refactor(auth): make keysigner internal

Drop the sks_signer build tag, mirroring the darwin keychain signer: the
TPM signer now compiles into every linux and windows/amd64 build via
constraint //go:build linux || (windows && amd64) — no -tags needed.
windows/arm64 is arch-excluded (go-ole has no arm64 VARIANT) and falls
back to client_secret only.

- goreleaser: drop -tags=sks_signer; merge windows-arm64 into the windows
  build (amd64+arm64) since no tag is needed and arm64 is arch-excluded.
- build-pkg-pr-new.sh: remove tag logic.
- doctor: update the no-signer hint (signer ships by default on macOS,
  Linux, Windows/amd64).
- Switching from a custom tag to GOOS/GOARCH constraints also lets
  go mod tidy track sks/go-tpm/go-ole correctly.

.github/workflows/ci.yml

@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ on:
     branches: [main]
   pull_request:
     branches: [main]
-    types: [opened, synchronize, reopened, edited]
   workflow_dispatch:
 
 permissions:
@@ -71,7 +70,6 @@ jobs:
       - uses: actions/checkout@93cb6efe18208431cddfb8368fd83d5badbf9bfd # v5
         with:
           fetch-depth: 0
-          persist-credentials: false
       - uses: actions/setup-go@4a3601121dd01d1626a1e23e37211e3254c1c06c # v6
         with:
           go-version-file: go.mod
@@ -89,23 +87,6 @@ jobs:
       - name: Run errs/ lint guards (lintcheck)
         run: go run -C lint . --changed-from "$QUALITY_GATE_CHANGED_FROM" ..
 
-  script-test:
-    needs: fast-gate
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@93cb6efe18208431cddfb8368fd83d5badbf9bfd # v5
-        with:
-          fetch-depth: 0
-          persist-credentials: false
-      - uses: actions/setup-go@4a3601121dd01d1626a1e23e37211e3254c1c06c # v6
-        with:
-          go-version-file: go.mod
-      - uses: actions/setup-node@49933ea5288caeca8642d1e84afbd3f7d6820020 # v4
-        with:
-          node-version: '22'
-      - name: Run script tests
-        run: make script-test
-
   deterministic-gate:
     needs: fast-gate
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
@@ -128,28 +109,8 @@ jobs:
         env:
           QUALITY_GATE_CHANGED_FROM: ${{ github.event.pull_request.base.sha || github.event.before || 'origin/main' }}
         run: echo "QUALITY_GATE_CHANGED_FROM=$(bash scripts/resolve-changed-from.sh)" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
-      - name: Write public content metadata
-        if: ${{ github.event_name == 'pull_request' }}
-        env:
-          PR_TITLE: ${{ github.event.pull_request.title }}
-          PR_BODY: ${{ github.event.pull_request.body }}
-          PR_BRANCH: ${{ github.head_ref }}
-        run: |
-          mkdir -p .tmp/quality-gate
-          python3 - <<'PY'
-          import json
-          import os
-
-          with open(".tmp/quality-gate/public-content-metadata.json", "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:
-              json.dump({
-                  "title": os.environ.get("PR_TITLE", ""),
-                  "body": os.environ.get("PR_BODY", ""),
-                  "branch": os.environ.get("PR_BRANCH", ""),
-              }, f)
-              f.write("\n")
-          PY
       - name: Run CLI deterministic gate
-        run: PUBLIC_CONTENT_METADATA=.tmp/quality-gate/public-content-metadata.json make quality-gate
+        run: make quality-gate
       - name: Upload quality gate facts
         if: ${{ always() && github.event_name == 'pull_request' }}
         uses: actions/upload-artifact@ea165f8d65b6e75b540449e92b4886f43607fa02 # v4
@@ -259,7 +220,7 @@ jobs:
 
   # ── Layer 3: E2E Gate ──────────────────────────────────────────────
   e2e-dry-run:
-    needs: [unit-test, lint, script-test, deterministic-gate]
+    needs: [unit-test, lint, deterministic-gate]
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     steps:
       - uses: actions/checkout@93cb6efe18208431cddfb8368fd83d5badbf9bfd # v5
@@ -280,7 +241,7 @@ jobs:
         run: go test -v -count=1 -timeout=5m ./tests/cli_e2e/... -run 'DryRun|Regression'
 
   e2e-live:
-    needs: [unit-test, lint, script-test, deterministic-gate]
+    needs: [unit-test, lint, deterministic-gate]
     if: ${{ github.event_name != 'pull_request' || !github.event.pull_request.head.repo.fork }}
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     permissions:
@@ -372,7 +333,7 @@ jobs:
   # ── Results Gate (single required check for branch protection) ─────
   results:
     if: ${{ always() }}
-    needs: [fast-gate, unit-test, lint, script-test, deterministic-gate, coverage, deadcode, e2e-dry-run, e2e-live, security, license-header]
+    needs: [fast-gate, unit-test, lint, deterministic-gate, coverage, deadcode, e2e-dry-run, e2e-live, security, license-header]
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     steps:
       - name: Evaluate results
@@ -384,7 +345,6 @@ jobs:
           echo "| L1 | fast-gate | ${{ needs.fast-gate.result }} |" >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY
           echo "| L2 | unit-test | ${{ needs.unit-test.result }} |" >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY
           echo "| L2 | lint | ${{ needs.lint.result }} |" >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY
-          echo "| L2 | script-test | ${{ needs.script-test.result }} |" >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY
           echo "| L2 | deterministic-gate | ${{ needs.deterministic-gate.result }} |" >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY
           echo "| L2 | coverage | ${{ needs.coverage.result }} |" >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY
           echo "| L2 | deadcode | ${{ needs.deadcode.result }} |" >> $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY
@@ -401,7 +361,6 @@ jobs:
             "${{ needs.fast-gate.result }}" \
             "${{ needs.unit-test.result }}" \
             "${{ needs.lint.result }}" \
-            "${{ needs.script-test.result }}" \
             "${{ needs.deterministic-gate.result }}" \
             "${{ needs.coverage.result }}" \
             "${{ needs.deadcode.result }}" \

.github/workflows/comment-audit.yml

@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-name: Comment Audit
-
-on:
-  issue_comment:
-    types: [created, edited]
-  pull_request_review:
-    types: [submitted, edited]
-  pull_request_review_comment:
-    types: [created, edited]
-
-permissions:
-  contents: read
-
-jobs:
-  public-content-comment-audit:
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@93cb6efe18208431cddfb8368fd83d5badbf9bfd # v5
-        with:
-          persist-credentials: false
-      - uses: actions/setup-go@4a3601121dd01d1626a1e23e37211e3254c1c06c # v6
-        with:
-          go-version-file: go.mod
-      - name: Post-publication comment audit
-        run: |
-          mkdir -p .tmp/comment-audit
-          cp "$GITHUB_EVENT_PATH" .tmp/comment-audit/event.json
-          go run ./internal/qualitygate/cmd/comment-audit --event .tmp/comment-audit/event.json --kind "$GITHUB_EVENT_NAME"

.github/workflows/release.yml

@@ -9,7 +9,11 @@ permissions:
   contents: read
 
 jobs:
+  # All platforms (incl. darwin keychain_signer) are CGO-free and cross-compiled
+  # on a single ubuntu runner in one goreleaser run (one checksums.txt). The
+  # darwin signer's runtime FFI is validated separately by the signer-test job.
   goreleaser:
+    needs: signer-test-macos
     runs-on: ubuntu-22.04
     permissions:
       contents: write
@@ -34,6 +38,21 @@ jobs:
         env:
           GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
 
+  # Validate the macOS keychain signer on real hardware. The release binaries are
+  # cross-compiled on ubuntu (CGO-free purego FFI), so this is the only step that
+  # needs a Mac — and it gates the release rather than producing it.
+  signer-test-macos:
+    runs-on: macos-latest
+    permissions:
+      contents: read
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
+      - uses: actions/setup-go@40f1582b2485089dde7abd97c1529aa768e1baff # v5
+        with:
+          go-version: '1.23'
+      - name: Keychain signer round-trip (CGO-free purego FFI)
+        run: LARK_KEYCHAIN_IT=1 CGO_ENABLED=0 go test -tags keychain_signer -run Keychain -v ./internal/keysigner/
+
   publish-npm:
     needs: goreleaser
     runs-on: ubuntu-22.04

.github/workflows/semantic-review.yml

@@ -47,13 +47,10 @@ jobs:
               throw new Error(`ambiguous workflow_run pull request bindings: ${runPRs.length}`);
             }
             let prNumber = Number(runPRs[0]?.number || 0);
-            const eventBaseSha = runPRs[0]?.base?.sha || "";
+            let eventBaseSha = runPRs[0]?.base?.sha || "";
             const eventHeadSha = runPRs[0]?.head?.sha || "";
-            const targetHeadSha = run.head_sha;
+            const targetHeadSha = eventHeadSha || run.head_sha;
             if (!/^[a-f0-9]{40}$/i.test(targetHeadSha)) throw new Error("invalid PR head sha");
-            if (eventHeadSha && eventHeadSha.toLowerCase() !== targetHeadSha.toLowerCase()) {
-              core.notice("PR quality summary using workflow_run head_sha because workflow_run pull request head differs from the CI run head");
-            }
 
             const factsArtifactPattern = /^quality-gate-facts-([a-f0-9]{40})-([a-f0-9]{40})$/i;
             const { data: artifactData } = await github.rest.actions.listWorkflowRunArtifacts({
@@ -74,11 +71,11 @@ jobs:
               if (artifactHeadSha.toLowerCase() !== targetHeadSha.toLowerCase()) {
                 artifactError = "facts artifact head sha does not match verified PR head sha";
                 factsArtifactName = "";
+              } else if (eventBaseSha && parsedBaseSha.toLowerCase() !== eventBaseSha.toLowerCase()) {
+                artifactError = "facts artifact base sha does not match workflow_run pull request base sha";
+                factsArtifactName = "";
               } else {
                 artifactBaseSha = parsedBaseSha;
-                if (eventBaseSha && parsedBaseSha.toLowerCase() !== eventBaseSha.toLowerCase()) {
-                  core.notice("PR quality summary using facts artifact base because workflow_run pull request base differs from the CI facts artifact base");
-                }
               }
             }
             if (!prNumber) {
@@ -88,44 +85,31 @@ jobs:
                 commit_sha: targetHeadSha,
               });
               const candidatePRs = associatedPRs.filter((candidate) =>
+                candidate.state === "open" &&
                 candidate.base?.repo?.id === context.payload.repository.id &&
                 candidate.head?.sha === targetHeadSha
               );
-              const openCandidatePRs = candidatePRs.filter((candidate) => candidate.state === "open");
-              if (openCandidatePRs.length > 1) {
-                throw new Error(`ambiguous open PRs for workflow_run head ${targetHeadSha}: ${openCandidatePRs.length}`);
+              if (candidatePRs.length > 1) {
+                throw new Error(`ambiguous open PRs for workflow_run head ${targetHeadSha}: ${candidatePRs.length}`);
               }
-              if (openCandidatePRs.length === 1) {
-                prNumber = openCandidatePRs[0].number;
-              } else if (candidatePRs.length > 0) {
-                core.notice("PR quality summary skipped: workflow_run target PR is no longer open");
-                core.setOutput("stale", "true");
-                return;
+              if (candidatePRs.length === 1) {
+                prNumber = candidatePRs[0].number;
               }
             }
             if (!prNumber) {
               const candidatePRs = await github.paginate(github.rest.pulls.list, {
                 owner: context.repo.owner,
                 repo: context.repo.repo,
-                state: "all",
+                state: "open",
                 per_page: 100,
               }).then((prs) => prs.filter((candidate) =>
                 candidate.base?.repo?.id === context.payload.repository.id &&
                 candidate.head?.sha === targetHeadSha
               ));
-              const openCandidatePRs = candidatePRs.filter((candidate) => candidate.state === "open");
-              if (openCandidatePRs.length > 1) {
-                throw new Error(`ambiguous open PRs from pull list fallback for workflow_run head ${targetHeadSha}: ${openCandidatePRs.length}`);
-              }
-              if (openCandidatePRs.length === 1) {
-                prNumber = openCandidatePRs[0].number;
-              } else if (candidatePRs.length > 0) {
-                core.notice("PR quality summary skipped: workflow_run target PR is no longer open");
-                core.setOutput("stale", "true");
-                return;
-              } else {
+              if (candidatePRs.length !== 1) {
                 throw new Error(`expected one open PR from pull list fallback for workflow_run head ${targetHeadSha}, got ${candidatePRs.length}`);
               }
+              prNumber = candidatePRs[0].number;
             }
             if (!Number.isInteger(prNumber) || prNumber <= 0) throw new Error("missing pull request binding");
             const { data: pr } = await github.rest.pulls.get({
@@ -134,17 +118,12 @@ jobs:
               pull_number: prNumber,
             });
             if (pr.base.repo.id !== context.payload.repository.id) throw new Error("PR base repo mismatch");
-            if (pr.state !== "open") {
-              core.notice("PR quality summary skipped: workflow_run target PR is no longer open");
-              core.setOutput("stale", "true");
-              return;
-            }
             if (pr.head.sha !== targetHeadSha) {
               core.notice("PR quality summary skipped: workflow_run is stale for this PR head");
               core.setOutput("stale", "true");
               return;
             }
-            const baseSha = artifactBaseSha || eventBaseSha || pr.base.sha;
+            const baseSha = eventBaseSha || artifactBaseSha || pr.base.sha;
             if (!/^[a-f0-9]{40}$/i.test(baseSha)) throw new Error("invalid PR base sha");
             if ((eventBaseSha || artifactBaseSha) && pr.base.sha !== baseSha) {
               core.notice("PR quality summary skipped: workflow_run is stale for this PR base");
@@ -276,13 +255,10 @@ jobs:
               throw new Error(`ambiguous workflow_run pull request bindings: ${runPRs.length}`);
             }
             let prNumber = Number(runPRs[0]?.number || 0);
-            const eventBaseSha = runPRs[0]?.base?.sha || "";
+            let eventBaseSha = runPRs[0]?.base?.sha || "";
             const eventHeadSha = runPRs[0]?.head?.sha || "";
-            const targetHeadSha = run.head_sha;
+            const targetHeadSha = eventHeadSha || run.head_sha;
             if (!/^[a-f0-9]{40}$/i.test(targetHeadSha)) throw new Error("invalid PR head sha");
-            if (eventHeadSha && eventHeadSha.toLowerCase() !== targetHeadSha.toLowerCase()) {
-              core.notice("semantic review using workflow_run head_sha because workflow_run pull request head differs from the CI run head");
-            }
 
             const factsArtifactPattern = /^quality-gate-facts-([a-f0-9]{40})-([a-f0-9]{40})$/i;
             const { data: artifactData } = await github.rest.actions.listWorkflowRunArtifacts({
@@ -303,11 +279,11 @@ jobs:
               if (artifactHeadSha.toLowerCase() !== targetHeadSha.toLowerCase()) {
                 artifactError = "facts artifact head sha does not match verified PR head sha";
                 factsArtifactName = "";
+              } else if (eventBaseSha && parsedBaseSha.toLowerCase() !== eventBaseSha.toLowerCase()) {
+                artifactError = "facts artifact base sha does not match workflow_run pull request base sha";
+                factsArtifactName = "";
               } else {
                 artifactBaseSha = parsedBaseSha;
-                if (eventBaseSha && parsedBaseSha.toLowerCase() !== eventBaseSha.toLowerCase()) {
-                  core.notice("semantic review using facts artifact base because workflow_run pull request base differs from the CI facts artifact base");
-                }
               }
             }
             if (!prNumber) {
@@ -317,44 +293,31 @@ jobs:
                 commit_sha: targetHeadSha,
               });
               const candidatePRs = associatedPRs.filter((candidate) =>
+                candidate.state === "open" &&
                 candidate.base?.repo?.id === context.payload.repository.id &&
                 candidate.head?.sha === targetHeadSha
               );
-              const openCandidatePRs = candidatePRs.filter((candidate) => candidate.state === "open");
-              if (openCandidatePRs.length > 1) {
-                throw new Error(`ambiguous open PRs for workflow_run head ${targetHeadSha}: ${openCandidatePRs.length}`);
+              if (candidatePRs.length > 1) {
+                throw new Error(`ambiguous open PRs for workflow_run head ${targetHeadSha}: ${candidatePRs.length}`);
               }
-              if (openCandidatePRs.length === 1) {
-                prNumber = openCandidatePRs[0].number;
-              } else if (candidatePRs.length > 0) {
-                core.notice("semantic review skipped: workflow_run target PR is no longer open");
-                core.setOutput("stale", "true");
-                return;
+              if (candidatePRs.length === 1) {
+                prNumber = candidatePRs[0].number;
               }
             }
             if (!prNumber) {
               const candidatePRs = await github.paginate(github.rest.pulls.list, {
                 owner: context.repo.owner,
                 repo: context.repo.repo,
-                state: "all",
+                state: "open",
                 per_page: 100,
               }).then((prs) => prs.filter((candidate) =>
                 candidate.base?.repo?.id === context.payload.repository.id &&
                 candidate.head?.sha === targetHeadSha
               ));
-              const openCandidatePRs = candidatePRs.filter((candidate) => candidate.state === "open");
-              if (openCandidatePRs.length > 1) {
-                throw new Error(`ambiguous open PRs from pull list fallback for workflow_run head ${targetHeadSha}: ${openCandidatePRs.length}`);
-              }
-              if (openCandidatePRs.length === 1) {
-                prNumber = openCandidatePRs[0].number;
-              } else if (candidatePRs.length > 0) {
-                core.notice("semantic review skipped: workflow_run target PR is no longer open");
-                core.setOutput("stale", "true");
-                return;
-              } else {
+              if (candidatePRs.length !== 1) {
                 throw new Error(`expected one open PR from pull list fallback for workflow_run head ${targetHeadSha}, got ${candidatePRs.length}`);
               }
+              prNumber = candidatePRs[0].number;
             }
             if (!Number.isInteger(prNumber) || prNumber <= 0) throw new Error("missing pull request binding");
             const { data: pr } = await github.rest.pulls.get({
@@ -363,22 +326,12 @@ jobs:
               pull_number: prNumber,
             });
             if (pr.base.repo.id !== context.payload.repository.id) throw new Error("PR base repo mismatch");
-            if (pr.state !== "open") {
-              core.notice("semantic review skipped: workflow_run target PR is no longer open");
-              core.setOutput("stale", "true");
-              return;
-            }
-            if (!pr.head.repo) {
-              core.notice("semantic review skipped: workflow_run target PR head repository is unavailable");
-              core.setOutput("stale", "true");
-              return;
-            }
             if (pr.head.sha !== targetHeadSha) {
               core.notice("semantic review skipped: workflow_run is stale for this PR head");
               core.setOutput("stale", "true");
               return;
             }
-            const baseSha = artifactBaseSha || eventBaseSha || pr.base.sha;
+            const baseSha = eventBaseSha || artifactBaseSha || pr.base.sha;
             if (!/^[a-f0-9]{40}$/i.test(baseSha)) throw new Error("invalid PR base sha");
             if ((eventBaseSha || artifactBaseSha) && pr.base.sha !== baseSha) {
               core.notice("semantic review skipped: workflow_run is stale for this PR base");
@@ -430,10 +383,6 @@ jobs:
               repo: context.repo.repo,
               pull_number: pr,
             });
-            if (pull.state !== "open") {
-              core.notice("semantic review skipped infrastructure failure check: PR is no longer open");
-              return;
-            }
             if (pull.head.sha !== headSha) {
               core.notice("semantic review skipped infrastructure failure check: PR head changed");
               return;

.gitignore

@@ -7,11 +7,6 @@ bin/
 # Node
 node_modules/
 
-# Python (skill-bundled helper scripts)
-__pycache__/
-*.py[cod]
-*$py.class
-
 
 # OS
 .DS_Store
@@ -51,4 +46,3 @@ app.log
 cover*.out
 
 lark-env.sh
-/automations/

.goreleaser.yml

@@ -5,15 +5,53 @@ before:
     - python3 scripts/fetch_meta.py
 
 builds:
-  - binary: lark-cli
+  # Linux & Windows: pure-Go TPM 2.0 signer is compiled in by default (no build
+  # tag), cross-compiled with CGO disabled — the binaries ship the platform key
+  # signer for private_key_jwt. windows/arm64 is the one exception: the sks
+  # Windows dependency stack (go-ole) has no arm64 support, so the signer file is
+  # arch-excluded there and that binary falls back to client_secret only.
+  - id: linux
+    binary: lark-cli
+    main: .
     env:
       - CGO_ENABLED=0
+    flags:
+      - -trimpath
+    ldflags:
+      - -s -w -X github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/build.Version={{ .Version }} -X github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/build.Date={{ .Date }}
+    goos:
+      - linux
+    goarch:
+      - amd64
+      - arm64
+  - id: windows
+    binary: lark-cli
+    main: .
+    env:
+      - CGO_ENABLED=0
+    flags:
+      - -trimpath
+    ldflags:
+      - -s -w -X github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/build.Version={{ .Version }} -X github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/build.Date={{ .Date }}
+    goos:
+      - windows
+    goarch:
+      - amd64
+      - arm64
+  # macOS: the keychain signer calls Security.framework via runtime FFI (purego),
+  # so it is CGO-free, compiled into every darwin build (no build tag), and
+  # cross-compiles from the same ubuntu runner as linux/windows.
+  - id: darwin
+    binary: lark-cli
+    main: .
+    env:
+      - CGO_ENABLED=0
+    flags:
+      - -trimpath
     ldflags:
       - -s -w -X github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/build.Version={{ .Version }} -X github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/build.Date={{ .Date }}
     goos:
       - darwin
-      - linux
-      - windows
     goarch:
       - amd64
       - arm64
@@ -23,7 +61,7 @@ archives:
   - name_template: "lark-cli-{{ .Version }}-{{ .Os }}-{{ .Arch }}"
     format_overrides:
       - goos: windows
-        format: zip
+        formats: [zip]
     files:
       - README.md
       - LICENSE

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -2,71 +2,6 @@
 
 All notable changes to this project will be documented in this file.
 
-## [v1.0.59] - 2026-06-26
-
-### Features
-
-- **slides**: Add `+replace-pages` and `xml get` shortcuts, and expose the presentation URL (#1585)
-- **minutes**: Support speaker list and no-Lark speaker replace (#1594)
-- **calendar/vc/minutes**: Optimize and extend calendar, vc, minutes, and note shortcuts and skills (#1571)
-
-### Bug Fixes
-
-- **docs**: Hide docs `api-version` compat flag (#1580)
-
-## [v1.0.58] - 2026-06-25
-
-### Features
-
-- **sheets**: Typed table I/O and error contract, workbook import/export, and skill refresh (#1355)
-- **base**: Add Base URL and title resolve shortcuts (#1338)
-- **drive**: Add `+member-add` shortcut with wiki space member collection collaborator support (#1204)
-- **doc**: Support `create` title option (#1536)
-- **doc**: Add `im-markdown` output format for doc fetch (#1550)
-- **whiteboard**: Export whiteboard as SVG and update whiteboard via SVG (#1559)
-- **card**: Support `card.action.trigger` event with auto-fetched card content (#1528)
-- **task**: Add task event consumer (#1510)
-
-### Bug Fixes
-
-- **doc**: Prefix docs resource shortcuts (#1564)
-- **binding**: Skip unix mode audit on Windows (#1525)
-
-### Documentation
-
-- **approval**: Sync approval skill for meta API commands (#1499)
-- **doc**: Restore lark-doc style requirements (#1579)
-- **im**: Document `chat.nickname` get/update/delete (#1378)
-- **im**: Clarify audio message opus requirement (#1271)
-
-### Build
-
-- **ci**: Add public content safeguards and reduce false positives
-
-## [v1.0.57] - 2026-06-23
-
-### Features
-
-- **slides**: Add `+screenshot` to capture slide page images (or render a single `<slide>` XML snippet), returning the local file path instead of Base64 (#1358)
-- **base**: Support record comments (#1043)
-- **search**: Surface search API notices (#1413)
-
-### Bug Fixes
-
-- **mail**: Resolve folder/label filter once per `+triage list` call (#1512)
-- **meta**: Backfill enum value descriptions from options (#1541)
-- **cli**: Add missing CLI headers for git credential helper (#1539)
-
-### Documentation
-
-- **doc**: Refine rich block, path, and block ID guidance (#1508)
-- **mail**: Trim lark-mail skill context (#1527)
-- **drive**: Add permission governance workflow guidance (#1292)
-
-### Build
-
-- **ci**: Bind semantic review to workflow run head (#1551)
-
 ## [v1.0.56] - 2026-06-18
 
 ### Features
@@ -1277,9 +1212,6 @@ Bundled AI agent skills for intelligent assistance:
 - Bilingual documentation (English & Chinese).
 - CI/CD pipelines: linting, testing, coverage reporting, and automated releases.
 
-[v1.0.59]: https://github.com/larksuite/cli/releases/tag/v1.0.59
-[v1.0.58]: https://github.com/larksuite/cli/releases/tag/v1.0.58
-[v1.0.57]: https://github.com/larksuite/cli/releases/tag/v1.0.57
 [v1.0.56]: https://github.com/larksuite/cli/releases/tag/v1.0.56
 [v1.0.55]: https://github.com/larksuite/cli/releases/tag/v1.0.55
 [v1.0.54]: https://github.com/larksuite/cli/releases/tag/v1.0.54

Makefile

@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ QUALITY_GATE_DIR ?= .tmp/quality-gate
 QUALITY_GATE_MANIFEST_OUT ?= $(QUALITY_GATE_DIR)/command-manifest.json
 QUALITY_GATE_COMMAND_INDEX_OUT ?= $(QUALITY_GATE_DIR)/command-index.json
 QUALITY_GATE_FACTS_OUT ?= $(QUALITY_GATE_DIR)/facts.json
-PUBLIC_CONTENT_METADATA ?= $(QUALITY_GATE_DIR)/public-content-metadata.json
 LDFLAGS  := -s -w -X $(MODULE)/internal/build.Version=$(VERSION) -X $(MODULE)/internal/build.Date=$(DATE)
 PREFIX   ?= /usr/local
 
@@ -34,7 +33,11 @@ build: fetch_meta
 	go build -trimpath -ldflags "$(LDFLAGS)" -o $(BINARY) .
 
 vet: fetch_meta
-	go vet ./...
+	# -unsafeptr=false: the macOS keychain signer dereferences dylib data-symbol
+	# addresses from purego.Dlsym (uintptr->unsafe.Pointer over stable C memory) —
+	# safe FFI, but go vet's unsafeptr can't prove it and has no inline suppress.
+	# golangci-lint still runs full govet (honoring the //nolint:govet) in CI.
+	go vet -unsafeptr=false ./...
 
 # fmt-check fails when any file would be reformatted by gofmt. Keep this
 # in sync with the fast-gate "Check formatting" step in CI.
@@ -70,8 +73,7 @@ integration-test: build
 test: vet fmt-check script-test unit-test examples-build integration-test
 
 quality-gate: build
-	mkdir -p $(QUALITY_GATE_DIR) $(dir $(QUALITY_GATE_FACTS_OUT)) $(dir $(PUBLIC_CONTENT_METADATA))
-	test -f $(PUBLIC_CONTENT_METADATA) || printf '{}\n' > $(PUBLIC_CONTENT_METADATA)
+	mkdir -p $(QUALITY_GATE_DIR) $(dir $(QUALITY_GATE_FACTS_OUT))
 	LARKSUITE_CLI_REMOTE_META=off \
 	LARKSUITE_CLI_NO_UPDATE_NOTIFIER=1 \
 	LARKSUITE_CLI_NO_SKILLS_NOTIFIER=1 \
@@ -91,7 +93,6 @@ quality-gate: build
 		--changed-from $(QUALITY_GATE_CHANGED_FROM_RESOLVED) \
 		--manifest $(QUALITY_GATE_MANIFEST_OUT) \
 		--command-index $(QUALITY_GATE_COMMAND_INDEX_OUT) \
-		--public-content-metadata $(PUBLIC_CONTENT_METADATA) \
 		--facts-out $(QUALITY_GATE_FACTS_OUT)
 
 install: build

README.md

@@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ Prefixed with `+`, designed to be friendly for both humans and AI, with smart de
 ```bash
 lark-cli calendar +agenda
 lark-cli im +messages-send --chat-id "oc_xxx" --text "Hello"
-lark-cli docs +create --doc-format markdown --content $'<title>Weekly Report</title>\n# Progress\n- Completed feature X'
+lark-cli docs +create --api-version v2 --doc-format markdown --content $'<title>Weekly Report</title>\n# Progress\n- Completed feature X'
 ```
 
 Run `lark-cli <service> --help` to see all shortcut commands.

README.zh.md

@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ CLI 提供三种粒度的调用方式，覆盖从快速操作到完全自定义
 ```bash
 lark-cli calendar +agenda
 lark-cli im +messages-send --chat-id "oc_xxx" --text "Hello"
-lark-cli docs +create --doc-format markdown --content $'<title>周报</title>\n# 本周进展\n- 完成了 X 功能'
+lark-cli docs +create --api-version v2 --doc-format markdown --content $'<title>周报</title>\n# 本周进展\n- 完成了 X 功能'
 ```
 
 运行 `lark-cli <service> --help` 查看所有快捷命令。

cmd/auth/login.go

@@ -265,7 +265,7 @@ func authLoginRun(opts *LoginOptions) error {
 	if err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
-	authResp, err := larkauth.RequestDeviceAuthorization(httpClient, config.AppID, config.AppSecret, config.Brand, finalScope, f.IOStreams.ErrOut)
+	authResp, err := larkauth.RequestDeviceAuthorization(opts.Ctx, httpClient, larkauth.ClientAuthFromConfig(config), config.Brand, finalScope, f.IOStreams.ErrOut)
 	if err != nil {
 		return errs.NewAuthenticationError(errs.SubtypeUnknown, "device authorization failed: %v", err).WithCause(err)
 	}
@@ -325,7 +325,7 @@ func authLoginRun(opts *LoginOptions) error {
 
 	// Step 3: Poll for token
 	log(msg.WaitingAuth)
-	result := pollDeviceToken(opts.Ctx, httpClient, config.AppID, config.AppSecret, config.Brand,
+	result := pollDeviceToken(opts.Ctx, httpClient, larkauth.ClientAuthFromConfig(config), config.Brand,
 		authResp.DeviceCode, authResp.Interval, authResp.ExpiresIn, f.IOStreams.ErrOut)
 
 	if !result.OK {
@@ -415,7 +415,7 @@ func authLoginPollDeviceCode(opts *LoginOptions, config *core.CliConfig, msg *lo
 		fmt.Fprintln(f.IOStreams.ErrOut, msg.AgentTimeoutHint)
 	}
 	log(msg.WaitingAuth)
-	result := pollDeviceToken(opts.Ctx, httpClient, config.AppID, config.AppSecret, config.Brand,
+	result := pollDeviceToken(opts.Ctx, httpClient, larkauth.ClientAuthFromConfig(config), config.Brand,
 		opts.DeviceCode, 5, 600, f.IOStreams.ErrOut)
 
 	if !result.OK {

cmd/auth/login_test.go

@@ -847,7 +847,7 @@ func TestAuthLoginRun_DeviceCodeTokenNilCleansScopeCache(t *testing.T) {
 
 	original := pollDeviceToken
 	t.Cleanup(func() { pollDeviceToken = original })
-	pollDeviceToken = func(ctx context.Context, httpClient *http.Client, appId, appSecret string, brand core.LarkBrand, deviceCode string, interval, expiresIn int, errOut io.Writer) *larkauth.DeviceFlowResult {
+	pollDeviceToken = func(ctx context.Context, httpClient *http.Client, ca larkauth.ClientAuth, brand core.LarkBrand, deviceCode string, interval, expiresIn int, errOut io.Writer) *larkauth.DeviceFlowResult {
 		return &larkauth.DeviceFlowResult{OK: true, Token: nil}
 	}
 
@@ -886,7 +886,7 @@ func TestAuthLoginRun_JSONAbort_StdoutEventOnly_StderrEmpty(t *testing.T) {
 
 	original := pollDeviceToken
 	t.Cleanup(func() { pollDeviceToken = original })
-	pollDeviceToken = func(ctx context.Context, httpClient *http.Client, appId, appSecret string, brand core.LarkBrand, deviceCode string, interval, expiresIn int, errOut io.Writer) *larkauth.DeviceFlowResult {
+	pollDeviceToken = func(ctx context.Context, httpClient *http.Client, ca larkauth.ClientAuth, brand core.LarkBrand, deviceCode string, interval, expiresIn int, errOut io.Writer) *larkauth.DeviceFlowResult {
 		return &larkauth.DeviceFlowResult{OK: false, Message: "user denied"}
 	}
 

cmd/config/config_test.go

@@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ func TestSaveInitConfig_OmitLangPreservesPrior(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("seed config: %v", err)
 	}
 
-	if err := saveInitConfig("", existing, f, "cli_x", core.PlainSecret("s2"), core.BrandFeishu, ""); err != nil {
+	if err := saveInitConfig("", existing, f, "cli_x", core.PlainSecret("s2"), core.BrandFeishu, "", "", nil); err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("saveInitConfig (no --lang): %v", err)
 	}
 
@@ -206,6 +206,88 @@ func TestSaveInitConfig_OmitLangPreservesPrior(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+func TestKeyRefFromResult_PrivateKeyJWT(t *testing.T) {
+	ref := keyRefFromResult(&configInitResult{
+		AuthMethod: core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT,
+		KeyLabel:   "lark-cli-default",
+	})
+	if ref == nil {
+		t.Fatal("keyRefFromResult returned nil")
+	}
+	if ref.Source != "tee" || ref.ID != "lark-cli-default" {
+		t.Fatalf("key ref = %#v, want tee/lark-cli-default", ref)
+	}
+
+	if ref := keyRefFromResult(&configInitResult{AuthMethod: core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT}); ref != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("missing key label should not persist key ref, got %#v", ref)
+	}
+	if ref := keyRefFromResult(&configInitResult{AuthMethod: core.AuthMethodClientSecret, KeyLabel: "ignored"}); ref != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("client_secret should not persist key ref, got %#v", ref)
+	}
+	if ref := keyRefFromResult(nil); ref != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("nil result should not persist key ref, got %#v", ref)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSaveInitConfig_PrivateKeyJWTSingleAppPersistsSecretlessAuth(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
+	f, _, _, _ := cmdutil.TestFactory(t, nil)
+
+	keyRef := &core.SecretRef{Source: "tee", ID: "lark-cli-default"}
+	if err := saveInitConfig("", nil, f, "cli_pkjwt", core.SecretInput{}, core.BrandFeishu, "en_us", core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT, keyRef); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("saveInitConfig private_key_jwt single app: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	got, err := core.LoadMultiAppConfig()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("LoadMultiAppConfig: %v", err)
+	}
+	if len(got.Apps) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("apps len = %d, want 1", len(got.Apps))
+	}
+	app := got.Apps[0]
+	if app.AppId != "cli_pkjwt" {
+		t.Fatalf("AppId = %q, want cli_pkjwt", app.AppId)
+	}
+	if app.AuthMethod != core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT {
+		t.Fatalf("AuthMethod = %q, want private_key_jwt", app.AuthMethod)
+	}
+	if app.KeyRef == nil || app.KeyRef.Source != "tee" || app.KeyRef.ID != "lark-cli-default" {
+		t.Fatalf("KeyRef = %#v, want tee/lark-cli-default", app.KeyRef)
+	}
+	if app.AppSecret.Ref != nil || app.AppSecret.Plain != "" {
+		t.Fatalf("private_key_jwt config must stay secretless, AppSecret=%#v", app.AppSecret)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSaveInitConfig_PrivateKeyJWTProfilePersistsSecretlessAuth(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
+	f, _, _, _ := cmdutil.TestFactory(t, nil)
+
+	keyRef := &core.SecretRef{Source: "tee", ID: "lark-cli-default"}
+	if err := saveInitConfig("prod", &core.MultiAppConfig{}, f, "cli_pkjwt", core.SecretInput{}, core.BrandLark, "en_us", core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT, keyRef); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("saveInitConfig private_key_jwt profile: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	got, err := core.LoadMultiAppConfig()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("LoadMultiAppConfig: %v", err)
+	}
+	app := got.FindApp("prod")
+	if app == nil {
+		t.Fatalf("profile prod not saved: %#v", got.Apps)
+	}
+	if app.AuthMethod != core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT {
+		t.Fatalf("AuthMethod = %q, want private_key_jwt", app.AuthMethod)
+	}
+	if app.KeyRef == nil || app.KeyRef.Source != "tee" || app.KeyRef.ID != "lark-cli-default" {
+		t.Fatalf("KeyRef = %#v, want tee/lark-cli-default", app.KeyRef)
+	}
+	if app.AppSecret.Ref != nil || app.AppSecret.Plain != "" {
+		t.Fatalf("private_key_jwt profile must stay secretless, AppSecret=%#v", app.AppSecret)
+	}
+}
+
 // TestConfigInitCmd_InvalidLang verifies a non-empty --lang on config init is
 // strictly validated the same way bind validates: wrong-case / typo / removed
 // codes / hyphen form all exit with ExitValidation. (Empty is a no-op.)
@@ -388,7 +470,7 @@ func TestSaveAsProfile_RejectsProfileNameCollisionWithExistingAppID(t *testing.T
 		},
 	}
 
-	err := saveAsProfile(existing, keychain.KeychainAccess(&noopConfigKeychain{}), "cli_prod", "app-new", core.PlainSecret("new-secret"), core.BrandLark, "en")
+	err := saveAsProfile(existing, keychain.KeychainAccess(&noopConfigKeychain{}), "cli_prod", "app-new", core.PlainSecret("new-secret"), core.BrandLark, "en", "", nil)
 	if err == nil {
 		t.Fatal("expected conflict error")
 	}
@@ -427,6 +509,46 @@ func TestWrapSaveConfigError_PassesTypedValidationThrough(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+func TestSaveAsProfile_UpdatePersistsPrivateKeyJWT(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
+
+	existing := &core.MultiAppConfig{
+		Apps: []core.AppConfig{{
+			Name:      "prod",
+			AppId:     "cli_prod",
+			AppSecret: core.PlainSecret("old-secret"),
+			Brand:     core.BrandFeishu,
+			Users:     []core.AppUser{{UserOpenId: "ou_1", UserName: "User"}},
+		}},
+	}
+	keyRef := &core.SecretRef{Source: "tee", ID: "lark-cli-default"}
+
+	if err := saveAsProfile(existing, keychain.KeychainAccess(&noopConfigKeychain{}), "prod", "cli_prod", core.SecretInput{}, core.BrandLark, "en_us", core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT, keyRef); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("saveAsProfile update private_key_jwt: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	got, err := core.LoadMultiAppConfig()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("LoadMultiAppConfig: %v", err)
+	}
+	app := got.FindApp("prod")
+	if app == nil {
+		t.Fatalf("profile prod not saved: %#v", got.Apps)
+	}
+	if app.AuthMethod != core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT {
+		t.Fatalf("AuthMethod = %q, want private_key_jwt", app.AuthMethod)
+	}
+	if app.KeyRef == nil || app.KeyRef.Source != "tee" || app.KeyRef.ID != "lark-cli-default" {
+		t.Fatalf("KeyRef = %#v, want tee/lark-cli-default", app.KeyRef)
+	}
+	if app.AppSecret.Ref != nil || app.AppSecret.Plain != "" {
+		t.Fatalf("private_key_jwt update must stay secretless, AppSecret=%#v", app.AppSecret)
+	}
+	if len(app.Users) != 1 || app.Users[0].UserOpenId != "ou_1" {
+		t.Fatalf("same-app update should preserve users, Users=%#v", app.Users)
+	}
+}
+
 func TestUpdateExistingProfileWithoutSecret_RejectsAppIDChange(t *testing.T) {
 	multi := &core.MultiAppConfig{
 		CurrentApp: "prod",

cmd/config/init.go

@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ import (
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/i18n"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/keychain"
+	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/keysigner"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/output"
 )
 
@@ -31,6 +32,7 @@ type ConfigInitOptions struct {
 	AppSecretStdin bool   // read app-secret from stdin (avoids process list exposure)
 	Brand          string
 	New            bool
+	AuthMethod     string // --auth-method for --new: "" (default client_secret) | private_key_jwt
 
 	Lang         string // raw --lang (string for cobra); normalized to canonical/"" in validateInitLang
 	langExplicit bool   // true when --lang was explicitly passed
@@ -39,6 +41,8 @@ type ConfigInitOptions struct {
 
 	ProfileName string // when set, create/update a named profile instead of replacing Apps[0]
 
+	Restore bool // Restore re-registers the app already in config to recover a lost credential
+
 	// ForceInit overrides the agent-workspace guard. Without it, running
 	// init under OPENCLAW_HOME / HERMES_HOME refuses and points the caller
 	// at config bind — which is what AI agents almost always want. Manual
@@ -81,11 +85,13 @@ if the user explicitly wants a separate app inside the Agent workspace.`,
 	}
 
 	cmd.Flags().BoolVar(&opts.New, "new", false, "create a new app directly (skip mode selection)")
+	cmd.Flags().StringVar(&opts.AuthMethod, "auth-method", "", "auth method for --new: client_secret (default) or private_key_jwt (signed by a platform key, no app secret)")
 	cmd.Flags().StringVar(&opts.AppID, "app-id", "", "App ID (non-interactive)")
 	cmd.Flags().BoolVar(&opts.AppSecretStdin, "app-secret-stdin", false, "Read App Secret from stdin to avoid process list exposure")
 	cmd.Flags().StringVar(&opts.Brand, "brand", "feishu", "feishu or lark (non-interactive, default feishu)")
 	cmd.Flags().StringVar(&opts.Lang, "lang", "", "language preference (e.g. zh or zh_cn)")
 	cmd.Flags().StringVar(&opts.ProfileName, "name", "", "create or update a named profile (append instead of replace)")
+	cmd.Flags().BoolVar(&opts.Restore, "restore", false, "re-register the app already in config to recover a lost credential (keychain key / app secret); reuses the stored app ID and auth method")
 	cmd.Flags().BoolVar(&opts.ForceInit, "force-init", false, "allow init inside an Agent workspace (OPENCLAW_HOME / HERMES_HOME); use config bind instead unless you really want a separate app")
 	cmdutil.SetRisk(cmd, "write")
 
@@ -132,7 +138,7 @@ func guardAgentWorkspace(opts *ConfigInitOptions) error {
 
 // hasAnyNonInteractiveFlag returns true if any non-interactive flag is set.
 func (o *ConfigInitOptions) hasAnyNonInteractiveFlag() bool {
-	return o.New || o.AppID != "" || o.AppSecretStdin
+	return o.New || o.Restore || o.AppID != "" || o.AppSecretStdin
 }
 
 // cleanupOldConfig clears keychain entries (AppSecret + UAT) for all apps in existing config except the app whose AppId equals skipAppID.
@@ -151,11 +157,44 @@ func cleanupOldConfig(existing *core.MultiAppConfig, f *cmdutil.Factory, skipApp
 	}
 }
 
+// removeStaleSecretForPKJWT clears a secret left in the keychain when the SAME
+// appId is migrated from client_secret to private_key_jwt. cleanupOldConfig
+// explicitly skips a matching appId, and saveAsProfile only cleans up on an
+// appId change, so a same-appId migration would orphan the old secret. This
+// fills that gap. RemoveSecretStore only deletes Source=="keychain" entries, so
+// the new pkjwt tee key handle is never touched.
+func removeStaleSecretForPKJWT(existing *core.MultiAppConfig, profileName, appID string, kc keychain.KeychainAccess) {
+	if existing == nil {
+		return
+	}
+	var prior *core.AppConfig
+	if profileName != "" {
+		if idx := findProfileIndexByName(existing, profileName); idx >= 0 {
+			prior = &existing.Apps[idx]
+		}
+	} else {
+		prior = existing.CurrentAppConfig("")
+	}
+	if prior != nil && prior.AppId == appID && !prior.AppSecret.IsZero() {
+		core.RemoveSecretStore(prior.AppSecret, kc)
+	}
+}
+
+// keyRefFromResult builds the TEE key reference to persist for a private_key_jwt
+// registration result, or nil for client_secret.
+func keyRefFromResult(r *configInitResult) *core.SecretRef {
+	if r != nil && r.AuthMethod == core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT && r.KeyLabel != "" {
+		return &core.SecretRef{Source: "tee", ID: r.KeyLabel}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
 // saveAsOnlyApp overwrites config.json with a single-app config.
-func saveAsOnlyApp(appId string, secret core.SecretInput, brand core.LarkBrand, lang string) error {
+func saveAsOnlyApp(appId string, secret core.SecretInput, brand core.LarkBrand, lang, authMethod string, keyRef *core.SecretRef) error {
 	config := &core.MultiAppConfig{
 		Apps: []core.AppConfig{{
 			AppId: appId, AppSecret: secret, Brand: brand, Lang: i18n.Lang(lang), Users: []core.AppUser{},
+			AuthMethod: authMethod, KeyRef: keyRef,
 		}},
 	}
 	return core.SaveMultiAppConfig(config)
@@ -164,9 +203,11 @@ func saveAsOnlyApp(appId string, secret core.SecretInput, brand core.LarkBrand,
 // saveInitConfig saves a new/updated app config, respecting --profile mode.
 // With profileName: appends or updates the named profile (preserves other profiles).
 // Without profileName: cleans up old config and saves as the only app.
-func saveInitConfig(profileName string, existing *core.MultiAppConfig, f *cmdutil.Factory, appId string, secret core.SecretInput, brand core.LarkBrand, lang string) error {
+// authMethod/keyRef carry the credential type: ("", nil) for client_secret,
+// (private_key_jwt, &{tee,label}) for the secretless TEE flow.
+func saveInitConfig(profileName string, existing *core.MultiAppConfig, f *cmdutil.Factory, appId string, secret core.SecretInput, brand core.LarkBrand, lang, authMethod string, keyRef *core.SecretRef) error {
 	if profileName != "" {
-		return saveAsProfile(existing, f.Keychain, profileName, appId, secret, brand, lang)
+		return saveAsProfile(existing, f.Keychain, profileName, appId, secret, brand, lang, authMethod, keyRef)
 	}
 	cleanupOldConfig(existing, f, appId)
 	var prior i18n.Lang
@@ -175,7 +216,7 @@ func saveInitConfig(profileName string, existing *core.MultiAppConfig, f *cmduti
 			prior = app.Lang
 		}
 	}
-	return saveAsOnlyApp(appId, secret, brand, string(preferredLang(i18n.Lang(lang), prior)))
+	return saveAsOnlyApp(appId, secret, brand, string(preferredLang(i18n.Lang(lang), prior)), authMethod, keyRef)
 }
 
 // wrapSaveConfigError passes an already-typed error (e.g. the --name conflict
@@ -195,7 +236,7 @@ func wrapSaveConfigError(err error) error {
 // saveAsProfile appends or updates a named profile in the config.
 // If a profile with the same name exists, it updates it; otherwise appends.
 // When updating, cleans up old keychain secrets if AppId changed.
-func saveAsProfile(existing *core.MultiAppConfig, kc keychain.KeychainAccess, profileName, appId string, secret core.SecretInput, brand core.LarkBrand, lang string) error {
+func saveAsProfile(existing *core.MultiAppConfig, kc keychain.KeychainAccess, profileName, appId string, secret core.SecretInput, brand core.LarkBrand, lang, authMethod string, keyRef *core.SecretRef) error {
 	multi := existing
 	if multi == nil {
 		multi = &core.MultiAppConfig{}
@@ -214,6 +255,8 @@ func saveAsProfile(existing *core.MultiAppConfig, kc keychain.KeychainAccess, pr
 		multi.Apps[idx].AppSecret = secret
 		multi.Apps[idx].Brand = brand
 		multi.Apps[idx].Lang = preferredLang(i18n.Lang(lang), multi.Apps[idx].Lang)
+		multi.Apps[idx].AuthMethod = authMethod
+		multi.Apps[idx].KeyRef = keyRef
 	} else {
 		if findAppIndexByAppID(multi, profileName) >= 0 {
 			return errs.NewValidationError(errs.SubtypeInvalidArgument,
@@ -222,12 +265,14 @@ func saveAsProfile(existing *core.MultiAppConfig, kc keychain.KeychainAccess, pr
 		}
 		// Append new profile
 		multi.Apps = append(multi.Apps, core.AppConfig{
-			Name:      profileName,
-			AppId:     appId,
-			AppSecret: secret,
-			Brand:     brand,
-			Lang:      i18n.Lang(lang),
-			Users:     []core.AppUser{},
+			Name:       profileName,
+			AppId:      appId,
+			AppSecret:  secret,
+			Brand:      brand,
+			Lang:       i18n.Lang(lang),
+			Users:      []core.AppUser{},
+			AuthMethod: authMethod,
+			KeyRef:     keyRef,
 		})
 	}
 	return core.SaveMultiAppConfig(multi)
@@ -305,6 +350,94 @@ func updateExistingProfileWithoutSecret(existing *core.MultiAppConfig, profileNa
 	return core.SaveMultiAppConfig(existing)
 }
 
+// persistAndProbeResult saves a registration/restore result into profileName and
+// runs the post-registration probe. profileName == "" replaces the single app
+// (legacy); a named profile is updated in place. Shared by --new and --restore.
+func persistAndProbeResult(opts *ConfigInitOptions, f *cmdutil.Factory, profileName string, result *configInitResult) error {
+	existing, _ := core.LoadMultiAppConfig()
+
+	// private_key_jwt apps have no secret: persist auth method + TEE key ref.
+	// Registration success already validated the key (server bound the public
+	// key), so the app_secret probe is skipped.
+	if result.AuthMethod == core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT {
+		if err := saveInitConfig(profileName, existing, f, result.AppID, core.SecretInput{}, result.Brand, opts.Lang, result.AuthMethod, keyRefFromResult(result)); err != nil {
+			return wrapSaveConfigError(err)
+		}
+		removeStaleSecretForPKJWT(existing, profileName, result.AppID, f.Keychain)
+		printLangPreferenceConfirmation(opts)
+		output.PrintJson(f.IOStreams.Out, map[string]interface{}{"appId": result.AppID, "authMethod": result.AuthMethod, "brand": result.Brand})
+		return runProbePKJWT(opts.Ctx, f, result.Brand, result.AppID, keysigner.Active(), result.KeyLabel)
+	}
+
+	secret, err := core.ForStorage(result.AppID, core.PlainSecret(result.AppSecret), f.Keychain)
+	if err != nil {
+		return errs.NewInternalError(errs.SubtypeSDKError, "%v", err).WithCause(err)
+	}
+	if err := saveInitConfig(profileName, existing, f, result.AppID, secret, result.Brand, opts.Lang, "", nil); err != nil {
+		return wrapSaveConfigError(err)
+	}
+	printLangPreferenceConfirmation(opts)
+	output.PrintJson(f.IOStreams.Out, map[string]interface{}{"appId": result.AppID, "appSecret": "****", "brand": result.Brand})
+	return runProbe(opts.Ctx, f, result.AppID, result.AppSecret, result.Brand)
+}
+
+// runRestoreFlow re-registers the app already in config to recover a lost
+// credential (deleted keychain key / lost app secret). It reads the existing
+// app id + auth method + brand from config (no secret needed — that's the lost
+// part) and re-runs the device-flow registration with the app id sent on begin,
+// so the server re-registers that app instead of creating a new one. The
+// re-issued credential is written back to the same profile.
+func runRestoreFlow(opts *ConfigInitOptions, existing *core.MultiAppConfig, f *cmdutil.Factory, msg *initMsg) error {
+	if existing == nil {
+		return errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeNotConfigured, "nothing to restore: no config found").
+			WithHint("run: lark-cli config init")
+	}
+	app := existing.CurrentAppConfig(opts.ProfileName)
+	if app == nil || app.AppId == "" {
+		return errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeNotConfigured, "nothing to restore: no app id in config%s", profileSuffix(opts.ProfileName)).
+			WithHint("run: lark-cli config init")
+	}
+
+	restoreAppID := app.AppId
+	// Reuse the stored auth method authoritatively — never prompt. Empty on disk
+	// means client_secret (omitempty back-compat); pass it explicitly so
+	// resolveRegisterAuthMethod doesn't fall through to the interactive picker.
+	authMethod := app.AuthMethod
+	if authMethod == "" {
+		authMethod = core.AuthMethodClientSecret
+	}
+	result, err := runCreateAppFlow(opts.Ctx, f, app.Brand, authMethod, msg, restoreAppID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if result == nil {
+		return errs.NewInternalError(errs.SubtypeSDKError, "app restore returned no result")
+	}
+
+	// Safety: if the server did not honor app_id (e.g. not yet supported), it may
+	// have created a NEW app instead of restoring. Warn so the user is not silently
+	// switched to a different app id.
+	if result.AppID != restoreAppID {
+		fmt.Fprintf(f.IOStreams.ErrOut, "[lark-cli] [WARN] restore: server returned app %s, expected %s — it may have created a new app instead of restoring\n", result.AppID, restoreAppID)
+	}
+
+	// Write back to the profile we restored: an explicit --name, else the resolved
+	// app's own name. Empty name => legacy single-app replace.
+	saveProfile := opts.ProfileName
+	if saveProfile == "" {
+		saveProfile = app.Name
+	}
+	return persistAndProbeResult(opts, f, saveProfile, result)
+}
+
+// profileSuffix renders " (profile %q)" for error messages, or "" when unnamed.
+func profileSuffix(profileName string) string {
+	if profileName == "" {
+		return ""
+	}
+	return fmt.Sprintf(" (profile %q)", profileName)
+}
+
 func configInitRun(opts *ConfigInitOptions) error {
 	f := opts.Factory
 
@@ -335,6 +468,17 @@ func configInitRun(opts *ConfigInitOptions) error {
 		}
 	}
 
+	// --restore recovers an existing app; it is incompatible with creating a new
+	// app (--new) or importing one non-interactively (--app-id / stdin secret).
+	if opts.Restore {
+		if opts.New {
+			return errs.NewValidationError(errs.SubtypeInvalidArgument, "--restore cannot be combined with --new").WithParam("--restore")
+		}
+		if opts.AppID != "" || opts.AppSecretStdin {
+			return errs.NewValidationError(errs.SubtypeInvalidArgument, "--restore cannot be combined with --app-id / --app-secret-stdin").WithParam("--restore")
+		}
+	}
+
 	// Mode 1: Non-interactive
 	if opts.AppID != "" && opts.appSecret != "" {
 		brand := parseBrand(opts.Brand)
@@ -342,7 +486,7 @@ func configInitRun(opts *ConfigInitOptions) error {
 		if err != nil {
 			return errs.NewInternalError(errs.SubtypeSDKError, "%v", err).WithCause(err)
 		}
-		if err := saveInitConfig(opts.ProfileName, existing, f, opts.AppID, secret, brand, opts.Lang); err != nil {
+		if err := saveInitConfig(opts.ProfileName, existing, f, opts.AppID, secret, brand, opts.Lang, "", nil); err != nil {
 			return wrapSaveConfigError(err)
 		}
 		output.PrintSuccess(f.IOStreams.ErrOut, fmt.Sprintf("Configuration saved to %s", core.GetConfigPath()))
@@ -368,34 +512,26 @@ func configInitRun(opts *ConfigInitOptions) error {
 
 	msg := getInitMsg(opts.UILang)
 
+	// Mode: Restore (--restore) — re-register the app already in config.
+	if opts.Restore {
+		return runRestoreFlow(opts, existing, f, msg)
+	}
+
 	// Mode 3: Create new app directly (--new)
 	if opts.New {
-		result, err := runCreateAppFlow(opts.Ctx, f, parseBrand(opts.Brand), msg)
+		result, err := runCreateAppFlow(opts.Ctx, f, parseBrand(opts.Brand), opts.AuthMethod, msg, "")
 		if err != nil {
 			return err
 		}
 		if result == nil {
 			return errs.NewInternalError(errs.SubtypeSDKError, "app creation returned no result")
 		}
-		existing, _ := core.LoadMultiAppConfig()
-		secret, err := core.ForStorage(result.AppID, core.PlainSecret(result.AppSecret), f.Keychain)
-		if err != nil {
-			return errs.NewInternalError(errs.SubtypeSDKError, "%v", err).WithCause(err)
-		}
-		if err := saveInitConfig(opts.ProfileName, existing, f, result.AppID, secret, result.Brand, opts.Lang); err != nil {
-			return wrapSaveConfigError(err)
-		}
-		printLangPreferenceConfirmation(opts)
-		output.PrintJson(f.IOStreams.Out, map[string]interface{}{"appId": result.AppID, "appSecret": "****", "brand": result.Brand})
-		if err := runProbe(opts.Ctx, f, result.AppID, result.AppSecret, result.Brand); err != nil {
-			return err
-		}
-		return nil
+		return persistAndProbeResult(opts, f, opts.ProfileName, result)
 	}
 
 	// Mode 4: Interactive TUI (terminal)
 	if !opts.hasAnyNonInteractiveFlag() && f.IOStreams.IsTerminal {
-		result, err := runInteractiveConfigInit(opts.Ctx, f, msg)
+		result, err := runInteractiveConfigInit(opts.Ctx, f, opts.AuthMethod, msg)
 		if err != nil {
 			return err
 		}
@@ -406,13 +542,22 @@ func configInitRun(opts *ConfigInitOptions) error {
 
 		existing, _ := core.LoadMultiAppConfig()
 
-		if result.AppSecret != "" {
+		if result.AuthMethod == core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT {
+			// Secretless create: persist auth method + TEE key ref, no secret.
+			if err := saveInitConfig(opts.ProfileName, existing, f, result.AppID, core.SecretInput{}, result.Brand, opts.Lang, result.AuthMethod, keyRefFromResult(result)); err != nil {
+				return wrapSaveConfigError(err)
+			}
+			removeStaleSecretForPKJWT(existing, opts.ProfileName, result.AppID, f.Keychain)
+			if err := runProbePKJWT(opts.Ctx, f, result.Brand, result.AppID, keysigner.Active(), result.KeyLabel); err != nil {
+				return err
+			}
+		} else if result.AppSecret != "" {
 			// New secret provided (either from "create" or "existing" with input)
 			secret, err := core.ForStorage(result.AppID, core.PlainSecret(result.AppSecret), f.Keychain)
 			if err != nil {
 				return errs.NewInternalError(errs.SubtypeSDKError, "%v", err).WithCause(err)
 			}
-			if err := saveInitConfig(opts.ProfileName, existing, f, result.AppID, secret, result.Brand, opts.Lang); err != nil {
+			if err := saveInitConfig(opts.ProfileName, existing, f, result.AppID, secret, result.Brand, opts.Lang, "", nil); err != nil {
 				return wrapSaveConfigError(err)
 			}
 		} else if result.Mode == "existing" && result.AppID != "" {
@@ -517,7 +662,7 @@ func configInitRun(opts *ConfigInitOptions) error {
 	if err != nil {
 		return errs.NewInternalError(errs.SubtypeSDKError, "%v", err).WithCause(err)
 	}
-	if err := saveInitConfig(opts.ProfileName, existing, f, resolvedAppId, storedSecret, parseBrand(resolvedBrand), opts.Lang); err != nil {
+	if err := saveInitConfig(opts.ProfileName, existing, f, resolvedAppId, storedSecret, parseBrand(resolvedBrand), opts.Lang, "", nil); err != nil {
 		return wrapSaveConfigError(err)
 	}
 	output.PrintSuccess(f.IOStreams.ErrOut, fmt.Sprintf("Configuration saved to %s", core.GetConfigPath()))

cmd/config/init_auth_method_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package config
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"crypto"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/cmdutil"
+	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
+	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/keysigner"
+)
+
+type authMethodTestSigner struct{}
+
+func (authMethodTestSigner) EnsureKey(context.Context, keysigner.KeyRef) (crypto.PublicKey, error) {
+	return nil, nil
+}
+
+func (authMethodTestSigner) PublicKey(context.Context, keysigner.KeyRef) (crypto.PublicKey, error) {
+	return nil, nil
+}
+
+func (authMethodTestSigner) Sign(context.Context, keysigner.KeyRef, []byte) ([]byte, string, error) {
+	return nil, "", nil
+}
+
+// TestResolveRegisterAuthMethod covers the non-interactive gating paths. The
+// darwin keychain signer is compiled into every build, so the test cannot rely
+// on the binary lacking a signer — it forces a known no-signer state for the
+// rejection cases, then registers a stub for the success case.
+func TestResolveRegisterAuthMethod(t *testing.T) {
+	f := &cmdutil.Factory{}
+
+	prevSigner := keysigner.Active()
+	t.Cleanup(func() { keysigner.Register(prevSigner) })
+	keysigner.Register(nil)
+
+	if m, err := resolveRegisterAuthMethod(f, core.AuthMethodClientSecret); err != nil || m != core.AuthMethodClientSecret {
+		t.Errorf("client_secret: got (%q, %v), want (client_secret, nil)", m, err)
+	}
+
+	if m, err := resolveRegisterAuthMethod(f, ""); err != nil || m != core.AuthMethodClientSecret {
+		t.Errorf("default: got (%q, %v), want (client_secret, nil)", m, err)
+	}
+
+	if _, err := resolveRegisterAuthMethod(f, "bogus"); err == nil {
+		t.Error("bogus auth-method: expected error")
+	}
+
+	if _, err := resolveRegisterAuthMethod(f, core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT); err == nil {
+		t.Error("private_key_jwt without a signer: expected error")
+	}
+
+	keysigner.Register(authMethodTestSigner{})
+
+	if m, err := resolveRegisterAuthMethod(f, core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT); err != nil || m != core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT {
+		t.Errorf("private_key_jwt with signer: got (%q, %v), want (private_key_jwt, nil)", m, err)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestValidatePKJWTKeyBinding covers the guard that rejects a registration
+// resolving to private_key_jwt with no signing key bound (e.g. an existing
+// secret-based app was selected on the confirm page).
+func TestValidatePKJWTKeyBinding(t *testing.T) {
+	if err := validatePKJWTKeyBinding(core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT, ""); err == nil {
+		t.Error("pkjwt with empty keyLabel: expected error")
+	}
+	if err := validatePKJWTKeyBinding(core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT, "agent-key"); err != nil {
+		t.Errorf("pkjwt with keyLabel: expected nil, got %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := validatePKJWTKeyBinding(core.AuthMethodClientSecret, ""); err != nil {
+		t.Errorf("client_secret: expected nil, got %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestResolveFinalAuthMethod locks the authoritative-method logic. The 2nd case
+// is the real bug: we requested private_key_jwt but the server resolved to an
+// existing client_secret app — we must persist client_secret, not pkjwt.
+func TestResolveFinalAuthMethod(t *testing.T) {
+	if m := resolveFinalAuthMethod([]string{"client_secret", "private_key_jwt"}, core.AuthMethodClientSecret); m != core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT {
+		t.Errorf("prefers private_key_jwt: got %q", m)
+	}
+	if m := resolveFinalAuthMethod([]string{"client_secret"}, core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT); m != core.AuthMethodClientSecret {
+		t.Errorf("server client_secret must override requested pkjwt: got %q", m)
+	}
+	if m := resolveFinalAuthMethod(nil, core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT); m != core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT {
+		t.Errorf("fallback to requested when server is silent: got %q", m)
+	}
+	// Explicit empty slice (not just nil) also falls back to requested — the same
+	// len()==0 back-compat allowance the init guard relies on to let private_key_jwt
+	// proceed against an older server (see internal/auth
+	// TestRequestAppRegistrationInit_EmptySupportedAuthMethods).
+	if m := resolveFinalAuthMethod([]string{}, core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT); m != core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT {
+		t.Errorf("empty []string should fall back to requested private_key_jwt: got %q", m)
+	}
+	if m := resolveFinalAuthMethod(nil, ""); m != core.AuthMethodClientSecret {
+		t.Errorf("default to client_secret: got %q", m)
+	}
+}

cmd/config/init_interactive.go

@@ -5,7 +5,11 @@ package config
 
 import (
 	"context"
+	"errors"
 	"fmt"
+	"slices"
+	"strings"
+	"time"
 
 	"github.com/charmbracelet/huh"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/build"
@@ -13,22 +17,26 @@ import (
 
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/errs"
 	larkauth "github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/auth"
+	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/auth/jwt"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/cmdutil"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
+	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/keysigner"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/output"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/transport"
 )
 
 // configInitResult holds the result of the interactive config init flow.
 type configInitResult struct {
-	Mode      string // "create" or "existing"
-	Brand     core.LarkBrand
-	AppID     string
-	AppSecret string
+	Mode       string // "create" or "existing"
+	Brand      core.LarkBrand
+	AppID      string
+	AppSecret  string
+	AuthMethod string // "" == client_secret; core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT
+	KeyLabel   string // TEE key handle when AuthMethod == private_key_jwt
 }
 
 // runInteractiveConfigInit shows an interactive TUI for config init.
-func runInteractiveConfigInit(ctx context.Context, f *cmdutil.Factory, msg *initMsg) (*configInitResult, error) {
+func runInteractiveConfigInit(ctx context.Context, f *cmdutil.Factory, authMethodFlag string, msg *initMsg) (*configInitResult, error) {
 	// Phase 1: Choose mode
 	var mode string
 	form1 := huh.NewForm(
@@ -54,7 +62,7 @@ func runInteractiveConfigInit(ctx context.Context, f *cmdutil.Factory, msg *init
 		return runExistingAppForm(f, msg)
 	}
 
-	return runCreateAppFlow(ctx, f, "", msg)
+	return runCreateAppFlow(ctx, f, "", authMethodFlag, msg, "")
 }
 
 // runExistingAppForm shows a huh form for manually entering App ID / App Secret / Brand.
@@ -146,9 +154,59 @@ func runExistingAppForm(f *cmdutil.Factory, msg *initMsg) (*configInitResult, er
 	}, nil
 }
 
+// resolveRegisterAuthMethod decides the auth method for a new-app registration.
+// An explicit --auth-method flag wins; otherwise, on an interactive terminal with
+// a TEE signer available, the user is prompted; the default is client_secret.
+func resolveRegisterAuthMethod(f *cmdutil.Factory, flag string) (string, error) {
+	signerAvailable := keysigner.Active() != nil
+	switch flag {
+	case core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT:
+		if !signerAvailable {
+			return "", errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeInvalidClient,
+				"--auth-method private_key_jwt requires a platform key signer, which is unavailable on this device/build").
+				WithHint("omit --auth-method (or pass --auth-method client_secret) to register with an app secret")
+		}
+		return core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT, nil
+	case core.AuthMethodClientSecret:
+		return core.AuthMethodClientSecret, nil
+	case "":
+		// fall through to interactive / default
+	default:
+		return "", errs.NewValidationError(errs.SubtypeInvalidArgument,
+			"unknown --auth-method %q (use client_secret or private_key_jwt)", flag)
+	}
+
+	if signerAvailable && f.IOStreams.IsTerminal {
+		var choice string
+		form := huh.NewForm(
+			huh.NewGroup(
+				huh.NewSelect[string]().
+					Title("Authentication method").
+					Options(
+						huh.NewOption("App Secret (client_secret)", core.AuthMethodClientSecret),
+						huh.NewOption("Secure key signer, no secret (private_key_jwt)", core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT),
+					).
+					Value(&choice),
+			),
+		).WithTheme(cmdutil.ThemeFeishu())
+		if err := form.Run(); err != nil {
+			if errors.Is(err, huh.ErrUserAborted) {
+				return "", output.ErrBare(1)
+			}
+			return "", err
+		}
+		return choice, nil
+	}
+	return core.AuthMethodClientSecret, nil
+}
+
 // runCreateAppFlow runs the "create new app" flow via OpenClaw device flow.
 // If brandOverride is non-empty, skip the interactive brand selection.
-func runCreateAppFlow(ctx context.Context, f *cmdutil.Factory, brandOverride core.LarkBrand, msg *initMsg) (*configInitResult, error) {
+// authMethodFlag is the raw --auth-method value ("" when unset).
+// restoreAppID, when non-empty, is sent on the registration begin request so the
+// server re-registers that existing app (credential recovery) instead of creating
+// a new one. Empty preserves the normal new-app flow.
+func runCreateAppFlow(ctx context.Context, f *cmdutil.Factory, brandOverride core.LarkBrand, authMethodFlag string, msg *initMsg, restoreAppID string) (*configInitResult, error) {
 	var larkBrand core.LarkBrand
 	if brandOverride != "" {
 		larkBrand = brandOverride
@@ -176,11 +234,51 @@ func runCreateAppFlow(ctx context.Context, f *cmdutil.Factory, brandOverride cor
 		larkBrand = parseBrand(brand)
 	}
 
-	// Step 1: Request app registration (begin)
+	authMethod, err := resolveRegisterAuthMethod(f, authMethodFlag)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	// Step 1: Request app registration (begin).
 	// Use the shared proxy-plugin-aware transport so registration traffic is not
 	// a bypass of proxy plugin mode.
 	httpClient := transport.NewHTTPClient(0)
-	authResp, err := larkauth.RequestAppRegistration(httpClient, larkBrand, f.IOStreams.ErrOut)
+
+	// For private_key_jwt: init to obtain a nonce, then sign a TEE attestation
+	// (carrying the public key in its jwk header) to send with begin.
+	beginOpts := larkauth.AppRegistrationBeginOptions{}
+	keyLabel := ""
+	if authMethod == core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT {
+		signer := keysigner.Active() // non-nil, guaranteed by resolveRegisterAuthMethod
+		initResp, initErr := larkauth.RequestAppRegistrationInit(httpClient)
+		if initErr != nil {
+			return nil, errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeInvalidClient, "app registration init failed: %v", initErr).WithCause(initErr)
+		}
+		// An empty SupportedAuthMethods is intentionally treated as "older server /
+		// unknown": len()==0 makes this guard false, so the requested
+		// private_key_jwt proceeds. This mirrors resolveFinalAuthMethod's
+		// back-compat fallback to the requested method. Only an explicit list that
+		// omits private_key_jwt rejects here.
+		if len(initResp.SupportedAuthMethods) > 0 && !slices.Contains(initResp.SupportedAuthMethods, core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT) {
+			return nil, errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeInvalidClient,
+				"server does not support private_key_jwt for this app type (supported: %s)", strings.Join(initResp.SupportedAuthMethods, ", ")).
+				WithHint("register with --auth-method client_secret instead")
+		}
+		keyLabel = keysigner.DefaultKeyLabel
+		attestation, signErr := jwt.SignAttestation(ctx, signer, keysigner.KeyRef{Label: keyLabel}, initResp.Nonce, time.Now())
+		if signErr != nil {
+			return nil, errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeInvalidClient, "failed to sign registration attestation: %v", signErr).WithCause(signErr)
+		}
+		beginOpts = larkauth.AppRegistrationBeginOptions{
+			AuthMethod:      core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT,
+			AuthAttestation: attestation,
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Restore flow: re-register the existing app instead of creating a new one.
+	beginOpts.RestoreAppID = restoreAppID
+
+	authResp, err := larkauth.RequestAppRegistration(httpClient, larkBrand, beginOpts, f.IOStreams.ErrOut)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeInvalidClient, "app registration failed: %v", err).WithCause(err)
 	}
@@ -213,18 +311,28 @@ func runCreateAppFlow(ctx context.Context, f *cmdutil.Factory, brandOverride cor
 		return nil, errs.NewAuthenticationError(errs.SubtypeUnknown, "%v", err).WithCause(err)
 	}
 
-	// Step 4: Handle Lark brand special case
-	// If tenant_brand=lark and no client_secret, retry with lark brand endpoint
-	if result.ClientSecret == "" && result.UserInfo != nil && result.UserInfo.TenantBrand == "lark" {
-		// fmt.Fprintf(f.IOStreams.ErrOut, "%s\n", msg.DetectedLarkTenant)
+	// The final auth method is decided by the user/admin at confirmation and
+	// returned by poll — NOT necessarily what we requested. Selecting an existing
+	// client_secret app, for example, yields client_secret even though we sent
+	// private_key_jwt. Trust the result so we persist the truth.
+	finalMethod := resolveFinalAuthMethod(result.AuthMethods, authMethod)
+
+	// Lark brand special case (client_secret only): a lark-tenant app returns its
+	// secret only from the lark endpoint. private_key_jwt returns no secret, so
+	// this retry does not apply.
+	if finalMethod != core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT && result.ClientSecret == "" && result.UserInfo != nil && result.UserInfo.TenantBrand == "lark" {
 		result, err = larkauth.PollAppRegistration(ctx, httpClient, core.BrandLark, authResp.DeviceCode, authResp.Interval, authResp.ExpiresIn, f.IOStreams.ErrOut)
 		if err != nil {
 			return nil, errs.NewNetworkError(errs.SubtypeNetworkTransport, "lark endpoint retry failed: %v", err).WithCause(err)
 		}
+		finalMethod = resolveFinalAuthMethod(result.AuthMethods, authMethod)
 	}
 
-	if result.ClientID == "" || result.ClientSecret == "" {
-		return nil, errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeInvalidClient, "app registration succeeded but missing client_id or client_secret")
+	if result.ClientID == "" {
+		return nil, errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeInvalidClient, "app registration succeeded but missing client_id")
+	}
+	if finalMethod != core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT && result.ClientSecret == "" {
+		return nil, errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeInvalidClient, "app registration succeeded but missing client_secret")
 	}
 
 	// Determine final brand from response
@@ -235,13 +343,67 @@ func runCreateAppFlow(ctx context.Context, f *cmdutil.Factory, brandOverride cor
 		finalBrand = core.BrandFeishu
 	}
 
+	// Surface a downgrade: requested private_key_jwt but the app resolved to a
+	// secret-based method (e.g. an existing app was selected). The key was NOT
+	// bound, so we must store the secret method, not private_key_jwt.
+	if authMethod == core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT && finalMethod != core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT {
+		fmt.Fprintf(f.IOStreams.ErrOut, "[lark-cli] note: requested private_key_jwt, but the app uses %q (e.g. an existing app was selected); storing %q.\n", finalMethod, finalMethod)
+	}
+
 	fmt.Fprintln(f.IOStreams.ErrOut)
 	output.PrintSuccess(f.IOStreams.ErrOut, fmt.Sprintf(msg.AppCreated, result.ClientID))
 
+	keyToStore := ""
+	if finalMethod == core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT {
+		keyToStore = keyLabel
+	}
+	if err := validatePKJWTKeyBinding(finalMethod, keyToStore); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
 	return &configInitResult{
-		Mode:      "create",
-		Brand:     finalBrand,
-		AppID:     result.ClientID,
-		AppSecret: result.ClientSecret,
+		Mode:       "create",
+		Brand:      finalBrand,
+		AppID:      result.ClientID,
+		AppSecret:  result.ClientSecret, // empty for private_key_jwt; real secret otherwise
+		AuthMethod: finalMethod,
+		KeyLabel:   keyToStore,
 	}, nil
 }
+
+// validatePKJWTKeyBinding rejects a registration that resolved to
+// private_key_jwt without a signing key bound to it. keyLabel is non-empty only
+// when the local flow chose private_key_jwt and signed a TEE attestation; a
+// resolved method of private_key_jwt with no key handle would save an unusable
+// config (rejected later at config load, surfacing as "saved OK, fails on first
+// use"), so it is caught here at registration time instead.
+func validatePKJWTKeyBinding(finalMethod, keyLabel string) error {
+	if finalMethod == core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT && keyLabel == "" {
+		return errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeInvalidClient,
+			"registration resolved to private_key_jwt but no signing key was bound to this app (an existing secret-based app may have been selected)").
+			WithHint("re-register with: lark-cli config init --new --auth-method private_key_jwt")
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// resolveFinalAuthMethod picks the authoritative method from the poll result,
+// preferring private_key_jwt, then client_secret. It falls back to the requested
+// method when the server returns nothing (older servers).
+func resolveFinalAuthMethod(serverMethods []string, requested string) string {
+	if len(serverMethods) == 0 {
+		if requested == "" {
+			return core.AuthMethodClientSecret
+		}
+		return requested
+	}
+	for _, m := range serverMethods {
+		if m == core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT {
+			return core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT
+		}
+	}
+	for _, m := range serverMethods {
+		if m == core.AuthMethodClientSecret {
+			return core.AuthMethodClientSecret
+		}
+	}
+	return serverMethods[0]
+}

cmd/config/init_probe.go

@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ import (
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/cmdutil"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/credential"
+	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/keysigner"
 )
 
 // probeTimeout is the total wall-clock budget for the credential probe step
@@ -90,3 +91,32 @@ func runProbe(parent context.Context, factory *cmdutil.Factory, appID, appSecret
 	_, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, resp.Body)
 	return nil
 }
+
+// runProbePKJWT does a best-effort key-binding validation after a private_key_jwt
+// config is saved: it signs a client_assertion with the local platform key and
+// mints a token. A typed error (a deterministic server rejection — e.g. the key
+// is not bound to this app) is propagated so `config init` exits non-zero with
+// the canonical envelope; untyped errors (transport / HTTP / parse / timeout)
+// are swallowed (return nil). The mint itself is the probe — no second call.
+func runProbePKJWT(parent context.Context, factory *cmdutil.Factory, brand core.LarkBrand, clientID string, signer keysigner.Signer, keyLabel string) error {
+	if factory == nil || signer == nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+	httpClient, err := factory.HttpClient()
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(parent, probeTimeout)
+	defer cancel()
+
+	if _, err := credential.FetchTATWithAssertion(ctx, httpClient, brand, clientID, signer, keyLabel); err != nil {
+		// Typed = deterministic credential rejection → propagate. Untyped
+		// (transport / HTTP / parse / timeout) is ambiguous → stay silent.
+		if errs.IsTyped(err) {
+			return err
+		}
+		return nil
+	}
+	return nil
+}

cmd/config/init_probe_test.go

@@ -6,6 +6,11 @@ package config
 import (
 	"bytes"
 	"context"
+	"crypto"
+	"crypto/ecdsa"
+	"crypto/elliptic"
+	crand "crypto/rand"
+	"crypto/sha256"
 	"errors"
 	"io"
 	"net/http"
@@ -17,14 +22,17 @@ import (
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/build"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/cmdutil"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
+	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/keysigner"
 )
 
 // fakeRT routes requests to per-path handlers and records what it saw.
 type fakeRT struct {
 	tatHandler   func(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error)
 	probeHandler func(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error)
+	oauthHandler func(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error)
 	tatCalls     int
 	probeCalls   int
+	oauthCalls   int
 	probeReq     *http.Request
 	probeBody    string
 }
@@ -48,10 +56,50 @@ func (f *fakeRT) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
 			return jsonResp(200, `{"code":0,"data":{},"msg":"success"}`), nil
 		}
 		return f.probeHandler(req)
+	case strings.HasSuffix(req.URL.Path, "/authen/v2/oauth/token"):
+		f.oauthCalls++
+		if f.oauthHandler == nil {
+			return jsonResp(200, `{"access_token":"t-jwt"}`), nil
+		}
+		return f.oauthHandler(req)
 	}
 	return nil, errors.New("unexpected URL: " + req.URL.String())
 }
 
+// probeTestSigner is an in-memory real ECDSA P-256 signer used to sign the
+// client_assertion in runProbePKJWT tests (authMethodTestSigner returns a nil
+// key and cannot sign).
+type probeTestSigner struct{ key *ecdsa.PrivateKey }
+
+func newProbeTestSigner(t *testing.T) *probeTestSigner {
+	t.Helper()
+	k, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), crand.Reader)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	return &probeTestSigner{key: k}
+}
+
+func (p *probeTestSigner) EnsureKey(context.Context, keysigner.KeyRef) (crypto.PublicKey, error) {
+	return p.key.Public(), nil
+}
+
+func (p *probeTestSigner) PublicKey(context.Context, keysigner.KeyRef) (crypto.PublicKey, error) {
+	return p.key.Public(), nil
+}
+
+func (p *probeTestSigner) Sign(_ context.Context, _ keysigner.KeyRef, in []byte) ([]byte, string, error) {
+	h := sha256.Sum256(in)
+	r, s, err := ecdsa.Sign(crand.Reader, p.key, h[:])
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, "", err
+	}
+	sig := make([]byte, 64)
+	r.FillBytes(sig[:32])
+	s.FillBytes(sig[32:])
+	return sig, keysigner.AlgES256, nil
+}
+
 func jsonResp(code int, body string) *http.Response {
 	return &http.Response{
 		StatusCode: code,
@@ -285,3 +333,42 @@ func TestRunProbe_TimeoutHonored(t *testing.T) {
 	// must stay silent and not block.
 	assertSilent(t, err, errBuf)
 }
+
+// runProbePKJWT: a deterministic server rejection (invalid_client) is propagated
+// as a typed ConfigError so config init exits non-zero.
+func TestRunProbePKJWT_DeterministicReject_Propagates(t *testing.T) {
+	rt := &fakeRT{oauthHandler: func(*http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
+		return jsonResp(401, `{"error":"invalid_client","error_description":"unknown key"}`), nil
+	}}
+	f, errBuf := fakeFactory(t, rt)
+	err := runProbePKJWT(context.Background(), f, core.BrandFeishu, "cli_x", newProbeTestSigner(t), "agent-key")
+	if err == nil || !errs.IsTyped(err) {
+		t.Fatalf("expected propagated typed error, got %T %v", err, err)
+	}
+	if errBuf.Len() != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("runProbePKJWT must not write stderr, got %q", errBuf.String())
+	}
+}
+
+// runProbePKJWT: ambiguous upstream noise (HTTP 503) is swallowed — silent, exit 0.
+func TestRunProbePKJWT_Ambiguous_Silent(t *testing.T) {
+	rt := &fakeRT{oauthHandler: func(*http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
+		return jsonResp(503, `unavailable`), nil
+	}}
+	f, errBuf := fakeFactory(t, rt)
+	assertSilent(t, runProbePKJWT(context.Background(), f, core.BrandFeishu, "cli_x", newProbeTestSigner(t), "agent-key"), errBuf)
+}
+
+// runProbePKJWT: a successful mint returns nil.
+func TestRunProbePKJWT_Success_Silent(t *testing.T) {
+	rt := &fakeRT{} // default oauth handler returns 200 + access_token
+	f, errBuf := fakeFactory(t, rt)
+	assertSilent(t, runProbePKJWT(context.Background(), f, core.BrandFeishu, "cli_x", newProbeTestSigner(t), "agent-key"), errBuf)
+}
+
+// runProbePKJWT: a nil signer is a defensive no-op (should not be reached, must
+// not panic).
+func TestRunProbePKJWT_NilSigner_Silent(t *testing.T) {
+	f, errBuf := fakeFactory(t, &fakeRT{})
+	assertSilent(t, runProbePKJWT(context.Background(), f, core.BrandFeishu, "cli_x", nil, "k"), errBuf)
+}

cmd/config/init_test.go

@@ -10,9 +10,25 @@ import (
 
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/errs"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
+	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/keychain"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/output"
 )
 
+// TestRunRestoreFlow_NothingToRestore covers the early guards that return before
+// any network/registration call: no config at all, and a config whose resolved
+// app has no app id (nothing to send on begin).
+func TestRunRestoreFlow_NothingToRestore(t *testing.T) {
+	// No config on disk.
+	if err := runRestoreFlow(&ConfigInitOptions{}, nil, nil, nil); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected error when there is no config to restore")
+	}
+	// Config present but the resolved app has no app id.
+	existing := &core.MultiAppConfig{Apps: []core.AppConfig{{AppId: ""}}}
+	if err := runRestoreFlow(&ConfigInitOptions{}, existing, nil, nil); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected error when the resolved app has no app id")
+	}
+}
+
 // updateExistingProfileWithoutSecret guards four blank-input scenarios. Each
 // must surface as *ValidationError(SubtypeInvalidArgument) per RFC 6749 §5.2:
 // SubtypeInvalidClient is reserved for IAM rejection of malformed credentials,
@@ -119,3 +135,62 @@ func assertValidationParam(t *testing.T, err error, wantParam string) {
 		t.Errorf("Param = %q, want %q", valErr.Param, wantParam)
 	}
 }
+
+// countingKeychain is an in-memory KeychainAccess that records whether Remove
+// was invoked, so the stale-secret cleanup can be asserted without a real OS
+// keychain.
+type countingKeychain struct {
+	store        map[string]string
+	removeCalled bool
+}
+
+func newCountingKeychain() *countingKeychain {
+	return &countingKeychain{store: map[string]string{}}
+}
+
+func (k *countingKeychain) Get(service, account string) (string, error) {
+	v, ok := k.store[service+"/"+account]
+	if !ok {
+		return "", keychain.ErrNotFound
+	}
+	return v, nil
+}
+
+func (k *countingKeychain) Set(service, account, value string) error {
+	k.store[service+"/"+account] = value
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (k *countingKeychain) Remove(service, account string) error {
+	k.removeCalled = true
+	delete(k.store, service+"/"+account)
+	return nil
+}
+
+func TestRemoveStaleSecretForPKJWT_SameAppID(t *testing.T) {
+	kc := newCountingKeychain()
+	ref, err := core.ForStorage("cli_same", core.PlainSecret("old-secret"), kc) // → Source:"keychain"
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	existing := &core.MultiAppConfig{Apps: []core.AppConfig{{AppId: "cli_same", AppSecret: ref}}}
+	removeStaleSecretForPKJWT(existing, "", "cli_same", kc)
+	if !kc.removeCalled {
+		t.Error("same appId with keychain secret: expected kc.Remove to be invoked")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRemoveStaleSecretForPKJWT_DifferentAppID(t *testing.T) {
+	kc := newCountingKeychain()
+	ref, _ := core.ForStorage("cli_old", core.PlainSecret("old-secret"), kc)
+	kc.removeCalled = false // ForStorage does not call Remove, but reset to be safe
+	existing := &core.MultiAppConfig{Apps: []core.AppConfig{{AppId: "cli_old", AppSecret: ref}}}
+	removeStaleSecretForPKJWT(existing, "", "cli_new", kc)
+	if kc.removeCalled {
+		t.Error("different appId: must NOT remove")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRemoveStaleSecretForPKJWT_NilExisting(t *testing.T) {
+	removeStaleSecretForPKJWT(nil, "", "cli_x", newCountingKeychain()) // must not panic
+}

cmd/doctor/doctor.go

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import (
 	"context"
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
+	"io"
 	"net/http"
 	"os"
 	"sync"
@@ -19,6 +20,7 @@ import (
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/cmdutil"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/identitydiag"
+	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/keysigner"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/output"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/transport"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/update"
@@ -132,6 +134,9 @@ func doctorRun(opts *DoctorOptions) error {
 		checks = append(checks, fail("identity_ready", "no usable bot or user identity is available", "run: lark-cli auth status --verify"))
 	}
 
+	// ── 3b. private_key_jwt / TEE signer (local; runs even with --offline) ──
+	checks = append(checks, teeSignerCheck(opts.Ctx, cfg))
+
 	// ── 4 & 5. Endpoint reachability ──
 	checks = append(checks, networkChecks(opts.Ctx, opts, ep)...)
 
@@ -145,6 +150,54 @@ func identityCheck(name string, id identitydiag.Identity) checkResult {
 	return warn(name, id.Message, id.Hint)
 }
 
+const teeUnavailableHint = "ensure the device secure hardware is accessible (Linux TPM: add your user to the 'tss' group or run with sufficient privileges)"
+
+// teeSignerCheck reports the private_key_jwt signing backend (TEE/TPM) status.
+// The probe is local hardware only (no network), so it runs even with --offline;
+// in a build without a TEE signer it short-circuits without touching any
+// hardware. It is a hard requirement for private_key_jwt apps and purely
+// informational for client_secret apps.
+func teeSignerCheck(ctx context.Context, cfg *core.CliConfig) checkResult {
+	usesPKJWT := cfg != nil && cfg.AuthMethod == core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT
+	info, ok, err := keysigner.ProbeActiveHardware(ctx)
+	return teeCheckResult(info, ok, err, usesPKJWT)
+}
+
+// teeCheckResult maps a hardware probe to a doctor check. Split out from
+// teeSignerCheck so the full matrix is unit-testable without a TPM.
+func teeCheckResult(info keysigner.HardwareInfo, ok bool, probeErr error, usesPKJWT bool) checkResult {
+	const name = "tee_signer"
+
+	// No signer registered → private_key_jwt is unsupported on this build.
+	if !ok {
+		if usesPKJWT {
+			return fail(name,
+				"app uses private_key_jwt but this build has no TEE key signer",
+				"the platform key signer ships by default on macOS, Linux, and Windows/amd64; this platform (e.g. Windows/arm64) has none — use a supported platform or re-register with --auth-method client_secret")
+		}
+		return skip(name, "no TEE signer in this build (only private_key_jwt is affected; client_secret is unaffected)")
+	}
+
+	backend := info.Backend
+	if backend == "" {
+		backend = "tee"
+	}
+
+	switch {
+	case probeErr != nil:
+		return warn(name, fmt.Sprintf("%s signer present but probe errored: %s", backend, probeErr), "")
+	case info.Available:
+		if info.VendorName != "" {
+			return pass(name, fmt.Sprintf("%s TEE available (%s)", backend, info.VendorName))
+		}
+		return pass(name, fmt.Sprintf("%s TEE available", backend))
+	case usesPKJWT:
+		return fail(name, fmt.Sprintf("%s signer present but TEE unavailable: %s", backend, info.Reason), teeUnavailableHint)
+	default:
+		return warn(name, fmt.Sprintf("%s signer present but TEE unavailable: %s", backend, info.Reason), teeUnavailableHint)
+	}
+}
+
 // networkChecks probes Open API and MCP endpoints concurrently.
 func networkChecks(ctx context.Context, opts *DoctorOptions, ep core.Endpoints) []checkResult {
 	if opts.Offline {
@@ -234,14 +287,90 @@ func finishDoctor(f *cmdutil.Factory, checks []checkResult) error {
 		}
 	}
 
-	result := map[string]interface{}{
-		"ok":        allOK,
-		"workspace": core.CurrentWorkspace().Display(),
-		"checks":    checks,
+	workspace := core.CurrentWorkspace().Display()
+	// A terminal on STDOUT gets a readable report; pipes, redirects, scripts and
+	// tests keep the stable JSON contract (NO_COLOR disables ANSI styling).
+	// StdoutIsTerminal checks stdout specifically — IOStreams.IsTerminal reflects
+	// stdin, which would wrongly send the human report into `doctor | jq`.
+	if f.IOStreams.StdoutIsTerminal() {
+		renderDoctorHuman(f.IOStreams.Out, workspace, checks, allOK, os.Getenv("NO_COLOR") == "")
+	} else {
+		output.PrintJson(f.IOStreams.Out, map[string]interface{}{
+			"ok":        allOK,
+			"workspace": workspace,
+			"checks":    checks,
+		})
 	}
-	output.PrintJson(f.IOStreams.Out, result)
 	if !allOK {
 		return output.ErrBare(1)
 	}
 	return nil
 }
+
+// renderDoctorHuman writes a readable health report: one aligned line per check
+// with a colored status tag, an indented hint when present, and a summary line.
+func renderDoctorHuman(w io.Writer, workspace string, checks []checkResult, allOK, color bool) {
+	const (
+		green  = "\033[32m"
+		yellow = "\033[33m"
+		red    = "\033[31m"
+		gray   = "\033[90m"
+		bold   = "\033[1m"
+		reset  = "\033[0m"
+	)
+	colorOf := map[string]string{"pass": green, "warn": yellow, "fail": red, "skip": gray}
+	tagOf := map[string]string{"pass": "PASS", "warn": "WARN", "fail": "FAIL", "skip": "SKIP"}
+	paint := func(code, s string) string {
+		if !color || code == "" {
+			return s
+		}
+		return code + s + reset
+	}
+
+	nameW := 0
+	for _, c := range checks {
+		if len(c.Name) > nameW {
+			nameW = len(c.Name)
+		}
+	}
+
+	fmt.Fprintf(w, "\n%s  (workspace: %s)\n\n", paint(bold, "lark-cli doctor"), workspace)
+
+	var passN, warnN, failN, skipN int
+	for _, c := range checks {
+		tag := tagOf[c.Status]
+		if tag == "" {
+			tag = "????"
+		}
+		fmt.Fprintf(w, "  %s  %-*s  %s\n", paint(colorOf[c.Status], "["+tag+"]"), nameW, c.Name, c.Message)
+		if c.Hint != "" {
+			fmt.Fprintf(w, "         %-*s  %s\n", nameW, "", paint(gray, "↳ "+c.Hint))
+		}
+		switch c.Status {
+		case "pass":
+			passN++
+		case "warn":
+			warnN++
+		case "fail":
+			failN++
+		case "skip":
+			skipN++
+		}
+	}
+
+	headline := paint(green, "healthy")
+	if !allOK {
+		headline = paint(red, "problems found")
+	}
+	fmt.Fprintf(w, "\n  %s — %d passed", headline, passN)
+	if warnN > 0 {
+		fmt.Fprintf(w, ", %d warning(s)", warnN)
+	}
+	if failN > 0 {
+		fmt.Fprintf(w, ", %d failed", failN)
+	}
+	if skipN > 0 {
+		fmt.Fprintf(w, ", %d skipped", skipN)
+	}
+	fmt.Fprintln(w)
+}

cmd/doctor/doctor_test.go

@@ -4,14 +4,18 @@
 package doctor
 
 import (
+	"bytes"
 	"context"
 	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"strings"
 	"testing"
 
 	"github.com/spf13/cobra"
 
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/cmdutil"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
+	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/keysigner"
 )
 
 func TestNewCmdDoctor_FlagParsing(t *testing.T) {
@@ -139,6 +143,107 @@ func TestDoctorRun_SplitsBotAndMissingUserIdentity(t *testing.T) {
 	assertCheck(t, got.Checks, "identity_ready", "pass")
 }
 
+func TestTeeCheckResult(t *testing.T) {
+	avail := keysigner.HardwareInfo{Backend: "tpm2", Available: true, VendorName: "ACME"}
+	unavail := keysigner.HardwareInfo{Backend: "tpm2", Reason: "open /dev/tpmrm0: permission denied"}
+
+	cases := []struct {
+		name     string
+		info     keysigner.HardwareInfo
+		ok       bool
+		probeErr error
+		pkjwt    bool
+		want     string
+	}{
+		{"no signer + private_key_jwt → fail", keysigner.HardwareInfo{}, false, nil, true, "fail"},
+		{"no signer + client_secret → skip", keysigner.HardwareInfo{}, false, nil, false, "skip"},
+		{"available + private_key_jwt → pass", avail, true, nil, true, "pass"},
+		{"available + client_secret → pass", avail, true, nil, false, "pass"},
+		{"unavailable + private_key_jwt → fail", unavail, true, nil, true, "fail"},
+		{"unavailable + client_secret → warn", unavail, true, nil, false, "warn"},
+		{"probe error → warn", keysigner.HardwareInfo{Backend: "tpm2"}, true, errors.New("boom"), true, "warn"},
+	}
+	for _, tc := range cases {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			got := teeCheckResult(tc.info, tc.ok, tc.probeErr, tc.pkjwt)
+			if got.Name != "tee_signer" {
+				t.Errorf("name = %q, want tee_signer", got.Name)
+			}
+			if got.Status != tc.want {
+				t.Errorf("status = %q, want %q (msg=%q)", got.Status, tc.want, got.Message)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// TestDoctorRun_TeeSignerWired proves the tee_signer check is part of doctorRun.
+// It asserts the build-independent invariant (a client_secret app must never
+// FAIL on TEE) so the test passes whether or not a signer is compiled in.
+func TestDoctorRun_TeeSignerWired(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
+	if err := core.SaveMultiAppConfig(&core.MultiAppConfig{
+		CurrentApp: "default",
+		Apps: []core.AppConfig{{
+			Name: "default", AppId: "test-app",
+			AppSecret: core.PlainSecret("secret"), Brand: core.BrandFeishu,
+		}},
+	}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("SaveMultiAppConfig() error = %v", err)
+	}
+	f, stdout, _, _ := cmdutil.TestFactory(t, &core.CliConfig{
+		AppID: "test-app", AppSecret: "secret", Brand: core.BrandFeishu,
+	})
+	if err := doctorRun(&DoctorOptions{Factory: f, Ctx: context.Background(), Offline: true}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("doctorRun() error = %v", err)
+	}
+	var got struct {
+		Checks []checkResult `json:"checks"`
+	}
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(stdout.Bytes(), &got); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("json.Unmarshal() error = %v", err)
+	}
+	var c *checkResult
+	for i := range got.Checks {
+		if got.Checks[i].Name == "tee_signer" {
+			c = &got.Checks[i]
+		}
+	}
+	if c == nil {
+		t.Fatalf("tee_signer check not present in doctor output: %#v", got.Checks)
+	}
+	if c.Status == "fail" {
+		t.Errorf("tee_signer = fail for a client_secret app; want skip/warn/pass (msg=%q)", c.Message)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRenderDoctorHuman(t *testing.T) {
+	var buf bytes.Buffer
+	checks := []checkResult{
+		pass("cli_version", "1.0.50"),
+		warn("tee_signer", "tpm2 signer present but TEE unavailable", "add your user to the 'tss' group"),
+		fail("identity_ready", "no usable identity", "run: lark-cli auth status --verify"),
+		skip("endpoint_open", "skipped (--offline)"),
+	}
+	renderDoctorHuman(&buf, "local", checks, false, false)
+	out := buf.String()
+
+	for _, want := range []string{
+		"lark-cli doctor", "workspace: local",
+		"[PASS]", "cli_version", "1.0.50",
+		"[WARN]", "tee_signer", "↳ add your user to the 'tss' group",
+		"[FAIL]", "identity_ready", "↳ run: lark-cli auth status --verify",
+		"[SKIP]", "endpoint_open",
+		"problems found", "1 passed", "1 warning(s)", "1 failed", "1 skipped",
+	} {
+		if !strings.Contains(out, want) {
+			t.Errorf("output missing %q\n---\n%s", want, out)
+		}
+	}
+	if strings.Contains(out, "\033[") {
+		t.Errorf("color=false but ANSI escapes present:\n%s", out)
+	}
+}
+
 func assertCheck(t *testing.T, checks []checkResult, name, status string) {
 	t.Helper()
 	for _, check := range checks {

cmd/event/list_test.go

@@ -26,7 +26,6 @@ func TestRunList_TextOutput(t *testing.T) {
 		"KEY", "AUTH", "PARAMS", "DESCRIPTION",
 		"im.message.receive_v1",
 		"im.message.message_read_v1",
-		"task.task.update_user_access_v2",
 	} {
 		if !strings.Contains(out, want) {
 			t.Errorf("list output missing %q; full output:\n%s", want, out)
@@ -56,17 +55,4 @@ func TestRunList_JSONOutput(t *testing.T) {
 			}
 		}
 	}
-
-	var foundTask bool
-	for _, row := range rows {
-		if row["key"] == "task.task.update_user_access_v2" {
-			foundTask = true
-			if row["single_consumer"] != true {
-				t.Errorf("task row single_consumer = %v, want true", row["single_consumer"])
-			}
-		}
-	}
-	if !foundTask {
-		t.Fatal("event list JSON missing task.task.update_user_access_v2")
-	}
 }

cmd/event/schema_test.go

@@ -96,34 +96,6 @@ func TestRunSchema_JSONOutput(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-func TestRunSchema_TaskUpdateUserAccessJSON(t *testing.T) {
-	f, stdout, _, _ := cmdutil.TestFactory(t, &core.CliConfig{AppID: "test"})
-
-	if err := runSchema(f, "task.task.update_user_access_v2", true); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("runSchema json: %v", err)
-	}
-
-	var payload map[string]interface{}
-	if err := json.Unmarshal(stdout.Bytes(), &payload); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("output is not valid JSON: %v\n%s", err, stdout.String())
-	}
-	if payload["jq_root_path"] != ".event" {
-		t.Errorf("jq_root_path = %v, want .event", payload["jq_root_path"])
-	}
-	if payload["single_consumer"] != true {
-		t.Errorf("single_consumer = %v, want true", payload["single_consumer"])
-	}
-	resolved := payload["resolved_output_schema"].(map[string]interface{})
-	props := resolved["properties"].(map[string]interface{})
-	eventProps := props["event"].(map[string]interface{})["properties"].(map[string]interface{})
-	if got := eventProps["task_guid"].(map[string]interface{})["format"]; got != "task_guid" {
-		t.Errorf("task_guid format = %v, want task_guid", got)
-	}
-	if _, ok := eventProps["event_types"].(map[string]interface{})["items"].(map[string]interface{})["enum"]; !ok {
-		t.Fatalf("event_types enum missing in schema: %#v", eventProps["event_types"])
-	}
-}
-
 func TestSchema_RendersSubscriptionKeyMarker(t *testing.T) {
 	const syntheticKey = "test.evt_sub"
 	t.Cleanup(func() { eventlib.UnregisterKeyForTest(syntheticKey) })

events/im/card_action.go

@@ -1,132 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
-
-package im
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"encoding/json"
-	"strings"
-
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/event"
-)
-
-// CardActionTriggerOutput is the flattened shape for card.action.trigger.
-type CardActionTriggerOutput struct {
-	Type        string `json:"type"                    desc:"Event type; always card.action.trigger"`
-	EventID     string `json:"event_id,omitempty"      desc:"Globally unique event ID"`
-	Timestamp   string `json:"timestamp,omitempty"     desc:"Event delivery time (ms timestamp string)" kind:"timestamp_ms"`
-	OperatorID  string `json:"operator_id,omitempty"   desc:"Operator open_id"                          kind:"open_id"`
-	MessageID   string `json:"message_id,omitempty"    desc:"Message ID of the card"                    kind:"message_id"`
-	ChatID      string `json:"chat_id,omitempty"       desc:"Chat ID"                                   kind:"chat_id"`
-	Host        string `json:"host,omitempty"          desc:"Host type: im_message / im_top_notice"`
-	Token       string `json:"token,omitempty"         desc:"Token for delay card update (valid 30 min, max 2 updates)"`
-	ActionTag   string `json:"action_tag,omitempty"    desc:"Triggered element type: button/select_static/input/checker/etc"`
-	ActionValue string `json:"action_value,omitempty"  desc:"Developer-defined action value as JSON string"`
-	ActionName  string `json:"action_name,omitempty"   desc:"Element name attribute"`
-	FormValue   string `json:"form_value,omitempty"    desc:"Form submission values as JSON string (only on form submit)"`
-	InputValue  string `json:"input_value,omitempty"   desc:"Input field value (only for input elements)"`
-	Option      string `json:"option,omitempty"        desc:"Selected option value (for single-select dropdown)"`
-	Options     string `json:"options,omitempty"       desc:"Selected options, comma-separated (for multi-select)"`
-	Checked     bool   `json:"checked"                 desc:"Checkbox state (for checkbox elements)"`
-	Timezone    string `json:"timezone,omitempty"      desc:"User timezone for date/time picker interactions"`
-	CardContent string `json:"card_content,omitempty"  desc:"Original card JSON content (body.content) auto-fetched via message get API at consume time using message_id; empty if message_id absent or fetch fails"`
-}
-
-func processCardAction(ctx context.Context, rt event.APIClient, raw *event.RawEvent, _ map[string]string) (json.RawMessage, error) {
-	var envelope struct {
-		Header struct {
-			EventID    string `json:"event_id"`
-			EventType  string `json:"event_type"`
-			CreateTime string `json:"create_time"`
-		} `json:"header"`
-		Event struct {
-			Operator struct {
-				OpenID string `json:"open_id"`
-			} `json:"operator"`
-			Token  string `json:"token"`
-			Host   string `json:"host"`
-			Action struct {
-				Tag        string                 `json:"tag"`
-				Value      map[string]interface{} `json:"value"`
-				Name       string                 `json:"name"`
-				FormValue  map[string]interface{} `json:"form_value"`
-				InputValue string                 `json:"input_value"`
-				Option     string                 `json:"option"`
-				Options    []string               `json:"options"`
-				Checked    bool                   `json:"checked"`
-				Timezone   string                 `json:"timezone"`
-			} `json:"action"`
-			Context struct {
-				OpenMessageID string `json:"open_message_id"`
-				OpenChatID    string `json:"open_chat_id"`
-			} `json:"context"`
-		} `json:"event"`
-	}
-	if err := json.Unmarshal(raw.Payload, &envelope); err != nil {
-		return raw.Payload, nil //nolint:nilerr // passthrough on malformed payload
-	}
-
-	actionValue := marshalToString(envelope.Event.Action.Value)
-	formValue := marshalToString(envelope.Event.Action.FormValue)
-	options := strings.Join(envelope.Event.Action.Options, ",")
-
-	out := &CardActionTriggerOutput{
-		Type:        envelope.Header.EventType,
-		EventID:     envelope.Header.EventID,
-		Timestamp:   envelope.Header.CreateTime,
-		OperatorID:  envelope.Event.Operator.OpenID,
-		MessageID:   envelope.Event.Context.OpenMessageID,
-		ChatID:      envelope.Event.Context.OpenChatID,
-		Host:        envelope.Event.Host,
-		Token:       envelope.Event.Token,
-		ActionTag:   envelope.Event.Action.Tag,
-		ActionValue: actionValue,
-		ActionName:  envelope.Event.Action.Name,
-		FormValue:   formValue,
-		InputValue:  envelope.Event.Action.InputValue,
-		Option:      envelope.Event.Action.Option,
-		Options:     options,
-		Checked:     envelope.Event.Action.Checked,
-		Timezone:    envelope.Event.Action.Timezone,
-	}
-
-	if out.MessageID != "" && rt != nil {
-		out.CardContent = fetchCardUserDSL(ctx, rt, out.MessageID)
-	}
-
-	return json.Marshal(out)
-}
-
-// fetchCardUserDSL gets the card message content via message get API.
-// Returns empty string on any failure — never blocks event consumption.
-func fetchCardUserDSL(ctx context.Context, rt event.APIClient, messageID string) string {
-	path := "/open-apis/im/v1/messages/" + messageID + "?card_msg_content_type=user_card_content"
-	resp, err := rt.CallAPI(ctx, "GET", path, nil)
-	if err != nil {
-		return ""
-	}
-	var result struct {
-		Code int    `json:"code"`
-		Msg  string `json:"msg"`
-		Data struct {
-			Items []struct {
-				Body struct {
-					Content string `json:"content"`
-				} `json:"body"`
-			} `json:"items"`
-		} `json:"data"`
-	}
-	if json.Unmarshal(resp, &result) != nil || result.Code != 0 || len(result.Data.Items) == 0 {
-		return ""
-	}
-	return result.Data.Items[0].Body.Content
-}
-
-func marshalToString(m map[string]interface{}) string {
-	if len(m) == 0 {
-		return ""
-	}
-	b, _ := json.Marshal(m)
-	return string(b)
-}

events/im/card_action_test.go

@@ -1,432 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
-
-package im
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"encoding/json"
-	"testing"
-	"time"
-
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/event"
-)
-
-func TestCardActionTriggerRegistered(t *testing.T) {
-	def, ok := event.Lookup("card.action.trigger")
-	if !ok {
-		t.Fatal("card.action.trigger should be registered via Keys()")
-	}
-	if def.Schema.Custom == nil {
-		t.Error("card.action.trigger must set Schema.Custom")
-	}
-	if def.Process == nil {
-		t.Error("card.action.trigger must set Process")
-	}
-	if len(def.Scopes) == 0 {
-		t.Error("Scopes must not be empty")
-	}
-}
-
-func TestProcessCardAction_Button(t *testing.T) {
-	payload := `{
-		"schema": "2.0",
-		"header": {
-			"event_id": "ev_btn_001",
-			"event_type": "card.action.trigger",
-			"create_time": "1776409469273"
-		},
-		"event": {
-			"operator": {"open_id": "ou_operator"},
-			"token": "c-token-btn",
-			"host": "im_message",
-			"action": {
-				"tag": "button",
-				"value": {"key": "approve"},
-				"name": "approve_btn",
-				"form_value": {},
-				"options": [],
-				"checked": false
-			},
-			"context": {
-				"open_message_id": "om_msg_001",
-				"open_chat_id": "oc_chat_001"
-			}
-		}
-	}`
-	out := runCardAction(t, payload, nil)
-
-	if out.Type != "card.action.trigger" {
-		t.Errorf("Type = %q, want card.action.trigger", out.Type)
-	}
-	if out.EventID != "ev_btn_001" {
-		t.Errorf("EventID = %q", out.EventID)
-	}
-	if out.OperatorID != "ou_operator" {
-		t.Errorf("OperatorID = %q", out.OperatorID)
-	}
-	if out.ActionTag != "button" {
-		t.Errorf("ActionTag = %q, want button", out.ActionTag)
-	}
-	if out.ActionValue != `{"key":"approve"}` {
-		t.Errorf("ActionValue = %q", out.ActionValue)
-	}
-	if out.ActionName != "approve_btn" {
-		t.Errorf("ActionName = %q", out.ActionName)
-	}
-	if out.Token != "c-token-btn" {
-		t.Errorf("Token = %q", out.Token)
-	}
-	if out.MessageID != "om_msg_001" {
-		t.Errorf("MessageID = %q", out.MessageID)
-	}
-	if out.ChatID != "oc_chat_001" {
-		t.Errorf("ChatID = %q", out.ChatID)
-	}
-	if out.Host != "im_message" {
-		t.Errorf("Host = %q", out.Host)
-	}
-	if out.Timestamp != "1776409469273" {
-		t.Errorf("Timestamp = %q", out.Timestamp)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestProcessCardAction_FormSubmit(t *testing.T) {
-	payload := `{
-		"schema": "2.0",
-		"header": {
-			"event_id": "ev_form_001",
-			"event_type": "card.action.trigger",
-			"create_time": "1776409469274"
-		},
-		"event": {
-			"operator": {"open_id": "ou_form_user"},
-			"token": "c-token-form",
-			"host": "im_message",
-			"action": {
-				"tag": "button",
-				"value": {},
-				"name": "submit_btn",
-				"form_value": {"name": "test-user", "reason": "testing"},
-				"options": [],
-				"checked": false
-			},
-			"context": {
-				"open_message_id": "om_form_001",
-				"open_chat_id": "oc_chat_002"
-			}
-		}
-	}`
-	out := runCardAction(t, payload, nil)
-
-	if out.FormValue != `{"name":"test-user","reason":"testing"}` {
-		t.Errorf("FormValue = %q", out.FormValue)
-	}
-	if out.ActionTag != "button" {
-		t.Errorf("ActionTag = %q, want button", out.ActionTag)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestProcessCardAction_MultiSelect(t *testing.T) {
-	payload := `{
-		"schema": "2.0",
-		"header": {
-			"event_id": "ev_ms_001",
-			"event_type": "card.action.trigger",
-			"create_time": "1776409469275"
-		},
-		"event": {
-			"operator": {"open_id": "ou_ms_user"},
-			"token": "c-token-ms",
-			"host": "im_message",
-			"action": {
-				"tag": "multi_select_static",
-				"value": {},
-				"name": "multi_select",
-				"options": ["opt_1", "opt_3"],
-				"checked": false
-			},
-			"context": {
-				"open_message_id": "om_ms_001",
-				"open_chat_id": "oc_chat_003"
-			}
-		}
-	}`
-	out := runCardAction(t, payload, nil)
-
-	if out.Options != "opt_1,opt_3" {
-		t.Errorf("Options = %q, want opt_1,opt_3", out.Options)
-	}
-	if out.ActionTag != "multi_select_static" {
-		t.Errorf("ActionTag = %q", out.ActionTag)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestProcessCardAction_Input(t *testing.T) {
-	payload := `{
-		"schema": "2.0",
-		"header": {
-			"event_id": "ev_input_001",
-			"event_type": "card.action.trigger",
-			"create_time": "1776409469276"
-		},
-		"event": {
-			"operator": {"open_id": "ou_input_user"},
-			"token": "c-token-input",
-			"host": "im_message",
-			"action": {
-				"tag": "input",
-				"value": {},
-				"name": "text_input",
-				"input_value": "hello world",
-				"options": [],
-				"checked": false
-			},
-			"context": {
-				"open_message_id": "om_input_001",
-				"open_chat_id": "oc_chat_004"
-			}
-		}
-	}`
-	out := runCardAction(t, payload, nil)
-
-	if out.InputValue != "hello world" {
-		t.Errorf("InputValue = %q", out.InputValue)
-	}
-	if out.ActionTag != "input" {
-		t.Errorf("ActionTag = %q", out.ActionTag)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestProcessCardAction_DatePicker(t *testing.T) {
-	payload := `{
-		"schema": "2.0",
-		"header": {
-			"event_id": "ev_date_001",
-			"event_type": "card.action.trigger",
-			"create_time": "1776409469277"
-		},
-		"event": {
-			"operator": {"open_id": "ou_date_user"},
-			"token": "c-token-date",
-			"host": "im_message",
-			"action": {
-				"tag": "date_picker",
-				"value": {},
-				"name": "date_selector",
-				"option": "2024-04-01 +0800",
-				"timezone": "Asia/Shanghai",
-				"options": [],
-				"checked": false
-			},
-			"context": {
-				"open_message_id": "om_date_001",
-				"open_chat_id": "oc_chat_005"
-			}
-		}
-	}`
-	out := runCardAction(t, payload, nil)
-
-	if out.Option != "2024-04-01 +0800" {
-		t.Errorf("Option = %q", out.Option)
-	}
-	if out.Timezone != "Asia/Shanghai" {
-		t.Errorf("Timezone = %q", out.Timezone)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestProcessCardAction_MalformedPayload(t *testing.T) {
-	raw := &event.RawEvent{
-		EventID:   "ev_bad",
-		EventType: "card.action.trigger",
-		Payload:   json.RawMessage(`not json`),
-		Timestamp: time.Now(),
-	}
-	got, err := processCardAction(context.Background(), nil, raw, nil)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("Process should swallow parse errors, got %v", err)
-	}
-	if string(got) != "not json" {
-		t.Errorf("malformed fallback output = %q, want original bytes", string(got))
-	}
-}
-
-func TestProcessCardAction_MessageGetSuccess(t *testing.T) {
-	payload := `{
-		"schema": "2.0",
-		"header": {
-			"event_id": "ev_mg_ok",
-			"event_type": "card.action.trigger",
-			"create_time": "1776409469278"
-		},
-		"event": {
-			"operator": {"open_id": "ou_mg_user"},
-			"token": "c-token-mg",
-			"host": "im_message",
-			"action": {
-				"tag": "button",
-				"value": {"key": "click"},
-				"name": "btn",
-				"form_value": {},
-				"options": [],
-				"checked": false
-			},
-			"context": {
-				"open_message_id": "om_mg_001",
-				"open_chat_id": "oc_chat_mg"
-			}
-		}
-	}`
-	cardContent := `{"header":{"title":{"tag":"plain_text","content":"A card"}}}`
-	mock := &mockAPIClient{resp: `{
-		"code": 0,
-		"msg": "success",
-		"data": {
-			"items": [{
-				"body": {"content": "` + escapeJSON(cardContent) + `"}
-			}]
-		}
-	}`}
-	out := runCardAction(t, payload, mock)
-
-	if out.CardContent == "" {
-		t.Error("CardContent should not be empty when message get succeeds")
-	}
-}
-
-func TestProcessCardAction_MessageGetErrorCode(t *testing.T) {
-	payload := `{
-		"schema": "2.0",
-		"header": {
-			"event_id": "ev_mg_ec",
-			"event_type": "card.action.trigger",
-			"create_time": "1776409469279"
-		},
-		"event": {
-			"operator": {"open_id": "ou_mg_user2"},
-			"token": "c-token-mg2",
-			"host": "im_message",
-			"action": {
-				"tag": "button",
-				"value": {},
-				"name": "btn",
-				"form_value": {},
-				"options": [],
-				"checked": false
-			},
-			"context": {
-				"open_message_id": "om_mg_002",
-				"open_chat_id": "oc_chat_mg2"
-			}
-		}
-	}`
-	mock := &mockAPIClient{resp: `{"code": 1, "msg": "error", "data": {"items": []}}`}
-	out := runCardAction(t, payload, mock)
-
-	if out.CardContent != "" {
-		t.Errorf("CardContent should be empty when code != 0, got %q", out.CardContent)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestProcessCardAction_MessageGetFailure(t *testing.T) {
-	payload := `{
-		"schema": "2.0",
-		"header": {
-			"event_id": "ev_mg_fail",
-			"event_type": "card.action.trigger",
-			"create_time": "1776409469280"
-		},
-		"event": {
-			"operator": {"open_id": "ou_mg_user3"},
-			"token": "c-token-mg3",
-			"host": "im_message",
-			"action": {
-				"tag": "button",
-				"value": {},
-				"name": "btn",
-				"form_value": {},
-				"options": [],
-				"checked": false
-			},
-			"context": {
-				"open_message_id": "om_mg_003",
-				"open_chat_id": "oc_chat_mg3"
-			}
-		}
-	}`
-	mock := &mockAPIClient{errResp: true}
-	out := runCardAction(t, payload, mock)
-
-	if out.CardContent != "" {
-		t.Errorf("CardContent should be empty when message get fails, got %q", out.CardContent)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestProcessCardAction_EmptyMessageID(t *testing.T) {
-	payload := `{
-		"schema": "2.0",
-		"header": {
-			"event_id": "ev_no_msg",
-			"event_type": "card.action.trigger",
-			"create_time": "1776409469281"
-		},
-		"event": {
-			"operator": {"open_id": "ou_no_msg"},
-			"token": "c-token-nm",
-			"host": "im_message",
-			"action": {
-				"tag": "button",
-				"value": {},
-				"name": "btn",
-				"form_value": {},
-				"options": [],
-				"checked": false
-			},
-			"context": {
-				"open_message_id": "",
-				"open_chat_id": "oc_chat_nm"
-			}
-		}
-	}`
-	out := runCardAction(t, payload, nil)
-
-	if out.CardContent != "" {
-		t.Errorf("CardContent should be empty when message_id is absent, got %q", out.CardContent)
-	}
-}
-
-type mockAPIClient struct {
-	resp    string
-	errResp bool
-}
-
-func (m *mockAPIClient) CallAPI(_ context.Context, _, _ string, _ interface{}) (json.RawMessage, error) {
-	if m.errResp {
-		return nil, context.DeadlineExceeded
-	}
-	return json.RawMessage(m.resp), nil
-}
-
-func runCardAction(t *testing.T, payload string, rt event.APIClient) CardActionTriggerOutput {
-	t.Helper()
-	raw := &event.RawEvent{
-		EventID:   "ev_test",
-		EventType: "card.action.trigger",
-		Payload:   json.RawMessage(payload),
-		Timestamp: time.Now(),
-	}
-	got, err := processCardAction(context.Background(), rt, raw, nil)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("Process error: %v", err)
-	}
-	var out CardActionTriggerOutput
-	if err := json.Unmarshal(got, &out); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("Process output is not valid CardActionTriggerOutput JSON: %v\nraw=%s", err, string(got))
-	}
-	return out
-}
-
-func escapeJSON(s string) string {
-	b, _ := json.Marshal(s)
-	return string(b[1 : len(b)-1])
-}

events/im/register.go

@@ -27,21 +27,6 @@ func Keys() []event.KeyDefinition {
 			AuthTypes:             []string{"bot"},
 			RequiredConsoleEvents: []string{"im.message.receive_v1"},
 		},
-		{
-			Key:              "card.action.trigger",
-			DisplayName:      "Card action",
-			Description:      "Triggered when a user interacts with an interactive card (button click, form submit, dropdown select, etc.). Output includes: token (valid 30 min, max 2 updates), action details (tag, value, name, form_value), and card_content (original card in userDSL text format, auto-fetched at consume time). To update the card: parse card_content to understand the current state, construct the new card JSON, then call `lark-cli api POST /open-apis/interactive/v1/card/update` with the token (see lark-im-card-action-reply.md).",
-			EventType:        "card.action.trigger",
-			SubscriptionType: event.SubTypeCallback,
-			Schema: event.SchemaDef{
-				Custom: &event.SchemaSpec{Type: reflect.TypeOf(CardActionTriggerOutput{})},
-			},
-			Process:               processCardAction,
-			Scopes:                []string{"im:message:readonly"},
-			AuthTypes:             []string{"bot"},
-			SingleConsumer:        true,
-			RequiredConsoleEvents: []string{"card.action.trigger"},
-		},
 	}
 
 	for _, rk := range nativeIMKeys {

events/register.go

@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ package events
 import (
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/events/im"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/events/minutes"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/events/task"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/events/vc"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/events/whiteboard"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/event"
@@ -18,7 +17,6 @@ func init() {
 	all := [][]event.KeyDefinition{
 		im.Keys(),
 		minutes.Keys(),
-		task.Keys(),
 		vc.Keys(),
 		whiteboard.Keys(),
 	}

events/task/native.go

@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
-
-package task
-
-// TaskUpdateUserAccessV2Data is the Task v2 update event payload under the
-// standard Lark V2 event envelope.
-type TaskUpdateUserAccessV2Data struct {
-	EventTypes []string `json:"event_types,omitempty" desc:"Task commit types included in this event" enum:"task_create,task_deleted,task_summary_update,task_desc_update,task_assignees_update,task_followers_update,task_reminders_update,task_start_due_update,task_completed_update"`
-	TaskGUID   string   `json:"task_guid,omitempty" desc:"Task GUID that changed" kind:"task_guid"`
-}
-
-var taskUpdateUserAccessCommitTypes = []string{
-	"task_create",
-	"task_deleted",
-	"task_summary_update",
-	"task_desc_update",
-	"task_assignees_update",
-	"task_followers_update",
-	"task_reminders_update",
-	"task_start_due_update",
-	"task_completed_update",
-}

events/task/preconsume.go

@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
-
-package task
-
-import (
-	"context"
-
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/errs"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/event"
-)
-
-const taskSubscriptionPath = "/open-apis/task/v2/task_v2/task_subscription?user_id_type=open_id"
-
-func taskSubscriptionPreConsume(ctx context.Context, rt event.APIClient, _ map[string]string) (func() error, error) {
-	if rt == nil {
-		return nil, errs.NewInternalError(errs.SubtypeUnknown,
-			"runtime API client is required for pre-consume subscription")
-	}
-
-	if _, err := rt.CallAPI(ctx, "POST", taskSubscriptionPath, nil); err != nil {
-		if _, ok := errs.ProblemOf(err); ok {
-			return nil, err
-		}
-		return nil, errs.NewNetworkError(
-			errs.SubtypeNetworkTransport,
-			"failed to subscribe task event",
-		).WithCause(err)
-	}
-
-	return nil, nil
-}

events/task/preconsume_test.go

@@ -1,119 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
-
-package task
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"encoding/json"
-	"errors"
-	"testing"
-
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/errs"
-)
-
-type stubAPIClient struct {
-	err error
-
-	method string
-	path   string
-	body   interface{}
-	calls  int
-}
-
-func (s *stubAPIClient) CallAPI(_ context.Context, method, path string, body interface{}) (json.RawMessage, error) {
-	s.method = method
-	s.path = path
-	s.body = body
-	s.calls++
-	if s.err != nil {
-		return nil, s.err
-	}
-	return json.RawMessage(`{"code":0,"msg":"success","data":{}}`), nil
-}
-
-func TestTaskSubscriptionPreConsumeCallsSubscribeAPI(t *testing.T) {
-	rt := &stubAPIClient{}
-	cleanup, err := taskSubscriptionPreConsume(context.Background(), rt, nil)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("taskSubscriptionPreConsume error = %v", err)
-	}
-	if cleanup != nil {
-		t.Fatal("cleanup = non-nil, want nil because task subscription has no unsubscribe API")
-	}
-	if rt.calls != 1 {
-		t.Fatalf("calls = %d, want 1", rt.calls)
-	}
-	if rt.method != "POST" {
-		t.Errorf("method = %q, want POST", rt.method)
-	}
-	if rt.path != taskSubscriptionPath {
-		t.Errorf("path = %q, want %q", rt.path, taskSubscriptionPath)
-	}
-	if rt.body != nil {
-		t.Errorf("body = %#v, want nil", rt.body)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestTaskSubscriptionPreConsumeRequiresRuntime(t *testing.T) {
-	_, err := taskSubscriptionPreConsume(context.Background(), nil, nil)
-	if err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("expected error")
-	}
-	p, ok := errs.ProblemOf(err)
-	if !ok {
-		t.Fatalf("expected typed error, got %T: %v", err, err)
-	}
-	if p.Category != errs.CategoryInternal {
-		t.Errorf("category = %s, want %s", p.Category, errs.CategoryInternal)
-	}
-	if p.Subtype != errs.SubtypeUnknown {
-		t.Errorf("subtype = %s, want %s", p.Subtype, errs.SubtypeUnknown)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestTaskSubscriptionPreConsumePassesThroughAPIError(t *testing.T) {
-	wantErr := errs.NewValidationError(errs.SubtypeFailedPrecondition, "subscription already exists")
-	rt := &stubAPIClient{err: wantErr}
-
-	_, err := taskSubscriptionPreConsume(context.Background(), rt, nil)
-	if err != wantErr {
-		t.Fatalf("err identity changed: got %T %v, want original %T %v", err, err, wantErr, wantErr)
-	}
-	if !errors.Is(err, wantErr) {
-		t.Fatalf("err = %v, want %v", err, wantErr)
-	}
-	p, ok := errs.ProblemOf(err)
-	if !ok {
-		t.Fatalf("expected typed error, got %T: %v", err, err)
-	}
-	if p.Category != errs.CategoryValidation {
-		t.Errorf("category = %s, want %s", p.Category, errs.CategoryValidation)
-	}
-	if p.Subtype != errs.SubtypeFailedPrecondition {
-		t.Errorf("subtype = %s, want %s", p.Subtype, errs.SubtypeFailedPrecondition)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestTaskSubscriptionPreConsumeWrapsUntypedAPIError(t *testing.T) {
-	cause := errors.New("connection reset")
-	rt := &stubAPIClient{err: cause}
-
-	_, err := taskSubscriptionPreConsume(context.Background(), rt, nil)
-	if err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("expected error")
-	}
-	if !errors.Is(err, cause) {
-		t.Fatalf("err = %v, want cause %v", err, cause)
-	}
-	p, ok := errs.ProblemOf(err)
-	if !ok {
-		t.Fatalf("expected typed error, got %T: %v", err, err)
-	}
-	if p.Category != errs.CategoryNetwork {
-		t.Errorf("category = %s, want %s", p.Category, errs.CategoryNetwork)
-	}
-	if p.Subtype != errs.SubtypeNetworkTransport {
-		t.Errorf("subtype = %s, want %s", p.Subtype, errs.SubtypeNetworkTransport)
-	}
-}

events/task/register.go

@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
-
-// Package task registers Task-domain EventKeys.
-package task
-
-import (
-	"reflect"
-
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/event"
-)
-
-const eventTypeTaskUpdateUserAccessV2 = "task.task.update_user_access_v2"
-
-// Keys returns all Task-domain EventKey definitions.
-func Keys() []event.KeyDefinition {
-	return []event.KeyDefinition{
-		{
-			Key:         eventTypeTaskUpdateUserAccessV2,
-			DisplayName: "Task updated",
-			Description: "Triggered when tasks visible to the current user or app are created, deleted, or updated",
-			EventType:   eventTypeTaskUpdateUserAccessV2,
-			Schema: event.SchemaDef{
-				Native: &event.SchemaSpec{Type: reflect.TypeOf(TaskUpdateUserAccessV2Data{})},
-			},
-			PreConsume:            taskSubscriptionPreConsume,
-			Scopes:                []string{"task:task:read"},
-			AuthTypes:             []string{"user", "bot"},
-			RequiredConsoleEvents: []string{eventTypeTaskUpdateUserAccessV2},
-			SingleConsumer:        true,
-		},
-	}
-}

events/task/register_test.go

@@ -1,95 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
-
-package task
-
-import (
-	"encoding/json"
-	"reflect"
-	"testing"
-
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/event"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/event/schemas"
-)
-
-func TestKeysTaskUpdateUserAccessMetadata(t *testing.T) {
-	keys := Keys()
-	if len(keys) != 1 {
-		t.Fatalf("len(Keys()) = %d, want 1", len(keys))
-	}
-
-	def := keys[0]
-	if def.Key != eventTypeTaskUpdateUserAccessV2 {
-		t.Errorf("Key = %q, want %q", def.Key, eventTypeTaskUpdateUserAccessV2)
-	}
-	if def.EventType != eventTypeTaskUpdateUserAccessV2 {
-		t.Errorf("EventType = %q, want %q", def.EventType, eventTypeTaskUpdateUserAccessV2)
-	}
-	if def.Schema.Native == nil {
-		t.Fatal("Schema.Native is nil")
-	}
-	if def.Schema.Native.Type != reflect.TypeOf(TaskUpdateUserAccessV2Data{}) {
-		t.Errorf("native type = %v, want TaskUpdateUserAccessV2Data", def.Schema.Native.Type)
-	}
-	if def.Process != nil {
-		t.Fatal("Native Task EventKey must not set Process")
-	}
-	if def.PreConsume == nil {
-		t.Fatal("PreConsume is nil")
-	}
-	if !def.SingleConsumer {
-		t.Fatal("SingleConsumer = false, want true")
-	}
-	if !reflect.DeepEqual(def.Scopes, []string{"task:task:read"}) {
-		t.Errorf("Scopes = %#v", def.Scopes)
-	}
-	if !reflect.DeepEqual(def.AuthTypes, []string{"user", "bot"}) {
-		t.Errorf("AuthTypes = %#v", def.AuthTypes)
-	}
-	if !reflect.DeepEqual(def.RequiredConsoleEvents, []string{eventTypeTaskUpdateUserAccessV2}) {
-		t.Errorf("RequiredConsoleEvents = %#v", def.RequiredConsoleEvents)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestTaskUpdateUserAccessSchemaAnnotations(t *testing.T) {
-	raw := schemas.WrapV2Envelope(schemas.FromType(reflect.TypeOf(TaskUpdateUserAccessV2Data{})))
-	var schema map[string]interface{}
-	if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &schema); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("unmarshal schema: %v", err)
-	}
-
-	eventProps := schema["properties"].(map[string]interface{})["event"].(map[string]interface{})["properties"].(map[string]interface{})
-	taskGUID := eventProps["task_guid"].(map[string]interface{})
-	if got := taskGUID["format"]; got != "task_guid" {
-		t.Errorf("task_guid format = %v, want task_guid", got)
-	}
-
-	eventTypes := eventProps["event_types"].(map[string]interface{})
-	items := eventTypes["items"].(map[string]interface{})
-	rawEnum, ok := items["enum"].([]interface{})
-	if !ok {
-		t.Fatalf("event_types item enum missing: %#v", items["enum"])
-	}
-	got := make(map[string]bool, len(rawEnum))
-	for _, v := range rawEnum {
-		got[v.(string)] = true
-	}
-	for _, want := range taskUpdateUserAccessCommitTypes {
-		if !got[want] {
-			t.Errorf("event_types enum missing %q; enum=%v", want, rawEnum)
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-func TestTaskUpdateUserAccessRegistersCleanly(t *testing.T) {
-	const key = eventTypeTaskUpdateUserAccessV2
-	event.UnregisterKeyForTest(key)
-	t.Cleanup(func() { event.UnregisterKeyForTest(key) })
-
-	for _, def := range Keys() {
-		event.RegisterKey(def)
-	}
-	if _, ok := event.Lookup(key); !ok {
-		t.Fatalf("event.Lookup(%q) not registered", key)
-	}
-}

go.mod

@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@ require (
 	github.com/bmatcuk/doublestar/v4 v4.10.0
 	github.com/charmbracelet/huh v1.0.0
 	github.com/charmbracelet/lipgloss v1.1.0
+	github.com/facebookincubator/flog v0.0.0-20190930132826-d2511d0ce33c
+	github.com/facebookincubator/sks v0.0.0-20251112220143-6823f23937b4
 	github.com/gofrs/flock v0.8.1
 	github.com/google/uuid v1.6.0
 	github.com/itchyny/gojq v0.12.17
@@ -27,7 +29,10 @@ require (
 	gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.1
 )
 
+require github.com/ebitengine/purego v0.10.1
+
 require (
+	github.com/StackExchange/wmi v1.2.1 // indirect
 	github.com/atotto/clipboard v0.1.4 // indirect
 	github.com/aymanbagabas/go-osc52/v2 v2.0.1 // indirect
 	github.com/catppuccin/go v0.3.0 // indirect
@@ -42,12 +47,23 @@ require (
 	github.com/davecgh/go-spew v1.1.1 // indirect
 	github.com/dustin/go-humanize v1.0.1 // indirect
 	github.com/erikgeiser/coninput v0.0.0-20211004153227-1c3628e74d0f // indirect
+	github.com/go-ole/go-ole v1.2.5 // indirect
 	github.com/godbus/dbus/v5 v5.2.2 // indirect
 	github.com/gogo/protobuf v1.3.2 // indirect
+	github.com/google/btree v1.0.1 // indirect
+	github.com/google/certificate-transparency-go v1.1.2 // indirect
+	github.com/google/certtostore v1.0.3-0.20230404221207-8d01647071cc // indirect
+	github.com/google/deck v0.0.0-20230104221208-105ad94aa8ae // indirect
+	github.com/google/go-attestation v0.5.1 // indirect
+	github.com/google/go-tpm v0.9.0 // indirect
+	github.com/google/go-tspi v0.3.0 // indirect
 	github.com/gopherjs/gopherjs v1.17.2 // indirect
 	github.com/gorilla/websocket v1.5.0 // indirect
+	github.com/hashicorp/errwrap v1.0.0 // indirect
+	github.com/hashicorp/go-multierror v1.1.1 // indirect
 	github.com/inconshreveable/mousetrap v1.1.0 // indirect
 	github.com/itchyny/timefmt-go v0.1.6 // indirect
+	github.com/jgoguen/go-utils v0.0.0-20200211015258-b42ad41486fd // indirect
 	github.com/jtolds/gls v4.20.0+incompatible // indirect
 	github.com/lucasb-eyer/go-colorful v1.2.0 // indirect
 	github.com/mattn/go-isatty v0.0.20 // indirect
@@ -57,10 +73,12 @@ require (
 	github.com/muesli/ansi v0.0.0-20230316100256-276c6243b2f6 // indirect
 	github.com/muesli/cancelreader v0.2.2 // indirect
 	github.com/muesli/termenv v0.16.0 // indirect
+	github.com/peterbourgon/diskv v2.0.1+incompatible // indirect
 	github.com/pmezard/go-difflib v1.0.0 // indirect
 	github.com/rivo/uniseg v0.4.7 // indirect
 	github.com/smarty/assertions v1.15.0 // indirect
 	github.com/tidwall/match v1.1.1 // indirect
 	github.com/tidwall/pretty v1.2.0 // indirect
 	github.com/xo/terminfo v0.0.0-20220910002029-abceb7e1c41e // indirect
+	golang.org/x/crypto v0.31.0 // indirect
 )

internal/auth/app_registration.go

@@ -31,6 +31,11 @@ type AppRegistrationResult struct {
 	ClientID     string
 	ClientSecret string
 	UserInfo     *AppRegUserInfo
+	// AuthMethods is the authoritative auth method(s) the app must use, as
+	// decided by the user/admin at confirmation (20260409 `auth_method` field).
+	// It may differ from what the client requested — e.g. selecting an existing
+	// client_secret app. Empty on older servers.
+	AuthMethods []string
 }
 
 // AppRegUserInfo contains user info returned from app registration.
@@ -39,8 +44,81 @@ type AppRegUserInfo struct {
 	TenantBrand string // "feishu" or "lark"
 }
 
-// RequestAppRegistration initiates the app registration device flow.
-func RequestAppRegistration(httpClient *http.Client, brand core.LarkBrand, errOut io.Writer) (*AppRegistrationResponse, error) {
+// AppRegistrationInit is the response from the app registration init endpoint.
+type AppRegistrationInit struct {
+	Nonce                string
+	SupportedAuthMethods []string // e.g. ["client_secret", "private_key_jwt"]
+}
+
+// AppRegistrationBeginOptions parametrizes the registration begin request.
+// A zero value selects the legacy client_secret flow, preserving prior behavior.
+type AppRegistrationBeginOptions struct {
+	AuthMethod      string // "" => client_secret; core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT
+	AuthAttestation string // private_key_jwt: the TEE-signed attestation JWT
+	RestoreAppID    string // when set, asks the server to re-register this existing app
+}
+
+// RequestAppRegistrationInit performs the init step of the registration flow,
+// returning a server nonce (to be embedded in a TEE-signed attestation JWT) and
+// the auth methods the server supports for this archetype.
+func RequestAppRegistrationInit(httpClient *http.Client) (*AppRegistrationInit, error) {
+	// Registration always begins against the feishu accounts host (mirrors begin).
+	endpoint := core.ResolveEndpoints(core.BrandFeishu).Accounts + PathAppRegistration
+
+	form := url.Values{}
+	form.Set("action", "init")
+	form.Set("archetype", "PersonalAgent")
+
+	req, err := http.NewRequest("POST", endpoint, strings.NewReader(form.Encode()))
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
+
+	resp, err := httpClient.Do(req)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	defer resp.Body.Close()
+	logHTTPResponse(resp)
+
+	body, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("app registration init failed: read body: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	var data map[string]interface{}
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &data); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("app registration init failed: HTTP %d – response not JSON", resp.StatusCode)
+	}
+
+	if _, hasError := data["error"]; resp.StatusCode >= 400 || hasError {
+		msg := getStr(data, "error_description")
+		if msg == "" {
+			msg = getStr(data, "error")
+		}
+		if msg == "" {
+			msg = "Unknown error"
+		}
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("app registration init failed: %s", msg)
+	}
+
+	out := &AppRegistrationInit{Nonce: getStr(data, "nonce")}
+	if methods, ok := data["supported_auth_methods"].([]interface{}); ok {
+		for _, m := range methods {
+			if s, ok := m.(string); ok {
+				out.SupportedAuthMethods = append(out.SupportedAuthMethods, s)
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if out.Nonce == "" {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("app registration init failed: server returned no nonce")
+	}
+	return out, nil
+}
+
+// RequestAppRegistration initiates the app registration device flow (begin step).
+func RequestAppRegistration(httpClient *http.Client, brand core.LarkBrand, opts AppRegistrationBeginOptions, errOut io.Writer) (*AppRegistrationResponse, error) {
 	if errOut == nil {
 		errOut = io.Discard
 	}
@@ -49,11 +127,24 @@ func RequestAppRegistration(httpClient *http.Client, brand core.LarkBrand, errOu
 	regEp := core.ResolveEndpoints(core.BrandFeishu) // registration begin always uses feishu
 	endpoint := regEp.Accounts + PathAppRegistration
 
+	authMethod := opts.AuthMethod
+	if authMethod == "" {
+		authMethod = core.AuthMethodClientSecret
+	}
+
 	form := url.Values{}
 	form.Set("action", "begin")
 	form.Set("archetype", "PersonalAgent")
-	form.Set("auth_method", "client_secret")
+	form.Set("auth_method", authMethod)
 	form.Set("request_user_info", "open_id tenant_brand")
+	if opts.AuthAttestation != "" {
+		form.Set("auth_attestation", opts.AuthAttestation)
+	}
+	// Restore flow: carry the existing app id so the server re-registers it
+	// rather than creating a new app.
+	if opts.RestoreAppID != "" {
+		form.Set("app_id", opts.RestoreAppID)
+	}
 
 	req, err := http.NewRequest("POST", endpoint, strings.NewReader(form.Encode()))
 	if err != nil {
@@ -95,7 +186,24 @@ func RequestAppRegistration(httpClient *http.Client, brand core.LarkBrand, errOu
 
 	userCode := getStr(data, "user_code")
 	verificationUri := getStr(data, "verification_uri")
-	verificationUriComplete := fmt.Sprintf("%s/page/cli?user_code=%s", ep.Open, userCode)
+	// Prefer the server-provided complete URL (currently /page/launcher); fall
+	// back to building it from verification_uri, then to /page/launcher. The old
+	// hard-coded /page/cli is stale — the server now returns /page/launcher.
+	verificationUriComplete := getStr(data, "verification_uri_complete")
+	if verificationUriComplete == "" {
+		base := verificationUri
+		if base == "" {
+			base = ep.Open + "/page/launcher"
+		}
+		// The server may return verification_uri with its own query (e.g.
+		// client_id when registering against an existing app), so join with
+		// the same ?/& logic as BuildVerificationURL.
+		sep := "?"
+		if strings.Contains(base, "?") {
+			sep = "&"
+		}
+		verificationUriComplete = base + sep + "user_code=" + url.QueryEscape(userCode)
+	}
 
 	return &AppRegistrationResponse{
 		DeviceCode:              getStr(data, "device_code"),
@@ -107,6 +215,26 @@ func RequestAppRegistration(httpClient *http.Client, brand core.LarkBrand, errOu
 	}, nil
 }
 
+// parseAuthMethods normalizes the poll response `auth_method` field, which the
+// server returns as a JSON array of strings (e.g. ["private_key_jwt"]) — or, on
+// some variants, a single space-separated string.
+func parseAuthMethods(v interface{}) []string {
+	switch t := v.(type) {
+	case []interface{}:
+		out := make([]string, 0, len(t))
+		for _, m := range t {
+			if s, ok := m.(string); ok && s != "" {
+				out = append(out, s)
+			}
+		}
+		return out
+	case string:
+		return strings.Fields(t)
+	default:
+		return nil
+	}
+}
+
 // BuildVerificationURL appends CLI tracking parameters to the verification URL.
 func BuildVerificationURL(baseURL, cliVersion string) string {
 	sep := "&"
@@ -187,6 +315,7 @@ func PollAppRegistration(ctx context.Context, httpClient *http.Client, brand cor
 			result := &AppRegistrationResult{
 				ClientID:     getStr(data, "client_id"),
 				ClientSecret: getStr(data, "client_secret"),
+				AuthMethods:  parseAuthMethods(data["auth_method"]),
 			}
 			if userInfoRaw, ok := data["user_info"].(map[string]interface{}); ok {
 				result.UserInfo = &AppRegUserInfo{

internal/auth/app_registration_test.go

@@ -4,8 +4,14 @@
 package auth
 
 import (
+	"io"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/url"
+	"slices"
+	"strings"
 	"testing"
 
+	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
 	"github.com/smartystreets/goconvey/convey"
 )
 
@@ -31,3 +37,184 @@ func Test_BuildVerificationURL(t *testing.T) {
 		})
 	})
 }
+
+// captureClient returns an http.Client that records the last request's form body
+// and replies with the given JSON payload.
+func captureClient(gotBody *url.Values, respJSON string) *http.Client {
+	return &http.Client{
+		Transport: roundTripFunc(func(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
+			if req.Body != nil {
+				b, _ := io.ReadAll(req.Body)
+				v, _ := url.ParseQuery(string(b))
+				*gotBody = v
+			}
+			return &http.Response{
+				StatusCode: http.StatusOK,
+				Header:     make(http.Header),
+				Body:       io.NopCloser(strings.NewReader(respJSON)),
+			}, nil
+		}),
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRequestAppRegistrationInit_ParsesNonceAndMethods(t *testing.T) {
+	var body url.Values
+	hc := captureClient(&body, `{"nonce":"n-123","supported_auth_methods":["client_secret","private_key_jwt"]}`)
+
+	out, err := RequestAppRegistrationInit(hc)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if out.Nonce != "n-123" {
+		t.Errorf("nonce = %q, want n-123", out.Nonce)
+	}
+	if len(out.SupportedAuthMethods) != 2 || out.SupportedAuthMethods[1] != "private_key_jwt" {
+		t.Errorf("methods = %v", out.SupportedAuthMethods)
+	}
+	if body.Get("action") != "init" {
+		t.Errorf("action = %q, want init", body.Get("action"))
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRequestAppRegistrationInit_ErrorOnMissingNonce(t *testing.T) {
+	var body url.Values
+	hc := captureClient(&body, `{"supported_auth_methods":["client_secret"]}`)
+	if _, err := RequestAppRegistrationInit(hc); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected error when server returns no nonce")
+	}
+}
+
+// TestRequestAppRegistrationInit_EmptySupportedAuthMethods covers the older-server
+// back-compat path: an empty supported_auth_methods array parses to an empty
+// slice, so the init guard in cmd/config/init_interactive.go
+// (`len(SupportedAuthMethods) > 0 && !slices.Contains(...)`) stays false and does
+// NOT reject the requested private_key_jwt. This aligns with
+// resolveFinalAuthMethod(nil/[], private_key_jwt) == private_key_jwt
+// (see cmd/config TestResolveFinalAuthMethod).
+func TestRequestAppRegistrationInit_EmptySupportedAuthMethods(t *testing.T) {
+	var body url.Values
+	hc := captureClient(&body, `{"nonce":"n-1","supported_auth_methods":[]}`)
+
+	out, err := RequestAppRegistrationInit(hc)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if out.Nonce != "n-1" {
+		t.Errorf("nonce = %q, want n-1", out.Nonce)
+	}
+	if len(out.SupportedAuthMethods) != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("SupportedAuthMethods = %v, want empty", out.SupportedAuthMethods)
+	}
+	// Reproduce the init guard expression on the real parsed result: an empty
+	// slice must NOT reject private_key_jwt.
+	rejected := len(out.SupportedAuthMethods) > 0 &&
+		!slices.Contains(out.SupportedAuthMethods, core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT)
+	if rejected {
+		t.Error("empty SupportedAuthMethods must allow private_key_jwt (older-server back-compat)")
+	}
+}
+
+const beginRespJSON = `{"device_code":"dc","user_code":"uc","verification_uri":"https://example/verify","expires_in":300,"interval":5}`
+
+func TestRequestAppRegistration_BeginDefaultsToClientSecret(t *testing.T) {
+	var body url.Values
+	hc := captureClient(&body, beginRespJSON)
+
+	if _, err := RequestAppRegistration(hc, core.BrandFeishu, AppRegistrationBeginOptions{}, nil); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if body.Get("action") != "begin" {
+		t.Errorf("action = %q", body.Get("action"))
+	}
+	if body.Get("auth_method") != "client_secret" {
+		t.Errorf("auth_method = %q, want client_secret (default)", body.Get("auth_method"))
+	}
+	if body.Has("auth_attestation") {
+		t.Errorf("auth_attestation should be absent for client_secret, got %q", body.Get("auth_attestation"))
+	}
+	// Normal (non-restore) begin must NOT carry app_id.
+	if body.Has("app_id") {
+		t.Errorf("app_id should be absent when RestoreAppID is empty, got %q", body.Get("app_id"))
+	}
+}
+
+// TestRequestAppRegistration_BeginRestoreAppID verifies the restore flow sends the
+// existing app id on begin so the server re-registers that app.
+func TestRequestAppRegistration_BeginRestoreAppID(t *testing.T) {
+	var body url.Values
+	hc := captureClient(&body, beginRespJSON)
+
+	opts := AppRegistrationBeginOptions{RestoreAppID: "cli_restore_me"}
+	if _, err := RequestAppRegistration(hc, core.BrandFeishu, opts, nil); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if body.Get("action") != "begin" {
+		t.Errorf("action = %q, want begin", body.Get("action"))
+	}
+	if body.Get("app_id") != "cli_restore_me" {
+		t.Errorf("app_id = %q, want cli_restore_me", body.Get("app_id"))
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRequestAppRegistration_VerificationURICompleteFallback(t *testing.T) {
+	cases := []struct {
+		name string
+		resp string
+		want string
+	}{
+		{
+			name: "bare verification_uri",
+			resp: `{"device_code":"dc","user_code":"uc","verification_uri":"https://example/verify","expires_in":300,"interval":5}`,
+			want: "https://example/verify?user_code=uc",
+		},
+		{
+			name: "verification_uri with existing query",
+			resp: `{"device_code":"dc","user_code":"uc","verification_uri":"https://example/verify?client_id=cli_x","expires_in":300,"interval":5}`,
+			want: "https://example/verify?client_id=cli_x&user_code=uc",
+		},
+	}
+	for _, tc := range cases {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			var body url.Values
+			hc := captureClient(&body, tc.resp)
+			got, err := RequestAppRegistration(hc, core.BrandFeishu, AppRegistrationBeginOptions{}, nil)
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatal(err)
+			}
+			if got.VerificationUriComplete != tc.want {
+				t.Errorf("VerificationUriComplete = %q, want %q", got.VerificationUriComplete, tc.want)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestParseAuthMethods(t *testing.T) {
+	if got := parseAuthMethods([]interface{}{"private_key_jwt", "client_secret"}); len(got) != 2 || got[0] != "private_key_jwt" {
+		t.Errorf("array form = %v", got)
+	}
+	if got := parseAuthMethods("client_secret private_key_jwt"); len(got) != 2 || got[1] != "private_key_jwt" {
+		t.Errorf("string form = %v", got)
+	}
+	if got := parseAuthMethods(nil); got != nil {
+		t.Errorf("nil form = %v, want nil", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRequestAppRegistration_BeginPrivateKeyJWT(t *testing.T) {
+	var body url.Values
+	hc := captureClient(&body, beginRespJSON)
+
+	opts := AppRegistrationBeginOptions{
+		AuthMethod:      core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT,
+		AuthAttestation: "header.claims.sig",
+	}
+	if _, err := RequestAppRegistration(hc, core.BrandFeishu, opts, nil); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if body.Get("auth_method") != "private_key_jwt" {
+		t.Errorf("auth_method = %q, want private_key_jwt", body.Get("auth_method"))
+	}
+	if body.Get("auth_attestation") != "header.claims.sig" {
+		t.Errorf("auth_attestation = %q", body.Get("auth_attestation"))
+	}
+}

internal/auth/client_auth.go

@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package auth
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"fmt"
+	"net/url"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/auth/jwt"
+	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
+	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/keysigner"
+)
+
+// ClientAuth describes how to authenticate the OAuth client at the token
+// endpoint: with a client_secret (default) or a TEE-signed client_assertion
+// (private_key_jwt).
+type ClientAuth struct {
+	AppID      string
+	AppSecret  string
+	AuthMethod string // "" == client_secret; core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT
+	Signer     keysigner.Signer
+	KeyLabel   string
+}
+
+// ClientAuthFromConfig builds a ClientAuth from resolved config, picking up the
+// active key signer for private_key_jwt apps.
+func ClientAuthFromConfig(cfg *core.CliConfig) ClientAuth {
+	if cfg == nil {
+		return ClientAuth{}
+	}
+	return ClientAuth{
+		AppID:      cfg.AppID,
+		AppSecret:  cfg.AppSecret,
+		AuthMethod: cfg.AuthMethod,
+		KeyLabel:   cfg.KeyLabel,
+		Signer:     keysigner.Active(),
+	}
+}
+
+func (c ClientAuth) isPrivateKeyJWT() bool { return c.AuthMethod == core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT }
+
+// applyClientAssertion adds client_assertion(+type) to a token-endpoint form for
+// private_key_jwt and returns true. For client_secret it returns false, leaving
+// the caller to apply its own secret-based authentication. audience is the token
+// endpoint URL (the assertion's aud claim).
+func (c ClientAuth) applyClientAssertion(ctx context.Context, form url.Values, audience string) (bool, error) {
+	if !c.isPrivateKeyJWT() {
+		return false, nil
+	}
+	if c.Signer == nil {
+		return false, fmt.Errorf("private_key_jwt requires a key signer, but none is available on this build")
+	}
+	assertion, err := jwt.SignClientAssertion(ctx, c.Signer, keysigner.KeyRef{Label: c.KeyLabel}, c.AppID, audience, time.Now())
+	if err != nil {
+		return false, err
+	}
+	form.Set("client_assertion_type", jwt.ClientAssertionType)
+	form.Set("client_assertion", assertion)
+	return true, nil
+}

internal/auth/client_auth_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package auth
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"crypto"
+	"crypto/ecdsa"
+	"crypto/elliptic"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"net/url"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/auth/jwt"
+	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
+	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/keysigner"
+)
+
+// fakeAuthSigner is a real in-memory ECDSA P-256 signer for client-auth tests.
+type fakeAuthSigner struct{ key *ecdsa.PrivateKey }
+
+func newFakeAuthSigner(t *testing.T) *fakeAuthSigner {
+	t.Helper()
+	k, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	return &fakeAuthSigner{key: k}
+}
+
+func (f *fakeAuthSigner) EnsureKey(context.Context, keysigner.KeyRef) (crypto.PublicKey, error) {
+	return f.key.Public(), nil
+}
+func (f *fakeAuthSigner) PublicKey(context.Context, keysigner.KeyRef) (crypto.PublicKey, error) {
+	return f.key.Public(), nil
+}
+func (f *fakeAuthSigner) Sign(_ context.Context, _ keysigner.KeyRef, in []byte) ([]byte, string, error) {
+	h := sha256.Sum256(in)
+	r, s, err := ecdsa.Sign(rand.Reader, f.key, h[:])
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, "", err
+	}
+	sig := make([]byte, 64)
+	r.FillBytes(sig[:32])
+	s.FillBytes(sig[32:])
+	return sig, keysigner.AlgES256, nil
+}
+
+func TestClientAuth_applyClientAssertion_ClientSecret(t *testing.T) {
+	ca := ClientAuth{AppID: "cli_a", AppSecret: "sec"} // AuthMethod "" => client_secret
+	form := url.Values{}
+	used, err := ca.applyClientAssertion(context.Background(), form, "https://aud/token")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if used {
+		t.Error("client_secret must not produce a client_assertion")
+	}
+	if form.Has("client_assertion") || form.Has("client_assertion_type") {
+		t.Errorf("form should be untouched, got %v", form)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestClientAuth_applyClientAssertion_PrivateKeyJWT(t *testing.T) {
+	ca := ClientAuth{
+		AppID:      "cli_a",
+		AuthMethod: core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT,
+		Signer:     newFakeAuthSigner(t),
+		KeyLabel:   "k",
+	}
+	form := url.Values{}
+	used, err := ca.applyClientAssertion(context.Background(), form, "https://accounts.feishu.cn/open-apis/authen/v2/oauth/token")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if !used {
+		t.Fatal("expected client_assertion to be applied")
+	}
+	if form.Get("client_assertion_type") != jwt.ClientAssertionType {
+		t.Errorf("client_assertion_type = %q", form.Get("client_assertion_type"))
+	}
+	if form.Get("client_assertion") == "" {
+		t.Error("client_assertion is empty")
+	}
+	if form.Has("client_secret") {
+		t.Error("client_secret must NOT be present for private_key_jwt")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestClientAuth_applyClientAssertion_NilSigner(t *testing.T) {
+	ca := ClientAuth{AppID: "cli_a", AuthMethod: core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT} // Signer nil
+	if _, err := ca.applyClientAssertion(context.Background(), url.Values{}, "aud"); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected error when private_key_jwt has no signer")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestClientAuthFromConfig(t *testing.T) {
+	ca := ClientAuthFromConfig(&core.CliConfig{
+		AppID:      "cli_x",
+		AppSecret:  "s",
+		AuthMethod: core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT,
+		KeyLabel:   "label-1",
+	})
+	if ca.AppID != "cli_x" || ca.AppSecret != "s" || ca.AuthMethod != core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT || ca.KeyLabel != "label-1" {
+		t.Errorf("ClientAuth = %+v", ca)
+	}
+}

internal/auth/device_flow.go

@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ func ResolveOAuthEndpoints(brand core.LarkBrand) OAuthEndpoints {
 }
 
 // RequestDeviceAuthorization requests a device authorization code.
-func RequestDeviceAuthorization(httpClient *http.Client, appId, appSecret string, brand core.LarkBrand, scope string, errOut io.Writer) (*DeviceAuthResponse, error) {
+func RequestDeviceAuthorization(ctx context.Context, httpClient *http.Client, ca ClientAuth, brand core.LarkBrand, scope string, errOut io.Writer) (*DeviceAuthResponse, error) {
 	if errOut == nil {
 		errOut = io.Discard
 	}
@@ -77,18 +77,26 @@ func RequestDeviceAuthorization(httpClient *http.Client, appId, appSecret string
 		}
 	}
 
-	basicAuth := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(appId + ":" + appSecret))
-
 	form := url.Values{}
-	form.Set("client_id", appId)
+	form.Set("client_id", ca.AppID)
 	form.Set("scope", scope)
 
-	req, err := http.NewRequest("POST", endpoints.DeviceAuthorization, strings.NewReader(form.Encode()))
+	// private_key_jwt authenticates the client with a signed assertion in the
+	// body; client_secret uses HTTP Basic.
+	usedAssertion, err := ca.applyClientAssertion(ctx, form, core.OpenAPIAudience(brand))
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "POST", endpoints.DeviceAuthorization, strings.NewReader(form.Encode()))
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}
 	req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
-	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Basic "+basicAuth)
+	if !usedAssertion {
+		basicAuth := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(ca.AppID + ":" + ca.AppSecret))
+		req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Basic "+basicAuth)
+	}
 
 	resp, err := httpClient.Do(req)
 	if err != nil {
@@ -139,7 +147,7 @@ func RequestDeviceAuthorization(httpClient *http.Client, appId, appSecret string
 }
 
 // PollDeviceToken polls the token endpoint until authorization completes or times out.
-func PollDeviceToken(ctx context.Context, httpClient *http.Client, appId, appSecret string, brand core.LarkBrand, deviceCode string, interval, expiresIn int, errOut io.Writer) *DeviceFlowResult {
+func PollDeviceToken(ctx context.Context, httpClient *http.Client, ca ClientAuth, brand core.LarkBrand, deviceCode string, interval, expiresIn int, errOut io.Writer) *DeviceFlowResult {
 	if errOut == nil {
 		errOut = io.Discard
 	}
@@ -171,10 +179,16 @@ func PollDeviceToken(ctx context.Context, httpClient *http.Client, appId, appSec
 		form := url.Values{}
 		form.Set("grant_type", "urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:device_code")
 		form.Set("device_code", deviceCode)
-		form.Set("client_id", appId)
-		form.Set("client_secret", appSecret)
+		form.Set("client_id", ca.AppID)
+		usedAssertion, caErr := ca.applyClientAssertion(ctx, form, core.OpenAPIAudience(brand))
+		if caErr != nil {
+			return &DeviceFlowResult{OK: false, Error: "invalid_client", Message: caErr.Error()}
+		}
+		if !usedAssertion {
+			form.Set("client_secret", ca.AppSecret)
+		}
 
-		req, err := http.NewRequest("POST", endpoints.Token, strings.NewReader(form.Encode()))
+		req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "POST", endpoints.Token, strings.NewReader(form.Encode()))
 		if err != nil {
 			continue
 		}

internal/auth/device_flow_test.go

@@ -7,8 +7,10 @@ import (
 	"bytes"
 	"context"
 	"fmt"
+	"io"
 	"log"
 	"net/http"
+	"net/url"
 	"strings"
 	"sync/atomic"
 	"testing"
@@ -83,7 +85,7 @@ func TestRequestDeviceAuthorization_LogsResponse(t *testing.T) {
 	})
 	t.Cleanup(restore)
 
-	_, err := RequestDeviceAuthorization(httpmock.NewClient(reg), "cli_a", "secret_b", core.BrandFeishu, "", nil)
+	_, err := RequestDeviceAuthorization(context.Background(), httpmock.NewClient(reg), ClientAuth{AppID: "cli_a", AppSecret: "secret_b"}, core.BrandFeishu, "", nil)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("RequestDeviceAuthorization() error: %v", err)
 	}
@@ -106,6 +108,66 @@ func TestRequestDeviceAuthorization_LogsResponse(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+// captureRT records the last request + body and returns a canned device-auth response.
+func captureDeviceAuthClient(gotReq **http.Request, gotBody *string, respJSON string) *http.Client {
+	return &http.Client{Transport: roundTripFunc(func(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
+		*gotReq = req
+		if req.Body != nil {
+			b, _ := io.ReadAll(req.Body)
+			*gotBody = string(b)
+		}
+		return &http.Response{
+			StatusCode: http.StatusOK,
+			Header:     make(http.Header),
+			Body:       io.NopCloser(strings.NewReader(respJSON)),
+		}, nil
+	})}
+}
+
+const deviceAuthRespJSON = `{"device_code":"dc","user_code":"uc","verification_uri":"https://example/verify","expires_in":300,"interval":5}`
+
+func TestRequestDeviceAuthorization_PrivateKeyJWT_UsesAssertionNotBasic(t *testing.T) {
+	var req *http.Request
+	var body string
+	client := captureDeviceAuthClient(&req, &body, deviceAuthRespJSON)
+
+	ca := ClientAuth{AppID: "cli_a", AuthMethod: core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT, Signer: newFakeAuthSigner(t), KeyLabel: "k"}
+	if _, err := RequestDeviceAuthorization(context.Background(), client, ca, core.BrandFeishu, "im:message:send", nil); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if req.Header.Get("Authorization") != "" {
+		t.Errorf("private_key_jwt must NOT send Basic auth, got %q", req.Header.Get("Authorization"))
+	}
+	form, _ := url.ParseQuery(body)
+	if form.Get("client_assertion") == "" {
+		t.Error("missing client_assertion")
+	}
+	if form.Get("client_assertion_type") != "urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:jwt-bearer" {
+		t.Errorf("client_assertion_type = %q", form.Get("client_assertion_type"))
+	}
+	if form.Has("client_secret") {
+		t.Error("client_secret must not be present for private_key_jwt")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRequestDeviceAuthorization_ClientSecret_UsesBasic(t *testing.T) {
+	var req *http.Request
+	var body string
+	client := captureDeviceAuthClient(&req, &body, deviceAuthRespJSON)
+
+	ca := ClientAuth{AppID: "cli_a", AppSecret: "sec"} // client_secret
+	if _, err := RequestDeviceAuthorization(context.Background(), client, ca, core.BrandFeishu, "", nil); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if !strings.HasPrefix(req.Header.Get("Authorization"), "Basic ") {
+		t.Errorf("client_secret should use Basic auth, got %q", req.Header.Get("Authorization"))
+	}
+	form, _ := url.ParseQuery(body)
+	if form.Has("client_assertion") {
+		t.Error("client_secret must not send a client_assertion")
+	}
+}
+
 // TestFormatAuthCmdline_TruncatesExtraArgs verifies that long command lines are truncated.
 func TestFormatAuthCmdline_TruncatesExtraArgs(t *testing.T) {
 	got := keychain.FormatAuthCmdline([]string{
@@ -205,7 +267,7 @@ func TestPollDeviceToken_DefaultsZeroIntervalToFiveSeconds(t *testing.T) {
 	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 100*time.Millisecond)
 	t.Cleanup(cancel)
 
-	result := PollDeviceToken(ctx, client, "cli_a", "secret_b", core.BrandFeishu, "device-code", 0, 10, nil)
+	result := PollDeviceToken(ctx, client, ClientAuth{AppID: "cli_a", AppSecret: "secret_b"}, core.BrandFeishu, "device-code", 0, 10, nil)
 	if result == nil {
 		t.Fatal("PollDeviceToken() returned nil result")
 	}

internal/auth/jwt/jwt.go

@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+// Package jwt builds compact JWS tokens signed by a keysigner.Signer.
+//
+// It deliberately depends only on the standard library plus the existing
+// google/uuid dependency — no third-party JWT library is introduced, keeping
+// go.mod free of new dependencies. The actual signing (and, for ECDSA, the
+// ASN.1->r||s conversion) is delegated to the Signer implementation.
+package jwt
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"fmt"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/google/uuid"
+	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/keysigner"
+)
+
+func b64(b []byte) string { return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(b) }
+
+// buildSignedJWT builds a compact JWS:
+//
+//	base64url(header).base64url(claims).base64url(signature)
+//
+// alg is written into the header (it is part of the signed input) and verified
+// against the alg the signer reports, guarding against a header/key mismatch.
+// typ defaults to "JWT": the server's client_assertion generalizedValidation
+// REQUIRES `typ == "JWT"` (rejects otherwise with "malformed client assertion
+// jwt"), even though the spec examples (§8.1/§8.2) show only alg.
+func buildSignedJWT(ctx context.Context, signer keysigner.Signer, ref keysigner.KeyRef, alg string, header, claims map[string]any) (string, error) {
+	if signer == nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("jwt: no signer available (private_key_jwt unsupported on this build)")
+	}
+	if header == nil {
+		header = map[string]any{}
+	}
+	header["alg"] = alg
+	if _, ok := header["typ"]; !ok {
+		header["typ"] = "JWT"
+	}
+
+	hb, err := json.Marshal(header)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("jwt: marshal header: %w", err)
+	}
+	cb, err := json.Marshal(claims)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("jwt: marshal claims: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	signingInput := b64(hb) + "." + b64(cb)
+	sig, gotAlg, err := signer.Sign(ctx, ref, []byte(signingInput))
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("jwt: sign: %w", err)
+	}
+	if gotAlg != alg {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("jwt: signer alg %q does not match header alg %q", gotAlg, alg)
+	}
+	return signingInput + "." + b64(sig), nil
+}
+
+// newJTI returns a random unique token identifier.
+func newJTI() string { return uuid.NewString() }
+
+// attestationTTL bounds the attestation JWT's lifetime. The init nonce (60s,
+// single-use) is the real anti-replay constraint; this is a modest margin for
+// clock skew on top of the immediate init→sign→begin round-trip.
+const attestationTTL = 2 * time.Minute
+
+// attestationClaims builds the registration attestation claim set per the App
+// Registration JWT spec: jti, iat, exp (all required) and the init-issued nonce.
+func attestationClaims(nonce string, now time.Time) map[string]any {
+	return map[string]any{
+		"jti":   newJTI(),
+		"iat":   now.Unix(),
+		"exp":   now.Add(attestationTTL).Unix(),
+		"nonce": nonce,
+	}
+}
+
+// clientAssertionClaims builds an RFC 7523 client_assertion claim set used to
+// mint tokens in place of client_secret. aud is the brand's token endpoint URL.
+func clientAssertionClaims(clientID, aud string, now time.Time, ttl time.Duration) map[string]any {
+	return map[string]any{
+		"iss": clientID,
+		"sub": clientID,
+		"aud": aud,
+		"iat": now.Unix(),
+		"exp": now.Add(ttl).Unix(),
+		"jti": newJTI(),
+	}
+}
+
+// ClientAssertionType is the RFC 7523 client_assertion_type value used for JWT
+// bearer client authentication at the token endpoint.
+const ClientAssertionType = "urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:jwt-bearer"
+
+// defaultAssertionTTL bounds a client_assertion's lifetime.
+const defaultAssertionTTL = 5 * time.Minute
+
+// SignAttestation signs the registration attestation JWT. The public key is
+// embedded in the JWS "jwk" header so the registration backend can bind it to
+// the app during action=begin; the claims carry the server nonce as a
+// proof-of-possession challenge.
+func SignAttestation(ctx context.Context, signer keysigner.Signer, ref keysigner.KeyRef, nonce string, now time.Time) (string, error) {
+	if signer == nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("jwt: no signer available (private_key_jwt unsupported on this build)")
+	}
+	pub, err := signer.EnsureKey(ctx, ref)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("jwt: ensure key: %w", err)
+	}
+	alg, err := keysigner.AlgForKey(pub)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	jwk, err := keysigner.PublicKeyJWK(pub)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	return buildSignedJWT(ctx, signer, ref, alg, map[string]any{"jwk": jwk}, attestationClaims(nonce, now))
+}
+
+// SignClientAssertion mints a short-lived RFC 7523 client_assertion: it reads the
+// registered key (it must already exist — bound at registration; a missing key is
+// an error, not a reason to create a new unbound one), derives the JWS alg from
+// the public key, and signs an assertion whose audience is the brand's Open API
+// host. The server, holding the public key bound at registration, verifies it in
+// place of client_secret. The assertion header carries only alg (no jwk/kid);
+// the server locates the key via iss/sub = client_id.
+//
+// This is the model-independent glue: the assertion JWT is identical whether the
+// server augments an existing grant (device_code/refresh_token) with client
+// authentication or uses a dedicated jwt-bearer grant — only where the caller
+// attaches it differs.
+func SignClientAssertion(ctx context.Context, signer keysigner.Signer, ref keysigner.KeyRef, clientID, audience string, now time.Time) (string, error) {
+	if signer == nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("jwt: no signer available (private_key_jwt unsupported on this build)")
+	}
+	pub, err := signer.PublicKey(ctx, ref)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("jwt: public key: %w", err)
+	}
+	alg, err := keysigner.AlgForKey(pub)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	return buildSignedJWT(ctx, signer, ref, alg, map[string]any{}, clientAssertionClaims(clientID, audience, now, defaultAssertionTTL))
+}

internal/auth/jwt/jwt_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,254 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package jwt
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"crypto"
+	"crypto/ecdsa"
+	"crypto/elliptic"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"math/big"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/keysigner"
+)
+
+// fakeSigner is a real in-memory ECDSA P-256 signer, so tests exercise the full
+// JWS path and the produced token is actually cryptographically verifiable.
+type fakeSigner struct{ key *ecdsa.PrivateKey }
+
+func newFakeSigner(t *testing.T) *fakeSigner {
+	t.Helper()
+	k, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	return &fakeSigner{key: k}
+}
+
+func (f *fakeSigner) EnsureKey(context.Context, keysigner.KeyRef) (crypto.PublicKey, error) {
+	return f.key.Public(), nil
+}
+func (f *fakeSigner) PublicKey(context.Context, keysigner.KeyRef) (crypto.PublicKey, error) {
+	return f.key.Public(), nil
+}
+func (f *fakeSigner) Sign(_ context.Context, _ keysigner.KeyRef, in []byte) ([]byte, string, error) {
+	h := sha256.Sum256(in)
+	r, s, err := ecdsa.Sign(rand.Reader, f.key, h[:])
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, "", err
+	}
+	// JOSE ES256: fixed-width big-endian r||s (32 bytes each for P-256).
+	sig := make([]byte, 64)
+	r.FillBytes(sig[:32])
+	s.FillBytes(sig[32:])
+	return sig, keysigner.AlgES256, nil
+}
+
+func TestBuildSignedJWT_VerifiableES256(t *testing.T) {
+	f := newFakeSigner(t)
+	now := time.Unix(1700000000, 0)
+
+	tok, err := buildSignedJWT(context.Background(), f, keysigner.KeyRef{Label: "x"}, keysigner.AlgES256,
+		map[string]any{}, clientAssertionClaims("cli_app", "https://accounts.example/token", now, 5*time.Minute))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	parts := strings.Split(tok, ".")
+	if len(parts) != 3 {
+		t.Fatalf("want 3 JWS parts, got %d", len(parts))
+	}
+
+	hb, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(parts[0])
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("header not base64url: %v", err)
+	}
+	var hdr map[string]any
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(hb, &hdr); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if hdr["alg"] != "ES256" || hdr["typ"] != "JWT" {
+		t.Errorf("header = %v, want alg=ES256 typ=JWT (server generalizedValidation requires typ)", hdr)
+	}
+
+	cb, _ := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(parts[1])
+	var claims map[string]any
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(cb, &claims); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if claims["iss"] != "cli_app" || claims["sub"] != "cli_app" || claims["aud"] != "https://accounts.example/token" {
+		t.Errorf("claims = %v", claims)
+	}
+
+	// Cryptographically verify the signature against the signing input.
+	sig, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(parts[2])
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("sig not base64url: %v", err)
+	}
+	if len(sig) != 64 {
+		t.Fatalf("ES256 sig len = %d, want 64", len(sig))
+	}
+	r := new(big.Int).SetBytes(sig[:32])
+	s := new(big.Int).SetBytes(sig[32:])
+	h := sha256.Sum256([]byte(parts[0] + "." + parts[1]))
+	if !ecdsa.Verify(f.key.Public().(*ecdsa.PublicKey), h[:], r, s) {
+		t.Error("signature did not verify")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestBuildSignedJWT_NilSigner(t *testing.T) {
+	if _, err := buildSignedJWT(context.Background(), nil, keysigner.KeyRef{}, "ES256", nil, nil); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected error for nil signer")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestBuildSignedJWT_AlgMismatch(t *testing.T) {
+	f := newFakeSigner(t) // always reports ES256
+	if _, err := buildSignedJWT(context.Background(), f, keysigner.KeyRef{}, keysigner.AlgRS256, nil, nil); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected error when header alg != signer alg")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestBuildSignedJWT_MarshalErrors(t *testing.T) {
+	f := newFakeSigner(t)
+	ctx := context.Background()
+
+	_, err := buildSignedJWT(ctx, f, keysigner.KeyRef{}, keysigner.AlgES256,
+		map[string]any{"bad": func() {}}, nil)
+	if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "jwt: marshal header") {
+		t.Fatalf("header marshal error = %v, want prefix %q", err, "jwt: marshal header")
+	}
+
+	_, err = buildSignedJWT(ctx, f, keysigner.KeyRef{}, keysigner.AlgES256,
+		nil, map[string]any{"bad": make(chan int)})
+	if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "jwt: marshal claims") {
+		t.Fatalf("claims marshal error = %v, want prefix %q", err, "jwt: marshal claims")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSignClientAssertion(t *testing.T) {
+	f := newFakeSigner(t)
+	now := time.Unix(1700000000, 0)
+	const aud = "https://accounts.feishu.cn/open-apis/authen/v2/oauth/token"
+
+	tok, err := SignClientAssertion(context.Background(), f, keysigner.KeyRef{Label: "k"}, "cli_app", aud, now)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	parts := strings.Split(tok, ".")
+	if len(parts) != 3 {
+		t.Fatalf("want 3 parts, got %d", len(parts))
+	}
+	cb, _ := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(parts[1])
+	var claims map[string]any
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(cb, &claims); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if claims["iss"] != "cli_app" || claims["aud"] != aud {
+		t.Errorf("claims = %v", claims)
+	}
+
+	// Signature must verify against the key's public half.
+	sig, _ := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(parts[2])
+	r := new(big.Int).SetBytes(sig[:32])
+	s := new(big.Int).SetBytes(sig[32:])
+	h := sha256.Sum256([]byte(parts[0] + "." + parts[1]))
+	if !ecdsa.Verify(f.key.Public().(*ecdsa.PublicKey), h[:], r, s) {
+		t.Error("client_assertion signature did not verify")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSignClientAssertion_NilSigner(t *testing.T) {
+	if _, err := SignClientAssertion(context.Background(), nil, keysigner.KeyRef{}, "cli_app", "aud", time.Unix(0, 0)); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected error for nil signer")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSignAttestation(t *testing.T) {
+	f := newFakeSigner(t)
+	now := time.Unix(1700000000, 0)
+
+	tok, err := SignAttestation(context.Background(), f, keysigner.KeyRef{Label: "k"}, "nonce-abc", now)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	parts := strings.Split(tok, ".")
+	if len(parts) != 3 {
+		t.Fatalf("want 3 parts, got %d", len(parts))
+	}
+
+	hb, _ := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(parts[0])
+	var hdr map[string]any
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(hb, &hdr); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	jwk, ok := hdr["jwk"].(map[string]any)
+	if !ok {
+		t.Fatalf("attestation header missing jwk: %v", hdr)
+	}
+	if jwk["kty"] != "EC" || jwk["crv"] != "P-256" || jwk["use"] != "sig" {
+		t.Errorf("jwk = %v", jwk)
+	}
+
+	cb, _ := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(parts[1])
+	var claims map[string]any
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(cb, &claims); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if claims["nonce"] != "nonce-abc" {
+		t.Errorf("nonce = %v", claims["nonce"])
+	}
+	// jti, iat, exp are all required by the attestation spec.
+	iat, iatOK := claims["iat"].(float64)
+	exp, expOK := claims["exp"].(float64)
+	if !iatOK || !expOK || exp <= iat {
+		t.Errorf("claims iat/exp invalid: iat=%v exp=%v", claims["iat"], claims["exp"])
+	}
+	if jti, _ := claims["jti"].(string); jti == "" {
+		t.Error("claims jti empty")
+	}
+
+	// Signature verifies against the embedded key.
+	sig, _ := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(parts[2])
+	r := new(big.Int).SetBytes(sig[:32])
+	s := new(big.Int).SetBytes(sig[32:])
+	h := sha256.Sum256([]byte(parts[0] + "." + parts[1]))
+	if !ecdsa.Verify(f.key.Public().(*ecdsa.PublicKey), h[:], r, s) {
+		t.Error("attestation signature did not verify")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSignAttestation_NilSigner(t *testing.T) {
+	if _, err := SignAttestation(context.Background(), nil, keysigner.KeyRef{}, "n", time.Unix(0, 0)); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected error for nil signer")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestClaimFactories(t *testing.T) {
+	now := time.Unix(1700000000, 0)
+
+	a := attestationClaims("nonce-xyz", now)
+	if a["nonce"] != "nonce-xyz" || a["iat"] != now.Unix() {
+		t.Errorf("attestation claims = %v", a)
+	}
+	if a["exp"] != now.Add(attestationTTL).Unix() {
+		t.Errorf("attestation exp = %v, want %v", a["exp"], now.Add(attestationTTL).Unix())
+	}
+	if jti, _ := a["jti"].(string); jti == "" {
+		t.Error("attestation jti empty")
+	}
+
+	c := clientAssertionClaims("cli_app", "aud", now, time.Minute)
+	if c["exp"].(int64) != now.Add(time.Minute).Unix() {
+		t.Errorf("client_assertion exp = %v", c["exp"])
+	}
+}

internal/auth/uat_client.go

@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ import (
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/errs"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/errclass"
+	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/keysigner"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/vfs"
 )
 
@@ -37,7 +38,10 @@ type UATCallOptions struct {
 	AppId      string
 	AppSecret  string
 	Domain     core.LarkBrand
-	ErrOut     io.Writer // diagnostic/status output (caller injects f.IOStreams.ErrOut)
+	AuthMethod string           // "" == client_secret; core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT
+	KeyLabel   string           // TEE key handle for private_key_jwt
+	Signer     keysigner.Signer // active signer for private_key_jwt
+	ErrOut     io.Writer        // diagnostic/status output (caller injects f.IOStreams.ErrOut)
 }
 
 // UATStatus represents the status of a user access token.
@@ -61,6 +65,9 @@ func NewUATCallOptions(cfg *core.CliConfig, errOut io.Writer) UATCallOptions {
 		AppId:      cfg.AppID,
 		AppSecret:  cfg.AppSecret,
 		Domain:     cfg.Brand,
+		AuthMethod: cfg.AuthMethod,
+		KeyLabel:   cfg.KeyLabel,
+		Signer:     keysigner.Active(),
 		ErrOut:     errOut,
 	}
 }
@@ -193,7 +200,14 @@ func doRefreshToken(httpClient *http.Client, opts UATCallOptions, stored *Stored
 		form.Set("grant_type", "refresh_token")
 		form.Set("refresh_token", stored.RefreshToken)
 		form.Set("client_id", opts.AppId)
-		form.Set("client_secret", opts.AppSecret)
+		ca := ClientAuth{AppID: opts.AppId, AppSecret: opts.AppSecret, AuthMethod: opts.AuthMethod, Signer: opts.Signer, KeyLabel: opts.KeyLabel}
+		usedAssertion, caErr := ca.applyClientAssertion(context.Background(), form, core.OpenAPIAudience(opts.Domain))
+		if caErr != nil {
+			return nil, caErr
+		}
+		if !usedAssertion {
+			form.Set("client_secret", opts.AppSecret)
+		}
 
 		req, err := http.NewRequest("POST", endpoints.Token, strings.NewReader(form.Encode()))
 		if err != nil {

internal/auth/uat_client_options_test.go

@@ -38,3 +38,23 @@ func TestNewUATCallOptions(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Error("ErrOut not set correctly")
 	}
 }
+
+// TestNewUATCallOptions_PrivateKeyJWT verifies the auth-method fields propagate
+// so the refresh path can mint a client_assertion instead of sending a secret.
+func TestNewUATCallOptions_PrivateKeyJWT(t *testing.T) {
+	cfg := &core.CliConfig{
+		AppID:      "cli_pk",
+		Brand:      core.BrandFeishu,
+		UserOpenId: "ou_test",
+		AuthMethod: core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT,
+		KeyLabel:   "agent-key",
+	}
+	opts := NewUATCallOptions(cfg, &bytes.Buffer{})
+
+	if opts.AuthMethod != core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT {
+		t.Errorf("AuthMethod = %q, want private_key_jwt", opts.AuthMethod)
+	}
+	if opts.KeyLabel != "agent-key" {
+		t.Errorf("KeyLabel = %q, want agent-key", opts.KeyLabel)
+	}
+}

internal/binding/audit.go

@@ -131,3 +131,31 @@ func requireInTrustedDirs(effectivePath string, trustedDirs []string, label stri
 	}
 	return fmt.Errorf("%s: path %q is not inside any trusted directory", label, effectivePath)
 }
+
+// auditFilePermissions rejects world/group-writable modes (always) and
+// world/group-readable modes (unless allowReadableByOthers is true, which
+// exec commands typically need for their usual 755 mode).
+func auditFilePermissions(effectivePath string, allowReadableByOthers bool, label string) error {
+	info, err := vfs.Stat(effectivePath)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("%s: cannot stat %q: %w", label, effectivePath, err)
+	}
+	mode := info.Mode().Perm()
+
+	if mode&0o002 != 0 {
+		return fmt.Errorf("%s: path %q is world-writable (mode %04o)", label, effectivePath, mode)
+	}
+	if mode&0o020 != 0 {
+		return fmt.Errorf("%s: path %q is group-writable (mode %04o)", label, effectivePath, mode)
+	}
+	if allowReadableByOthers {
+		return nil
+	}
+	if mode&0o004 != 0 {
+		return fmt.Errorf("%s: path %q is world-readable (mode %04o)", label, effectivePath, mode)
+	}
+	if mode&0o040 != 0 {
+		return fmt.Errorf("%s: path %q is group-readable (mode %04o)", label, effectivePath, mode)
+	}
+	return nil
+}

internal/binding/audit_unix.go

@@ -29,31 +29,3 @@ func checkOwnerUID(path, label string) error {
 	}
 	return nil
 }
-
-// auditFilePermissions rejects world/group-writable modes (always) and
-// world/group-readable modes (unless allowReadableByOthers is true, which
-// exec commands typically need for their usual 755 mode).
-func auditFilePermissions(effectivePath string, allowReadableByOthers bool, label string) error {
-	info, err := vfs.Stat(effectivePath)
-	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("%s: cannot stat %q: %w", label, effectivePath, err)
-	}
-	mode := info.Mode().Perm()
-
-	if mode&0o002 != 0 {
-		return fmt.Errorf("%s: path %q is world-writable (mode %04o)", label, effectivePath, mode)
-	}
-	if mode&0o020 != 0 {
-		return fmt.Errorf("%s: path %q is group-writable (mode %04o)", label, effectivePath, mode)
-	}
-	if allowReadableByOthers {
-		return nil
-	}
-	if mode&0o004 != 0 {
-		return fmt.Errorf("%s: path %q is world-readable (mode %04o)", label, effectivePath, mode)
-	}
-	if mode&0o040 != 0 {
-		return fmt.Errorf("%s: path %q is group-readable (mode %04o)", label, effectivePath, mode)
-	}
-	return nil
-}

internal/binding/audit_windows.go

@@ -5,22 +5,7 @@
 
 package binding
 
-import (
-	"fmt"
-
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/vfs"
-)
-
 // checkOwnerUID is a no-op on Windows where Unix UID semantics don't apply.
 func checkOwnerUID(path, label string) error {
 	return nil
 }
-
-// auditFilePermissions skips POSIX permission-bit auditing on Windows because
-// Go synthesizes mode bits from file attributes rather than NTFS ACLs.
-func auditFilePermissions(effectivePath string, allowReadableByOthers bool, label string) error {
-	if _, err := vfs.Stat(effectivePath); err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("%s: cannot stat %q: %w", label, effectivePath, err)
-	}
-	return nil
-}

internal/binding/audit_windows_test.go

@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
-
-//go:build windows
-
-package binding
-
-import (
-	"os"
-	"path/filepath"
-	"testing"
-)
-
-func TestAssertSecurePath_WindowsIgnoresSyntheticUnixPermissionBits(t *testing.T) {
-	dir := t.TempDir()
-	p := filepath.Join(dir, "secrets-getter.cmd")
-	if err := os.WriteFile(p, []byte("@echo off\r\n"), 0o600); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("write temp command: %v", err)
-	}
-
-	got, err := AssertSecurePath(AuditParams{
-		TargetPath:            p,
-		Label:                 "exec provider command",
-		AllowInsecurePath:     false,
-		AllowReadableByOthers: true,
-	})
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("unexpected error for Windows synthetic mode bits: %v", err)
-	}
-	if got != p {
-		t.Errorf("got %q, want %q", got, p)
-	}
-}

internal/cmdutil/iostreams.go

@@ -42,6 +42,16 @@ func NewIOStreams(in io.Reader, out, errOut io.Writer) *IOStreams {
 	return &IOStreams{In: in, Out: out, ErrOut: errOut, IsTerminal: isTerminal, StderrIsTerminal: stderrIsTerminal}
 }
 
+// StdoutIsTerminal reports whether Out is an interactive terminal. Unlike
+// IsTerminal — which reflects stdin and drives prompt decisions — this is the
+// correct check for OUTPUT formatting: `cmd | jq` must still emit machine output
+// from an interactive shell (stdin is a TTY there, but stdout is the pipe).
+// Buffers (tests) and redirects are not *os.File terminals, so they yield false.
+func (s *IOStreams) StdoutIsTerminal() bool {
+	f, ok := s.Out.(*os.File)
+	return ok && term.IsTerminal(int(f.Fd()))
+}
+
 // SystemIO creates an IOStreams wired to the process's standard file descriptors.
 //
 //nolint:forbidigo // entry point for real stdio

internal/cmdutil/iostreams_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package cmdutil
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"os"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func TestStdoutIsTerminal(t *testing.T) {
+	// Buffer-backed output (tests, captured output) is never a terminal.
+	if (&IOStreams{Out: &bytes.Buffer{}}).StdoutIsTerminal() {
+		t.Error("bytes.Buffer Out should not be a terminal")
+	}
+	// An os.Pipe write end is an *os.File but not a terminal — mirrors `cmd | jq`,
+	// the case the stdin-based IsTerminal would get wrong.
+	r, w, err := os.Pipe()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	defer r.Close()
+	defer w.Close()
+	if (&IOStreams{Out: w}).StdoutIsTerminal() {
+		t.Error("os.Pipe Out should not be a terminal")
+	}
+}

internal/core/config.go

@@ -36,6 +36,13 @@ type AppUser struct {
 	UserName   string `json:"userName"`
 }
 
+// Auth methods for app credentials. An empty AppConfig.AuthMethod means the
+// default, client_secret.
+const (
+	AuthMethodClientSecret  = "client_secret"   // app_id + app_secret
+	AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT = "private_key_jwt" // TEE-signed client_assertion; no app secret
+)
+
 // AppConfig is a per-app configuration entry (stored format — secrets may be unresolved).
 type AppConfig struct {
 	Name       string      `json:"name,omitempty"`
@@ -46,6 +53,15 @@ type AppConfig struct {
 	DefaultAs  Identity    `json:"defaultAs,omitempty"` // AsUser | AsBot | AsAuto
 	StrictMode *StrictMode `json:"strictMode,omitempty"`
 	Users      []AppUser   `json:"users"`
+
+	// AuthMethod selects how tokens are minted. Empty == AuthMethodClientSecret
+	// (back-compat). AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT uses a TEE-held key (see KeyRef) to
+	// sign client_assertion JWTs instead of sending an app secret.
+	AuthMethod string `json:"authMethod,omitempty"`
+	// KeyRef references the non-exportable signing key for private_key_jwt.
+	// Source is "tee" and ID is the backend key label; the actual key never
+	// leaves the secure backend, so this is a handle, not secret material.
+	KeyRef *SecretRef `json:"keyRef,omitempty"`
 }
 
 // ProfileName returns the display name for this app config.
@@ -161,7 +177,9 @@ type CliConfig struct {
 	UserOpenId          string
 	UserName            string
 	Lang                i18n.Lang
-	SupportedIdentities uint8 `json:"-"` // bitflag: 1=user, 2=bot; set by credential provider
+	SupportedIdentities uint8  `json:"-"` // bitflag: 1=user, 2=bot; set by credential provider
+	AuthMethod          string // "" == client_secret; AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT
+	KeyLabel            string // resolved TEE key handle for private_key_jwt
 }
 
 // identityBotBit is the bit flag for bot identity in SupportedIdentities.
@@ -247,31 +265,58 @@ func ResolveConfigFromMulti(raw *MultiAppConfig, kc keychain.KeychainAccess, pro
 			WithHint("available profiles: %s", formatProfileNames(raw.ProfileNames()))
 	}
 
-	if err := ValidateSecretKeyMatch(app.AppId, app.AppSecret); err != nil {
-		return nil, errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeNotConfigured, "appId and appSecret keychain key are out of sync").
-			WithHint("%s", err.Error()).
-			WithCause(err)
+	// Validate the auth method first so a malformed profile fails here rather
+	// than silently degrading to client_secret (unknown method) or failing later
+	// at token-signing. Empty stays empty — downstream treats it as client_secret
+	// (back-compat).
+	switch app.AuthMethod {
+	case "", AuthMethodClientSecret, AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT:
+	default:
+		return nil, errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeInvalidConfig, "unknown authMethod %q", app.AuthMethod).
+			WithHint("supported: %s, %s (empty defaults to %s)", AuthMethodClientSecret, AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT, AuthMethodClientSecret)
 	}
 
-	secret, err := ResolveSecretInput(app.AppSecret, kc)
-	if err != nil {
-		if errs.IsTyped(err) {
-			return nil, err
+	// private_key_jwt carries no secret: validate the key handle and skip secret
+	// resolution entirely, so a stale/broken AppSecret ref never produces a
+	// confusing secret-resolution error for an otherwise-valid pkjwt profile.
+	var secret string
+	if app.AuthMethod == AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT {
+		if app.KeyRef == nil || app.KeyRef.Source != "tee" || app.KeyRef.ID == "" {
+			return nil, errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeInvalidConfig, "private_key_jwt requires a key handle (keyRef) but none is configured").
+				WithHint("re-run: lark-cli config init --new --auth-method private_key_jwt")
 		}
-		subtype := errs.SubtypeNotConfigured
-		if isMalformedConfigError(err) {
-			subtype = errs.SubtypeInvalidConfig
+	} else {
+		if err := ValidateSecretKeyMatch(app.AppId, app.AppSecret); err != nil {
+			return nil, errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeNotConfigured, "appId and appSecret keychain key are out of sync").
+				WithHint("%s", err.Error()).
+				WithCause(err)
+		}
+		var resolveErr error
+		secret, resolveErr = ResolveSecretInput(app.AppSecret, kc)
+		if resolveErr != nil {
+			if errs.IsTyped(resolveErr) {
+				return nil, resolveErr
+			}
+			subtype := errs.SubtypeNotConfigured
+			if isMalformedConfigError(resolveErr) {
+				subtype = errs.SubtypeInvalidConfig
+			}
+			return nil, errs.NewConfigError(subtype, "%s", resolveErr.Error()).WithCause(resolveErr)
 		}
-		return nil, errs.NewConfigError(subtype, "%s", err.Error()).WithCause(err)
 	}
+
 	cfg := &CliConfig{
 		ProfileName: app.ProfileName(),
 		AppID:       app.AppId,
 		AppSecret:   secret,
 		Brand:       app.Brand,
 		Lang:        app.Lang,
+		AuthMethod:  app.AuthMethod,
 		DefaultAs:   app.DefaultAs,
 	}
+	if app.KeyRef != nil {
+		cfg.KeyLabel = app.KeyRef.ID
+	}
 	if len(app.Users) > 0 {
 		cfg.UserOpenId = app.Users[0].UserOpenId
 		cfg.UserName = app.Users[0].UserName

internal/core/config_test.go

@@ -133,6 +133,108 @@ func TestResolveConfigFromMulti_AcceptsPlainSecret(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+// TestResolveConfigFromMulti_RejectsUnknownAuthMethod ensures an unsupported
+// authMethod fails at resolution rather than silently degrading to client_secret.
+func TestResolveConfigFromMulti_RejectsUnknownAuthMethod(t *testing.T) {
+	raw := &MultiAppConfig{
+		Apps: []AppConfig{
+			{
+				AppId:      "cli_abc",
+				AppSecret:  PlainSecret("my-secret"),
+				Brand:      BrandFeishu,
+				AuthMethod: "bogus_method",
+			},
+		},
+	}
+
+	_, err := ResolveConfigFromMulti(raw, nil, "")
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected error for unknown authMethod")
+	}
+	var cfgErr *errs.ConfigError
+	if !errors.As(err, &cfgErr) {
+		t.Fatalf("expected ConfigError, got %T: %v", err, err)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestResolveConfigFromMulti_PrivateKeyJWTRequiresKeyRef ensures private_key_jwt
+// without a key handle fails at resolution rather than later at token-signing.
+func TestResolveConfigFromMulti_PrivateKeyJWTRequiresKeyRef(t *testing.T) {
+	raw := &MultiAppConfig{
+		Apps: []AppConfig{
+			{
+				AppId:      "cli_abc",
+				AppSecret:  SecretInput{}, // private_key_jwt carries no app secret
+				Brand:      BrandFeishu,
+				AuthMethod: AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT,
+				// KeyRef intentionally nil
+			},
+		},
+	}
+
+	_, err := ResolveConfigFromMulti(raw, nil, "")
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected error for private_key_jwt without keyRef")
+	}
+	var cfgErr *errs.ConfigError
+	if !errors.As(err, &cfgErr) {
+		t.Fatalf("expected ConfigError, got %T: %v", err, err)
+	}
+
+	// Control: same config WITH a keyRef resolves cleanly and sets KeyLabel.
+	raw.Apps[0].KeyRef = &SecretRef{Source: "tee", ID: "larksuite-cli-agent"}
+	cfg, err := ResolveConfigFromMulti(raw, nil, "")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("unexpected error with keyRef present: %v", err)
+	}
+	if cfg.KeyLabel != "larksuite-cli-agent" {
+		t.Errorf("KeyLabel = %q, want larksuite-cli-agent", cfg.KeyLabel)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestResolveConfigFromMulti_PKJWTSkipsSecretResolution ensures a private_key_jwt
+// profile that carries a stale/broken AppSecret ref still resolves cleanly: the
+// auth method is judged before any secret handling, so the stale ref is ignored
+// instead of producing a confusing secret-resolution failure.
+func TestResolveConfigFromMulti_PKJWTSkipsSecretResolution(t *testing.T) {
+	raw := &MultiAppConfig{
+		Apps: []AppConfig{{
+			AppId: "cli_pk",
+			// Stale keychain ref whose ID does not match appId — would trip
+			// ValidateSecretKeyMatch / ResolveSecretInput if it were reached.
+			AppSecret:  SecretInput{Ref: &SecretRef{Source: "keychain", ID: "appsecret:cli_OTHER"}},
+			Brand:      BrandFeishu,
+			AuthMethod: AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT,
+			KeyRef:     &SecretRef{Source: "tee", ID: "agent-key"},
+			Users:      []AppUser{},
+		}},
+	}
+	cfg, err := ResolveConfigFromMulti(raw, stubKeychain{}, "")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("pkjwt with stale secret ref must skip secret resolution, got %v", err)
+	}
+	if cfg.AuthMethod != AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT || cfg.KeyLabel != "agent-key" {
+		t.Errorf("got authMethod=%q keyLabel=%q", cfg.AuthMethod, cfg.KeyLabel)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestResolveConfigFromMulti_PKJWTRejectsBadKeyRef ensures the stricter keyRef
+// check (Source=="tee" && ID!="") rejects malformed handles.
+func TestResolveConfigFromMulti_PKJWTRejectsBadKeyRef(t *testing.T) {
+	for i, ref := range []*SecretRef{
+		{Source: "keychain", ID: "x"}, // wrong source
+		{Source: "tee", ID: ""},       // empty id
+	} {
+		raw := &MultiAppConfig{Apps: []AppConfig{{
+			AppId: "cli_pk", Brand: BrandFeishu,
+			AuthMethod: AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT, KeyRef: ref, Users: []AppUser{},
+		}}}
+		if _, err := ResolveConfigFromMulti(raw, stubKeychain{}, ""); err == nil {
+			t.Errorf("case %d: expected ConfigError for bad keyRef", i)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
 func TestResolveConfigFromMulti_CarriesLang(t *testing.T) {
 	raw := &MultiAppConfig{
 		Apps: []AppConfig{

internal/core/types.go

@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@
 
 package core
 
+import "strings"
+
 // LarkBrand represents the Lark platform brand.
 // "feishu" targets China-mainland, "lark" targets international.
 // Any other string is treated as a custom base URL.
@@ -60,3 +62,10 @@ func ResolveEndpoints(brand LarkBrand) Endpoints {
 func ResolveOpenBaseURL(brand LarkBrand) string {
 	return ResolveEndpoints(brand).Open
 }
+
+// OpenAPIAudience returns the client_assertion `aud` value for the brand: the
+// bare Open API host per the App Authentication JWT spec — "open.feishu.cn" or
+// "open.larksuite.com" — not the full token endpoint URL.
+func OpenAPIAudience(brand LarkBrand) string {
+	return strings.TrimPrefix(ResolveOpenBaseURL(brand), "https://")
+}

internal/core/types_test.go

@@ -57,3 +57,12 @@ func TestResolveOpenBaseURL(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Errorf("ResolveOpenBaseURL(lark) = %q", got)
 	}
 }
+
+func TestOpenAPIAudience(t *testing.T) {
+	if got := OpenAPIAudience(BrandFeishu); got != "open.feishu.cn" {
+		t.Errorf("OpenAPIAudience(feishu) = %q, want open.feishu.cn", got)
+	}
+	if got := OpenAPIAudience(BrandLark); got != "open.larksuite.com" {
+		t.Errorf("OpenAPIAudience(lark) = %q, want open.larksuite.com", got)
+	}
+}

internal/credential/default_provider.go

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ import (
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/keychain"
 
 	extcred "github.com/larksuite/cli/extension/credential"
+	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/keysigner"
 )
 
 // classifyTATResponseCode wraps a deterministic (non-transient) failure from the
@@ -175,6 +176,23 @@ func (p *DefaultTokenProvider) doResolveTAT(ctx context.Context) (*TokenResult,
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}
+
+	// private_key_jwt apps have no app secret: mint via the jwt-bearer grant
+	// using a TEE-signed client_assertion instead.
+	if acct.AuthMethod == core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT {
+		signer := keysigner.Active()
+		if signer == nil {
+			return nil, errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeInvalidClient,
+				"profile uses private_key_jwt but no TEE key signer is available on this build").
+				WithHint("install a build with the platform key-signer extension, or reconfigure the app to use an app secret")
+		}
+		token, err := FetchTATWithAssertion(ctx, httpClient, acct.Brand, acct.AppID, signer, acct.KeyLabel)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		return &TokenResult{Token: token}, nil
+	}
+
 	token, err := FetchTAT(ctx, httpClient, acct.Brand, acct.AppID, acct.AppSecret)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err

internal/credential/tat_fetch.go

@@ -11,8 +11,13 @@ import (
 	"net/http"
 	"net/url"
 	"strings"
+	"time"
 
+	"github.com/larksuite/cli/errs"
+	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/auth"
+	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/auth/jwt"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
+	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/keysigner"
 )
 
 // FetchTAT performs a single HTTP POST to mint a tenant access token via the
@@ -100,3 +105,96 @@ func FetchTAT(ctx context.Context, httpClient *http.Client, brand core.LarkBrand
 	}
 	return "", classifyTATResponseCode(result.Code, result.Error, desc, string(brand), appID)
 }
+
+// FetchTATWithAssertion mints a tenant access token for a private_key_jwt app via
+// the RFC 7523 jwt-bearer grant: it signs a short-lived client_assertion with the
+// TEE-held key and posts it to the unified OAuth token endpoint, replacing the
+// app_secret entirely.
+//
+// The unified v2 token endpoint returns the minted token as access_token
+// (tenant_access_token is accepted as a fallback).
+func FetchTATWithAssertion(ctx context.Context, httpClient *http.Client, brand core.LarkBrand, clientID string, signer keysigner.Signer, keyLabel string) (string, error) {
+	if signer == nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("private_key_jwt requires a key signer, but none is available on this build")
+	}
+	ep := core.ResolveEndpoints(brand)
+	endpoint := ep.Open + auth.PathOAuthTokenV2
+
+	assertion, err := jwt.SignClientAssertion(ctx, signer, keysigner.KeyRef{Label: keyLabel}, clientID, core.OpenAPIAudience(brand), time.Now())
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+
+	form := url.Values{}
+	form.Set("grant_type", "urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:jwt-bearer")
+	form.Set("client_id", clientID)
+	form.Set("client_assertion_type", jwt.ClientAssertionType)
+	form.Set("client_assertion", assertion)
+
+	req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodPost, endpoint, strings.NewReader(form.Encode()))
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
+
+	resp, err := httpClient.Do(req)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	defer resp.Body.Close()
+
+	body, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("read token response: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	var result struct {
+		Code              int    `json:"code"`
+		Msg               string `json:"msg"`
+		Error             string `json:"error"`
+		ErrorDescription  string `json:"error_description"`
+		AccessToken       string `json:"access_token"`
+		TenantAccessToken string `json:"tenant_access_token"`
+	}
+	_ = json.Unmarshal(body, &result) // best-effort; error body may not be JSON
+
+	token := result.AccessToken
+	if token == "" {
+		token = result.TenantAccessToken
+	}
+	if resp.StatusCode == http.StatusOK && token != "" && result.Error == "" && result.Code == 0 {
+		return token, nil
+	}
+
+	// Surface the server's reason, preferring the OAuth `error` code (e.g.
+	// unauthorized_client) which is more diagnostic than the description alone.
+	detail := result.ErrorDescription
+	if detail == "" {
+		detail = result.Msg
+	}
+	if detail == "" {
+		detail = strings.TrimSpace(string(body))
+	}
+	if result.Error != "" {
+		return "", classifyAssertionError(result.Error, resp.StatusCode, detail)
+	}
+	return "", fmt.Errorf("token endpoint HTTP %d (code=%d): %s", resp.StatusCode, result.Code, detail)
+}
+
+// classifyAssertionError maps the OAuth token endpoint's `error` field to a
+// typed or untyped error. Only deterministic client-credential rejections get a
+// typed errs.ConfigError (so runProbePKJWT can tell "this key is not bound to
+// this app" apart from upstream noise); every other error (e.g.
+// temporarily_unavailable) stays untyped and is swallowed by the probe. detail
+// carries only the server's error_description / msg / body text — it never
+// echoes the client_assertion or private key (the assertion lives only in the
+// request form).
+func classifyAssertionError(oauthError string, httpStatus int, detail string) error {
+	switch oauthError {
+	case "invalid_client", "unauthorized_client", "invalid_grant":
+		return errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeInvalidClient,
+			"token endpoint rejected the key (%s): %s", oauthError, detail)
+	default:
+		return fmt.Errorf("token endpoint HTTP %d (%s): %s", httpStatus, oauthError, detail)
+	}
+}

internal/credential/tat_fetch_test.go

@@ -5,15 +5,24 @@ package credential
 
 import (
 	"context"
+	"crypto"
+	"crypto/ecdsa"
+	"crypto/elliptic"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/json"
 	"errors"
 	"io"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/http/httptest"
+	"net/url"
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
 
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/errs"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
+	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/keysigner"
 )
 
 // stubRoundTripper lets us assert request shape and return canned responses.
@@ -307,3 +316,147 @@ func (r *urlRewriteRT) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
 	req2.Header = req.Header
 	return http.DefaultTransport.RoundTrip(req2)
 }
+
+// fakeTATSigner is a real in-memory ECDSA P-256 signer for assertion tests.
+type fakeTATSigner struct{ key *ecdsa.PrivateKey }
+
+func newFakeTATSigner(t *testing.T) *fakeTATSigner {
+	t.Helper()
+	k, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	return &fakeTATSigner{key: k}
+}
+
+func (f *fakeTATSigner) EnsureKey(context.Context, keysigner.KeyRef) (crypto.PublicKey, error) {
+	return f.key.Public(), nil
+}
+func (f *fakeTATSigner) PublicKey(context.Context, keysigner.KeyRef) (crypto.PublicKey, error) {
+	return f.key.Public(), nil
+}
+func (f *fakeTATSigner) Sign(_ context.Context, _ keysigner.KeyRef, in []byte) ([]byte, string, error) {
+	h := sha256.Sum256(in)
+	r, s, err := ecdsa.Sign(rand.Reader, f.key, h[:])
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, "", err
+	}
+	sig := make([]byte, 64)
+	r.FillBytes(sig[:32])
+	s.FillBytes(sig[32:])
+	return sig, keysigner.AlgES256, nil
+}
+
+func TestFetchTATWithAssertion_Success(t *testing.T) {
+	rt := &stubRoundTripper{respCode: 200, respBody: `{"access_token":"t-jwt","token_type":"Bearer","expires_in":7200}`}
+	hc := &http.Client{Transport: rt}
+
+	token, err := FetchTATWithAssertion(context.Background(), hc, core.BrandFeishu, "cli_app", newFakeTATSigner(t), "agent-key")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
+	}
+	if token != "t-jwt" {
+		t.Errorf("token = %q, want t-jwt", token)
+	}
+	if rt.gotReq.URL.String() != "https://open.feishu.cn/open-apis/authen/v2/oauth/token" {
+		t.Errorf("url = %s", rt.gotReq.URL.String())
+	}
+
+	form, err := url.ParseQuery(rt.gotBody)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if form.Get("grant_type") != "urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:jwt-bearer" {
+		t.Errorf("grant_type = %q", form.Get("grant_type"))
+	}
+	if form.Get("client_assertion_type") != "urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:jwt-bearer" {
+		t.Errorf("client_assertion_type = %q", form.Get("client_assertion_type"))
+	}
+	if form.Get("client_assertion") == "" {
+		t.Error("client_assertion is empty")
+	}
+	if form.Has("client_secret") {
+		t.Error("client_secret must NOT be sent for private_key_jwt")
+	}
+
+	// The assertion's aud must be the bare Open host per the App Authentication
+	// JWT spec — not the full token endpoint URL.
+	jwtParts := strings.Split(form.Get("client_assertion"), ".")
+	if len(jwtParts) != 3 {
+		t.Fatalf("malformed client_assertion: %q", form.Get("client_assertion"))
+	}
+	payload, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(jwtParts[1])
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("assertion payload not base64url: %v", err)
+	}
+	var claims map[string]any
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(payload, &claims); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if claims["aud"] != "open.feishu.cn" {
+		t.Errorf("client_assertion aud = %v, want open.feishu.cn", claims["aud"])
+	}
+	if claims["iss"] != "cli_app" || claims["sub"] != "cli_app" {
+		t.Errorf("client_assertion iss/sub = %v/%v, want cli_app", claims["iss"], claims["sub"])
+	}
+	if form.Get("client_id") != "cli_app" {
+		t.Errorf("client_id = %q", form.Get("client_id"))
+	}
+}
+
+func TestFetchTATWithAssertion_NilSigner(t *testing.T) {
+	hc := &http.Client{Transport: &stubRoundTripper{respCode: 200, respBody: `{}`}}
+	if _, err := FetchTATWithAssertion(context.Background(), hc, core.BrandFeishu, "cli_app", nil, "k"); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected error when signer is nil")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestFetchTATWithAssertion_ServerError(t *testing.T) {
+	rt := &stubRoundTripper{respCode: 200, respBody: `{"error":"invalid_client","error_description":"unknown key"}`}
+	hc := &http.Client{Transport: rt}
+	if _, err := FetchTATWithAssertion(context.Background(), hc, core.BrandFeishu, "cli_app", newFakeTATSigner(t), "k"); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected error for invalid_client response")
+	}
+}
+
+// Deterministic OAuth client rejections must be typed (ConfigError /
+// SubtypeInvalidClient) so runProbePKJWT can tell "the key is not bound to this
+// app" apart from transport noise.
+func TestFetchTATWithAssertion_DeterministicReject_Typed(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, oauthErr := range []string{"invalid_client", "unauthorized_client", "invalid_grant"} {
+		rt := &stubRoundTripper{respCode: 401, respBody: `{"error":"` + oauthErr + `","error_description":"bad key"}`}
+		hc := &http.Client{Transport: rt}
+		_, err := FetchTATWithAssertion(context.Background(), hc, core.BrandFeishu, "cli_app", newFakeTATSigner(t), "k")
+		if err == nil {
+			t.Fatalf("%s: expected error", oauthErr)
+		}
+		if !errs.IsTyped(err) {
+			t.Errorf("%s: must be typed, got %T", oauthErr, err)
+		}
+		var cfgErr *errs.ConfigError
+		if !errors.As(err, &cfgErr) || cfgErr.Subtype != errs.SubtypeInvalidClient {
+			t.Errorf("%s: want ConfigError/InvalidClient, got %T %v", oauthErr, err, err)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// Unrecognized OAuth errors and non-payload noise stay UNTYPED so the probe
+// treats them as upstream noise and stays silent.
+func TestFetchTATWithAssertion_AmbiguousError_Untyped(t *testing.T) {
+	cases := []string{
+		`{"error":"temporarily_unavailable","error_description":"retry"}`,
+		`{"code":99999,"msg":"weird"}`,
+		`not json`,
+	}
+	for _, body := range cases {
+		rt := &stubRoundTripper{respCode: 503, respBody: body}
+		hc := &http.Client{Transport: rt}
+		_, err := FetchTATWithAssertion(context.Background(), hc, core.BrandFeishu, "cli_app", newFakeTATSigner(t), "k")
+		if err == nil {
+			t.Fatalf("body %q: expected error", body)
+		}
+		if errs.IsTyped(err) {
+			t.Errorf("body %q: must be UNTYPED, got typed %T", body, err)
+		}
+	}
+}

internal/credential/types.go

@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ type Account struct {
 	UserName            string
 	Lang                i18n.Lang
 	SupportedIdentities uint8
+	AuthMethod          string // "" == client_secret; core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT
+	KeyLabel            string // resolved TEE key handle for private_key_jwt
 }
 
 const runtimePlaceholderAppSecret = "__LARKSUITE_CLI_TOKEN_ONLY__"
@@ -69,6 +71,8 @@ func AccountFromCliConfig(cfg *core.CliConfig) *Account {
 		UserName:            cfg.UserName,
 		Lang:                cfg.Lang,
 		SupportedIdentities: cfg.SupportedIdentities,
+		AuthMethod:          cfg.AuthMethod,
+		KeyLabel:            cfg.KeyLabel,
 	}
 }
 
@@ -87,6 +91,8 @@ func (a *Account) ToCliConfig() *core.CliConfig {
 		UserName:            a.UserName,
 		Lang:                a.Lang,
 		SupportedIdentities: a.SupportedIdentities,
+		AuthMethod:          a.AuthMethod,
+		KeyLabel:            a.KeyLabel,
 	}
 }
 

internal/identitydiag/diagnostics.go

@@ -82,7 +82,9 @@ func diagnoseBot(ctx context.Context, f *cmdutil.Factory, cfg *core.CliConfig, v
 			Hint:    "check strict mode or the active credential provider",
 		}
 	}
-	if cfg.SupportedIdentities == 0 && !credential.HasRealAppSecret(cfg.AppSecret) {
+	// private_key_jwt apps have no app secret — the bot/tenant token is minted via
+	// a TEE-signed client_assertion — so absence of a secret is NOT "unconfigured".
+	if cfg.SupportedIdentities == 0 && !credential.HasRealAppSecret(cfg.AppSecret) && cfg.AuthMethod != core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT {
 		return Identity{
 			Status:  StatusNotConfigured,
 			Message: "Bot identity: not configured (missing app secret or bot token)",

internal/keysigner/keysigner.go

@@ -0,0 +1,212 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+// Package keysigner defines the pluggable signing abstraction used by the
+// private_key_jwt registration and authentication flow.
+//
+// The open-source core only declares the Signer interface and pure-stdlib key
+// helpers. The platform implementations that hold a non-exportable private key
+// (TPM 2.0 via facebookincubator/sks on Linux/Windows, a non-extractable
+// Keychain key on macOS) live OUTSIDE this core — in a build-tagged module or
+// extension — and register themselves via Register from init(). This keeps
+// CGO-heavy and license-sensitive dependencies out of the open-source build.
+package keysigner
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"crypto"
+	"crypto/ecdsa"
+	"crypto/elliptic"
+	"crypto/rsa"
+	"crypto/x509"
+	"encoding/asn1"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"math/big"
+	"strings"
+)
+
+// KeyRef identifies a non-exportable signing key held by a backend
+// (TEE/TPM/Keychain). It is a stable handle (label), never the key material.
+type KeyRef struct {
+	// Label is the backend key label/tag (e.g. "larksuite-cli-agent").
+	Label string
+}
+
+// Signer signs JWS signing inputs with a non-exportable key.
+type Signer interface {
+	// EnsureKey returns the public key for ref, creating the key if absent.
+	EnsureKey(ctx context.Context, ref KeyRef) (crypto.PublicKey, error)
+	// PublicKey returns the public key for ref without creating it.
+	PublicKey(ctx context.Context, ref KeyRef) (crypto.PublicKey, error)
+	// Sign signs signingInput and returns a JOSE-format signature plus the JWS
+	// alg ("ES256"/"RS256"). Implementations apply the alg's hash and, for
+	// ECDSA, MUST return the fixed-width r||s form required by RFC 7518 §3.4
+	// (not ASN.1 DER), because the backend (TPM/Keychain) typically yields DER.
+	Sign(ctx context.Context, ref KeyRef, signingInput []byte) (sig []byte, alg string, err error)
+}
+
+// Supported JWS algorithms.
+const (
+	AlgES256 = "ES256"
+	AlgRS256 = "RS256"
+)
+
+// DefaultKeyLabel is the backend key label lark-cli uses for its device signing
+// key. One non-exportable key is created on first private_key_jwt registration
+// and reused across subsequent app registrations on the same device.
+const DefaultKeyLabel = "larksuite-cli-agent"
+
+// HardwareInfo describes the secure hardware backing a Signer, as reported by a
+// HardwareProber. It is advisory/diagnostic: it tells a user whether
+// private_key_jwt can use a real TEE on this device.
+type HardwareInfo struct {
+	Backend    string // backing technology, e.g. "tpm2" or "keychain"
+	Available  bool   // the hardware is present and usable for signing
+	VendorName string // hardware vendor/manufacturer, when known
+	VendorInfo string // additional vendor detail, when known
+	Reason     string // when Available is false, a human-readable cause
+}
+
+// HardwareProber is an optional capability a Signer may implement to report on
+// the secure hardware backing it (TPM/TEE vendor and availability) WITHOUT
+// creating or using a key. Probing never mutates key state.
+type HardwareProber interface {
+	ProbeHardware(ctx context.Context) (HardwareInfo, error)
+}
+
+// ProbeActiveHardware probes the active signer's secure hardware. ok is false
+// when there is no active signer or it does not implement HardwareProber — in
+// which case private_key_jwt is unsupported on this build. When ok is true, info
+// reports availability and, if unavailable, info.Reason explains why.
+func ProbeActiveHardware(ctx context.Context) (info HardwareInfo, ok bool, err error) {
+	return probeHardware(ctx, Active())
+}
+
+// probeHardware is the registry-independent core of ProbeActiveHardware, so it
+// can be unit-tested without touching the global signer.
+func probeHardware(ctx context.Context, s Signer) (HardwareInfo, bool, error) {
+	p, ok := s.(HardwareProber)
+	if !ok {
+		return HardwareInfo{}, false, nil
+	}
+	info, err := p.ProbeHardware(ctx)
+	return info, true, err
+}
+
+// cleanProbeError renders err's message with redundant re-wraps collapsed. Some
+// backends (e.g. facebookincubator/sks) wrap an error twice with the SAME "%w"
+// prefix, yielding "P: P: cause"; this peels each outer layer whose only
+// contribution is to repeat the prefix already present in the wrapped error,
+// leaving a single "P: cause". A layer that adds genuinely new context is kept.
+func cleanProbeError(err error) string {
+	if err == nil {
+		return ""
+	}
+	msg := err.Error()
+	for {
+		inner := errors.Unwrap(err)
+		if inner == nil {
+			break
+		}
+		innerMsg := inner.Error()
+		prefix, ok := strings.CutSuffix(msg, innerMsg)
+		if !ok || prefix == "" || !strings.HasPrefix(innerMsg, prefix) {
+			break
+		}
+		msg, err = innerMsg, inner
+	}
+	return msg
+}
+
+// AlgForKey returns the JWS alg for a public key: EC P-256 -> ES256, RSA -> RS256.
+// The signer backend chooses the key type (the macOS keychain signer uses an
+// RSA-2048 key, hence RS256).
+func AlgForKey(pub crypto.PublicKey) (string, error) {
+	switch k := pub.(type) {
+	case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
+		if k.Curve == elliptic.P256() {
+			return AlgES256, nil
+		}
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("keysigner: unsupported EC curve %q (only P-256/ES256)", k.Curve.Params().Name)
+	case *rsa.PublicKey:
+		return AlgRS256, nil
+	default:
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("keysigner: unsupported public key type %T", pub)
+	}
+}
+
+// ecdsaDERToJOSE converts an ASN.1 DER-encoded ECDSA signature — the form most
+// TEE/TPM backends emit (e.g. facebookincubator/sks marshals the TPM's r,s with
+// asn1.Marshal) — into the fixed-width r||s form JWS requires for ES256
+// (RFC 7518 §3.4). byteLen is the curve coordinate size (32 for P-256), so the
+// result is exactly 2*byteLen bytes with r and s each left-zero-padded.
+//
+// This is intentionally part of the pure-stdlib core (not a platform signer) so
+// it can be unit-tested with a software key on any machine, including TPM-less CI.
+func ecdsaDERToJOSE(der []byte, byteLen int) ([]byte, error) {
+	var sig struct{ R, S *big.Int }
+	rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(der, &sig)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("keysigner: parse ECDSA DER signature: %w", err)
+	}
+	if len(rest) != 0 {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("keysigner: %d trailing byte(s) after ECDSA DER signature", len(rest))
+	}
+	if sig.R == nil || sig.S == nil || sig.R.Sign() <= 0 || sig.S.Sign() <= 0 {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("keysigner: ECDSA signature has non-positive r/s")
+	}
+	// Guard before FillBytes, which panics if the scalar does not fit in byteLen.
+	if sig.R.BitLen() > byteLen*8 || sig.S.BitLen() > byteLen*8 {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("keysigner: ECDSA r/s exceeds %d-byte coordinate", byteLen)
+	}
+	out := make([]byte, 2*byteLen)
+	sig.R.FillBytes(out[:byteLen])
+	sig.S.FillBytes(out[byteLen:])
+	return out, nil
+}
+
+// EncodePublicKey marshals pub to PKIX DER and base64-encodes it (std encoding),
+// matching the public-key form the registration backend binds to the app.
+func EncodePublicKey(pub crypto.PublicKey) (string, error) {
+	der, err := x509.MarshalPKIXPublicKey(pub)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("keysigner: encode public key: %w", err)
+	}
+	return base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(der), nil
+}
+
+// PublicKeyJWK returns the RFC 7517 JSON Web Key for pub, used to embed the
+// public key in the attestation JWT's "jwk" header so the registration backend
+// can bind it to the app. EC keys use base64url fixed-width coordinates
+// (RFC 7518 §6.2.1); RSA keys use base64url-encoded modulus and exponent.
+func PublicKeyJWK(pub crypto.PublicKey) (map[string]any, error) {
+	switch k := pub.(type) {
+	case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
+		if k.Curve != elliptic.P256() {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("keysigner: JWK supports EC P-256 only, got %q", k.Curve.Params().Name)
+		}
+		const coordLen = 32 // P-256 field element size
+		x := make([]byte, coordLen)
+		y := make([]byte, coordLen)
+		k.X.FillBytes(x)
+		k.Y.FillBytes(y)
+		return map[string]any{
+			"use": "sig",
+			"kty": "EC",
+			"crv": "P-256",
+			"x":   base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(x),
+			"y":   base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(y),
+		}, nil
+	case *rsa.PublicKey:
+		return map[string]any{
+			"use": "sig",
+			"kty": "RSA",
+			"n":   base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(k.N.Bytes()),
+			"e":   base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(big.NewInt(int64(k.E)).Bytes()),
+		}, nil
+	default:
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("keysigner: unsupported public key type %T for JWK", pub)
+	}
+}

internal/keysigner/keysigner_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,240 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package keysigner
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"crypto"
+	"crypto/ecdsa"
+	"crypto/elliptic"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"crypto/rsa"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"crypto/x509"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"math/big"
+	"reflect"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func TestAlgForKey(t *testing.T) {
+	ec, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if alg, err := AlgForKey(ec.Public()); err != nil || alg != AlgES256 {
+		t.Errorf("P-256: alg=%q err=%v, want ES256/nil", alg, err)
+	}
+
+	rsaKey, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if alg, err := AlgForKey(rsaKey.Public()); err != nil || alg != AlgRS256 {
+		t.Errorf("RSA: alg=%q err=%v, want RS256/nil", alg, err)
+	}
+
+	ec384, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P384(), rand.Reader)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := AlgForKey(ec384.Public()); err == nil {
+		t.Error("P-384: expected unsupported-curve error")
+	}
+
+	if _, err := AlgForKey("not a key"); err == nil {
+		t.Error("string: expected unsupported-type error")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestEncodePublicKeyRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
+	ec, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	enc, err := EncodePublicKey(ec.Public())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	der, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(enc)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("not valid base64: %v", err)
+	}
+	pub, err := x509.ParsePKIXPublicKey(der)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("not valid PKIX: %v", err)
+	}
+	if !reflect.DeepEqual(pub, ec.Public()) {
+		t.Error("public key did not round-trip")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestPublicKeyJWK_EC(t *testing.T) {
+	ec, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	jwk, err := PublicKeyJWK(ec.Public())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if jwk["kty"] != "EC" || jwk["crv"] != "P-256" {
+		t.Errorf("jwk = %v, want kty=EC crv=P-256", jwk)
+	}
+	if jwk["use"] != "sig" {
+		t.Errorf("jwk use = %v, want sig", jwk["use"])
+	}
+	x, _ := jwk["x"].(string)
+	xb, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(x)
+	if err != nil || len(xb) != 32 {
+		t.Errorf("x = %q (decoded %d bytes), want 32-byte base64url", x, len(xb))
+	}
+	if _, ok := jwk["y"].(string); !ok {
+		t.Error("jwk missing y")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestPublicKeyJWK_RSA(t *testing.T) {
+	rsaKey, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	jwk, err := PublicKeyJWK(rsaKey.Public())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if jwk["kty"] != "RSA" || jwk["n"] == "" || jwk["e"] == "" {
+		t.Errorf("jwk = %v, want kty=RSA with n,e", jwk)
+	}
+	if jwk["use"] != "sig" {
+		t.Errorf("jwk use = %v, want sig", jwk["use"])
+	}
+}
+
+func TestPublicKeyJWK_UnsupportedCurve(t *testing.T) {
+	ec384, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P384(), rand.Reader)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := PublicKeyJWK(ec384.Public()); err == nil {
+		t.Error("P-384: expected error")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestECDSADERToJOSE(t *testing.T) {
+	key, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	// Iterate so we hit signatures whose r or s has its high bit set (ASN.1 pads
+	// those with a leading 0x00) and whose scalars are short (need left-zero
+	// padding) — verifying fixed-width conversion in both directions.
+	for i := 0; i < 64; i++ {
+		digest := sha256.Sum256([]byte{byte(i), byte(i >> 8), 'j', 'w', 't'})
+		der, err := ecdsa.SignASN1(rand.Reader, key, digest[:])
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		jose, err := ecdsaDERToJOSE(der, 32)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("iter %d: %v", i, err)
+		}
+		if len(jose) != 64 {
+			t.Fatalf("iter %d: len(jose)=%d, want 64 (fixed-width r||s)", i, len(jose))
+		}
+		r := new(big.Int).SetBytes(jose[:32])
+		s := new(big.Int).SetBytes(jose[32:])
+		if !ecdsa.Verify(&key.PublicKey, digest[:], r, s) {
+			t.Fatalf("iter %d: converted r||s did not verify against the public key", i)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestECDSADERToJOSE_Errors(t *testing.T) {
+	if _, err := ecdsaDERToJOSE([]byte{0x01, 0x02, 0x03}, 32); err == nil {
+		t.Error("garbage DER: expected error")
+	}
+	key, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	digest := sha256.Sum256([]byte("trailing"))
+	der, err := ecdsa.SignASN1(rand.Reader, key, digest[:])
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if _, err := ecdsaDERToJOSE(append(der, 0x00), 32); err == nil {
+		t.Error("DER with trailing byte: expected error")
+	}
+}
+
+type stubSigner struct{}
+
+func (stubSigner) EnsureKey(context.Context, KeyRef) (crypto.PublicKey, error)  { return nil, nil }
+func (stubSigner) PublicKey(context.Context, KeyRef) (crypto.PublicKey, error)  { return nil, nil }
+func (stubSigner) Sign(context.Context, KeyRef, []byte) ([]byte, string, error) { return nil, "", nil }
+
+func TestCleanProbeError(t *testing.T) {
+	cause := errors.New("open /dev/tpmrm0: permission denied")
+	const p = "sks: error fetching Secure Hardware Vendor Data: "
+
+	// sks double-wraps with the same %w prefix → collapse to a single prefix.
+	doubled := fmt.Errorf(p+"%w", fmt.Errorf(p+"%w", cause))
+	if got, want := cleanProbeError(doubled), p+cause.Error(); got != want {
+		t.Errorf("doubled: got %q, want %q", got, want)
+	}
+	// Triple wrap collapses too.
+	if got, want := cleanProbeError(fmt.Errorf(p+"%w", doubled)), p+cause.Error(); got != want {
+		t.Errorf("tripled: got %q, want %q", got, want)
+	}
+	// A layer adding genuinely new context is preserved.
+	if got, want := cleanProbeError(fmt.Errorf("load: %w", cause)), "load: "+cause.Error(); got != want {
+		t.Errorf("distinct prefix: got %q, want %q", got, want)
+	}
+	// nil and unwrapped-leaf cases.
+	if got := cleanProbeError(nil); got != "" {
+		t.Errorf("nil: got %q, want empty", got)
+	}
+	if got := cleanProbeError(cause); got != cause.Error() {
+		t.Errorf("leaf: got %q, want %q", got, cause.Error())
+	}
+}
+
+type proberSigner struct {
+	stubSigner
+	info HardwareInfo
+}
+
+func (p proberSigner) ProbeHardware(context.Context) (HardwareInfo, error) { return p.info, nil }
+
+func TestProbeHardware(t *testing.T) {
+	// nil signer and a signer that does not implement HardwareProber both yield ok=false.
+	if _, ok, _ := probeHardware(context.Background(), nil); ok {
+		t.Error("nil signer: ok should be false")
+	}
+	if _, ok, _ := probeHardware(context.Background(), stubSigner{}); ok {
+		t.Error("non-prober signer: ok should be false")
+	}
+
+	want := HardwareInfo{Backend: "tpm2", Available: true, VendorName: "ACME"}
+	info, ok, err := probeHardware(context.Background(), proberSigner{info: want})
+	if err != nil || !ok {
+		t.Fatalf("prober: ok=%v err=%v, want true/nil", ok, err)
+	}
+	if info != want {
+		t.Errorf("info = %+v, want %+v", info, want)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRegistry(t *testing.T) {
+	if Active() != nil {
+		t.Skip("a signer is already registered in this build")
+	}
+	Register(stubSigner{})
+	if _, ok := Active().(stubSigner); !ok {
+		t.Error("Active did not return the registered signer")
+	}
+}

internal/keysigner/registry.go

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package keysigner
+
+import "sync"
+
+var (
+	mu     sync.RWMutex
+	active Signer
+)
+
+// Register sets the active Signer. It is typically called from the init() of a
+// build-tagged or extension package that provides the platform TEE/Keychain
+// implementation. The last registration wins (one backend per platform).
+func Register(s Signer) {
+	mu.Lock()
+	defer mu.Unlock()
+	active = s
+}
+
+// Active returns the registered Signer, or nil if none is available — in which
+// case private_key_jwt is unsupported on this build and only client_secret auth
+// can be used.
+func Active() Signer {
+	mu.RLock()
+	defer mu.RUnlock()
+	return active
+}

internal/keysigner/signer_keychain_darwin.go

@@ -0,0 +1,613 @@
+//go:build darwin
+
+// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+// macOS non-exportable Keychain signer (compiled into every darwin build).
+//
+// It does NOT use the Secure Enclave / hardware TEE (which would require
+// code-signing entitlements that are unfriendly to open source). Instead it
+// generates an RSA-2048 key in software, imports it into a dedicated app
+// keychain as NON-EXTRACTABLE (`security import -x`), then deletes the software
+// copy — so the private key can sign but can never be exported. Signing is
+// RSASSA-PKCS1v15-SHA256 (RS256).
+//
+// Unlike the original revision, this implementation calls the Security and
+// CoreFoundation frameworks via RUNTIME FFI (github.com/ebitengine/purego)
+// instead of cgo. The security model is identical (the private key is still a
+// non-extractable keychain key and every signature is produced by the OS via
+// SecKeyCreateSignature), but the binary builds with CGO_ENABLED=0 and can be
+// cross-compiled for darwin from any host — so release binaries no longer
+// require a native macOS build runner.
+//
+// Build with:  go build   (cgo-free; compiled into every darwin build, no tag)
+package keysigner
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"crypto"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"crypto/rsa"
+	"crypto/sha1"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"crypto/x509"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/hex"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"fmt"
+	"os"
+	"os/exec"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"runtime"
+	"strings"
+	"sync"
+	"unsafe"
+
+	"github.com/ebitengine/purego"
+	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/vfs"
+)
+
+// ---- Security / CoreFoundation runtime bindings (purego, no cgo) ----
+
+const (
+	cfFrameworkPath  = "/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreFoundation.framework/CoreFoundation"
+	secFrameworkPath = "/System/Library/Frameworks/Security.framework/Security"
+
+	// kCFStringEncodingUTF8 (CFStringBuiltInEncodings).
+	cfStringEncodingUTF8 = 0x08000100
+
+	// OSStatus values.
+	errSecSuccess = 0
+)
+
+var (
+	ffiOnce sync.Once
+	ffiErr  error
+
+	cfDataCreate          func(alloc uintptr, bytes *byte, length int) uintptr
+	cfDataGetLength       func(d uintptr) int
+	cfDataGetBytePtr      func(d uintptr) unsafe.Pointer
+	cfStringCreate        func(alloc uintptr, cstr *byte, encoding uint32) uintptr
+	cfArrayCreate         func(alloc uintptr, values *uintptr, numValues int, cb uintptr) uintptr
+	cfDictCreateMutable   func(alloc uintptr, capacity int, keyCB, valCB uintptr) uintptr
+	cfDictSetValue        func(dict, key, val uintptr)
+	cfRelease             func(ref uintptr)
+	cfErrorGetCode        func(e uintptr) int
+	secKeychainOpen       func(path *byte, out *uintptr) int32
+	secItemCopyMatching   func(query uintptr, result *uintptr) int32
+	secItemUpdate         func(query, attrs uintptr) int32
+	secKeyCreateSignature func(key, algo, data uintptr, errOut *uintptr) uintptr
+
+	// CFTypeRef data-symbol constants (deref to obtain the held ref value).
+	kSecClass                uintptr
+	kSecClassKey             uintptr
+	kSecAttrKeyClass         uintptr
+	kSecAttrKeyClassPrivate  uintptr
+	kSecAttrKeyType          uintptr
+	kSecAttrKeyTypeRSA       uintptr
+	kSecAttrApplicationLabel uintptr
+	kSecReturnRef            uintptr
+	kSecMatchSearchList      uintptr
+	kSecAttrLabel            uintptr
+	kCFBooleanTrue           uintptr
+	algRSAPKCS1SHA256        uintptr
+
+	// Struct-symbol constants (passed BY ADDRESS, not dereferenced).
+	cbTypeArray uintptr
+	cbDictKey   uintptr
+	cbDictValue uintptr
+)
+
+// loadFFI resolves the framework functions and constants once. Any failure
+// (framework missing, symbol absent) is returned to every caller so signing
+// fails cleanly rather than crashing.
+func loadFFI() error {
+	ffiOnce.Do(func() {
+		cf, err := purego.Dlopen(cfFrameworkPath, purego.RTLD_NOW|purego.RTLD_GLOBAL)
+		if err != nil {
+			ffiErr = fmt.Errorf("keysigner: dlopen CoreFoundation: %w", err)
+			return
+		}
+		sec, err := purego.Dlopen(secFrameworkPath, purego.RTLD_NOW|purego.RTLD_GLOBAL)
+		if err != nil {
+			ffiErr = fmt.Errorf("keysigner: dlopen Security: %w", err)
+			return
+		}
+
+		purego.RegisterLibFunc(&cfDataCreate, cf, "CFDataCreate")
+		purego.RegisterLibFunc(&cfDataGetLength, cf, "CFDataGetLength")
+		purego.RegisterLibFunc(&cfDataGetBytePtr, cf, "CFDataGetBytePtr")
+		purego.RegisterLibFunc(&cfStringCreate, cf, "CFStringCreateWithCString")
+		purego.RegisterLibFunc(&cfArrayCreate, cf, "CFArrayCreate")
+		purego.RegisterLibFunc(&cfDictCreateMutable, cf, "CFDictionaryCreateMutable")
+		purego.RegisterLibFunc(&cfDictSetValue, cf, "CFDictionarySetValue")
+		purego.RegisterLibFunc(&cfRelease, cf, "CFRelease")
+		purego.RegisterLibFunc(&cfErrorGetCode, cf, "CFErrorGetCode")
+		purego.RegisterLibFunc(&secKeychainOpen, sec, "SecKeychainOpen")
+		purego.RegisterLibFunc(&secItemCopyMatching, sec, "SecItemCopyMatching")
+		purego.RegisterLibFunc(&secItemUpdate, sec, "SecItemUpdate")
+		purego.RegisterLibFunc(&secKeyCreateSignature, sec, "SecKeyCreateSignature")
+
+		// CFStringRef/CFBooleanRef constants: Dlsym gives the address of the
+		// exported variable; deref once to read the ref it holds.
+		derefs := []struct {
+			dst    *uintptr
+			handle uintptr
+			name   string
+		}{
+			{&kSecClass, sec, "kSecClass"},
+			{&kSecClassKey, sec, "kSecClassKey"},
+			{&kSecAttrKeyClass, sec, "kSecAttrKeyClass"},
+			{&kSecAttrKeyClassPrivate, sec, "kSecAttrKeyClassPrivate"},
+			{&kSecAttrKeyType, sec, "kSecAttrKeyType"},
+			{&kSecAttrKeyTypeRSA, sec, "kSecAttrKeyTypeRSA"},
+			{&kSecAttrApplicationLabel, sec, "kSecAttrApplicationLabel"},
+			{&kSecReturnRef, sec, "kSecReturnRef"},
+			{&kSecMatchSearchList, sec, "kSecMatchSearchList"},
+			{&kSecAttrLabel, sec, "kSecAttrLabel"},
+			{&kCFBooleanTrue, cf, "kCFBooleanTrue"},
+			{&algRSAPKCS1SHA256, sec, "kSecKeyAlgorithmRSASignatureDigestPKCS1v15SHA256"},
+		}
+		for _, d := range derefs {
+			sym, e := purego.Dlsym(d.handle, d.name)
+			if e != nil || sym == 0 {
+				ffiErr = fmt.Errorf("keysigner: dlsym %s: %v", d.name, e)
+				return
+			}
+			// deref of a stable dylib data-symbol address (not Go-managed memory), so safe.
+			*d.dst = *(*uintptr)(unsafe.Pointer(sym)) //nolint:govet // unsafeptr: see comment above
+		}
+
+		// Callback structs are passed by address (no deref).
+		addrs := []struct {
+			dst    *uintptr
+			handle uintptr
+			name   string
+		}{
+			{&cbTypeArray, cf, "kCFTypeArrayCallBacks"},
+			{&cbDictKey, cf, "kCFTypeDictionaryKeyCallBacks"},
+			{&cbDictValue, cf, "kCFTypeDictionaryValueCallBacks"},
+		}
+		for _, a := range addrs {
+			sym, e := purego.Dlsym(a.handle, a.name)
+			if e != nil || sym == 0 {
+				ffiErr = fmt.Errorf("keysigner: dlsym %s: %v", a.name, e)
+				return
+			}
+			*a.dst = sym
+		}
+	})
+	return ffiErr
+}
+
+// cstr returns a pointer to a NUL-terminated copy of s. The backing array stays
+// alive while the returned pointer is reachable.
+func cstr(s string) *byte {
+	b := append([]byte(s), 0)
+	return &b[0]
+}
+
+// cfBytes wraps Go bytes in a CFData (CFDataCreate copies the bytes). Caller
+// releases the returned CFDataRef.
+func cfBytes(b []byte) uintptr {
+	var p *byte
+	if len(b) > 0 {
+		p = &b[0]
+	}
+	d := cfDataCreate(0, p, len(b))
+	runtime.KeepAlive(b)
+	return d
+}
+
+// keychainSearchArray opens the dedicated keychain file and wraps it in a
+// CFArray for kSecMatchSearchList. Caller releases the returned array.
+//
+// NOTE: SecKeychainOpen / the file-based keychain are deprecated by Apple in
+// favor of the data-protection keychain. They still function on current macOS;
+// migrating off them is tracked separately and is independent of the cgo→purego
+// change (the original cgo version used the same APIs).
+func keychainSearchArray(keychainPath string) (uintptr, error) {
+	var kc uintptr
+	if st := secKeychainOpen(cstr(keychainPath), &kc); st != errSecSuccess {
+		return 0, keychainError("open keychain", int(st))
+	}
+	vals := [1]uintptr{kc}
+	arr := cfArrayCreate(0, &vals[0], 1, cbTypeArray)
+	cfRelease(kc) // the array retains it
+	if arr == 0 {
+		return 0, fmt.Errorf("keysigner: CFArrayCreate(search list) failed")
+	}
+	return arr, nil
+}
+
+// findPrivateKey locates the non-extractable private key by its application
+// label within the dedicated keychain. Caller releases the returned SecKeyRef.
+func findPrivateKey(appLabel []byte, keychainPath string) (uintptr, error) {
+	search, err := keychainSearchArray(keychainPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		return 0, err
+	}
+	defer cfRelease(search)
+
+	labelData := cfBytes(appLabel)
+	defer cfRelease(labelData)
+
+	q := cfDictCreateMutable(0, 0, cbDictKey, cbDictValue)
+	if q == 0 {
+		return 0, fmt.Errorf("keysigner: CFDictionaryCreateMutable(query) failed")
+	}
+	defer cfRelease(q)
+	cfDictSetValue(q, kSecClass, kSecClassKey)
+	cfDictSetValue(q, kSecAttrKeyClass, kSecAttrKeyClassPrivate)
+	cfDictSetValue(q, kSecAttrKeyType, kSecAttrKeyTypeRSA)
+	cfDictSetValue(q, kSecAttrApplicationLabel, labelData)
+	cfDictSetValue(q, kSecReturnRef, kCFBooleanTrue)
+	cfDictSetValue(q, kSecMatchSearchList, search)
+
+	var keyRef uintptr
+	if st := secItemCopyMatching(q, &keyRef); st != errSecSuccess {
+		return 0, keychainError("find private key", int(st))
+	}
+	return keyRef, nil
+}
+
+// securityBin is invoked by absolute path so a poisoned PATH cannot hijack it.
+const securityBin = "/usr/bin/security"
+
+// keychainSigner implements Signer using a macOS non-exportable Keychain key.
+type keychainSigner struct{}
+
+func init() { Register(keychainSigner{}) }
+
+// ProbeHardware reports the macOS Keychain backend backing this signer. The
+// keychain signer is compiled into every darwin build and needs no special
+// hardware, so it reports available whenever the Security tooling is present.
+// It performs no key access, so it never prompts. Implementing HardwareProber
+// is what lets `doctor` report the signer as present rather than treating the
+// (prober-less) signer as "no TEE signer in this build".
+func (keychainSigner) ProbeHardware(_ context.Context) (HardwareInfo, error) {
+	info := HardwareInfo{Backend: "keychain", VendorName: "macOS Keychain"}
+	// A missing security tool is a status (Available=false via Reason), not a
+	// probe error — so we deliberately return a nil error here.
+	if _, err := vfs.Stat(securityBin); err != nil {
+		info.Reason = securityBin + " not found"
+		return info, nil //nolint:nilerr // absence is reported via Reason, not as an error
+	}
+	info.Available = true
+	return info, nil
+}
+
+func (keychainSigner) EnsureKey(_ context.Context, ref KeyRef) (crypto.PublicKey, error) {
+	if md, err := readKeyMetadata(ref.Label); err == nil {
+		return decodePublicKey(md.PublicKey)
+	} else if !os.IsNotExist(err) {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return createKeychainKey(ref.Label)
+}
+
+func (keychainSigner) PublicKey(_ context.Context, ref KeyRef) (crypto.PublicKey, error) {
+	md, err := readKeyMetadata(ref.Label)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return decodePublicKey(md.PublicKey)
+}
+
+func (keychainSigner) Sign(_ context.Context, ref KeyRef, signingInput []byte) ([]byte, string, error) {
+	if err := loadFFI(); err != nil {
+		return nil, "", err
+	}
+	md, err := readKeyMetadata(ref.Label)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, "", err
+	}
+	appLabel, err := hex.DecodeString(md.AppLabel)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("keysigner: decode app label: %w", err)
+	}
+	if len(appLabel) == 0 {
+		// Guard the &appLabel[0] pointer below against corrupted metadata.
+		return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("keysigner: key metadata for %q has empty app label", ref.Label)
+	}
+	keychain, err := ensureKeychain()
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, "", err
+	}
+
+	keyRef, err := findPrivateKey(appLabel, keychain)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, "", err
+	}
+	defer cfRelease(keyRef)
+
+	digest := sha256.Sum256(signingInput)
+	digestData := cfBytes(digest[:])
+	defer cfRelease(digestData)
+
+	var errRef uintptr
+	sigRef := secKeyCreateSignature(keyRef, algRSAPKCS1SHA256, digestData, &errRef)
+	if sigRef == 0 {
+		code := 0
+		if errRef != 0 {
+			code = cfErrorGetCode(errRef)
+			cfRelease(errRef)
+		}
+		return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("keysigner: SecKeyCreateSignature failed (CFError %d)", code)
+	}
+	defer cfRelease(sigRef)
+
+	n := cfDataGetLength(sigRef)
+	bp := cfDataGetBytePtr(sigRef)
+	out := make([]byte, n)
+	copy(out, unsafe.Slice((*byte)(bp), n))
+	// RS256: the SecKey PKCS1v15-SHA256 signature is the JOSE signature as-is.
+	return out, AlgRS256, nil
+}
+
+// keyMetadata records the public key + the keychain application-label used to
+// locate the non-extractable private key.
+type keyMetadata struct {
+	PublicKey string `json:"public_key"` // PKIX DER, std base64 (see EncodePublicKey)
+	AppLabel  string `json:"app_label"`  // hex(sha1(PKCS1 public key))
+}
+
+func createKeychainKey(label string) (crypto.PublicKey, error) {
+	metadataPath, err := keyMetadataPath(label)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	privateKey, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("keysigner: generate RSA key: %w", err)
+	}
+	appLabel := sha1.Sum(x509.MarshalPKCS1PublicKey(&privateKey.PublicKey))
+
+	pemFile, err := vfs.CreateTemp("", "lark-keysigner-*.pem")
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("keysigner: temp key file: %w", err)
+	}
+	pemPath := pemFile.Name()
+	defer vfs.Remove(pemPath)
+	if err := pemFile.Chmod(0600); err != nil {
+		pemFile.Close()
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	der := x509.MarshalPKCS1PrivateKey(privateKey)
+	if _, err := pemFile.WriteString("-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\n" +
+		base64Wrap(der) + "-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\n"); err != nil {
+		pemFile.Close()
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if err := pemFile.Close(); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	executable, err := vfs.Executable()
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("keysigner: resolve executable: %w", err)
+	}
+	keychain, err := ensureKeychain()
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	// -x: import as NON-EXTRACTABLE; the software copy (pemPath) is then removed.
+	importCmd := exec.Command(securityBin, "import", pemPath, "-k", keychain, "-t", "priv", "-f", "openssl", "-x", "-A", "-T", executable)
+	if out, err := importCmd.CombinedOutput(); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("keysigner: import non-extractable key: %w: %s", err, summarizeCmdOutput(out))
+	}
+	if err := setKeychainKeyLabel(appLabel[:], keychain, label); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	encodedPub, err := EncodePublicKey(&privateKey.PublicKey)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if err := writeKeyMetadata(metadataPath, keyMetadata{PublicKey: encodedPub, AppLabel: hex.EncodeToString(appLabel[:])}); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return &privateKey.PublicKey, nil
+}
+
+func setKeychainKeyLabel(appLabel []byte, keychain, label string) error {
+	if err := loadFFI(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	search, err := keychainSearchArray(keychain)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	defer cfRelease(search)
+
+	labelData := cfBytes(appLabel)
+	defer cfRelease(labelData)
+
+	q := cfDictCreateMutable(0, 0, cbDictKey, cbDictValue)
+	if q == 0 {
+		return fmt.Errorf("keysigner: CFDictionaryCreateMutable(query) failed")
+	}
+	defer cfRelease(q)
+	cfDictSetValue(q, kSecClass, kSecClassKey)
+	cfDictSetValue(q, kSecAttrKeyClass, kSecAttrKeyClassPrivate)
+	cfDictSetValue(q, kSecAttrKeyType, kSecAttrKeyTypeRSA)
+	cfDictSetValue(q, kSecAttrApplicationLabel, labelData)
+	cfDictSetValue(q, kSecMatchSearchList, search)
+
+	cfLabel := cfStringCreate(0, cstr(label), cfStringEncodingUTF8)
+	if cfLabel == 0 {
+		return fmt.Errorf("keysigner: CFStringCreateWithCString failed")
+	}
+	defer cfRelease(cfLabel)
+	attrs := cfDictCreateMutable(0, 0, cbDictKey, cbDictValue)
+	if attrs == 0 {
+		return fmt.Errorf("keysigner: CFDictionaryCreateMutable(attrs) failed")
+	}
+	defer cfRelease(attrs)
+	cfDictSetValue(attrs, kSecAttrLabel, cfLabel)
+
+	if st := secItemUpdate(q, attrs); st != errSecSuccess {
+		return keychainError("set keychain key label", int(st))
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+func decodePublicKey(encoded string) (crypto.PublicKey, error) {
+	der, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(encoded)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("keysigner: decode public key: %w", err)
+	}
+	return x509.ParsePKIXPublicKey(der)
+}
+
+// base64Wrap PEM-wraps DER bytes at 64 columns.
+func base64Wrap(der []byte) string {
+	enc := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(der)
+	var b strings.Builder
+	for i := 0; i < len(enc); i += 64 {
+		end := i + 64
+		if end > len(enc) {
+			end = len(enc)
+		}
+		b.WriteString(enc[i:end])
+		b.WriteByte('\n')
+	}
+	return b.String()
+}
+
+func readKeyMetadata(label string) (*keyMetadata, error) {
+	path, err := keyMetadataPath(label)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	data, err := vfs.ReadFile(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err // preserves os.ErrNotExist for EnsureKey
+	}
+	var md keyMetadata
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &md); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("keysigner: parse key metadata: %w", err)
+	}
+	return &md, nil
+}
+
+func writeKeyMetadata(path string, md keyMetadata) error {
+	if err := vfs.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(path), 0700); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	data, err := json.MarshalIndent(md, "", "  ")
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	return vfs.WriteFile(path, data, 0600)
+}
+
+func ensureKeychain() (string, error) {
+	keychainPath, err := keychainFilePath()
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	password, err := keychainPassword()
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	if _, err := vfs.Stat(keychainPath); err != nil {
+		if !os.IsNotExist(err) {
+			return "", fmt.Errorf("keysigner: stat keychain: %w", err)
+		}
+		if err := vfs.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(keychainPath), 0700); err != nil {
+			return "", err
+		}
+		for _, args := range [][]string{
+			{"create-keychain", "-p", password, keychainPath},
+			{"set-keychain-settings", keychainPath},
+			{"unlock-keychain", "-p", password, keychainPath},
+		} {
+			if out, err := exec.Command(securityBin, args...).CombinedOutput(); err != nil {
+				return "", fmt.Errorf("keysigner: security %s: %w: %s", args[0], err, summarizeCmdOutput(out))
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return keychainPath, nil
+}
+
+func keysignerDir() (string, error) {
+	configDir, err := os.UserConfigDir()
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("keysigner: resolve config dir: %w", err)
+	}
+	return filepath.Join(configDir, "lark-cli", "keysigner"), nil
+}
+
+func keychainFilePath() (string, error) {
+	dir, err := keysignerDir()
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	return filepath.Join(dir, "lark-cli.keychain"), nil
+}
+
+func keychainPassword() (string, error) {
+	dir, err := keysignerDir()
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	path := filepath.Join(dir, "keychain.pass")
+	if data, err := vfs.ReadFile(path); err == nil {
+		if pw := strings.TrimSpace(string(data)); pw != "" {
+			return pw, nil
+		}
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("keysigner: empty keychain password")
+	} else if !os.IsNotExist(err) {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	buf := make([]byte, 32)
+	if _, err := rand.Read(buf); err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	pw := hex.EncodeToString(buf)
+	if err := vfs.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(path), 0700); err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	if err := vfs.WriteFile(path, []byte(pw+"\n"), 0600); err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	return pw, nil
+}
+
+func keyMetadataPath(label string) (string, error) {
+	dir, err := keysignerDir()
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	id := sha256.Sum256([]byte(label))
+	return filepath.Join(dir, "keys", hex.EncodeToString(id[:])+".json"), nil
+}
+
+// summarizeCmdOutput bounds external command output before it is embedded in
+// an error: first line only, capped at 200 chars.
+func summarizeCmdOutput(out []byte) string {
+	s := strings.TrimSpace(string(out))
+	if i := strings.IndexByte(s, '\n'); i >= 0 {
+		s = strings.TrimSpace(s[:i])
+	}
+	const maxLen = 200
+	if len(s) > maxLen {
+		s = s[:maxLen] + "..."
+	}
+	return s
+}
+
+func keychainError(operation string, status int) error {
+	switch status {
+	case -25299:
+		return fmt.Errorf("keysigner: %s: key already exists", operation)
+	case -25300:
+		return fmt.Errorf("keysigner: %s: key not found", operation)
+	case -2:
+		return fmt.Errorf("keysigner: %s: allocation failed", operation)
+	default:
+		return fmt.Errorf("keysigner: %s: Security framework status %d", operation, status)
+	}
+}

internal/keysigner/signer_keychain_darwin_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+//go:build darwin
+
+// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package keysigner
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"crypto"
+	"crypto/rsa"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"os"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// TestKeychainSignerRegistered confirms the keychain_signer build self-registers
+// (init → Register), so keysigner.Active() is non-nil. No keychain access.
+func TestKeychainSignerRegistered(t *testing.T) {
+	if _, ok := Active().(keychainSigner); !ok {
+		t.Fatalf("Active() = %T, want keychainSigner (keychain_signer build must self-register)", Active())
+	}
+}
+
+// TestKeychainSignerRoundTrip creates a real non-extractable RSA key, signs, and
+// verifies RS256 against the returned public key. Gated by LARK_KEYCHAIN_IT
+// because it mutates the dedicated lark-cli keychain store. The signer is now
+// cgo-free (purego runtime FFI), so it runs with CGO_ENABLED=0. Run with:
+//
+//	LARK_KEYCHAIN_IT=1 go test -run RoundTrip ./internal/keysigner/
+func TestKeychainSignerRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
+	if os.Getenv("LARK_KEYCHAIN_IT") == "" {
+		t.Skip("set LARK_KEYCHAIN_IT=1 to run (mutates the macOS keychain)")
+	}
+	s := keychainSigner{}
+	ref := KeyRef{Label: "lark-cli-keychain-it"}
+
+	pub, err := s.EnsureKey(context.Background(), ref)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("EnsureKey: %v", err)
+	}
+	rsaPub, ok := pub.(*rsa.PublicKey)
+	if !ok {
+		t.Fatalf("public key = %T, want *rsa.PublicKey", pub)
+	}
+	if alg, err := AlgForKey(pub); err != nil || alg != AlgRS256 {
+		t.Fatalf("AlgForKey = %q, %v; want RS256", alg, err)
+	}
+
+	input := []byte("header.payload")
+	sig, alg, err := s.Sign(context.Background(), ref, input)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Sign: %v", err)
+	}
+	if alg != AlgRS256 {
+		t.Errorf("Sign alg = %q, want RS256", alg)
+	}
+	h := sha256.Sum256(input)
+	if err := rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15(rsaPub, crypto.SHA256, h[:], sig); err != nil {
+		t.Errorf("RS256 signature did not verify: %v", err)
+	}
+}

internal/keysigner/signer_sks.go

@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+//go:build linux || (windows && amd64)
+
+// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+// TPM 2.0 signer (compiled into every linux and windows/amd64 build, no build
+// tag required), backed by github.com/facebookincubator/sks.
+//
+// sks holds a non-exportable ECDSA P-256 key in the platform TPM and signs
+// SHA-256 digests. On Linux it talks to /dev/tpmrm0; on Windows it uses the
+// Microsoft Platform Crypto Provider (CNG). Both backends return an ASN.1 DER
+// ECDSA signature, which we convert to the fixed-width r||s form JWS requires for
+// ES256 (see ecdsaDERToJOSE). One key is created on the first private_key_jwt
+// registration (DefaultKeyLabel) and reused for subsequent app registrations and
+// every client_assertion on the same device.
+//
+// Excluded from windows/arm64: the sks Windows dependency stack (go-ole) has no
+// arm64 VARIANT and fails to compile, so windows/arm64 falls back to
+// client_secret only (keysigner.Active() is nil). On darwin the keychain signer
+// is used instead. CGO is never required.
+package keysigner
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"crypto"
+	"crypto/ecdsa"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+
+	"github.com/facebookincubator/flog"
+	"github.com/facebookincubator/sks"
+)
+
+// p256ByteLen is the P-256 coordinate width. sks regular keys are always ECDSA
+// P-256, so ES256 signatures are 2*p256ByteLen bytes of r||s.
+const p256ByteLen = 32
+
+// keyTag is the sks key tag. Both the Linux and Windows sks backends address
+// keys by label and ignore the tag, but the macOS backend uses it, so we set a
+// stable namespaced value for forward compatibility.
+const keyTag = "com.larksuite.cli"
+
+// sksSigner implements Signer (and HardwareProber) using a non-exportable
+// TPM 2.0 ECDSA key via sks.
+type sksSigner struct{}
+
+func init() {
+	Register(sksSigner{})
+	// This sks version logs verbose TPM-operation chatter to stderr via flog (a
+	// glog fork it owns exclusively) — e.g. "Loaded TPM device", "Found handle
+	// for key" on every sign. The CLI does not use flog, so silence it
+	// process-wide here; real failures are returned as errors, never relied upon
+	// from these logs. (Newer sks switched to slog, but that lands only on its
+	// go-1.24 line, which we avoid to keep the module on go 1.23.)
+	flog.SetOutput(io.Discard)
+}
+
+// EnsureKey returns the public key for ref, creating the TPM key if absent.
+// sks.NewKey is find-or-create: it returns the existing key when one is present.
+func (sksSigner) EnsureKey(_ context.Context, ref KeyRef) (crypto.PublicKey, error) {
+	key, err := sks.NewKey(ref.Label, keyTag, false, true, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("keysigner: ensure TPM key %q: %w", ref.Label, err)
+	}
+	defer key.Close()
+	return ecdsaPublic(ref.Label, key.Public())
+}
+
+// PublicKey returns the public key for ref without creating it. FromLabelTag does
+// not touch the TPM until Public() loads the sealed key; a missing key yields a
+// nil public key, which we surface as an error — at runtime the key MUST already
+// exist (it was bound to the app at registration), so we never silently mint a
+// new, unbound one here.
+func (sksSigner) PublicKey(_ context.Context, ref KeyRef) (crypto.PublicKey, error) {
+	pub := sks.FromLabelTag(ref.Label).Public()
+	if pub == nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("keysigner: TPM key %q not found", ref.Label)
+	}
+	return ecdsaPublic(ref.Label, pub)
+}
+
+// Sign signs signingInput with the TPM key and returns a JOSE-format ES256
+// signature (fixed-width r||s) plus its alg.
+func (sksSigner) Sign(_ context.Context, ref KeyRef, signingInput []byte) ([]byte, string, error) {
+	key, err := sks.NewKey(ref.Label, keyTag, false, true, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("keysigner: load TPM key %q: %w", ref.Label, err)
+	}
+	defer key.Close()
+
+	// ES256 signs the SHA-256 digest of the JWS signing input.
+	digest := sha256.Sum256(signingInput)
+	der, err := key.Sign(nil, digest[:], crypto.SHA256)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("keysigner: TPM sign with key %q: %w", ref.Label, err)
+	}
+	// Both sks backends emit ASN.1 DER; JWS ES256 requires fixed-width r||s
+	// (RFC 7518 §3.4).
+	rs, err := ecdsaDERToJOSE(der, p256ByteLen)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, "", err
+	}
+	return rs, AlgES256, nil
+}
+
+// ProbeHardware reports on the TPM backing this signer without touching any key.
+// A failure to reach the TPM (no device, permission denied, not TPM 2.0) is
+// reported as Available=false with Reason set, NOT as a Go error — the probe
+// still succeeded in determining that the TEE is currently unusable.
+func (sksSigner) ProbeHardware(_ context.Context) (HardwareInfo, error) {
+	info := HardwareInfo{Backend: "tpm2"}
+	data, err := sks.GetSecureHardwareVendorData()
+	if err != nil {
+		info.Reason = cleanProbeError(err)
+		return info, nil
+	}
+	info.VendorName = data.VendorName
+	info.VendorInfo = data.VendorInfo
+	info.Available = data.IsTPM20CompliantDevice
+	if !info.Available {
+		info.Reason = "secure hardware is not a TPM 2.0 compliant device"
+	}
+	return info, nil
+}
+
+// ecdsaPublic asserts that an sks public key is an ECDSA key (it always is for
+// regular sks keys) so the caller gets the concrete type AlgForKey/PublicKeyJWK expect.
+func ecdsaPublic(label string, pub crypto.PublicKey) (*ecdsa.PublicKey, error) {
+	ecPub, ok := pub.(*ecdsa.PublicKey)
+	if !ok {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("keysigner: TPM key %q public is %T, want *ecdsa.PublicKey", label, pub)
+	}
+	return ecPub, nil
+}

internal/keysigner/signer_sks_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+//go:build linux || (windows && amd64)
+
+// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package keysigner
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"context"
+	"crypto/ecdsa"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"io"
+	"math/big"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/facebookincubator/flog"
+	"github.com/facebookincubator/sks"
+)
+
+// TestFlogSilenced verifies the mechanism init() relies on to keep sks's flog
+// TPM chatter off the CLI's stderr: SetOutput redirects flog, and io.Discard
+// drops it. Cleanup restores io.Discard so init()'s silencing holds for the
+// rest of the package's tests.
+func TestFlogSilenced(t *testing.T) {
+	var buf bytes.Buffer
+	flog.SetOutput(&buf)
+	t.Cleanup(func() { flog.SetOutput(io.Discard) })
+
+	flog.Info("captured-line")
+	if !strings.Contains(buf.String(), "captured-line") {
+		t.Fatalf("flog.SetOutput(buffer) did not capture output: %q", buf.String())
+	}
+
+	flog.SetOutput(io.Discard)
+	buf.Reset()
+	flog.Info("should-be-discarded")
+	if buf.Len() != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("flog output not discarded: %q", buf.String())
+	}
+}
+
+// requireTEE skips the test unless the TPM is present and usable. On a Linux
+// machine with a TPM but a restrictive device owner (`/dev/tpmrm0` is `tss:tss`
+// by default), grant access with `sudo usermod -aG tss $USER` then re-login, or
+// run the test under sudo.
+func requireTEE(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Helper()
+	info, err := sksSigner{}.ProbeHardware(context.Background())
+	if err != nil || !info.Available {
+		reason := info.Reason
+		if err != nil {
+			reason = err.Error()
+		}
+		t.Skipf("TEE not available (%s)", reason)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestSKSSignerRoundTrip exercises the full registration→assertion contract
+// against the real TPM: create the key, read it back without creating, derive
+// the JWS alg + JWK, sign, and verify the fixed-width r||s output.
+func TestSKSSignerRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
+	requireTEE(t)
+
+	var s sksSigner
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	ref := KeyRef{Label: "larksuite-cli-test"}
+
+	// Best-effort cleanup so the test key does not linger in the TPM-sealed store.
+	t.Cleanup(func() {
+		if k, err := sks.NewKey(ref.Label, keyTag, false, true, nil); err == nil {
+			_ = k.Remove()
+			_ = k.Close()
+		}
+	})
+
+	pub, err := s.EnsureKey(ctx, ref)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("EnsureKey: %v", err)
+	}
+	ecPub, ok := pub.(*ecdsa.PublicKey)
+	if !ok {
+		t.Fatalf("EnsureKey returned %T, want *ecdsa.PublicKey", pub)
+	}
+
+	// PublicKey (no-create) must return the same key bound at EnsureKey.
+	pub2, err := s.PublicKey(ctx, ref)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("PublicKey: %v", err)
+	}
+	if !ecPub.Equal(pub2) {
+		t.Fatal("PublicKey returned a different key than EnsureKey")
+	}
+
+	// The JWT layer derives alg + JWK from the public key; both must work.
+	if alg, err := AlgForKey(pub); err != nil || alg != AlgES256 {
+		t.Fatalf("AlgForKey = %q, %v; want ES256", alg, err)
+	}
+	if _, err := PublicKeyJWK(pub); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("PublicKeyJWK: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// Sign a representative JWS signing input and verify the converted r||s.
+	input := []byte("eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiJ9.eyJzdWIiOiJjbGkifQ")
+	sig, alg, err := s.Sign(ctx, ref, input)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("Sign: %v", err)
+	}
+	if alg != AlgES256 {
+		t.Fatalf("Sign alg = %q, want ES256", alg)
+	}
+	if len(sig) != 2*p256ByteLen {
+		t.Fatalf("len(sig) = %d, want %d (fixed-width r||s)", len(sig), 2*p256ByteLen)
+	}
+	digest := sha256.Sum256(input)
+	r := new(big.Int).SetBytes(sig[:p256ByteLen])
+	ss := new(big.Int).SetBytes(sig[p256ByteLen:])
+	if !ecdsa.Verify(ecPub, digest[:], r, ss) {
+		t.Fatal("TPM signature did not verify against the public key")
+	}
+}

internal/meta/normalize.go

@@ -113,8 +113,7 @@ type EnumOption struct {
 }
 
 // EnumOptions returns the field's allowed values paired with their descriptions
-// — from enum (with descriptions backfilled from options when the field carries
-// both forms), or from options when enum is absent — coerced to the canonical
+// — from enum, or from options when enum is absent — coerced to the canonical
 // type and ordered: numeric and boolean values are sorted; string values keep
 // source order (which can encode priority). Uncoercible literals are dropped.
 // Returns nil when the field declares no enum constraint.
@@ -123,14 +122,9 @@ func (f Field) EnumOptions() []EnumOption {
 	var out []EnumOption
 	switch {
 	case len(f.Enum) > 0:
-		// key by raw literal so enum "1" and option 1 align across JSON types
-		desc := make(map[string]string, len(f.Options))
-		for _, o := range f.Options {
-			desc[fmt.Sprintf("%v", o.Value)] = o.Description
-		}
 		for _, e := range f.Enum {
 			if v, ok := coerceLiteral(ct, e); ok {
-				out = append(out, EnumOption{Value: v, Description: desc[fmt.Sprintf("%v", e)]})
+				out = append(out, EnumOption{Value: v})
 			}
 		}
 	case len(f.Options) > 0:

internal/meta/normalize_test.go

@@ -80,39 +80,6 @@ func TestField_EnumOptions(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-func TestField_EnumOptions_BothEnumAndOptions(t *testing.T) {
-	// enum is the value set; descriptions backfilled from options, empty where absent
-	f := Field{Type: "string", Enum: []any{"1", "2", "3", "4", "6"}, Options: []Option{
-		{Value: "1", Description: "from"},
-		{Value: "2", Description: "to"},
-		{Value: "6", Description: "subject"},
-	}}
-	want := []EnumOption{
-		{Value: "1", Description: "from"},
-		{Value: "2", Description: "to"},
-		{Value: "3", Description: ""},
-		{Value: "4", Description: ""},
-		{Value: "6", Description: "subject"},
-	}
-	if got := f.EnumOptions(); !reflect.DeepEqual(got, want) {
-		t.Errorf("EnumOptions(enum+options) = %+v, want %+v", got, want)
-	}
-
-	// enum values stored as strings match option values stored as numbers
-	fi := Field{Type: "integer", Enum: []any{"10", "2", "1"}, Options: []Option{
-		{Value: 1, Description: "one"},
-		{Value: 2, Description: "two"},
-	}}
-	wantI := []EnumOption{
-		{Value: int64(1), Description: "one"},
-		{Value: int64(2), Description: "two"},
-		{Value: int64(10), Description: ""},
-	}
-	if got := fi.EnumOptions(); !reflect.DeepEqual(got, wantI) {
-		t.Errorf("EnumOptions(integer enum+options) = %+v, want %+v", got, wantI)
-	}
-}
-
 func TestField_Enum_NumberAndBoolean(t *testing.T) {
 	// number: string-stored floats coerced to float64 and numerically sorted
 	if got := (Field{Type: "number", Enum: []any{"2.5", "1.5", "10"}}).EnumValues(); !reflect.DeepEqual(got, []any{1.5, 2.5, float64(10)}) {

internal/qualitygate/cmd/comment-audit/main.go

@@ -1,92 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
-
-package main
-
-import (
-	"encoding/json"
-	"flag"
-	"fmt"
-	"os"
-
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/errs"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/qualitygate/publiccontent"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/qualitygate/report"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/validate"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/vfs"
-)
-
-type eventPayload struct {
-	Comment *struct {
-		Body string `json:"body"`
-	} `json:"comment"`
-	Review *struct {
-		Body string `json:"body"`
-	} `json:"review"`
-}
-
-func main() {
-	eventPath := flag.String("event", os.Getenv("GITHUB_EVENT_PATH"), "GitHub event payload path")
-	kind := flag.String("kind", os.Getenv("GITHUB_EVENT_NAME"), "GitHub event kind")
-	flag.Parse()
-
-	if *eventPath == "" {
-		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "comment-audit: --event or GITHUB_EVENT_PATH is required")
-		os.Exit(2)
-	}
-	body, err := commentBody(*eventPath)
-	if err != nil {
-		fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "comment-audit: %v\n", err)
-		os.Exit(2)
-	}
-	diags := diagnostics(publiccontent.ScanComment(*kind, body))
-	if len(diags) > 0 {
-		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, auditFailureSummary(len(diags)))
-	}
-	report.Print(os.Stderr, diags)
-	os.Exit(report.ExitCode(diags))
-}
-
-func auditFailureSummary(count int) string {
-	return fmt.Sprintf("post-publication audit found public content findings: %d", count)
-}
-
-func commentBody(path string) (string, error) {
-	safePath, err := validate.SafeInputPath(path)
-	if err != nil {
-		return "", errs.NewValidationError(errs.SubtypeInvalidArgument, "invalid --event: %v", err).
-			WithParam("--event").
-			WithCause(err)
-	}
-	data, err := vfs.ReadFile(safePath)
-	if err != nil {
-		return "", err
-	}
-	var payload eventPayload
-	if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &payload); err != nil {
-		return "", err
-	}
-	switch {
-	case payload.Comment != nil:
-		return payload.Comment.Body, nil
-	case payload.Review != nil:
-		return payload.Review.Body, nil
-	default:
-		return "", nil
-	}
-}
-
-func diagnostics(items []publiccontent.Finding) []report.Diagnostic {
-	out := make([]report.Diagnostic, 0, len(items))
-	for _, item := range items {
-		out = append(out, report.Diagnostic{
-			Rule:       item.Rule,
-			Action:     item.Action,
-			File:       item.File,
-			Line:       item.Line,
-			Message:    item.Message,
-			Suggestion: item.Suggestion,
-		})
-	}
-	return out
-}

internal/qualitygate/cmd/comment-audit/main_test.go

@@ -1,70 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
-
-package main
-
-import (
-	"errors"
-	"os"
-	"path/filepath"
-	"testing"
-
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/errs"
-)
-
-func TestCommentBodyReadsSafeRelativeEventPath(t *testing.T) {
-	dir := t.TempDir()
-	if err := writeTestFile(filepath.Join(dir, "event.json"), `{"comment":{"body":"clean comment"}}`); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	origDir, err := os.Getwd()
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if err := os.Chdir(dir); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	t.Cleanup(func() {
-		_ = os.Chdir(origDir)
-	})
-
-	got, err := commentBody("event.json")
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("commentBody() error = %v", err)
-	}
-	if got != "clean comment" {
-		t.Fatalf("comment body = %q", got)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestCommentBodyRejectsUnsafeEventPath(t *testing.T) {
-	path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "event.json")
-	if err := writeTestFile(path, `{"comment":{"body":"clean"}}`); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-
-	_, err := commentBody(path)
-	problem, ok := errs.ProblemOf(err)
-	if err == nil || !ok {
-		t.Fatalf("commentBody(%q) error = %v, want unsafe path validation error", path, err)
-	}
-	if problem.Category != errs.CategoryValidation || problem.Subtype != errs.SubtypeInvalidArgument {
-		t.Fatalf("commentBody(%q) problem = %#v, want invalid argument validation", path, problem)
-	}
-	var validationErr *errs.ValidationError
-	if !errors.As(err, &validationErr) || validationErr.Param != "--event" {
-		t.Fatalf("commentBody(%q) error = %v, want --event validation param", path, err)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestAuditFailureSummaryStatesPostPublicationAudit(t *testing.T) {
-	got := auditFailureSummary(2)
-	want := "post-publication audit found public content findings: 2"
-	if got != want {
-		t.Fatalf("auditFailureSummary() = %q, want %q", got, want)
-	}
-}
-
-func writeTestFile(path, data string) error {
-	return os.WriteFile(path, []byte(data), 0o644)
-}

internal/qualitygate/cmd/quality-gate/main.go

@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@ import (
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/qualitygate/manifest"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/qualitygate/report"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/qualitygate/rules"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/validate"
 )
 
 func main() {
@@ -42,7 +41,6 @@ func runCheck(args []string) int {
 	fs.StringVar(&opts.FactsOut, "facts-out", "", "write facts JSON to this path")
 	fs.StringVar(&opts.ManifestPath, "manifest", "", "hand-authored command manifest JSON")
 	fs.StringVar(&opts.CommandIndexPath, "command-index", "", "full command index JSON")
-	fs.StringVar(&opts.PublicContentMetadataPath, "public-content-metadata", "", "PR title/body metadata JSON for public content checks")
 	fs.BoolVar(&printLegacyCommandCandidates, "print-legacy-command-candidates", false, "print current non-kebab-case hand-authored command candidates")
 	fs.BoolVar(&printLegacyFlagCandidates, "print-legacy-flag-candidates", false, "print current non-kebab-case flag candidates")
 	if err := fs.Parse(args); err != nil {
@@ -50,15 +48,6 @@ func runCheck(args []string) int {
 		return 2
 	}
 
-	if opts.PublicContentMetadataPath != "" {
-		safePath, err := validate.SafeInputPath(opts.PublicContentMetadataPath)
-		if err != nil {
-			fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "quality-gate check: --public-content-metadata: %v\n", err)
-			return 2
-		}
-		opts.PublicContentMetadataPath = safePath
-	}
-
 	if opts.ManifestPath == "" || opts.CommandIndexPath == "" {
 		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "quality-gate check: --manifest and --command-index are required")
 		return 2

internal/qualitygate/cmd/quality-gate/main_test.go

@@ -37,37 +37,6 @@ func TestCheckRequiresManifestInputs(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-func TestCheckAcceptsPublicContentMetadataFlag(t *testing.T) {
-	code, stderr := runCheckCaptureStderr(t, []string{
-		"--repo", t.TempDir(),
-		"--cli-bin", "./lark-cli",
-		"--public-content-metadata", ".tmp/quality-gate/pr.json",
-	})
-	if code != 2 {
-		t.Fatalf("exit code = %d, stderr=%s", code, stderr)
-	}
-	if strings.Contains(stderr, "flag provided but not defined") {
-		t.Fatalf("public content metadata flag was not registered: %s", stderr)
-	}
-	if !strings.Contains(stderr, "--manifest and --command-index are required") {
-		t.Fatalf("stderr = %s", stderr)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestCheckRejectsUnsafePublicContentMetadataPath(t *testing.T) {
-	code, stderr := runCheckCaptureStderr(t, []string{
-		"--repo", t.TempDir(),
-		"--cli-bin", "./lark-cli",
-		"--public-content-metadata", filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "pr.json"),
-	})
-	if code != 2 {
-		t.Fatalf("exit code = %d, stderr=%s", code, stderr)
-	}
-	if !strings.Contains(stderr, "--public-content-metadata") || !strings.Contains(stderr, "--file") {
-		t.Fatalf("stderr = %s, want unsafe public content metadata path error", stderr)
-	}
-}
-
 func TestCheckReportsManifestReadErrorsWithFlagName(t *testing.T) {
 	dir := t.TempDir()
 	manifestPath := filepath.Join(dir, "command-manifest.json")

internal/qualitygate/cmd/semantic-review/main.go

@@ -56,14 +56,6 @@ func run(args []string) int {
 		_ = semantic.WriteMarkdown(markdownOut, decision)
 		return 0
 	}
-	if reviewPath == "" && !semantic.BuildInputView(f).HasReviewableFacts() {
-		decision := finalizeDecision(block, waiverDiags, semantic.Decision{})
-		if err := writeSemanticOutputs(decisionOut, markdownOut, decision); err != nil {
-			fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "semantic-review: %v\n", err)
-			return 2
-		}
-		return decisionExitCode(decision)
-	}
 	review, err := semantic.LoadOrReviewWithConfig(context.Background(), f, reviewPath, modelConfig)
 	if err != nil {
 		fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "semantic-review: %v\n", err)
@@ -80,15 +72,6 @@ func run(args []string) int {
 		return 0
 	}
 	decision := semantic.DecideWithWaivers(f, review, policy, waivers)
-	decision = finalizeDecision(block, waiverDiags, decision)
-	if err := writeSemanticOutputs(decisionOut, markdownOut, decision); err != nil {
-		fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "semantic-review: %v\n", err)
-		return 2
-	}
-	return decisionExitCode(decision)
-}
-
-func finalizeDecision(block bool, waiverDiags []report.Diagnostic, decision semantic.Decision) semantic.Decision {
 	decision.BlockMode = block
 	if !block && len(decision.Blockers) > 0 {
 		for i := range decision.Blockers {
@@ -98,21 +81,15 @@ func finalizeDecision(block bool, waiverDiags []report.Diagnostic, decision sema
 		decision.Blockers = nil
 	}
 	decision.SystemWarnings = append(diagnosticSystemWarnings(waiverDiags), decision.SystemWarnings...)
-	return decision
-}
-
-func writeSemanticOutputs(decisionOut, markdownOut string, decision semantic.Decision) error {
 	if err := semantic.WriteDecision(decisionOut, decision); err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("write decision: %w", err)
+		fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "semantic-review: write decision: %v\n", err)
+		return 2
 	}
 	if err := semantic.WriteMarkdown(markdownOut, decision); err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("write markdown: %w", err)
+		fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "semantic-review: write markdown: %v\n", err)
+		return 2
 	}
-	return nil
-}
-
-func decisionExitCode(decision semantic.Decision) int {
-	if decision.BlockMode && len(decision.Blockers) > 0 {
+	if block && len(decision.Blockers) > 0 {
 		return 1
 	}
 	return 0

internal/qualitygate/cmd/semantic-review/main_test.go

@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ import (
 	"encoding/json"
 	"os"
 	"path/filepath"
-	"strings"
 	"testing"
 
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/qualitygate/facts"
@@ -212,19 +211,7 @@ func TestRunWritesSkippedDecisionForUnavailableReviewer(t *testing.T) {
 	  "allowed_base_urls": ["https://ark.ap-southeast.bytepluses.com/api/v3"]
 	}`, "")
 	factsPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "facts.json")
-	f := facts.Facts{
-		SchemaVersion: 1,
-		Skills: []facts.SkillFact{{
-			SourceFile:               "skills/lark-wiki/SKILL.md",
-			Line:                     30,
-			Changed:                  true,
-			ReferencesInvalidCommand: true,
-		}},
-	}
-	if !semantic.BuildInputView(f).HasReviewableFacts() {
-		t.Fatal("test setup must contain reviewable facts")
-	}
-	if err := f.WriteFile(factsPath); err != nil {
+	if err := (facts.Facts{SchemaVersion: 1}).WriteFile(factsPath); err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("write facts: %v", err)
 	}
 	decisionPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "decision.json")
@@ -241,71 +228,6 @@ func TestRunWritesSkippedDecisionForUnavailableReviewer(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-func TestRunShortCircuitsEmptySemanticInputWithoutReviewer(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Setenv("ARK_API_KEY", "")
-	t.Setenv("ARK_BASE_URL", "")
-	t.Setenv("ARK_MODEL", "")
-
-	repo := t.TempDir()
-	writeSemanticConfig(t, repo, `{
-	  "schema_version": 1,
-	  "default_enforcement": "observe",
-	  "block_categories": ["skill_quality"]
-	}`, `{
-	  "allowed": ["semantic-review-v1"],
-	  "allowed_base_urls": ["https://ark.ap-southeast.bytepluses.com/api/v3"]
-	}`, "")
-	factsPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "facts.json")
-	f := facts.Facts{
-		SchemaVersion: 1,
-		Commands: []facts.CommandFact{{
-			Path:    "service command 1",
-			Domain:  "service",
-			Changed: true,
-			Source:  "service",
-		}},
-		Outputs: []facts.OutputFact{{
-			Command:          "service command 1",
-			Domain:           "service",
-			Changed:          true,
-			Source:           "service",
-			IsList:           true,
-			HasDefaultLimit:  true,
-			HasDecisionField: true,
-		}},
-	}
-	if semantic.BuildInputView(f).HasReviewableFacts() {
-		t.Fatal("test setup must not contain reviewable facts")
-	}
-	if err := f.WriteFile(factsPath); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("write facts: %v", err)
-	}
-	decisionPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "decision.json")
-	markdownPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "semantic.md")
-	code := run([]string{"--repo", repo, "--facts", factsPath, "--decision-out", decisionPath, "--markdown-out", markdownPath, "--block"})
-	if code != 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("run() = %d, want clean pass", code)
-	}
-	decision := readDecision(t, decisionPath)
-	if decision.Skipped || decision.Degraded || decision.InfrastructureFailure || !decision.BlockMode {
-		t.Fatalf("expected non-degraded pass decision: %#v", decision)
-	}
-	if len(decision.SystemWarnings) != 0 || len(decision.Warnings) != 0 || len(decision.Blockers) != 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("empty semantic view should not produce findings: %#v", decision)
-	}
-	data, err := os.ReadFile(markdownPath)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("read markdown: %v", err)
-	}
-	markdown := string(data)
-	if !strings.Contains(markdown, "No semantic blockers.") {
-		t.Fatalf("markdown missing pass summary: %s", markdown)
-	}
-	if strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(markdown), "skipped") || strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(markdown), "degraded") {
-		t.Fatalf("markdown should not report semantic review as skipped/degraded: %s", markdown)
-	}
-}
-
 func TestRunWritesInfrastructureFailureDecisionForInvalidReviewerConfig(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Setenv("ARK_API_KEY", "test-key")
 	t.Setenv("ARK_BASE_URL", "")
@@ -321,19 +243,7 @@ func TestRunWritesInfrastructureFailureDecisionForInvalidReviewerConfig(t *testi
 	  "allowed_base_urls": ["https://ark.ap-southeast.bytepluses.com/api/v3"]
 	}`, "")
 	factsPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "facts.json")
-	f := facts.Facts{
-		SchemaVersion: 1,
-		Skills: []facts.SkillFact{{
-			SourceFile:               "skills/lark-wiki/SKILL.md",
-			Line:                     30,
-			Changed:                  true,
-			ReferencesInvalidCommand: true,
-		}},
-	}
-	if !semantic.BuildInputView(f).HasReviewableFacts() {
-		t.Fatal("test setup must contain reviewable facts")
-	}
-	if err := f.WriteFile(factsPath); err != nil {
+	if err := (facts.Facts{SchemaVersion: 1}).WriteFile(factsPath); err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("write facts: %v", err)
 	}
 	decisionPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "decision.json")

internal/qualitygate/config/semantic/policy.json

@@ -5,8 +5,7 @@
     "error_hint",
     "default_output",
     "naming",
-    "skill_quality",
-    "public_content_leakage"
+    "skill_quality"
   ],
   "rollout_groups": [
     {
@@ -17,8 +16,7 @@
       },
       "categories": [
         "error_hint",
-        "skill_quality",
-        "public_content_leakage"
+        "skill_quality"
       ],
       "owner": "cli-owner",
       "reason": "first semantic blocking rollout only affects changed facts"

internal/qualitygate/facts/schema.go

@@ -13,15 +13,14 @@ import (
 )
 
 type Facts struct {
-	SchemaVersion int                 `json:"schema_version"`
-	Commands      []CommandFact       `json:"commands,omitempty"`
-	Skills        []SkillFact         `json:"skills,omitempty"`
-	SkillQuality  []SkillQualityFact  `json:"skill_quality,omitempty"`
-	Errors        []ErrorFact         `json:"errors,omitempty"`
-	Outputs       []OutputFact        `json:"outputs,omitempty"`
-	Examples      []CommandExample    `json:"examples,omitempty"`
-	PublicContent []PublicContentFact `json:"public_content,omitempty"`
-	Diagnostics   []DiagnosticFact    `json:"diagnostics,omitempty"`
+	SchemaVersion int                `json:"schema_version"`
+	Commands      []CommandFact      `json:"commands,omitempty"`
+	Skills        []SkillFact        `json:"skills,omitempty"`
+	SkillQuality  []SkillQualityFact `json:"skill_quality,omitempty"`
+	Errors        []ErrorFact        `json:"errors,omitempty"`
+	Outputs       []OutputFact       `json:"outputs,omitempty"`
+	Examples      []CommandExample   `json:"examples,omitempty"`
+	Diagnostics   []DiagnosticFact   `json:"diagnostics,omitempty"`
 }
 
 type CommandFact struct {
@@ -110,17 +109,6 @@ type OutputFact struct {
 	HasDecisionField bool     `json:"has_decision_field,omitempty"`
 }
 
-type PublicContentFact struct {
-	Rule       string        `json:"rule"`
-	Action     report.Action `json:"action"`
-	File       string        `json:"file"`
-	Line       int           `json:"line"`
-	Source     string        `json:"source,omitempty"`
-	Excerpt    string        `json:"excerpt,omitempty"`
-	Message    string        `json:"message,omitempty"`
-	Suggestion string        `json:"suggestion,omitempty"`
-}
-
 type DryRunRequest struct {
 	Method string              `json:"method"`
 	URL    string              `json:"url"`
@@ -218,11 +206,6 @@ func BuildWithCommandLookup(m manifest.Manifest, commandLookup manifest.Manifest
 	}
 }
 
-func WithPublicContent(f Facts, publicContent []PublicContentFact) Facts {
-	f.PublicContent = publicContent
-	return f
-}
-
 type commandScope struct {
 	Domain string
 	Source string

internal/qualitygate/facts/schema_test.go

@@ -34,7 +34,6 @@ func TestFactsSchemaCarriesGatekeeperFields(t *testing.T) {
 		Errors:        []ErrorFact{{Code: "invalid_input", Message: "bad path", Hint: "pass --file", Retryable: false, HintActionCount: 1, RequiredHint: true}},
 		Outputs:       []OutputFact{{Command: "im messages list", Fields: []string{"message_id", "sender", "create_time"}, IsList: true, HasDefaultLimit: true, HasDecisionField: true}},
 		Skills:        []SkillFact{{SourceFile: "skills/lark-doc/SKILL.md", Line: 1, DestructiveWithoutGuard: true, ScopeConflict: true}},
-		PublicContent: []PublicContentFact{{Rule: "public_content_generic_credential", Action: report.ActionReject, File: "docs/public.md", Line: 4, Excerpt: "api_key = <redacted>"}},
 	}
 	data, err := json.Marshal(f)
 	if err != nil {
@@ -44,10 +43,7 @@ func TestFactsSchemaCarriesGatekeeperFields(t *testing.T) {
 	if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &got); err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("unmarshal facts: %v", err)
 	}
-	if !got.Errors[0].RequiredHint ||
-		got.Outputs[0].Fields[0] != "message_id" ||
-		!got.Skills[0].ScopeConflict ||
-		got.PublicContent[0].Rule != "public_content_generic_credential" {
+	if !got.Errors[0].RequiredHint || got.Outputs[0].Fields[0] != "message_id" || !got.Skills[0].ScopeConflict {
 		t.Fatalf("facts lost gatekeeper fields: %#v", got)
 	}
 }

internal/qualitygate/publiccontent/collect.go

@@ -1,343 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
-
-package publiccontent
-
-import (
-	"bytes"
-	"context"
-	"fmt"
-	"os"
-	"os/exec"
-	"path/filepath"
-	"sort"
-	"strconv"
-	"strings"
-)
-
-func Collect(ctx context.Context, opts Options) ([]Finding, error) {
-	metadata, err := LoadMetadata(opts.MetadataPath)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-
-	var out []Finding
-	changedFiles, base, err := changedFiles(ctx, opts.Repo, opts.ChangedFrom)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-	patches := map[string][]changedChunk{}
-	if base != "" {
-		patches, err = changedPatches(ctx, opts.Repo, base)
-		if err != nil {
-			return nil, err
-		}
-	}
-	for _, file := range changedFiles {
-		if !scanChangedFile(file) {
-			continue
-		}
-		for _, chunk := range patches[file] {
-			findings := scanText(file, "file", chunk.Text, isDetectorRuleFile(file))
-			for i := range findings {
-				findings[i].Line += chunk.StartLine - 1
-			}
-			out = append(out, findings...)
-			out = append(out, semanticCandidate(file, "file", chunk.Text, chunk.StartLine)...)
-		}
-		privateKeyFindings, err := scanTouchedPrivateKeyBlocks(ctx, opts.Repo, file, patches[file])
-		if err != nil {
-			return nil, err
-		}
-		out = appendUniqueFindings(out, privateKeyFindings...)
-	}
-	if base != "" {
-		commitFindings, err := scanCommitMessages(ctx, opts.Repo, base)
-		if err != nil {
-			return nil, err
-		}
-		out = append(out, commitFindings...)
-	}
-	branchName := opts.BranchName
-	if branchName == "" {
-		branchName = metadata.Branch
-	}
-	if branchName == "" {
-		branchName = branchFromEnv()
-	}
-	if branchName == "" {
-		branchName = currentBranch(ctx, opts.Repo)
-	}
-	if branchName != "" {
-		out = append(out, scanText("branch", "branch", branchName, false)...)
-	}
-	out = append(out, scanMetadata(metadata)...)
-	sort.SliceStable(out, func(i, j int) bool {
-		if out[i].File != out[j].File {
-			return out[i].File < out[j].File
-		}
-		if out[i].Line != out[j].Line {
-			return out[i].Line < out[j].Line
-		}
-		return out[i].Rule < out[j].Rule
-	})
-	return out, nil
-}
-
-func currentBranch(ctx context.Context, repo string) string {
-	data, err := gitOutput(ctx, repo, "branch", "--show-current")
-	if err != nil {
-		return ""
-	}
-	return strings.TrimSpace(string(data))
-}
-
-func branchFromEnv() string {
-	for _, key := range []string{"PR_BRANCH", "GITHUB_HEAD_REF", "GITHUB_REF_NAME"} {
-		if value := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv(key)); value != "" {
-			return value
-		}
-	}
-	return ""
-}
-
-func changedFiles(ctx context.Context, repo, changedFrom string) ([]string, string, error) {
-	if changedFrom == "" {
-		return nil, "", nil
-	}
-	baseBytes, err := gitOutput(ctx, repo, "merge-base", changedFrom, "HEAD")
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, "", err
-	}
-	base := strings.TrimSpace(string(baseBytes))
-	files, err := diffFileNames(ctx, repo, base)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, "", err
-	}
-	sort.Strings(files)
-	return files, base, nil
-}
-
-func diffFileNames(ctx context.Context, repo, base string) ([]string, error) {
-	data, err := gitOutput(ctx, repo, "diff", "--name-only", "-z", "--diff-filter=ACMR", base+"..HEAD")
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-	var files []string
-	for _, file := range bytes.Split(data, []byte{0}) {
-		if len(file) == 0 {
-			continue
-		}
-		files = append(files, filepath.ToSlash(string(file)))
-	}
-	return files, nil
-}
-
-var detectorFixtureExclusions = map[string]bool{
-	"internal/qualitygate/publiccontent/collect_test.go": true,
-	"internal/qualitygate/publiccontent/rules.go":        true,
-	"internal/qualitygate/publiccontent/scan.go":         true,
-	"internal/qualitygate/publiccontent/scan_test.go":    true,
-}
-
-func scanChangedFile(file string) bool {
-	normalized := strings.TrimPrefix(strings.ReplaceAll(file, "\\", "/"), "./")
-	return !detectorFixtureExclusions[normalized]
-}
-
-type changedChunk struct {
-	StartLine int
-	Text      string
-}
-
-func (c changedChunk) endLine() int {
-	lines := strings.Count(strings.TrimRight(c.Text, "\n"), "\n") + 1
-	if lines < 1 {
-		lines = 1
-	}
-	return c.StartLine + lines - 1
-}
-
-func changedPatches(ctx context.Context, repo, base string) (map[string][]changedChunk, error) {
-	files, err := diffFileNames(ctx, repo, base)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-	data, err := gitOutput(ctx, repo, "diff", "--no-ext-diff", "--unified=0", "--diff-filter=ACMR", base+"..HEAD")
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-	out := map[string][]changedChunk{}
-	var file string
-	var chunk *changedChunk
-	nextLine := 0
-	nextFile := 0
-	flush := func() {
-		if file == "" || chunk == nil || chunk.Text == "" {
-			chunk = nil
-			return
-		}
-		out[file] = append(out[file], *chunk)
-		chunk = nil
-	}
-	for _, raw := range strings.Split(string(data), "\n") {
-		switch {
-		case strings.HasPrefix(raw, "diff --git "):
-			flush()
-			file = ""
-			if nextFile < len(files) {
-				file = files[nextFile]
-				nextFile++
-			}
-		case strings.HasPrefix(raw, "@@ "):
-			flush()
-			start, ok := parseNewHunkStart(raw)
-			if !ok {
-				nextLine = 0
-				continue
-			}
-			nextLine = start
-			chunk = &changedChunk{StartLine: start}
-		case strings.HasPrefix(raw, "+") && !strings.HasPrefix(raw, "+++"):
-			if chunk == nil {
-				chunk = &changedChunk{StartLine: max(nextLine, 1)}
-			}
-			chunk.Text += strings.TrimPrefix(raw, "+") + "\n"
-			nextLine++
-		case strings.HasPrefix(raw, "-"):
-			continue
-		default:
-			if chunk != nil && strings.HasPrefix(raw, `\ No newline at end of file`) {
-				continue
-			}
-			flush()
-		}
-	}
-	flush()
-	return out, nil
-}
-
-func parseNewHunkStart(header string) (int, bool) {
-	parts := strings.Split(header, " ")
-	for _, part := range parts {
-		if !strings.HasPrefix(part, "+") {
-			continue
-		}
-		raw := strings.TrimPrefix(part, "+")
-		if before, _, ok := strings.Cut(raw, ","); ok {
-			raw = before
-		}
-		start, err := strconv.Atoi(raw)
-		return start, err == nil && start > 0
-	}
-	return 0, false
-}
-
-func scanCommitMessages(ctx context.Context, repo, base string) ([]Finding, error) {
-	data, err := gitOutput(ctx, repo, "log", "--format=%H%x00%B%x00", base+"..HEAD")
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-	parts := bytes.Split(data, []byte{0})
-	var out []Finding
-	for i := 0; i+1 < len(parts); i += 2 {
-		sha := strings.TrimSpace(string(parts[i]))
-		body := string(parts[i+1])
-		if sha == "" || body == "" {
-			continue
-		}
-		short := sha
-		if len(short) > 12 {
-			short = short[:12]
-		}
-		out = append(out, scanText("commit:"+short, "commit", body, false)...)
-		out = append(out, semanticCandidate("commit:"+short, "commit", body, 1)...)
-	}
-	return out, nil
-}
-
-type lineRange struct {
-	Start int
-	End   int
-}
-
-func scanTouchedPrivateKeyBlocks(ctx context.Context, repo, file string, chunks []changedChunk) ([]Finding, error) {
-	if len(chunks) == 0 {
-		return nil, nil
-	}
-	data, err := gitOutput(ctx, repo, "show", "HEAD:"+file)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-	var added []lineRange
-	for _, chunk := range chunks {
-		added = append(added, lineRange{Start: chunk.StartLine, End: chunk.endLine()})
-	}
-	var out []Finding
-	for _, block := range privateKeyBlocks(string(data)) {
-		if !rangesIntersectAny(block, added) {
-			continue
-		}
-		out = append(out, newFinding("public_content_private_key_block", file, block.Start, "file", "private key block"))
-	}
-	return out, nil
-}
-
-func privateKeyBlocks(text string) []lineRange {
-	lines := strings.Split(text, "\n")
-	var out []lineRange
-	inPrivateKey := false
-	start := 0
-	for i, line := range lines {
-		lineNo := i + 1
-		if !inPrivateKey && strings.Contains(line, privateKeyBeginPrefix) && strings.Contains(line, privateKeyMarker) {
-			inPrivateKey = true
-			start = lineNo
-		}
-		if inPrivateKey && strings.Contains(line, privateKeyEndPrefix) && strings.Contains(line, privateKeyMarker) {
-			out = append(out, lineRange{Start: start, End: lineNo})
-			inPrivateKey = false
-		}
-	}
-	return out
-}
-
-func rangesIntersectAny(block lineRange, ranges []lineRange) bool {
-	for _, r := range ranges {
-		if block.Start <= r.End && r.Start <= block.End {
-			return true
-		}
-	}
-	return false
-}
-
-func appendUniqueFindings(items []Finding, additions ...Finding) []Finding {
-	for _, addition := range additions {
-		duplicate := false
-		for _, item := range items {
-			if item.Rule == addition.Rule &&
-				item.File == addition.File &&
-				item.Line == addition.Line &&
-				item.Source == addition.Source {
-				duplicate = true
-				break
-			}
-		}
-		if !duplicate {
-			items = append(items, addition)
-		}
-	}
-	return items
-}
-
-func gitOutput(ctx context.Context, repo string, args ...string) ([]byte, error) {
-	cmd := exec.CommandContext(ctx, "git", args...)
-	cmd.Dir = repo
-	var stdout, stderr bytes.Buffer
-	cmd.Stdout = &stdout
-	cmd.Stderr = &stderr
-	if err := cmd.Run(); err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("git %s: %w\n%s", strings.Join(args, " "), err, stderr.Bytes())
-	}
-	return stdout.Bytes(), nil
-}

internal/qualitygate/publiccontent/collect_test.go

@@ -1,885 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
-
-package publiccontent
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"os"
-	"os/exec"
-	"path/filepath"
-	"strings"
-	"testing"
-)
-
-func TestCollectScansOnlyCurrentContributionAndMetadata(t *testing.T) {
-	repo := t.TempDir()
-	runGit(t, repo, "init")
-	runGit(t, repo, "config", "user.email", "test@example.com")
-	runGit(t, repo, "config", "user.name", "Test User")
-
-	writeFile(t, filepath.Join(repo, "baseline.md"), `BASE_`+`TOKEN="baseline-only"
-`)
-	runGit(t, repo, "add", "baseline.md")
-	runGit(t, repo, "commit", "-m", "base")
-
-	writeFile(t, filepath.Join(repo, "docs", "public.md"), `# Public change
-
-api_`+`key = "example-public-key"
-`)
-	runGit(t, repo, "add", "docs/public.md")
-	runGit(t, repo, "commit", "-m", "add public doc", "-m", "Change"+"-Id: I0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef01234567")
-
-	metadataPath := filepath.Join(repo, "pr-metadata.json")
-	writeFile(t, metadataPath, `{"title":"publish public docs","body":"Reviewed`+`-on: https://review.example.test/c/project/+/123"}`)
-
-	got, err := Collect(context.Background(), Options{
-		Repo:         repo,
-		ChangedFrom:  "HEAD~1",
-		MetadataPath: metadataPath,
-	})
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("Collect() error = %v", err)
-	}
-
-	rules := findingRules(got)
-	for _, want := range []string{
-		"public_content_generic_credential",
-		"public_content_change_id_trailer",
-		"public_content_reviewed_on_trailer",
-	} {
-		if !rules[want] {
-			t.Fatalf("missing rule %s in findings %#v", want, got)
-		}
-	}
-	for _, item := range got {
-		if item.File == "baseline.md" {
-			t.Fatalf("collector scanned unchanged baseline file: %#v", got)
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-func TestCollectScansOnlyChangedLinesInChangedFiles(t *testing.T) {
-	repo := t.TempDir()
-	runGit(t, repo, "init")
-	runGit(t, repo, "config", "user.email", "test@example.com")
-	runGit(t, repo, "config", "user.name", "Test User")
-
-	writeFile(t, filepath.Join(repo, "docs", "workflow.md"), "SECRET_TOKEN=legacy-example\npublic baseline\n")
-	runGit(t, repo, "add", "docs/workflow.md")
-	runGit(t, repo, "commit", "-m", "base")
-
-	writeFile(t, filepath.Join(repo, "docs", "workflow.md"), "SECRET_TOKEN=legacy-example\npublic baseline\nnew public line\n")
-	runGit(t, repo, "add", "docs/workflow.md")
-	runGit(t, repo, "commit", "-m", "add public line")
-
-	metadataPath := filepath.Join(repo, "pr-metadata.json")
-	writeFile(t, metadataPath, `{}`)
-
-	got, err := Collect(context.Background(), Options{
-		Repo:         repo,
-		ChangedFrom:  "HEAD~1",
-		MetadataPath: metadataPath,
-	})
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("Collect() error = %v", err)
-	}
-	for _, item := range got {
-		if item.Rule == "public_content_generic_credential" && item.File == "docs/workflow.md" {
-			t.Fatalf("collector scanned unchanged legacy line in changed file: %#v", got)
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-func TestCollectSemanticCandidatesStoreSanitizedReviewText(t *testing.T) {
-	repo := t.TempDir()
-	runGit(t, repo, "init")
-	runGit(t, repo, "config", "user.email", "test@example.com")
-	runGit(t, repo, "config", "user.name", "Test User")
-
-	writeFile(t, filepath.Join(repo, "docs", "public.md"), "base\n")
-	runGit(t, repo, "add", "docs/public.md")
-	runGit(t, repo, "commit", "-m", "base")
-
-	raw := "private launch plan for alpha-service rollout on Friday with SERVICE_" + "TOKEN=real-" + "secret-value"
-	writeFile(t, filepath.Join(repo, "docs", "public.md"), "base\n"+raw+"\n")
-	runGit(t, repo, "add", "docs/public.md")
-	runGit(t, repo, "commit", "-m", "add semantic candidate")
-
-	metadataPath := filepath.Join(repo, "pr-metadata.json")
-	writeFile(t, metadataPath, `{}`)
-
-	got, err := Collect(context.Background(), Options{
-		Repo:         repo,
-		ChangedFrom:  "HEAD~1",
-		MetadataPath: metadataPath,
-	})
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("Collect() error = %v", err)
-	}
-	var found bool
-	for _, item := range got {
-		if item.Rule != "public_content_semantic_candidate" || item.File != "docs/public.md" {
-			continue
-		}
-		found = true
-		if !strings.Contains(item.Excerpt, "alpha-service rollout on Friday") {
-			t.Fatalf("semantic candidate should include sanitized review text, got %#v", item)
-		}
-		if strings.Contains(item.Excerpt, "real-"+"secret-value") {
-			t.Fatalf("semantic candidate leaked credential value: %#v", item)
-		}
-		if !strings.Contains(item.Excerpt, "SERVICE_TOKEN=<redacted>") {
-			t.Fatalf("semantic candidate should redact credentials in review text, got %#v", item)
-		}
-		if !strings.Contains(item.Excerpt, "semantic signals") || !strings.Contains(item.Excerpt, "roadmap_timing") {
-			t.Fatalf("semantic candidate excerpt should preserve semantic signals, got %#v", item)
-		}
-	}
-	if !found {
-		t.Fatalf("missing semantic candidate in findings %#v", got)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestCollectSemanticCandidatesDoNotLeakWhitespaceCredentialTail(t *testing.T) {
-	repo := newGitRepo(t)
-	writeFile(t, filepath.Join(repo, "docs", "public.md"), "base\n")
-	runGit(t, repo, "add", "docs/public.md")
-	runGit(t, repo, "commit", "-m", "base")
-
-	raw := "private launch plan for internal rollout on Friday with SERVICE_" + "TOKEN=\"real " + "secret value\""
-	writeFile(t, filepath.Join(repo, "docs", "public.md"), "base\n"+raw+"\n")
-	runGit(t, repo, "add", "docs/public.md")
-	runGit(t, repo, "commit", "-m", "add semantic candidate")
-
-	got := collectFromPreviousCommit(t, repo)
-	for _, item := range got {
-		if item.Rule != "public_content_semantic_candidate" || item.File != "docs/public.md" {
-			continue
-		}
-		if strings.Contains(item.Excerpt, "secret value") || strings.Contains(item.Excerpt, "real "+"secret value") {
-			t.Fatalf("semantic candidate leaked credential tail: %#v", item)
-		}
-		if !strings.Contains(item.Excerpt, "SERVICE_TOKEN=<redacted>") {
-			t.Fatalf("semantic candidate should redact full credential assignment, got %#v", item)
-		}
-		return
-	}
-	t.Fatalf("missing semantic candidate in findings %#v", got)
-}
-
-func TestCollectJSONBearerHeadersDoNotLeakIntoSemanticCandidates(t *testing.T) {
-	repo := newGitRepo(t)
-	writeFile(t, filepath.Join(repo, "docs", "public.md"), "base\n")
-	runGit(t, repo, "add", "docs/public.md")
-	runGit(t, repo, "commit", "-m", "base")
-
-	token := "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz"
-	raw := "private launch plan for internal rollout on Friday with " +
-		`{"headers":{"Authorization":"Bearer ` + token + `"}}`
-	writeFile(t, filepath.Join(repo, "docs", "public.md"), "base\n"+raw+"\n")
-	runGit(t, repo, "add", "docs/public.md")
-	runGit(t, repo, "commit", "-m", "add json bearer")
-
-	got := collectFromPreviousCommit(t, repo)
-	requireFinding(t, got, "docs/public.md", "public_content_bearer_header")
-	for _, item := range got {
-		if item.File != "docs/public.md" {
-			continue
-		}
-		if strings.Contains(item.Excerpt, token) {
-			t.Fatalf("finding leaked JSON bearer token: %#v", item)
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-func TestCollectDetectsQuotedJSONCredentialAssignments(t *testing.T) {
-	repo := newGitRepo(t)
-	writeFile(t, filepath.Join(repo, "docs", "public.json"), "{}\n")
-	runGit(t, repo, "add", "docs/public.json")
-	runGit(t, repo, "commit", "-m", "base")
-
-	writeFile(t, filepath.Join(repo, "docs", "public.json"), strings.Join([]string{
-		`{"access_` + `token":"real-json-token"}`,
-		`{"client_` + `secret": "real ` + `secret value"}`,
-		`{"tenantAccess` + `Token":"real-tenant-camel-token"}`,
-		`{"github` + `Token":"real-github-token"}`,
-		`{"vendorApi` + `Key":"real-vendor-key"}`,
-		`{"slackBot` + `Token":"xoxb-real-token"}`,
-	}, "\n")+"\n")
-	runGit(t, repo, "add", "docs/public.json")
-	runGit(t, repo, "commit", "-m", "add json config")
-
-	got := collectFromPreviousCommit(t, repo)
-	var count int
-	for _, item := range got {
-		if item.File == "docs/public.json" && item.Rule == "public_content_generic_credential" {
-			count++
-			for _, forbidden := range []string{
-				"real-json-token",
-				"real secret value",
-				"real-tenant-camel-token",
-				"real-github-token",
-				"real-vendor-key",
-				"xoxb-real-token",
-			} {
-				if strings.Contains(item.Excerpt, forbidden) {
-					t.Fatalf("JSON credential finding leaked value %q in excerpt %q", forbidden, item.Excerpt)
-				}
-			}
-		}
-	}
-	if count != 6 {
-		t.Fatalf("JSON credential findings = %d, want 6: %#v", count, got)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestCollectAllowsBenignJSONTokenFields(t *testing.T) {
-	repo := newGitRepo(t)
-	writeFile(t, filepath.Join(repo, "docs", "public.json"), "{}\n")
-	runGit(t, repo, "add", "docs/public.json")
-	runGit(t, repo, "commit", "-m", "base")
-
-	writeFile(t, filepath.Join(repo, "docs", "public.json"), strings.Join([]string{
-		`{"tokenizer":"cl100k_base"}`,
-		`{"token_count": 42}`,
-		`{"page_token":"next"}`,
-		`{"next_page_token":"next"}`,
-		`{"file_token":"file-example"}`,
-		`{"doc_token":"doc-example"}`,
-		`{"node_token":"node-example"}`,
-		`{"wiki_token":"wikcn_public_doc_example"}`,
-		`{"folder_token":"folder-example"}`,
-		`{"obj_token":"obj-example"}`,
-		`{"spreadsheet_token":"sheet-example"}`,
-		`{"parent_node_token":"parent-example"}`,
-		`{"origin_node_token":"origin-example"}`,
-		`{"drive_route_token":"route-example"}`,
-		`{"token":"<wiki_token>"}`,
-		`{"token":"wiki_token"}`,
-		`{"token_url":"https://example.com/oauth/token"}`,
-		`{"token_endpoint":"https://example.com/oauth/token"}`,
-		`{"token_format":"Bearer"}`,
-		`{"secret_name":"public-example-secret"}`,
-		`{"base_token":"base-example"}`,
-		`{"app_token":"app-example"}`,
-		`{"sync_token":"sync-example"}`,
-		`{"parent_token":"parent-example"}`,
-		`{"target_token":"target-example"}`,
-		`{"parent_file_token":"parent-file-example"}`,
-		`{"refresh_token_expires_in": 7200}`,
-		`{"access_token_expires_in": 7200}`,
-		`{"token_expires_in": 7200}`,
-		`{"token_status":"active"}`,
-	}, "\n")+"\n")
-	runGit(t, repo, "add", "docs/public.json")
-	runGit(t, repo, "commit", "-m", "add benign json token fields")
-
-	got := collectFromPreviousCommit(t, repo)
-	for _, item := range got {
-		if item.File == "docs/public.json" && item.Rule == "public_content_generic_credential" {
-			t.Fatalf("benign JSON token field should not be credential finding: %#v", got)
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-func TestCollectDetectsAngleWrappedRealisticCredentialValues(t *testing.T) {
-	repo := newGitRepo(t)
-	writeFile(t, filepath.Join(repo, "docs", "config.yaml"), "base: true\n")
-	runGit(t, repo, "add", "docs/config.yaml")
-	runGit(t, repo, "commit", "-m", "base")
-	stripeLike := "sk_" + "live_1234567890abcdef"
-	patLike := "gh" + "p_1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234"
-
-	writeFile(t, filepath.Join(repo, "docs", "config.yaml"), strings.Join([]string{
-		"API_KEY: <" + stripeLike + ">",
-		"SECRET_TOKEN: <" + patLike + ">",
-		"CLIENT_SECRET: <real-client-secret-value>",
-	}, "\n")+"\n")
-	runGit(t, repo, "add", "docs/config.yaml")
-	runGit(t, repo, "commit", "-m", "add credential config")
-
-	got := collectFromPreviousCommit(t, repo)
-	var count int
-	for _, item := range got {
-		if item.File == "docs/config.yaml" && item.Rule == "public_content_generic_credential" {
-			count++
-		}
-	}
-	if count != 3 {
-		t.Fatalf("angle-wrapped realistic credential findings = %d, want 3: %#v", count, got)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestCollectDetectsCredentialShapedValuesUnderBenignKeys(t *testing.T) {
-	repo := newGitRepo(t)
-	writeFile(t, filepath.Join(repo, "docs", "public.json"), "{}\n")
-	runGit(t, repo, "add", "docs/public.json")
-	runGit(t, repo, "commit", "-m", "base")
-	stripeLike := "sk_" + "live_1234567890abcdef"
-	patLike := "gh" + "p_1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234"
-
-	writeFile(t, filepath.Join(repo, "docs", "public.json"), strings.Join([]string{
-		`{"access_token_expires_in":"` + patLike + `"}`,
-		`{"refresh_token_expires_in":"` + stripeLike + `"}`,
-		`{"client_secret_status":"real-client-secret-value"}`,
-		`{"client_secret_name":"real-client-secret-value"}`,
-		`{"app_token":"` + patLike + `"}`,
-		`{"sync_token":"` + stripeLike + `"}`,
-		`{"target_token":"real-client-secret-value"}`,
-	}, "\n")+"\n")
-	runGit(t, repo, "add", "docs/public.json")
-	runGit(t, repo, "commit", "-m", "add credential-shaped benign fields")
-
-	got := collectFromPreviousCommit(t, repo)
-	var count int
-	for _, item := range got {
-		if item.File == "docs/public.json" && item.Rule == "public_content_generic_credential" {
-			count++
-		}
-	}
-	if count != 7 {
-		t.Fatalf("credential-shaped benign-key findings = %d, want 7: %#v", count, got)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestCollectDetectsBareIdentifierCredentialsWithMetadataSuffixes(t *testing.T) {
-	repo := newGitRepo(t)
-	writeFile(t, filepath.Join(repo, "docs", "config.yaml"), "base: true\n")
-	runGit(t, repo, "add", "docs/config.yaml")
-	runGit(t, repo, "commit", "-m", "base")
-
-	writeFile(t, filepath.Join(repo, "docs", "config.yaml"), strings.Join([]string{
-		"API_KEY_NAME: prod_key",
-		"CLIENT_SECRET_NAME: prod_secret",
-		"SECRET_STATUS: prod_secret",
-	}, "\n")+"\n")
-	runGit(t, repo, "add", "docs/config.yaml")
-	runGit(t, repo, "commit", "-m", "add credential config")
-
-	got := collectFromPreviousCommit(t, repo)
-	var count int
-	for _, item := range got {
-		if item.File == "docs/config.yaml" && item.Rule == "public_content_generic_credential" {
-			count++
-		}
-	}
-	if count != 3 {
-		t.Fatalf("metadata-suffixed bare credential findings = %d, want 3: %#v", count, got)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestCollectDetectsAccessKeyCredentials(t *testing.T) {
-	repo := newGitRepo(t)
-	writeFile(t, filepath.Join(repo, "docs", "config.yaml"), "base: true\n")
-	runGit(t, repo, "add", "docs/config.yaml")
-	runGit(t, repo, "commit", "-m", "base")
-	accessKey := "AK" + "IAIOSFODNN7EXAMPX"
-
-	writeFile(t, filepath.Join(repo, "docs", "config.yaml"), strings.Join([]string{
-		"AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID: " + accessKey,
-		"ACCESS_KEY_ID: " + accessKey,
-		"ACCESS_KEY: " + accessKey,
-	}, "\n")+"\n")
-	runGit(t, repo, "add", "docs/config.yaml")
-	runGit(t, repo, "commit", "-m", "add access key config")
-
-	got := collectFromPreviousCommit(t, repo)
-	var count int
-	for _, item := range got {
-		if item.File != "docs/config.yaml" || item.Rule != "public_content_generic_credential" {
-			continue
-		}
-		count++
-		if strings.Contains(item.Excerpt, "AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPX") {
-			t.Fatalf("access key finding leaked value in excerpt %q", item.Excerpt)
-		}
-	}
-	if count != 3 {
-		t.Fatalf("access key credential findings = %d, want 3: %#v", count, got)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestCollectDetectsPrivateKeyAssignments(t *testing.T) {
-	repo := newGitRepo(t)
-	writeFile(t, filepath.Join(repo, "docs", "config.yaml"), "base: true\n")
-	runGit(t, repo, "add", "docs/config.yaml")
-	runGit(t, repo, "commit", "-m", "base")
-
-	privateKey := "LS0tLS1CRUdJTiBQUklWQVRFIEtFWS0tLS0t"
-	writeFile(t, filepath.Join(repo, "docs", "config.yaml"), strings.Join([]string{
-		"PRIVATE_KEY: " + privateKey,
-		"SSH_PRIVATE_KEY: " + privateKey,
-		"JWT_PRIVATE_KEY: " + privateKey,
-		"SIGNING_PRIVATE_KEY: " + privateKey,
-	}, "\n")+"\n")
-	runGit(t, repo, "add", "docs/config.yaml")
-	runGit(t, repo, "commit", "-m", "add private key config")
-
-	got := collectFromPreviousCommit(t, repo)
-	var count int
-	for _, item := range got {
-		if item.File != "docs/config.yaml" || item.Rule != "public_content_generic_credential" {
-			continue
-		}
-		count++
-		if strings.Contains(item.Excerpt, privateKey) {
-			t.Fatalf("private key finding leaked value in excerpt %q", item.Excerpt)
-		}
-	}
-	if count != 4 {
-		t.Fatalf("private key assignment findings = %d, want 4: %#v", count, got)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestCollectDetectsCredentialValuesThatLookLikeBareIdentifiers(t *testing.T) {
-	repo := newGitRepo(t)
-	writeFile(t, filepath.Join(repo, "docs", "config.yaml"), "base: true\n")
-	runGit(t, repo, "add", "docs/config.yaml")
-	runGit(t, repo, "commit", "-m", "base")
-
-	writeFile(t, filepath.Join(repo, "docs", "config.yaml"), strings.Join([]string{
-		"API_KEY_OPENAI: prod_key",
-		"CLIENT_SECRET_GOOGLE: prod_secret",
-		"TOKEN_GITHUB: github_token",
-		"APP_PASSWORD_PROD: prod_password",
-	}, "\n")+"\n")
-	runGit(t, repo, "add", "docs/config.yaml")
-	runGit(t, repo, "commit", "-m", "add credential config")
-
-	got := collectFromPreviousCommit(t, repo)
-	var count int
-	for _, item := range got {
-		if item.File == "docs/config.yaml" && item.Rule == "public_content_generic_credential" {
-			count++
-		}
-	}
-	if count != 4 {
-		t.Fatalf("bare identifier credential findings = %d, want 4: %#v", count, got)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestCollectAllowsBenignUnquotedTokenFields(t *testing.T) {
-	repo := newGitRepo(t)
-	writeFile(t, filepath.Join(repo, "docs", "config.yaml"), "base: true\n")
-	runGit(t, repo, "add", "docs/config.yaml")
-	runGit(t, repo, "commit", "-m", "base")
-
-	writeFile(t, filepath.Join(repo, "docs", "config.yaml"), strings.Join([]string{
-		"tokens: 128",
-		"token_type: bearer",
-		"max_tokens: 2000",
-		"completion_tokens: 200",
-		"prompt_tokens: 100",
-	}, "\n")+"\n")
-	runGit(t, repo, "add", "docs/config.yaml")
-	runGit(t, repo, "commit", "-m", "add benign token config")
-
-	got := collectFromPreviousCommit(t, repo)
-	for _, item := range got {
-		if item.File == "docs/config.yaml" && item.Rule == "public_content_generic_credential" {
-			t.Fatalf("benign unquoted token field should not be credential finding: %#v", got)
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-func TestCollectDetectsCredentialPhraseBeforeEnvironmentSuffix(t *testing.T) {
-	repo := newGitRepo(t)
-	writeFile(t, filepath.Join(repo, "docs", "config.yaml"), "base: true\n")
-	runGit(t, repo, "add", "docs/config.yaml")
-	runGit(t, repo, "commit", "-m", "base")
-
-	writeFile(t, filepath.Join(repo, "docs", "config.yaml"), strings.Join([]string{
-		"API_KEY_OPENAI: real-openai-key",
-		"TOKEN_GITHUB: real-github-token",
-		"CLIENT_SECRET_GOOGLE: real-google-secret",
-		"SECRET_KEY_BASE: real-secret-key-base",
-		"APP_PASSWORD_PROD: real-prod-password",
-	}, "\n")+"\n")
-	runGit(t, repo, "add", "docs/config.yaml")
-	runGit(t, repo, "commit", "-m", "add credential config")
-
-	got := collectFromPreviousCommit(t, repo)
-	var count int
-	for _, item := range got {
-		if item.File != "docs/config.yaml" || item.Rule != "public_content_generic_credential" {
-			continue
-		}
-		count++
-		for _, forbidden := range []string{
-			"real-openai-key",
-			"real-github-token",
-			"real-google-secret",
-			"real-secret-key-base",
-			"real-prod-password",
-		} {
-			if strings.Contains(item.Excerpt, forbidden) {
-				t.Fatalf("credential finding leaked value %q in excerpt %q", forbidden, item.Excerpt)
-			}
-		}
-	}
-	if count != 5 {
-		t.Fatalf("credential suffix variants findings = %d, want 5: %#v", count, got)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestCollectDetectsPrivateKeyWhenOnlyEndIsAdded(t *testing.T) {
-	repo := newGitRepo(t)
-
-	writeFile(t, filepath.Join(repo, "docs", "key.pem"), privateKeyBegin()+"legacy-body\n")
-	runGit(t, repo, "add", "docs/key.pem")
-	runGit(t, repo, "commit", "-m", "base")
-
-	writeFile(t, filepath.Join(repo, "docs", "key.pem"), privateKeyBegin()+"legacy-body\nnew-body\n"+privateKeyEnd())
-	runGit(t, repo, "add", "docs/key.pem")
-	runGit(t, repo, "commit", "-m", "complete key")
-
-	got := collectFromPreviousCommit(t, repo)
-	requireFinding(t, got, "docs/key.pem", "public_content_private_key_block")
-}
-
-func TestCollectDetectsPrivateKeyWhenOnlyBeginIsAdded(t *testing.T) {
-	repo := newGitRepo(t)
-
-	writeFile(t, filepath.Join(repo, "docs", "key.pem"), "legacy-body\n"+privateKeyEnd())
-	runGit(t, repo, "add", "docs/key.pem")
-	runGit(t, repo, "commit", "-m", "base")
-
-	writeFile(t, filepath.Join(repo, "docs", "key.pem"), privateKeyBegin()+"legacy-body\n"+privateKeyEnd())
-	runGit(t, repo, "add", "docs/key.pem")
-	runGit(t, repo, "commit", "-m", "complete key")
-
-	got := collectFromPreviousCommit(t, repo)
-	requireFinding(t, got, "docs/key.pem", "public_content_private_key_block")
-}
-
-func TestCollectDetectsPrivateKeyWhenOnlyBodyIsAdded(t *testing.T) {
-	repo := newGitRepo(t)
-
-	writeFile(t, filepath.Join(repo, "docs", "key.pem"), privateKeyBegin()+privateKeyEnd())
-	runGit(t, repo, "add", "docs/key.pem")
-	runGit(t, repo, "commit", "-m", "base")
-
-	writeFile(t, filepath.Join(repo, "docs", "key.pem"), privateKeyBegin()+"new-body\n"+privateKeyEnd())
-	runGit(t, repo, "add", "docs/key.pem")
-	runGit(t, repo, "commit", "-m", "add body")
-
-	got := collectFromPreviousCommit(t, repo)
-	requireFinding(t, got, "docs/key.pem", "public_content_private_key_block")
-}
-
-func TestCollectIgnoresUntouchedHistoricalPrivateKey(t *testing.T) {
-	repo := newGitRepo(t)
-
-	writeFile(t, filepath.Join(repo, "docs", "key.pem"), privateKeyBegin()+"legacy-body\n"+privateKeyEnd())
-	runGit(t, repo, "add", "docs/key.pem")
-	runGit(t, repo, "commit", "-m", "base")
-
-	writeFile(t, filepath.Join(repo, "docs", "key.pem"), privateKeyBegin()+"legacy-body\n"+privateKeyEnd())
-	writeFile(t, filepath.Join(repo, "docs", "public.md"), "public docs update\n")
-	runGit(t, repo, "add", "docs/public.md")
-	runGit(t, repo, "commit", "-m", "docs update")
-
-	got := collectFromPreviousCommit(t, repo)
-	for _, item := range got {
-		if item.File == "docs/key.pem" && item.Rule == "public_content_private_key_block" {
-			t.Fatalf("collector reported untouched historical private key: %#v", got)
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-func TestCollectIgnoresDeletedPrivateKeyLine(t *testing.T) {
-	repo := newGitRepo(t)
-
-	writeFile(t, filepath.Join(repo, "docs", "key.pem"), privateKeyBegin()+"legacy-body\n"+privateKeyEnd())
-	runGit(t, repo, "add", "docs/key.pem")
-	runGit(t, repo, "commit", "-m", "base")
-
-	writeFile(t, filepath.Join(repo, "docs", "key.pem"), privateKeyBegin()+privateKeyEnd())
-	runGit(t, repo, "add", "docs/key.pem")
-	runGit(t, repo, "commit", "-m", "remove body")
-
-	got := collectFromPreviousCommit(t, repo)
-	for _, item := range got {
-		if item.File == "docs/key.pem" && item.Rule == "public_content_private_key_block" {
-			t.Fatalf("collector reported delete-only private key cleanup: %#v", got)
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-func TestCollectSkipsOnlyKnownQualityGateFixtureFiles(t *testing.T) {
-	repo := t.TempDir()
-	runGit(t, repo, "init")
-	runGit(t, repo, "config", "user.email", "test@example.com")
-	runGit(t, repo, "config", "user.name", "Test User")
-
-	writeFile(t, filepath.Join(repo, "README.md"), "base\n")
-	runGit(t, repo, "add", "README.md")
-	runGit(t, repo, "commit", "-m", "base")
-
-	writeFile(t, filepath.Join(repo, "internal", "qualitygate", "publiccontent", "collect_test.go"), "SECRET_TOKEN=fixture\n")
-	writeFile(t, filepath.Join(repo, "internal", "qualitygate", "publiccontent", "scan_test.go"), "SECRET_TOKEN=fixture\n")
-	writeFile(t, filepath.Join(repo, "internal", "qualitygate", "publiccontent", "scan.go"), "const privateKeyFixture = \""+privateKeyBeginPrefix+privateKeyMarker+"\"\n")
-	writeFile(t, filepath.Join(repo, "internal", "qualitygate", "publiccontent", "rules.go"), "markers := []string{\"generated with automation\"}\n")
-	writeFile(t, filepath.Join(repo, "tests", "e2e", "new-public-workflow.test.sh"), "SECRET_TOKEN=real-leak\n")
-	runGit(t, repo, "add", ".")
-	runGit(t, repo, "commit", "-m", "add scanner fixtures")
-
-	metadataPath := filepath.Join(repo, "pr-metadata.json")
-	writeFile(t, metadataPath, `{}`)
-
-	got, err := Collect(context.Background(), Options{
-		Repo:         repo,
-		ChangedFrom:  "HEAD~1",
-		MetadataPath: metadataPath,
-	})
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("Collect() error = %v", err)
-	}
-	var foundOrdinaryTestLeak bool
-	for _, item := range got {
-		switch item.File {
-		case "internal/qualitygate/publiccontent/collect_test.go",
-			"internal/qualitygate/publiccontent/scan.go",
-			"internal/qualitygate/publiccontent/scan_test.go",
-			"internal/qualitygate/publiccontent/rules.go":
-			t.Fatalf("collector scanned known fixture or detector implementation file: %#v", got)
-		}
-		if item.File == "tests/e2e/new-public-workflow.test.sh" && item.Rule == "public_content_generic_credential" {
-			foundOrdinaryTestLeak = true
-		}
-	}
-	if !foundOrdinaryTestLeak {
-		t.Fatalf("collector should still scan ordinary test files for real leaks: %#v", got)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestScanChangedFileDocumentsFixtureExclusions(t *testing.T) {
-	excluded := []string{
-		"internal/qualitygate/publiccontent/collect_test.go",
-		"internal/qualitygate/publiccontent/rules.go",
-		"internal/qualitygate/publiccontent/scan.go",
-		"internal/qualitygate/publiccontent/scan_test.go",
-	}
-	for _, file := range excluded {
-		if scanChangedFile(file) {
-			t.Fatalf("scanChangedFile(%q) = true, want false for detector fixture/implementation path", file)
-		}
-	}
-
-	included := []string{
-		"internal/qualitygate/publiccontent/new_test.go",
-		"tests/e2e/new-public-workflow.test.sh",
-		"docs/public.md",
-	}
-	for _, file := range included {
-		if !scanChangedFile(file) {
-			t.Fatalf("scanChangedFile(%q) = false, want true", file)
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-func TestCollectScansAddedLinesInSpecialPathNames(t *testing.T) {
-	repo := newGitRepo(t)
-	writeFile(t, filepath.Join(repo, "docs", "old.md"), "base\n")
-	runGit(t, repo, "add", ".")
-	runGit(t, repo, "commit", "-m", "base")
-
-	writeFile(t, filepath.Join(repo, "docs", "has space.md"), "SECRET_TOKEN=space-value\n")
-	writeFile(t, filepath.Join(repo, `weird"quote.md`), "SECRET_TOKEN=quote-value\n")
-	runGit(t, repo, "mv", "docs/old.md", "docs/new name.md")
-	writeFile(t, filepath.Join(repo, "docs", "new name.md"), "base\nSECRET_TOKEN=rename-value\n")
-	runGit(t, repo, "add", ".")
-	runGit(t, repo, "commit", "-m", "add special paths")
-
-	got := collectFromPreviousCommit(t, repo)
-	requireFinding(t, got, "docs/has space.md", "public_content_generic_credential")
-	requireFinding(t, got, `weird"quote.md`, "public_content_generic_credential")
-	requireFinding(t, got, "docs/new name.md", "public_content_generic_credential")
-}
-
-func TestCollectScansBranchNameAsWarning(t *testing.T) {
-	repo := t.TempDir()
-	metadataPath := filepath.Join(repo, "pr-metadata.json")
-	writeFile(t, metadataPath, `{"branch":"bot/public-doc-update"}`)
-	got, err := Collect(context.Background(), Options{
-		Repo:         repo,
-		MetadataPath: metadataPath,
-	})
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("Collect() error = %v", err)
-	}
-	if len(got) != 1 || got[0].Rule != "public_content_automation_branch" {
-		t.Fatalf("branch findings = %#v", got)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestCollectUsesExplicitBranchNameWhenDetached(t *testing.T) {
-	repo := newGitRepo(t)
-	writeFile(t, filepath.Join(repo, "README.md"), "base\n")
-	runGit(t, repo, "add", "README.md")
-	runGit(t, repo, "commit", "-m", "base")
-	runGit(t, repo, "checkout", "-b", "bot/public-doc-update")
-	writeFile(t, filepath.Join(repo, "docs.md"), "safe docs\n")
-	runGit(t, repo, "add", "docs.md")
-	runGit(t, repo, "commit", "-m", "docs")
-	head := strings.TrimSpace(string(runGitOutput(t, repo, "rev-parse", "HEAD")))
-	runGit(t, repo, "checkout", "--detach", head)
-
-	metadataPath := filepath.Join(repo, "pr-metadata.json")
-	writeFile(t, metadataPath, `{}`)
-	got, err := Collect(context.Background(), Options{
-		Repo:         repo,
-		MetadataPath: metadataPath,
-		BranchName:   "bot/public-doc-update",
-	})
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("Collect() error = %v", err)
-	}
-	requireFinding(t, got, "branch", "public_content_automation_branch")
-}
-
-func TestCollectUsesBranchEnvironmentWhenDetached(t *testing.T) {
-	repo := newGitRepo(t)
-	writeFile(t, filepath.Join(repo, "README.md"), "base\n")
-	runGit(t, repo, "add", "README.md")
-	runGit(t, repo, "commit", "-m", "base")
-	runGit(t, repo, "checkout", "-b", "bot/public-env-update")
-	writeFile(t, filepath.Join(repo, "docs.md"), "safe docs\n")
-	runGit(t, repo, "add", "docs.md")
-	runGit(t, repo, "commit", "-m", "docs")
-	head := strings.TrimSpace(string(runGitOutput(t, repo, "rev-parse", "HEAD")))
-	runGit(t, repo, "checkout", "--detach", head)
-	t.Setenv("GITHUB_HEAD_REF", "bot/public-env-update")
-
-	metadataPath := filepath.Join(repo, "pr-metadata.json")
-	writeFile(t, metadataPath, `{}`)
-	got, err := Collect(context.Background(), Options{
-		Repo:         repo,
-		MetadataPath: metadataPath,
-	})
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("Collect() error = %v", err)
-	}
-	requireFinding(t, got, "branch", "public_content_automation_branch")
-}
-
-func TestCollectPreservesFindingAttributionForChangedLines(t *testing.T) {
-	repo := newGitRepo(t)
-	writeFile(t, filepath.Join(repo, "docs", "auth.md"), "intro\n")
-	runGit(t, repo, "add", "docs/auth.md")
-	runGit(t, repo, "commit", "-m", "base")
-
-	writeFile(t, filepath.Join(repo, "docs", "auth.md"), "intro\nAuthorization: Bearer abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz\n")
-	runGit(t, repo, "add", "docs/auth.md")
-	runGit(t, repo, "commit", "-m", "add auth docs")
-
-	got := collectFromPreviousCommit(t, repo)
-	for _, item := range got {
-		if item.Rule == "public_content_bearer_header" {
-			if item.File != "docs/auth.md" || item.Line != 2 || item.Source != "file" {
-				t.Fatalf("changed-line attribution = %#v", item)
-			}
-			return
-		}
-	}
-	t.Fatalf("missing bearer finding: %#v", got)
-}
-
-func TestAppendUniqueFindingsDeduplicatesByRuleFileLineAndSource(t *testing.T) {
-	base := []Finding{newFinding("public_content_private_key_block", "docs/key.pem", 1, "file", "private key block")}
-	got := appendUniqueFindings(base,
-		newFinding("public_content_private_key_block", "docs/key.pem", 1, "file", "private key block"),
-		newFinding("public_content_private_key_block", "docs/key.pem", 2, "file", "private key block"),
-	)
-	if len(got) != 2 {
-		t.Fatalf("appendUniqueFindings len = %d, want 2: %#v", len(got), got)
-	}
-}
-
-func newGitRepo(t *testing.T) string {
-	t.Helper()
-	repo := t.TempDir()
-	runGit(t, repo, "init")
-	runGit(t, repo, "config", "user.email", "test@example.com")
-	runGit(t, repo, "config", "user.name", "Test User")
-	return repo
-}
-
-func privateKeyBegin() string {
-	return privateKeyBeginPrefix + privateKeyMarker + "\n"
-}
-
-func privateKeyEnd() string {
-	return privateKeyEndPrefix + privateKeyMarker + "\n"
-}
-
-func collectFromPreviousCommit(t *testing.T, repo string) []Finding {
-	t.Helper()
-	metadataPath := filepath.Join(repo, "pr-metadata.json")
-	writeFile(t, metadataPath, `{}`)
-	got, err := Collect(context.Background(), Options{
-		Repo:         repo,
-		ChangedFrom:  "HEAD~1",
-		MetadataPath: metadataPath,
-	})
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("Collect() error = %v", err)
-	}
-	return got
-}
-
-func requireFinding(t *testing.T, got []Finding, file, rule string) {
-	t.Helper()
-	for _, item := range got {
-		if item.File == file && item.Rule == rule {
-			return
-		}
-	}
-	t.Fatalf("missing %s in %s findings: %#v", rule, file, got)
-}
-
-func TestCollectRequiresValidMetadataJSON(t *testing.T) {
-	repo := t.TempDir()
-	metadataPath := filepath.Join(repo, "pr-metadata.json")
-	writeFile(t, metadataPath, `{"title":`)
-
-	_, err := Collect(context.Background(), Options{Repo: repo, MetadataPath: metadataPath})
-	if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "public content metadata") {
-		t.Fatalf("Collect() error = %v, want metadata parse error", err)
-	}
-}
-
-func runGit(t *testing.T, repo string, args ...string) {
-	t.Helper()
-	if len(args) > 0 && args[0] == "commit" {
-		args = append([]string{"commit", "--no-verify"}, args[1:]...)
-	}
-	cmd := exec.Command("git", args...)
-	cmd.Dir = repo
-	out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("git %v failed: %v\n%s", args, err, out)
-	}
-}
-
-func runGitOutput(t *testing.T, repo string, args ...string) []byte {
-	t.Helper()
-	cmd := exec.Command("git", args...)
-	cmd.Dir = repo
-	out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("git %v failed: %v\n%s", args, err, out)
-	}
-	return out
-}
-
-func writeFile(t *testing.T, path, data string) {
-	t.Helper()
-	if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(path), 0o755); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(data), 0o644); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-}

internal/qualitygate/publiccontent/comment_audit.go

@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
-
-package publiccontent
-
-func ScanComment(kind, body string) []Finding {
-	if kind == "" {
-		kind = "comment"
-	}
-	return scanText(kind, "comment", body, false)
-}

internal/qualitygate/publiccontent/comment_audit_test.go

@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
-
-package publiccontent
-
-import "testing"
-
-func TestScanCommentAuditsPublishedCommentBodies(t *testing.T) {
-	got := ScanComment("issue_comment", `The published comment included /tmp/harness`+`-agent/run and CCM`+`-Harness: stage-4`)
-	rules := findingRules(got)
-	if !rules["public_content_harness_metadata"] || !rules["public_content_ccm_harness_trailer"] {
-		t.Fatalf("comment audit findings = %#v", got)
-	}
-	for _, item := range got {
-		if item.File != "issue_comment" {
-			t.Fatalf("comment finding file = %q, want issue_comment", item.File)
-		}
-	}
-}

internal/qualitygate/publiccontent/metadata.go

@@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
-
-package publiccontent
-
-import (
-	"encoding/json"
-	"fmt"
-
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/vfs"
-)
-
-func LoadMetadata(path string) (Metadata, error) {
-	if path == "" {
-		return Metadata{}, nil
-	}
-	data, err := vfs.ReadFile(path)
-	if err != nil {
-		return Metadata{}, fmt.Errorf("public content metadata: %w", err)
-	}
-	if len(data) == 0 {
-		return Metadata{}, nil
-	}
-	var out Metadata
-	if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &out); err != nil {
-		return Metadata{}, fmt.Errorf("public content metadata: %w", err)
-	}
-	return out, nil
-}
-
-func scanMetadata(m Metadata) []Finding {
-	text := ""
-	if m.Title != "" {
-		text += "title: " + m.Title + "\n"
-	}
-	if m.Body != "" {
-		text += "body:\n" + m.Body + "\n"
-	}
-	if text == "" {
-		return nil
-	}
-	out := scanText("pull_request_metadata", "metadata", text, false)
-	out = append(out, semanticCandidate("pull_request_metadata", "metadata", text, 1)...)
-	return out
-}

internal/qualitygate/publiccontent/metadata_test.go

@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
-
-package publiccontent
-
-import (
-	"path/filepath"
-	"testing"
-)
-
-func TestLoadMetadataReadsTitleAndBody(t *testing.T) {
-	path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "metadata.json")
-	writeFile(t, path, `{"title":"public change","body":"pass`+`word = \"example-password\""}`)
-
-	got, err := LoadMetadata(path)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("LoadMetadata() error = %v", err)
-	}
-	if got.Title != "public change" || got.Body == "" {
-		t.Fatalf("metadata = %#v", got)
-	}
-}

internal/qualitygate/publiccontent/rules.go

@@ -1,441 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
-
-package publiccontent
-
-import (
-	"net/url"
-	"path/filepath"
-	"regexp"
-	"strings"
-
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/qualitygate/report"
-)
-
-var (
-	credentialAssignmentRE = regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)["']?\b[A-Za-z0-9_-]*(?:api[_-]?key|access[_-]?key|private[_-]?key|secret|password|passwd|token|webhook|access[_-]?token|client[_-]?secret)[A-Za-z0-9_-]*\b["']?\s*[:=]\s*(?:"((?:\\.|[^"\\])*)"|'((?:\\.|[^'\\])*)'|(\$\([^)]*\))|(\$\{\{[^}]+\}\})|([^"'\s,}\]]+))`)
-	jwtLikeRE              = regexp.MustCompile(`\b[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}\b`)
-	credentialURLRE        = regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)\b[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]*://[^/\s:@]*:[^@\s/]+@[^)\s]+`)
-	bearerHeaderRE         = regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)(?:\bAuthorization\s*:\s*Bearer\s+|["']Authorization["']\s*:\s*["']Bearer\s+)[A-Za-z0-9._+/=-]{12,}`)
-	semanticBearerHeaderRE = regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)(?:\bAuthorization\s*:\s*Bearer\s+[^"'\s,}\]]+|["']Authorization["']\s*:\s*["']Bearer\s+[^"'\\\s,}\]]+)`)
-	changeIDTrailerRE      = regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)^\s*Change-Id:\s*\S+`)
-	reviewedOnTrailerRE    = regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)^\s*Reviewed-on:\s*\S+`)
-	ccmHarnessTrailerRE    = regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)\bCCM-Harness:\s*\S+`)
-	privateIPv4RE          = regexp.MustCompile(`\b(?:10\.[0-9]{1,3}\.[0-9]{1,3}\.[0-9]{1,3}|192\.168\.[0-9]{1,3}\.[0-9]{1,3}|172\.(?:1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[0-1])\.[0-9]{1,3}\.[0-9]{1,3})\b`)
-	automationBranchRE     = regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)(^|/)(bot|automation)[-/]`)
-)
-
-func actionForRule(rule string) report.Action {
-	switch rule {
-	case "public_content_generic_credential",
-		"public_content_private_key_block",
-		"public_content_jwt_like_token",
-		"public_content_bearer_header",
-		"public_content_credential_url",
-		"public_content_change_id_trailer",
-		"public_content_reviewed_on_trailer",
-		"public_content_provenance_marker",
-		"public_content_detector_fingerprint",
-		"public_content_harness_metadata",
-		"public_content_ccm_harness_trailer":
-		return report.ActionReject
-	case "public_content_private_ipv4",
-		"public_content_automation_branch":
-		return report.ActionWarning
-	default:
-		return report.ActionWarning
-	}
-}
-
-func isPlaceholderValue(value string) bool {
-	trimmed := strings.Trim(value, `"'`)
-	normalized := strings.ToLower(trimmed)
-	if normalized == "" ||
-		normalized == "=" ||
-		percentWrappedPlaceholder(normalized) ||
-		angleWrappedPlaceholder(normalized) ||
-		urlWithAnglePlaceholder(normalized) ||
-		isCredentialReferenceValue(trimmed) {
-		return true
-	}
-	return namedPlaceholderValue(normalized)
-}
-
-func namedPlaceholderValue(value string) bool {
-	switch value {
-	case "...", "placeholder", "redacted", "<redacted>", "xxxx", "test-secret":
-		return true
-	}
-	return strings.Contains(value, "cli_example") || allXPlaceholder(value)
-}
-
-func allXPlaceholder(value string) bool {
-	if len(value) < 4 {
-		return false
-	}
-	for _, r := range value {
-		if r != 'x' {
-			return false
-		}
-	}
-	return true
-}
-
-func urlWithAnglePlaceholder(value string) bool {
-	if !strings.Contains(value, "://") ||
-		!strings.Contains(value, "<") ||
-		!strings.Contains(value, ">") {
-		return false
-	}
-	return !urlRemainderLooksCredentialLike(removeAnglePlaceholders(value))
-}
-
-func removeAnglePlaceholders(value string) string {
-	var out strings.Builder
-	for len(value) > 0 {
-		start := strings.Index(value, "<")
-		if start < 0 {
-			out.WriteString(value)
-			break
-		}
-		out.WriteString(value[:start])
-		end := strings.Index(value[start+1:], ">")
-		if end < 0 {
-			out.WriteString(value[start:])
-			break
-		}
-		value = value[start+end+2:]
-	}
-	return out.String()
-}
-
-func urlRemainderLooksCredentialLike(value string) bool {
-	normalized := strings.ToLower(value)
-	for _, marker := range []string{
-		"secret",
-		"token",
-		"password",
-		"passwd",
-		"api_key",
-		"apikey",
-		"private_key",
-		"privatekey",
-		"client_secret",
-		"clientsecret",
-	} {
-		if strings.Contains(normalized, marker) {
-			return true
-		}
-	}
-	for _, part := range strings.FieldsFunc(normalized, func(r rune) bool {
-		return !((r >= 'a' && r <= 'z') || (r >= '0' && r <= '9') || r == '_' || r == '-')
-	}) {
-		if credentialShapedIdentifier(part) || longCredentialSegment(part) {
-			return true
-		}
-	}
-	return false
-}
-
-func longCredentialSegment(value string) bool {
-	if len(value) < 16 {
-		return false
-	}
-	var hasLetter, hasDigit bool
-	for _, r := range value {
-		switch {
-		case r >= 'a' && r <= 'z':
-			hasLetter = true
-		case r >= '0' && r <= '9':
-			hasDigit = true
-		case r == '_' || r == '-':
-		default:
-			return false
-		}
-	}
-	return hasLetter || hasDigit
-}
-
-func isCredentialReferenceValue(value string) bool {
-	normalized := strings.ToLower(value)
-	switch {
-	case strings.HasPrefix(normalized, "${{"):
-		return githubExpressionReference(normalized)
-	case strings.HasPrefix(normalized, "$("):
-		return !commandSubstitutionLooksCredentialLike(normalized)
-	case strings.HasPrefix(normalized, "process.env."):
-		return credentialReferenceIdentifier(strings.TrimPrefix(normalized, "process.env."))
-	case strings.HasPrefix(normalized, "${"):
-		return credentialReferenceIdentifier(strings.TrimSuffix(strings.TrimPrefix(normalized, "${"), "}"))
-	case strings.HasPrefix(value, "$"):
-		return credentialReferenceIdentifier(strings.TrimPrefix(normalized, "$"))
-	default:
-		return false
-	}
-}
-
-func commandSubstitutionLooksCredentialLike(value string) bool {
-	if !strings.HasPrefix(value, "$(") || !strings.HasSuffix(value, ")") {
-		return false
-	}
-	inner := strings.TrimSuffix(strings.TrimPrefix(value, "$("), ")")
-	for _, part := range strings.FieldsFunc(inner, func(r rune) bool {
-		return !((r >= 'a' && r <= 'z') || (r >= '0' && r <= '9') || r == '_' || r == '-')
-	}) {
-		if credentialShapedIdentifier(part) || longCredentialSegment(part) {
-			return true
-		}
-	}
-	return false
-}
-
-func githubExpressionReference(value string) bool {
-	if !strings.HasPrefix(value, "${{") || !strings.HasSuffix(value, "}}") {
-		return false
-	}
-	expr := strings.TrimSpace(strings.TrimSuffix(strings.TrimPrefix(value, "${{"), "}}"))
-	switch {
-	case strings.HasPrefix(expr, "secrets."):
-		return dottedReferenceIdentifier(strings.TrimPrefix(expr, "secrets."))
-	case strings.HasPrefix(expr, "env."):
-		return dottedReferenceIdentifier(strings.TrimPrefix(expr, "env."))
-	case strings.HasPrefix(expr, "vars."):
-		return dottedReferenceIdentifier(strings.TrimPrefix(expr, "vars."))
-	case expr == "github.token":
-		return true
-	default:
-		return false
-	}
-}
-
-func dottedReferenceIdentifier(value string) bool {
-	if value == "" {
-		return false
-	}
-	for _, part := range strings.Split(value, ".") {
-		if !referenceIdentifier(part) {
-			return false
-		}
-	}
-	return true
-}
-
-func credentialReferenceIdentifier(value string) bool {
-	return referenceIdentifier(value) && !credentialShapedIdentifier(value)
-}
-
-func referenceIdentifier(value string) bool {
-	if value == "" {
-		return false
-	}
-	for i, r := range value {
-		switch {
-		case r >= 'a' && r <= 'z':
-		case r >= '0' && r <= '9' && i > 0:
-		case r == '_' && i > 0:
-		default:
-			return false
-		}
-	}
-	return true
-}
-
-func angleWrappedPlaceholder(value string) bool {
-	if len(value) < 3 || !strings.HasPrefix(value, "<") || !strings.HasSuffix(value, ">") {
-		return false
-	}
-	return anglePlaceholderIdentifier(strings.Trim(value, "<>"))
-}
-
-func percentWrappedPlaceholder(value string) bool {
-	if len(value) < 3 || !strings.HasPrefix(value, "%") || !strings.HasSuffix(value, "%") {
-		return false
-	}
-	inner := strings.Trim(value, "%")
-	return delimitedPlaceholderIdentifier(inner) && !credentialShapedIdentifier(inner)
-}
-
-func delimitedPlaceholderIdentifier(value string) bool {
-	if value == "" {
-		return false
-	}
-	for _, r := range value {
-		if (r >= 'a' && r <= 'z') || (r >= '0' && r <= '9') || r == '_' || r == '-' {
-			continue
-		}
-		return false
-	}
-	return true
-}
-
-func anglePlaceholderIdentifier(value string) bool {
-	if value == "" {
-		return false
-	}
-	for _, r := range value {
-		if (r >= 'a' && r <= 'z') || (r >= '0' && r <= '9') || r == '_' || r == '-' {
-			continue
-		}
-		return false
-	}
-	if credentialShapedIdentifier(value) {
-		return false
-	}
-	switch value {
-	case "token",
-		"id",
-		"userid",
-		"openid",
-		"key",
-		"secret",
-		"password",
-		"api-key",
-		"user-id",
-		"open-id",
-		"client-secret",
-		"access-token",
-		"refresh-token",
-		"auth-token",
-		"bearer-token",
-		"session-token",
-		"service-token":
-		return true
-	}
-	for _, suffix := range []string{"_token", "_id", "_key", "_secret", "_password"} {
-		if strings.HasSuffix(value, suffix) {
-			return true
-		}
-	}
-	for _, suffix := range []string{"-token", "-id", "-key", "-secret", "-password"} {
-		if strings.HasSuffix(value, suffix) {
-			return true
-		}
-	}
-	return false
-}
-
-func credentialShapedValue(value string) bool {
-	normalized := strings.ToLower(strings.Trim(value, `"'<>`))
-	return credentialShapedIdentifier(normalized)
-}
-
-func credentialShapedIdentifier(value string) bool {
-	switch {
-	case strings.HasPrefix(value, "sk_live_"),
-		strings.HasPrefix(value, "sk_test_"),
-		strings.HasPrefix(value, "ghp_"),
-		strings.HasPrefix(value, "gho_"),
-		strings.HasPrefix(value, "ghu_"),
-		strings.HasPrefix(value, "github_pat_"),
-		strings.HasPrefix(value, "xoxb_"),
-		strings.HasPrefix(value, "xoxp_"),
-		strings.HasPrefix(value, "xoxa_"):
-		return true
-	case strings.HasPrefix(value, "real-") &&
-		(strings.Contains(value, "secret") ||
-			strings.Contains(value, "token") ||
-			strings.Contains(value, "key") ||
-			strings.Contains(value, "password")):
-		return true
-	default:
-		return false
-	}
-}
-
-func resourceTokenPlaceholderValue(value string) bool {
-	normalized := strings.ToLower(strings.Trim(value, `"'`))
-	switch normalized {
-	case "wiki_token",
-		"folder_token",
-		"obj_token",
-		"spreadsheet_token",
-		"file_token",
-		"doc_token",
-		"node_token",
-		"parent_node_token",
-		"origin_node_token",
-		"drive_route_token":
-		return true
-	default:
-		return minuteTokenFixturePlaceholder(normalized)
-	}
-}
-
-func minuteTokenFixturePlaceholder(value string) bool {
-	if value == "minute_no_meta" {
-		return true
-	}
-	suffix, ok := strings.CutPrefix(value, "minute_")
-	if !ok || suffix == "" {
-		return false
-	}
-	for _, r := range suffix {
-		if r < '0' || r > '9' {
-			return false
-		}
-	}
-	return true
-}
-
-func provenanceMarker(line string) bool {
-	normalized := strings.ToLower(line)
-	markers := []string{
-		"generat" + "ed by tool",
-		"creat" + "ed by tool",
-		"generat" + "ed by automation",
-		"creat" + "ed by automation",
-		"machine-" + "generated",
-		"generated with automated",
-		"generated with automation",
-		"🤖 generated",
-	}
-	for _, marker := range markers {
-		if strings.Contains(normalized, marker) {
-			return true
-		}
-	}
-	if strings.HasPrefix(normalized, "co-authored-by:") &&
-		(strings.Contains(normalized, "<bot@") ||
-			strings.Contains(normalized, " bot@") ||
-			strings.Contains(normalized, "[bot]") ||
-			strings.Contains(normalized, "automation") ||
-			strings.Contains(normalized, "automated-code-assistant")) {
-		return true
-	}
-	return false
-}
-
-// Detector fingerprint checks are intentionally scoped to public rule/config
-// files. They do not try to hide this package's implementation; they prevent
-// publishing reusable detector identifiers in external-facing rule bundles.
-func isDetectorRuleFile(path string) bool {
-	normalized := filepath.ToSlash(path)
-	base := filepath.Base(normalized)
-	return base == ".gitleaks.toml" ||
-		strings.Contains(normalized, "public-rules/") ||
-		strings.Contains(normalized, "public_rules/")
-}
-
-func detectorFingerprint(line string) bool {
-	normalized := strings.ToLower(line)
-	fingerprints := []string{
-		strings.Join([]string{"public", "content", "leakage"}, "-"),
-		strings.Join([]string{"public", "content", "detector"}, "-"),
-		"publiccontent",
-	}
-	for _, fingerprint := range fingerprints {
-		if strings.Contains(normalized, fingerprint) {
-			return true
-		}
-	}
-	return false
-}
-
-func redactCredentialURL(raw string) string {
-	u, err := url.Parse(raw)
-	if err != nil || u.User == nil {
-		return "<credential-url>"
-	}
-	u.User = url.UserPassword("<user>", "<redacted>")
-	return u.String()
-}

internal/qualitygate/publiccontent/scan.go

@@ -1,797 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
-
-package publiccontent
-
-import (
-	"fmt"
-	"path/filepath"
-	"sort"
-	"strings"
-	"unicode"
-)
-
-const (
-	privateKeyBeginPrefix = "-----" + "BEGIN "
-	privateKeyEndPrefix   = "-----" + "END "
-	privateKeyMarker      = "PRIVATE " + "KEY-----"
-)
-
-func ScanFile(path string, data []byte) []Finding {
-	return scanText(filepath.ToSlash(path), "file", string(data), isDetectorRuleFile(path))
-}
-
-func semanticCandidate(file, source, text string, line int) []Finding {
-	excerpt := redactedSemanticExcerpt(text)
-	if excerpt == "" {
-		return nil
-	}
-	return []Finding{newFinding("public_content_semantic_candidate", file, line, source, excerpt)}
-}
-
-func scanText(file, source, text string, detectorFile bool) []Finding {
-	var out []Finding
-	lines := strings.Split(text, "\n")
-	inPrivateKey := false
-	privateKeyLine := 0
-	for i, line := range lines {
-		lineNo := i + 1
-		if strings.Contains(line, privateKeyBeginPrefix) && strings.Contains(line, privateKeyMarker) {
-			inPrivateKey = true
-			privateKeyLine = lineNo
-		}
-		if inPrivateKey && strings.Contains(line, privateKeyEndPrefix) && strings.Contains(line, privateKeyMarker) {
-			out = append(out, newFinding("public_content_private_key_block", file, privateKeyLine, source, "private key block"))
-			inPrivateKey = false
-		}
-		for _, match := range credentialAssignmentRE.FindAllStringSubmatch(line, -1) {
-			if !isCredentialAssignmentMatch(match[0]) {
-				continue
-			}
-			value := credentialAssignmentValue(match)
-			keyName, _ := normalizedCredentialAssignmentKey(match[0])
-			if value == "" ||
-				isNonSecretLiteralValue(value) ||
-				isBenignCodeCredentialExpression(file, value) ||
-				isPlaceholderValue(value) ||
-				isResourceTokenPlaceholderAssignment(keyName, value) {
-				continue
-			}
-			if looksLikeEqualityComparison(value) {
-				continue
-			}
-			out = append(out, newFinding("public_content_generic_credential", file, lineNo, source, redactAssignment(match[0])))
-		}
-		for _, match := range jwtLikeRE.FindAllString(line, -1) {
-			if isSchemaDottedIdentifier(line, match) {
-				continue
-			}
-			out = append(out, newFinding("public_content_jwt_like_token", file, lineNo, source, redactToken(match)))
-		}
-		for range bearerHeaderRE.FindAllString(line, -1) {
-			out = append(out, newFinding("public_content_bearer_header", file, lineNo, source, "Authorization: Bearer <redacted>"))
-		}
-		for _, match := range credentialURLRE.FindAllString(line, -1) {
-			if isPlaceholderCredentialURL(match) {
-				continue
-			}
-			out = append(out, newFinding("public_content_credential_url", file, lineNo, source, redactCredentialURL(match)))
-		}
-		for _, match := range privateIPv4RE.FindAllString(line, -1) {
-			out = append(out, newFinding("public_content_private_ipv4", file, lineNo, source, match))
-		}
-		if source == "branch" && automationBranchRE.MatchString(line) {
-			out = append(out, newFinding("public_content_automation_branch", file, lineNo, source, "automation branch marker"))
-		}
-		switch {
-		case changeIDTrailerRE.MatchString(line):
-			out = append(out, newFinding("public_content_change_id_trailer", file, lineNo, source, "Change-Id: <redacted>"))
-		case reviewedOnTrailerRE.MatchString(line):
-			out = append(out, newFinding("public_content_reviewed_on_trailer", file, lineNo, source, "Reviewed-on: <redacted>"))
-		case ccmHarnessTrailerRE.MatchString(line):
-			out = append(out, newFinding("public_content_ccm_harness_trailer", file, lineNo, source, "CCM-Harness: <redacted>"))
-		}
-		if provenanceMarker(line) {
-			out = append(out, newFinding("public_content_provenance_marker", file, lineNo, source, "provenance marker"))
-		}
-		if strings.Contains(line, "/tmp/harness-agent") {
-			out = append(out, newFinding("public_content_harness_metadata", file, lineNo, source, "/tmp/harness-agent"))
-		}
-		if detectorFile && detectorFingerprint(line) {
-			out = append(out, newFinding("public_content_detector_fingerprint", file, lineNo, source, "public detector fingerprint"))
-		}
-	}
-	sort.SliceStable(out, func(i, j int) bool {
-		if out[i].File != out[j].File {
-			return out[i].File < out[j].File
-		}
-		if out[i].Line != out[j].Line {
-			return out[i].Line < out[j].Line
-		}
-		return out[i].Rule < out[j].Rule
-	})
-	return out
-}
-
-func isCredentialAssignmentMatch(match string) bool {
-	name, value, ok := normalizedCredentialAssignment(match)
-	if !ok {
-		return false
-	}
-	if isWebhookCredentialKey(name) && webhookAssignmentValueLooksCredentialLike(value) {
-		return true
-	}
-	if isBenignTokenField(name) && !credentialShapedValue(value) {
-		return false
-	}
-	return isExplicitCredentialKey(name)
-}
-
-func normalizedCredentialAssignmentKey(match string) (string, bool) {
-	key, _, ok := normalizedCredentialAssignment(match)
-	return key, ok
-}
-
-func normalizedCredentialAssignment(match string) (string, string, bool) {
-	key, ok := credentialAssignmentKey(match)
-	if !ok {
-		return "", "", false
-	}
-	key = strings.TrimSpace(key)
-	if key == "" {
-		return "", "", false
-	}
-	submatches := credentialAssignmentRE.FindStringSubmatch(match)
-	return normalizedCredentialKey(strings.Trim(key, `"'`)), credentialAssignmentValue(submatches), true
-}
-
-func normalizedCredentialKey(key string) string {
-	key = strings.TrimSpace(key)
-	var out []rune
-	var prev rune
-	for i, r := range key {
-		if r == '-' {
-			r = '_'
-		}
-		if i > 0 && isCredentialKeyBoundary(prev, r) {
-			out = append(out, '_')
-		}
-		out = append(out, unicode.ToLower(r))
-		prev = r
-	}
-	key = string(out)
-	key = strings.ReplaceAll(key, "-", "_")
-	return key
-}
-
-func isCredentialKeyBoundary(prev, current rune) bool {
-	if prev == '_' || current == '_' {
-		return false
-	}
-	return (unicode.IsLower(prev) || unicode.IsDigit(prev)) && unicode.IsUpper(current)
-}
-
-func isBenignTokenField(key string) bool {
-	if isTokenMetricField(key) ||
-		isTokenMetadataField(key) ||
-		isResourceTokenField(key) ||
-		isPaginationOrSyncTokenField(key) {
-		return true
-	}
-	return false
-}
-
-func isTokenMetricField(key string) bool {
-	switch key {
-	case "tokenizer",
-		"token_count",
-		"tokens",
-		"max_tokens",
-		"completion_tokens",
-		"prompt_tokens":
-		return true
-	default:
-		return false
-	}
-}
-
-func isTokenMetadataField(key string) bool {
-	switch key {
-	case "access_token_expires_in",
-		"refresh_token_expires_in",
-		"token_expires_in",
-		"token_status",
-		"token_type",
-		"token_url",
-		"token_endpoint",
-		"token_format",
-		"secret_name":
-		return true
-	default:
-		return false
-	}
-}
-
-func isPaginationOrSyncTokenField(key string) bool {
-	switch key {
-	case "page_token",
-		"next_page_token",
-		"sync_token":
-		return true
-	default:
-		return false
-	}
-}
-
-func isResourceTokenField(key string) bool {
-	if !strings.HasSuffix(key, "_token") {
-		return false
-	}
-	prefix := strings.TrimSuffix(key, "_token")
-	switch prefix {
-	case "app",
-		"base",
-		"board",
-		"doc",
-		"drive_route",
-		"file",
-		"folder",
-		"host_node",
-		"minute",
-		"node",
-		"obj",
-		"origin_node",
-		"parent",
-		"parent_file",
-		"parent_node",
-		"share",
-		"spreadsheet",
-		"target",
-		"wiki":
-		return true
-	default:
-		return false
-	}
-}
-
-func isResourceTokenPlaceholderAssignment(key, value string) bool {
-	switch {
-	case key == "client_token" && idempotencyTokenPlaceholderValue(value):
-		return true
-	case key == "retry_without_token" && numericStringPlaceholderValue(value):
-		return true
-	case tokenLikePlaceholderKey(key):
-		return tokenLikePlaceholderValue(value)
-	default:
-		return false
-	}
-}
-
-func tokenLikePlaceholderKey(key string) bool {
-	return key == "token" ||
-		strings.HasSuffix(key, "_token") ||
-		strings.HasSuffix(key, "-token")
-}
-
-func tokenLikePlaceholderValue(value string) bool {
-	normalized := strings.ToLower(strings.Trim(value, `"'`))
-	if normalized == "" || credentialShapedIdentifier(normalized) {
-		return false
-	}
-	return resourceTokenPlaceholderValue(value) ||
-		isPlaceholderValue(value) ||
-		normalized == "token" ||
-		strings.Contains(normalized, "...") ||
-		strings.Contains(normalized, "xxx") ||
-		strings.Contains(normalized, "_or_") ||
-		strings.HasSuffix(normalized, "_token") ||
-		strings.HasPrefix(normalized, ".")
-}
-
-func idempotencyTokenPlaceholderValue(value string) bool {
-	return numericStringPlaceholderValue(value) || uuidStringPlaceholderValue(value)
-}
-
-func uuidStringPlaceholderValue(value string) bool {
-	normalized := strings.Trim(value, `"'`)
-	parts := strings.Split(normalized, "-")
-	if len(parts) != 5 {
-		return false
-	}
-	for i, part := range parts {
-		want := []int{8, 4, 4, 4, 12}[i]
-		if len(part) != want {
-			return false
-		}
-		for _, r := range part {
-			if (r >= '0' && r <= '9') ||
-				(r >= 'a' && r <= 'f') ||
-				(r >= 'A' && r <= 'F') {
-				continue
-			}
-			return false
-		}
-	}
-	return true
-}
-
-func numericStringPlaceholderValue(value string) bool {
-	normalized := strings.Trim(value, `"'`)
-	if normalized == "" {
-		return false
-	}
-	for _, r := range normalized {
-		if r < '0' || r > '9' {
-			return false
-		}
-	}
-	return true
-}
-
-func isBenignCodeCredentialExpression(file, value string) bool {
-	normalized := strings.TrimSpace(value)
-	if strings.HasPrefix(normalized, "regexp.MustCompile(") {
-		return true
-	}
-	if !sourceCodeFile(file) || quotedLiteral(value) || credentialShapedValue(value) {
-		return false
-	}
-	return codeReferenceExpression(normalized)
-}
-
-func sourceCodeFile(file string) bool {
-	switch filepath.Ext(file) {
-	case ".go", ".py":
-		return true
-	default:
-		return false
-	}
-}
-
-func quotedLiteral(value string) bool {
-	normalized := strings.TrimSpace(value)
-	return len(normalized) >= 2 &&
-		((strings.HasPrefix(normalized, `"`) && strings.HasSuffix(normalized, `"`)) ||
-			(strings.HasPrefix(normalized, `'`) && strings.HasSuffix(normalized, `'`)))
-}
-
-func codeReferenceExpression(value string) bool {
-	if value == "" {
-		return false
-	}
-	for _, marker := range []string{".", "(", ")", "[", "]", "{"} {
-		if strings.Contains(value, marker) {
-			return true
-		}
-	}
-	return codeIdentifier(value) && !credentialNameFragment(value)
-}
-
-func codeIdentifier(value string) bool {
-	for i, r := range value {
-		switch {
-		case r >= 'a' && r <= 'z':
-		case r >= 'A' && r <= 'Z':
-		case r == '_' && i > 0:
-		case r >= '0' && r <= '9' && i > 0:
-		default:
-			return false
-		}
-	}
-	return true
-}
-
-func credentialNameFragment(value string) bool {
-	normalized := strings.ToLower(value)
-	for _, marker := range []string{"secret", "token", "password", "passwd", "key"} {
-		if strings.Contains(normalized, marker) {
-			return true
-		}
-	}
-	return false
-}
-
-func isSchemaDottedIdentifier(line, match string) bool {
-	return strings.Contains(line, "schema ") && strings.Contains(match, "_")
-}
-
-func isNonSecretLiteralValue(value string) bool {
-	switch strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(strings.Trim(value, `"'`))) {
-	case "true", "false", "null", "nil", "{", "[":
-		return true
-	default:
-		return false
-	}
-}
-
-func isWebhookCredentialKey(key string) bool {
-	return strings.Contains(strings.ReplaceAll(key, "_", ""), "webhook")
-}
-
-func webhookAssignmentValueLooksCredentialLike(value string) bool {
-	normalized := strings.ToLower(strings.Trim(value, `"'`))
-	if normalized == "" || isPlaceholderValue(normalized) || isNonSecretLiteralValue(normalized) {
-		return false
-	}
-	return urlRemainderLooksCredentialLike(removeAnglePlaceholders(normalized)) ||
-		credentialShapedIdentifier(strings.Trim(normalized, "$"))
-}
-
-func isExplicitCredentialKey(key string) bool {
-	compact := strings.ReplaceAll(key, "_", "")
-	switch compact {
-	case "token",
-		"accesstoken",
-		"refreshtoken",
-		"authtoken",
-		"bearertoken",
-		"sessiontoken",
-		"servicetoken",
-		"apikey",
-		"accesskey",
-		"privatekey",
-		"apisecret",
-		"secret",
-		"secretkey",
-		"clientsecret",
-		"password",
-		"passwd":
-		return true
-	}
-	for _, phrase := range []string{
-		"accesstoken",
-		"refreshtoken",
-		"authtoken",
-		"bearertoken",
-		"sessiontoken",
-		"servicetoken",
-		"bottoken",
-		"apikey",
-		"accesskey",
-		"privatekey",
-		"apisecret",
-		"clientsecret",
-		"secretkey",
-	} {
-		if strings.Contains(compact, phrase) {
-			return true
-		}
-	}
-	parts := credentialKeyParts(key)
-	for _, phrase := range [][2]string{
-		{"access", "token"},
-		{"refresh", "token"},
-		{"auth", "token"},
-		{"bearer", "token"},
-		{"session", "token"},
-		{"service", "token"},
-		{"bot", "token"},
-		{"api", "key"},
-		{"access", "key"},
-		{"private", "key"},
-		{"api", "secret"},
-		{"client", "secret"},
-		{"secret", "key"},
-	} {
-		if hasAdjacentCredentialParts(parts, phrase[0], phrase[1]) {
-			return true
-		}
-	}
-	for _, part := range parts {
-		switch part {
-		case "token", "secret", "password", "passwd":
-			return true
-		}
-	}
-	for _, suffix := range []string{
-		"token",
-		"accesstoken",
-		"refreshtoken",
-		"authtoken",
-		"bearertoken",
-		"sessiontoken",
-		"servicetoken",
-		"bottoken",
-		"apikey",
-		"accesskey",
-		"privatekey",
-		"apisecret",
-		"clientsecret",
-		"secret",
-		"secretkey",
-		"password",
-		"passwd",
-	} {
-		if strings.HasSuffix(compact, suffix) {
-			return true
-		}
-	}
-	for _, suffix := range []string{
-		"_access_token",
-		"_refresh_token",
-		"_auth_token",
-		"_bearer_token",
-		"_session_token",
-		"_service_token",
-		"_api_key",
-		"_access_key",
-		"_private_key",
-		"_api_secret",
-		"_client_secret",
-		"_secret",
-		"_secret_key",
-		"_password",
-		"_passwd",
-	} {
-		if strings.HasSuffix(key, suffix) {
-			return true
-		}
-	}
-	return false
-}
-
-func credentialKeyParts(key string) []string {
-	var parts []string
-	for _, part := range strings.Split(key, "_") {
-		if part != "" {
-			parts = append(parts, part)
-		}
-	}
-	return parts
-}
-
-func hasAdjacentCredentialParts(parts []string, first, second string) bool {
-	for i := 0; i+1 < len(parts); i++ {
-		if parts[i] == first && parts[i+1] == second {
-			return true
-		}
-	}
-	return false
-}
-
-func credentialAssignmentValue(match []string) string {
-	for _, value := range match[1:] {
-		if value != "" {
-			return value
-		}
-	}
-	return ""
-}
-
-func looksLikeEqualityComparison(value string) bool {
-	return strings.HasPrefix(strings.TrimSpace(value), "=")
-}
-
-func isPlaceholderCredentialURL(raw string) bool {
-	userInfo, ok := credentialURLUserInfo(raw)
-	if !ok {
-		return false
-	}
-	_, password, ok := strings.Cut(userInfo, ":")
-	if !ok {
-		return false
-	}
-	return credentialURLPasswordPlaceholder(password)
-}
-
-func credentialURLPasswordPlaceholder(password string) bool {
-	normalized := strings.ToLower(password)
-	decoded := strings.ReplaceAll(normalized, "%3c", "<")
-	decoded = strings.ReplaceAll(decoded, "%3e", ">")
-	switch decoded {
-	case "placeholder", "redacted", "<redacted>", "xxxx":
-		return true
-	}
-	return angleWrappedPlaceholder(decoded) || percentWrappedPlaceholder(decoded)
-}
-
-func credentialURLUserInfo(raw string) (string, bool) {
-	schemeIdx := strings.Index(raw, "://")
-	if schemeIdx < 0 {
-		return "", false
-	}
-	rest := raw[schemeIdx+len("://"):]
-	atIdx := strings.Index(rest, "@")
-	if atIdx < 0 {
-		return "", false
-	}
-	return rest[:atIdx], true
-}
-
-func newFinding(rule, file string, line int, source, excerpt string) Finding {
-	return Finding{
-		Rule:       rule,
-		Action:     actionForRule(rule),
-		File:       file,
-		Line:       line,
-		Source:     source,
-		Excerpt:    excerpt,
-		Message:    messageForRule(rule),
-		Suggestion: suggestionForRule(rule),
-	}
-}
-
-func messageForRule(rule string) string {
-	switch rule {
-	case "public_content_generic_credential":
-		return "public contribution contains a generic credential assignment"
-	case "public_content_private_key_block":
-		return "public contribution contains a private key block"
-	case "public_content_jwt_like_token":
-		return "public contribution contains a JWT-like token"
-	case "public_content_bearer_header":
-		return "public contribution contains an Authorization bearer token"
-	case "public_content_credential_url":
-		return "public contribution contains credentials embedded in a URL"
-	case "public_content_private_ipv4":
-		return "public contribution contains a private-network IP address"
-	case "public_content_automation_branch":
-		return "public contribution uses an automation-shaped branch name"
-	case "public_content_change_id_trailer":
-		return "public contribution contains a Change-Id trailer"
-	case "public_content_reviewed_on_trailer":
-		return "public contribution contains a Reviewed-on trailer"
-	case "public_content_provenance_marker":
-		return "public contribution contains a prohibited provenance marker"
-	case "public_content_detector_fingerprint":
-		return "public rule/config content exposes public detector fingerprints"
-	case "public_content_harness_metadata":
-		return "public contribution contains visible harness pipeline metadata"
-	case "public_content_ccm_harness_trailer":
-		return "public contribution contains a CCM-Harness trailer"
-	case "public_content_semantic_candidate":
-		return "public contribution contains text for semantic public content review"
-	default:
-		return "public contribution contains content that should not be published"
-	}
-}
-
-func suggestionForRule(rule string) string {
-	switch actionForRule(rule) {
-	case "REJECT":
-		return "remove the value from the public contribution and replace it with a non-sensitive placeholder"
-	default:
-		return "remove private workflow metadata before publishing the public contribution"
-	}
-}
-
-func redactAssignment(match string) string {
-	key, ok := credentialAssignmentKey(match)
-	if !ok {
-		return "<credential-assignment>"
-	}
-	return fmt.Sprintf("%s= <redacted>", strings.TrimSpace(key))
-}
-
-func credentialAssignmentKey(match string) (string, bool) {
-	idx := -1
-	for _, sep := range []string{":", "="} {
-		if candidate := strings.Index(match, sep); candidate >= 0 && (idx < 0 || candidate < idx) {
-			idx = candidate
-		}
-	}
-	if idx < 0 {
-		return "", false
-	}
-	return match[:idx], true
-}
-
-func redactToken(_ string) string {
-	return "<jwt-like-token>"
-}
-
-func redactedSemanticExcerpt(text string) string {
-	normalized := strings.Join(strings.Fields(text), " ")
-	if normalized == "" {
-		return ""
-	}
-	signals := semanticSignals(normalized)
-	if len(signals) == 0 {
-		return ""
-	}
-	sanitized := truncateRunes(sanitizeSemanticExcerpt(text), 600)
-	return fmt.Sprintf("semantic signals: %s; excerpt: %q", strings.Join(signals, ","), sanitized)
-}
-
-func semanticSignals(normalized string) []string {
-	lower := strings.ToLower(normalized)
-	var signals []string
-	add := func(signal string) {
-		for _, existing := range signals {
-			if existing == signal {
-				return
-			}
-		}
-		signals = append(signals, signal)
-	}
-
-	hasPrivateScope := strings.Contains(lower, "private") || strings.Contains(lower, "internal-only")
-	hasRequestMetadata := strings.Contains(lower, "request header") || strings.Contains(lower, "request headers") || strings.Contains(lower, "authorization header") || strings.Contains(lower, "metadata header")
-	hasTrustBoundary := strings.Contains(lower, "spoof") || strings.Contains(lower, "trust") || strings.Contains(lower, "risk scoring") || strings.Contains(lower, "classification")
-	hasRoadmap := strings.Contains(lower, "roadmap") || strings.Contains(lower, "migration") || strings.Contains(lower, "rollout") || strings.Contains(lower, "cutover") || strings.Contains(lower, "unpublished")
-	hasTiming := strings.Contains(lower, "target date") || strings.Contains(lower, "friday") || strings.Contains(lower, "monday") || strings.Contains(lower, "tuesday") || strings.Contains(lower, "wednesday") || strings.Contains(lower, "thursday") || strings.Contains(lower, "customer-visible")
-	hasImplementation := strings.Contains(lower, "server-side") || strings.Contains(lower, "implementation")
-
-	if hasPrivateScope && hasRequestMetadata && hasTrustBoundary {
-		add("private_scope")
-		add("request_metadata")
-		add("trust_boundary_detail")
-	}
-	if hasRoadmap && (hasPrivateScope || hasTiming) {
-		add("roadmap_detail")
-		if hasPrivateScope {
-			add("private_scope")
-		}
-		if hasTiming {
-			add("roadmap_timing")
-		}
-	}
-	if hasPrivateScope && hasImplementation && hasTrustBoundary {
-		add("private_scope")
-		add("implementation_detail")
-		add("trust_boundary_detail")
-	}
-
-	return signals
-}
-
-func sanitizeSemanticExcerpt(text string) string {
-	text = redactPrivateKeyBlocks(text)
-	text = credentialAssignmentRE.ReplaceAllStringFunc(text, sanitizeCredentialAssignment)
-	text = strings.ReplaceAll(text, `<redacted>"`, `<redacted>`)
-	text = strings.ReplaceAll(text, `<redacted>'`, `<redacted>`)
-	text = semanticBearerHeaderRE.ReplaceAllString(text, "Authorization: Bearer <redacted>")
-	text = jwtLikeRE.ReplaceAllString(text, "<jwt-like-token>")
-	text = credentialURLRE.ReplaceAllStringFunc(text, sanitizeCredentialURL)
-	return strings.Join(strings.Fields(text), " ")
-}
-
-func redactPrivateKeyBlocks(text string) string {
-	lines := strings.Split(text, "\n")
-	var out []string
-	inPrivateKey := false
-	for _, line := range lines {
-		if strings.Contains(line, privateKeyBeginPrefix) && strings.Contains(line, privateKeyMarker) {
-			out = append(out, "<private-key-block>")
-			inPrivateKey = true
-			if strings.Contains(line, privateKeyEndPrefix) && strings.Contains(line, privateKeyMarker) {
-				inPrivateKey = false
-			}
-			continue
-		}
-		if inPrivateKey {
-			if strings.Contains(line, privateKeyEndPrefix) && strings.Contains(line, privateKeyMarker) {
-				inPrivateKey = false
-			}
-			continue
-		}
-		out = append(out, line)
-	}
-	return strings.Join(out, "\n")
-}
-
-func sanitizeCredentialAssignment(match string) string {
-	key, ok := credentialAssignmentKey(match)
-	if !ok {
-		return "<credential-assignment>"
-	}
-	return strings.TrimSpace(key) + "=<redacted>"
-}
-
-func sanitizeCredentialURL(raw string) string {
-	redacted := redactCredentialURL(raw)
-	redacted = strings.ReplaceAll(redacted, "%3Cuser%3E", "<user>")
-	redacted = strings.ReplaceAll(redacted, "%3Credacted%3E", "<redacted>")
-	return redacted
-}
-
-func truncateRunes(text string, limit int) string {
-	if limit <= 0 {
-		return ""
-	}
-	runes := []rune(text)
-	if len(runes) <= limit {
-		return text
-	}
-	return string(runes[:limit]) + "..."
-}

internal/qualitygate/publiccontent/types.go

@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
-
-package publiccontent
-
-import "github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/qualitygate/report"
-
-type Options struct {
-	Repo         string
-	ChangedFrom  string
-	MetadataPath string
-	BranchName   string
-}
-
-type Metadata struct {
-	Title  string `json:"title"`
-	Body   string `json:"body"`
-	Branch string `json:"branch"`
-}
-
-type Finding struct {
-	Rule       string
-	Action     report.Action
-	File       string
-	Line       int
-	Source     string
-	Excerpt    string
-	Message    string
-	Suggestion string
-}

internal/qualitygate/rules/dryrun.go

@@ -174,9 +174,8 @@ type materializedExample struct {
 }
 
 type placeholderContext struct {
-	FlagName    string
-	FlagUsage   string
-	FlagDefault string
+	FlagName  string
+	FlagUsage string
 }
 
 func materializePlaceholderExample(raw string, cmd manifest.Command) (materializedExample, bool) {
@@ -248,7 +247,6 @@ func placeholderContextForFlag(name string, flag *manifest.Flag) placeholderCont
 	ctx := placeholderContext{FlagName: name}
 	if flag != nil {
 		ctx.FlagUsage = flag.Usage
-		ctx.FlagDefault = flag.DefValue
 	}
 	return ctx
 }
@@ -311,17 +309,11 @@ func fakeValueForPlaceholder(raw string, ctx placeholderContext) (string, bool)
 	if name == "" {
 		return "", false
 	}
-	if value, ok := fakeNumericValueForPlaceholder(name, ctx); ok {
-		return value, true
-	}
-	if value, ok := fakeContextualURLValueForPlaceholder(name, ctx); ok {
-		return value, true
-	}
 	if value, ok := fakeValueFromPlaceholderName(name); ok {
 		return value, true
 	}
 	if isGenericPlaceholderName(name) {
-		return fakeValueFromContextHint(ctx)
+		return fakeValueFromUsageHint(ctx.FlagUsage)
 	}
 	return "", false
 }
@@ -344,26 +336,16 @@ func fakeValueFromPlaceholderName(name string) (string, bool) {
 		return "file_test123", true
 	case hasPlaceholderToken(tokens, "file") && hasPlaceholderToken(tokens, "token"):
 		return "file_test123", true
-	case hasPlaceholderToken(tokens, "folder") && hasPlaceholderToken(tokens, "token"):
-		return "fld_test123", true
 	case hasPlaceholderToken(tokens, "image", "img"):
 		return "img_test123", true
 	case hasPlaceholderToken(tokens, "app"):
 		return "app_test123", true
-	case hasPlaceholderToken(tokens, "draft"):
-		return "draft_test123", true
-	case hasPlaceholderToken(tokens, "label"):
-		return "label_test123", true
-	case hasPlaceholderToken(tokens, "share"):
-		return "share_test123", true
 	case hasPlaceholderToken(tokens, "doc", "document"):
 		return "doc_test123", true
 	case hasPlaceholderToken(tokens, "sheet", "spreadsheet"):
 		return "shtcn_test123", true
 	case hasPlaceholderToken(tokens, "base"):
 		return "base_test123", true
-	case hasPlaceholderToken(tokens, "space"):
-		return "space_test123", true
 	case hasPlaceholderToken(tokens, "table"):
 		return "tbl_test123", true
 	case hasPlaceholderToken(tokens, "view"):
@@ -395,98 +377,17 @@ func fakeValueFromPlaceholderName(name string) (string, bool) {
 	}
 }
 
-func fakeValueFromContextHint(ctx placeholderContext) (string, bool) {
-	if value, ok := fakeNumericValueForPlaceholder("", ctx); ok {
-		return value, true
-	}
-	if value, ok := fakeContextualURLValueForPlaceholder("", ctx); ok {
-		return value, true
-	}
-	match := placeholderValuePattern.FindStringSubmatch(strings.ToLower(ctx.FlagUsage))
+func fakeValueFromUsageHint(usage string) (string, bool) {
+	match := placeholderValuePattern.FindStringSubmatch(strings.ToLower(usage))
 	if len(match) != 2 || !knownTokenPrefix(match[1]) {
 		return "", false
 	}
 	return match[1] + "_test123", true
 }
 
-func fakeContextualURLValueForPlaceholder(name string, ctx placeholderContext) (string, bool) {
-	nameTokens := placeholderTokenSet(name)
-	flagName := strings.ReplaceAll(strings.ToLower(ctx.FlagName), "-", "_")
-	flagTokens := placeholderTokenSet(flagName)
-	if !hasPlaceholderToken(nameTokens, "url", "link") && !hasPlaceholderToken(flagTokens, "url", "link") {
-		return "", false
-	}
-	usage := strings.ToLower(ctx.FlagUsage)
-	if strings.Contains(usage, "lark") || strings.Contains(usage, "feishu") || strings.Contains(usage, "document url") {
-		return "https://example.feishu.cn/docx/doc_test123", true
-	}
-	return "", false
-}
-
-func fakeNumericValueForPlaceholder(name string, ctx placeholderContext) (string, bool) {
-	nameTokens := placeholderTokenSet(name)
-	flagName := strings.ReplaceAll(strings.ToLower(ctx.FlagName), "-", "_")
-	flagTokens := placeholderTokenSet(flagName)
-	usage := strings.ToLower(ctx.FlagUsage)
-
-	switch {
-	case placeholderTokenPair(nameTokens, "meeting", "id") || placeholderTokenPair(flagTokens, "meeting", "id"):
-		return "400000000001", true
-	case placeholderTokenPair(nameTokens, "meeting", "ids") || placeholderTokenPair(flagTokens, "meeting", "ids"):
-		return "400000000001", true
-	case placeholderTokenPair(nameTokens, "meeting", "no") || placeholderTokenPair(flagTokens, "meeting", "no"):
-		return "123456789", true
-	case placeholderTokenPair(nameTokens, "meeting", "number") || placeholderTokenPair(flagTokens, "meeting", "number"):
-		return "123456789", true
-	case hasPlaceholderToken(nameTokens, "timestamp") || hasPlaceholderToken(flagTokens, "timestamp") || strings.Contains(usage, "unix timestamp"):
-		return defaultPositiveInteger(ctx.FlagDefault, "1893456000"), true
-	case placeholderTokenPair(nameTokens, "page", "size") || placeholderTokenPair(flagTokens, "page", "size"):
-		return defaultPositiveInteger(ctx.FlagDefault, "20"), true
-	case placeholderTokenPair(nameTokens, "page", "limit") || placeholderTokenPair(flagTokens, "page", "limit"):
-		return defaultPositiveInteger(ctx.FlagDefault, "10"), true
-	case numericPlaceholderName(nameTokens) || numericPlaceholderName(flagTokens) || numericUsageHint(usage):
-		return defaultPositiveInteger(ctx.FlagDefault, "20"), true
-	default:
-		return "", false
-	}
-}
-
-func numericPlaceholderName(tokens map[string]bool) bool {
-	if len(tokens) == 0 || hasPlaceholderToken(tokens, "token", "format", "type", "status", "mode") {
-		return false
-	}
-	return hasPlaceholderToken(tokens,
-		"amount", "count", "depth", "height", "index", "length", "limit", "max",
-		"number", "revision", "size", "width",
-	)
-}
-
-func numericUsageHint(usage string) bool {
-	if usage == "" {
-		return false
-	}
-	return strings.Contains(usage, "positive integer") ||
-		strings.Contains(usage, "decimal integer") ||
-		strings.Contains(usage, "number of ") ||
-		strings.Contains(usage, "(number)")
-}
-
-func defaultPositiveInteger(raw, fallback string) string {
-	raw = strings.TrimSpace(raw)
-	if raw == "" || strings.HasPrefix(raw, "-") || raw == "0" {
-		return fallback
-	}
-	for _, r := range raw {
-		if r < '0' || r > '9' {
-			return fallback
-		}
-	}
-	return raw
-}
-
 func knownTokenPrefix(prefix string) bool {
 	switch prefix {
-	case "app", "base", "doc", "draft", "file", "fld", "img", "item", "label", "meeting", "obcn", "oc", "od", "om", "ou", "page", "rec", "share", "shtcn", "space", "task", "tbl", "token", "viw", "wiki":
+	case "app", "base", "doc", "file", "fld", "img", "item", "meeting", "obcn", "oc", "od", "om", "ou", "page", "rec", "shtcn", "task", "tbl", "token", "viw", "wiki":
 		return true
 	default:
 		return false
@@ -530,10 +431,6 @@ func hasPlaceholderToken(tokens map[string]bool, wants ...string) bool {
 	return false
 }
 
-func placeholderTokenPair(tokens map[string]bool, first, second string) bool {
-	return tokens[first] && tokens[second]
-}
-
 func hasUnresolvedDryRunPlaceholder(value string) bool {
 	if skillscan.HasPlaceholder(value) {
 		return true
@@ -726,7 +623,6 @@ func appendDryRunArg(raw string) ([]string, error) {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("not a lark-cli command")
 	}
 	argv = truncateShellTail(argv)
-	argv = forceDryRunJSONFormat(argv)
 	hasDryRunArg := false
 	dryRunEnabled := false
 	for _, arg := range argv[1:] {
@@ -746,23 +642,6 @@ func appendDryRunArg(raw string) ([]string, error) {
 	return append(argv[1:], "--dry-run"), nil
 }
 
-func forceDryRunJSONFormat(argv []string) []string {
-	for i := 1; i < len(argv); i++ {
-		arg := argv[i]
-		if arg == "--format" {
-			if i+1 < len(argv) && argv[i+1] == "pretty" {
-				argv[i+1] = "json"
-			}
-			return argv
-		}
-		if arg == "--format=pretty" {
-			argv[i] = "--format=json"
-			return argv
-		}
-	}
-	return argv
-}
-
 func truncateShellTail(argv []string) []string {
 	for i, arg := range argv {
 		if i == 0 {

internal/qualitygate/rules/dryrun_test.go

@@ -305,161 +305,6 @@ func TestRunDryRunsMaterializesInlinePlaceholderFlagValues(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-func TestRunDryRunsMaterializesNumericPlaceholderFlagValues(t *testing.T) {
-	cliBin, argsPath := fakeDryRunCLI(t, `{"api":[{"method":"GET","url":"/open-apis/vc/v1/bots/events","params":{"meeting_id":"400000000001","page_size":50}}]}`)
-	m := manifest.Manifest{Commands: []manifest.Command{{
-		Path:     "vc +meeting-events",
-		Runnable: true,
-		Flags: []manifest.Flag{
-			{Name: "meeting-id", TakesValue: true, Usage: "meeting ID to query; must be a long positive integer, not a 9-digit meeting number"},
-			{Name: "page-size", TakesValue: true, Usage: "page size, 20-100 (default 50)", DefValue: "50"},
-			{Name: "dry-run"},
-		},
-	}}}
-	ex := skillscan.Example{
-		Raw:            "lark-cli vc +meeting-events --meeting-id <meeting_id> --page-size <page_size>",
-		SourceFile:     "skills/lark-vc-agent/SKILL.md",
-		Line:           120,
-		HasPlaceholder: true,
-	}
-
-	diags, facts := RunDryRuns(context.Background(), cliBin, m, []skillscan.Example{ex})
-	if len(diags) != 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("RunDryRuns() diagnostics = %#v", diags)
-	}
-	if len(facts) != 1 || !facts[0].Executable || facts[0].SkipReason != "" {
-		t.Fatalf("numeric placeholder example should be executable after materialization: %#v", facts)
-	}
-	wantArgs := []string{"vc", "+meeting-events", "--meeting-id", "400000000001", "--page-size", "50", "--dry-run"}
-	if gotArgs := readArgs(t, argsPath); !reflect.DeepEqual(gotArgs, wantArgs) {
-		t.Fatalf("fake CLI args = %#v, want %#v", gotArgs, wantArgs)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestRunDryRunsMaterializesNumericPlaceholdersInsideJSONFlags(t *testing.T) {
-	cliBin, argsPath := fakeDryRunCLI(t, `{"api":[{"method":"GET","url":"/open-apis/test","params":{"timestamp":"1893456000","count":"20"}}]}`)
-	m := manifest.Manifest{Commands: []manifest.Command{{
-		Path:     "api GET",
-		Runnable: true,
-		Flags: []manifest.Flag{
-			{Name: "params", TakesValue: true},
-			{Name: "dry-run"},
-		},
-	}}}
-	ex := skillscan.Example{
-		Raw:            `lark-cli api GET /open-apis/test --params '{"timestamp":"<timestamp>","count":"<count>"}'`,
-		SourceFile:     "skills/lark-demo/SKILL.md",
-		Line:           20,
-		HasPlaceholder: true,
-	}
-
-	diags, facts := RunDryRuns(context.Background(), cliBin, m, []skillscan.Example{ex})
-	if len(diags) != 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("RunDryRuns() diagnostics = %#v", diags)
-	}
-	if len(facts) != 1 || !facts[0].Executable || facts[0].SkipReason != "" {
-		t.Fatalf("JSON numeric placeholder example should be executable after materialization: %#v", facts)
-	}
-	wantArgs := []string{"api", "GET", "/open-apis/test", "--params", `{"timestamp":"1893456000","count":"20"}`, "--dry-run"}
-	if gotArgs := readArgs(t, argsPath); !reflect.DeepEqual(gotArgs, wantArgs) {
-		t.Fatalf("fake CLI args = %#v, want %#v", gotArgs, wantArgs)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestRunDryRunsMaterializesLarkDocumentURLPlaceholders(t *testing.T) {
-	cliBin, argsPath := fakeDryRunCLI(t, `{"api":[{"method":"GET","url":"/open-apis/drive/v1/metas/batch_query"}]}`)
-	m := manifest.Manifest{Commands: []manifest.Command{{
-		Path:     "drive +inspect",
-		Runnable: true,
-		Flags: []manifest.Flag{
-			{Name: "url", TakesValue: true, Usage: "Lark/Feishu document URL (docx, doc, sheet, bitable, wiki, file, folder, mindnote, slides)"},
-			{Name: "format", TakesValue: true},
-			{Name: "dry-run"},
-		},
-	}}}
-	ex := skillscan.Example{
-		Raw:            "lark-cli drive +inspect --url '<url>' --format json",
-		SourceFile:     "skills/lark-drive/references/lark-drive-workflow-permission-governance-commands.md",
-		Line:           15,
-		HasPlaceholder: true,
-	}
-
-	diags, facts := RunDryRuns(context.Background(), cliBin, m, []skillscan.Example{ex})
-	if len(diags) != 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("RunDryRuns() diagnostics = %#v", diags)
-	}
-	if len(facts) != 1 || !facts[0].Executable || facts[0].SkipReason != "" {
-		t.Fatalf("Lark URL placeholder example should be executable after materialization: %#v", facts)
-	}
-	wantArgs := []string{"drive", "+inspect", "--url", "https://example.feishu.cn/docx/doc_test123", "--format", "json", "--dry-run"}
-	if gotArgs := readArgs(t, argsPath); !reflect.DeepEqual(gotArgs, wantArgs) {
-		t.Fatalf("fake CLI args = %#v, want %#v", gotArgs, wantArgs)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestRunDryRunsMaterializesResourceIDPlaceholderFlagValues(t *testing.T) {
-	cliBin, argsPath := fakeDryRunCLI(t, `{"api":[{"method":"GET","url":"/open-apis/wiki/v2/spaces/space_test123/nodes"}]}`)
-	m := manifest.Manifest{Commands: []manifest.Command{{
-		Path:     "wiki +node-list",
-		Runnable: true,
-		Flags: []manifest.Flag{
-			{Name: "space-id", TakesValue: true, Usage: "wiki space ID"},
-			{Name: "page-token", TakesValue: true, Usage: "page token"},
-			{Name: "format", TakesValue: true},
-			{Name: "dry-run"},
-		},
-	}}}
-	ex := skillscan.Example{
-		Raw:            "lark-cli wiki +node-list --space-id <space_id> --page-token <PAGE_TOKEN> --format json",
-		SourceFile:     "skills/lark-wiki/references/lark-wiki-node-list.md",
-		Line:           24,
-		HasPlaceholder: true,
-	}
-
-	diags, facts := RunDryRuns(context.Background(), cliBin, m, []skillscan.Example{ex})
-	if len(diags) != 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("RunDryRuns() diagnostics = %#v", diags)
-	}
-	if len(facts) != 1 || !facts[0].Executable || facts[0].SkipReason != "" {
-		t.Fatalf("resource ID placeholder example should be executable after materialization: %#v", facts)
-	}
-	wantArgs := []string{"wiki", "+node-list", "--space-id", "space_test123", "--page-token", "page_test123", "--format", "json", "--dry-run"}
-	if gotArgs := readArgs(t, argsPath); !reflect.DeepEqual(gotArgs, wantArgs) {
-		t.Fatalf("fake CLI args = %#v, want %#v", gotArgs, wantArgs)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestRunDryRunsMaterializesResourcePlaceholdersInsideJSONFlags(t *testing.T) {
-	cliBin, argsPath := fakeDryRunCLI(t, `{"api":[{"method":"POST","url":"/open-apis/mail/v1/user_mailboxes/me/drafts/draft_test123/send"}]}`)
-	m := manifest.Manifest{Commands: []manifest.Command{{
-		Path:     "mail user_mailbox.drafts send",
-		Runnable: true,
-		Flags: []manifest.Flag{
-			{Name: "params", TakesValue: true},
-			{Name: "data", TakesValue: true},
-			{Name: "dry-run"},
-		},
-	}}}
-	ex := skillscan.Example{
-		Raw:            `lark-cli mail user_mailbox.drafts send --params '{"user_mailbox_id":"me","draft_id":"<draft_id>"}' --data '{"send_time":"<unix_timestamp>"}'`,
-		SourceFile:     "skills/lark-mail/references/lark-mail-send.md",
-		Line:           172,
-		HasPlaceholder: true,
-	}
-
-	diags, facts := RunDryRuns(context.Background(), cliBin, m, []skillscan.Example{ex})
-	if len(diags) != 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("RunDryRuns() diagnostics = %#v", diags)
-	}
-	if len(facts) != 1 || !facts[0].Executable || facts[0].SkipReason != "" {
-		t.Fatalf("JSON resource placeholder example should be executable after materialization: %#v", facts)
-	}
-	wantArgs := []string{"mail", "user_mailbox.drafts", "send", "--params", `{"user_mailbox_id":"me","draft_id":"draft_test123"}`, "--data", `{"send_time":"1893456000"}`, "--dry-run"}
-	if gotArgs := readArgs(t, argsPath); !reflect.DeepEqual(gotArgs, wantArgs) {
-		t.Fatalf("fake CLI args = %#v, want %#v", gotArgs, wantArgs)
-	}
-}
-
 func TestRunDryRunsSkipsUnknownFlagsBeforeDryRun(t *testing.T) {
 	m := manifest.Manifest{Commands: []manifest.Command{{
 		Path:     "im +chat-messages-list",
@@ -755,51 +600,6 @@ func TestAppendDryRunArgDoesNotDuplicate(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-func TestAppendDryRunArgForcesJSONFormat(t *testing.T) {
-	got, err := appendDryRunArg("lark-cli vc +meeting-events --meeting-id 400000000001 --format pretty")
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("appendDryRunArg() error = %v", err)
-	}
-	want := []string{"vc", "+meeting-events", "--meeting-id", "400000000001", "--format", "json", "--dry-run"}
-	if !reflect.DeepEqual(got, want) {
-		t.Fatalf("appendDryRunArg() = %#v, want %#v", got, want)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestAppendDryRunArgForcesInlineJSONFormat(t *testing.T) {
-	got, err := appendDryRunArg("lark-cli vc +meeting-events --meeting-id 400000000001 --format=pretty --dry-run")
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("appendDryRunArg() error = %v", err)
-	}
-	want := []string{"vc", "+meeting-events", "--meeting-id", "400000000001", "--format=json", "--dry-run"}
-	if !reflect.DeepEqual(got, want) {
-		t.Fatalf("appendDryRunArg() = %#v, want %#v", got, want)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestAppendDryRunArgPreservesNonPrettyFormat(t *testing.T) {
-	for _, raw := range []string{
-		"lark-cli mail +watch --format data --dry-run",
-		"lark-cli export +events --format=ndjson --dry-run",
-		"lark-cli docs +fetch --format table",
-	} {
-		got, err := appendDryRunArg(raw)
-		if err != nil {
-			t.Fatalf("appendDryRunArg(%q) error = %v", raw, err)
-		}
-		for _, arg := range got {
-			if arg == "--format=json" {
-				t.Fatalf("appendDryRunArg(%q) unexpectedly rewrote inline format: %#v", raw, got)
-			}
-		}
-		for i, arg := range got {
-			if arg == "--format" && i+1 < len(got) && got[i+1] == "json" {
-				t.Fatalf("appendDryRunArg(%q) unexpectedly rewrote split format: %#v", raw, got)
-			}
-		}
-	}
-}
-
 func TestAppendDryRunArgForcesDryRunWhenExplicitlyDisabled(t *testing.T) {
 	got, err := appendDryRunArg("lark-cli docs +fetch --dry-run=false --doc abc")
 	if err != nil {

internal/qualitygate/rules/run.go

@@ -15,20 +15,18 @@ import (
 	manifestexamples "github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/qualitygate/examples"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/qualitygate/facts"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/qualitygate/manifest"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/qualitygate/publiccontent"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/qualitygate/report"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/qualitygate/skillscan"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/vfs"
 )
 
 type Options struct {
-	Repo                      string
-	CLIBin                    string
-	ChangedFrom               string
-	FactsOut                  string
-	ManifestPath              string
-	CommandIndexPath          string
-	PublicContentMetadataPath string
+	Repo             string
+	CLIBin           string
+	ChangedFrom      string
+	FactsOut         string
+	ManifestPath     string
+	CommandIndexPath string
 }
 
 func Run(ctx context.Context, opts Options) ([]report.Diagnostic, facts.Facts, error) {
@@ -100,60 +98,9 @@ func Run(ctx context.Context, opts Options) ([]report.Diagnostic, facts.Facts, e
 	if opts.ChangedFrom != "" {
 		diags = append(diags, errorDiags...)
 	}
-	publicContent, err := publiccontent.Collect(ctx, publiccontent.Options{
-		Repo:         opts.Repo,
-		ChangedFrom:  opts.ChangedFrom,
-		MetadataPath: opts.PublicContentMetadataPath,
-	})
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, facts.Facts{}, err
-	}
-	diags = append(diags, publicContentDiagnostics(publicContent)...)
 	diags = filterPRDiagnostics(opts.Repo, opts.ChangedFrom, scope, m, diags)
 
-	builtFacts := facts.BuildWithCommandLookup(m, commandIndex, skillFacts, skillQualityFacts, errorFacts, exampleFacts, outputFacts, diags, scope.Files)
-	return diags, facts.WithPublicContent(builtFacts, publicContentFacts(publicContent)), nil
-}
-
-func publicContentDiagnostics(items []publiccontent.Finding) []report.Diagnostic {
-	if len(items) == 0 {
-		return nil
-	}
-	out := make([]report.Diagnostic, 0, len(items))
-	for _, item := range items {
-		if item.Rule == "public_content_semantic_candidate" {
-			continue
-		}
-		out = append(out, report.Diagnostic{
-			Rule:       item.Rule,
-			Action:     item.Action,
-			File:       item.File,
-			Line:       item.Line,
-			Message:    item.Message,
-			Suggestion: item.Suggestion,
-		})
-	}
-	return out
-}
-
-func publicContentFacts(items []publiccontent.Finding) []facts.PublicContentFact {
-	if len(items) == 0 {
-		return nil
-	}
-	out := make([]facts.PublicContentFact, 0, len(items))
-	for _, item := range items {
-		out = append(out, facts.PublicContentFact{
-			Rule:       item.Rule,
-			Action:     item.Action,
-			File:       item.File,
-			Line:       item.Line,
-			Source:     item.Source,
-			Excerpt:    item.Excerpt,
-			Message:    item.Message,
-			Suggestion: item.Suggestion,
-		})
-	}
-	return out
+	return diags, facts.BuildWithCommandLookup(m, commandIndex, skillFacts, skillQualityFacts, errorFacts, exampleFacts, outputFacts, diags, scope.Files), nil
 }
 
 func readManifestInput(path, kind, flag string) (manifest.Manifest, error) {
@@ -220,9 +167,6 @@ func filterPRDiagnostics(repo, changedFrom string, scope qdiff.Scope, m manifest
 }
 
 func prDiagnosticRelevant(repo string, changedFiles map[string]bool, commandScope diagnosticCommandScope, m manifest.Manifest, diag report.Diagnostic) bool {
-	if strings.HasPrefix(diag.Rule, "public_content_") {
-		return true
-	}
 	file := normalizeDiagnosticFile(repo, diag.File)
 	if file != "" && changedFiles[file] {
 		return true

internal/qualitygate/rules/run_test.go

@@ -189,99 +189,6 @@ description: Manage Drive comments with service command references.
 	}
 }
 
-func TestRunCollectsPublicContentFindingsIntoDiagnosticsAndFacts(t *testing.T) {
-	repo := t.TempDir()
-	runGit(t, repo, "init")
-	runGit(t, repo, "config", "user.email", "test@example.com")
-	runGit(t, repo, "config", "user.name", "Test User")
-	if err := vfs.WriteFile(filepath.Join(repo, "README.md"), []byte("# test\n"), 0o644); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	runGit(t, repo, "add", "README.md")
-	runGit(t, repo, "commit", "-m", "base")
-
-	if err := vfs.MkdirAll(filepath.Join(repo, "docs"), 0o755); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	publicDoc := "api_" + "key = \"example-public-key\"\n" +
-		"Public docs describe a pri" + "vate request header and trust classification detail.\n"
-	if err := vfs.WriteFile(filepath.Join(repo, "docs", "public.md"), []byte(publicDoc), 0o644); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	runGit(t, repo, "add", "docs/public.md")
-	runGit(t, repo, "commit", "-m", "add public doc")
-
-	metadataPath := filepath.Join(repo, "pr-metadata.json")
-	if err := vfs.WriteFile(metadataPath, []byte(`{"title":"public docs","body":"Change`+`-Id: I0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef01234567"}`), 0o644); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-
-	manifestPath := filepath.Join(repo, "command-manifest.json")
-	indexPath := filepath.Join(repo, "command-index.json")
-	m := manifest.Manifest{SchemaVersion: 1, Commands: []manifest.Command{{
-		Path:          "docs +fetch",
-		CanonicalPath: "docs +fetch",
-		Domain:        "docs",
-		Source:        manifest.SourceShortcut,
-	}}}
-	if err := manifest.WriteFile(manifestPath, manifest.KindCommandManifest, m); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	idx := manifest.Manifest{SchemaVersion: 1, Commands: append([]manifest.Command{}, m.Commands...)}
-	idx.Commands = append(idx.Commands, manifest.Command{
-		Path:          "drive files get",
-		CanonicalPath: "drive files get",
-		Domain:        "drive",
-		Source:        manifest.SourceService,
-		Generated:     true,
-		Runnable:      true,
-	})
-	if err := manifest.WriteFile(indexPath, manifest.KindCommandIndex, idx); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-
-	diags, gotFacts, err := Run(context.Background(), Options{
-		Repo:                      repo,
-		CLIBin:                    "./lark-cli",
-		ChangedFrom:               "HEAD~1",
-		ManifestPath:              manifestPath,
-		CommandIndexPath:          indexPath,
-		PublicContentMetadataPath: metadataPath,
-	})
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("Run() error = %v", err)
-	}
-	actions := map[string]report.Action{}
-	for _, diag := range diags {
-		actions[diag.Rule] = diag.Action
-	}
-	if actions["public_content_generic_credential"] != report.ActionReject {
-		t.Fatalf("generic credential diagnostic action = %q, diagnostics=%#v", actions["public_content_generic_credential"], diags)
-	}
-	if actions["public_content_change_id_trailer"] != report.ActionReject {
-		t.Fatalf("change-id diagnostic action = %q, diagnostics=%#v", actions["public_content_change_id_trailer"], diags)
-	}
-	if actions["public_content_semantic_candidate"] != "" {
-		t.Fatalf("semantic candidates should not become deterministic diagnostics: %#v", diags)
-	}
-	factRules := map[string]bool{}
-	for _, item := range gotFacts.PublicContent {
-		factRules[item.Rule] = true
-	}
-	for _, want := range []string{
-		"public_content_generic_credential",
-		"public_content_change_id_trailer",
-		"public_content_semantic_candidate",
-	} {
-		if !factRules[want] {
-			t.Fatalf("missing public content fact %s: %#v", want, gotFacts.PublicContent)
-		}
-	}
-	if len(gotFacts.PublicContent) < 3 {
-		t.Fatalf("public content facts = %#v", gotFacts.PublicContent)
-	}
-}
-
 func TestLoadBaseReferenceManifestReadsCommandGolden(t *testing.T) {
 	repo := t.TempDir()
 	runGit(t, repo, "init")
@@ -599,7 +506,7 @@ func TestNormalizeDiagnosticFileHandlesAbsoluteRepo(t *testing.T) {
 
 func runGit(t *testing.T, repo string, args ...string) {
 	t.Helper()
-	cmd := exec.Command("git", append([]string{"-c", "core.hooksPath=/dev/null", "-C", repo}, args...)...)
+	cmd := exec.Command("git", append([]string{"-C", repo}, args...)...)
 	cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(), "GIT_AUTHOR_DATE=2026-06-17T00:00:00Z", "GIT_COMMITTER_DATE=2026-06-17T00:00:00Z")
 	out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
 	if err != nil {

internal/qualitygate/semantic/client.go

@@ -339,7 +339,7 @@ func jsonSchemaResponseFormat() map[string]any {
 							"properties": map[string]any{
 								"category": map[string]any{
 									"type": "string",
-									"enum": []string{"error_hint", "default_output", "naming", "skill_quality", "public_content_leakage"},
+									"enum": []string{"error_hint", "default_output", "naming", "skill_quality"},
 								},
 								"severity": map[string]any{
 									"type": "string",

internal/qualitygate/semantic/gatekeeper.go

@@ -10,10 +10,9 @@ import (
 	"strings"
 
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/qualitygate/facts"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/qualitygate/report"
 )
 
-var evidencePattern = regexp.MustCompile(`^facts\.(commands|skills|errors|outputs|public_content)\[(\d+)\]$`)
+var evidencePattern = regexp.MustCompile(`^facts\.(commands|skills|errors|outputs)\[(\d+)\]$`)
 
 func Decide(f facts.Facts, r Review, p Policy) Decision {
 	return DecideWithWaivers(f, r, p, Waivers{})
@@ -173,16 +172,6 @@ func evidenceFingerprint(f facts.Facts, ev string) string {
 			"has_default_limit:" + strconv.FormatBool(out.HasDefaultLimit),
 			"has_decision_field:" + strconv.FormatBool(out.HasDecisionField),
 		}, ":")
-	case "public_content":
-		item := f.PublicContent[idx]
-		return strings.Join([]string{
-			"public_content",
-			"rule:" + item.Rule,
-			"action:" + string(item.Action),
-			"file:" + item.File,
-			"line:" + strconv.Itoa(item.Line),
-			"source:" + item.Source,
-		}, ":")
 	default:
 		return "ref:" + ev
 	}
@@ -212,7 +201,7 @@ func validFinding(f Finding) bool {
 
 func allowedCategory(category string) bool {
 	switch category {
-	case "error_hint", "default_output", "naming", "skill_quality", "public_content_leakage":
+	case "error_hint", "default_output", "naming", "skill_quality":
 		return true
 	default:
 		return false
@@ -258,12 +247,6 @@ func reproducibleEvidence(f facts.Facts, category, kind string, idx int) bool {
 		}
 		skill := f.Skills[idx]
 		return skill.ReferencesInvalidCommand
-	case "public_content_leakage":
-		if kind != "public_content" {
-			return false
-		}
-		item := f.PublicContent[idx]
-		return item.Action == report.ActionReject || item.Rule == "public_content_semantic_candidate"
 	default:
 		return false
 	}
@@ -294,8 +277,6 @@ func evidenceExists(f facts.Facts, kind string, idx int) bool {
 		return idx < len(f.Errors)
 	case "outputs":
 		return idx < len(f.Outputs)
-	case "public_content":
-		return idx < len(f.PublicContent)
 	default:
 		return false
 	}

internal/qualitygate/semantic/gatekeeper_test.go

@@ -242,7 +242,6 @@ func TestGatekeeperBlockerMatrix(t *testing.T) {
 		Outputs:       []facts.OutputFact{{Command: "im messages list", IsList: true, HasDefaultLimit: false, HasDecisionField: false}},
 		Commands:      []facts.CommandFact{{Path: "docs fetch", NameConflictsExisting: true}},
 		Skills:        []facts.SkillFact{{SourceFile: "skills/lark-doc/SKILL.md", Line: 3, ReferencesInvalidCommand: true}},
-		PublicContent: []facts.PublicContentFact{{Rule: "public_content_generic_credential", Action: "REJECT", File: "docs/public.md", Line: 4, Source: "metadata"}},
 	}
 	for _, tc := range []struct {
 		category string
@@ -252,7 +251,6 @@ func TestGatekeeperBlockerMatrix(t *testing.T) {
 		{"default_output", "facts.outputs[0]"},
 		{"naming", "facts.commands[0]"},
 		{"skill_quality", "facts.skills[0]"},
-		{"public_content_leakage", "facts.public_content[0]"},
 	} {
 		t.Run(tc.category, func(t *testing.T) {
 			r := Review{Findings: []Finding{{
@@ -270,59 +268,6 @@ func TestGatekeeperBlockerMatrix(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-func TestGatekeeperDoesNotPromotePublicContentWarningsToBlockers(t *testing.T) {
-	f := facts.Facts{
-		SchemaVersion: 1,
-		PublicContent: []facts.PublicContentFact{{
-			Rule:   "public_content_" + "pri" + "vate_ipv4",
-			Action: "WARNING",
-			File:   "docs/network.md",
-			Line:   1,
-			Source: "file",
-		}},
-	}
-	review := Review{Findings: []Finding{{
-		Category:        "public_content_leakage",
-		Severity:        "minor",
-		Evidence:        []string{"facts.public_content[0]"},
-		Message:         "pri" + "vate network address appears in public docs",
-		SuggestedAction: "confirm the public docs do not expose pri" + "vate deployment details",
-	}}}
-
-	got := Decide(f, review, DefaultPolicy())
-	if len(got.Blockers) != 0 || len(got.Warnings) != 1 {
-		t.Fatalf("public content warning should not become a blocker: %#v", got)
-	}
-	if got.Warnings[0].ReviewAction != ReviewActionObserve {
-		t.Fatalf("review action = %q, want %q", got.Warnings[0].ReviewAction, ReviewActionObserve)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestGatekeeperAllowsPublicContentSemanticCandidatesAsBlockers(t *testing.T) {
-	f := facts.Facts{
-		SchemaVersion: 1,
-		PublicContent: []facts.PublicContentFact{{
-			Rule:   "public_content_semantic_candidate",
-			Action: "WARNING",
-			File:   "docs/public.md",
-			Line:   1,
-			Source: "file",
-		}},
-	}
-	review := Review{Findings: []Finding{{
-		Category:        "public_content_leakage",
-		Severity:        "major",
-		Evidence:        []string{"facts.public_content[0]"},
-		Message:         "semantic review found pri" + "vate rollout detail",
-		SuggestedAction: "remove pri" + "vate rollout detail from public docs",
-	}}}
-
-	got := Decide(f, review, DefaultPolicy())
-	if len(got.Blockers) != 1 {
-		t.Fatalf("semantic candidate should remain blockable, got %#v", got)
-	}
-}
-
 func TestGatekeeperSkillQualityOnlyBlocksInvalidCommandReferences(t *testing.T) {
 	f := facts.Facts{
 		SchemaVersion: 1,

internal/qualitygate/semantic/prompt.go

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ func BuildPrompt(f facts.Facts) []Message {
 			"Use only the provided JSON view.",
 			"The changed_summary may summarize broad changed surfaces; review only listed facts, not omitted summarized items.",
 			"Use fact_ref values exactly when writing finding evidence.",
-			"Only facts.commands, facts.skills, facts.errors, facts.outputs, and facts.public_content fact_ref values may be blocker evidence.",
+			"Only facts.commands, facts.skills, facts.errors, and facts.outputs fact_ref values may be blocker evidence.",
 			"Evidence entries must be exact fact_ref strings such as \"facts.commands[0]\" with no explanations, labels, or suffix text.",
 			"facts.examples and facts.skill_quality entries are context only.",
 			"Report an error_hint finding for any facts.errors item where boundary is true, required_hint is true, and hint_action_count is 0.",
@@ -38,9 +38,6 @@ func BuildPrompt(f facts.Facts) []Message {
 			"For naming findings, use category \"naming\" and evidence containing that facts.commands fact_ref.",
 			"Report a skill_quality finding for any facts.skills item where references_invalid_command is true.",
 			"For skill_quality findings, use category \"skill_quality\" and evidence containing that facts.skills fact_ref.",
-			"Review public content leakage findings and semantic candidates without private dictionaries.",
-			"Do not reveal internal rule lists when explaining public content leakage.",
-			"For public_content_leakage findings, preserve the deterministic finding source and excerpt.",
 			"Report each distinct issue as a separate finding.",
 			"The verdict value must be \"pass\" when findings is empty and \"warn\" when findings is non-empty; never use \"fail\".",
 			"Severity must be one of \"minor\", \"major\", or \"critical\"; never use \"error\", \"warning\", \"medium\", or \"high\".",

internal/qualitygate/semantic/prompt_contract_test.go

@@ -23,10 +23,7 @@ func TestBuildPromptContainsSemanticReviewContract(t *testing.T) {
 		"A facts.outputs item with is_list true, has_default_limit false, and has_decision_field true must still produce a default_output finding.",
 		"Report a naming finding for any facts.commands item where name_conflicts_existing is true or flag_alias_conflict is true.",
 		"Report a skill_quality finding for any facts.skills item where references_invalid_command is true.",
-		"Review public content leakage findings and semantic candidates without private dictionaries.",
-		"Do not reveal internal rule lists when explaining public content leakage.",
-		"For public_content_leakage findings, preserve the deterministic finding source and excerpt.",
-		"Only facts.commands, facts.skills, facts.errors, facts.outputs, and facts.public_content fact_ref values may be blocker evidence.",
+		"Only facts.commands, facts.skills, facts.errors, and facts.outputs fact_ref values may be blocker evidence.",
 		"Evidence entries must be exact fact_ref strings such as \"facts.commands[0]\" with no explanations, labels, or suffix text.",
 		"facts.examples and facts.skill_quality entries are context only.",
 		"Report each distinct issue as a separate finding.",

internal/qualitygate/semantic/schema.go

@@ -78,11 +78,11 @@ func DefaultPolicy() Policy {
 	return Policy{
 		SchemaVersion:      1,
 		DefaultEnforcement: "observe",
-		BlockCategories:    []string{"error_hint", "default_output", "naming", "skill_quality", "public_content_leakage"},
+		BlockCategories:    []string{"error_hint", "default_output", "naming", "skill_quality"},
 		RolloutGroups: []RolloutGroup{{
 			ID:          "all",
 			Enforcement: "blocking",
-			Categories:  []string{"error_hint", "default_output", "naming", "skill_quality", "public_content_leakage"},
+			Categories:  []string{"error_hint", "default_output", "naming", "skill_quality"},
 			Owner:       "test",
 			Reason:      "default in-memory policy",
 		}},

internal/qualitygate/semantic/scope.go

@@ -82,15 +82,6 @@ func factScope(f facts.Facts, kind string, idx int) (FactScope, bool) {
 			Source:      item.Source,
 			CommandPath: item.Command,
 		}, true
-	case "public_content":
-		item := f.PublicContent[idx]
-		return FactScope{
-			FactKind:   "public_content",
-			Changed:    true,
-			Source:     item.Source,
-			SourceFile: item.File,
-			Line:       item.Line,
-		}, true
 	default:
 		return FactScope{}, false
 	}
@@ -204,7 +195,7 @@ func containsString(values []string, want string) bool {
 
 func allowedFactKind(kind string) bool {
 	switch kind {
-	case "skill", "command", "error", "output", "public_content":
+	case "skill", "command", "error", "output":
 		return true
 	default:
 		return false

internal/qualitygate/semantic/scope_test.go

@@ -81,30 +81,6 @@ func TestGatekeeperSkillQualityUsesSkillEvidence(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-func TestGatekeeperUsesPublicContentEvidence(t *testing.T) {
-	f := facts.Facts{
-		SchemaVersion: 1,
-		PublicContent: []facts.PublicContentFact{{
-			Rule:   "public_content_generic_credential",
-			Action: "REJECT",
-			File:   "docs/public.md",
-			Line:   12,
-			Source: "metadata",
-		}},
-	}
-	review := Review{Findings: []Finding{{
-		Category:        "public_content_leakage",
-		Severity:        "critical",
-		Evidence:        []string{"facts.public_content[0]"},
-		Message:         "public content finding needs review",
-		SuggestedAction: "remove the sensitive public content",
-	}}}
-	got := Decide(f, review, DefaultPolicy())
-	if len(got.Blockers) != 1 || got.Blockers[0].RolloutGroups[0] != "all" {
-		t.Fatalf("expected public content blocker, got %#v", got)
-	}
-}
-
 func TestGatekeeperAppliesSharedWaiverID(t *testing.T) {
 	f := facts.Facts{
 		SchemaVersion: 1,

internal/qualitygate/semantic/view.go

@@ -13,29 +13,27 @@ import (
 )
 
 type InputView struct {
-	SchemaVersion        int                    `json:"schema_version"`
-	ChangedSummary       ChangedSummary         `json:"changed_summary"`
-	RuleSummary          []RuleSummaryItem      `json:"rule_summary,omitempty"`
-	Commands             []CommandInput         `json:"commands,omitempty"`
-	Skills               []SkillInput           `json:"skills,omitempty"`
-	SkillQuality         []SkillQualityInput    `json:"skill_quality,omitempty"`
-	Errors               []ErrorInput           `json:"errors,omitempty"`
-	Outputs              []OutputInput          `json:"outputs,omitempty"`
-	Examples             []ExampleInput         `json:"examples,omitempty"`
-	PublicContentLeakage []PublicContentInput   `json:"public_content_leakage,omitempty"`
-	Diagnostics          []facts.DiagnosticFact `json:"diagnostics,omitempty"`
+	SchemaVersion  int                    `json:"schema_version"`
+	ChangedSummary ChangedSummary         `json:"changed_summary"`
+	RuleSummary    []RuleSummaryItem      `json:"rule_summary,omitempty"`
+	Commands       []CommandInput         `json:"commands,omitempty"`
+	Skills         []SkillInput           `json:"skills,omitempty"`
+	SkillQuality   []SkillQualityInput    `json:"skill_quality,omitempty"`
+	Errors         []ErrorInput           `json:"errors,omitempty"`
+	Outputs        []OutputInput          `json:"outputs,omitempty"`
+	Examples       []ExampleInput         `json:"examples,omitempty"`
+	Diagnostics    []facts.DiagnosticFact `json:"diagnostics,omitempty"`
 }
 
 type ChangedSummary struct {
-	Commands      int      `json:"commands,omitempty"`
-	Skills        int      `json:"skills,omitempty"`
-	SkillQuality  int      `json:"skill_quality,omitempty"`
-	Errors        int      `json:"errors,omitempty"`
-	Outputs       int      `json:"outputs,omitempty"`
-	Examples      int      `json:"examples,omitempty"`
-	PublicContent int      `json:"public_content,omitempty"`
-	Domains       []string `json:"domains,omitempty"`
-	Sources       []string `json:"sources,omitempty"`
+	Commands     int      `json:"commands,omitempty"`
+	Skills       int      `json:"skills,omitempty"`
+	SkillQuality int      `json:"skill_quality,omitempty"`
+	Errors       int      `json:"errors,omitempty"`
+	Outputs      int      `json:"outputs,omitempty"`
+	Examples     int      `json:"examples,omitempty"`
+	Domains      []string `json:"domains,omitempty"`
+	Sources      []string `json:"sources,omitempty"`
 }
 
 type RuleSummaryItem struct {
@@ -88,22 +86,6 @@ type ExampleInput struct {
 	facts.CommandExample
 }
 
-type PublicContentInput struct {
-	FactRef string `json:"fact_ref"`
-	facts.PublicContentFact
-}
-
-func (v InputView) HasReviewableFacts() bool {
-	return len(v.Commands) > 0 ||
-		len(v.Skills) > 0 ||
-		len(v.SkillQuality) > 0 ||
-		len(v.Errors) > 0 ||
-		len(v.Outputs) > 0 ||
-		len(v.Examples) > 0 ||
-		len(v.PublicContentLeakage) > 0 ||
-		len(v.Diagnostics) > 0
-}
-
 func BuildInputView(f facts.Facts) InputView {
 	selected := newInputSelection(f)
 	selected.addChangedReviewCandidates()
@@ -122,17 +104,16 @@ func BuildInputView(f facts.Facts) InputView {
 	}
 
 	return InputView{
-		SchemaVersion:        f.SchemaVersion,
-		ChangedSummary:       changedSummary(f),
-		RuleSummary:          ruleSummary(f.Diagnostics),
-		Commands:             selected.commandInputs(),
-		Skills:               selected.skillInputs(),
-		SkillQuality:         selected.skillQualityInputs(),
-		Errors:               selected.errorInputs(),
-		Outputs:              selected.outputInputs(),
-		Examples:             selected.exampleInputs(),
-		PublicContentLeakage: selected.publicContentInputs(),
-		Diagnostics:          viewDiagnostics,
+		SchemaVersion:  f.SchemaVersion,
+		ChangedSummary: changedSummary(f),
+		RuleSummary:    ruleSummary(f.Diagnostics),
+		Commands:       selected.commandInputs(),
+		Skills:         selected.skillInputs(),
+		SkillQuality:   selected.skillQualityInputs(),
+		Errors:         selected.errorInputs(),
+		Outputs:        selected.outputInputs(),
+		Examples:       selected.exampleInputs(),
+		Diagnostics:    viewDiagnostics,
 	}
 }
 
@@ -157,11 +138,6 @@ func (s *inputSelection) addChangedReviewCandidates() {
 			s.outputs[i] = true
 		}
 	}
-	for i, item := range s.f.PublicContent {
-		if publicContentReviewCandidate(item) {
-			s.publicContent[i] = true
-		}
-	}
 }
 
 func commandReviewCandidate(cmd facts.CommandFact) bool {
@@ -181,31 +157,25 @@ func outputReviewCandidate(_ facts.OutputFact) bool {
 	return false
 }
 
-func publicContentReviewCandidate(item facts.PublicContentFact) bool {
-	return item.Rule == "public_content_semantic_candidate"
-}
-
 type inputSelection struct {
-	f             facts.Facts
-	commands      []bool
-	skills        []bool
-	skillQuality  []bool
-	errors        []bool
-	outputs       []bool
-	examples      []bool
-	publicContent []bool
+	f            facts.Facts
+	commands     []bool
+	skills       []bool
+	skillQuality []bool
+	errors       []bool
+	outputs      []bool
+	examples     []bool
 }
 
 func newInputSelection(f facts.Facts) *inputSelection {
 	return &inputSelection{
-		f:             f,
-		commands:      make([]bool, len(f.Commands)),
-		skills:        make([]bool, len(f.Skills)),
-		skillQuality:  make([]bool, len(f.SkillQuality)),
-		errors:        make([]bool, len(f.Errors)),
-		outputs:       make([]bool, len(f.Outputs)),
-		examples:      make([]bool, len(f.Examples)),
-		publicContent: make([]bool, len(f.PublicContent)),
+		f:            f,
+		commands:     make([]bool, len(f.Commands)),
+		skills:       make([]bool, len(f.Skills)),
+		skillQuality: make([]bool, len(f.SkillQuality)),
+		errors:       make([]bool, len(f.Errors)),
+		outputs:      make([]bool, len(f.Outputs)),
+		examples:     make([]bool, len(f.Examples)),
 	}
 }
 
@@ -224,8 +194,6 @@ func (s *inputSelection) diagnosticContext(diag facts.DiagnosticFact) *inputSele
 		s.addDiagnosticExamples(out, diag)
 	case diag.Rule == "no_bare_helper_error":
 		s.addDiagnosticErrors(out, diag)
-	case strings.HasPrefix(diag.Rule, "public_content_"):
-		s.addDiagnosticPublicContent(out, diag)
 	}
 	return out
 }
@@ -288,15 +256,6 @@ func (s *inputSelection) addDiagnosticExamples(out *inputSelection, diag facts.D
 	}
 }
 
-func (s *inputSelection) addDiagnosticPublicContent(out *inputSelection, diag facts.DiagnosticFact) {
-	for i, item := range s.f.PublicContent {
-		if diagnosticLocationMatches(diag.File, diag.Line, item.File, item.Line) ||
-			diag.Rule == item.Rule {
-			out.publicContent[i] = true
-		}
-	}
-}
-
 func includeDiagnosticInView(diag facts.DiagnosticFact, selected, context *inputSelection) bool {
 	if diag.Action == report.ActionReject {
 		return true
@@ -311,7 +270,6 @@ func (s *inputSelection) merge(other *inputSelection) {
 	mergeSelections(s.errors, other.errors)
 	mergeSelections(s.outputs, other.outputs)
 	mergeSelections(s.examples, other.examples)
-	mergeSelections(s.publicContent, other.publicContent)
 }
 
 func (s *inputSelection) intersects(other *inputSelection) bool {
@@ -320,8 +278,7 @@ func (s *inputSelection) intersects(other *inputSelection) bool {
 		selectionsIntersect(s.skillQuality, other.skillQuality) ||
 		selectionsIntersect(s.errors, other.errors) ||
 		selectionsIntersect(s.outputs, other.outputs) ||
-		selectionsIntersect(s.examples, other.examples) ||
-		selectionsIntersect(s.publicContent, other.publicContent)
+		selectionsIntersect(s.examples, other.examples)
 }
 
 func (s *inputSelection) commandInputs() []CommandInput {
@@ -394,16 +351,6 @@ func (s *inputSelection) exampleInputs() []ExampleInput {
 	return out
 }
 
-func (s *inputSelection) publicContentInputs() []PublicContentInput {
-	out := make([]PublicContentInput, 0, countSelected(s.publicContent))
-	for i, ok := range s.publicContent {
-		if ok {
-			out = append(out, PublicContentInput{FactRef: factRef("public_content", i), PublicContentFact: s.f.PublicContent[i]})
-		}
-	}
-	return out
-}
-
 func changedSummary(f facts.Facts) ChangedSummary {
 	domains := map[string]bool{}
 	sources := map[string]bool{}
@@ -455,10 +402,6 @@ func changedSummary(f facts.Facts) ChangedSummary {
 		addNonEmpty(domains, example.Domain)
 		addNonEmpty(sources, example.Source)
 	}
-	for _, item := range f.PublicContent {
-		out.PublicContent++
-		addNonEmpty(sources, item.Source)
-	}
 	out.Domains = sortedViewSetKeys(domains)
 	out.Sources = sortedViewSetKeys(sources)
 	return out
@@ -491,8 +434,7 @@ func semanticDiagnosticRule(rule string) bool {
 		strings.HasPrefix(rule, "default_output") ||
 		strings.HasPrefix(rule, "skill_") ||
 		strings.HasPrefix(rule, "example_dry_run") ||
-		rule == "no_bare_helper_error" ||
-		strings.HasPrefix(rule, "public_content_")
+		rule == "no_bare_helper_error"
 }
 
 func diagnosticCommandMatches(diag facts.DiagnosticFact, values ...string) bool {