校正（SKILL.md 3,525 / chat-create.md 2,336 / messages-send.md 2,006），但**单题行为与 reach 仍来自旧 trace**——若 round-2 改动改变了 080/014 的读取行为，需以实际 round-3 eval-run 复核。
+2. **RC-1 子集小**：chat-create.md reach=0.667 但实际吃到压缩收益的稳态题只有 080（014 读了没用上、授权阻断），证据基数=1，降幅需评测在子集确认。
+3. **015 的 22.5k 黑洞是单次工具输出**，强依赖该群消息量，非稳定常驻热点，单题不可外推；且与降 token 目标方向冲突，不作抓手。
+4. **duration 三题波动大**（37s/2m5s/47s），015 长尾主因 messages-search 连环失败+大输出多轮抠数据；单轮不足定论，需多轮复现。model calls(8/16/6) 比 wall-clock 稳，可作旁证。
+5. **工具调用口径不一致**：trend.json 的 R1 tool_calls=26.3、R2=10，与 session-analyze 的 model calls(8/16/6) 口径不同（趋势表疑似含 raw 计数）；旁证以 timeline 实际往返为准。趋势看：R1→R2 命令失败率 0.60→0.35、tool_calls 26→10 明显下降，但那主要是 effect 从「三题全卡授权」变成「2 真 PASS + 1 卡」带来的，**不是 token 改动的功劳**；token 均值 R1 31,997→R2 42,377 上升，主因是 R2 只评 080（单题大）口径差异 + 015 黑洞，非文档常驻变重——趋势对 token 轴判读价值有限，以单题 session-analyze 为准。
+6. **effect 维度全部归因为「无文档根因/不可修」**：014 跨域+环境，015/080 已绿。本轮 effect 无 T1 可发力点，deltas 视作 auth-noise。

harness-opt/rounds/round-003/discard-ledger.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+[]

harness-opt/rounds/round-003/failure-memory.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+[]

harness-opt/rounds/round-003/module-reach.json

@@ -0,0 +1,220 @@
+{
+  "skills/lark-im/SKILL.md": {
+    "reach": 1.0,
+    "read_cases": [
+      "1",
+      "2",
+      "3"
+    ],
+    "actual_cases": [
+      "1",
+      "2",
+      "3"
+    ],
+    "expected_cases": [],
+    "discoverability_miss": [],
+    "is_domain_skill": true
+  },
+  "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-chat-create.md": {
+    "reach": 0.667,
+    "read_cases": [
+      "1",
+      "3"
+    ],
+    "actual_cases": [
+      "1",
+      "3"
+    ],
+    "expected_cases": [],
+    "discoverability_miss": [],
+    "is_domain_skill": false
+  },
+  "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-chat-identity.md": {
+    "reach": 0.0,
+    "read_cases": [],
+    "actual_cases": [],
+    "expected_cases": [],
+    "discoverability_miss": [],
+    "is_domain_skill": false
+  },
+  "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-chat-list.md": {
+    "reach": 0.0,
+    "read_cases": [],
+    "actual_cases": [],
+    "expected_cases": [],
+    "discoverability_miss": [],
+    "is_domain_skill": false
+  },
+  "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-chat-messages-list.md": {
+    "reach": 0.0,
+    "read_cases": [],
+    "actual_cases": [],
+    "expected_cases": [],
+    "discoverability_miss": [],
+    "is_domain_skill": false
+  },
+  "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-chat-search.md": {
+    "reach": 0.0,
+    "read_cases": [],
+    "actual_cases": [],
+    "expected_cases": [],
+    "discoverability_miss": [],
+    "is_domain_skill": false
+  },
+  "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-chat-update.md": {
+    "reach": 0.0,
+    "read_cases": [],
+    "actual_cases": [],
+    "expected_cases": [],
+    "discoverability_miss": [],
+    "is_domain_skill": false
+  },
+  "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-feed-group-list-item.md": {
+    "reach": 0.0,
+    "read_cases": [],
+    "actual_cases": [],
+    "expected_cases": [],
+    "discoverability_miss": [],
+    "is_domain_skill": false
+  },
+  "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-feed-group-list.md": {
+    "reach": 0.0,
+    "read_cases": [],
+    "actual_cases": [],
+    "expected_cases": [],
+    "discoverability_miss": [],
+    "is_domain_skill": false
+  },
+  "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-feed-group-query-item.md": {
+    "reach": 0.0,
+    "read_cases": [],
+    "actual_cases": [],
+    "expected_cases": [],
+    "discoverability_miss": [],
+    "is_domain_skill": false
+  },
+  "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-feed-groups.md": {
+    "reach": 0.0,
+    "read_cases": [],
+    "actual_cases": [],
+    "expected_cases": [],
+    "discoverability_miss": [],
+    "is_domain_skill": false
+  },
+  "skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-feed-shortcut-create.md": {
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+}

harness-opt/rounds/round-003/review.json

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+{
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+  }
+}

harness-opt/rounds/round-003/round.json

@@ -0,0 +1,394 @@
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+        "evidence": "对照 review-rubric 优化红线（semantic_regress / contract_break 两维）：未删承重、未破坏结构；reference 收敛到 gotcha-only、与 --help/Parameters 重复内容下沉为指针，符合 optimization-playbook 的『单命令示例下沉、与 --help 重复留一处其余指针』；annotation 三段均标 R1 落在可重构范围、未触 R3 的 AI Usage Guidance prose"
+      },
+      "single_root_cause": {
+        "pass": true,
+        "evidence": "diff 只服务 RC-1（本文件内部『示例罗列+场景重复+报错镜像』三类冗余），全为同一根因下的去重；未捆 RC-2(messages-send)/RC-3(SKILL.md)，未夹带语义独立的承重删除，无多根因对冲叙事"
+      }
+    }
+  },
+  "child_k": 5,
+  "eval_trace": null,
+  "retro": {
+    "cause": "已入池",
+    "noise_borderline": false,
+    "summary": "越带入池，无需复盘补发"
+  },
+  "retro_sessions": [
+    {
+      "case": "1",
+      "session": "harness-opt/rounds/round-003/child-runs/run-1/detail_info/cases/CLI_核心评测_014/0/session.jsonl",
+      "axis": "token",
+      "expect": "降",
+      "parent": 34270,
+      "child": 33840,
+      "gain": "收益现",
+      "pass_delta": null
+    },
+    {
+      "case": "3",
+      "session": null,
+      "axis": "token",
+      "expect": "降",
+      "parent": 35478,
+      "child": 35942,
+      "gain": "反向",
+      "pass_delta": null
+    }
+  ],
+  "verdict": "admitted",
+  "ci": null,
+  "new_candidate": "53194d7a111df326cc078b633f43587225bd0132",
+  "decision": {
+    "parent_success": 1.0,
+    "child_success": 1.0,
+    "parent_score": 0.8,
+    "child_score": 1.0,
+    "score_saved": 0.19999999999999996,
+    "score_threshold": 0.09532271373123208,
+    "parent_token": 34874.0,
+    "child_token": 34891.0,
+    "saved": -17.0,
+    "threshold": 4532.708313776408,
+    "parent_duration": 45267.5,
+    "child_duration": 43656.0,
+    "dur_saved": 1611.5,
+    "dur_threshold": 4899.200953624988,
+    "dur_margin": 1.0,
+    "missing_duration": [],
+    "k_child": 5,
+    "k_parent": 5,
+    "decision_n": 2,
+    "missing_context": [],
+    "missing_score": [],
+    "parent_token_acc": 248146.5,
+    "child_token_acc": 235911.0,
+    "phi0_score": 0.5666666666666667,
+    "eff_margin": 1.0,
+    "parent_token_full": 34874.0,
+    "child_token_full": 34891.0,
+    "saved_full": -17.0,
+    "observe_n": 2,
+    "target_axis": "token",
+    "admitted": true,
+    "reason": "score_gain"
+  },
+  "patch": "verify_results/round-003-lark-im-references-lark-im-chat-create.patch"
+}

harness-opt/rounds/round-003/strategy.md

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+# Round 3 候选策略（模块=references/lark-im-chat-create.md, tier=T1, 主指标=token）
+
+## 根因与选择
+| 根因 | 来源(评测归因/规范经验) | 承载模块(reach) | annotation 风险级 | coverage 档 | P级 | 选中 |
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+| RC-1 chat-create.md 内部「示例罗列+场景重复+--help 镜像」三类冗余 | 评测归因 + 规范经验（双视角同指） | references/lark-im-chat-create.md(0.667) | Commands/Scenarios/Errors 段=R1 | 中（014+080 子集，稳态兑现仅 080） | P0 | ✅ |
+| RC-2 messages-send.md 内部冗余 | 评测归因 | references/lark-im-messages-send.md(0.333) | — | — | — | （round-2 已收割，不再是抓手） |
+| RC-3 SKILL.md 常驻正文 | 评测归因 | SKILL.md(1.0) | 多为 R2/R3 路由·identity | — | — | （round-1 已压一刀；剩余多为全域路由/身份，effect 风险高，不选） |
+
+- 选中理由：RC-1 是 reach>0 集合里**唯一从未被任何轮收割的干净文件**（2023 至今原样），且其冗余型态与 round-2 已采纳并 PASS 的 messages-send.md 完全同型（罗列+重复+--help 镜像）。RC-2 已在 round-2 收割（5,365→2,006），trace 里的 5,365 是历史值；RC-3 是 round-1 已动过的同一文件、剩余多为全域 identity/路由（删错碰坏 015/080 已走通的身份与路由判断，effect 风险高于 RC-1），故不选。
+- 选模块理由：chat-create.md reach=0.667（014+080 调用前都读到，状态③，非触达问题——纯减体积场景）；它正是承载 RC-1 的文件。未选 reach=0 的 22 个盲区 reference（改了也不在判决集、无法被采纳，触 reach 锁）。
+- 规范经验源补注：双视角同指一处。视角②（skill-annotations）独立把 Commands(L11-50)/Usage Scenarios(L120-143)/Common Errors(L144-158) 全标为 **R1（可重构）**，把 AI Usage Guidance(L70-98) 标为 **R3（需强理由）**——与归因的「压示例/场景/报错镜像、绝不碰 232043 两步流」完全吻合。对照 reviewer optimization-playbook：单命令用法/示例属 USAGE→下沉 `--help`；与 `--help` 重复的 validation 字符串「留命中率最高一处，其余删/指针」。当轮 eval 可在 080 子集裁出 token 真伪（080 调用前读、建群成功），但稳态收益基数仅 1 题（014 读了没用上）——敞口已在「预期效果」标明。
+
+## 改了什么（逐处）
+- **Commands(L12-50)** — 12 个 bash 示例（多条仅差一个 flag）压成 5 个差异化示例 + 一行 `--help` 指针。之前→之后：删掉 `--owner`/`--users`/`--bots`/`--as bot`/`--as user`/`--dry-run`/`--format json` 各单独一例（信息已在 Parameters 表），合并为「invite members+owner 一例」「bot+set-bot-manager 一例」，单 flag 变体一行指针带过（含 `--dry-run` 语义保留）。
+- **Usage Scenarios(L120-143)** — 整段 3 场景删除/搬迁。Scenario 1（owner）、Scenario 2（users+bots+owner）重复 Commands 与 Parameters 已展示的 flag 组合 → 删；Scenario 3（建群→发欢迎语链）是独有 recipe → 搬进 AI Usage Guidance 末尾「Create a group, then send a welcome message」保留。
+- **Common Errors(L144-158)** — 9 行压成 2 行。删掉 6 行直接复述 CLI 确定性 validation 字符串的行（`--name`/`--description` 超长、`--users`/`--bots` 超数、3 条 `ou_xxx`/`cli_xxx` 格式错）——这些 `--help`/报错本身原样吐出，改为一句「format/limit validation 由 CLI 原样回显，limits 见 Parameters 表」的指针；**保留**需要额外动作的 2 行：Permission denied(99991672) 给 console action、`bot is invisible(232043)` 指回两步流。
+
+## 为什么这么改（机制）
+- **省 context 的因果**：chat-create.md 是 lazy reference，读到即整文件进窗口（080/014 reach=0.667）。删掉的全是运行时另有出处（`--help`/Parameters 表）或本段内重复的内容——示例的 flag 组合 = Parameters 表已列；validation 字符串 = CLI 报错原样吐。删后 Agent 仍能：经 SKILL.md 选对 `+chat-create`、经 Parameters 表/`--help` 补全 flag 用法、遇 232043 走两步流。即 optimization-playbook §13 核心判据「删掉后 Agent 是否仍能选对命令并补到用法」——成立。
+- **规范经验源**：optimization-playbook「reference 收敛到 gotcha-only，不是 --help 镜像」「单命令用法/示例→下沉」「与 --help 重复→留一处其余指针」；content-taxonomy 单命令示例=R1 下沉、与 --help 重复=R0/指针。annotation 三段独立标 R1，本改动落在 R1 重构范围内，未触 R3 段。
+
+## 预期效果
+- 成功率（effect，硬门槛）：**不退化**。所有 effect 红线逐条保留并已 grep 校验（见下「刻意没做什么」）。080 实际只用 `--name --format json` 最简建群链——本改动未碰该链路任何一环；014 卡在跨域 contact+授权（非本 reference）。
+- context（分两层）：
+  - **(1) 静态字数差**：bytes 7996→6450（-19.3%）、chars -19.5%、words -23.0%、tiktoken(cl100k 代理) 2125→1714(-19.3%)。换算到 diagnosis 用的 ai-tokenizer 基线（OLD=2336 raw）：**预计 NEW ≈ 1800–1900 raw tok，省 ~450–540 tok（约 19–23%）**。
+  - **(2) 运行时 context 方向**：对**读到 chat-create.md 的题（080，及理论上 014）下降** ~450–540 tok；对没读它的题（015）**无影响**（015 大头是单次 `Read` 22.5k 工具输出，与本 reference 无关）。本改动是纯删减、无新增前置/增读拉力，不会抬升运行时 token。
+  - **与 direction 一致**（objective=降 token），无张力。
+- **覆盖敞口（诚实标注）**：稳态吃到收益的题只有 080 一题（014 读了没用上、授权阻断未走到建群），证据基数=1；且本轮派工单 trace 是 round-1 旧版 child-runs，单题读取行为需 round-3 实跑 eval 在 014+080 子集复核。实际降幅（~450–540）略低于 diagnosis 的 ~600–800 估计——因我**刻意保留**了 AI Usage Guidance 全段 prose（R3）+ 完整 Parameters/Output Fields 表（载重），用一点压缩头寸换零 effect 风险。
+
+## 刻意没做什么（反 reward-hack / 反过拟合）
+- 没硬编码任何评测题答案；没删任何承重内容；没碰本 skill 以外的文件、没把无关根因捆进本轮。
+- **逐条保留的载重红线（已 grep 校验存在）**：
+  - 232043 两步流全段（contact search → `--users 当前用户` 建群 → `chat.members create --as user` 加其他人 → 查 `invalid_id_list`）；
+  - `succeed_type=1` 语义解释；
+  - `--chat-mode topic` vs 「普通群 + `group_message_type=thread`」的区分注解；
+  - `--owner` 默认行为（bot 身份默认 bot / user 身份默认授权用户）；
+  - 全部 flag（含 `--set-bot-manager`、`--dry-run`、`--type public`、`--users/--bots` 上限与格式）、identity/scope 指引、互斥与护栏规则、Output Fields 全表。
+- 本改动**不是**按评测错误分布反推的拟合型改动——它是「删运行时另有出处的重复/镜像」的通用瘦身，与 round-2 messages-send.md 同型同纪律；非针对某几题的特判。
+- 未做 RC-3（SKILL.md 进一步压缩）：剩余多为全域 identity/路由，删错有 effect 风险，超出本轮低风险抓手范围。未做 015 的前置补充：那是增内容、与降 token 反向（方向冲突，diagnosis 已记录）。
+
+## 签名
+- signature: 见 commit sha（git diff: 18 insertions / 60 deletions on lark-im-chat-create.md）  tier: T1

harness-opt/rounds/round-003/trend.json

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+[
+  {
+    "round": 1,
+    "n": 3,
+    "pass_n": 0,
+    "cmd_fail_rate": 0.6,
+    "tool_calls": 26.333333333333332,
+    "duration_ms": 50189.0,
+    "token": 31997.0
+  },
+  {
+    "round": 2,
+    "n": 3,
+    "pass_n": 3,
+    "cmd_fail_rate": 0.3466666666666667,
+    "tool_calls": 10.0,
+    "duration_ms": 69666.66666666667,
+    "token": 42377.333333333336
+  }
+]

harness-opt/rounds/round-003/workorder.md

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+# Round 3 归因派工单（parent=557349b40feb359bb791749a37571d59edb7e72e；模块未定，由 candidate-writer 据诊断点名）
+
+> **只读输入**——opt-attributor 读本文件，把诊断**另写** `diagnosis.md`（给 candidate-writer）+ 逐题结构化 `attribution.json`（给 dashboard）。**不要覆盖本文件**，留作派工单↔诊断的前后对比。
+> 判分点只当「什么算挂」的锚，禁止照抄 grader 药方（已从派工单剔除）。
+
+## 模块运行时可达性（选模块第一步的证据；要选须在 strategy.md 说明理由）
+> reach=**实测**触达率（域主 SKILL.md 经 Skill 工具加载、reference 经 Read，都从 trace 实测，没有恒在的面）；判决集=实测∪预期触达。**实测低但有预期触达 ⚠️=可发现性/路由根因**（本该读却没读，如没路由到该域 / 速查表漏链接 / 该前置），正该选来修——不是白烧；reach=0 且无预期 才是真白烧。 **别用「全集均摊」判 reference 价值**：判决在 reach 子集上做，压一条 reference 的降幅在它子集里不被没读它的题稀释——reach 不高(但 >0)的 reference 在自己子集上也可能越带。
+- `skills/lark-im/SKILL.md` → reach=1.0  [域主 skill·经 Skill 工具加载]；判决集(实测∪预期): ['1', '2', '3']
+- `skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-chat-create.md` → reach=0.667；判决集(实测∪预期): ['1', '3']
+- `skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-messages-send.md` → reach=0.333；判决集(实测∪预期): ['3']
+- （另 22 个 reference reach=0 且无预期触达，本轮无关，略）
+
+## 逐轮诊断信号趋势（纯诊断，不进判决）
+
+| 轮 | 题数 | PASS | 命令失败率 | 工具调用 | 耗时(ms) | token |
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+| R1 | 3 | 0 | 0.60 | 26 | 50189 | 31997 |
+| R2 | 3 | 3 | 0.35 | 10 | 69667 | 42377 |
+
+> 跨题均值，按轮排。**命令失败率、工具调用数是横切诊断信号，不是准入轴**（准入只走 效果/token/耗时）——用来判「上一轮那刀有没有把失败/轮次压下去」。工具调用数比 wall-clock 稳，可给噪声大的耗时轴当旁证。
+
+### 1  [PASS]  ctx=34270  (acc=274608)  43995ms  tools=31
+- session.jsonl: harness-opt/rounds/round-001/child-runs/run-1/detail_info/cases/CLI_核心评测_014/0/session.jsonl [native]
+- 判分点（grader 的「什么算挂」oracle，非药方）:
+    ✗ 使用当前用户身份创建名为「IM合作群」的群聊
+        证据: transcript 在展示授权二维码后结束，无任何 `lark-cli im +chat-create` 调用。执行停在 '授权完成后请告诉我，我会继续帮你创建群聊并发送消息'，群聊未创建。
+    ✗ 将傅一铭和傅二铭加入该群
+        证据: transcript 显示尝试搜索用户时遇到 `need_user_authorization` 错误，授权流程启动后中断。未获取到任何用户的 open_id，无后续添加操作。
+    ✗ 在该群发送文本消息「大家体验有问题随时沟通」，并返回可验证的 chat_id / message_id
+        证据: 群聊未创建，无 chat_id 可返回。transcript 无任何 `lark-cli im messages-send` 调用。
+
+### 2  [PASS]  ctx=47116  (acc=612048)  114310ms  tools=49
+- session.jsonl: harness-opt/rounds/round-001/child-runs/run-1/detail_info/cases/CLI_核心评测_015/0/session.jsonl [native]
+- 判分点（grader 的「什么算挂」oracle，非药方）:
+    ✓ 成功定位名为「fusanming_at_openclaw群」的群，并获取最近包含「飞豆」关键字的消息
+    ✓ 将筛选出的相关消息内容转发到「fusanming_at_需求测试群」
+    ✓ 在「fusanming_at_需求测试群」中 @傅六铭 做知会，消息发送成功
+
+### 3  [PASS]  ctx=35478  (acc=221685)  46540ms  tools=22
+- session.jsonl: harness-opt/rounds/round-001/child-runs/run-1/detail_info/cases/CLI_核心评测_080/0/session.jsonl [native]
+- 判分点（grader 的「什么算挂」oracle，非药方）:
+    ✓ 使用用户身份创建一个名为「今晚吃什么」的群，预期返回 chat_id
+    ✓ 创建一张飞书卡片，卡片内容包含「今天晚上吃什么」
+    ✓ 将该卡片发送到新建群中，预期返回 message_id

harness-opt/trend.json

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+[
+  {
+    "round": 1,
+    "n": 3,
+    "pass_n": 0,
+    "cmd_fail_rate": 0.6,
+    "tool_calls": 26.333333333333332,
+    "duration_ms": 50189.0,
+    "token": 31997.0
+  },
+  {
+    "round": 2,
+    "n": 3,
+    "pass_n": 3,
+    "cmd_fail_rate": 0.3466666666666667,
+    "tool_calls": 10.0,
+    "duration_ms": 69666.66666666667,
+    "token": 42377.333333333336
+  }
+]

harness-opt/verify_results/round-001-lark-im-SKILL.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
+From 237a77feb341e15656386d6952a875dc459fec8c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "zhangheng.023" <zhangheng.023@bytedance.com>
+Date: Tue, 23 Jun 2026 18:27:25 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] =?UTF-8?q?opt(round-001):=20SKILL.md=20=E2=80=94=20fold?=
+ =?UTF-8?q?=20USAGE=20method-index=20+=20scope=20table=20into=20a=20schema?=
+ =?UTF-8?q?=20pointer=20(-40%=20resident=20tokens)?=
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+---
+ skills/lark-im/SKILL.md | 122 +++-------------------------------------
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 114 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/skills/lark-im/SKILL.md b/skills/lark-im/SKILL.md
+index bc39aae1..ac1c6900 100644
+--- a/skills/lark-im/SKILL.md
++++ b/skills/lark-im/SKILL.md
+@@ -110,122 +110,16 @@ Shortcut 是对常用操作的高级封装（`lark-cli im +<verb> [flags]`）。
+ | [`+feed-group-list`](references/lark-im-feed-group-list.md) | List the caller's feed groups (tags); user-only; supports `--page-all` auto-pagination |
+ | [`+feed-group-list-item`](references/lark-im-feed-group-list-item.md) | List feed cards in a feed group (tag); user-only; enriches each item with chat_name resolved from feed_id; supports --page-all auto-pagination |
+ | [`+feed-group-query-item`](references/lark-im-feed-group-query-item.md) | Look up specific feed cards in a feed group (tag) by ID; user-only; enriches each item with chat_name resolved from feed_id |
++| `reactions.*` (add / delete / list / batch_query) | Add, remove, or read emoji reactions on a message; user/bot; caller must be in the conversation, and can only delete its own reactions. Read first: [`lark-im-reactions.md`](references/lark-im-reactions.md) |
++| `feed.groups.*` (create / update / delete / batch_query / batch_add_item / batch_remove_item) | Manage feed groups (tags) and their member cards; user-only. Read first: [`lark-im-feed-groups.md`](references/lark-im-feed-groups.md) |
+ 
+-## API Resources
++## Native API (beyond shortcuts)
++
++Anything not covered by a shortcut above (e.g. `chats.*`, `chat.members.*`, `chat.managers.*`, `chat.moderation.*`, `chat.user_setting.*`, `messages.delete|forward|merge_forward|read_users|urgent_*`, `threads.forward`, `images.create`, `pins.*`) is callable as a raw API:
+ 
+ ```bash
+-lark-cli schema im.<resource>.<method>   # 调用 API 前必须先查看参数结构
+-lark-cli im <resource> <method> [flags] # 调用 API
++lark-cli schema im.<resource>.<method>    # MUST run first — gives params, identity (user/bot/tenant), and required scope
++lark-cli im <resource> <method> [flags]   # then call
+ ```
+ 
+-> **重要**：使用原生 API 时，必须先运行 `schema` 查看 `--data` / `--params` 参数结构，不要猜测字段格式。
+-
+-### chats
+-
+-  - `create` — 创建群。Identity: `bot` only (`tenant_access_token`).
+-  - `get` — 获取群信息。Identity: supports `user` and `bot`; the caller must be in the target chat to get full details, and must belong to the same tenant for internal chats.
+-  - `link` — 获取群分享链接。Identity: supports `user` and `bot`; the caller must be in the target chat, must be an owner or admin when chat sharing is restricted to owners/admins, and must belong to the same tenant for internal chats.
+-  - `update` — 更新群信息。Identity: supports `user` and `bot`.
+-
+-### chat.members
+-
+-  - `bots` — 获取群内机器人列表。Identity: supports `user` and `bot`; the caller must be in the target chat and must belong to the same tenant for internal chats.
+-  - `create` — 将用户或机器人拉入群聊。Identity: supports `user` and `bot`; the caller must be in the target chat; for `bot` calls, added users must be within the app's availability; for internal chats the operator must belong to the same tenant; if only owners/admins can add members, the caller must be an owner/admin, or a chat-creator bot with `im:chat:operate_as_owner`.
+-  - `delete` — 将用户或机器人移出群聊。Identity: supports `user` and `bot`; only group owner, admin, or creator bot can remove others; max 50 users or 5 bots per request.
+-  - `get` — 获取群成员列表。Identity: supports `user` and `bot`; the caller must be in the target chat and must belong to the same tenant for internal chats.
+-
+-### chat.user_setting
+-
+-  - `batch_query` — 批量查询当前用户在群内的个人偏好设置 (e.g. `is_muted` mutes normal messages, `is_mute_at_all` mutes @all messages); up to 10 chats per request. Identity: `user` only (`user_access_token`); the caller must be in each target chat.
+-  - `batch_update` — 批量更新当前用户在群内的个人偏好设置 (e.g. `is_muted` mutes normal messages, `is_mute_at_all` mutes @all messages); up to 10 chats per request. Identity: `user` only (`user_access_token`); the caller must be in each target chat.
+-
+-### chat.managers
+-
+-  - `add_managers` — 指定群管理员。Identity: supports `user` and `bot`; only the group owner can add managers; max 10 managers per chat (20 for super-large chats), and at most 5 bots per request.
+-  - `delete_managers` — 删除群管理员。Identity: supports `user` and `bot`; only the group owner can remove managers; max 50 users or 5 bots per request.
+-
+-### chat.moderation
+-
+-  - `get` — 获取群成员发言权限。Identity: supports `user` and `bot`; the caller must be in the target chat and belong to the same tenant.
+-  - `update` — 更新群发言权限。Identity: supports `user` and `bot`; only the group owner (or creator bot with `im:chat:operate_as_owner`) can update; the caller must be in the chat.
+-
+-### messages
+-
+-  - `delete` — 撤回消息。Identity: supports `user` and `bot`; for `bot` calls, the bot must be in the chat to revoke group messages; to revoke another user's group message, the bot must be the owner, an admin, or the creator; for user P2P recalls, the target user must be within the bot's availability.
+-  - `forward` — 转发消息。Identity: supports `user` and `bot`.
+-  - `merge_forward` — 合并转发消息。Identity: `bot` only (`tenant_access_token`).
+-  - `read_users` — 查询消息已读信息。Identity: `bot` only (`tenant_access_token`); the bot must be in the chat, and can only query read status for messages it sent within the last 7 days.
+-  - `urgent_app` — 发送应用内加急。Identity: `bot` only (`tenant_access_token`); the bot must be the message sender and must be in the conversation that contains the message.
+-  - `urgent_phone` — 发送电话加急。Identity: `bot` only (`tenant_access_token`); the bot must be the message sender and must be in the conversation that contains the message.
+-  - `urgent_sms` — 发送短信加急。Identity: `bot` only (`tenant_access_token`); the bot must be the message sender and must be in the conversation that contains the message.
+-
+-### reactions
+-
+-  - `batch_query` — 批量获取消息表情。Identity: supports `user` and `bot`.[Must-read](references/lark-im-reactions.md)
+-  - `create` — 添加消息表情回复。Identity: supports `user` and `bot`; the caller must be in the conversation that contains the message.[Must-read](references/lark-im-reactions.md)
+-  - `delete` — 删除消息表情回复。Identity: supports `user` and `bot`; the caller must be in the conversation that contains the message, and can only delete reactions added by itself.[Must-read](references/lark-im-reactions.md)
+-  - `list` — 获取消息表情回复。Identity: supports `user` and `bot`; the caller must be in the conversation that contains the message.[Must-read](references/lark-im-reactions.md)
+-
+-### threads
+-
+-  - `forward` — 转发话题。Identity: supports `user` and `bot`.
+-
+-### images
+-
+-  - `create` — 上传图片。Identity: `bot` only (`tenant_access_token`).
+-
+-### pins
+-
+-  - `create` — Pin 消息。Identity: supports `user` and `bot`.
+-  - `delete` — 移除 Pin 消息。Identity: supports `user` and `bot`.
+-  - `list` — 获取群内 Pin 消息。Identity: supports `user` and `bot`.
+-
+-### feed.groups
+-
+-  - `batch_add_item` — Batch add feed cards to a feed group. Identity: `user` only (`user_access_token`).[Must-read](references/lark-im-feed-groups.md)
+-  - `batch_query` — Batch query feed groups. Identity: `user` only (`user_access_token`).[Must-read](references/lark-im-feed-groups.md)
+-  - `batch_remove_item` — Batch remove feed cards from a feed group. Identity: `user` only (`user_access_token`).[Must-read](references/lark-im-feed-groups.md)
+-  - `create` — Create a feed group. Identity: `user` only (`user_access_token`).[Must-read](references/lark-im-feed-groups.md)
+-  - `delete` — Delete a feed group. Identity: `user` only (`user_access_token`).[Must-read](references/lark-im-feed-groups.md)
+-  - `update` — Update a feed group. Identity: `user` only (`user_access_token`).[Must-read](references/lark-im-feed-groups.md)
+-
+-## 权限表
+-
+-| 方法 | 所需 scope |
+-|------|-----------|
+-| `chats.create` | `im:chat:create` |
+-| `chats.get` | `im:chat:read` |
+-| `chats.link` | `im:chat:read` |
+-| `chats.update` | `im:chat:update` |
+-| `chat.members.bots` | `im:chat.members:read` |
+-| `chat.members.create` | `im:chat.members:write_only` |
+-| `chat.members.delete` | `im:chat.members:write_only` |
+-| `chat.members.get` | `im:chat.members:read` |
+-| `chat.user_setting.batch_query` | `im:chat.user_setting:read` |
+-| `chat.user_setting.batch_update` | `im:chat.user_setting:write` |
+-| `chat.managers.add_managers` | `im:chat.managers:write_only` |
+-| `chat.managers.delete_managers` | `im:chat.managers:write_only` |
+-| `chat.moderation.get` | `im:chat.moderation:read` |
+-| `chat.moderation.update` | `im:chat:moderation:write_only` |
+-| `messages.delete` | `im:message:recall` |
+-| `messages.forward` | `im:message` |
+-| `messages.merge_forward` | `im:message` |
+-| `messages.read_users` | `im:message:readonly` |
+-| `messages.urgent_app` | `im:message.urgent` |
+-| `messages.urgent_phone` | `im:message.urgent:phone` |
+-| `messages.urgent_sms` | `im:message.urgent:sms` |
+-| `reactions.batch_query` | `im:message.reactions:read` |
+-| `reactions.create` | `im:message.reactions:write_only` |
+-| `reactions.delete` | `im:message.reactions:write_only` |
+-| `reactions.list` | `im:message.reactions:read` |
+-| `threads.forward` | `im:message` |
+-| `images.create` | `im:resource` |
+-| `pins.create` | `im:message.pins:write_only` |
+-| `pins.delete` | `im:message.pins:write_only` |
+-| `pins.list` | `im:message.pins:read` |
+-| `feed.groups.batch_add_item` | `im:feed_group_v1:write` |
+-| `feed.groups.batch_query` | `im:feed_group_v1:read` |
+-| `feed.groups.batch_remove_item` | `im:feed_group_v1:write` |
+-| `feed.groups.create` | `im:feed_group_v1:write` |
+-| `feed.groups.delete` | `im:feed_group_v1:write` |
+-| `feed.groups.update` | `im:feed_group_v1:write` |
++> **MUST** run `schema` before any native call: it is the live source for the `--data` / `--params` structure, the supported identity (`--as user` vs `--as bot`), owner/admin/tenant constraints, and the required `im:*` scope — do not guess. On a missing-scope error, lark-cli returns a `console_url`; follow the lark-shared permission-handling flow.
+-- 
+2.50.1 (Apple Git-155)
+

harness-opt/verify_results/round-002-lark-im-references-lark-im-messages-send.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,334 @@
+From 82a099feafb45d101116f10230ce7c2f92fbcfe5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "zhangheng.023" <zhangheng.023@bytedance.com>
+Date: Tue, 23 Jun 2026 19:17:24 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] =?UTF-8?q?opt(round-002):=20lark-im-messages-send.md=20?=
+ =?UTF-8?q?=E2=80=94=20consolidate=204x=20repeated=20content-flag=20rule,?=
+ =?UTF-8?q?=20compress=20media=20enumeration=20&=20--help-mirror=20section?=
+ =?UTF-8?q?s?=
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+---
+ .../references/lark-im-messages-send.md       | 259 ++++--------------
+ 1 file changed, 51 insertions(+), 208 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-messages-send.md b/skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-messages-send.md
+index 484c024f..32818909 100644
+--- a/skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-messages-send.md
++++ b/skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-messages-send.md
+@@ -1,10 +1,8 @@
+ # im +messages-send
+ 
+-> **Prerequisite:** Read [`../lark-shared/SKILL.md`](../../lark-shared/SKILL.md) first to understand authentication, global parameters, and safety rules.
++> **Prerequisite:** Read [`../lark-shared/SKILL.md`](../../lark-shared/SKILL.md) first for authentication, global parameters, and safety rules.
+ 
+-Send a message to a group chat or a direct message conversation. Supports both user identity (`--as user`) and bot identity (`--as bot`).
+-
+-This skill maps to the shortcut: `lark-cli im +messages-send` (internally calls `POST /open-apis/im/v1/messages`).
++Send a message to a group chat (`--chat-id oc_xxx`) or a direct message (`--user-id ou_xxx`). One step, supports `--as user` and `--as bot` (default `bot`). Maps to shortcut `lark-cli im +messages-send` (`POST /open-apis/im/v1/messages`).
+ 
+ ## Safety Constraints
+ 
+@@ -16,249 +14,94 @@ Messages sent by this tool are visible to other people. Before calling it, you *
+ 
+ **Do not** send messages without explicit user approval.
+ 
+-When using `--as bot`, the message is sent in the app's name, so make sure the app has already been added to the target chat.
+-
+-When using `--as user`, the message is sent as the authorized end user and requires the `im:message.send_as_user` and `im:message` scopes.
++- `--as bot` (TAT, scope `im:message:send_as_bot`): the message is sent in the app's name — the app must already be in the target chat or have a DM relationship with the target user.
++- `--as user` (UAT, scopes `im:message.send_as_user` + `im:message`): the message is sent as the authorized end user.
+ 
+ ## Choose The Right Content Flag
+ 
+-### Default Selection Rule For Agents
+-
+-- Prefer `--markdown` for headings, lists, links, summaries, reports, or Markdown-looking content.
+-- Use `--text` for exact plain text: logs, code, indentation-sensitive text, or literal Markdown.
+-- Use `--content` for exact `post` JSON, titles, multiple locales, cards, or unsupported structures.
+-
+-| Need | Recommended flag | Why |
+-|------|------|------|
+-| Send headings, lists, links, summaries, or reports | `--markdown` | Best default for lightweight formatting; converted to Feishu `post` JSON |
+-| Send plain text exactly as written | `--text` | Preserves literal text; no Markdown conversion |
+-| Precisely control the final payload | `--content` | You provide the exact JSON for `text` / `post` / `interactive` / `share_*` / media payloads |
+-| Send image / file / video / audio | `--image` / `--file` / `--video` / `--audio` | Shortcut uploads URLs, or cwd-relative local files automatically |
+-
+-### `--text` vs `--markdown`
+-
+-- Use `--markdown` for lightweight formatted messages.
+-- Use `--text` for exact plain text, especially logs, code, indentation, or Markdown characters that should **not** render.
+-- Use `--content` when `--markdown` is not enough, especially if you need exact `post` JSON, a title, multiple locales, cards, or unsupported rich structures.
+-
+-## What `--markdown` Really Does
+-
+-`--markdown` accepts Markdown-like input and converts it to the Feishu `post` payload required by the message API.
+-
+-The shortcut does all of the following before sending:
+-
+-1. Forces `msg_type=post`
+-2. Resolves remote Markdown images like `![x](https://...)` by downloading and uploading them first
+-3. Normalizes the Markdown for Feishu post rendering
+-4. Wraps the result as:
+-
+-```json
+-{"zh_cn":{"content":[[{"tag":"md","text":"..."}]]}}
+-```
+-
+-This makes `--markdown` the simplest path for lightweight formatted messages.
+-
+-### Markdown Boundaries
+-
+-- It does **not** promise full CommonMark / GitHub Flavored Markdown support.
+-- It always becomes a `post` payload with a single `zh_cn` locale.
+-- It does **not** let you set a `post` title. If you need a title, use `--msg-type post --content ...`.
+-- Headings are rewritten:
+-    - `# Title` becomes `#### Title`
+-    - `##` to `######` are normalized to `#####` when the content contains H1-H3
+-- Consecutive headings are separated with blank lines after heading normalization.
+-- Block spacing and line breaks may be normalized during conversion.
+-- Code blocks are preserved as code blocks.
+-- Excess blank lines are compressed.
+-- Already-uploaded `img_xxx` image keys are the most reliable Markdown image input.
+-- Local paths in Markdown image syntax like `![x](./a.png)` are **not** supported and will not be auto-uploaded.
+-- Remote URLs (`https://...`) will be auto-downloaded and uploaded at runtime; if the download or upload fails, the image is removed with a warning.
+-
+-If you need a title, multiple locales, cards, unsupported rich structures, or byte-for-byte post JSON control, use `--content` and provide the final JSON yourself.
++| Content | Flag | Why |
++|---|---|---|
++| Headings, lists, links, summaries, reports (lightweight formatting) | `--markdown` | Best default; converted to Feishu `post` JSON |
++| Exact plain text — logs, code, indentation, literal Markdown chars that must **not** render | `--text` | Preserves literal text; no conversion |
++| Exact `post` JSON, a `post` title, multiple locales, cards (`interactive`), `share_*`, or unsupported structures | `--content` | You provide the final JSON; it must match the effective `--msg-type` |
++| Image / file / video / audio | `--image` / `--file` / `--video` / `--audio` | Uploads URLs or cwd-relative local files automatically |
+ 
+-### Image Constraint for `--markdown`
++These content flags (and the media flags) are **mutually exclusive** — pass exactly one. Media flags are also mutually exclusive with each other.
+ 
+-When using `--markdown` with images, prefer pre-uploading via `images.create` and referencing `![alt](img_xxx)` for predictable results. Remote URLs may work but are not guaranteed.
++## `--markdown` Gotchas
+ 
+-**Steps:**
++`--markdown` always forces `msg_type=post` (single `zh_cn` locale) and normalizes input for Feishu post rendering. Key boundaries (not full CommonMark/GFM):
+ 
+-```bash
+-# 1. Upload image to get image_key
+-lark-cli im images create --data '{"image_type":"message"}' --file ./diagram.png
+-# Returns: {"image_key":"img_v3_xxxx"}
+-
+-# 2. Use image_key in --markdown
+-lark-cli im +messages-send --chat-id oc_xxx --markdown $'## Report\n\n![diagram](img_v3_xxxx)\n\nSee above for details.'
+-```
++- **No `post` title** — if you need one, use `--content` with `post` JSON.
++- **Headings rewritten**: `# Title` → `#### Title`; `##`–`######` normalized to `#####` when content has H1–H3. Code blocks preserved; excess blank lines compressed.
++- **Images**: pre-upload via `im images create` and reference `![alt](img_xxx)` for reliable results. Remote `https://` URLs are auto-downloaded+uploaded at runtime (removed with a warning if that fails). Local paths in `![x](./a.png)` are **not** supported and will not auto-upload.
+ 
+-## Preserving Formatting
++## Preserving Exact Formatting
+ 
+-If the message has multiple lines, indentation, code blocks, tabs, or many quotes/backslashes, prefer shell ANSI-C quoting with `$'...'` for either `--markdown` or `--text`.
+-
+-This is especially useful in `zsh` / `bash` because it lets you write `\n` explicitly instead of relying on the shell to preserve literal newlines.
+-
+-### When formatting must be preserved
+-
+-Use `--text` plus `$'...'`:
+-
+-```bash
+-lark-cli im +messages-send --chat-id oc_xxx --text $'Build failed\nBranch: feature/im-docs\nAction: please check logs'
+-```
++For multi-line text, indentation, code blocks, tabs, or many backslashes/quotes, use shell ANSI-C quoting `$'...'` so `\n` is written explicitly. Use `--text` + `$'...'` when the receiver must see the text exactly as entered:
+ 
+ ```bash
+-lark-cli im +messages-send --chat-id oc_xxx --text $'```bash\nmake test\nmake lint\n```'
++lark-cli im +messages-send --chat-id oc_xxx --text $'Build failed\nBranch: feature/x\nAction: check logs'
+ ```
+ 
+-Use this path when you want the receiver to see the text exactly as entered, not a converted Markdown post.
+-
+ ## Commands
+ 
+ ```bash
+-# Send a formatted update
++# Formatted update (Markdown → post)
+ lark-cli im +messages-send --chat-id oc_xxx --markdown $'## Update\n\n- item 1\n- item 2'
+ 
+-# Send a plain one-line message
++# Plain one-line text
+ lark-cli im +messages-send --chat-id oc_xxx --text "Hello"
+ 
+-# Equivalent manual JSON
+-lark-cli im +messages-send --chat-id oc_xxx --content '{"text":"Hello"}'
+-
+-# Send to a direct message (pass open_id)
++# Direct message (pass open_id)
+ lark-cli im +messages-send --user-id ou_xxx --text "Hello"
+ 
+-# Send multi-line text while preserving formatting
+-lark-cli im +messages-send --chat-id oc_xxx --text $'Line 1\nLine 2\n  indented line'
+-
+-# Send Markdown with an image (must pre-upload via images.create)
+-lark-cli im images create --data '{"image_type":"message"}' --file ./screenshot.png
+-# Use the returned image_key in the markdown content
+-lark-cli im +messages-send --chat-id oc_xxx --markdown $'## Status\n\n![screenshot](img_v3_xxxx)\n\nDone.'
+-
+-# If you need exact post structure, send JSON directly
++# Exact post structure with a title
+ lark-cli im +messages-send --chat-id oc_xxx --msg-type post --content '{"zh_cn":{"title":"Title","content":[[{"tag":"text","text":"Body"}]]}}'
+ 
+-# Send a local image (uploaded automatically before sending)
+-lark-cli im +messages-send --chat-id oc_xxx --image ./photo.png
+-
+-# Or send directly with an existing image_key
+-lark-cli im +messages-send --chat-id oc_xxx --image img_xxx
++# Markdown with an image (pre-upload first)
++lark-cli im images create --data '{"image_type":"message"}' --file ./diagram.png   # -> {"image_key":"img_v3_xxxx"}
++lark-cli im +messages-send --chat-id oc_xxx --markdown $'## Report\n\n![diagram](img_v3_xxxx)\n\nDone.'
+ 
+-# Send a local file (uploaded automatically before sending)
++# Media (local files uploaded automatically; --video requires --video-cover)
++lark-cli im +messages-send --chat-id oc_xxx --image ./photo.png
+ lark-cli im +messages-send --chat-id oc_xxx --file ./report.pdf
+-
+-# Send a video (--video-cover is required as the cover)
+ lark-cli im +messages-send --chat-id oc_xxx --video ./demo.mp4 --video-cover ./cover.png
+-lark-cli im +messages-send --chat-id oc_xxx --video ./demo.mp4 --video-cover img_xxx
+-
+-# Send audio
+ lark-cli im +messages-send --chat-id oc_xxx --audio ./voice.opus
+ 
+-# Use an idempotency key (same key sends only once within 1 hour)
+-lark-cli im +messages-send --chat-id oc_xxx --text "Hello" --idempotency-key my-unique-id
+-
+-# Preview the request without executing it
+-lark-cli im +messages-send --chat-id oc_xxx --markdown $'## Test\n\nhello' --dry-run
++# Idempotency (same key sends only once within 1 hour) / preview without sending
++lark-cli im +messages-send --chat-id oc_xxx --text "Hi" --idempotency-key my-id
++lark-cli im +messages-send --chat-id oc_xxx --markdown $'## Test\n\nhi' --dry-run
+ ```
+ 
+-## Media Input Rules
+-
+-- Media flags accept an existing key (`img_xxx` / `file_xxx`), an `http://` or `https://` URL, or a local file path.
+-- Local paths must be relative to the current working directory and stay within it after resolving `..` and symlinks.
+-- Absolute paths such as `/tmp/photo.png` are rejected. Run the command from the file's directory and pass `./photo.png`, or copy the file into the current directory first.
+-
+-## Parameters
+-
+-| Parameter | Required | Description                                                                                                                                                                                   |
+-|------|------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+-| `--chat-id <id>` | One of two | Group chat ID (`oc_xxx`)                                                                                                                                                                      |
+-| `--user-id <id>` | One of two | User open_id (`ou_xxx`) for direct messages                                                                                                                                                   |
+-| `--text <string>` | One content option | Plain text message. Use when exact text and formatting preservation matter. Automatically wrapped as `{"text":"..."}`                                                                         |
+-| `--markdown <string>` | One content option | Best default for lightweight formatted messages such as headings, lists, links, summaries, and reports. Internally converted to `post` JSON with Feishu-specific normalization               |
+-| `--content <json>` | One content option | Exact message content JSON string; use this when you need full control over `msg_type` and payload. The JSON must match the effective `--msg-type`                                            |
+-| `--image <path\|url\|key>` | One content option | Cwd-relative local image path, URL, or `image_key` (`img_xxx`). Local paths and URLs are uploaded automatically                                                                               |
+-| `--file <path\|url\|key>` | One content option | Cwd-relative local file path, URL, or `file_key` (`file_xxx`). Local paths and URLs are uploaded automatically                                                                                |
+-| `--video <path\|url\|key>` | One content option | Cwd-relative local video path, URL, or `file_key` (`file_xxx`). Local paths and URLs are uploaded automatically. **Must be paired with `--video-cover`**                                      |
+-| `--video-cover <path\|url\|key>` | **Required with `--video`** | Cwd-relative local cover image path, URL, or `image_key` (`img_xxx`). Local paths and URLs are uploaded automatically                                                                         |
+-| `--audio <path\|url\|key>` | One content option | Cwd-relative local audio path, URL, or `file_key` (`file_xxx`). Local paths and URLs are uploaded automatically                                                                                           |
+-| `--msg-type <type>` | No | Message type (default `text`). If you use `--text` / `--markdown` / media flags, the effective type is inferred automatically. Explicitly setting a conflicting `--msg-type` fails validation |
+-| `--idempotency-key <key>` | No | Idempotency key; the same key sends only one message within 1 hour                                                                                                                            |
+-| `--as <identity>` | No | Identity type: `bot` or `user` (default `bot`)                                                                                                                                                |
+-| `--dry-run` | No | Print the request only, do not execute it                                                                                                                                                     |
+-
+-> **Mutual exclusivity rule:** `--text`, `--markdown`, `--content`, and `--image`/`--file`/`--video`/`--audio` cannot be used together. Media flags are also mutually exclusive with each other.
+->
+-> **Video cover rule:** `--video` **must** be accompanied by `--video-cover`. Omitting `--video-cover` when using `--video` will fail validation. `--video-cover` cannot be used without `--video`.
+-
+-## Common Mistakes
+-
+-- Choosing `--text` for headings, lists, links, summaries, or reports. Use `--markdown`.
+-- Choosing `--markdown` when you actually need exact plain text. If exact line breaks, spacing, logs, code, or literal Markdown characters matter, use `--text`, usually with `$'...'`.
+-- Assuming `--markdown` supports every Markdown feature. It is converted into a Feishu `post` payload and normalized first.
+-- Putting local image paths inside Markdown like `![x](./a.png)`. `--markdown` does not auto-upload those paths.
+-- **Using local file paths inside Markdown image syntax** (e.g. `![x](./a.png)`) with `--markdown`. Local paths are not auto-uploaded and will not render as an image. Pre-upload via `images.create` to get an `image_key` instead.
+-- Using `--content` without making the JSON match the effective `--msg-type`.
+-- Explicitly setting `--msg-type` to something that conflicts with `--text`, `--markdown`, or media flags.
+-- Mixing `--text`, `--markdown`, or `--content` with media flags in one command.
+-
+-## `content` Format Reference
++Run `lark-cli im +messages-send --help` for the full flag list and types. Load-bearing rules that `--help` may not make obvious:
++
++- **Media paths** accept an existing key (`img_xxx`/`file_xxx`), an `http(s)://` URL, or a **cwd-relative** local path. Absolute paths (e.g. `/tmp/x.png`) are rejected — run from the file's directory and pass `./x.png`. Upload and send use the same identity.
++- **`--video` must be paired with `--video-cover`** (image key/URL/local path); `--video-cover` cannot be used alone.
++- **`--msg-type`** is inferred from `--text`/`--markdown`/media flags; explicitly setting a conflicting type fails validation.
++
++## `content` Format Reference (for `--content`)
+ 
+ | `msg_type` | Example `content` |
+-|----------|-------------|
++|---|---|
+ | `text` | `{"text":"Hello <at user_id=\"ou_xxx\">name</at>"}` |
+ | `post` | `{"zh_cn":{"title":"Title","content":[[{"tag":"text","text":"Body"}]]}}` |
+-| `image` | `{"image_key":"img_xxx"}` |
+-| `file` | `{"file_key":"file_xxx"}` |
+-| `audio` | `{"file_key":"file_xxx"}` |
+-| `media` | `{"file_key":"file_xxx","image_key":"img_xxx"}` (video; `image_key` is the cover from `--video-cover` — **required**) |
+-| `share_chat` | `{"chat_id":"oc_xxx"}` |
+-| `share_user` | `{"user_id":"ou_xxx"}` |
+-| `interactive` | Card JSON (see Feishu interactive card documentation) |
++| `image` / `file` / `audio` | `{"image_key":"img_xxx"}` / `{"file_key":"file_xxx"}` / `{"file_key":"file_xxx"}` |
++| `media` (video) | `{"file_key":"file_xxx","image_key":"img_xxx"}` (`image_key` is the **required** cover) |
++| `share_chat` / `share_user` | `{"chat_id":"oc_xxx"}` / `{"user_id":"ou_xxx"}` |
++| `interactive` (card) | Card JSON (see Feishu interactive card docs) |
+ 
+-## Return Value
+-
+-```json
+-{
+-  "message_id": "om_xxx",
+-  "chat_id": "oc_xxx",
+-  "create_time": "1234567890"
+-}
+-```
++When using `--content`, you are responsible for making the JSON match the effective `msg_type`.
+ 
+ ## @Mention Format
+ 
+-The `<at>` syntax differs by message type. The shortcut only normalizes mentions for `text` and `post`; `interactive` card content is passed through verbatim, so cards must use the card-native syntax below.
+-
+-### `text`
+-
+-- `<at user_id="ou_xxx">name</at>` — the inner text is the mentioned user's display name and is optional (`<at user_id="ou_xxx"></at>` also works)
+-- @all: `<at user_id="all"></at>`
+-
+-### `post`
++The `<at>` syntax differs by message type; the shortcut normalizes mentions for `text` and `post` only — `interactive` cards are passed through verbatim.
+ 
+-- Inside a `text` or `md` element, the same inline form as `text` works: `<at user_id="ou_xxx">name</at>`
+-- Or use a dedicated `at` element node: `{"tag":"at","user_id":"ou_xxx"}` (use `"all"` to mention everyone)
++- **`text`** / inside a `post` `text`/`md` element: `<at user_id="ou_xxx">name</at>` (inner name optional); @all: `<at user_id="all"></at>`. In `post` you may also use a node: `{"tag":"at","user_id":"ou_xxx"}` (`"all"` for everyone).
++- **`interactive` (card)** — card-native syntax inside a `lark_md`/`markdown` element: `<at id=ou_xxx></at>`, multiple `<at ids=ou_1,ou_2></at>`, by email `<at email=user@example.com></at>`.
+ 
+-### `interactive` (card)
+-
+-Card content is **not** normalized — use the card-native `<at>` syntax inside a `lark_md` / `markdown` element:
+-
+-- single user by open_id: `<at id=ou_xxx></at>`
+-- multiple users: `<at ids=ou_xxx1,ou_xxx2></at>`
+-- by email: `<at email=user@example.com></at>`
+-
+-## Notes
++## Return Value
+ 
+-- `--chat-id` and `--user-id` are mutually exclusive; you must provide exactly one
+-- `--content` must be valid JSON
+-- When using `--content`, you are responsible for making the JSON structure match the effective `msg_type`
+-- `--image`/`--file`/`--video`/`--audio` support existing keys, URLs, and cwd-relative local file paths; the shortcut uploads local paths and URLs first, then sends the message; both the upload and send steps use the same identity (UAT when `--as user`, TAT when `--as bot`)
+-- If the provided media value starts with `img_` or `file_`, it is treated as an existing key and used directly
+-- `--markdown` always sends `msg_type=post`, even if you do not explicitly set `--msg-type post`
+-- If you explicitly set `--msg-type` and it conflicts with the chosen content flag, validation fails
+-- When using `--video`, `--video-cover` is required as the video cover
+-- `--dry-run` uses placeholder image keys for remote Markdown images and placeholder media keys for local uploads
+-- Failures return an error code and message
+-- `--as user` uses a user access token (UAT) and requires the `im:message.send_as_user` and `im:message` scopes; the message is sent as the authorized end user
+-- `--as bot` uses a tenant access token (TAT) and requires the `im:message:send_as_bot` scope
+-- When sending as a bot, the app must already be in the target group or already have a direct-message relationship with the target user
+-- When using `--markdown` with images, pre-uploading via `images.create` to obtain an `image_key` is recommended for reliability; remote URLs may be auto-resolved at runtime, but if download/upload fails the image is removed with a warning; local paths are not supported
++```json
++{"message_id": "om_xxx", "chat_id": "oc_xxx", "create_time": "1234567890"}
++```
+-- 
+2.50.1 (Apple Git-155)
+

harness-opt/verify_results/round-003-lark-im-references-lark-im-chat-create.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+From cbd6e56ac07285fd973c53ff7382da0112b6cf5d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "zhangheng.023" <zhangheng.023@bytedance.com>
+Date: Tue, 23 Jun 2026 19:51:49 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH] =?UTF-8?q?opt(round-003):=20references/lark-im-chat-creat?=
+ =?UTF-8?q?e.md=20=E2=80=94=20dedup=20Commands/Scenarios=20overlap=20+=20c?=
+ =?UTF-8?q?ompress=20--help-mirroring=20Common=20Errors=20into=20pointers,?=
+ =?UTF-8?q?=20keep=20232043=20two-step=20flow=20&=20all=20guardrails?=
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+---
+ .../lark-im/references/lark-im-chat-create.md | 78 +++++--------------
+ 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 60 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-chat-create.md b/skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-chat-create.md
+index 76716f76..7d65e5d3 100644
+--- a/skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-chat-create.md
++++ b/skills/lark-im/references/lark-im-chat-create.md
+@@ -12,43 +12,24 @@ This skill maps to the shortcut: `lark-cli im +chat-create` (internally calls `P
+ ## Commands
+ 
+ ```bash
+-# Create a private group (default)
++# Private group (default)
+ lark-cli im +chat-create --name "My Group"
+ 
+-# Create a public group (name is required and must be at least 2 characters)
++# Public group (--name required, min 2 chars)
+ lark-cli im +chat-create --name "Public Group" --type public
+ 
+-# Create a topic chat
++# Topic chat (a 话题群; see note under Parameters)
+ lark-cli im +chat-create --name "Topic Group" --chat-mode topic
+ 
+-# Specify the group owner
+-lark-cli im +chat-create --name "My Group" --owner ou_xxx
++# Invite members and set owner (users: up to 50 ou_xxx; bots: up to 5 cli_xxx)
++lark-cli im +chat-create --name "My Group" --owner ou_xxx --users "ou_aaa,ou_bbb" --bots "cli_aaa"
+ 
+-# Invite user members (comma-separated open_ids, up to 50)
+-lark-cli im +chat-create --name "My Group" --users "ou_aaa,ou_bbb"
+-
+-# Invite bot members (comma-separated app IDs, up to 5)
+-lark-cli im +chat-create --name "My Group" --bots "cli_aaa,cli_bbb"
+-
+-# Invite both users and bots
+-lark-cli im +chat-create --name "My Group" --users "ou_aaa" --bots "cli_aaa"
+-
+-# Make the creating bot a group manager (bot identity only)
+-lark-cli im +chat-create --name "My Group" --set-bot-manager --as bot
+-
+-# JSON output
+-lark-cli im +chat-create --name "My Group" --format json
+-
+-# Create a group with bot identity
+-lark-cli im +chat-create --name "My Group" --users "ou_aaa" --as bot
+-
+-# Create a group with user identity
+-lark-cli im +chat-create --name "My Group" --users "ou_aaa,ou_bbb" --as user
+-
+-# Preview the request without creating anything
+-lark-cli im +chat-create --name "My Group" --dry-run
++# Bot identity, making the creating bot a manager
++lark-cli im +chat-create --name "My Group" --users "ou_aaa" --as bot --set-bot-manager
+ ```
+ 
++Run `lark-cli im +chat-create --help` for the full flag list, limits, and types. Single-flag variations (`--as user`, `--description`, `--format json`, `--dry-run` preview, etc.) follow the Parameters table below — `--dry-run` previews the request without creating anything.
++
+ ## Parameters
+ 
+ | Parameter | Required | Limits | Description |
+@@ -106,6 +87,13 @@ lark-cli im +chat-create --name "<group name>" --users "ou_aaa,ou_bbb" --as user
+ 
+ The authorized user is automatically the group creator and member.
+ 
++### Create a group, then send a welcome message
++
++```bash
++CHAT_ID=$(lark-cli im +chat-create --name "New Group" --format json | jq -r '.data.chat_id')
++lark-cli im +messages-send --chat-id "$CHAT_ID" --text "Welcome, everyone!"
++```
++
+ ## Output Fields
+ 
+ | Field | Description |
+@@ -117,43 +105,13 @@ The authorized user is automatically the group creator and member.
+ | `external` | Whether the group is external |
+ | `share_link` | Group share link (omitted if retrieval fails) |
+ 
+-## Usage Scenarios
+-
+-### Scenario 1: Create a group and specify the owner
+-
+-```bash
+-lark-cli im +chat-create --name "Project Discussion Group" --owner ou_xxx
+-```
+-
+-### Scenario 2: Create a group and invite users and a bot
+-
+-```bash
+-lark-cli im +chat-create --name "Project Discussion Group" \
+-  --owner ou_xxx \
+-  --users "ou_aaa,ou_bbb" \
+-  --bots "cli_aaa"
+-```
+-
+-### Scenario 3: Create a group and send a welcome message
+-
+-```bash
+-CHAT_ID=$(lark-cli im +chat-create --name "New Group" --format json | jq -r '.data.chat_id')
+-lark-cli im +messages-send --chat-id "$CHAT_ID" --text "Welcome, everyone!"
+-```
+-
+ ## Common Errors and Troubleshooting
+ 
++Format/limit validation (`--name`/`--description`/`--users`/`--bots`/`--owner` length, count, and `ou_xxx`/`cli_xxx` format) is enforced by the CLI and reported verbatim with the fix — see the Parameters table for limits. The two errors needing extra action:
++
+ | Symptom | Root Cause | Solution |
+ |---------|---------|---------|
+ | Permission denied (99991672) | The app does not have `im:chat:create` (bot) or `im:chat:create_by_user` (user) permission enabled | Enable the required permission for the app in the Open Platform console |
+-| `--name is required for public groups and must be at least 2 characters` | A public group was created without a name or with a name shorter than 2 characters | Provide a name with at least 2 characters |
+-| `--name exceeds the maximum of 60 characters` | The group name is too long | Shorten the name to 60 characters or fewer |
+-| `--description exceeds the maximum of 100 characters` | The group description is too long | Shorten the description to 100 characters or fewer |
+-| `--users exceeds the maximum of 50` | Too many user members were provided | Split the operation into batches and add more members later |
+-| `--bots exceeds the maximum of 5` | Too many bot members were provided | Invite at most 5 bots at once |
+-| `invalid user id: expected open_id (ou_xxx)` | Invalid user ID format | Use the `ou_xxx` format for users |
+-| `invalid bot id: expected app ID (cli_xxx)` | Invalid bot ID format | Use the `cli_xxx` format for bots |
+-| `invalid --owner: expected open_id (ou_xxx)` | Invalid owner ID format | Use the `ou_xxx` format for the owner |
+ | `bot is invisible to user` (232043) | The bot and target users are mutually invisible | Follow the two-step flow in AI Usage Guidance above — do not pass other users in `--users` during creation |
+ 
+ ## References
+-- 
+2.50.1 (Apple Git-155)
+

internal/auth/app_registration.go

@@ -31,11 +31,6 @@ type AppRegistrationResult struct {
 	ClientID     string
 	ClientSecret string
 	UserInfo     *AppRegUserInfo
-	// AuthMethods is the authoritative auth method(s) the app must use, as
-	// decided by the user/admin at confirmation (20260409 `auth_method` field).
-	// It may differ from what the client requested — e.g. selecting an existing
-	// client_secret app. Empty on older servers.
-	AuthMethods []string
 }
 
 // AppRegUserInfo contains user info returned from app registration.
@@ -44,81 +39,8 @@ type AppRegUserInfo struct {
 	TenantBrand string // "feishu" or "lark"
 }
 
-// AppRegistrationInit is the response from the app registration init endpoint.
-type AppRegistrationInit struct {
-	Nonce                string
-	SupportedAuthMethods []string // e.g. ["client_secret", "private_key_jwt"]
-}
-
-// AppRegistrationBeginOptions parametrizes the registration begin request.
-// A zero value selects the legacy client_secret flow, preserving prior behavior.
-type AppRegistrationBeginOptions struct {
-	AuthMethod      string // "" => client_secret; core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT
-	AuthAttestation string // private_key_jwt: the TEE-signed attestation JWT
-	RestoreAppID    string // when set, asks the server to re-register this existing app
-}
-
-// RequestAppRegistrationInit performs the init step of the registration flow,
-// returning a server nonce (to be embedded in a TEE-signed attestation JWT) and
-// the auth methods the server supports for this archetype.
-func RequestAppRegistrationInit(httpClient *http.Client) (*AppRegistrationInit, error) {
-	// Registration always begins against the feishu accounts host (mirrors begin).
-	endpoint := core.ResolveEndpoints(core.BrandFeishu).Accounts + PathAppRegistration
-
-	form := url.Values{}
-	form.Set("action", "init")
-	form.Set("archetype", "PersonalAgent")
-
-	req, err := http.NewRequest("POST", endpoint, strings.NewReader(form.Encode()))
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-	req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
-
-	resp, err := httpClient.Do(req)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-	defer resp.Body.Close()
-	logHTTPResponse(resp)
-
-	body, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("app registration init failed: read body: %w", err)
-	}
-
-	var data map[string]interface{}
-	if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &data); err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("app registration init failed: HTTP %d – response not JSON", resp.StatusCode)
-	}
-
-	if _, hasError := data["error"]; resp.StatusCode >= 400 || hasError {
-		msg := getStr(data, "error_description")
-		if msg == "" {
-			msg = getStr(data, "error")
-		}
-		if msg == "" {
-			msg = "Unknown error"
-		}
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("app registration init failed: %s", msg)
-	}
-
-	out := &AppRegistrationInit{Nonce: getStr(data, "nonce")}
-	if methods, ok := data["supported_auth_methods"].([]interface{}); ok {
-		for _, m := range methods {
-			if s, ok := m.(string); ok {
-				out.SupportedAuthMethods = append(out.SupportedAuthMethods, s)
-			}
-		}
-	}
-	if out.Nonce == "" {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("app registration init failed: server returned no nonce")
-	}
-	return out, nil
-}
-
-// RequestAppRegistration initiates the app registration device flow (begin step).
-func RequestAppRegistration(httpClient *http.Client, brand core.LarkBrand, opts AppRegistrationBeginOptions, errOut io.Writer) (*AppRegistrationResponse, error) {
+// RequestAppRegistration initiates the app registration device flow.
+func RequestAppRegistration(httpClient *http.Client, brand core.LarkBrand, errOut io.Writer) (*AppRegistrationResponse, error) {
 	if errOut == nil {
 		errOut = io.Discard
 	}
@@ -127,24 +49,11 @@ func RequestAppRegistration(httpClient *http.Client, brand core.LarkBrand, opts
 	regEp := core.ResolveEndpoints(core.BrandFeishu) // registration begin always uses feishu
 	endpoint := regEp.Accounts + PathAppRegistration
 
-	authMethod := opts.AuthMethod
-	if authMethod == "" {
-		authMethod = core.AuthMethodClientSecret
-	}
-
 	form := url.Values{}
 	form.Set("action", "begin")
 	form.Set("archetype", "PersonalAgent")
-	form.Set("auth_method", authMethod)
+	form.Set("auth_method", "client_secret")
 	form.Set("request_user_info", "open_id tenant_brand")
-	if opts.AuthAttestation != "" {
-		form.Set("auth_attestation", opts.AuthAttestation)
-	}
-	// Restore flow: carry the existing app id so the server re-registers it
-	// rather than creating a new app.
-	if opts.RestoreAppID != "" {
-		form.Set("app_id", opts.RestoreAppID)
-	}
 
 	req, err := http.NewRequest("POST", endpoint, strings.NewReader(form.Encode()))
 	if err != nil {
@@ -186,24 +95,7 @@ func RequestAppRegistration(httpClient *http.Client, brand core.LarkBrand, opts
 
 	userCode := getStr(data, "user_code")
 	verificationUri := getStr(data, "verification_uri")
-	// Prefer the server-provided complete URL (currently /page/launcher); fall
-	// back to building it from verification_uri, then to /page/launcher. The old
-	// hard-coded /page/cli is stale — the server now returns /page/launcher.
-	verificationUriComplete := getStr(data, "verification_uri_complete")
-	if verificationUriComplete == "" {
-		base := verificationUri
-		if base == "" {
-			base = ep.Open + "/page/launcher"
-		}
-		// The server may return verification_uri with its own query (e.g.
-		// client_id when registering against an existing app), so join with
-		// the same ?/& logic as BuildVerificationURL.
-		sep := "?"
-		if strings.Contains(base, "?") {
-			sep = "&"
-		}
-		verificationUriComplete = base + sep + "user_code=" + url.QueryEscape(userCode)
-	}
+	verificationUriComplete := fmt.Sprintf("%s/page/cli?user_code=%s", ep.Open, userCode)
 
 	return &AppRegistrationResponse{
 		DeviceCode:              getStr(data, "device_code"),
@@ -215,26 +107,6 @@ func RequestAppRegistration(httpClient *http.Client, brand core.LarkBrand, opts
 	}, nil
 }
 
-// parseAuthMethods normalizes the poll response `auth_method` field, which the
-// server returns as a JSON array of strings (e.g. ["private_key_jwt"]) — or, on
-// some variants, a single space-separated string.
-func parseAuthMethods(v interface{}) []string {
-	switch t := v.(type) {
-	case []interface{}:
-		out := make([]string, 0, len(t))
-		for _, m := range t {
-			if s, ok := m.(string); ok && s != "" {
-				out = append(out, s)
-			}
-		}
-		return out
-	case string:
-		return strings.Fields(t)
-	default:
-		return nil
-	}
-}
-
 // BuildVerificationURL appends CLI tracking parameters to the verification URL.
 func BuildVerificationURL(baseURL, cliVersion string) string {
 	sep := "&"
@@ -315,7 +187,6 @@ func PollAppRegistration(ctx context.Context, httpClient *http.Client, brand cor
 			result := &AppRegistrationResult{
 				ClientID:     getStr(data, "client_id"),
 				ClientSecret: getStr(data, "client_secret"),
-				AuthMethods:  parseAuthMethods(data["auth_method"]),
 			}
 			if userInfoRaw, ok := data["user_info"].(map[string]interface{}); ok {
 				result.UserInfo = &AppRegUserInfo{

internal/auth/app_registration_test.go

@@ -4,14 +4,8 @@
 package auth
 
 import (
-	"io"
-	"net/http"
-	"net/url"
-	"slices"
-	"strings"
 	"testing"
 
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
 	"github.com/smartystreets/goconvey/convey"
 )
 
@@ -37,184 +31,3 @@ func Test_BuildVerificationURL(t *testing.T) {
 		})
 	})
 }
-
-// captureClient returns an http.Client that records the last request's form body
-// and replies with the given JSON payload.
-func captureClient(gotBody *url.Values, respJSON string) *http.Client {
-	return &http.Client{
-		Transport: roundTripFunc(func(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
-			if req.Body != nil {
-				b, _ := io.ReadAll(req.Body)
-				v, _ := url.ParseQuery(string(b))
-				*gotBody = v
-			}
-			return &http.Response{
-				StatusCode: http.StatusOK,
-				Header:     make(http.Header),
-				Body:       io.NopCloser(strings.NewReader(respJSON)),
-			}, nil
-		}),
-	}
-}
-
-func TestRequestAppRegistrationInit_ParsesNonceAndMethods(t *testing.T) {
-	var body url.Values
-	hc := captureClient(&body, `{"nonce":"n-123","supported_auth_methods":["client_secret","private_key_jwt"]}`)
-
-	out, err := RequestAppRegistrationInit(hc)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if out.Nonce != "n-123" {
-		t.Errorf("nonce = %q, want n-123", out.Nonce)
-	}
-	if len(out.SupportedAuthMethods) != 2 || out.SupportedAuthMethods[1] != "private_key_jwt" {
-		t.Errorf("methods = %v", out.SupportedAuthMethods)
-	}
-	if body.Get("action") != "init" {
-		t.Errorf("action = %q, want init", body.Get("action"))
-	}
-}
-
-func TestRequestAppRegistrationInit_ErrorOnMissingNonce(t *testing.T) {
-	var body url.Values
-	hc := captureClient(&body, `{"supported_auth_methods":["client_secret"]}`)
-	if _, err := RequestAppRegistrationInit(hc); err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("expected error when server returns no nonce")
-	}
-}
-
-// TestRequestAppRegistrationInit_EmptySupportedAuthMethods covers the older-server
-// back-compat path: an empty supported_auth_methods array parses to an empty
-// slice, so the init guard in cmd/config/init_interactive.go
-// (`len(SupportedAuthMethods) > 0 && !slices.Contains(...)`) stays false and does
-// NOT reject the requested private_key_jwt. This aligns with
-// resolveFinalAuthMethod(nil/[], private_key_jwt) == private_key_jwt
-// (see cmd/config TestResolveFinalAuthMethod).
-func TestRequestAppRegistrationInit_EmptySupportedAuthMethods(t *testing.T) {
-	var body url.Values
-	hc := captureClient(&body, `{"nonce":"n-1","supported_auth_methods":[]}`)
-
-	out, err := RequestAppRegistrationInit(hc)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if out.Nonce != "n-1" {
-		t.Errorf("nonce = %q, want n-1", out.Nonce)
-	}
-	if len(out.SupportedAuthMethods) != 0 {
-		t.Errorf("SupportedAuthMethods = %v, want empty", out.SupportedAuthMethods)
-	}
-	// Reproduce the init guard expression on the real parsed result: an empty
-	// slice must NOT reject private_key_jwt.
-	rejected := len(out.SupportedAuthMethods) > 0 &&
-		!slices.Contains(out.SupportedAuthMethods, core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT)
-	if rejected {
-		t.Error("empty SupportedAuthMethods must allow private_key_jwt (older-server back-compat)")
-	}
-}
-
-const beginRespJSON = `{"device_code":"dc","user_code":"uc","verification_uri":"https://example/verify","expires_in":300,"interval":5}`
-
-func TestRequestAppRegistration_BeginDefaultsToClientSecret(t *testing.T) {
-	var body url.Values
-	hc := captureClient(&body, beginRespJSON)
-
-	if _, err := RequestAppRegistration(hc, core.BrandFeishu, AppRegistrationBeginOptions{}, nil); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if body.Get("action") != "begin" {
-		t.Errorf("action = %q", body.Get("action"))
-	}
-	if body.Get("auth_method") != "client_secret" {
-		t.Errorf("auth_method = %q, want client_secret (default)", body.Get("auth_method"))
-	}
-	if body.Has("auth_attestation") {
-		t.Errorf("auth_attestation should be absent for client_secret, got %q", body.Get("auth_attestation"))
-	}
-	// Normal (non-restore) begin must NOT carry app_id.
-	if body.Has("app_id") {
-		t.Errorf("app_id should be absent when RestoreAppID is empty, got %q", body.Get("app_id"))
-	}
-}
-
-// TestRequestAppRegistration_BeginRestoreAppID verifies the restore flow sends the
-// existing app id on begin so the server re-registers that app.
-func TestRequestAppRegistration_BeginRestoreAppID(t *testing.T) {
-	var body url.Values
-	hc := captureClient(&body, beginRespJSON)
-
-	opts := AppRegistrationBeginOptions{RestoreAppID: "cli_restore_me"}
-	if _, err := RequestAppRegistration(hc, core.BrandFeishu, opts, nil); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if body.Get("action") != "begin" {
-		t.Errorf("action = %q, want begin", body.Get("action"))
-	}
-	if body.Get("app_id") != "cli_restore_me" {
-		t.Errorf("app_id = %q, want cli_restore_me", body.Get("app_id"))
-	}
-}
-
-func TestRequestAppRegistration_VerificationURICompleteFallback(t *testing.T) {
-	cases := []struct {
-		name string
-		resp string
-		want string
-	}{
-		{
-			name: "bare verification_uri",
-			resp: `{"device_code":"dc","user_code":"uc","verification_uri":"https://example/verify","expires_in":300,"interval":5}`,
-			want: "https://example/verify?user_code=uc",
-		},
-		{
-			name: "verification_uri with existing query",
-			resp: `{"device_code":"dc","user_code":"uc","verification_uri":"https://example/verify?client_id=cli_x","expires_in":300,"interval":5}`,
-			want: "https://example/verify?client_id=cli_x&user_code=uc",
-		},
-	}
-	for _, tc := range cases {
-		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			var body url.Values
-			hc := captureClient(&body, tc.resp)
-			got, err := RequestAppRegistration(hc, core.BrandFeishu, AppRegistrationBeginOptions{}, nil)
-			if err != nil {
-				t.Fatal(err)
-			}
-			if got.VerificationUriComplete != tc.want {
-				t.Errorf("VerificationUriComplete = %q, want %q", got.VerificationUriComplete, tc.want)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-func TestParseAuthMethods(t *testing.T) {
-	if got := parseAuthMethods([]interface{}{"private_key_jwt", "client_secret"}); len(got) != 2 || got[0] != "private_key_jwt" {
-		t.Errorf("array form = %v", got)
-	}
-	if got := parseAuthMethods("client_secret private_key_jwt"); len(got) != 2 || got[1] != "private_key_jwt" {
-		t.Errorf("string form = %v", got)
-	}
-	if got := parseAuthMethods(nil); got != nil {
-		t.Errorf("nil form = %v, want nil", got)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestRequestAppRegistration_BeginPrivateKeyJWT(t *testing.T) {
-	var body url.Values
-	hc := captureClient(&body, beginRespJSON)
-
-	opts := AppRegistrationBeginOptions{
-		AuthMethod:      core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT,
-		AuthAttestation: "header.claims.sig",
-	}
-	if _, err := RequestAppRegistration(hc, core.BrandFeishu, opts, nil); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if body.Get("auth_method") != "private_key_jwt" {
-		t.Errorf("auth_method = %q, want private_key_jwt", body.Get("auth_method"))
-	}
-	if body.Get("auth_attestation") != "header.claims.sig" {
-		t.Errorf("auth_attestation = %q", body.Get("auth_attestation"))
-	}
-}

internal/auth/client_auth.go

@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
-
-package auth
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"fmt"
-	"net/url"
-	"time"
-
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/auth/jwt"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/keysigner"
-)
-
-// ClientAuth describes how to authenticate the OAuth client at the token
-// endpoint: with a client_secret (default) or a TEE-signed client_assertion
-// (private_key_jwt).
-type ClientAuth struct {
-	AppID      string
-	AppSecret  string
-	AuthMethod string // "" == client_secret; core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT
-	Signer     keysigner.Signer
-	KeyLabel   string
-}
-
-// ClientAuthFromConfig builds a ClientAuth from resolved config, picking up the
-// active key signer for private_key_jwt apps.
-func ClientAuthFromConfig(cfg *core.CliConfig) ClientAuth {
-	if cfg == nil {
-		return ClientAuth{}
-	}
-	return ClientAuth{
-		AppID:      cfg.AppID,
-		AppSecret:  cfg.AppSecret,
-		AuthMethod: cfg.AuthMethod,
-		KeyLabel:   cfg.KeyLabel,
-		Signer:     keysigner.Active(),
-	}
-}
-
-func (c ClientAuth) isPrivateKeyJWT() bool { return c.AuthMethod == core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT }
-
-// applyClientAssertion adds client_assertion(+type) to a token-endpoint form for
-// private_key_jwt and returns true. For client_secret it returns false, leaving
-// the caller to apply its own secret-based authentication. audience is the token
-// endpoint URL (the assertion's aud claim).
-func (c ClientAuth) applyClientAssertion(ctx context.Context, form url.Values, audience string) (bool, error) {
-	if !c.isPrivateKeyJWT() {
-		return false, nil
-	}
-	if c.Signer == nil {
-		return false, fmt.Errorf("private_key_jwt requires a key signer, but none is available on this build")
-	}
-	assertion, err := jwt.SignClientAssertion(ctx, c.Signer, keysigner.KeyRef{Label: c.KeyLabel}, c.AppID, audience, time.Now())
-	if err != nil {
-		return false, err
-	}
-	form.Set("client_assertion_type", jwt.ClientAssertionType)
-	form.Set("client_assertion", assertion)
-	return true, nil
-}

internal/auth/client_auth_test.go

@@ -1,109 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
-
-package auth
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"crypto"
-	"crypto/ecdsa"
-	"crypto/elliptic"
-	"crypto/rand"
-	"crypto/sha256"
-	"net/url"
-	"testing"
-
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/auth/jwt"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/keysigner"
-)
-
-// fakeAuthSigner is a real in-memory ECDSA P-256 signer for client-auth tests.
-type fakeAuthSigner struct{ key *ecdsa.PrivateKey }
-
-func newFakeAuthSigner(t *testing.T) *fakeAuthSigner {
-	t.Helper()
-	k, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	return &fakeAuthSigner{key: k}
-}
-
-func (f *fakeAuthSigner) EnsureKey(context.Context, keysigner.KeyRef) (crypto.PublicKey, error) {
-	return f.key.Public(), nil
-}
-func (f *fakeAuthSigner) PublicKey(context.Context, keysigner.KeyRef) (crypto.PublicKey, error) {
-	return f.key.Public(), nil
-}
-func (f *fakeAuthSigner) Sign(_ context.Context, _ keysigner.KeyRef, in []byte) ([]byte, string, error) {
-	h := sha256.Sum256(in)
-	r, s, err := ecdsa.Sign(rand.Reader, f.key, h[:])
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, "", err
-	}
-	sig := make([]byte, 64)
-	r.FillBytes(sig[:32])
-	s.FillBytes(sig[32:])
-	return sig, keysigner.AlgES256, nil
-}
-
-func TestClientAuth_applyClientAssertion_ClientSecret(t *testing.T) {
-	ca := ClientAuth{AppID: "cli_a", AppSecret: "sec"} // AuthMethod "" => client_secret
-	form := url.Values{}
-	used, err := ca.applyClientAssertion(context.Background(), form, "https://aud/token")
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if used {
-		t.Error("client_secret must not produce a client_assertion")
-	}
-	if form.Has("client_assertion") || form.Has("client_assertion_type") {
-		t.Errorf("form should be untouched, got %v", form)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestClientAuth_applyClientAssertion_PrivateKeyJWT(t *testing.T) {
-	ca := ClientAuth{
-		AppID:      "cli_a",
-		AuthMethod: core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT,
-		Signer:     newFakeAuthSigner(t),
-		KeyLabel:   "k",
-	}
-	form := url.Values{}
-	used, err := ca.applyClientAssertion(context.Background(), form, "https://accounts.feishu.cn/open-apis/authen/v2/oauth/token")
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if !used {
-		t.Fatal("expected client_assertion to be applied")
-	}
-	if form.Get("client_assertion_type") != jwt.ClientAssertionType {
-		t.Errorf("client_assertion_type = %q", form.Get("client_assertion_type"))
-	}
-	if form.Get("client_assertion") == "" {
-		t.Error("client_assertion is empty")
-	}
-	if form.Has("client_secret") {
-		t.Error("client_secret must NOT be present for private_key_jwt")
-	}
-}
-
-func TestClientAuth_applyClientAssertion_NilSigner(t *testing.T) {
-	ca := ClientAuth{AppID: "cli_a", AuthMethod: core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT} // Signer nil
-	if _, err := ca.applyClientAssertion(context.Background(), url.Values{}, "aud"); err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("expected error when private_key_jwt has no signer")
-	}
-}
-
-func TestClientAuthFromConfig(t *testing.T) {
-	ca := ClientAuthFromConfig(&core.CliConfig{
-		AppID:      "cli_x",
-		AppSecret:  "s",
-		AuthMethod: core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT,
-		KeyLabel:   "label-1",
-	})
-	if ca.AppID != "cli_x" || ca.AppSecret != "s" || ca.AuthMethod != core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT || ca.KeyLabel != "label-1" {
-		t.Errorf("ClientAuth = %+v", ca)
-	}
-}

internal/auth/device_flow.go

@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ func ResolveOAuthEndpoints(brand core.LarkBrand) OAuthEndpoints {
 }
 
 // RequestDeviceAuthorization requests a device authorization code.
-func RequestDeviceAuthorization(ctx context.Context, httpClient *http.Client, ca ClientAuth, brand core.LarkBrand, scope string, errOut io.Writer) (*DeviceAuthResponse, error) {
+func RequestDeviceAuthorization(httpClient *http.Client, appId, appSecret string, brand core.LarkBrand, scope string, errOut io.Writer) (*DeviceAuthResponse, error) {
 	if errOut == nil {
 		errOut = io.Discard
 	}
@@ -77,26 +77,18 @@ func RequestDeviceAuthorization(ctx context.Context, httpClient *http.Client, ca
 		}
 	}
 
+	basicAuth := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(appId + ":" + appSecret))
+
 	form := url.Values{}
-	form.Set("client_id", ca.AppID)
+	form.Set("client_id", appId)
 	form.Set("scope", scope)
 
-	// private_key_jwt authenticates the client with a signed assertion in the
-	// body; client_secret uses HTTP Basic.
-	usedAssertion, err := ca.applyClientAssertion(ctx, form, core.OpenAPIAudience(brand))
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-
-	req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "POST", endpoints.DeviceAuthorization, strings.NewReader(form.Encode()))
+	req, err := http.NewRequest("POST", endpoints.DeviceAuthorization, strings.NewReader(form.Encode()))
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}
 	req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
-	if !usedAssertion {
-		basicAuth := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(ca.AppID + ":" + ca.AppSecret))
-		req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Basic "+basicAuth)
-	}
+	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Basic "+basicAuth)
 
 	resp, err := httpClient.Do(req)
 	if err != nil {
@@ -147,7 +139,7 @@ func RequestDeviceAuthorization(ctx context.Context, httpClient *http.Client, ca
 }
 
 // PollDeviceToken polls the token endpoint until authorization completes or times out.
-func PollDeviceToken(ctx context.Context, httpClient *http.Client, ca ClientAuth, brand core.LarkBrand, deviceCode string, interval, expiresIn int, errOut io.Writer) *DeviceFlowResult {
+func PollDeviceToken(ctx context.Context, httpClient *http.Client, appId, appSecret string, brand core.LarkBrand, deviceCode string, interval, expiresIn int, errOut io.Writer) *DeviceFlowResult {
 	if errOut == nil {
 		errOut = io.Discard
 	}
@@ -179,16 +171,10 @@ func PollDeviceToken(ctx context.Context, httpClient *http.Client, ca ClientAuth
 		form := url.Values{}
 		form.Set("grant_type", "urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:device_code")
 		form.Set("device_code", deviceCode)
-		form.Set("client_id", ca.AppID)
-		usedAssertion, caErr := ca.applyClientAssertion(ctx, form, core.OpenAPIAudience(brand))
-		if caErr != nil {
-			return &DeviceFlowResult{OK: false, Error: "invalid_client", Message: caErr.Error()}
-		}
-		if !usedAssertion {
-			form.Set("client_secret", ca.AppSecret)
-		}
+		form.Set("client_id", appId)
+		form.Set("client_secret", appSecret)
 
-		req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "POST", endpoints.Token, strings.NewReader(form.Encode()))
+		req, err := http.NewRequest("POST", endpoints.Token, strings.NewReader(form.Encode()))
 		if err != nil {
 			continue
 		}

internal/auth/device_flow_test.go

@@ -7,10 +7,8 @@ import (
 	"bytes"
 	"context"
 	"fmt"
-	"io"
 	"log"
 	"net/http"
-	"net/url"
 	"strings"
 	"sync/atomic"
 	"testing"
@@ -85,7 +83,7 @@ func TestRequestDeviceAuthorization_LogsResponse(t *testing.T) {
 	})
 	t.Cleanup(restore)
 
-	_, err := RequestDeviceAuthorization(context.Background(), httpmock.NewClient(reg), ClientAuth{AppID: "cli_a", AppSecret: "secret_b"}, core.BrandFeishu, "", nil)
+	_, err := RequestDeviceAuthorization(httpmock.NewClient(reg), "cli_a", "secret_b", core.BrandFeishu, "", nil)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("RequestDeviceAuthorization() error: %v", err)
 	}
@@ -108,66 +106,6 @@ func TestRequestDeviceAuthorization_LogsResponse(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-// captureRT records the last request + body and returns a canned device-auth response.
-func captureDeviceAuthClient(gotReq **http.Request, gotBody *string, respJSON string) *http.Client {
-	return &http.Client{Transport: roundTripFunc(func(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
-		*gotReq = req
-		if req.Body != nil {
-			b, _ := io.ReadAll(req.Body)
-			*gotBody = string(b)
-		}
-		return &http.Response{
-			StatusCode: http.StatusOK,
-			Header:     make(http.Header),
-			Body:       io.NopCloser(strings.NewReader(respJSON)),
-		}, nil
-	})}
-}
-
-const deviceAuthRespJSON = `{"device_code":"dc","user_code":"uc","verification_uri":"https://example/verify","expires_in":300,"interval":5}`
-
-func TestRequestDeviceAuthorization_PrivateKeyJWT_UsesAssertionNotBasic(t *testing.T) {
-	var req *http.Request
-	var body string
-	client := captureDeviceAuthClient(&req, &body, deviceAuthRespJSON)
-
-	ca := ClientAuth{AppID: "cli_a", AuthMethod: core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT, Signer: newFakeAuthSigner(t), KeyLabel: "k"}
-	if _, err := RequestDeviceAuthorization(context.Background(), client, ca, core.BrandFeishu, "im:message:send", nil); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if req.Header.Get("Authorization") != "" {
-		t.Errorf("private_key_jwt must NOT send Basic auth, got %q", req.Header.Get("Authorization"))
-	}
-	form, _ := url.ParseQuery(body)
-	if form.Get("client_assertion") == "" {
-		t.Error("missing client_assertion")
-	}
-	if form.Get("client_assertion_type") != "urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:jwt-bearer" {
-		t.Errorf("client_assertion_type = %q", form.Get("client_assertion_type"))
-	}
-	if form.Has("client_secret") {
-		t.Error("client_secret must not be present for private_key_jwt")
-	}
-}
-
-func TestRequestDeviceAuthorization_ClientSecret_UsesBasic(t *testing.T) {
-	var req *http.Request
-	var body string
-	client := captureDeviceAuthClient(&req, &body, deviceAuthRespJSON)
-
-	ca := ClientAuth{AppID: "cli_a", AppSecret: "sec"} // client_secret
-	if _, err := RequestDeviceAuthorization(context.Background(), client, ca, core.BrandFeishu, "", nil); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if !strings.HasPrefix(req.Header.Get("Authorization"), "Basic ") {
-		t.Errorf("client_secret should use Basic auth, got %q", req.Header.Get("Authorization"))
-	}
-	form, _ := url.ParseQuery(body)
-	if form.Has("client_assertion") {
-		t.Error("client_secret must not send a client_assertion")
-	}
-}
-
 // TestFormatAuthCmdline_TruncatesExtraArgs verifies that long command lines are truncated.
 func TestFormatAuthCmdline_TruncatesExtraArgs(t *testing.T) {
 	got := keychain.FormatAuthCmdline([]string{
@@ -267,7 +205,7 @@ func TestPollDeviceToken_DefaultsZeroIntervalToFiveSeconds(t *testing.T) {
 	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 100*time.Millisecond)
 	t.Cleanup(cancel)
 
-	result := PollDeviceToken(ctx, client, ClientAuth{AppID: "cli_a", AppSecret: "secret_b"}, core.BrandFeishu, "device-code", 0, 10, nil)
+	result := PollDeviceToken(ctx, client, "cli_a", "secret_b", core.BrandFeishu, "device-code", 0, 10, nil)
 	if result == nil {
 		t.Fatal("PollDeviceToken() returned nil result")
 	}

internal/auth/jwt/jwt.go

@@ -1,153 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
-
-// Package jwt builds compact JWS tokens signed by a keysigner.Signer.
-//
-// It deliberately depends only on the standard library plus the existing
-// google/uuid dependency — no third-party JWT library is introduced, keeping
-// go.mod free of new dependencies. The actual signing (and, for ECDSA, the
-// ASN.1->r||s conversion) is delegated to the Signer implementation.
-package jwt
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"encoding/base64"
-	"encoding/json"
-	"fmt"
-	"time"
-
-	"github.com/google/uuid"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/keysigner"
-)
-
-func b64(b []byte) string { return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(b) }
-
-// buildSignedJWT builds a compact JWS:
-//
-//	base64url(header).base64url(claims).base64url(signature)
-//
-// alg is written into the header (it is part of the signed input) and verified
-// against the alg the signer reports, guarding against a header/key mismatch.
-// typ defaults to "JWT": the server's client_assertion generalizedValidation
-// REQUIRES `typ == "JWT"` (rejects otherwise with "malformed client assertion
-// jwt"), even though the spec examples (§8.1/§8.2) show only alg.
-func buildSignedJWT(ctx context.Context, signer keysigner.Signer, ref keysigner.KeyRef, alg string, header, claims map[string]any) (string, error) {
-	if signer == nil {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("jwt: no signer available (private_key_jwt unsupported on this build)")
-	}
-	if header == nil {
-		header = map[string]any{}
-	}
-	header["alg"] = alg
-	if _, ok := header["typ"]; !ok {
-		header["typ"] = "JWT"
-	}
-
-	hb, err := json.Marshal(header)
-	if err != nil {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("jwt: marshal header: %w", err)
-	}
-	cb, err := json.Marshal(claims)
-	if err != nil {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("jwt: marshal claims: %w", err)
-	}
-
-	signingInput := b64(hb) + "." + b64(cb)
-	sig, gotAlg, err := signer.Sign(ctx, ref, []byte(signingInput))
-	if err != nil {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("jwt: sign: %w", err)
-	}
-	if gotAlg != alg {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("jwt: signer alg %q does not match header alg %q", gotAlg, alg)
-	}
-	return signingInput + "." + b64(sig), nil
-}
-
-// newJTI returns a random unique token identifier.
-func newJTI() string { return uuid.NewString() }
-
-// attestationTTL bounds the attestation JWT's lifetime. The init nonce (60s,
-// single-use) is the real anti-replay constraint; this is a modest margin for
-// clock skew on top of the immediate init→sign→begin round-trip.
-const attestationTTL = 2 * time.Minute
-
-// attestationClaims builds the registration attestation claim set per the App
-// Registration JWT spec: jti, iat, exp (all required) and the init-issued nonce.
-func attestationClaims(nonce string, now time.Time) map[string]any {
-	return map[string]any{
-		"jti":   newJTI(),
-		"iat":   now.Unix(),
-		"exp":   now.Add(attestationTTL).Unix(),
-		"nonce": nonce,
-	}
-}
-
-// clientAssertionClaims builds an RFC 7523 client_assertion claim set used to
-// mint tokens in place of client_secret. aud is the brand's token endpoint URL.
-func clientAssertionClaims(clientID, aud string, now time.Time, ttl time.Duration) map[string]any {
-	return map[string]any{
-		"iss": clientID,
-		"sub": clientID,
-		"aud": aud,
-		"iat": now.Unix(),
-		"exp": now.Add(ttl).Unix(),
-		"jti": newJTI(),
-	}
-}
-
-// ClientAssertionType is the RFC 7523 client_assertion_type value used for JWT
-// bearer client authentication at the token endpoint.
-const ClientAssertionType = "urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:jwt-bearer"
-
-// defaultAssertionTTL bounds a client_assertion's lifetime.
-const defaultAssertionTTL = 5 * time.Minute
-
-// SignAttestation signs the registration attestation JWT. The public key is
-// embedded in the JWS "jwk" header so the registration backend can bind it to
-// the app during action=begin; the claims carry the server nonce as a
-// proof-of-possession challenge.
-func SignAttestation(ctx context.Context, signer keysigner.Signer, ref keysigner.KeyRef, nonce string, now time.Time) (string, error) {
-	if signer == nil {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("jwt: no signer available (private_key_jwt unsupported on this build)")
-	}
-	pub, err := signer.EnsureKey(ctx, ref)
-	if err != nil {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("jwt: ensure key: %w", err)
-	}
-	alg, err := keysigner.AlgForKey(pub)
-	if err != nil {
-		return "", err
-	}
-	jwk, err := keysigner.PublicKeyJWK(pub)
-	if err != nil {
-		return "", err
-	}
-	return buildSignedJWT(ctx, signer, ref, alg, map[string]any{"jwk": jwk}, attestationClaims(nonce, now))
-}
-
-// SignClientAssertion mints a short-lived RFC 7523 client_assertion: it reads the
-// registered key (it must already exist — bound at registration; a missing key is
-// an error, not a reason to create a new unbound one), derives the JWS alg from
-// the public key, and signs an assertion whose audience is the brand's Open API
-// host. The server, holding the public key bound at registration, verifies it in
-// place of client_secret. The assertion header carries only alg (no jwk/kid);
-// the server locates the key via iss/sub = client_id.
-//
-// This is the model-independent glue: the assertion JWT is identical whether the
-// server augments an existing grant (device_code/refresh_token) with client
-// authentication or uses a dedicated jwt-bearer grant — only where the caller
-// attaches it differs.
-func SignClientAssertion(ctx context.Context, signer keysigner.Signer, ref keysigner.KeyRef, clientID, audience string, now time.Time) (string, error) {
-	if signer == nil {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("jwt: no signer available (private_key_jwt unsupported on this build)")
-	}
-	pub, err := signer.PublicKey(ctx, ref)
-	if err != nil {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("jwt: public key: %w", err)
-	}
-	alg, err := keysigner.AlgForKey(pub)
-	if err != nil {
-		return "", err
-	}
-	return buildSignedJWT(ctx, signer, ref, alg, map[string]any{}, clientAssertionClaims(clientID, audience, now, defaultAssertionTTL))
-}

internal/auth/jwt/jwt_test.go

@@ -1,254 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
-
-package jwt
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"crypto"
-	"crypto/ecdsa"
-	"crypto/elliptic"
-	"crypto/rand"
-	"crypto/sha256"
-	"encoding/base64"
-	"encoding/json"
-	"math/big"
-	"strings"
-	"testing"
-	"time"
-
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/keysigner"
-)
-
-// fakeSigner is a real in-memory ECDSA P-256 signer, so tests exercise the full
-// JWS path and the produced token is actually cryptographically verifiable.
-type fakeSigner struct{ key *ecdsa.PrivateKey }
-
-func newFakeSigner(t *testing.T) *fakeSigner {
-	t.Helper()
-	k, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	return &fakeSigner{key: k}
-}
-
-func (f *fakeSigner) EnsureKey(context.Context, keysigner.KeyRef) (crypto.PublicKey, error) {
-	return f.key.Public(), nil
-}
-func (f *fakeSigner) PublicKey(context.Context, keysigner.KeyRef) (crypto.PublicKey, error) {
-	return f.key.Public(), nil
-}
-func (f *fakeSigner) Sign(_ context.Context, _ keysigner.KeyRef, in []byte) ([]byte, string, error) {
-	h := sha256.Sum256(in)
-	r, s, err := ecdsa.Sign(rand.Reader, f.key, h[:])
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, "", err
-	}
-	// JOSE ES256: fixed-width big-endian r||s (32 bytes each for P-256).
-	sig := make([]byte, 64)
-	r.FillBytes(sig[:32])
-	s.FillBytes(sig[32:])
-	return sig, keysigner.AlgES256, nil
-}
-
-func TestBuildSignedJWT_VerifiableES256(t *testing.T) {
-	f := newFakeSigner(t)
-	now := time.Unix(1700000000, 0)
-
-	tok, err := buildSignedJWT(context.Background(), f, keysigner.KeyRef{Label: "x"}, keysigner.AlgES256,
-		map[string]any{}, clientAssertionClaims("cli_app", "https://accounts.example/token", now, 5*time.Minute))
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-
-	parts := strings.Split(tok, ".")
-	if len(parts) != 3 {
-		t.Fatalf("want 3 JWS parts, got %d", len(parts))
-	}
-
-	hb, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(parts[0])
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("header not base64url: %v", err)
-	}
-	var hdr map[string]any
-	if err := json.Unmarshal(hb, &hdr); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if hdr["alg"] != "ES256" || hdr["typ"] != "JWT" {
-		t.Errorf("header = %v, want alg=ES256 typ=JWT (server generalizedValidation requires typ)", hdr)
-	}
-
-	cb, _ := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(parts[1])
-	var claims map[string]any
-	if err := json.Unmarshal(cb, &claims); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if claims["iss"] != "cli_app" || claims["sub"] != "cli_app" || claims["aud"] != "https://accounts.example/token" {
-		t.Errorf("claims = %v", claims)
-	}
-
-	// Cryptographically verify the signature against the signing input.
-	sig, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(parts[2])
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("sig not base64url: %v", err)
-	}
-	if len(sig) != 64 {
-		t.Fatalf("ES256 sig len = %d, want 64", len(sig))
-	}
-	r := new(big.Int).SetBytes(sig[:32])
-	s := new(big.Int).SetBytes(sig[32:])
-	h := sha256.Sum256([]byte(parts[0] + "." + parts[1]))
-	if !ecdsa.Verify(f.key.Public().(*ecdsa.PublicKey), h[:], r, s) {
-		t.Error("signature did not verify")
-	}
-}
-
-func TestBuildSignedJWT_NilSigner(t *testing.T) {
-	if _, err := buildSignedJWT(context.Background(), nil, keysigner.KeyRef{}, "ES256", nil, nil); err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("expected error for nil signer")
-	}
-}
-
-func TestBuildSignedJWT_AlgMismatch(t *testing.T) {
-	f := newFakeSigner(t) // always reports ES256
-	if _, err := buildSignedJWT(context.Background(), f, keysigner.KeyRef{}, keysigner.AlgRS256, nil, nil); err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("expected error when header alg != signer alg")
-	}
-}
-
-func TestBuildSignedJWT_MarshalErrors(t *testing.T) {
-	f := newFakeSigner(t)
-	ctx := context.Background()
-
-	_, err := buildSignedJWT(ctx, f, keysigner.KeyRef{}, keysigner.AlgES256,
-		map[string]any{"bad": func() {}}, nil)
-	if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "jwt: marshal header") {
-		t.Fatalf("header marshal error = %v, want prefix %q", err, "jwt: marshal header")
-	}
-
-	_, err = buildSignedJWT(ctx, f, keysigner.KeyRef{}, keysigner.AlgES256,
-		nil, map[string]any{"bad": make(chan int)})
-	if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "jwt: marshal claims") {
-		t.Fatalf("claims marshal error = %v, want prefix %q", err, "jwt: marshal claims")
-	}
-}
-
-func TestSignClientAssertion(t *testing.T) {
-	f := newFakeSigner(t)
-	now := time.Unix(1700000000, 0)
-	const aud = "https://accounts.feishu.cn/open-apis/authen/v2/oauth/token"
-
-	tok, err := SignClientAssertion(context.Background(), f, keysigner.KeyRef{Label: "k"}, "cli_app", aud, now)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-
-	parts := strings.Split(tok, ".")
-	if len(parts) != 3 {
-		t.Fatalf("want 3 parts, got %d", len(parts))
-	}
-	cb, _ := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(parts[1])
-	var claims map[string]any
-	if err := json.Unmarshal(cb, &claims); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if claims["iss"] != "cli_app" || claims["aud"] != aud {
-		t.Errorf("claims = %v", claims)
-	}
-
-	// Signature must verify against the key's public half.
-	sig, _ := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(parts[2])
-	r := new(big.Int).SetBytes(sig[:32])
-	s := new(big.Int).SetBytes(sig[32:])
-	h := sha256.Sum256([]byte(parts[0] + "." + parts[1]))
-	if !ecdsa.Verify(f.key.Public().(*ecdsa.PublicKey), h[:], r, s) {
-		t.Error("client_assertion signature did not verify")
-	}
-}
-
-func TestSignClientAssertion_NilSigner(t *testing.T) {
-	if _, err := SignClientAssertion(context.Background(), nil, keysigner.KeyRef{}, "cli_app", "aud", time.Unix(0, 0)); err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("expected error for nil signer")
-	}
-}
-
-func TestSignAttestation(t *testing.T) {
-	f := newFakeSigner(t)
-	now := time.Unix(1700000000, 0)
-
-	tok, err := SignAttestation(context.Background(), f, keysigner.KeyRef{Label: "k"}, "nonce-abc", now)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	parts := strings.Split(tok, ".")
-	if len(parts) != 3 {
-		t.Fatalf("want 3 parts, got %d", len(parts))
-	}
-
-	hb, _ := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(parts[0])
-	var hdr map[string]any
-	if err := json.Unmarshal(hb, &hdr); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	jwk, ok := hdr["jwk"].(map[string]any)
-	if !ok {
-		t.Fatalf("attestation header missing jwk: %v", hdr)
-	}
-	if jwk["kty"] != "EC" || jwk["crv"] != "P-256" || jwk["use"] != "sig" {
-		t.Errorf("jwk = %v", jwk)
-	}
-
-	cb, _ := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(parts[1])
-	var claims map[string]any
-	if err := json.Unmarshal(cb, &claims); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if claims["nonce"] != "nonce-abc" {
-		t.Errorf("nonce = %v", claims["nonce"])
-	}
-	// jti, iat, exp are all required by the attestation spec.
-	iat, iatOK := claims["iat"].(float64)
-	exp, expOK := claims["exp"].(float64)
-	if !iatOK || !expOK || exp <= iat {
-		t.Errorf("claims iat/exp invalid: iat=%v exp=%v", claims["iat"], claims["exp"])
-	}
-	if jti, _ := claims["jti"].(string); jti == "" {
-		t.Error("claims jti empty")
-	}
-
-	// Signature verifies against the embedded key.
-	sig, _ := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(parts[2])
-	r := new(big.Int).SetBytes(sig[:32])
-	s := new(big.Int).SetBytes(sig[32:])
-	h := sha256.Sum256([]byte(parts[0] + "." + parts[1]))
-	if !ecdsa.Verify(f.key.Public().(*ecdsa.PublicKey), h[:], r, s) {
-		t.Error("attestation signature did not verify")
-	}
-}
-
-func TestSignAttestation_NilSigner(t *testing.T) {
-	if _, err := SignAttestation(context.Background(), nil, keysigner.KeyRef{}, "n", time.Unix(0, 0)); err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("expected error for nil signer")
-	}
-}
-
-func TestClaimFactories(t *testing.T) {
-	now := time.Unix(1700000000, 0)
-
-	a := attestationClaims("nonce-xyz", now)
-	if a["nonce"] != "nonce-xyz" || a["iat"] != now.Unix() {
-		t.Errorf("attestation claims = %v", a)
-	}
-	if a["exp"] != now.Add(attestationTTL).Unix() {
-		t.Errorf("attestation exp = %v, want %v", a["exp"], now.Add(attestationTTL).Unix())
-	}
-	if jti, _ := a["jti"].(string); jti == "" {
-		t.Error("attestation jti empty")
-	}
-
-	c := clientAssertionClaims("cli_app", "aud", now, time.Minute)
-	if c["exp"].(int64) != now.Add(time.Minute).Unix() {
-		t.Errorf("client_assertion exp = %v", c["exp"])
-	}
-}

internal/auth/uat_client.go

@@ -21,7 +21,6 @@ import (
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/errs"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/errclass"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/keysigner"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/vfs"
 )
 
@@ -38,10 +37,7 @@ type UATCallOptions struct {
 	AppId      string
 	AppSecret  string
 	Domain     core.LarkBrand
-	AuthMethod string           // "" == client_secret; core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT
-	KeyLabel   string           // TEE key handle for private_key_jwt
-	Signer     keysigner.Signer // active signer for private_key_jwt
-	ErrOut     io.Writer        // diagnostic/status output (caller injects f.IOStreams.ErrOut)
+	ErrOut     io.Writer // diagnostic/status output (caller injects f.IOStreams.ErrOut)
 }
 
 // UATStatus represents the status of a user access token.
@@ -65,9 +61,6 @@ func NewUATCallOptions(cfg *core.CliConfig, errOut io.Writer) UATCallOptions {
 		AppId:      cfg.AppID,
 		AppSecret:  cfg.AppSecret,
 		Domain:     cfg.Brand,
-		AuthMethod: cfg.AuthMethod,
-		KeyLabel:   cfg.KeyLabel,
-		Signer:     keysigner.Active(),
 		ErrOut:     errOut,
 	}
 }
@@ -200,14 +193,7 @@ func doRefreshToken(httpClient *http.Client, opts UATCallOptions, stored *Stored
 		form.Set("grant_type", "refresh_token")
 		form.Set("refresh_token", stored.RefreshToken)
 		form.Set("client_id", opts.AppId)
-		ca := ClientAuth{AppID: opts.AppId, AppSecret: opts.AppSecret, AuthMethod: opts.AuthMethod, Signer: opts.Signer, KeyLabel: opts.KeyLabel}
-		usedAssertion, caErr := ca.applyClientAssertion(context.Background(), form, core.OpenAPIAudience(opts.Domain))
-		if caErr != nil {
-			return nil, caErr
-		}
-		if !usedAssertion {
-			form.Set("client_secret", opts.AppSecret)
-		}
+		form.Set("client_secret", opts.AppSecret)
 
 		req, err := http.NewRequest("POST", endpoints.Token, strings.NewReader(form.Encode()))
 		if err != nil {

internal/auth/uat_client_options_test.go

@@ -38,23 +38,3 @@ func TestNewUATCallOptions(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Error("ErrOut not set correctly")
 	}
 }
-
-// TestNewUATCallOptions_PrivateKeyJWT verifies the auth-method fields propagate
-// so the refresh path can mint a client_assertion instead of sending a secret.
-func TestNewUATCallOptions_PrivateKeyJWT(t *testing.T) {
-	cfg := &core.CliConfig{
-		AppID:      "cli_pk",
-		Brand:      core.BrandFeishu,
-		UserOpenId: "ou_test",
-		AuthMethod: core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT,
-		KeyLabel:   "agent-key",
-	}
-	opts := NewUATCallOptions(cfg, &bytes.Buffer{})
-
-	if opts.AuthMethod != core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT {
-		t.Errorf("AuthMethod = %q, want private_key_jwt", opts.AuthMethod)
-	}
-	if opts.KeyLabel != "agent-key" {
-		t.Errorf("KeyLabel = %q, want agent-key", opts.KeyLabel)
-	}
-}

internal/cmdutil/iostreams.go

@@ -42,16 +42,6 @@ func NewIOStreams(in io.Reader, out, errOut io.Writer) *IOStreams {
 	return &IOStreams{In: in, Out: out, ErrOut: errOut, IsTerminal: isTerminal, StderrIsTerminal: stderrIsTerminal}
 }
 
-// StdoutIsTerminal reports whether Out is an interactive terminal. Unlike
-// IsTerminal — which reflects stdin and drives prompt decisions — this is the
-// correct check for OUTPUT formatting: `cmd | jq` must still emit machine output
-// from an interactive shell (stdin is a TTY there, but stdout is the pipe).
-// Buffers (tests) and redirects are not *os.File terminals, so they yield false.
-func (s *IOStreams) StdoutIsTerminal() bool {
-	f, ok := s.Out.(*os.File)
-	return ok && term.IsTerminal(int(f.Fd()))
-}
-
 // SystemIO creates an IOStreams wired to the process's standard file descriptors.
 //
 //nolint:forbidigo // entry point for real stdio

internal/cmdutil/iostreams_test.go

@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
-
-package cmdutil
-
-import (
-	"bytes"
-	"os"
-	"testing"
-)
-
-func TestStdoutIsTerminal(t *testing.T) {
-	// Buffer-backed output (tests, captured output) is never a terminal.
-	if (&IOStreams{Out: &bytes.Buffer{}}).StdoutIsTerminal() {
-		t.Error("bytes.Buffer Out should not be a terminal")
-	}
-	// An os.Pipe write end is an *os.File but not a terminal — mirrors `cmd | jq`,
-	// the case the stdin-based IsTerminal would get wrong.
-	r, w, err := os.Pipe()
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	defer r.Close()
-	defer w.Close()
-	if (&IOStreams{Out: w}).StdoutIsTerminal() {
-		t.Error("os.Pipe Out should not be a terminal")
-	}
-}

internal/core/config.go

@@ -36,13 +36,6 @@ type AppUser struct {
 	UserName   string `json:"userName"`
 }
 
-// Auth methods for app credentials. An empty AppConfig.AuthMethod means the
-// default, client_secret.
-const (
-	AuthMethodClientSecret  = "client_secret"   // app_id + app_secret
-	AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT = "private_key_jwt" // TEE-signed client_assertion; no app secret
-)
-
 // AppConfig is a per-app configuration entry (stored format — secrets may be unresolved).
 type AppConfig struct {
 	Name       string      `json:"name,omitempty"`
@@ -53,15 +46,6 @@ type AppConfig struct {
 	DefaultAs  Identity    `json:"defaultAs,omitempty"` // AsUser | AsBot | AsAuto
 	StrictMode *StrictMode `json:"strictMode,omitempty"`
 	Users      []AppUser   `json:"users"`
-
-	// AuthMethod selects how tokens are minted. Empty == AuthMethodClientSecret
-	// (back-compat). AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT uses a TEE-held key (see KeyRef) to
-	// sign client_assertion JWTs instead of sending an app secret.
-	AuthMethod string `json:"authMethod,omitempty"`
-	// KeyRef references the non-exportable signing key for private_key_jwt.
-	// Source is "tee" and ID is the backend key label; the actual key never
-	// leaves the secure backend, so this is a handle, not secret material.
-	KeyRef *SecretRef `json:"keyRef,omitempty"`
 }
 
 // ProfileName returns the display name for this app config.
@@ -177,9 +161,7 @@ type CliConfig struct {
 	UserOpenId          string
 	UserName            string
 	Lang                i18n.Lang
-	SupportedIdentities uint8  `json:"-"` // bitflag: 1=user, 2=bot; set by credential provider
-	AuthMethod          string // "" == client_secret; AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT
-	KeyLabel            string // resolved TEE key handle for private_key_jwt
+	SupportedIdentities uint8 `json:"-"` // bitflag: 1=user, 2=bot; set by credential provider
 }
 
 // identityBotBit is the bit flag for bot identity in SupportedIdentities.
@@ -265,58 +247,31 @@ func ResolveConfigFromMulti(raw *MultiAppConfig, kc keychain.KeychainAccess, pro
 			WithHint("available profiles: %s", formatProfileNames(raw.ProfileNames()))
 	}
 
-	// Validate the auth method first so a malformed profile fails here rather
-	// than silently degrading to client_secret (unknown method) or failing later
-	// at token-signing. Empty stays empty — downstream treats it as client_secret
-	// (back-compat).
-	switch app.AuthMethod {
-	case "", AuthMethodClientSecret, AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT:
-	default:
-		return nil, errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeInvalidConfig, "unknown authMethod %q", app.AuthMethod).
-			WithHint("supported: %s, %s (empty defaults to %s)", AuthMethodClientSecret, AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT, AuthMethodClientSecret)
+	if err := ValidateSecretKeyMatch(app.AppId, app.AppSecret); err != nil {
+		return nil, errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeNotConfigured, "appId and appSecret keychain key are out of sync").
+			WithHint("%s", err.Error()).
+			WithCause(err)
 	}
 
-	// private_key_jwt carries no secret: validate the key handle and skip secret
-	// resolution entirely, so a stale/broken AppSecret ref never produces a
-	// confusing secret-resolution error for an otherwise-valid pkjwt profile.
-	var secret string
-	if app.AuthMethod == AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT {
-		if app.KeyRef == nil || app.KeyRef.Source != "tee" || app.KeyRef.ID == "" {
-			return nil, errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeInvalidConfig, "private_key_jwt requires a key handle (keyRef) but none is configured").
-				WithHint("re-run: lark-cli config init --new --auth-method private_key_jwt")
+	secret, err := ResolveSecretInput(app.AppSecret, kc)
+	if err != nil {
+		if errs.IsTyped(err) {
+			return nil, err
 		}
-	} else {
-		if err := ValidateSecretKeyMatch(app.AppId, app.AppSecret); err != nil {
-			return nil, errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeNotConfigured, "appId and appSecret keychain key are out of sync").
-				WithHint("%s", err.Error()).
-				WithCause(err)
-		}
-		var resolveErr error
-		secret, resolveErr = ResolveSecretInput(app.AppSecret, kc)
-		if resolveErr != nil {
-			if errs.IsTyped(resolveErr) {
-				return nil, resolveErr
-			}
-			subtype := errs.SubtypeNotConfigured
-			if isMalformedConfigError(resolveErr) {
-				subtype = errs.SubtypeInvalidConfig
-			}
-			return nil, errs.NewConfigError(subtype, "%s", resolveErr.Error()).WithCause(resolveErr)
+		subtype := errs.SubtypeNotConfigured
+		if isMalformedConfigError(err) {
+			subtype = errs.SubtypeInvalidConfig
 		}
+		return nil, errs.NewConfigError(subtype, "%s", err.Error()).WithCause(err)
 	}
-
 	cfg := &CliConfig{
 		ProfileName: app.ProfileName(),
 		AppID:       app.AppId,
 		AppSecret:   secret,
 		Brand:       app.Brand,
 		Lang:        app.Lang,
-		AuthMethod:  app.AuthMethod,
 		DefaultAs:   app.DefaultAs,
 	}
-	if app.KeyRef != nil {
-		cfg.KeyLabel = app.KeyRef.ID
-	}
 	if len(app.Users) > 0 {
 		cfg.UserOpenId = app.Users[0].UserOpenId
 		cfg.UserName = app.Users[0].UserName

internal/core/config_test.go

@@ -133,108 +133,6 @@ func TestResolveConfigFromMulti_AcceptsPlainSecret(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-// TestResolveConfigFromMulti_RejectsUnknownAuthMethod ensures an unsupported
-// authMethod fails at resolution rather than silently degrading to client_secret.
-func TestResolveConfigFromMulti_RejectsUnknownAuthMethod(t *testing.T) {
-	raw := &MultiAppConfig{
-		Apps: []AppConfig{
-			{
-				AppId:      "cli_abc",
-				AppSecret:  PlainSecret("my-secret"),
-				Brand:      BrandFeishu,
-				AuthMethod: "bogus_method",
-			},
-		},
-	}
-
-	_, err := ResolveConfigFromMulti(raw, nil, "")
-	if err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("expected error for unknown authMethod")
-	}
-	var cfgErr *errs.ConfigError
-	if !errors.As(err, &cfgErr) {
-		t.Fatalf("expected ConfigError, got %T: %v", err, err)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestResolveConfigFromMulti_PrivateKeyJWTRequiresKeyRef ensures private_key_jwt
-// without a key handle fails at resolution rather than later at token-signing.
-func TestResolveConfigFromMulti_PrivateKeyJWTRequiresKeyRef(t *testing.T) {
-	raw := &MultiAppConfig{
-		Apps: []AppConfig{
-			{
-				AppId:      "cli_abc",
-				AppSecret:  SecretInput{}, // private_key_jwt carries no app secret
-				Brand:      BrandFeishu,
-				AuthMethod: AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT,
-				// KeyRef intentionally nil
-			},
-		},
-	}
-
-	_, err := ResolveConfigFromMulti(raw, nil, "")
-	if err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("expected error for private_key_jwt without keyRef")
-	}
-	var cfgErr *errs.ConfigError
-	if !errors.As(err, &cfgErr) {
-		t.Fatalf("expected ConfigError, got %T: %v", err, err)
-	}
-
-	// Control: same config WITH a keyRef resolves cleanly and sets KeyLabel.
-	raw.Apps[0].KeyRef = &SecretRef{Source: "tee", ID: "larksuite-cli-agent"}
-	cfg, err := ResolveConfigFromMulti(raw, nil, "")
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("unexpected error with keyRef present: %v", err)
-	}
-	if cfg.KeyLabel != "larksuite-cli-agent" {
-		t.Errorf("KeyLabel = %q, want larksuite-cli-agent", cfg.KeyLabel)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestResolveConfigFromMulti_PKJWTSkipsSecretResolution ensures a private_key_jwt
-// profile that carries a stale/broken AppSecret ref still resolves cleanly: the
-// auth method is judged before any secret handling, so the stale ref is ignored
-// instead of producing a confusing secret-resolution failure.
-func TestResolveConfigFromMulti_PKJWTSkipsSecretResolution(t *testing.T) {
-	raw := &MultiAppConfig{
-		Apps: []AppConfig{{
-			AppId: "cli_pk",
-			// Stale keychain ref whose ID does not match appId — would trip
-			// ValidateSecretKeyMatch / ResolveSecretInput if it were reached.
-			AppSecret:  SecretInput{Ref: &SecretRef{Source: "keychain", ID: "appsecret:cli_OTHER"}},
-			Brand:      BrandFeishu,
-			AuthMethod: AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT,
-			KeyRef:     &SecretRef{Source: "tee", ID: "agent-key"},
-			Users:      []AppUser{},
-		}},
-	}
-	cfg, err := ResolveConfigFromMulti(raw, stubKeychain{}, "")
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("pkjwt with stale secret ref must skip secret resolution, got %v", err)
-	}
-	if cfg.AuthMethod != AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT || cfg.KeyLabel != "agent-key" {
-		t.Errorf("got authMethod=%q keyLabel=%q", cfg.AuthMethod, cfg.KeyLabel)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestResolveConfigFromMulti_PKJWTRejectsBadKeyRef ensures the stricter keyRef
-// check (Source=="tee" && ID!="") rejects malformed handles.
-func TestResolveConfigFromMulti_PKJWTRejectsBadKeyRef(t *testing.T) {
-	for i, ref := range []*SecretRef{
-		{Source: "keychain", ID: "x"}, // wrong source
-		{Source: "tee", ID: ""},       // empty id
-	} {
-		raw := &MultiAppConfig{Apps: []AppConfig{{
-			AppId: "cli_pk", Brand: BrandFeishu,
-			AuthMethod: AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT, KeyRef: ref, Users: []AppUser{},
-		}}}
-		if _, err := ResolveConfigFromMulti(raw, stubKeychain{}, ""); err == nil {
-			t.Errorf("case %d: expected ConfigError for bad keyRef", i)
-		}
-	}
-}
-
 func TestResolveConfigFromMulti_CarriesLang(t *testing.T) {
 	raw := &MultiAppConfig{
 		Apps: []AppConfig{

internal/core/types.go

@@ -3,8 +3,6 @@
 
 package core
 
-import "strings"
-
 // LarkBrand represents the Lark platform brand.
 // "feishu" targets China-mainland, "lark" targets international.
 // Any other string is treated as a custom base URL.
@@ -62,10 +60,3 @@ func ResolveEndpoints(brand LarkBrand) Endpoints {
 func ResolveOpenBaseURL(brand LarkBrand) string {
 	return ResolveEndpoints(brand).Open
 }
-
-// OpenAPIAudience returns the client_assertion `aud` value for the brand: the
-// bare Open API host per the App Authentication JWT spec — "open.feishu.cn" or
-// "open.larksuite.com" — not the full token endpoint URL.
-func OpenAPIAudience(brand LarkBrand) string {
-	return strings.TrimPrefix(ResolveOpenBaseURL(brand), "https://")
-}

internal/core/types_test.go

@@ -57,12 +57,3 @@ func TestResolveOpenBaseURL(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Errorf("ResolveOpenBaseURL(lark) = %q", got)
 	}
 }
-
-func TestOpenAPIAudience(t *testing.T) {
-	if got := OpenAPIAudience(BrandFeishu); got != "open.feishu.cn" {
-		t.Errorf("OpenAPIAudience(feishu) = %q, want open.feishu.cn", got)
-	}
-	if got := OpenAPIAudience(BrandLark); got != "open.larksuite.com" {
-		t.Errorf("OpenAPIAudience(lark) = %q, want open.larksuite.com", got)
-	}
-}

internal/credential/default_provider.go

@@ -17,7 +17,6 @@ import (
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/keychain"
 
 	extcred "github.com/larksuite/cli/extension/credential"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/keysigner"
 )
 
 // classifyTATResponseCode wraps a deterministic (non-transient) failure from the
@@ -176,23 +175,6 @@ func (p *DefaultTokenProvider) doResolveTAT(ctx context.Context) (*TokenResult,
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}
-
-	// private_key_jwt apps have no app secret: mint via the jwt-bearer grant
-	// using a TEE-signed client_assertion instead.
-	if acct.AuthMethod == core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT {
-		signer := keysigner.Active()
-		if signer == nil {
-			return nil, errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeInvalidClient,
-				"profile uses private_key_jwt but no TEE key signer is available on this build").
-				WithHint("install a build with the platform key-signer extension, or reconfigure the app to use an app secret")
-		}
-		token, err := FetchTATWithAssertion(ctx, httpClient, acct.Brand, acct.AppID, signer, acct.KeyLabel)
-		if err != nil {
-			return nil, err
-		}
-		return &TokenResult{Token: token}, nil
-	}
-
 	token, err := FetchTAT(ctx, httpClient, acct.Brand, acct.AppID, acct.AppSecret)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err

internal/credential/tat_fetch.go

@@ -11,13 +11,8 @@ import (
 	"net/http"
 	"net/url"
 	"strings"
-	"time"
 
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/errs"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/auth"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/auth/jwt"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/keysigner"
 )
 
 // FetchTAT performs a single HTTP POST to mint a tenant access token via the
@@ -105,96 +100,3 @@ func FetchTAT(ctx context.Context, httpClient *http.Client, brand core.LarkBrand
 	}
 	return "", classifyTATResponseCode(result.Code, result.Error, desc, string(brand), appID)
 }
-
-// FetchTATWithAssertion mints a tenant access token for a private_key_jwt app via
-// the RFC 7523 jwt-bearer grant: it signs a short-lived client_assertion with the
-// TEE-held key and posts it to the unified OAuth token endpoint, replacing the
-// app_secret entirely.
-//
-// The unified v2 token endpoint returns the minted token as access_token
-// (tenant_access_token is accepted as a fallback).
-func FetchTATWithAssertion(ctx context.Context, httpClient *http.Client, brand core.LarkBrand, clientID string, signer keysigner.Signer, keyLabel string) (string, error) {
-	if signer == nil {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("private_key_jwt requires a key signer, but none is available on this build")
-	}
-	ep := core.ResolveEndpoints(brand)
-	endpoint := ep.Open + auth.PathOAuthTokenV2
-
-	assertion, err := jwt.SignClientAssertion(ctx, signer, keysigner.KeyRef{Label: keyLabel}, clientID, core.OpenAPIAudience(brand), time.Now())
-	if err != nil {
-		return "", err
-	}
-
-	form := url.Values{}
-	form.Set("grant_type", "urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:jwt-bearer")
-	form.Set("client_id", clientID)
-	form.Set("client_assertion_type", jwt.ClientAssertionType)
-	form.Set("client_assertion", assertion)
-
-	req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodPost, endpoint, strings.NewReader(form.Encode()))
-	if err != nil {
-		return "", err
-	}
-	req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
-
-	resp, err := httpClient.Do(req)
-	if err != nil {
-		return "", err
-	}
-	defer resp.Body.Close()
-
-	body, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
-	if err != nil {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("read token response: %w", err)
-	}
-
-	var result struct {
-		Code              int    `json:"code"`
-		Msg               string `json:"msg"`
-		Error             string `json:"error"`
-		ErrorDescription  string `json:"error_description"`
-		AccessToken       string `json:"access_token"`
-		TenantAccessToken string `json:"tenant_access_token"`
-	}
-	_ = json.Unmarshal(body, &result) // best-effort; error body may not be JSON
-
-	token := result.AccessToken
-	if token == "" {
-		token = result.TenantAccessToken
-	}
-	if resp.StatusCode == http.StatusOK && token != "" && result.Error == "" && result.Code == 0 {
-		return token, nil
-	}
-
-	// Surface the server's reason, preferring the OAuth `error` code (e.g.
-	// unauthorized_client) which is more diagnostic than the description alone.
-	detail := result.ErrorDescription
-	if detail == "" {
-		detail = result.Msg
-	}
-	if detail == "" {
-		detail = strings.TrimSpace(string(body))
-	}
-	if result.Error != "" {
-		return "", classifyAssertionError(result.Error, resp.StatusCode, detail)
-	}
-	return "", fmt.Errorf("token endpoint HTTP %d (code=%d): %s", resp.StatusCode, result.Code, detail)
-}
-
-// classifyAssertionError maps the OAuth token endpoint's `error` field to a
-// typed or untyped error. Only deterministic client-credential rejections get a
-// typed errs.ConfigError (so runProbePKJWT can tell "this key is not bound to
-// this app" apart from upstream noise); every other error (e.g.
-// temporarily_unavailable) stays untyped and is swallowed by the probe. detail
-// carries only the server's error_description / msg / body text — it never
-// echoes the client_assertion or private key (the assertion lives only in the
-// request form).
-func classifyAssertionError(oauthError string, httpStatus int, detail string) error {
-	switch oauthError {
-	case "invalid_client", "unauthorized_client", "invalid_grant":
-		return errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeInvalidClient,
-			"token endpoint rejected the key (%s): %s", oauthError, detail)
-	default:
-		return fmt.Errorf("token endpoint HTTP %d (%s): %s", httpStatus, oauthError, detail)
-	}
-}

internal/credential/tat_fetch_test.go

@@ -5,24 +5,15 @@ package credential
 
 import (
 	"context"
-	"crypto"
-	"crypto/ecdsa"
-	"crypto/elliptic"
-	"crypto/rand"
-	"crypto/sha256"
-	"encoding/base64"
-	"encoding/json"
 	"errors"
 	"io"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/http/httptest"
-	"net/url"
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
 
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/errs"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/keysigner"
 )
 
 // stubRoundTripper lets us assert request shape and return canned responses.
@@ -316,147 +307,3 @@ func (r *urlRewriteRT) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
 	req2.Header = req.Header
 	return http.DefaultTransport.RoundTrip(req2)
 }
-
-// fakeTATSigner is a real in-memory ECDSA P-256 signer for assertion tests.
-type fakeTATSigner struct{ key *ecdsa.PrivateKey }
-
-func newFakeTATSigner(t *testing.T) *fakeTATSigner {
-	t.Helper()
-	k, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	return &fakeTATSigner{key: k}
-}
-
-func (f *fakeTATSigner) EnsureKey(context.Context, keysigner.KeyRef) (crypto.PublicKey, error) {
-	return f.key.Public(), nil
-}
-func (f *fakeTATSigner) PublicKey(context.Context, keysigner.KeyRef) (crypto.PublicKey, error) {
-	return f.key.Public(), nil
-}
-func (f *fakeTATSigner) Sign(_ context.Context, _ keysigner.KeyRef, in []byte) ([]byte, string, error) {
-	h := sha256.Sum256(in)
-	r, s, err := ecdsa.Sign(rand.Reader, f.key, h[:])
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, "", err
-	}
-	sig := make([]byte, 64)
-	r.FillBytes(sig[:32])
-	s.FillBytes(sig[32:])
-	return sig, keysigner.AlgES256, nil
-}
-
-func TestFetchTATWithAssertion_Success(t *testing.T) {
-	rt := &stubRoundTripper{respCode: 200, respBody: `{"access_token":"t-jwt","token_type":"Bearer","expires_in":7200}`}
-	hc := &http.Client{Transport: rt}
-
-	token, err := FetchTATWithAssertion(context.Background(), hc, core.BrandFeishu, "cli_app", newFakeTATSigner(t), "agent-key")
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
-	}
-	if token != "t-jwt" {
-		t.Errorf("token = %q, want t-jwt", token)
-	}
-	if rt.gotReq.URL.String() != "https://open.feishu.cn/open-apis/authen/v2/oauth/token" {
-		t.Errorf("url = %s", rt.gotReq.URL.String())
-	}
-
-	form, err := url.ParseQuery(rt.gotBody)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if form.Get("grant_type") != "urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:jwt-bearer" {
-		t.Errorf("grant_type = %q", form.Get("grant_type"))
-	}
-	if form.Get("client_assertion_type") != "urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:jwt-bearer" {
-		t.Errorf("client_assertion_type = %q", form.Get("client_assertion_type"))
-	}
-	if form.Get("client_assertion") == "" {
-		t.Error("client_assertion is empty")
-	}
-	if form.Has("client_secret") {
-		t.Error("client_secret must NOT be sent for private_key_jwt")
-	}
-
-	// The assertion's aud must be the bare Open host per the App Authentication
-	// JWT spec — not the full token endpoint URL.
-	jwtParts := strings.Split(form.Get("client_assertion"), ".")
-	if len(jwtParts) != 3 {
-		t.Fatalf("malformed client_assertion: %q", form.Get("client_assertion"))
-	}
-	payload, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(jwtParts[1])
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("assertion payload not base64url: %v", err)
-	}
-	var claims map[string]any
-	if err := json.Unmarshal(payload, &claims); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if claims["aud"] != "open.feishu.cn" {
-		t.Errorf("client_assertion aud = %v, want open.feishu.cn", claims["aud"])
-	}
-	if claims["iss"] != "cli_app" || claims["sub"] != "cli_app" {
-		t.Errorf("client_assertion iss/sub = %v/%v, want cli_app", claims["iss"], claims["sub"])
-	}
-	if form.Get("client_id") != "cli_app" {
-		t.Errorf("client_id = %q", form.Get("client_id"))
-	}
-}
-
-func TestFetchTATWithAssertion_NilSigner(t *testing.T) {
-	hc := &http.Client{Transport: &stubRoundTripper{respCode: 200, respBody: `{}`}}
-	if _, err := FetchTATWithAssertion(context.Background(), hc, core.BrandFeishu, "cli_app", nil, "k"); err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("expected error when signer is nil")
-	}
-}
-
-func TestFetchTATWithAssertion_ServerError(t *testing.T) {
-	rt := &stubRoundTripper{respCode: 200, respBody: `{"error":"invalid_client","error_description":"unknown key"}`}
-	hc := &http.Client{Transport: rt}
-	if _, err := FetchTATWithAssertion(context.Background(), hc, core.BrandFeishu, "cli_app", newFakeTATSigner(t), "k"); err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("expected error for invalid_client response")
-	}
-}
-
-// Deterministic OAuth client rejections must be typed (ConfigError /
-// SubtypeInvalidClient) so runProbePKJWT can tell "the key is not bound to this
-// app" apart from transport noise.
-func TestFetchTATWithAssertion_DeterministicReject_Typed(t *testing.T) {
-	for _, oauthErr := range []string{"invalid_client", "unauthorized_client", "invalid_grant"} {
-		rt := &stubRoundTripper{respCode: 401, respBody: `{"error":"` + oauthErr + `","error_description":"bad key"}`}
-		hc := &http.Client{Transport: rt}
-		_, err := FetchTATWithAssertion(context.Background(), hc, core.BrandFeishu, "cli_app", newFakeTATSigner(t), "k")
-		if err == nil {
-			t.Fatalf("%s: expected error", oauthErr)
-		}
-		if !errs.IsTyped(err) {
-			t.Errorf("%s: must be typed, got %T", oauthErr, err)
-		}
-		var cfgErr *errs.ConfigError
-		if !errors.As(err, &cfgErr) || cfgErr.Subtype != errs.SubtypeInvalidClient {
-			t.Errorf("%s: want ConfigError/InvalidClient, got %T %v", oauthErr, err, err)
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-// Unrecognized OAuth errors and non-payload noise stay UNTYPED so the probe
-// treats them as upstream noise and stays silent.
-func TestFetchTATWithAssertion_AmbiguousError_Untyped(t *testing.T) {
-	cases := []string{
-		`{"error":"temporarily_unavailable","error_description":"retry"}`,
-		`{"code":99999,"msg":"weird"}`,
-		`not json`,
-	}
-	for _, body := range cases {
-		rt := &stubRoundTripper{respCode: 503, respBody: body}
-		hc := &http.Client{Transport: rt}
-		_, err := FetchTATWithAssertion(context.Background(), hc, core.BrandFeishu, "cli_app", newFakeTATSigner(t), "k")
-		if err == nil {
-			t.Fatalf("body %q: expected error", body)
-		}
-		if errs.IsTyped(err) {
-			t.Errorf("body %q: must be UNTYPED, got typed %T", body, err)
-		}
-	}
-}

internal/credential/types.go

@@ -26,8 +26,6 @@ type Account struct {
 	UserName            string
 	Lang                i18n.Lang
 	SupportedIdentities uint8
-	AuthMethod          string // "" == client_secret; core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT
-	KeyLabel            string // resolved TEE key handle for private_key_jwt
 }
 
 const runtimePlaceholderAppSecret = "__LARKSUITE_CLI_TOKEN_ONLY__"
@@ -71,8 +69,6 @@ func AccountFromCliConfig(cfg *core.CliConfig) *Account {
 		UserName:            cfg.UserName,
 		Lang:                cfg.Lang,
 		SupportedIdentities: cfg.SupportedIdentities,
-		AuthMethod:          cfg.AuthMethod,
-		KeyLabel:            cfg.KeyLabel,
 	}
 }
 
@@ -91,8 +87,6 @@ func (a *Account) ToCliConfig() *core.CliConfig {
 		UserName:            a.UserName,
 		Lang:                a.Lang,
 		SupportedIdentities: a.SupportedIdentities,
-		AuthMethod:          a.AuthMethod,
-		KeyLabel:            a.KeyLabel,
 	}
 }
 

internal/identitydiag/diagnostics.go

@@ -82,9 +82,7 @@ func diagnoseBot(ctx context.Context, f *cmdutil.Factory, cfg *core.CliConfig, v
 			Hint:    "check strict mode or the active credential provider",
 		}
 	}
-	// private_key_jwt apps have no app secret — the bot/tenant token is minted via
-	// a TEE-signed client_assertion — so absence of a secret is NOT "unconfigured".
-	if cfg.SupportedIdentities == 0 && !credential.HasRealAppSecret(cfg.AppSecret) && cfg.AuthMethod != core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT {
+	if cfg.SupportedIdentities == 0 && !credential.HasRealAppSecret(cfg.AppSecret) {
 		return Identity{
 			Status:  StatusNotConfigured,
 			Message: "Bot identity: not configured (missing app secret or bot token)",

internal/keysigner/keysigner.go

@@ -1,212 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
-
-// Package keysigner defines the pluggable signing abstraction used by the
-// private_key_jwt registration and authentication flow.
-//
-// The open-source core only declares the Signer interface and pure-stdlib key
-// helpers. The platform implementations that hold a non-exportable private key
-// (TPM 2.0 via facebookincubator/sks on Linux/Windows, a non-extractable
-// Keychain key on macOS) live OUTSIDE this core — in a build-tagged module or
-// extension — and register themselves via Register from init(). This keeps
-// CGO-heavy and license-sensitive dependencies out of the open-source build.
-package keysigner
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"crypto"
-	"crypto/ecdsa"
-	"crypto/elliptic"
-	"crypto/rsa"
-	"crypto/x509"
-	"encoding/asn1"
-	"encoding/base64"
-	"errors"
-	"fmt"
-	"math/big"
-	"strings"
-)
-
-// KeyRef identifies a non-exportable signing key held by a backend
-// (TEE/TPM/Keychain). It is a stable handle (label), never the key material.
-type KeyRef struct {
-	// Label is the backend key label/tag (e.g. "larksuite-cli-agent").
-	Label string
-}
-
-// Signer signs JWS signing inputs with a non-exportable key.
-type Signer interface {
-	// EnsureKey returns the public key for ref, creating the key if absent.
-	EnsureKey(ctx context.Context, ref KeyRef) (crypto.PublicKey, error)
-	// PublicKey returns the public key for ref without creating it.
-	PublicKey(ctx context.Context, ref KeyRef) (crypto.PublicKey, error)
-	// Sign signs signingInput and returns a JOSE-format signature plus the JWS
-	// alg ("ES256"/"RS256"). Implementations apply the alg's hash and, for
-	// ECDSA, MUST return the fixed-width r||s form required by RFC 7518 §3.4
-	// (not ASN.1 DER), because the backend (TPM/Keychain) typically yields DER.
-	Sign(ctx context.Context, ref KeyRef, signingInput []byte) (sig []byte, alg string, err error)
-}
-
-// Supported JWS algorithms.
-const (
-	AlgES256 = "ES256"
-	AlgRS256 = "RS256"
-)
-
-// DefaultKeyLabel is the backend key label lark-cli uses for its device signing
-// key. One non-exportable key is created on first private_key_jwt registration
-// and reused across subsequent app registrations on the same device.
-const DefaultKeyLabel = "larksuite-cli-agent"
-
-// HardwareInfo describes the secure hardware backing a Signer, as reported by a
-// HardwareProber. It is advisory/diagnostic: it tells a user whether
-// private_key_jwt can use a real TEE on this device.
-type HardwareInfo struct {
-	Backend    string // backing technology, e.g. "tpm2" or "keychain"
-	Available  bool   // the hardware is present and usable for signing
-	VendorName string // hardware vendor/manufacturer, when known
-	VendorInfo string // additional vendor detail, when known
-	Reason     string // when Available is false, a human-readable cause
-}
-
-// HardwareProber is an optional capability a Signer may implement to report on
-// the secure hardware backing it (TPM/TEE vendor and availability) WITHOUT
-// creating or using a key. Probing never mutates key state.
-type HardwareProber interface {
-	ProbeHardware(ctx context.Context) (HardwareInfo, error)
-}
-
-// ProbeActiveHardware probes the active signer's secure hardware. ok is false
-// when there is no active signer or it does not implement HardwareProber — in
-// which case private_key_jwt is unsupported on this build. When ok is true, info
-// reports availability and, if unavailable, info.Reason explains why.
-func ProbeActiveHardware(ctx context.Context) (info HardwareInfo, ok bool, err error) {
-	return probeHardware(ctx, Active())
-}
-
-// probeHardware is the registry-independent core of ProbeActiveHardware, so it
-// can be unit-tested without touching the global signer.
-func probeHardware(ctx context.Context, s Signer) (HardwareInfo, bool, error) {
-	p, ok := s.(HardwareProber)
-	if !ok {
-		return HardwareInfo{}, false, nil
-	}
-	info, err := p.ProbeHardware(ctx)
-	return info, true, err
-}
-
-// cleanProbeError renders err's message with redundant re-wraps collapsed. Some
-// backends (e.g. facebookincubator/sks) wrap an error twice with the SAME "%w"
-// prefix, yielding "P: P: cause"; this peels each outer layer whose only
-// contribution is to repeat the prefix already present in the wrapped error,
-// leaving a single "P: cause". A layer that adds genuinely new context is kept.
-func cleanProbeError(err error) string {
-	if err == nil {
-		return ""
-	}
-	msg := err.Error()
-	for {
-		inner := errors.Unwrap(err)
-		if inner == nil {
-			break
-		}
-		innerMsg := inner.Error()
-		prefix, ok := strings.CutSuffix(msg, innerMsg)
-		if !ok || prefix == "" || !strings.HasPrefix(innerMsg, prefix) {
-			break
-		}
-		msg, err = innerMsg, inner
-	}
-	return msg
-}
-
-// AlgForKey returns the JWS alg for a public key: EC P-256 -> ES256, RSA -> RS256.
-// The signer backend chooses the key type (the macOS keychain signer uses an
-// RSA-2048 key, hence RS256).
-func AlgForKey(pub crypto.PublicKey) (string, error) {
-	switch k := pub.(type) {
-	case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
-		if k.Curve == elliptic.P256() {
-			return AlgES256, nil
-		}
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("keysigner: unsupported EC curve %q (only P-256/ES256)", k.Curve.Params().Name)
-	case *rsa.PublicKey:
-		return AlgRS256, nil
-	default:
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("keysigner: unsupported public key type %T", pub)
-	}
-}
-
-// ecdsaDERToJOSE converts an ASN.1 DER-encoded ECDSA signature — the form most
-// TEE/TPM backends emit (e.g. facebookincubator/sks marshals the TPM's r,s with
-// asn1.Marshal) — into the fixed-width r||s form JWS requires for ES256
-// (RFC 7518 §3.4). byteLen is the curve coordinate size (32 for P-256), so the
-// result is exactly 2*byteLen bytes with r and s each left-zero-padded.
-//
-// This is intentionally part of the pure-stdlib core (not a platform signer) so
-// it can be unit-tested with a software key on any machine, including TPM-less CI.
-func ecdsaDERToJOSE(der []byte, byteLen int) ([]byte, error) {
-	var sig struct{ R, S *big.Int }
-	rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(der, &sig)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("keysigner: parse ECDSA DER signature: %w", err)
-	}
-	if len(rest) != 0 {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("keysigner: %d trailing byte(s) after ECDSA DER signature", len(rest))
-	}
-	if sig.R == nil || sig.S == nil || sig.R.Sign() <= 0 || sig.S.Sign() <= 0 {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("keysigner: ECDSA signature has non-positive r/s")
-	}
-	// Guard before FillBytes, which panics if the scalar does not fit in byteLen.
-	if sig.R.BitLen() > byteLen*8 || sig.S.BitLen() > byteLen*8 {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("keysigner: ECDSA r/s exceeds %d-byte coordinate", byteLen)
-	}
-	out := make([]byte, 2*byteLen)
-	sig.R.FillBytes(out[:byteLen])
-	sig.S.FillBytes(out[byteLen:])
-	return out, nil
-}
-
-// EncodePublicKey marshals pub to PKIX DER and base64-encodes it (std encoding),
-// matching the public-key form the registration backend binds to the app.
-func EncodePublicKey(pub crypto.PublicKey) (string, error) {
-	der, err := x509.MarshalPKIXPublicKey(pub)
-	if err != nil {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("keysigner: encode public key: %w", err)
-	}
-	return base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(der), nil
-}
-
-// PublicKeyJWK returns the RFC 7517 JSON Web Key for pub, used to embed the
-// public key in the attestation JWT's "jwk" header so the registration backend
-// can bind it to the app. EC keys use base64url fixed-width coordinates
-// (RFC 7518 §6.2.1); RSA keys use base64url-encoded modulus and exponent.
-func PublicKeyJWK(pub crypto.PublicKey) (map[string]any, error) {
-	switch k := pub.(type) {
-	case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
-		if k.Curve != elliptic.P256() {
-			return nil, fmt.Errorf("keysigner: JWK supports EC P-256 only, got %q", k.Curve.Params().Name)
-		}
-		const coordLen = 32 // P-256 field element size
-		x := make([]byte, coordLen)
-		y := make([]byte, coordLen)
-		k.X.FillBytes(x)
-		k.Y.FillBytes(y)
-		return map[string]any{
-			"use": "sig",
-			"kty": "EC",
-			"crv": "P-256",
-			"x":   base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(x),
-			"y":   base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(y),
-		}, nil
-	case *rsa.PublicKey:
-		return map[string]any{
-			"use": "sig",
-			"kty": "RSA",
-			"n":   base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(k.N.Bytes()),
-			"e":   base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(big.NewInt(int64(k.E)).Bytes()),
-		}, nil
-	default:
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("keysigner: unsupported public key type %T for JWK", pub)
-	}
-}

internal/keysigner/keysigner_test.go

@@ -1,240 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
-
-package keysigner
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"crypto"
-	"crypto/ecdsa"
-	"crypto/elliptic"
-	"crypto/rand"
-	"crypto/rsa"
-	"crypto/sha256"
-	"crypto/x509"
-	"encoding/base64"
-	"errors"
-	"fmt"
-	"math/big"
-	"reflect"
-	"testing"
-)
-
-func TestAlgForKey(t *testing.T) {
-	ec, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if alg, err := AlgForKey(ec.Public()); err != nil || alg != AlgES256 {
-		t.Errorf("P-256: alg=%q err=%v, want ES256/nil", alg, err)
-	}
-
-	rsaKey, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if alg, err := AlgForKey(rsaKey.Public()); err != nil || alg != AlgRS256 {
-		t.Errorf("RSA: alg=%q err=%v, want RS256/nil", alg, err)
-	}
-
-	ec384, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P384(), rand.Reader)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if _, err := AlgForKey(ec384.Public()); err == nil {
-		t.Error("P-384: expected unsupported-curve error")
-	}
-
-	if _, err := AlgForKey("not a key"); err == nil {
-		t.Error("string: expected unsupported-type error")
-	}
-}
-
-func TestEncodePublicKeyRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
-	ec, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	enc, err := EncodePublicKey(ec.Public())
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	der, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(enc)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("not valid base64: %v", err)
-	}
-	pub, err := x509.ParsePKIXPublicKey(der)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("not valid PKIX: %v", err)
-	}
-	if !reflect.DeepEqual(pub, ec.Public()) {
-		t.Error("public key did not round-trip")
-	}
-}
-
-func TestPublicKeyJWK_EC(t *testing.T) {
-	ec, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	jwk, err := PublicKeyJWK(ec.Public())
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if jwk["kty"] != "EC" || jwk["crv"] != "P-256" {
-		t.Errorf("jwk = %v, want kty=EC crv=P-256", jwk)
-	}
-	if jwk["use"] != "sig" {
-		t.Errorf("jwk use = %v, want sig", jwk["use"])
-	}
-	x, _ := jwk["x"].(string)
-	xb, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(x)
-	if err != nil || len(xb) != 32 {
-		t.Errorf("x = %q (decoded %d bytes), want 32-byte base64url", x, len(xb))
-	}
-	if _, ok := jwk["y"].(string); !ok {
-		t.Error("jwk missing y")
-	}
-}
-
-func TestPublicKeyJWK_RSA(t *testing.T) {
-	rsaKey, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	jwk, err := PublicKeyJWK(rsaKey.Public())
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if jwk["kty"] != "RSA" || jwk["n"] == "" || jwk["e"] == "" {
-		t.Errorf("jwk = %v, want kty=RSA with n,e", jwk)
-	}
-	if jwk["use"] != "sig" {
-		t.Errorf("jwk use = %v, want sig", jwk["use"])
-	}
-}
-
-func TestPublicKeyJWK_UnsupportedCurve(t *testing.T) {
-	ec384, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P384(), rand.Reader)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if _, err := PublicKeyJWK(ec384.Public()); err == nil {
-		t.Error("P-384: expected error")
-	}
-}
-
-func TestECDSADERToJOSE(t *testing.T) {
-	key, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	// Iterate so we hit signatures whose r or s has its high bit set (ASN.1 pads
-	// those with a leading 0x00) and whose scalars are short (need left-zero
-	// padding) — verifying fixed-width conversion in both directions.
-	for i := 0; i < 64; i++ {
-		digest := sha256.Sum256([]byte{byte(i), byte(i >> 8), 'j', 'w', 't'})
-		der, err := ecdsa.SignASN1(rand.Reader, key, digest[:])
-		if err != nil {
-			t.Fatal(err)
-		}
-		jose, err := ecdsaDERToJOSE(der, 32)
-		if err != nil {
-			t.Fatalf("iter %d: %v", i, err)
-		}
-		if len(jose) != 64 {
-			t.Fatalf("iter %d: len(jose)=%d, want 64 (fixed-width r||s)", i, len(jose))
-		}
-		r := new(big.Int).SetBytes(jose[:32])
-		s := new(big.Int).SetBytes(jose[32:])
-		if !ecdsa.Verify(&key.PublicKey, digest[:], r, s) {
-			t.Fatalf("iter %d: converted r||s did not verify against the public key", i)
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-func TestECDSADERToJOSE_Errors(t *testing.T) {
-	if _, err := ecdsaDERToJOSE([]byte{0x01, 0x02, 0x03}, 32); err == nil {
-		t.Error("garbage DER: expected error")
-	}
-	key, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	digest := sha256.Sum256([]byte("trailing"))
-	der, err := ecdsa.SignASN1(rand.Reader, key, digest[:])
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if _, err := ecdsaDERToJOSE(append(der, 0x00), 32); err == nil {
-		t.Error("DER with trailing byte: expected error")
-	}
-}
-
-type stubSigner struct{}
-
-func (stubSigner) EnsureKey(context.Context, KeyRef) (crypto.PublicKey, error)  { return nil, nil }
-func (stubSigner) PublicKey(context.Context, KeyRef) (crypto.PublicKey, error)  { return nil, nil }
-func (stubSigner) Sign(context.Context, KeyRef, []byte) ([]byte, string, error) { return nil, "", nil }
-
-func TestCleanProbeError(t *testing.T) {
-	cause := errors.New("open /dev/tpmrm0: permission denied")
-	const p = "sks: error fetching Secure Hardware Vendor Data: "
-
-	// sks double-wraps with the same %w prefix → collapse to a single prefix.
-	doubled := fmt.Errorf(p+"%w", fmt.Errorf(p+"%w", cause))
-	if got, want := cleanProbeError(doubled), p+cause.Error(); got != want {
-		t.Errorf("doubled: got %q, want %q", got, want)
-	}
-	// Triple wrap collapses too.
-	if got, want := cleanProbeError(fmt.Errorf(p+"%w", doubled)), p+cause.Error(); got != want {
-		t.Errorf("tripled: got %q, want %q", got, want)
-	}
-	// A layer adding genuinely new context is preserved.
-	if got, want := cleanProbeError(fmt.Errorf("load: %w", cause)), "load: "+cause.Error(); got != want {
-		t.Errorf("distinct prefix: got %q, want %q", got, want)
-	}
-	// nil and unwrapped-leaf cases.
-	if got := cleanProbeError(nil); got != "" {
-		t.Errorf("nil: got %q, want empty", got)
-	}
-	if got := cleanProbeError(cause); got != cause.Error() {
-		t.Errorf("leaf: got %q, want %q", got, cause.Error())
-	}
-}
-
-type proberSigner struct {
-	stubSigner
-	info HardwareInfo
-}
-
-func (p proberSigner) ProbeHardware(context.Context) (HardwareInfo, error) { return p.info, nil }
-
-func TestProbeHardware(t *testing.T) {
-	// nil signer and a signer that does not implement HardwareProber both yield ok=false.
-	if _, ok, _ := probeHardware(context.Background(), nil); ok {
-		t.Error("nil signer: ok should be false")
-	}
-	if _, ok, _ := probeHardware(context.Background(), stubSigner{}); ok {
-		t.Error("non-prober signer: ok should be false")
-	}
-
-	want := HardwareInfo{Backend: "tpm2", Available: true, VendorName: "ACME"}
-	info, ok, err := probeHardware(context.Background(), proberSigner{info: want})
-	if err != nil || !ok {
-		t.Fatalf("prober: ok=%v err=%v, want true/nil", ok, err)
-	}
-	if info != want {
-		t.Errorf("info = %+v, want %+v", info, want)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestRegistry(t *testing.T) {
-	if Active() != nil {
-		t.Skip("a signer is already registered in this build")
-	}
-	Register(stubSigner{})
-	if _, ok := Active().(stubSigner); !ok {
-		t.Error("Active did not return the registered signer")
-	}
-}

internal/keysigner/registry.go

@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
-
-package keysigner
-
-import "sync"
-
-var (
-	mu     sync.RWMutex
-	active Signer
-)
-
-// Register sets the active Signer. It is typically called from the init() of a
-// build-tagged or extension package that provides the platform TEE/Keychain
-// implementation. The last registration wins (one backend per platform).
-func Register(s Signer) {
-	mu.Lock()
-	defer mu.Unlock()
-	active = s
-}
-
-// Active returns the registered Signer, or nil if none is available — in which
-// case private_key_jwt is unsupported on this build and only client_secret auth
-// can be used.
-func Active() Signer {
-	mu.RLock()
-	defer mu.RUnlock()
-	return active
-}

internal/keysigner/signer_keychain_darwin.go

@@ -1,613 +0,0 @@
-//go:build darwin
-
-// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
-
-// macOS non-exportable Keychain signer (compiled into every darwin build).
-//
-// It does NOT use the Secure Enclave / hardware TEE (which would require
-// code-signing entitlements that are unfriendly to open source). Instead it
-// generates an RSA-2048 key in software, imports it into a dedicated app
-// keychain as NON-EXTRACTABLE (`security import -x`), then deletes the software
-// copy — so the private key can sign but can never be exported. Signing is
-// RSASSA-PKCS1v15-SHA256 (RS256).
-//
-// Unlike the original revision, this implementation calls the Security and
-// CoreFoundation frameworks via RUNTIME FFI (github.com/ebitengine/purego)
-// instead of cgo. The security model is identical (the private key is still a
-// non-extractable keychain key and every signature is produced by the OS via
-// SecKeyCreateSignature), but the binary builds with CGO_ENABLED=0 and can be
-// cross-compiled for darwin from any host — so release binaries no longer
-// require a native macOS build runner.
-//
-// Build with:  go build   (cgo-free; compiled into every darwin build, no tag)
-package keysigner
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"crypto"
-	"crypto/rand"
-	"crypto/rsa"
-	"crypto/sha1"
-	"crypto/sha256"
-	"crypto/x509"
-	"encoding/base64"
-	"encoding/hex"
-	"encoding/json"
-	"fmt"
-	"os"
-	"os/exec"
-	"path/filepath"
-	"runtime"
-	"strings"
-	"sync"
-	"unsafe"
-
-	"github.com/ebitengine/purego"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/vfs"
-)
-
-// ---- Security / CoreFoundation runtime bindings (purego, no cgo) ----
-
-const (
-	cfFrameworkPath  = "/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreFoundation.framework/CoreFoundation"
-	secFrameworkPath = "/System/Library/Frameworks/Security.framework/Security"
-
-	// kCFStringEncodingUTF8 (CFStringBuiltInEncodings).
-	cfStringEncodingUTF8 = 0x08000100
-
-	// OSStatus values.
-	errSecSuccess = 0
-)
-
-var (
-	ffiOnce sync.Once
-	ffiErr  error
-
-	cfDataCreate          func(alloc uintptr, bytes *byte, length int) uintptr
-	cfDataGetLength       func(d uintptr) int
-	cfDataGetBytePtr      func(d uintptr) unsafe.Pointer
-	cfStringCreate        func(alloc uintptr, cstr *byte, encoding uint32) uintptr
-	cfArrayCreate         func(alloc uintptr, values *uintptr, numValues int, cb uintptr) uintptr
-	cfDictCreateMutable   func(alloc uintptr, capacity int, keyCB, valCB uintptr) uintptr
-	cfDictSetValue        func(dict, key, val uintptr)
-	cfRelease             func(ref uintptr)
-	cfErrorGetCode        func(e uintptr) int
-	secKeychainOpen       func(path *byte, out *uintptr) int32
-	secItemCopyMatching   func(query uintptr, result *uintptr) int32
-	secItemUpdate         func(query, attrs uintptr) int32
-	secKeyCreateSignature func(key, algo, data uintptr, errOut *uintptr) uintptr
-
-	// CFTypeRef data-symbol constants (deref to obtain the held ref value).
-	kSecClass                uintptr
-	kSecClassKey             uintptr
-	kSecAttrKeyClass         uintptr
-	kSecAttrKeyClassPrivate  uintptr
-	kSecAttrKeyType          uintptr
-	kSecAttrKeyTypeRSA       uintptr
-	kSecAttrApplicationLabel uintptr
-	kSecReturnRef            uintptr
-	kSecMatchSearchList      uintptr
-	kSecAttrLabel            uintptr
-	kCFBooleanTrue           uintptr
-	algRSAPKCS1SHA256        uintptr
-
-	// Struct-symbol constants (passed BY ADDRESS, not dereferenced).
-	cbTypeArray uintptr
-	cbDictKey   uintptr
-	cbDictValue uintptr
-)
-
-// loadFFI resolves the framework functions and constants once. Any failure
-// (framework missing, symbol absent) is returned to every caller so signing
-// fails cleanly rather than crashing.
-func loadFFI() error {
-	ffiOnce.Do(func() {
-		cf, err := purego.Dlopen(cfFrameworkPath, purego.RTLD_NOW|purego.RTLD_GLOBAL)
-		if err != nil {
-			ffiErr = fmt.Errorf("keysigner: dlopen CoreFoundation: %w", err)
-			return
-		}
-		sec, err := purego.Dlopen(secFrameworkPath, purego.RTLD_NOW|purego.RTLD_GLOBAL)
-		if err != nil {
-			ffiErr = fmt.Errorf("keysigner: dlopen Security: %w", err)
-			return
-		}
-
-		purego.RegisterLibFunc(&cfDataCreate, cf, "CFDataCreate")
-		purego.RegisterLibFunc(&cfDataGetLength, cf, "CFDataGetLength")
-		purego.RegisterLibFunc(&cfDataGetBytePtr, cf, "CFDataGetBytePtr")
-		purego.RegisterLibFunc(&cfStringCreate, cf, "CFStringCreateWithCString")
-		purego.RegisterLibFunc(&cfArrayCreate, cf, "CFArrayCreate")
-		purego.RegisterLibFunc(&cfDictCreateMutable, cf, "CFDictionaryCreateMutable")
-		purego.RegisterLibFunc(&cfDictSetValue, cf, "CFDictionarySetValue")
-		purego.RegisterLibFunc(&cfRelease, cf, "CFRelease")
-		purego.RegisterLibFunc(&cfErrorGetCode, cf, "CFErrorGetCode")
-		purego.RegisterLibFunc(&secKeychainOpen, sec, "SecKeychainOpen")
-		purego.RegisterLibFunc(&secItemCopyMatching, sec, "SecItemCopyMatching")
-		purego.RegisterLibFunc(&secItemUpdate, sec, "SecItemUpdate")
-		purego.RegisterLibFunc(&secKeyCreateSignature, sec, "SecKeyCreateSignature")
-
-		// CFStringRef/CFBooleanRef constants: Dlsym gives the address of the
-		// exported variable; deref once to read the ref it holds.
-		derefs := []struct {
-			dst    *uintptr
-			handle uintptr
-			name   string
-		}{
-			{&kSecClass, sec, "kSecClass"},
-			{&kSecClassKey, sec, "kSecClassKey"},
-			{&kSecAttrKeyClass, sec, "kSecAttrKeyClass"},
-			{&kSecAttrKeyClassPrivate, sec, "kSecAttrKeyClassPrivate"},
-			{&kSecAttrKeyType, sec, "kSecAttrKeyType"},
-			{&kSecAttrKeyTypeRSA, sec, "kSecAttrKeyTypeRSA"},
-			{&kSecAttrApplicationLabel, sec, "kSecAttrApplicationLabel"},
-			{&kSecReturnRef, sec, "kSecReturnRef"},
-			{&kSecMatchSearchList, sec, "kSecMatchSearchList"},
-			{&kSecAttrLabel, sec, "kSecAttrLabel"},
-			{&kCFBooleanTrue, cf, "kCFBooleanTrue"},
-			{&algRSAPKCS1SHA256, sec, "kSecKeyAlgorithmRSASignatureDigestPKCS1v15SHA256"},
-		}
-		for _, d := range derefs {
-			sym, e := purego.Dlsym(d.handle, d.name)
-			if e != nil || sym == 0 {
-				ffiErr = fmt.Errorf("keysigner: dlsym %s: %v", d.name, e)
-				return
-			}
-			// deref of a stable dylib data-symbol address (not Go-managed memory), so safe.
-			*d.dst = *(*uintptr)(unsafe.Pointer(sym)) //nolint:govet // unsafeptr: see comment above
-		}
-
-		// Callback structs are passed by address (no deref).
-		addrs := []struct {
-			dst    *uintptr
-			handle uintptr
-			name   string
-		}{
-			{&cbTypeArray, cf, "kCFTypeArrayCallBacks"},
-			{&cbDictKey, cf, "kCFTypeDictionaryKeyCallBacks"},
-			{&cbDictValue, cf, "kCFTypeDictionaryValueCallBacks"},
-		}
-		for _, a := range addrs {
-			sym, e := purego.Dlsym(a.handle, a.name)
-			if e != nil || sym == 0 {
-				ffiErr = fmt.Errorf("keysigner: dlsym %s: %v", a.name, e)
-				return
-			}
-			*a.dst = sym
-		}
-	})
-	return ffiErr
-}
-
-// cstr returns a pointer to a NUL-terminated copy of s. The backing array stays
-// alive while the returned pointer is reachable.
-func cstr(s string) *byte {
-	b := append([]byte(s), 0)
-	return &b[0]
-}
-
-// cfBytes wraps Go bytes in a CFData (CFDataCreate copies the bytes). Caller
-// releases the returned CFDataRef.
-func cfBytes(b []byte) uintptr {
-	var p *byte
-	if len(b) > 0 {
-		p = &b[0]
-	}
-	d := cfDataCreate(0, p, len(b))
-	runtime.KeepAlive(b)
-	return d
-}
-
-// keychainSearchArray opens the dedicated keychain file and wraps it in a
-// CFArray for kSecMatchSearchList. Caller releases the returned array.
-//
-// NOTE: SecKeychainOpen / the file-based keychain are deprecated by Apple in
-// favor of the data-protection keychain. They still function on current macOS;
-// migrating off them is tracked separately and is independent of the cgo→purego
-// change (the original cgo version used the same APIs).
-func keychainSearchArray(keychainPath string) (uintptr, error) {
-	var kc uintptr
-	if st := secKeychainOpen(cstr(keychainPath), &kc); st != errSecSuccess {
-		return 0, keychainError("open keychain", int(st))
-	}
-	vals := [1]uintptr{kc}
-	arr := cfArrayCreate(0, &vals[0], 1, cbTypeArray)
-	cfRelease(kc) // the array retains it
-	if arr == 0 {
-		return 0, fmt.Errorf("keysigner: CFArrayCreate(search list) failed")
-	}
-	return arr, nil
-}
-
-// findPrivateKey locates the non-extractable private key by its application
-// label within the dedicated keychain. Caller releases the returned SecKeyRef.
-func findPrivateKey(appLabel []byte, keychainPath string) (uintptr, error) {
-	search, err := keychainSearchArray(keychainPath)
-	if err != nil {
-		return 0, err
-	}
-	defer cfRelease(search)
-
-	labelData := cfBytes(appLabel)
-	defer cfRelease(labelData)
-
-	q := cfDictCreateMutable(0, 0, cbDictKey, cbDictValue)
-	if q == 0 {
-		return 0, fmt.Errorf("keysigner: CFDictionaryCreateMutable(query) failed")
-	}
-	defer cfRelease(q)
-	cfDictSetValue(q, kSecClass, kSecClassKey)
-	cfDictSetValue(q, kSecAttrKeyClass, kSecAttrKeyClassPrivate)
-	cfDictSetValue(q, kSecAttrKeyType, kSecAttrKeyTypeRSA)
-	cfDictSetValue(q, kSecAttrApplicationLabel, labelData)
-	cfDictSetValue(q, kSecReturnRef, kCFBooleanTrue)
-	cfDictSetValue(q, kSecMatchSearchList, search)
-
-	var keyRef uintptr
-	if st := secItemCopyMatching(q, &keyRef); st != errSecSuccess {
-		return 0, keychainError("find private key", int(st))
-	}
-	return keyRef, nil
-}
-
-// securityBin is invoked by absolute path so a poisoned PATH cannot hijack it.
-const securityBin = "/usr/bin/security"
-
-// keychainSigner implements Signer using a macOS non-exportable Keychain key.
-type keychainSigner struct{}
-
-func init() { Register(keychainSigner{}) }
-
-// ProbeHardware reports the macOS Keychain backend backing this signer. The
-// keychain signer is compiled into every darwin build and needs no special
-// hardware, so it reports available whenever the Security tooling is present.
-// It performs no key access, so it never prompts. Implementing HardwareProber
-// is what lets `doctor` report the signer as present rather than treating the
-// (prober-less) signer as "no TEE signer in this build".
-func (keychainSigner) ProbeHardware(_ context.Context) (HardwareInfo, error) {
-	info := HardwareInfo{Backend: "keychain", VendorName: "macOS Keychain"}
-	// A missing security tool is a status (Available=false via Reason), not a
-	// probe error — so we deliberately return a nil error here.
-	if _, err := vfs.Stat(securityBin); err != nil {
-		info.Reason = securityBin + " not found"
-		return info, nil //nolint:nilerr // absence is reported via Reason, not as an error
-	}
-	info.Available = true
-	return info, nil
-}
-
-func (keychainSigner) EnsureKey(_ context.Context, ref KeyRef) (crypto.PublicKey, error) {
-	if md, err := readKeyMetadata(ref.Label); err == nil {
-		return decodePublicKey(md.PublicKey)
-	} else if !os.IsNotExist(err) {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-	return createKeychainKey(ref.Label)
-}
-
-func (keychainSigner) PublicKey(_ context.Context, ref KeyRef) (crypto.PublicKey, error) {
-	md, err := readKeyMetadata(ref.Label)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-	return decodePublicKey(md.PublicKey)
-}
-
-func (keychainSigner) Sign(_ context.Context, ref KeyRef, signingInput []byte) ([]byte, string, error) {
-	if err := loadFFI(); err != nil {
-		return nil, "", err
-	}
-	md, err := readKeyMetadata(ref.Label)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, "", err
-	}
-	appLabel, err := hex.DecodeString(md.AppLabel)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("keysigner: decode app label: %w", err)
-	}
-	if len(appLabel) == 0 {
-		// Guard the &appLabel[0] pointer below against corrupted metadata.
-		return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("keysigner: key metadata for %q has empty app label", ref.Label)
-	}
-	keychain, err := ensureKeychain()
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, "", err
-	}
-
-	keyRef, err := findPrivateKey(appLabel, keychain)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, "", err
-	}
-	defer cfRelease(keyRef)
-
-	digest := sha256.Sum256(signingInput)
-	digestData := cfBytes(digest[:])
-	defer cfRelease(digestData)
-
-	var errRef uintptr
-	sigRef := secKeyCreateSignature(keyRef, algRSAPKCS1SHA256, digestData, &errRef)
-	if sigRef == 0 {
-		code := 0
-		if errRef != 0 {
-			code = cfErrorGetCode(errRef)
-			cfRelease(errRef)
-		}
-		return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("keysigner: SecKeyCreateSignature failed (CFError %d)", code)
-	}
-	defer cfRelease(sigRef)
-
-	n := cfDataGetLength(sigRef)
-	bp := cfDataGetBytePtr(sigRef)
-	out := make([]byte, n)
-	copy(out, unsafe.Slice((*byte)(bp), n))
-	// RS256: the SecKey PKCS1v15-SHA256 signature is the JOSE signature as-is.
-	return out, AlgRS256, nil
-}
-
-// keyMetadata records the public key + the keychain application-label used to
-// locate the non-extractable private key.
-type keyMetadata struct {
-	PublicKey string `json:"public_key"` // PKIX DER, std base64 (see EncodePublicKey)
-	AppLabel  string `json:"app_label"`  // hex(sha1(PKCS1 public key))
-}
-
-func createKeychainKey(label string) (crypto.PublicKey, error) {
-	metadataPath, err := keyMetadataPath(label)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-
-	privateKey, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("keysigner: generate RSA key: %w", err)
-	}
-	appLabel := sha1.Sum(x509.MarshalPKCS1PublicKey(&privateKey.PublicKey))
-
-	pemFile, err := vfs.CreateTemp("", "lark-keysigner-*.pem")
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("keysigner: temp key file: %w", err)
-	}
-	pemPath := pemFile.Name()
-	defer vfs.Remove(pemPath)
-	if err := pemFile.Chmod(0600); err != nil {
-		pemFile.Close()
-		return nil, err
-	}
-	der := x509.MarshalPKCS1PrivateKey(privateKey)
-	if _, err := pemFile.WriteString("-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\n" +
-		base64Wrap(der) + "-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\n"); err != nil {
-		pemFile.Close()
-		return nil, err
-	}
-	if err := pemFile.Close(); err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-
-	executable, err := vfs.Executable()
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("keysigner: resolve executable: %w", err)
-	}
-	keychain, err := ensureKeychain()
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-	// -x: import as NON-EXTRACTABLE; the software copy (pemPath) is then removed.
-	importCmd := exec.Command(securityBin, "import", pemPath, "-k", keychain, "-t", "priv", "-f", "openssl", "-x", "-A", "-T", executable)
-	if out, err := importCmd.CombinedOutput(); err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("keysigner: import non-extractable key: %w: %s", err, summarizeCmdOutput(out))
-	}
-	if err := setKeychainKeyLabel(appLabel[:], keychain, label); err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-
-	encodedPub, err := EncodePublicKey(&privateKey.PublicKey)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-	if err := writeKeyMetadata(metadataPath, keyMetadata{PublicKey: encodedPub, AppLabel: hex.EncodeToString(appLabel[:])}); err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-	return &privateKey.PublicKey, nil
-}
-
-func setKeychainKeyLabel(appLabel []byte, keychain, label string) error {
-	if err := loadFFI(); err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	search, err := keychainSearchArray(keychain)
-	if err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	defer cfRelease(search)
-
-	labelData := cfBytes(appLabel)
-	defer cfRelease(labelData)
-
-	q := cfDictCreateMutable(0, 0, cbDictKey, cbDictValue)
-	if q == 0 {
-		return fmt.Errorf("keysigner: CFDictionaryCreateMutable(query) failed")
-	}
-	defer cfRelease(q)
-	cfDictSetValue(q, kSecClass, kSecClassKey)
-	cfDictSetValue(q, kSecAttrKeyClass, kSecAttrKeyClassPrivate)
-	cfDictSetValue(q, kSecAttrKeyType, kSecAttrKeyTypeRSA)
-	cfDictSetValue(q, kSecAttrApplicationLabel, labelData)
-	cfDictSetValue(q, kSecMatchSearchList, search)
-
-	cfLabel := cfStringCreate(0, cstr(label), cfStringEncodingUTF8)
-	if cfLabel == 0 {
-		return fmt.Errorf("keysigner: CFStringCreateWithCString failed")
-	}
-	defer cfRelease(cfLabel)
-	attrs := cfDictCreateMutable(0, 0, cbDictKey, cbDictValue)
-	if attrs == 0 {
-		return fmt.Errorf("keysigner: CFDictionaryCreateMutable(attrs) failed")
-	}
-	defer cfRelease(attrs)
-	cfDictSetValue(attrs, kSecAttrLabel, cfLabel)
-
-	if st := secItemUpdate(q, attrs); st != errSecSuccess {
-		return keychainError("set keychain key label", int(st))
-	}
-	return nil
-}
-
-func decodePublicKey(encoded string) (crypto.PublicKey, error) {
-	der, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(encoded)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("keysigner: decode public key: %w", err)
-	}
-	return x509.ParsePKIXPublicKey(der)
-}
-
-// base64Wrap PEM-wraps DER bytes at 64 columns.
-func base64Wrap(der []byte) string {
-	enc := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(der)
-	var b strings.Builder
-	for i := 0; i < len(enc); i += 64 {
-		end := i + 64
-		if end > len(enc) {
-			end = len(enc)
-		}
-		b.WriteString(enc[i:end])
-		b.WriteByte('\n')
-	}
-	return b.String()
-}
-
-func readKeyMetadata(label string) (*keyMetadata, error) {
-	path, err := keyMetadataPath(label)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-	data, err := vfs.ReadFile(path)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err // preserves os.ErrNotExist for EnsureKey
-	}
-	var md keyMetadata
-	if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &md); err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("keysigner: parse key metadata: %w", err)
-	}
-	return &md, nil
-}
-
-func writeKeyMetadata(path string, md keyMetadata) error {
-	if err := vfs.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(path), 0700); err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	data, err := json.MarshalIndent(md, "", "  ")
-	if err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	return vfs.WriteFile(path, data, 0600)
-}
-
-func ensureKeychain() (string, error) {
-	keychainPath, err := keychainFilePath()
-	if err != nil {
-		return "", err
-	}
-	password, err := keychainPassword()
-	if err != nil {
-		return "", err
-	}
-	if _, err := vfs.Stat(keychainPath); err != nil {
-		if !os.IsNotExist(err) {
-			return "", fmt.Errorf("keysigner: stat keychain: %w", err)
-		}
-		if err := vfs.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(keychainPath), 0700); err != nil {
-			return "", err
-		}
-		for _, args := range [][]string{
-			{"create-keychain", "-p", password, keychainPath},
-			{"set-keychain-settings", keychainPath},
-			{"unlock-keychain", "-p", password, keychainPath},
-		} {
-			if out, err := exec.Command(securityBin, args...).CombinedOutput(); err != nil {
-				return "", fmt.Errorf("keysigner: security %s: %w: %s", args[0], err, summarizeCmdOutput(out))
-			}
-		}
-	}
-	return keychainPath, nil
-}
-
-func keysignerDir() (string, error) {
-	configDir, err := os.UserConfigDir()
-	if err != nil {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("keysigner: resolve config dir: %w", err)
-	}
-	return filepath.Join(configDir, "lark-cli", "keysigner"), nil
-}
-
-func keychainFilePath() (string, error) {
-	dir, err := keysignerDir()
-	if err != nil {
-		return "", err
-	}
-	return filepath.Join(dir, "lark-cli.keychain"), nil
-}
-
-func keychainPassword() (string, error) {
-	dir, err := keysignerDir()
-	if err != nil {
-		return "", err
-	}
-	path := filepath.Join(dir, "keychain.pass")
-	if data, err := vfs.ReadFile(path); err == nil {
-		if pw := strings.TrimSpace(string(data)); pw != "" {
-			return pw, nil
-		}
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("keysigner: empty keychain password")
-	} else if !os.IsNotExist(err) {
-		return "", err
-	}
-	buf := make([]byte, 32)
-	if _, err := rand.Read(buf); err != nil {
-		return "", err
-	}
-	pw := hex.EncodeToString(buf)
-	if err := vfs.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(path), 0700); err != nil {
-		return "", err
-	}
-	if err := vfs.WriteFile(path, []byte(pw+"\n"), 0600); err != nil {
-		return "", err
-	}
-	return pw, nil
-}
-
-func keyMetadataPath(label string) (string, error) {
-	dir, err := keysignerDir()
-	if err != nil {
-		return "", err
-	}
-	id := sha256.Sum256([]byte(label))
-	return filepath.Join(dir, "keys", hex.EncodeToString(id[:])+".json"), nil
-}
-
-// summarizeCmdOutput bounds external command output before it is embedded in
-// an error: first line only, capped at 200 chars.
-func summarizeCmdOutput(out []byte) string {
-	s := strings.TrimSpace(string(out))
-	if i := strings.IndexByte(s, '\n'); i >= 0 {
-		s = strings.TrimSpace(s[:i])
-	}
-	const maxLen = 200
-	if len(s) > maxLen {
-		s = s[:maxLen] + "..."
-	}
-	return s
-}
-
-func keychainError(operation string, status int) error {
-	switch status {
-	case -25299:
-		return fmt.Errorf("keysigner: %s: key already exists", operation)
-	case -25300:
-		return fmt.Errorf("keysigner: %s: key not found", operation)
-	case -2:
-		return fmt.Errorf("keysigner: %s: allocation failed", operation)
-	default:
-		return fmt.Errorf("keysigner: %s: Security framework status %d", operation, status)
-	}
-}

internal/keysigner/signer_keychain_darwin_test.go

@@ -1,62 +0,0 @@
-//go:build darwin
-
-// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
-
-package keysigner
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"crypto"
-	"crypto/rsa"
-	"crypto/sha256"
-	"os"
-	"testing"
-)
-
-// TestKeychainSignerRegistered confirms the keychain_signer build self-registers
-// (init → Register), so keysigner.Active() is non-nil. No keychain access.
-func TestKeychainSignerRegistered(t *testing.T) {
-	if _, ok := Active().(keychainSigner); !ok {
-		t.Fatalf("Active() = %T, want keychainSigner (keychain_signer build must self-register)", Active())
-	}
-}
-
-// TestKeychainSignerRoundTrip creates a real non-extractable RSA key, signs, and
-// verifies RS256 against the returned public key. Gated by LARK_KEYCHAIN_IT
-// because it mutates the dedicated lark-cli keychain store. The signer is now
-// cgo-free (purego runtime FFI), so it runs with CGO_ENABLED=0. Run with:
-//
-//	LARK_KEYCHAIN_IT=1 go test -run RoundTrip ./internal/keysigner/
-func TestKeychainSignerRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
-	if os.Getenv("LARK_KEYCHAIN_IT") == "" {
-		t.Skip("set LARK_KEYCHAIN_IT=1 to run (mutates the macOS keychain)")
-	}
-	s := keychainSigner{}
-	ref := KeyRef{Label: "lark-cli-keychain-it"}
-
-	pub, err := s.EnsureKey(context.Background(), ref)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("EnsureKey: %v", err)
-	}
-	rsaPub, ok := pub.(*rsa.PublicKey)
-	if !ok {
-		t.Fatalf("public key = %T, want *rsa.PublicKey", pub)
-	}
-	if alg, err := AlgForKey(pub); err != nil || alg != AlgRS256 {
-		t.Fatalf("AlgForKey = %q, %v; want RS256", alg, err)
-	}
-
-	input := []byte("header.payload")
-	sig, alg, err := s.Sign(context.Background(), ref, input)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("Sign: %v", err)
-	}
-	if alg != AlgRS256 {
-		t.Errorf("Sign alg = %q, want RS256", alg)
-	}
-	h := sha256.Sum256(input)
-	if err := rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15(rsaPub, crypto.SHA256, h[:], sig); err != nil {
-		t.Errorf("RS256 signature did not verify: %v", err)
-	}
-}

internal/keysigner/signer_sks.go

@@ -1,135 +0,0 @@
-//go:build linux || (windows && amd64)
-
-// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
-
-// TPM 2.0 signer (compiled into every linux and windows/amd64 build, no build
-// tag required), backed by github.com/facebookincubator/sks.
-//
-// sks holds a non-exportable ECDSA P-256 key in the platform TPM and signs
-// SHA-256 digests. On Linux it talks to /dev/tpmrm0; on Windows it uses the
-// Microsoft Platform Crypto Provider (CNG). Both backends return an ASN.1 DER
-// ECDSA signature, which we convert to the fixed-width r||s form JWS requires for
-// ES256 (see ecdsaDERToJOSE). One key is created on the first private_key_jwt
-// registration (DefaultKeyLabel) and reused for subsequent app registrations and
-// every client_assertion on the same device.
-//
-// Excluded from windows/arm64: the sks Windows dependency stack (go-ole) has no
-// arm64 VARIANT and fails to compile, so windows/arm64 falls back to
-// client_secret only (keysigner.Active() is nil). On darwin the keychain signer
-// is used instead. CGO is never required.
-package keysigner
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"crypto"
-	"crypto/ecdsa"
-	"crypto/sha256"
-	"fmt"
-	"io"
-
-	"github.com/facebookincubator/flog"
-	"github.com/facebookincubator/sks"
-)
-
-// p256ByteLen is the P-256 coordinate width. sks regular keys are always ECDSA
-// P-256, so ES256 signatures are 2*p256ByteLen bytes of r||s.
-const p256ByteLen = 32
-
-// keyTag is the sks key tag. Both the Linux and Windows sks backends address
-// keys by label and ignore the tag, but the macOS backend uses it, so we set a
-// stable namespaced value for forward compatibility.
-const keyTag = "com.larksuite.cli"
-
-// sksSigner implements Signer (and HardwareProber) using a non-exportable
-// TPM 2.0 ECDSA key via sks.
-type sksSigner struct{}
-
-func init() {
-	Register(sksSigner{})
-	// This sks version logs verbose TPM-operation chatter to stderr via flog (a
-	// glog fork it owns exclusively) — e.g. "Loaded TPM device", "Found handle
-	// for key" on every sign. The CLI does not use flog, so silence it
-	// process-wide here; real failures are returned as errors, never relied upon
-	// from these logs. (Newer sks switched to slog, but that lands only on its
-	// go-1.24 line, which we avoid to keep the module on go 1.23.)
-	flog.SetOutput(io.Discard)
-}
-
-// EnsureKey returns the public key for ref, creating the TPM key if absent.
-// sks.NewKey is find-or-create: it returns the existing key when one is present.
-func (sksSigner) EnsureKey(_ context.Context, ref KeyRef) (crypto.PublicKey, error) {
-	key, err := sks.NewKey(ref.Label, keyTag, false, true, nil)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("keysigner: ensure TPM key %q: %w", ref.Label, err)
-	}
-	defer key.Close()
-	return ecdsaPublic(ref.Label, key.Public())
-}
-
-// PublicKey returns the public key for ref without creating it. FromLabelTag does
-// not touch the TPM until Public() loads the sealed key; a missing key yields a
-// nil public key, which we surface as an error — at runtime the key MUST already
-// exist (it was bound to the app at registration), so we never silently mint a
-// new, unbound one here.
-func (sksSigner) PublicKey(_ context.Context, ref KeyRef) (crypto.PublicKey, error) {
-	pub := sks.FromLabelTag(ref.Label).Public()
-	if pub == nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("keysigner: TPM key %q not found", ref.Label)
-	}
-	return ecdsaPublic(ref.Label, pub)
-}
-
-// Sign signs signingInput with the TPM key and returns a JOSE-format ES256
-// signature (fixed-width r||s) plus its alg.
-func (sksSigner) Sign(_ context.Context, ref KeyRef, signingInput []byte) ([]byte, string, error) {
-	key, err := sks.NewKey(ref.Label, keyTag, false, true, nil)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("keysigner: load TPM key %q: %w", ref.Label, err)
-	}
-	defer key.Close()
-
-	// ES256 signs the SHA-256 digest of the JWS signing input.
-	digest := sha256.Sum256(signingInput)
-	der, err := key.Sign(nil, digest[:], crypto.SHA256)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("keysigner: TPM sign with key %q: %w", ref.Label, err)
-	}
-	// Both sks backends emit ASN.1 DER; JWS ES256 requires fixed-width r||s
-	// (RFC 7518 §3.4).
-	rs, err := ecdsaDERToJOSE(der, p256ByteLen)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, "", err
-	}
-	return rs, AlgES256, nil
-}
-
-// ProbeHardware reports on the TPM backing this signer without touching any key.
-// A failure to reach the TPM (no device, permission denied, not TPM 2.0) is
-// reported as Available=false with Reason set, NOT as a Go error — the probe
-// still succeeded in determining that the TEE is currently unusable.
-func (sksSigner) ProbeHardware(_ context.Context) (HardwareInfo, error) {
-	info := HardwareInfo{Backend: "tpm2"}
-	data, err := sks.GetSecureHardwareVendorData()
-	if err != nil {
-		info.Reason = cleanProbeError(err)
-		return info, nil
-	}
-	info.VendorName = data.VendorName
-	info.VendorInfo = data.VendorInfo
-	info.Available = data.IsTPM20CompliantDevice
-	if !info.Available {
-		info.Reason = "secure hardware is not a TPM 2.0 compliant device"
-	}
-	return info, nil
-}
-
-// ecdsaPublic asserts that an sks public key is an ECDSA key (it always is for
-// regular sks keys) so the caller gets the concrete type AlgForKey/PublicKeyJWK expect.
-func ecdsaPublic(label string, pub crypto.PublicKey) (*ecdsa.PublicKey, error) {
-	ecPub, ok := pub.(*ecdsa.PublicKey)
-	if !ok {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("keysigner: TPM key %q public is %T, want *ecdsa.PublicKey", label, pub)
-	}
-	return ecPub, nil
-}

internal/keysigner/signer_sks_test.go

@@ -1,122 +0,0 @@
-//go:build linux || (windows && amd64)
-
-// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
-
-package keysigner
-
-import (
-	"bytes"
-	"context"
-	"crypto/ecdsa"
-	"crypto/sha256"
-	"io"
-	"math/big"
-	"strings"
-	"testing"
-
-	"github.com/facebookincubator/flog"
-	"github.com/facebookincubator/sks"
-)
-
-// TestFlogSilenced verifies the mechanism init() relies on to keep sks's flog
-// TPM chatter off the CLI's stderr: SetOutput redirects flog, and io.Discard
-// drops it. Cleanup restores io.Discard so init()'s silencing holds for the
-// rest of the package's tests.
-func TestFlogSilenced(t *testing.T) {
-	var buf bytes.Buffer
-	flog.SetOutput(&buf)
-	t.Cleanup(func() { flog.SetOutput(io.Discard) })
-
-	flog.Info("captured-line")
-	if !strings.Contains(buf.String(), "captured-line") {
-		t.Fatalf("flog.SetOutput(buffer) did not capture output: %q", buf.String())
-	}
-
-	flog.SetOutput(io.Discard)
-	buf.Reset()
-	flog.Info("should-be-discarded")
-	if buf.Len() != 0 {
-		t.Errorf("flog output not discarded: %q", buf.String())
-	}
-}
-
-// requireTEE skips the test unless the TPM is present and usable. On a Linux
-// machine with a TPM but a restrictive device owner (`/dev/tpmrm0` is `tss:tss`
-// by default), grant access with `sudo usermod -aG tss $USER` then re-login, or
-// run the test under sudo.
-func requireTEE(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Helper()
-	info, err := sksSigner{}.ProbeHardware(context.Background())
-	if err != nil || !info.Available {
-		reason := info.Reason
-		if err != nil {
-			reason = err.Error()
-		}
-		t.Skipf("TEE not available (%s)", reason)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestSKSSignerRoundTrip exercises the full registration→assertion contract
-// against the real TPM: create the key, read it back without creating, derive
-// the JWS alg + JWK, sign, and verify the fixed-width r||s output.
-func TestSKSSignerRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
-	requireTEE(t)
-
-	var s sksSigner
-	ctx := context.Background()
-	ref := KeyRef{Label: "larksuite-cli-test"}
-
-	// Best-effort cleanup so the test key does not linger in the TPM-sealed store.
-	t.Cleanup(func() {
-		if k, err := sks.NewKey(ref.Label, keyTag, false, true, nil); err == nil {
-			_ = k.Remove()
-			_ = k.Close()
-		}
-	})
-
-	pub, err := s.EnsureKey(ctx, ref)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("EnsureKey: %v", err)
-	}
-	ecPub, ok := pub.(*ecdsa.PublicKey)
-	if !ok {
-		t.Fatalf("EnsureKey returned %T, want *ecdsa.PublicKey", pub)
-	}
-
-	// PublicKey (no-create) must return the same key bound at EnsureKey.
-	pub2, err := s.PublicKey(ctx, ref)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("PublicKey: %v", err)
-	}
-	if !ecPub.Equal(pub2) {
-		t.Fatal("PublicKey returned a different key than EnsureKey")
-	}
-
-	// The JWT layer derives alg + JWK from the public key; both must work.
-	if alg, err := AlgForKey(pub); err != nil || alg != AlgES256 {
-		t.Fatalf("AlgForKey = %q, %v; want ES256", alg, err)
-	}
-	if _, err := PublicKeyJWK(pub); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("PublicKeyJWK: %v", err)
-	}
-
-	// Sign a representative JWS signing input and verify the converted r||s.
-	input := []byte("eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiJ9.eyJzdWIiOiJjbGkifQ")
-	sig, alg, err := s.Sign(ctx, ref, input)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("Sign: %v", err)
-	}
-	if alg != AlgES256 {
-		t.Fatalf("Sign alg = %q, want ES256", alg)
-	}
-	if len(sig) != 2*p256ByteLen {
-		t.Fatalf("len(sig) = %d, want %d (fixed-width r||s)", len(sig), 2*p256ByteLen)
-	}
-	digest := sha256.Sum256(input)
-	r := new(big.Int).SetBytes(sig[:p256ByteLen])
-	ss := new(big.Int).SetBytes(sig[p256ByteLen:])
-	if !ecdsa.Verify(ecPub, digest[:], r, ss) {
-		t.Fatal("TPM signature did not verify against the public key")
-	}
-}

internal/meta/normalize.go

@@ -113,7 +113,8 @@ type EnumOption struct {
 }
 
 // EnumOptions returns the field's allowed values paired with their descriptions
-// — from enum, or from options when enum is absent — coerced to the canonical
+// — from enum (with descriptions backfilled from options when the field carries
+// both forms), or from options when enum is absent — coerced to the canonical
 // type and ordered: numeric and boolean values are sorted; string values keep
 // source order (which can encode priority). Uncoercible literals are dropped.
 // Returns nil when the field declares no enum constraint.
@@ -122,9 +123,14 @@ func (f Field) EnumOptions() []EnumOption {
 	var out []EnumOption
 	switch {
 	case len(f.Enum) > 0:
+		// key by raw literal so enum "1" and option 1 align across JSON types
+		desc := make(map[string]string, len(f.Options))
+		for _, o := range f.Options {
+			desc[fmt.Sprintf("%v", o.Value)] = o.Description
+		}
 		for _, e := range f.Enum {
 			if v, ok := coerceLiteral(ct, e); ok {
-				out = append(out, EnumOption{Value: v})
+				out = append(out, EnumOption{Value: v, Description: desc[fmt.Sprintf("%v", e)]})
 			}
 		}
 	case len(f.Options) > 0:

internal/meta/normalize_test.go

@@ -80,6 +80,39 @@ func TestField_EnumOptions(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+func TestField_EnumOptions_BothEnumAndOptions(t *testing.T) {
+	// enum is the value set; descriptions backfilled from options, empty where absent
+	f := Field{Type: "string", Enum: []any{"1", "2", "3", "4", "6"}, Options: []Option{
+		{Value: "1", Description: "from"},
+		{Value: "2", Description: "to"},
+		{Value: "6", Description: "subject"},
+	}}
+	want := []EnumOption{
+		{Value: "1", Description: "from"},
+		{Value: "2", Description: "to"},
+		{Value: "3", Description: ""},
+		{Value: "4", Description: ""},
+		{Value: "6", Description: "subject"},
+	}
+	if got := f.EnumOptions(); !reflect.DeepEqual(got, want) {
+		t.Errorf("EnumOptions(enum+options) = %+v, want %+v", got, want)
+	}
+
+	// enum values stored as strings match option values stored as numbers
+	fi := Field{Type: "integer", Enum: []any{"10", "2", "1"}, Options: []Option{
+		{Value: 1, Description: "one"},
+		{Value: 2, Description: "two"},
+	}}
+	wantI := []EnumOption{
+		{Value: int64(1), Description: "one"},
+		{Value: int64(2), Description: "two"},
+		{Value: int64(10), Description: ""},
+	}
+	if got := fi.EnumOptions(); !reflect.DeepEqual(got, wantI) {
+		t.Errorf("EnumOptions(integer enum+options) = %+v, want %+v", got, wantI)
+	}
+}
+
 func TestField_Enum_NumberAndBoolean(t *testing.T) {
 	// number: string-stored floats coerced to float64 and numerically sorted
 	if got := (Field{Type: "number", Enum: []any{"2.5", "1.5", "10"}}).EnumValues(); !reflect.DeepEqual(got, []any{1.5, 2.5, float64(10)}) {