feat(enhancement): centralize HTTP transport policies (#2021)

* docs(base): clarify form and file operation routing

* docs: clarify complete base role table rules

* docs: clarify base advanced permission status

* docs: clarify base form field lifecycle

* docs: guide base form question creation

* fix(base): address form dry-run review findings

* docs(base): add complete editable role example

* fix(base): validate form question create inputs

.github/CODEOWNERS

@@ -1,4 +1,7 @@
+/go.mod @liangshuo-1
+/go.sum @liangshuo-1
 /internal/ @liangshuo-1
+/shortcuts/common/ @liangshuo-1
 
 # Last match wins: existing domains below are exempt, only new skills/ entries need review.
 /skills/ @liangshuo-1

.github/workflows/release.yml

@@ -9,11 +9,40 @@ permissions:
   contents: read
 
 jobs:
-  # All platforms (incl. darwin keychain_signer) are CGO-free and cross-compiled
-  # on a single ubuntu runner in one goreleaser run (one checksums.txt). The
-  # darwin signer's runtime FFI is validated separately by the signer-test job.
-  goreleaser:
-    needs: signer-test-macos
+  preflight:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-22.04
+    permissions:
+      contents: read
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
+        with:
+          fetch-depth: 0
+
+      - uses: actions/setup-node@249970729cb0ef3589644e2896645e5dc5ba9c38 # v6
+        with:
+          node-version: '22.14.0'
+
+      - name: Validate tag and commit
+        env:
+          TAG: ${{ github.ref_name }}
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+          node scripts/release-preflight.js --tag "$TAG"
+          git fetch origin main
+          HEAD_SHA="$(git rev-parse --verify 'HEAD^{commit}')"
+          MAIN_SHA="$(git rev-parse --verify 'FETCH_HEAD^{commit}')"
+          TAG_SHA="$(git rev-parse --verify "refs/tags/${TAG}^{commit}")"
+          if [[ "$TAG_SHA" != "$HEAD_SHA" ]]; then
+            echo "Tag ${TAG} does not resolve to the checked-out HEAD commit." >&2
+            exit 1
+          fi
+          if ! git merge-base --is-ancestor "$HEAD_SHA" "$MAIN_SHA"; then
+            echo "Tag ${TAG} does not point to a commit contained in origin/main." >&2
+            exit 1
+          fi
+
+  build-release:
+    needs: preflight
     runs-on: ubuntu-22.04
     permissions:
       contents: write
@@ -30,50 +59,79 @@ jobs:
         with:
           python-version: '3.x'
 
+      - uses: actions/setup-node@249970729cb0ef3589644e2896645e5dc5ba9c38 # v6
+        with:
+          node-version: '22.14.0'
+          registry-url: 'https://registry.npmjs.org'
+          package-manager-cache: false
+
+      - name: Install pinned npm
+        run: npm install --global npm@11.16.0
+
       - name: Run GoReleaser
         uses: goreleaser/goreleaser-action@e435ccd777264be153ace6237001ef4d979d3a7a # v6
         with:
           version: '~> v2'
           args: release --clean
         env:
-          GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
+          GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
 
-  # Validate the macOS keychain signer on real hardware. The release binaries are
-  # cross-compiled on ubuntu (CGO-free purego FFI), so this is the only step that
-  # needs a Mac — and it gates the release rather than producing it.
-  signer-test-macos:
-    runs-on: macos-latest
-    permissions:
-      contents: read
-    steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
-      - uses: actions/setup-go@40f1582b2485089dde7abd97c1529aa768e1baff # v5
-        with:
-          go-version: '1.23'
-      - name: Keychain signer round-trip (CGO-free purego FFI)
-        run: LARK_KEYCHAIN_IT=1 CGO_ENABLED=0 go test -tags keychain_signer -run Keychain -v ./internal/keysigner/
-
-  publish-npm:
-    needs: goreleaser
-    runs-on: ubuntu-22.04
-    steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
-
-      - uses: actions/setup-node@49933ea5288caeca8642d1e84afbd3f7d6820020 # v4
-        with:
-          node-version: '20'
-          registry-url: 'https://registry.npmjs.org'
-
-      - name: Download checksums from release
-        env:
-          GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
+      - name: Include release checksums
         run: |
           set -euo pipefail
-          TAG="${GITHUB_REF_NAME}"
-          gh release download "${TAG}" --pattern checksums.txt --dir .
-          test -s checksums.txt || { echo "checksums.txt missing or empty for ${TAG}"; exit 1; }
+          test -s dist/checksums.txt
+          (cd dist && sha256sum --check checksums.txt)
+          cp dist/checksums.txt checksums.txt
+
+      - name: Collect release asset
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+          mkdir npm-publish-asset
+          cp dist/*.tar.gz dist/*.zip dist/checksums.txt npm-publish-asset/
+
+      - name: Upload release asset
+        uses: actions/upload-artifact@ea165f8d65b6e75b540449e92b4886f43607fa02 # v4
+        with:
+          name: npm-publish-asset-${{ github.run_id }}
+          path: npm-publish-asset/
+          if-no-files-found: error
+          overwrite: true
+
+  publish-npm:
+    needs: build-release
+    runs-on: ubuntu-22.04
+    environment: npm-production
+    permissions:
+      contents: read
+      id-token: write
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
+
+      - uses: actions/setup-node@249970729cb0ef3589644e2896645e5dc5ba9c38 # v6
+        with:
+          node-version: '22.14.0'
+          registry-url: 'https://registry.npmjs.org'
+          package-manager-cache: false
+
+      - name: Install pinned npm
+        run: npm install --global npm@11.16.0
+
+      - name: Download release asset
+        uses: actions/download-artifact@3e5f45b2cfb9172054b4087a40e8e0b5a5461e7c # v8
+        with:
+          name: npm-publish-asset-${{ github.run_id }}
+          path: npm-publish-asset
+
+      - name: Verify npm publish asset
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+          (cd npm-publish-asset && sha256sum --check checksums.txt)
+          cp npm-publish-asset/checksums.txt checksums.txt
+          PACK_JSON="$(npm pack --ignore-scripts --json)"
+          PACK_FILE="$(node -e 'const p=JSON.parse(process.argv[1]); if(p.length!==1 || !p[0].filename) process.exit(1); process.stdout.write(p[0].filename)' "$PACK_JSON")"
+          test -s "$PACK_FILE"
+          tar -tzf "$PACK_FILE" | grep -qx 'package/checksums.txt'
+          rm "$PACK_FILE"
 
       - name: Publish to npm
-        env:
-          NODE_AUTH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.NPM_TOKEN }}
         run: npm publish --access public

.github/workflows/semantic-review.yml

@@ -25,19 +25,16 @@ jobs:
         with:
           script: |
             const run = context.payload.workflow_run;
-            if (run.name !== "CI") throw new Error(`unexpected workflow name: ${run.name}`);
-            let workflowPath = run.path || "";
-            if (!workflowPath) {
-              const workflowId = Number(run.workflow_id || 0);
-              if (!Number.isInteger(workflowId) || workflowId <= 0) throw new Error("missing workflow id");
-              const { data: workflow } = await github.rest.actions.getWorkflow({
-                owner: context.repo.owner,
-                repo: context.repo.repo,
-                workflow_id: workflowId,
-              });
-              workflowPath = workflow.path || "";
-            }
-            if (workflowPath !== ".github/workflows/ci.yml") throw new Error(`unexpected workflow path: ${workflowPath}`);
+            const workflowId = Number(run.workflow_id || 0);
+            if (!Number.isInteger(workflowId) || workflowId <= 0) throw new Error("missing workflow id");
+            const { data: workflow } = await github.rest.actions.getWorkflow({
+              owner: context.repo.owner,
+              repo: context.repo.repo,
+              workflow_id: workflowId,
+            });
+            if (workflow.name !== "CI") throw new Error(`unexpected workflow name: ${workflow.name}`);
+            if (workflow.path !== ".github/workflows/ci.yml") throw new Error(`unexpected workflow path: ${workflow.path}`);
+            if (run.path && run.path !== workflow.path) throw new Error(`workflow path mismatch: ${run.path}`);
             if (run.event !== "pull_request") throw new Error(`unexpected event: ${run.event}`);
             if (run.repository.id !== context.payload.repository.id) throw new Error("repository id mismatch");
             if (run.repository.full_name !== context.payload.repository.full_name) throw new Error("repository name mismatch");
@@ -253,19 +250,16 @@ jobs:
         with:
           script: |
             const run = context.payload.workflow_run;
-            if (run.name !== "CI") throw new Error(`unexpected workflow name: ${run.name}`);
-            let workflowPath = run.path || "";
-            if (!workflowPath) {
-              const workflowId = Number(run.workflow_id || 0);
-              if (!Number.isInteger(workflowId) || workflowId <= 0) throw new Error("missing workflow id");
-              const { data: workflow } = await github.rest.actions.getWorkflow({
-                owner: context.repo.owner,
-                repo: context.repo.repo,
-                workflow_id: workflowId,
-              });
-              workflowPath = workflow.path || "";
-            }
-            if (workflowPath !== ".github/workflows/ci.yml") throw new Error(`unexpected workflow path: ${workflowPath}`);
+            const workflowId = Number(run.workflow_id || 0);
+            if (!Number.isInteger(workflowId) || workflowId <= 0) throw new Error("missing workflow id");
+            const { data: workflow } = await github.rest.actions.getWorkflow({
+              owner: context.repo.owner,
+              repo: context.repo.repo,
+              workflow_id: workflowId,
+            });
+            if (workflow.name !== "CI") throw new Error(`unexpected workflow name: ${workflow.name}`);
+            if (workflow.path !== ".github/workflows/ci.yml") throw new Error(`unexpected workflow path: ${workflow.path}`);
+            if (run.path && run.path !== workflow.path) throw new Error(`workflow path mismatch: ${run.path}`);
             if (run.event !== "pull_request") throw new Error(`unexpected event: ${run.event}`);
             if (run.conclusion !== "success") throw new Error(`unexpected conclusion: ${run.conclusion}`);
             if (run.repository.id !== context.payload.repository.id) throw new Error("repository id mismatch");

.goreleaser.yml

@@ -5,63 +5,25 @@ before:
     - python3 scripts/fetch_meta.py
 
 builds:
-  # Linux & Windows: pure-Go TPM 2.0 signer is compiled in by default (no build
-  # tag), cross-compiled with CGO disabled — the binaries ship the platform key
-  # signer for private_key_jwt. windows/arm64 is the one exception: the sks
-  # Windows dependency stack (go-ole) has no arm64 support, so the signer file is
-  # arch-excluded there and that binary falls back to client_secret only.
-  - id: linux
-    binary: lark-cli
-    main: .
+  - binary: lark-cli
     env:
       - CGO_ENABLED=0
-    flags:
-      - -trimpath
-    ldflags:
-      - -s -w -X github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/build.Version={{ .Version }} -X github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/build.Date={{ .Date }}
-    goos:
-      - linux
-    goarch:
-      - amd64
-      - arm64
-      - riscv64
-  - id: windows
-    binary: lark-cli
-    main: .
-    env:
-      - CGO_ENABLED=0
-    flags:
-      - -trimpath
-    ldflags:
-      - -s -w -X github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/build.Version={{ .Version }} -X github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/build.Date={{ .Date }}
-    goos:
-      - windows
-    goarch:
-      - amd64
-      - arm64
-  # macOS: the keychain signer calls Security.framework via runtime FFI (purego),
-  # so it is CGO-free, compiled into every darwin build (no build tag), and
-  # cross-compiles from the same ubuntu runner as linux/windows.
-  - id: darwin
-    binary: lark-cli
-    main: .
-    env:
-      - CGO_ENABLED=0
-    flags:
-      - -trimpath
     ldflags:
       - -s -w -X github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/build.Version={{ .Version }} -X github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/build.Date={{ .Date }}
     goos:
       - darwin
+      - linux
+      - windows
     goarch:
       - amd64
       - arm64
+      - riscv64
 
 archives:
   - name_template: "lark-cli-{{ .Version }}-{{ .Os }}-{{ .Arch }}"
     format_overrides:
       - goos: windows
-        formats: [zip]
+        format: zip
     files:
       - README.md
       - LICENSE

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -2,6 +2,149 @@
 
 All notable changes to this project will be documented in this file.
 
+## [v1.0.81] - 2026-07-31
+
+### Features
+
+- support visible_rule for form questions (#1891)
+- **contact**: add bot search shortcut (#2083)
+- add SXSD schema validation to Slides lint (#2103)
+- **drive**: add comment-operation shortcuts (#1898)
+- **drive**: extend permission shortcuts for Miaoda (#2070)
+- **apps**: add cache debug commands (+cache-get/-delete/-clear) (#1896)
+- support source file preview artifacts (#2085)
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+- **contact**: stop bot match segments carrying tags or empty entries (#2115)
+- **base**: resolve Base URL block types accurately (#2099)
+- **drive**: use title for default download filename (#2089)
+- drop stale target version from root upgrade prompt (#2100)
+
+### Documentation
+
+- **calendar**: warn against container-default timezone in time conversion (#2104)
+- **calendar**: confirm scope before editing recurring events (#2119)
+- **base**: clarify form and file operation routing (#2110)
+
+### Misc
+
+- add protected public domain allowlists (#2111)
+
+## [v1.0.80] - 2026-07-29
+
+### Features
+
+- **drive**: add +member-list shortcut (#1795)
+- **drive**: add +permission-get-setting shortcut (#1738)
+- propagate invocation metadata (#2097)
+
+### Documentation
+
+- **slides**: 补齐 shortcut 参数说明，修正 +xml-get --output 必填标注 (#2088)
+- **slides**: +create 的参数下沉到 create.md，主 skill 只留路由 (#2096)
+
+### Tests
+
+- **e2e**: wait for base role update visibility (#2087)
+
+### Misc
+
+- Feat/detect line text overlap (#2069)
+
+## [v1.0.79] - 2026-07-28
+
+### Features
+
+- **slides**: update xsd (#2067)
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+- **ci**: validate static workflow identity (#2015)
+- **sheets**: recognize OFL0X local office tokens (#2063)
+
+### Documentation
+
+- **calendar**: clarify identity selection by event ownership (#2071)
+- **slides**: add formula inline element syntax to quick-ref (#2077)
+
+## [v1.0.78] - 2026-07-27
+
+### Features
+
+- event description support rich text (#1975)
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+- **slides**: restrict canvas overflow checks
+- **slides**: upgrade text overflow to error above 10px threshold
+- **slides**: detect letterSpacing-driven text overflow
+- **slides**: downgrade background-decoration text overflow to info
+- **slides**: allow chartParsedValues roundtrip tag
+- refine character width estimation for lark-slides text lint
+- **slides**: preserve info lint severity
+- **slides**: text may over flow shape
+- exempt ghost text from slides lint
+
+## [v1.0.77] - 2026-07-24
+
+### Features
+
+- introducing official card icon (#1973)
+- **apps**: validate +file-list --page-size against server (0, 200] range (#2007)
+- **apps**: support absolute and relative upload paths (#2005)
+- **slides**: fill xml-schema-quick-ref gaps that forced XSD fallback (#2026)
+- **slides**: add layout density lint for sparse/empty containers (#2022)
+- add risk-control protection (#1910)
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+- **slides**: normalize presentation flag aliases (#2032)
+- **base**: classify +form-submit as high-risk-write (#1969)
+- **slides**: declare screenshot scope
+- **slides**: support CSV multi-value for --slide-id in screenshot (#2047)
+
+### Documentation
+
+- **skill**: clarify scope handling for query expansion (#2030)
+- **base**: clarify complete and partial updates (#1993)
+- **skills**: clarify callout child rules (#2048)
+
+### Misc
+
+- fix/task id handling (#2023)
+- fix/task search pagination (#2041)
+
+## [v1.0.75] - 2026-07-22
+
+### Features
+
+- add okr single create shortcut & skill text opti (#1941)
+- **calendar**: auto-add bot self as attendee and note user-only search (#1991)
+
+### Bug Fixes
+
+- **base**: improve table shortcut behavior & guidance (#1803)
+- issue#1935 & whiteboard shortcut reformat (#1980)
+- remove legacy shortcut (#1997)
+- **e2e**: inject shared credentials by identity (#1995)
+
+### Documentation
+
+- **skill**: describe html5 block xml usage (#1380)
+- clarify fetch metadata and user cites (#1981)
+- add topic move collector workflow (#1473)
+- update lark doc HTML size limit (#2001)
+- **base**: align record write schema guidance (#2000)
+
+### Tests
+
+- **e2e**: declare request identities explicitly (#2004)
+
+### Misc
+
+- harden npm release publishing (#1918)
+
 ## [v1.0.74] - 2026-07-21
 
 ### Features
@@ -1608,6 +1751,12 @@ Bundled AI agent skills for intelligent assistance:
 - Bilingual documentation (English & Chinese).
 - CI/CD pipelines: linting, testing, coverage reporting, and automated releases.
 
+[v1.0.81]: https://github.com/larksuite/cli/releases/tag/v1.0.81
+[v1.0.80]: https://github.com/larksuite/cli/releases/tag/v1.0.80
+[v1.0.79]: https://github.com/larksuite/cli/releases/tag/v1.0.79
+[v1.0.78]: https://github.com/larksuite/cli/releases/tag/v1.0.78
+[v1.0.77]: https://github.com/larksuite/cli/releases/tag/v1.0.77
+[v1.0.75]: https://github.com/larksuite/cli/releases/tag/v1.0.75
 [v1.0.74]: https://github.com/larksuite/cli/releases/tag/v1.0.74
 [v1.0.73]: https://github.com/larksuite/cli/releases/tag/v1.0.73
 [v1.0.72]: https://github.com/larksuite/cli/releases/tag/v1.0.72

Makefile

@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ script-test:
 	bash scripts/resolve-changed-from.test.sh
 	bash scripts/ci-workflow.test.sh
 	bash scripts/semantic-review-workflow.test.sh
-	$(NODE) --test scripts/e2e_domains.test.js scripts/fetch_e2e_tat.test.js scripts/semantic-review-verify-artifact.test.js scripts/pr-quality-summary.test.js scripts/semantic-review-publish.test.js scripts/ci-quality-summary-publish.test.js
+	$(NODE) --test scripts/e2e_domains.test.js scripts/fetch_e2e_tat.test.js scripts/install.test.js scripts/release-preflight.test.js scripts/semantic-review-verify-artifact.test.js scripts/pr-quality-summary.test.js scripts/semantic-review-publish.test.js scripts/ci-quality-summary-publish.test.js
 
 # ./extension/... keeps the public plugin SDK in the default test matrix.
 unit-test: fetch_meta

README.md

@@ -285,12 +285,31 @@ To reduce these risks, the tool enables default security protections at multiple
 
 We recommend using the Lark/Feishu bot integrated with this tool as a private conversational assistant. Do not add it to group chats or allow other users to interact with it, to avoid abuse of permissions or data leakage.
 
+To reduce the security risks associated with access token theft, the CLI sends a minimal set of risk-control signals with OpenAPI requests made to exact official Feishu/Lark HTTPS domains. These signals are used to help identify anomalous API activity. This protection is enabled by default. The information sent is limited to:
+
+- Operating system type: macOS, Windows, or Linux
+- Device hardware model: for example, Mac17,9
+
+To disable this protection for the current workspace, run:
+
+```bash
+lark-cli config risk-control off
+```
+
+To enable this protection for the current workspace, run:
+
+```bash
+lark-cli config risk-control on
+```
+
+To restore the default policy for the current workspace, run:
+
+```bash
+lark-cli config risk-control default
+```
+
 Please fully understand all usage risks. By using this tool, you are deemed to voluntarily assume all related responsibilities.
 
-## Star History
-
-[![Star History Chart](https://api.star-history.com/svg?repos=larksuite/cli&type=Date)](https://star-history.com/#larksuite/cli&Date)
-
 ## Contributing
 
 Community contributions are welcome! If you find a bug or have feature suggestions, please submit an [Issue](https://github.com/larksuite/cli/issues) or [Pull Request](https://github.com/larksuite/cli/pulls).

README.zh.md

@@ -286,12 +286,31 @@ lark-cli schema im.messages.delete
 
 我们建议您将对接本工具的飞书机器人作为私人对话助手使用，请勿将其拉入群聊或允许其他用户与其交互，以避免权限被滥用或数据泄露。
 
+为降低访问令牌被盗用后的安全风险，CLI 在向飞书/Lark 官方 HTTPS 精确域名发起 OpenAPI 请求时，会随请求发送一组最小化的风控信号，用于辅助识别异常调用行为。该保护默认开启，发送的信息仅包括：
+
+- 操作系统类型：macOS、Windows 或 Linux
+- 设备的硬件产品型号：例如 Mac17,9
+
+如需让当前 workspace 退出该保护，可执行以下命令：
+
+```bash
+lark-cli config risk-control off
+```
+
+如需开启当前 workspace 的保护，可执行以下命令：
+
+```bash
+lark-cli config risk-control on
+```
+
+恢复当前 workspace 默认策略可执行：
+
+```bash
+lark-cli config risk-control default
+```
+
 请您充分知悉全部使用风险，使用本工具即视为您自愿承担相关所有责任。
 
-## Star History
-
-[![Star History Chart](https://api.star-history.com/svg?repos=larksuite/cli&type=Date)](https://star-history.com/#larksuite/cli&Date)
-
 ## 贡献
 
 欢迎社区贡献！如果你发现 bug 或有功能建议，请提交 [Issue](https://github.com/larksuite/cli/issues) 或 [Pull Request](https://github.com/larksuite/cli/pulls)。

affordance/contact.md

@@ -23,6 +23,41 @@ lark-cli contact +search-user --query "alice" --as user
 lark-cli contact +search-user --user-ids "ou_3a8b****6a7b,me" --as user
 ```
 
+## +search-bot
+Search bots (apps) by keyword. Pass `--query` or `--queries`; use `--chat-ids` to search within specific chats.
+
+### Skills
+- lark-contact/references/lark-contact-search-bot.md
+
+### Avoid when
+- Looking for a person rather than a bot → use [[+search-user]]
+- Running as a bot — this shortcut is user-only
+
+### Tips
+- `has_more=true` means the search is incomplete; refine the keyword or search scope instead of paginating
+
+### Examples
+
+**Find bots by keyword**
+```bash
+lark-cli contact +search-bot --query "会议助手" --as user
+```
+
+**Search inside one chat**
+```bash
+lark-cli contact +search-bot --query "助手" --chat-ids "oc_3a8b****6a7b" --as user
+```
+
+**Find bots you've chatted with**
+```bash
+lark-cli contact +search-bot --query "助手" --has-chatted --as user
+```
+
+**Search several bot keywords in one call**
+```bash
+lark-cli contact +search-bot --queries "会议助手,日报助手,审批助手" --as user
+```
+
 ## +get-user
 Fetch one user's profile by id, or your own with --user-id omitted. Use it under bot identity — `+search-user` is user-only.
 

cmd/auth/login.go

@@ -40,10 +40,6 @@ type LoginOptions struct {
 
 var pollDeviceToken = larkauth.PollDeviceToken
 
-var resolveLoginClientAuth = func(ctx context.Context, cfg *core.CliConfig) (larkauth.ClientAuth, error) {
-	return larkauth.ClientAuthFromConfig(cfg).ResolveSigner(ctx)
-}
-
 // NewCmdAuthLogin creates the auth login subcommand.
 func NewCmdAuthLogin(f *cmdutil.Factory, runF func(*LoginOptions) error) *cobra.Command {
 	opts := &LoginOptions{Factory: f}
@@ -269,11 +265,7 @@ func authLoginRun(opts *LoginOptions) error {
 	if err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
-	clientAuth, err := resolveLoginClientAuth(opts.Ctx, config)
-	if err != nil {
-		return errs.NewAuthenticationError(errs.SubtypeUnknown, "device authorization failed: %v", err).WithCause(err)
-	}
-	authResp, err := larkauth.RequestDeviceAuthorization(opts.Ctx, httpClient, clientAuth, config.Brand, finalScope, f.IOStreams.ErrOut)
+	authResp, err := larkauth.RequestDeviceAuthorization(httpClient, config.AppID, config.AppSecret, config.Brand, finalScope, f.IOStreams.ErrOut)
 	if err != nil {
 		return errs.NewAuthenticationError(errs.SubtypeUnknown, "device authorization failed: %v", err).WithCause(err)
 	}
@@ -333,7 +325,7 @@ func authLoginRun(opts *LoginOptions) error {
 
 	// Step 3: Poll for token
 	log(msg.WaitingAuth)
-	result := pollDeviceToken(opts.Ctx, httpClient, clientAuth, config.Brand,
+	result := pollDeviceToken(opts.Ctx, httpClient, config.AppID, config.AppSecret, config.Brand,
 		authResp.DeviceCode, authResp.Interval, authResp.ExpiresIn, f.IOStreams.ErrOut)
 
 	if !result.OK {
@@ -406,10 +398,6 @@ func authLoginPollDeviceCode(opts *LoginOptions, config *core.CliConfig, msg *lo
 	if err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
-	clientAuth, err := resolveLoginClientAuth(opts.Ctx, config)
-	if err != nil {
-		return errs.NewAuthenticationError(errs.SubtypeUnknown, "authorization failed: %v", err).WithCause(err)
-	}
 	requestedScope, err := loadLoginRequestedScope(opts.DeviceCode)
 	if err != nil {
 		fmt.Fprintf(f.IOStreams.ErrOut, "[lark-cli] [WARN] auth login: failed to load cached requested scopes: %v\n", err)
@@ -427,7 +415,7 @@ func authLoginPollDeviceCode(opts *LoginOptions, config *core.CliConfig, msg *lo
 		fmt.Fprintln(f.IOStreams.ErrOut, msg.AgentTimeoutHint)
 	}
 	log(msg.WaitingAuth)
-	result := pollDeviceToken(opts.Ctx, httpClient, clientAuth, config.Brand,
+	result := pollDeviceToken(opts.Ctx, httpClient, config.AppID, config.AppSecret, config.Brand,
 		opts.DeviceCode, 5, 600, f.IOStreams.ErrOut)
 
 	if !result.OK {

cmd/auth/login_test.go

@@ -716,14 +716,6 @@ func TestAuthLoginRun_DeviceCodeUsesCachedRequestedScopes(t *testing.T) {
 	setupLoginConfigDir(t)
 	t.Setenv("HOME", t.TempDir())
 
-	originalResolve := resolveLoginClientAuth
-	resolveCalls := 0
-	resolveLoginClientAuth = func(_ context.Context, cfg *core.CliConfig) (larkauth.ClientAuth, error) {
-		resolveCalls++
-		return larkauth.ClientAuthFromConfig(cfg), nil
-	}
-	t.Cleanup(func() { resolveLoginClientAuth = originalResolve })
-
 	multi := &core.MultiAppConfig{
 		CurrentApp: "default",
 		Apps: []core.AppConfig{
@@ -786,9 +778,6 @@ func TestAuthLoginRun_DeviceCodeUsesCachedRequestedScopes(t *testing.T) {
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("no-wait authLoginRun() error = %v", err)
 	}
-	if resolveCalls != 1 {
-		t.Fatalf("no-wait client auth preparations = %d, want 1", resolveCalls)
-	}
 	if got, err := loadLoginRequestedScope("device-code"); err != nil || got != "im:message:send" {
 		t.Fatalf("loadLoginRequestedScope() = (%q, %v), want requested scope", got, err)
 	}
@@ -804,9 +793,6 @@ func TestAuthLoginRun_DeviceCodeUsesCachedRequestedScopes(t *testing.T) {
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("device-code authLoginRun() error = %v", err)
 	}
-	if resolveCalls != 2 {
-		t.Fatalf("split-flow client auth preparations = %d, want one per invocation", resolveCalls)
-	}
 	got := stderr.String()
 	for _, want := range []string{
 		"OK: 授权成功! 用户: tester (ou_user)",
@@ -861,7 +847,7 @@ func TestAuthLoginRun_DeviceCodeTokenNilCleansScopeCache(t *testing.T) {
 
 	original := pollDeviceToken
 	t.Cleanup(func() { pollDeviceToken = original })
-	pollDeviceToken = func(ctx context.Context, httpClient *http.Client, ca larkauth.ClientAuth, brand core.LarkBrand, deviceCode string, interval, expiresIn int, errOut io.Writer) *larkauth.DeviceFlowResult {
+	pollDeviceToken = func(ctx context.Context, httpClient *http.Client, appId, appSecret string, brand core.LarkBrand, deviceCode string, interval, expiresIn int, errOut io.Writer) *larkauth.DeviceFlowResult {
 		return &larkauth.DeviceFlowResult{OK: true, Token: nil}
 	}
 
@@ -898,17 +884,9 @@ func TestAuthLoginRun_JSONAbort_StdoutEventOnly_StderrEmpty(t *testing.T) {
 	keyring.MockInit()
 	setupLoginConfigDir(t)
 
-	originalResolve := resolveLoginClientAuth
-	resolveCalls := 0
-	resolveLoginClientAuth = func(_ context.Context, cfg *core.CliConfig) (larkauth.ClientAuth, error) {
-		resolveCalls++
-		return larkauth.ClientAuthFromConfig(cfg), nil
-	}
-	t.Cleanup(func() { resolveLoginClientAuth = originalResolve })
-
 	original := pollDeviceToken
 	t.Cleanup(func() { pollDeviceToken = original })
-	pollDeviceToken = func(ctx context.Context, httpClient *http.Client, ca larkauth.ClientAuth, brand core.LarkBrand, deviceCode string, interval, expiresIn int, errOut io.Writer) *larkauth.DeviceFlowResult {
+	pollDeviceToken = func(ctx context.Context, httpClient *http.Client, appId, appSecret string, brand core.LarkBrand, deviceCode string, interval, expiresIn int, errOut io.Writer) *larkauth.DeviceFlowResult {
 		return &larkauth.DeviceFlowResult{OK: false, Message: "user denied"}
 	}
 
@@ -941,9 +919,6 @@ func TestAuthLoginRun_JSONAbort_StdoutEventOnly_StderrEmpty(t *testing.T) {
 	if err == nil {
 		t.Fatal("expected error for aborted authorization")
 	}
-	if resolveCalls != 1 {
-		t.Fatalf("blocking-flow client auth preparations = %d, want 1", resolveCalls)
-	}
 	if gotCode := output.ExitCodeOf(err); gotCode != output.ExitAuth {
 		t.Fatalf("exit code = %d, want %d", gotCode, output.ExitAuth)
 	}

cmd/config/bind.go

@@ -4,18 +4,12 @@
 package config
 
 import (
-	"bytes"
-	"context"
 	"encoding/json"
 	"fmt"
 	"os"
-	"path/filepath"
 	"strings"
-	"sync"
-	"time"
 
 	"github.com/charmbracelet/huh"
-	"github.com/gofrs/flock"
 	"github.com/spf13/cobra"
 
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/errs"
@@ -28,14 +22,9 @@ import (
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/vfs"
 )
 
-const bindCommitLockTimeout = 5 * time.Second
-
-var bindCommitMu sync.Mutex
-
 // BindOptions holds all inputs for config bind.
 type BindOptions struct {
 	Factory *cmdutil.Factory
-	Ctx     context.Context
 	Source  string
 	AppID   string
 	// Identity selects one of two presets — "bot-only" or "user-default" —
@@ -105,7 +94,6 @@ Interactive terminal use: run with no flags to enter the TUI form.`,
   # Interactive (terminal user) — TUI prompts for everything:
   lark-cli config bind`,
 		RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
-			opts.Ctx = cmd.Context()
 			opts.langExplicit = cmd.Flags().Changed("lang")
 			if runF != nil {
 				return runF(opts)
@@ -151,11 +139,10 @@ func configBindRun(opts *BindOptions) error {
 		return nil
 	}
 
-	result, err := resolveAccount(opts, source)
+	appConfig, err := resolveAccount(opts, source)
 	if err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
-	appConfig := result.AppConfig
 	opts.Brand = string(appConfig.Brand)
 
 	if err := resolveIdentity(opts); err != nil {
@@ -164,20 +151,10 @@ func configBindRun(opts *BindOptions) error {
 	if err := warnIdentityEscalation(opts, existing.ConfigBytes); err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
-	if err := validateBindResult(bindContext(opts), opts, result); err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	applyPreferences(appConfig, opts, priorLangForApp(existing.ConfigBytes, appConfig.AppId))
+	applyPreferences(appConfig, opts, priorLang(existing.ConfigBytes))
 	noticeUserDefaultRisk(opts)
 
-	return commitBinding(opts, result, existing.ConfigBytes, source, targetConfigPath)
-}
-
-func bindContext(opts *BindOptions) context.Context {
-	if opts != nil && opts.Ctx != nil {
-		return opts.Ctx
-	}
-	return context.Background()
+	return commitBinding(opts, appConfig, existing.ConfigBytes, source, targetConfigPath)
 }
 
 // existingBinding is the outcome of checking whether a workspace was already
@@ -262,15 +239,9 @@ func finalizeSource(opts *BindOptions) (string, error) {
 // notice on success so the caller still sees that a rebind happened.
 // See existingBinding for the returned fields.
 func reconcileExistingBinding(opts *BindOptions, source, configPath string) (existingBinding, error) {
-	oldConfigData, err := vfs.ReadFile(configPath)
-	if err != nil {
-		if os.IsNotExist(err) {
-			return existingBinding{}, nil
-		}
-		return existingBinding{}, errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeInvalidConfig,
-			"cannot read existing workspace config %s: %v", configPath, err).
-			WithHint("fix the file permissions or I/O error before binding").
-			WithCause(err)
+	oldConfigData, _ := vfs.ReadFile(configPath)
+	if oldConfigData == nil {
+		return existingBinding{}, nil
 	}
 
 	if opts.IsTUI {
@@ -293,7 +264,7 @@ func reconcileExistingBinding(opts *BindOptions, source, configPath string) (exi
 // enumerate candidates, pick one via the shared decision layer, and build a
 // ready-to-persist AppConfig. Adding a new bind source only requires
 // implementing SourceBinder — none of the logic below needs to change.
-func resolveAccount(opts *BindOptions, source string) (*BindResult, error) {
+func resolveAccount(opts *BindOptions, source string) (*core.AppConfig, error) {
 	binder, err := newBinder(source, opts)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
@@ -307,7 +278,7 @@ func resolveAccount(opts *BindOptions, source string) (*BindResult, error) {
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}
-	return binder.Build(bindContext(opts), *picked)
+	return binder.Build(picked.AppID)
 }
 
 // resolveIdentity ensures opts.Identity is set before applyPreferences runs.
@@ -418,21 +389,10 @@ func applyPreferences(appConfig *core.AppConfig, opts *BindOptions, prior i18n.L
 // wrong profile's preference into a re-bind when the workspace holds multiple
 // named profiles and the active one disagrees with Apps[0].
 func priorLang(previousConfigBytes []byte) i18n.Lang {
-	return priorLangForApp(previousConfigBytes, "")
-}
-
-func priorLangForApp(previousConfigBytes []byte, appID string) i18n.Lang {
 	var multi core.MultiAppConfig
 	if json.Unmarshal(previousConfigBytes, &multi) != nil {
 		return ""
 	}
-	if appID != "" {
-		for i := range multi.Apps {
-			if multi.Apps[i].AppId == appID {
-				return multi.Apps[i].Lang
-			}
-		}
-	}
 	if app := multi.CurrentAppConfig(""); app != nil {
 		return app.Lang
 	}
@@ -440,16 +400,12 @@ func priorLangForApp(previousConfigBytes []byte, appID string) i18n.Lang {
 }
 
 // commitBinding finalizes the bind: atomic write of the new workspace config,
-// deferred provider-manifest commit for keyless binds, and a JSON success
-// envelope. The write and provider commit are serialized across CLI processes;
-// if the provider commit fails, the workspace write is rolled back before any
-// success output so an existing binding remains usable.
-func commitBinding(opts *BindOptions, result *BindResult, previousConfigBytes []byte, source, configPath string) error {
-	appConfig := result.AppConfig
-	multi, err := mergeBoundApp(appConfig, previousConfigBytes, opts.langExplicit)
-	if err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
+// best-effort cleanup of stale keychain entries from the previous binding (if
+// any), and a JSON success envelope. Cleanup runs only after the new config
+// is durably written — if anything fails earlier, the old workspace stays
+// usable.
+func commitBinding(opts *BindOptions, appConfig *core.AppConfig, previousConfigBytes []byte, source, configPath string) error {
+	multi := &core.MultiAppConfig{Apps: []core.AppConfig{*appConfig}}
 
 	if err := vfs.MkdirAll(core.GetConfigDir(), 0700); err != nil {
 		return errs.NewInternalError(errs.SubtypeFileIO, "failed to create workspace directory: %v", err).WithCause(err)
@@ -458,38 +414,9 @@ func commitBinding(opts *BindOptions, result *BindResult, previousConfigBytes []
 	if err != nil {
 		return errs.NewInternalError(errs.SubtypeStorage, "failed to marshal config: %v", err).WithCause(err)
 	}
-	releaseCommitLock, err := acquireBindCommitLock(opts)
-	if err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	commitLockHeld := true
-	defer func() {
-		if commitLockHeld {
-			releaseCommitLock()
-		}
-	}()
-	if err := ensureBindingSnapshotUnchanged(configPath, previousConfigBytes); err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	newConfigBytes := append(data, '\n')
-	if err := validate.AtomicWrite(configPath, newConfigBytes, 0600); err != nil {
+	if err := validate.AtomicWrite(configPath, append(data, '\n'), 0600); err != nil {
 		return errs.NewInternalError(errs.SubtypeStorage, "failed to write config %s: %v", configPath, err).WithCause(err)
 	}
-	if result.commitProviderManifest != nil {
-		if err := result.commitProviderManifest(); err != nil {
-			rollbackErr := rollbackBindingConfig(configPath, previousConfigBytes, newConfigBytes)
-			if rollbackErr != nil {
-				return errs.NewInternalError(errs.SubtypeStorage,
-					"failed to persist keyless signer provider: %v; failed to restore workspace config: %v", err, rollbackErr).
-					WithCause(err)
-			}
-			return errs.NewInternalError(errs.SubtypeStorage,
-				"failed to persist keyless signer provider (workspace config restored): %v", err).
-				WithCause(err)
-		}
-	}
-	releaseCommitLock()
-	commitLockHeld = false
 
 	replaced := previousConfigBytes != nil
 	// uiMsg renders human-facing TUI text (stderr success banner). Follows
@@ -498,6 +425,10 @@ func commitBinding(opts *BindOptions, result *BindResult, previousConfigBytes []
 	uiMsg := getBindMsg(opts.UILang)
 	display := sourceDisplayName(source)
 
+	if replaced {
+		cleanupKeychainFromData(opts.Factory.Keychain, previousConfigBytes, appConfig)
+	}
+
 	fmt.Fprintln(opts.Factory.IOStreams.ErrOut,
 		fmt.Sprintf(uiMsg.BindSuccessHeader, display)+"\n"+uiMsg.BindSuccessNotice)
 
@@ -539,133 +470,6 @@ func commitBinding(opts *BindOptions, result *BindResult, previousConfigBytes []
 	return nil
 }
 
-func acquireBindCommitLock(opts *BindOptions) (func(), error) {
-	bindCommitMu.Lock()
-	lockDir := filepath.Join(core.GetBaseConfigDir(), "locks")
-	if err := vfs.MkdirAll(lockDir, 0700); err != nil {
-		bindCommitMu.Unlock()
-		return nil, errs.NewInternalError(errs.SubtypeStorage,
-			"failed to create bind lock directory: %v", err).WithCause(err)
-	}
-	fileLock := flock.New(filepath.Join(lockDir, "config-bind.lock"))
-	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(bindContext(opts), bindCommitLockTimeout)
-	locked, err := fileLock.TryLockContext(ctx, 50*time.Millisecond)
-	cancel()
-	if err != nil || !locked {
-		bindCommitMu.Unlock()
-		if err == nil {
-			err = context.DeadlineExceeded
-		}
-		return nil, errs.NewInternalError(errs.SubtypeStorage,
-			"failed to acquire config bind lock: %v", err).WithCause(err)
-	}
-	return func() {
-		_ = fileLock.Unlock()
-		bindCommitMu.Unlock()
-	}, nil
-}
-
-func ensureBindingSnapshotUnchanged(configPath string, previousConfigBytes []byte) error {
-	current, err := vfs.ReadFile(configPath)
-	if err != nil {
-		if os.IsNotExist(err) && previousConfigBytes == nil {
-			return nil
-		}
-		return errs.NewInternalError(errs.SubtypeStorage,
-			"failed to recheck workspace config %s before binding: %v", configPath, err).WithCause(err)
-	}
-	if previousConfigBytes != nil && bytes.Equal(current, previousConfigBytes) {
-		return nil
-	}
-	return errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeInvalidConfig,
-		"workspace config %s changed while the bind was being validated", configPath).
-		WithHint("retry config bind using the latest workspace state")
-}
-
-func rollbackBindingConfig(configPath string, previousConfigBytes, writtenConfigBytes []byte) error {
-	current, err := vfs.ReadFile(configPath)
-	if err != nil {
-		if os.IsNotExist(err) && previousConfigBytes == nil {
-			return nil
-		}
-		//nolint:forbidigo // intermediate rollback diagnostic; commitBinding wraps it into a typed storage error
-		return fmt.Errorf("recheck workspace config before rollback: %w", err)
-	}
-	if !bytes.Equal(current, writtenConfigBytes) {
-		//nolint:forbidigo // intermediate rollback diagnostic; commitBinding wraps it into a typed storage error
-		return fmt.Errorf("workspace config changed after the bind write; refusing to overwrite it during rollback")
-	}
-	if previousConfigBytes != nil {
-		return validate.AtomicWrite(configPath, previousConfigBytes, 0600)
-	}
-	if err := vfs.Remove(configPath); err != nil && !os.IsNotExist(err) {
-		return err
-	}
-	return nil
-}
-
-// mergeBoundApp upserts by unique appId and activates the target while
-// preserving every non-target profile and root policy.
-func mergeBoundApp(incoming *core.AppConfig, previousBytes []byte, langExplicit bool) (*core.MultiAppConfig, error) {
-	if incoming == nil || strings.TrimSpace(incoming.AppId) == "" {
-		return nil, errs.NewInternalError(errs.SubtypeSDKError, "config bind produced an empty app")
-	}
-	if previousBytes == nil {
-		return &core.MultiAppConfig{Apps: []core.AppConfig{*incoming}, CurrentApp: incoming.ProfileName()}, nil
-	}
-
-	var multi core.MultiAppConfig
-	if err := json.Unmarshal(previousBytes, &multi); err != nil {
-		return nil, errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeInvalidConfig,
-			"cannot update malformed workspace config: %v", err).WithCause(err)
-	}
-	match := -1
-	for i := range multi.Apps {
-		if multi.Apps[i].AppId != incoming.AppId {
-			continue
-		}
-		if match >= 0 {
-			return nil, errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeInvalidConfig,
-				"appId %s appears in multiple CLI profiles", incoming.AppId).
-				WithHint("remove the duplicate profile before binding")
-		}
-		match = i
-	}
-
-	oldActive := ""
-	if active := multi.CurrentAppConfig(""); active != nil {
-		oldActive = active.ProfileName()
-	}
-	if match >= 0 {
-		old := multi.Apps[match]
-		incoming.Name = old.Name
-		incoming.Users = old.Users
-		if !langExplicit {
-			incoming.Lang = old.Lang
-		}
-		multi.Apps[match] = *incoming
-	} else {
-		for i := range multi.Apps {
-			if multi.Apps[i].Name != "" && multi.Apps[i].Name == incoming.AppId {
-				return nil, errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeInvalidConfig,
-					"new appId %s conflicts with existing profile name", incoming.AppId).
-					WithHint("rename the existing profile before binding")
-			}
-		}
-		incoming.Name = ""
-		incoming.Users = []core.AppUser{}
-		multi.Apps = append(multi.Apps, *incoming)
-		match = len(multi.Apps) - 1
-	}
-
-	targetName := multi.Apps[match].ProfileName()
-	if oldActive != targetName {
-		multi.PreviousApp = oldActive
-		multi.CurrentApp = targetName
-	}
-	return &multi, nil
-}
-
 // cleanupKeychainFromData removes keychain entries referenced by a previous
 // config snapshot, skipping any entry whose keychain ID is still in use by
 // the new app config. This prevents rebinding the same appId from deleting

cmd/config/bind_test.go

@@ -84,21 +84,6 @@ func saveWorkspace(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Cleanup(func() { core.SetCurrentWorkspace(orig) })
 }
 
-func TestReconcileExistingBinding_ReadFailureIsNotTreatedAsMissing(t *testing.T) {
-	configPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "config.json")
-	if err := os.Mkdir(configPath, 0700); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	f, _, _, _ := cmdutil.TestFactory(t, nil)
-	_, err := reconcileExistingBinding(&BindOptions{Factory: f}, "openclaw", configPath)
-	if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "cannot read existing workspace config") {
-		t.Fatalf("reconcileExistingBinding error = %v", err)
-	}
-	if info, statErr := os.Stat(configPath); statErr != nil || !info.IsDir() {
-		t.Fatalf("unreadable existing config was changed: info=%v error=%v", info, statErr)
-	}
-}
-
 // ── Command flag parsing tests (aligned with config_test.go pattern) ──
 
 func TestConfigBindCmd_FlagParsing(t *testing.T) {
@@ -1512,11 +1497,7 @@ func assertPresetApplied(t *testing.T, configPath string, wantStrict core.Strict
 	if len(multi.Apps) == 0 {
 		t.Fatalf("no apps in %s", configPath)
 	}
-	appPtr := multi.CurrentAppConfig("")
-	if appPtr == nil {
-		t.Fatalf("no current app in %s", configPath)
-	}
-	app := *appPtr
+	app := multi.Apps[0]
 	if app.StrictMode == nil || *app.StrictMode != wantStrict {
 		t.Errorf("StrictMode = %v, want %q", app.StrictMode, wantStrict)
 	}

cmd/config/binder.go

@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@
 package config
 
 import (
-	"context"
 	"fmt"
 	"os"
 	"path/filepath"
@@ -24,19 +23,6 @@ type Candidate struct {
 	Label string
 }
 
-// BindResult carries the selected app. External signer configuration is the
-// logical provider on AppConfig.KeyRef; bind never persists executable paths.
-type BindResult struct {
-	AppConfig *core.AppConfig
-
-	// commitProviderManifest is populated only after a keyless bind probe has
-	// authenticated successfully. commitBinding runs it after the workspace
-	// config write and rolls that write back if the global provider index cannot
-	// be committed, so a failed bind never changes the signer used by existing
-	// applications.
-	commitProviderManifest func() error
-}
-
 // SourceBinder abstracts a bind source (openclaw / hermes / future sources).
 // Implementations only list candidates and build an AppConfig for a chosen
 // candidate — they stay out of mode (TUI vs flag) and orchestration concerns.
@@ -48,9 +34,9 @@ type SourceBinder interface {
 	// ListCandidates enumerates bindable accounts from the source config.
 	// An empty slice is valid (selectCandidate will turn it into a typed error).
 	ListCandidates() ([]Candidate, error)
-	// Build resolves credentials and returns the app plus any signer command
-	// needed by the workspace. Must be called after ListCandidates succeeds.
-	Build(ctx context.Context, candidate Candidate) (*BindResult, error)
+	// Build resolves secrets, persists to keychain, and returns a ready AppConfig
+	// for the chosen candidate AppID. Must be called after ListCandidates succeeds.
+	Build(appID string) (*core.AppConfig, error)
 }
 
 // newBinder constructs the SourceBinder for the given source name.
@@ -107,21 +93,11 @@ func selectCandidate(
 	}
 
 	if appIDFlag != "" {
-		var matches []Candidate
 		for i := range candidates {
 			if candidates[i].AppID == appIDFlag {
-				matches = append(matches, candidates[i])
+				return &candidates[i], nil
 			}
 		}
-		if len(matches) == 1 {
-			return &matches[0], nil
-		}
-		if len(matches) > 1 {
-			return nil, errs.NewValidationError(errs.SubtypeInvalidArgument,
-				"--app-id %q matches multiple accounts in %s", appIDFlag, cfgBase).
-				WithHint("run 'lark-cli config bind' interactively to choose an account, or configure unique app IDs:\n  %s", formatCandidates(matches)).
-				WithParam("--app-id")
-		}
 		return nil, errs.NewValidationError(errs.SubtypeInvalidArgument, "--app-id %q not found in %s", appIDFlag, cfgBase).
 			WithHint("available app IDs:\n  %s", formatCandidates(candidates)).
 			WithParam("--app-id")
@@ -192,48 +168,20 @@ func (b *openclawBinder) ListCandidates() ([]Candidate, error) {
 	return result, nil
 }
 
-func (b *openclawBinder) Build(_ context.Context, candidate Candidate) (*BindResult, error) {
+func (b *openclawBinder) Build(appID string) (*core.AppConfig, error) {
 	if b.cfg == nil {
 		return nil, errs.NewInternalError(errs.SubtypeSDKError, "internal: Build called before ListCandidates")
 	}
 
 	var selected *binding.CandidateApp
 	for i := range b.rawApps {
-		if b.rawApps[i].AppID == candidate.AppID && b.rawApps[i].Label == candidate.Label {
+		if b.rawApps[i].AppID == appID {
 			selected = &b.rawApps[i]
 			break
 		}
 	}
 	if selected == nil {
-		return nil, errs.NewInternalError(errs.SubtypeSDKError,
-			"internal: account %q (appID %q) not in candidates", candidate.Label, candidate.AppID)
-	}
-	if selected.AuthMethod != "" && selected.AuthMethod != "app_secret" && selected.AuthMethod != binding.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT {
-		return nil, errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeInvalidConfig, "unknown authMethod %q for app %s in %s", selected.AuthMethod, selected.AppID, b.path).
-			WithHint("supported values are app_secret and private_key_jwt")
-	}
-
-	// openclaw-lark deliberately gives appSecret precedence when both shapes
-	// are present. Reproduce that behavior so bind never changes the effective
-	// credential type merely because authMethod was left stale.
-	if selected.AppSecret.IsZero() && selected.AuthMethod == binding.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT {
-		if strings.TrimSpace(selected.KeyRef) == "" {
-			return nil, errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeInvalidConfig,
-				"private_key_jwt app %s in %s is missing keyRef", selected.AppID, b.path).
-				WithHint("re-run OpenClaw onboarding so the keyless account records its signer keyRef")
-		}
-		return &BindResult{
-			AppConfig: &core.AppConfig{
-				AppId:      selected.AppID,
-				Brand:      core.ParseBrand(selected.Brand),
-				AuthMethod: core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT,
-				KeyRef: &core.SecretRef{
-					Source:   core.SecretSourceTEE,
-					Provider: core.KeylessProviderLarkSuite,
-					ID:       strings.TrimSpace(selected.KeyRef),
-				},
-			},
-		}, nil
+		return nil, errs.NewInternalError(errs.SubtypeSDKError, "internal: appID %q not in candidates", appID)
 	}
 
 	if selected.AppSecret.IsZero() {
@@ -254,11 +202,11 @@ func (b *openclawBinder) Build(_ context.Context, candidate Candidate) (*BindRes
 			WithCause(err)
 	}
 
-	return &BindResult{AppConfig: &core.AppConfig{
+	return &core.AppConfig{
 		AppId:     selected.AppID,
 		AppSecret: stored,
 		Brand:     core.ParseBrand(selected.Brand),
-	}}, nil
+	}, nil
 }
 
 // ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -290,8 +238,7 @@ func (b *hermesBinder) ListCandidates() ([]Candidate, error) {
 	return []Candidate{{AppID: appID, Label: "default"}}, nil
 }
 
-func (b *hermesBinder) Build(_ context.Context, candidate Candidate) (*BindResult, error) {
-	appID := candidate.AppID
+func (b *hermesBinder) Build(appID string) (*core.AppConfig, error) {
 	if b.envMap == nil {
 		return nil, errs.NewInternalError(errs.SubtypeSDKError, "internal: Build called before ListCandidates")
 	}
@@ -311,11 +258,11 @@ func (b *hermesBinder) Build(_ context.Context, candidate Candidate) (*BindResul
 			WithCause(err)
 	}
 
-	return &BindResult{AppConfig: &core.AppConfig{
+	return &core.AppConfig{
 		AppId:     appID,
 		AppSecret: stored,
 		Brand:     core.ParseBrand(b.envMap["FEISHU_DOMAIN"]),
-	}}, nil
+	}, nil
 }
 
 // ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -348,8 +295,7 @@ func (b *larkChannelBinder) ListCandidates() ([]Candidate, error) {
 	return []Candidate{{AppID: cfg.Accounts.App.ID, Label: "default"}}, nil
 }
 
-func (b *larkChannelBinder) Build(_ context.Context, candidate Candidate) (*BindResult, error) {
-	appID := candidate.AppID
+func (b *larkChannelBinder) Build(appID string) (*core.AppConfig, error) {
 	if b.cfg == nil {
 		return nil, errs.NewInternalError(errs.SubtypeSDKError, "internal: Build called before ListCandidates")
 	}
@@ -377,11 +323,11 @@ func (b *larkChannelBinder) Build(_ context.Context, candidate Candidate) (*Bind
 			WithCause(err)
 	}
 
-	return &BindResult{AppConfig: &core.AppConfig{
+	return &core.AppConfig{
 		AppId:     appID,
 		AppSecret: stored,
 		Brand:     core.ParseBrand(b.cfg.Accounts.App.Tenant),
-	}}, nil
+	}, nil
 }
 
 // ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

cmd/config/binder_test.go

@@ -4,12 +4,10 @@
 package config
 
 import (
-	"context"
 	"path/filepath"
 	"reflect"
 	"testing"
 
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/binding"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/output"
 )
@@ -22,10 +20,10 @@ type fakeBinder struct {
 	path string
 }
 
-func (b *fakeBinder) Name() string                                          { return b.name }
-func (b *fakeBinder) ConfigPath() string                                    { return b.path }
-func (b *fakeBinder) ListCandidates() ([]Candidate, error)                  { return nil, nil }
-func (b *fakeBinder) Build(context.Context, Candidate) (*BindResult, error) { return nil, nil }
+func (b *fakeBinder) Name() string                                { return b.name }
+func (b *fakeBinder) ConfigPath() string                          { return b.path }
+func (b *fakeBinder) ListCandidates() ([]Candidate, error)        { return nil, nil }
+func (b *fakeBinder) Build(appID string) (*core.AppConfig, error) { return nil, nil }
 
 // tuiUnreachable is a tuiPrompt that fails the test if called. It's the
 // guardrail that proves the non-TUI decision paths really do stay out of the
@@ -109,20 +107,6 @@ func TestSelectCandidate_AppIDFlag_NoMatch(t *testing.T) {
 	})
 }
 
-func TestSelectCandidate_AppIDFlag_RejectsDuplicateInheritedAppID(t *testing.T) {
-	b := &fakeBinder{name: "openclaw", path: "/tmp/openclaw.json"}
-	candidates := []Candidate{
-		{AppID: "cli_shared", Label: "work"},
-		{AppID: "cli_shared", Label: "personal"},
-	}
-	_, err := selectCandidate(b, candidates, "cli_shared", false, tuiUnreachable(t))
-	assertExitError(t, err, output.ExitValidation, wantErrDetail{
-		Type:    "validation",
-		Message: `--app-id "cli_shared" matches multiple accounts in openclaw.json`,
-		Hint:    "run 'lark-cli config bind' interactively to choose an account, or configure unique app IDs:\n  cli_shared (work)\n  cli_shared (personal)",
-	})
-}
-
 func TestSelectCandidate_MultiCandidate_NoFlag_NonTUI(t *testing.T) {
 	// Flag-mode with multiple candidates and no --app-id must produce a
 	// validation error and the candidate list, never an interactive prompt.
@@ -191,27 +175,6 @@ func TestSelectCandidate_AppIDFlag_WinsOverTUI(t *testing.T) {
 	assertCandidate(t, got, Candidate{AppID: "cli_b"})
 }
 
-func TestOpenClawBuildUsesSelectedLabelWhenAppIDIsShared(t *testing.T) {
-	b := &openclawBinder{
-		cfg: &binding.OpenClawRoot{},
-		rawApps: []binding.CandidateApp{
-			{Label: "work", AppID: "cli_shared", AuthMethod: binding.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT, KeyRef: "work-key"},
-			{Label: "personal", AppID: "cli_shared", AuthMethod: binding.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT, KeyRef: "personal-key"},
-		},
-	}
-
-	result, err := b.Build(context.Background(), Candidate{AppID: "cli_shared", Label: "personal"})
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if result.AppConfig.KeyRef == nil || result.AppConfig.KeyRef.ID != "personal-key" {
-		t.Fatalf("keyRef = %#v, want personal-key", result.AppConfig.KeyRef)
-	}
-	if result.AppConfig.KeyRef.Provider != core.KeylessProviderLarkSuite {
-		t.Fatalf("provider = %q, want %q", result.AppConfig.KeyRef.Provider, core.KeylessProviderLarkSuite)
-	}
-}
-
 func TestResolveLarkChannelConfigPath_Default(t *testing.T) {
 	home := t.TempDir()
 	t.Setenv("HOME", home)

cmd/config/config.go

@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ func NewCmdConfig(f *cmdutil.Factory) *cobra.Command {
 	cmd.AddCommand(NewCmdConfigShow(f, nil))
 	cmd.AddCommand(NewCmdConfigDefaultAs(f))
 	cmd.AddCommand(NewCmdConfigStrictMode(f))
+	cmd.AddCommand(NewCmdConfigRiskControl(f))
 	cmd.AddCommand(NewCmdConfigPolicy(f))
 	cmd.AddCommand(NewCmdConfigPlugins(f))
 	cmd.AddCommand(NewCmdConfigKeychainDowngrade(f))

cmd/config/config_test.go

@@ -65,39 +65,6 @@ func TestConfigInitCmd_FlagParsing(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-func TestConfigInitCmd_PrivateKeyJWTFlag(t *testing.T) {
-	clearAgentEnv(t) // assumes local workspace; guard refuses init in agent contexts
-	f, _, _, _ := cmdutil.TestFactory(t, nil)
-
-	var gotOpts *ConfigInitOptions
-	cmd := NewCmdConfigInit(f, func(opts *ConfigInitOptions) error {
-		gotOpts = opts
-		return nil
-	})
-	cmd.SetArgs([]string{"--new", "--private-key-jwt"})
-	if err := cmd.Execute(); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
-	}
-	if !gotOpts.PrivateKeyJWT {
-		t.Error("PrivateKeyJWT = false, want true")
-	}
-}
-
-func TestConfigInitCmd_AuthMethodFlagRemoved(t *testing.T) {
-	clearAgentEnv(t) // assumes local workspace; guard refuses init in agent contexts
-	f, _, _, _ := cmdutil.TestFactory(t, nil)
-
-	cmd := NewCmdConfigInit(f, func(opts *ConfigInitOptions) error { return nil })
-	cmd.SetArgs([]string{"--new", "--auth-method", core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT})
-	err := cmd.Execute()
-	if err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("expected unknown flag error")
-	}
-	if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "unknown flag: --auth-method") {
-		t.Fatalf("error = %v, want unknown --auth-method flag", err)
-	}
-}
-
 func TestConfigShowCmd_FlagParsing(t *testing.T) {
 	f, _, _, _ := cmdutil.TestFactory(t, &core.CliConfig{
 		AppID: "test-app", AppSecret: "test-secret", Brand: core.BrandFeishu,
@@ -226,7 +193,7 @@ func TestSaveInitConfig_OmitLangPreservesPrior(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("seed config: %v", err)
 	}
 
-	if err := saveInitConfig("", existing, f, "cli_x", core.PlainSecret("s2"), core.BrandFeishu, "", "", nil); err != nil {
+	if err := saveInitConfig("", existing, f, "cli_x", core.PlainSecret("s2"), core.BrandFeishu, ""); err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("saveInitConfig (no --lang): %v", err)
 	}
 
@@ -239,68 +206,6 @@ func TestSaveInitConfig_OmitLangPreservesPrior(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-func TestKeyRefFromResult_PrivateKeyJWT(t *testing.T) {
-	ref := keyRefFromResult(&configInitResult{
-		AuthMethod: core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT,
-		KeyLabel:   "lark-cli-default",
-	})
-	if ref == nil {
-		t.Fatal("keyRefFromResult returned nil")
-	}
-	if ref.Source != "tee" || ref.ID != "lark-cli-default" {
-		t.Fatalf("key ref = %#v, want tee/lark-cli-default", ref)
-	}
-
-	if ref := keyRefFromResult(&configInitResult{AuthMethod: core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT}); ref != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("missing key label should not persist key ref, got %#v", ref)
-	}
-	if ref := keyRefFromResult(&configInitResult{AuthMethod: core.AuthMethodClientSecret, KeyLabel: "ignored"}); ref != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("client_secret should not persist key ref, got %#v", ref)
-	}
-	if ref := keyRefFromResult(nil); ref != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("nil result should not persist key ref, got %#v", ref)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestPersistInitResult_PrivateKeyJWT(t *testing.T) {
-	for _, tc := range []struct {
-		name    string
-		profile string
-		brand   core.LarkBrand
-	}{
-		{name: "single app", brand: core.BrandFeishu},
-		{name: "named profile", profile: "prod", brand: core.BrandLark},
-	} {
-		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
-			f, _, _, _ := cmdutil.TestFactory(t, nil)
-			opts := &ConfigInitOptions{Factory: f, Ctx: context.Background(), Lang: "en_us"}
-			result := &configInitResult{
-				Brand: tc.brand, AppID: "cli_pkjwt",
-				AuthMethod: core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT, KeyLabel: "lark-cli-default",
-			}
-			if err := persistInitResult(opts, f, tc.profile, result); err != nil {
-				t.Fatal(err)
-			}
-
-			got, err := core.LoadMultiAppConfig()
-			if err != nil {
-				t.Fatal(err)
-			}
-			app := got.CurrentAppConfig(tc.profile)
-			if app == nil || app.AppId != "cli_pkjwt" || app.AuthMethod != core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT {
-				t.Fatalf("saved app = %#v", app)
-			}
-			if app.KeyRef == nil || app.KeyRef.Source != "tee" || app.KeyRef.ID != "lark-cli-default" {
-				t.Fatalf("KeyRef = %#v, want tee/lark-cli-default", app.KeyRef)
-			}
-			if !app.AppSecret.IsZero() {
-				t.Fatalf("private_key_jwt config must stay secretless, AppSecret value %#v", app.AppSecret)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}
-
 // TestConfigInitCmd_InvalidLang verifies a non-empty --lang on config init is
 // strictly validated the same way bind validates: wrong-case / typo / removed
 // codes / hyphen form all exit with ExitValidation. (Empty is a no-op.)
@@ -483,7 +388,7 @@ func TestSaveAsProfile_RejectsProfileNameCollisionWithExistingAppID(t *testing.T
 		},
 	}
 
-	err := saveAsProfile(existing, keychain.KeychainAccess(&noopConfigKeychain{}), "cli_prod", "app-new", core.PlainSecret("new-secret"), core.BrandLark, "en", "", nil)
+	err := saveAsProfile(existing, keychain.KeychainAccess(&noopConfigKeychain{}), "cli_prod", "app-new", core.PlainSecret("new-secret"), core.BrandLark, "en")
 	if err == nil {
 		t.Fatal("expected conflict error")
 	}
@@ -522,46 +427,6 @@ func TestWrapSaveConfigError_PassesTypedValidationThrough(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-func TestSaveAsProfile_UpdatePersistsPrivateKeyJWT(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
-
-	existing := &core.MultiAppConfig{
-		Apps: []core.AppConfig{{
-			Name:      "prod",
-			AppId:     "cli_prod",
-			AppSecret: core.PlainSecret("old-secret"),
-			Brand:     core.BrandFeishu,
-			Users:     []core.AppUser{{UserOpenId: "ou_1", UserName: "User"}},
-		}},
-	}
-	keyRef := &core.SecretRef{Source: "tee", ID: "lark-cli-default"}
-
-	if err := saveAsProfile(existing, keychain.KeychainAccess(&noopConfigKeychain{}), "prod", "cli_prod", core.SecretInput{}, core.BrandLark, "en_us", core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT, keyRef); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("saveAsProfile update private_key_jwt: %v", err)
-	}
-
-	got, err := core.LoadMultiAppConfig()
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("LoadMultiAppConfig: %v", err)
-	}
-	app := got.FindApp("prod")
-	if app == nil {
-		t.Fatalf("profile prod not saved: %#v", got.Apps)
-	}
-	if app.AuthMethod != core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT {
-		t.Fatalf("AuthMethod = %q, want private_key_jwt", app.AuthMethod)
-	}
-	if app.KeyRef == nil || app.KeyRef.Source != "tee" || app.KeyRef.ID != "lark-cli-default" {
-		t.Fatalf("KeyRef = %#v, want tee/lark-cli-default", app.KeyRef)
-	}
-	if app.AppSecret.Ref != nil || app.AppSecret.Plain != "" {
-		t.Fatalf("private_key_jwt update must stay secretless, AppSecret value %#v", app.AppSecret)
-	}
-	if len(app.Users) != 1 || app.Users[0].UserOpenId != "ou_1" {
-		t.Fatalf("same-app update should preserve users, Users=%#v", app.Users)
-	}
-}
-
 func TestUpdateExistingProfileWithoutSecret_RejectsAppIDChange(t *testing.T) {
 	multi := &core.MultiAppConfig{
 		CurrentApp: "prod",

cmd/config/init.go

@@ -19,7 +19,6 @@ import (
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/i18n"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/keychain"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/keysigner"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/output"
 )
 
@@ -32,7 +31,6 @@ type ConfigInitOptions struct {
 	AppSecretStdin bool   // read app-secret from stdin (avoids process list exposure)
 	Brand          string
 	New            bool
-	PrivateKeyJWT  bool // --private-key-jwt: request private_key_jwt instead of the default client_secret
 
 	Lang         string // raw --lang (string for cobra); normalized to canonical/"" in validateInitLang
 	langExplicit bool   // true when --lang was explicitly passed
@@ -41,8 +39,6 @@ type ConfigInitOptions struct {
 
 	ProfileName string // when set, create/update a named profile instead of replacing Apps[0]
 
-	Restore bool // Restore re-registers the app already in config to recover a lost credential
-
 	// ForceInit overrides the agent-workspace guard. Without it, running
 	// init under OPENCLAW_HOME / HERMES_HOME refuses and points the caller
 	// at config bind — which is what AI agents almost always want. Manual
@@ -85,26 +81,17 @@ if the user explicitly wants a separate app inside the Agent workspace.`,
 	}
 
 	cmd.Flags().BoolVar(&opts.New, "new", false, "create a new app directly (skip mode selection)")
-	cmd.Flags().BoolVar(&opts.PrivateKeyJWT, "private-key-jwt", false, "create a new app with private_key_jwt (signed by a platform key, no app secret)")
 	cmd.Flags().StringVar(&opts.AppID, "app-id", "", "App ID (non-interactive)")
 	cmd.Flags().BoolVar(&opts.AppSecretStdin, "app-secret-stdin", false, "Read App Secret from stdin to avoid process list exposure")
 	cmd.Flags().StringVar(&opts.Brand, "brand", "feishu", "feishu or lark (non-interactive, default feishu)")
 	cmd.Flags().StringVar(&opts.Lang, "lang", "", "language preference (e.g. zh or zh_cn)")
 	cmd.Flags().StringVar(&opts.ProfileName, "name", "", "create or update a named profile (append instead of replace)")
-	cmd.Flags().BoolVar(&opts.Restore, "restore", false, "re-register the app already in config to recover a lost credential (keychain key / app secret); reuses the stored app ID and auth method")
 	cmd.Flags().BoolVar(&opts.ForceInit, "force-init", false, "allow init inside an Agent workspace (OPENCLAW_HOME / HERMES_HOME); use config bind instead unless you really want a separate app")
 	cmdutil.SetRisk(cmd, "write")
 
 	return cmd
 }
 
-func requestedInitAuthMethod(opts *ConfigInitOptions) string {
-	if opts.PrivateKeyJWT {
-		return core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT
-	}
-	return core.AuthMethodClientSecret
-}
-
 // printLangPreferenceConfirmation echoes the set preference to stderr, only
 // when --lang explicitly set a non-empty value.
 func printLangPreferenceConfirmation(opts *ConfigInitOptions) {
@@ -145,7 +132,7 @@ func guardAgentWorkspace(opts *ConfigInitOptions) error {
 
 // hasAnyNonInteractiveFlag returns true if any non-interactive flag is set.
 func (o *ConfigInitOptions) hasAnyNonInteractiveFlag() bool {
-	return o.New || o.Restore || o.AppID != "" || o.AppSecretStdin
+	return o.New || o.AppID != "" || o.AppSecretStdin
 }
 
 // cleanupOldConfig clears keychain entries (AppSecret + UAT) for all apps in existing config except the app whose AppId equals skipAppID.
@@ -164,61 +151,22 @@ func cleanupOldConfig(existing *core.MultiAppConfig, f *cmdutil.Factory, skipApp
 	}
 }
 
-// removeStaleSecretForPKJWT clears a secret left in the keychain when the SAME
-// appId is migrated from client_secret to private_key_jwt. cleanupOldConfig
-// explicitly skips a matching appId, and saveAsProfile only cleans up on an
-// appId change, so a same-appId migration would orphan the old secret. This
-// fills that gap. RemoveSecretStore only deletes Source=="keychain" entries, so
-// the new pkjwt tee key handle is never touched.
-func removeStaleSecretForPKJWT(existing *core.MultiAppConfig, profileName, appID string, kc keychain.KeychainAccess) {
-	if existing == nil {
-		return
-	}
-	var prior *core.AppConfig
-	if profileName != "" {
-		if idx := findProfileIndexByName(existing, profileName); idx >= 0 {
-			prior = &existing.Apps[idx]
-		}
-	} else {
-		prior = existing.CurrentAppConfig("")
-	}
-	if prior != nil && prior.AppId == appID && !prior.AppSecret.IsZero() {
-		core.RemoveSecretStore(prior.AppSecret, kc)
-	}
-}
-
-// keyRefFromResult builds the TEE key reference to persist for a private_key_jwt
-// registration result, or nil for client_secret.
-func keyRefFromResult(r *configInitResult) *core.SecretRef {
-	if r != nil && r.AuthMethod == core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT && r.KeyLabel != "" {
-		return &core.SecretRef{Source: "tee", ID: r.KeyLabel}
-	}
-	return nil
-}
-
 // saveAsOnlyApp overwrites config.json with a single-app config.
-func saveAsOnlyApp(appId string, secret core.SecretInput, brand core.LarkBrand, lang, authMethod string, keyRef *core.SecretRef) error {
+func saveAsOnlyApp(appId string, secret core.SecretInput, brand core.LarkBrand, lang string) error {
 	config := &core.MultiAppConfig{
 		Apps: []core.AppConfig{{
 			AppId: appId, AppSecret: secret, Brand: brand, Lang: i18n.Lang(lang), Users: []core.AppUser{},
-			AuthMethod: authMethod, KeyRef: keyRef,
 		}},
 	}
-	return saveMultiAppConfigForInit(config)
-}
-
-func saveMultiAppConfigForInit(config *core.MultiAppConfig) error {
 	return core.SaveMultiAppConfig(config)
 }
 
 // saveInitConfig saves a new/updated app config, respecting --profile mode.
 // With profileName: appends or updates the named profile (preserves other profiles).
 // Without profileName: cleans up old config and saves as the only app.
-// authMethod/keyRef carry the credential type: ("", nil) for client_secret,
-// (private_key_jwt, &{tee,label}) for the secretless TEE flow.
-func saveInitConfig(profileName string, existing *core.MultiAppConfig, f *cmdutil.Factory, appId string, secret core.SecretInput, brand core.LarkBrand, lang, authMethod string, keyRef *core.SecretRef) error {
+func saveInitConfig(profileName string, existing *core.MultiAppConfig, f *cmdutil.Factory, appId string, secret core.SecretInput, brand core.LarkBrand, lang string) error {
 	if profileName != "" {
-		return saveAsProfile(existing, f.Keychain, profileName, appId, secret, brand, lang, authMethod, keyRef)
+		return saveAsProfile(existing, f.Keychain, profileName, appId, secret, brand, lang)
 	}
 	cleanupOldConfig(existing, f, appId)
 	var prior i18n.Lang
@@ -227,7 +175,7 @@ func saveInitConfig(profileName string, existing *core.MultiAppConfig, f *cmduti
 			prior = app.Lang
 		}
 	}
-	return saveAsOnlyApp(appId, secret, brand, string(preferredLang(i18n.Lang(lang), prior)), authMethod, keyRef)
+	return saveAsOnlyApp(appId, secret, brand, string(preferredLang(i18n.Lang(lang), prior)))
 }
 
 // wrapSaveConfigError passes an already-typed error (e.g. the --name conflict
@@ -247,7 +195,7 @@ func wrapSaveConfigError(err error) error {
 // saveAsProfile appends or updates a named profile in the config.
 // If a profile with the same name exists, it updates it; otherwise appends.
 // When updating, cleans up old keychain secrets if AppId changed.
-func saveAsProfile(existing *core.MultiAppConfig, kc keychain.KeychainAccess, profileName, appId string, secret core.SecretInput, brand core.LarkBrand, lang, authMethod string, keyRef *core.SecretRef) error {
+func saveAsProfile(existing *core.MultiAppConfig, kc keychain.KeychainAccess, profileName, appId string, secret core.SecretInput, brand core.LarkBrand, lang string) error {
 	multi := existing
 	if multi == nil {
 		multi = &core.MultiAppConfig{}
@@ -266,8 +214,6 @@ func saveAsProfile(existing *core.MultiAppConfig, kc keychain.KeychainAccess, pr
 		multi.Apps[idx].AppSecret = secret
 		multi.Apps[idx].Brand = brand
 		multi.Apps[idx].Lang = preferredLang(i18n.Lang(lang), multi.Apps[idx].Lang)
-		multi.Apps[idx].AuthMethod = authMethod
-		multi.Apps[idx].KeyRef = keyRef
 	} else {
 		if findAppIndexByAppID(multi, profileName) >= 0 {
 			return errs.NewValidationError(errs.SubtypeInvalidArgument,
@@ -276,17 +222,15 @@ func saveAsProfile(existing *core.MultiAppConfig, kc keychain.KeychainAccess, pr
 		}
 		// Append new profile
 		multi.Apps = append(multi.Apps, core.AppConfig{
-			Name:       profileName,
-			AppId:      appId,
-			AppSecret:  secret,
-			Brand:      brand,
-			Lang:       i18n.Lang(lang),
-			Users:      []core.AppUser{},
-			AuthMethod: authMethod,
-			KeyRef:     keyRef,
+			Name:      profileName,
+			AppId:     appId,
+			AppSecret: secret,
+			Brand:     brand,
+			Lang:      i18n.Lang(lang),
+			Users:     []core.AppUser{},
 		})
 	}
-	return saveMultiAppConfigForInit(multi)
+	return core.SaveMultiAppConfig(multi)
 }
 
 func findProfileIndexByName(multi *core.MultiAppConfig, profileName string) int {
@@ -358,141 +302,12 @@ func updateExistingProfileWithoutSecret(existing *core.MultiAppConfig, profileNa
 	app.AppId = appID
 	app.Brand = brand
 	app.Lang = preferredLang(i18n.Lang(lang), app.Lang)
-	return saveMultiAppConfigForInit(existing)
-}
-
-func persistInitResult(opts *ConfigInitOptions, f *cmdutil.Factory, profileName string, result *configInitResult) error {
-	existing, _ := core.LoadMultiAppConfig()
-
-	switch {
-	case result.AuthMethod == core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT:
-		if err := saveInitConfig(profileName, existing, f, result.AppID, core.SecretInput{}, result.Brand, opts.Lang, result.AuthMethod, keyRefFromResult(result)); err != nil {
-			return wrapSaveConfigError(err)
-		}
-		removeStaleSecretForPKJWT(existing, profileName, result.AppID, f.Keychain)
-		return nil
-	case result.AppSecret != "":
-		secret, err := core.ForStorage(result.AppID, core.PlainSecret(result.AppSecret), f.Keychain)
-		if err != nil {
-			return errs.NewInternalError(errs.SubtypeSDKError, "%v", err).WithCause(err)
-		}
-		if err := saveInitConfig(profileName, existing, f, result.AppID, secret, result.Brand, opts.Lang, "", nil); err != nil {
-			return wrapSaveConfigError(err)
-		}
-		return nil
-	case result.Mode == "existing" && result.AppID != "":
-		return wrapUpdateExistingProfileErr(updateExistingProfileWithoutSecret(existing, profileName, result.AppID, result.Brand, opts.Lang))
-	default:
-		return errs.NewValidationError(errs.SubtypeInvalidArgument, "App ID and App Secret cannot be empty").WithParam("--app-id")
-	}
-}
-
-func probeInitResult(opts *ConfigInitOptions, f *cmdutil.Factory, result *configInitResult) error {
-	if result.AuthMethod == core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT {
-		return runProbePKJWT(opts.Ctx, f, result.Brand, result.AppID, keysigner.Active(), result.KeyLabel)
-	}
-	if result.AppSecret != "" {
-		return runProbe(opts.Ctx, f, result.AppID, result.AppSecret, result.Brand)
-	}
-	return nil
-}
-
-// persistAndProbeResult saves a registration/restore result into profileName and
-// runs the post-registration probe. profileName == "" replaces the single app
-// (legacy); a named profile is updated in place. Shared by --new and --restore.
-func persistAndProbeResult(opts *ConfigInitOptions, f *cmdutil.Factory, profileName string, result *configInitResult) error {
-	if err := persistInitResult(opts, f, profileName, result); err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	printLangPreferenceConfirmation(opts)
-	if result.AuthMethod == core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT {
-		output.PrintJson(f.IOStreams.Out, map[string]interface{}{"appId": result.AppID, "authMethod": result.AuthMethod, "brand": result.Brand})
-	} else {
-		output.PrintJson(f.IOStreams.Out, map[string]interface{}{"appId": result.AppID, "appSecret": "****", "brand": result.Brand})
-	}
-	return probeInitResult(opts, f, result)
-}
-
-// runRestoreFlow re-registers the app already in config to recover a lost
-// credential (deleted keychain key / lost app secret). It reads the existing
-// app id + auth method + brand from config (no secret needed — that's the lost
-// part) and re-runs the device-flow registration with the app id sent on begin,
-// so the server re-registers that app instead of creating a new one. The
-// re-issued credential is written back to the same profile.
-func runRestoreFlow(opts *ConfigInitOptions, existing *core.MultiAppConfig, f *cmdutil.Factory, msg *initMsg) error {
-	if existing == nil {
-		return errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeNotConfigured, "nothing to restore: no config found").
-			WithHint("run: lark-cli config init")
-	}
-	app := existing.CurrentAppConfig(opts.ProfileName)
-	if app == nil || app.AppId == "" {
-		return errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeNotConfigured, "nothing to restore: no app id in config%s", profileSuffix(opts.ProfileName)).
-			WithHint("run: lark-cli config init")
-	}
-	if app.KeyRef != nil && strings.TrimSpace(app.KeyRef.Provider) != "" {
-		return errs.NewValidationError(errs.SubtypeFailedPrecondition,
-			"config init --restore does not manage external signer provider %q", app.KeyRef.Provider).
-			WithHint("repair the OpenClaw provider with onboarding doctor --fix, then run config bind again")
-	}
-
-	restoreAppID := app.AppId
-	// Reuse the stored auth method authoritatively — never prompt. Empty on disk
-	// means client_secret (omitempty back-compat); pass it explicitly so restore
-	// preserves the existing credential type.
-	authMethod := app.AuthMethod
-	if authMethod == "" {
-		authMethod = core.AuthMethodClientSecret
-	}
-	result, err := runCreateAppFlow(opts.Ctx, f, app.Brand, authMethod, msg, restoreAppID)
-	if err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	if result == nil {
-		return errs.NewInternalError(errs.SubtypeSDKError, "app restore returned no result")
-	}
-
-	// Safety: if the server did not honor app_id (e.g. not yet supported), it may
-	// have created a NEW app instead of restoring. Warn so the user is not silently
-	// switched to a different app id.
-	if result.AppID != restoreAppID {
-		fmt.Fprintf(f.IOStreams.ErrOut, "[lark-cli] [WARN] restore: server returned app %s, expected %s — it may have created a new app instead of restoring\n", result.AppID, restoreAppID)
-	}
-
-	// Write back to the profile we restored: an explicit --name, else the resolved
-	// app's own name. Empty name => legacy single-app replace.
-	saveProfile := opts.ProfileName
-	if saveProfile == "" {
-		saveProfile = app.Name
-	}
-	return persistAndProbeResult(opts, f, saveProfile, result)
-}
-
-// profileSuffix renders " (profile %q)" for error messages, or "" when unnamed.
-func profileSuffix(profileName string) string {
-	if profileName == "" {
-		return ""
-	}
-	return fmt.Sprintf(" (profile %q)", profileName)
+	return core.SaveMultiAppConfig(existing)
 }
 
 func configInitRun(opts *ConfigInitOptions) error {
 	f := opts.Factory
-	if opts.PrivateKeyJWT {
-		switch {
-		case opts.Restore:
-			return errs.NewValidationError(errs.SubtypeInvalidArgument,
-				"--private-key-jwt cannot be combined with --restore; restore preserves the stored auth method").
-				WithParam("--private-key-jwt")
-		case opts.AppID != "":
-			return errs.NewValidationError(errs.SubtypeInvalidArgument,
-				"--private-key-jwt cannot be combined with --app-id; use --new to register a private_key_jwt app").
-				WithParam("--private-key-jwt")
-		case opts.AppSecretStdin:
-			return errs.NewValidationError(errs.SubtypeInvalidArgument,
-				"--private-key-jwt cannot be combined with --app-secret-stdin; private_key_jwt does not use an app secret").
-				WithParam("--private-key-jwt")
-		}
-	}
+
 	// Read secret from stdin if --app-secret-stdin is set
 	if opts.AppSecretStdin {
 		scanner := bufio.NewScanner(f.IOStreams.In)
@@ -520,26 +335,6 @@ func configInitRun(opts *ConfigInitOptions) error {
 		}
 	}
 
-	// --restore recovers an existing app; it is incompatible with creating a new
-	// app (--new) or importing one non-interactively (--app-id / stdin secret).
-	if opts.Restore {
-		if opts.New {
-			return errs.NewValidationError(errs.SubtypeInvalidArgument, "--restore cannot be combined with --new").WithParam("--restore")
-		}
-		if opts.AppID != "" || opts.AppSecretStdin {
-			return errs.NewValidationError(errs.SubtypeInvalidArgument, "--restore cannot be combined with --app-id / --app-secret-stdin").WithParam("--restore")
-		}
-	}
-
-	// A user who explicitly asks for private_key_jwt needs immediate feedback
-	// before any interactive prompt. Otherwise unsupported machines enter the
-	// TUI and fail only after the user chooses a create flow.
-	if opts.PrivateKeyJWT && !opts.New && !opts.Restore {
-		if _, err := resolveRegisterAuthMethod(opts.Ctx, f, core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT); err != nil {
-			return err
-		}
-	}
-
 	// Mode 1: Non-interactive
 	if opts.AppID != "" && opts.appSecret != "" {
 		brand := parseBrand(opts.Brand)
@@ -547,7 +342,7 @@ func configInitRun(opts *ConfigInitOptions) error {
 		if err != nil {
 			return errs.NewInternalError(errs.SubtypeSDKError, "%v", err).WithCause(err)
 		}
-		if err := saveInitConfig(opts.ProfileName, existing, f, opts.AppID, secret, brand, opts.Lang, "", nil); err != nil {
+		if err := saveInitConfig(opts.ProfileName, existing, f, opts.AppID, secret, brand, opts.Lang); err != nil {
 			return wrapSaveConfigError(err)
 		}
 		output.PrintSuccess(f.IOStreams.ErrOut, fmt.Sprintf("Configuration saved to %s", core.GetConfigPath()))
@@ -573,26 +368,34 @@ func configInitRun(opts *ConfigInitOptions) error {
 
 	msg := getInitMsg(opts.UILang)
 
-	// Mode: Restore (--restore) — re-register the app already in config.
-	if opts.Restore {
-		return runRestoreFlow(opts, existing, f, msg)
-	}
-
 	// Mode 3: Create new app directly (--new)
 	if opts.New {
-		result, err := runCreateAppFlow(opts.Ctx, f, parseBrand(opts.Brand), requestedInitAuthMethod(opts), msg, "")
+		result, err := runCreateAppFlow(opts.Ctx, f, parseBrand(opts.Brand), msg)
 		if err != nil {
 			return err
 		}
 		if result == nil {
 			return errs.NewInternalError(errs.SubtypeSDKError, "app creation returned no result")
 		}
-		return persistAndProbeResult(opts, f, opts.ProfileName, result)
+		existing, _ := core.LoadMultiAppConfig()
+		secret, err := core.ForStorage(result.AppID, core.PlainSecret(result.AppSecret), f.Keychain)
+		if err != nil {
+			return errs.NewInternalError(errs.SubtypeSDKError, "%v", err).WithCause(err)
+		}
+		if err := saveInitConfig(opts.ProfileName, existing, f, result.AppID, secret, result.Brand, opts.Lang); err != nil {
+			return wrapSaveConfigError(err)
+		}
+		printLangPreferenceConfirmation(opts)
+		output.PrintJson(f.IOStreams.Out, map[string]interface{}{"appId": result.AppID, "appSecret": "****", "brand": result.Brand})
+		if err := runProbe(opts.Ctx, f, result.AppID, result.AppSecret, result.Brand); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		return nil
 	}
 
 	// Mode 4: Interactive TUI (terminal)
 	if !opts.hasAnyNonInteractiveFlag() && f.IOStreams.IsTerminal {
-		result, err := runInteractiveConfigInit(opts.Ctx, f, requestedInitAuthMethod(opts), msg)
+		result, err := runInteractiveConfigInit(opts.Ctx, f, msg)
 		if err != nil {
 			return err
 		}
@@ -601,21 +404,35 @@ func configInitRun(opts *ConfigInitOptions) error {
 				WithParam("--app-id")
 		}
 
-		if err := persistInitResult(opts, f, opts.ProfileName, result); err != nil {
-			return err
-		}
-		if result.AuthMethod == core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT {
-			if err := probeInitResult(opts, f, result); err != nil {
+		existing, _ := core.LoadMultiAppConfig()
+
+		if result.AppSecret != "" {
+			// New secret provided (either from "create" or "existing" with input)
+			secret, err := core.ForStorage(result.AppID, core.PlainSecret(result.AppSecret), f.Keychain)
+			if err != nil {
+				return errs.NewInternalError(errs.SubtypeSDKError, "%v", err).WithCause(err)
+			}
+			if err := saveInitConfig(opts.ProfileName, existing, f, result.AppID, secret, result.Brand, opts.Lang); err != nil {
+				return wrapSaveConfigError(err)
+			}
+		} else if result.Mode == "existing" && result.AppID != "" {
+			// Existing app with unchanged secret — update app ID and brand only
+			if err := wrapUpdateExistingProfileErr(updateExistingProfileWithoutSecret(existing, opts.ProfileName, result.AppID, result.Brand, opts.Lang)); err != nil {
 				return err
 			}
+		} else {
+			return errs.NewValidationError(errs.SubtypeInvalidArgument, "App ID and App Secret cannot be empty").
+				WithParam("--app-id")
 		}
 
 		if result.Mode == "existing" {
 			output.PrintSuccess(f.IOStreams.ErrOut, fmt.Sprintf(msg.ConfigSaved, result.AppID))
 		}
 		printLangPreferenceConfirmation(opts)
-		if result.AuthMethod != core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT {
-			return probeInitResult(opts, f, result)
+		if result.AppSecret != "" {
+			if err := runProbe(opts.Ctx, f, result.AppID, result.AppSecret, result.Brand); err != nil {
+				return err
+			}
 		}
 		return nil
 	}
@@ -700,7 +517,7 @@ func configInitRun(opts *ConfigInitOptions) error {
 	if err != nil {
 		return errs.NewInternalError(errs.SubtypeSDKError, "%v", err).WithCause(err)
 	}
-	if err := saveInitConfig(opts.ProfileName, existing, f, resolvedAppId, storedSecret, parseBrand(resolvedBrand), opts.Lang, "", nil); err != nil {
+	if err := saveInitConfig(opts.ProfileName, existing, f, resolvedAppId, storedSecret, parseBrand(resolvedBrand), opts.Lang); err != nil {
 		return wrapSaveConfigError(err)
 	}
 	output.PrintSuccess(f.IOStreams.ErrOut, fmt.Sprintf("Configuration saved to %s", core.GetConfigPath()))

cmd/config/init_auth_method_test.go

@@ -1,306 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
-
-package config
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"crypto"
-	"errors"
-	"strings"
-	"testing"
-
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/errs"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/cmdutil"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/keysigner"
-)
-
-type authMethodTestSigner struct {
-	info     keysigner.HardwareInfo
-	probeErr error
-}
-
-func (authMethodTestSigner) EnsureKey(context.Context, keysigner.KeyRef) (crypto.PublicKey, error) {
-	return nil, nil
-}
-
-func (authMethodTestSigner) PublicKey(context.Context, keysigner.KeyRef) (crypto.PublicKey, error) {
-	return nil, nil
-}
-
-func (authMethodTestSigner) Sign(context.Context, keysigner.KeyRef, []byte) ([]byte, string, error) {
-	return nil, "", nil
-}
-
-func (s authMethodTestSigner) ProbeHardware(context.Context) (keysigner.HardwareInfo, error) {
-	return s.info, s.probeErr
-}
-
-// TestResolveRegisterAuthMethod covers the non-interactive gating paths. The
-// darwin keychain signer is compiled into every build, so the test cannot rely
-// on the binary lacking a signer — it forces a known no-signer state for the
-// rejection cases, then registers a stub for the success case.
-func TestResolveRegisterAuthMethod(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
-	f := &cmdutil.Factory{}
-	ctx := context.Background()
-
-	prevSigner := keysigner.Active()
-	t.Cleanup(func() { keysigner.Register(prevSigner) })
-	keysigner.Register(nil)
-
-	if m, err := resolveRegisterAuthMethod(ctx, f, core.AuthMethodClientSecret); err != nil || m != core.AuthMethodClientSecret {
-		t.Errorf("client_secret: got (%q, %v), want (client_secret, nil)", m, err)
-	}
-
-	if m, err := resolveRegisterAuthMethod(ctx, f, ""); err != nil || m != core.AuthMethodClientSecret {
-		t.Errorf("default: got (%q, %v), want (client_secret, nil)", m, err)
-	}
-
-	if _, err := resolveRegisterAuthMethod(ctx, f, "bogus"); err == nil {
-		t.Error("bogus auth-method: expected error")
-	}
-
-	if _, err := resolveRegisterAuthMethod(ctx, f, core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT); err == nil {
-		t.Error("private_key_jwt without a signer: expected error")
-	}
-
-	keysigner.Register(authMethodTestSigner{info: keysigner.HardwareInfo{Backend: "tpm2", Available: true}})
-
-	if m, err := resolveRegisterAuthMethod(ctx, f, core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT); err != nil || m != core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT {
-		t.Errorf("private_key_jwt with signer: got (%q, %v), want (private_key_jwt, nil)", m, err)
-	}
-
-	f.IOStreams = &cmdutil.IOStreams{IsTerminal: true}
-	if m, err := resolveRegisterAuthMethod(ctx, f, ""); err != nil || m != core.AuthMethodClientSecret {
-		t.Errorf("default with terminal signer: got (%q, %v), want (client_secret, nil)", m, err)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestConfigInitRunRejectsPrivateKeyJWTIncompatibleModes(t *testing.T) {
-	tests := []struct {
-		name       string
-		configure  func(*ConfigInitOptions, *cmdutil.Factory)
-		wantTarget string
-	}{
-		{
-			name: "app id import",
-			configure: func(opts *ConfigInitOptions, _ *cmdutil.Factory) {
-				opts.AppID = "cli_test"
-			},
-			wantTarget: "--app-id",
-		},
-		{
-			name: "app secret stdin import",
-			configure: func(opts *ConfigInitOptions, f *cmdutil.Factory) {
-				opts.AppSecretStdin = true
-				f.IOStreams.In = strings.NewReader("secret\n")
-			},
-			wantTarget: "--app-secret-stdin",
-		},
-		{
-			name: "restore",
-			configure: func(opts *ConfigInitOptions, _ *cmdutil.Factory) {
-				opts.Restore = true
-			},
-			wantTarget: "--restore",
-		},
-	}
-
-	for _, tc := range tests {
-		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
-			f, _, _, _ := cmdutil.TestFactory(t, nil)
-			opts := &ConfigInitOptions{
-				Factory:       f,
-				Ctx:           context.Background(),
-				PrivateKeyJWT: true,
-			}
-			tc.configure(opts, f)
-
-			err := configInitRun(opts)
-			if err == nil {
-				t.Fatal("expected incompatible mode error")
-			}
-			problem, ok := errs.ProblemOf(err)
-			if !ok {
-				t.Fatalf("error is not typed: %T %[1]v", err)
-			}
-			if problem.Category != errs.CategoryValidation || problem.Subtype != errs.SubtypeInvalidArgument {
-				t.Fatalf("problem = %s/%s, want validation/invalid_argument", problem.Category, problem.Subtype)
-			}
-			var validationErr *errs.ValidationError
-			if !errors.As(err, &validationErr) {
-				t.Fatalf("error = %T, want *errs.ValidationError", err)
-			}
-			if validationErr.Param != "--private-key-jwt" {
-				t.Fatalf("param = %q, want --private-key-jwt", validationErr.Param)
-			}
-			if !strings.Contains(problem.Message, tc.wantTarget) {
-				t.Fatalf("message = %q, want %s", problem.Message, tc.wantTarget)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-func TestResolveRegisterAuthMethod_PrivateKeyJWTRejectsUnavailableHardware(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
-	prevSigner := keysigner.Active()
-	t.Cleanup(func() { keysigner.Register(prevSigner) })
-	keysigner.Register(authMethodTestSigner{info: keysigner.HardwareInfo{
-		Backend: "tpm2",
-		Reason:  "open /dev/tpmrm0: permission denied",
-	}})
-
-	_, err := resolveRegisterAuthMethod(context.Background(), &cmdutil.Factory{}, core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT)
-	if err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("private_key_jwt with unavailable signer hardware: expected error")
-	}
-	problem, ok := errs.ProblemOf(err)
-	if !ok {
-		t.Fatalf("error is not typed: %T %[1]v", err)
-	}
-	if problem.Category != errs.CategoryConfig || problem.Subtype != errs.SubtypeInvalidClient {
-		t.Fatalf("problem = %s/%s, want config/invalid_client", problem.Category, problem.Subtype)
-	}
-	wantMessage := "this machine does not support --private-key-jwt"
-	if problem.Message != wantMessage {
-		t.Fatalf("message = %q, want %q", problem.Message, wantMessage)
-	}
-	if strings.Contains(problem.Message, "sks") || strings.Contains(problem.Message, "/dev/tpm") || strings.Contains(problem.Message, "tpm") || strings.Contains(problem.Message, "TEE") || strings.Contains(problem.Message, "Keychain") {
-		t.Fatalf("message exposes backend detail: %q", problem.Message)
-	}
-	if !strings.Contains(problem.Hint, "omit --private-key-jwt") {
-		t.Fatalf("hint = %q, want guidance to omit --private-key-jwt", problem.Hint)
-	}
-	if strings.Contains(problem.Hint, "fix the local signer") {
-		t.Fatalf("hint exposes unnecessary signer recovery: %q", problem.Hint)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestResolveRegisterAuthMethod_PrivateKeyJWTRejectsProbeError(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
-	probeErr := errors.New("probe exploded")
-	prevSigner := keysigner.Active()
-	t.Cleanup(func() { keysigner.Register(prevSigner) })
-	keysigner.Register(authMethodTestSigner{
-		info:     keysigner.HardwareInfo{Backend: "keychain"},
-		probeErr: probeErr,
-	})
-
-	_, err := resolveRegisterAuthMethod(context.Background(), &cmdutil.Factory{}, core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT)
-	if err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("private_key_jwt with probe error: expected error")
-	}
-	if !errors.Is(err, probeErr) {
-		t.Fatalf("error does not preserve probe cause: %v", err)
-	}
-	problem, ok := errs.ProblemOf(err)
-	if !ok {
-		t.Fatalf("error is not typed: %T %[1]v", err)
-	}
-	if problem.Category != errs.CategoryConfig || problem.Subtype != errs.SubtypeInvalidClient {
-		t.Fatalf("problem = %s/%s, want config/invalid_client", problem.Category, problem.Subtype)
-	}
-	wantMessage := "this machine does not support --private-key-jwt"
-	if problem.Message != wantMessage {
-		t.Fatalf("message = %q, want %q", problem.Message, wantMessage)
-	}
-	if strings.Contains(problem.Message, "probe") || strings.Contains(problem.Message, "keychain signer") {
-		t.Fatalf("message exposes probe detail: %q", problem.Message)
-	}
-	if !strings.Contains(problem.Hint, "omit --private-key-jwt") {
-		t.Fatalf("hint = %q, want guidance to omit --private-key-jwt", problem.Hint)
-	}
-	if strings.Contains(problem.Hint, "fix the local signer") {
-		t.Fatalf("hint exposes unnecessary signer recovery: %q", problem.Hint)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestConfigInitRun_PrivateKeyJWTRejectsBeforeInteractiveMode(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
-	prevSigner := keysigner.Active()
-	t.Cleanup(func() { keysigner.Register(prevSigner) })
-	keysigner.Register(authMethodTestSigner{info: keysigner.HardwareInfo{
-		Backend: "tpm2",
-		Reason:  "not available",
-	}})
-
-	f, _, _, _ := cmdutil.TestFactory(t, nil)
-	f.IOStreams.IsTerminal = true
-	opts := &ConfigInitOptions{
-		Factory:       f,
-		Ctx:           context.Background(),
-		PrivateKeyJWT: true,
-		Lang:          "zh_cn",
-		UILang:        "zh_cn",
-	}
-
-	err := configInitRun(opts)
-	if err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("config init --private-key-jwt on unsupported machine: expected error before interactive mode")
-	}
-	problem, ok := errs.ProblemOf(err)
-	if !ok {
-		t.Fatalf("error is not typed: %T %[1]v", err)
-	}
-	if problem.Category != errs.CategoryConfig || problem.Subtype != errs.SubtypeInvalidClient {
-		t.Fatalf("problem = %s/%s, want config/invalid_client", problem.Category, problem.Subtype)
-	}
-	if problem.Message != "this machine does not support --private-key-jwt" {
-		t.Fatalf("message = %q", problem.Message)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestExistingAppRequiresSecret(t *testing.T) {
-	if !existingAppRequiresSecret(core.AuthMethodClientSecret) {
-		t.Error("client_secret existing app should require App Secret")
-	}
-	if existingAppRequiresSecret("") != true {
-		t.Error("default existing app should require App Secret")
-	}
-	if existingAppRequiresSecret(core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT) {
-		t.Error("private_key_jwt existing app should not require App Secret")
-	}
-}
-
-// TestValidatePKJWTKeyBinding covers the guard that rejects a registration
-// resolving to private_key_jwt with no signing key bound (e.g. an existing
-// secret-based app was selected on the confirm page).
-func TestValidatePKJWTKeyBinding(t *testing.T) {
-	if err := validatePKJWTKeyBinding(core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT, ""); err == nil {
-		t.Error("pkjwt with empty keyLabel: expected error")
-	}
-	if err := validatePKJWTKeyBinding(core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT, "agent-key"); err != nil {
-		t.Errorf("pkjwt with keyLabel: expected nil, got %v", err)
-	}
-	if err := validatePKJWTKeyBinding(core.AuthMethodClientSecret, ""); err != nil {
-		t.Errorf("client_secret: expected nil, got %v", err)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestResolveFinalAuthMethod locks the authoritative-method logic. The 2nd case
-// is the real bug: we requested private_key_jwt but the server resolved to an
-// existing client_secret app — we must persist client_secret, not pkjwt.
-func TestResolveFinalAuthMethod(t *testing.T) {
-	if m := resolveFinalAuthMethod([]string{"client_secret", "private_key_jwt"}, core.AuthMethodClientSecret); m != core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT {
-		t.Errorf("prefers private_key_jwt: got %q", m)
-	}
-	if m := resolveFinalAuthMethod([]string{"client_secret"}, core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT); m != core.AuthMethodClientSecret {
-		t.Errorf("server client_secret must override requested pkjwt: got %q", m)
-	}
-	if m := resolveFinalAuthMethod(nil, core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT); m != core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT {
-		t.Errorf("fallback to requested when server is silent: got %q", m)
-	}
-	// Explicit empty slice (not just nil) also falls back to requested — the same
-	// len()==0 back-compat allowance the init guard relies on to let private_key_jwt
-	// proceed against an older server (see internal/auth
-	// TestRequestAppRegistrationInit_EmptySupportedAuthMethods).
-	if m := resolveFinalAuthMethod([]string{}, core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT); m != core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT {
-		t.Errorf("empty []string should fall back to requested private_key_jwt: got %q", m)
-	}
-	if m := resolveFinalAuthMethod(nil, ""); m != core.AuthMethodClientSecret {
-		t.Errorf("default to client_secret: got %q", m)
-	}
-}

cmd/config/init_interactive.go

@@ -8,9 +8,6 @@ import (
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"net"
-	"slices"
-	"strings"
-	"time"
 
 	"github.com/charmbracelet/huh"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/build"
@@ -18,26 +15,22 @@ import (
 
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/errs"
 	larkauth "github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/auth"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/auth/jwt"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/cmdutil"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/keysigner"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/output"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/transport"
 )
 
 // configInitResult holds the result of the interactive config init flow.
 type configInitResult struct {
-	Mode       string // "create" or "existing"
-	Brand      core.LarkBrand
-	AppID      string
-	AppSecret  string
-	AuthMethod string // "" == client_secret; core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT
-	KeyLabel   string // TEE key handle when AuthMethod == private_key_jwt
+	Mode      string // "create" or "existing"
+	Brand     core.LarkBrand
+	AppID     string
+	AppSecret string
 }
 
 // runInteractiveConfigInit shows an interactive TUI for config init.
-func runInteractiveConfigInit(ctx context.Context, f *cmdutil.Factory, authMethodFlag string, msg *initMsg) (*configInitResult, error) {
+func runInteractiveConfigInit(ctx context.Context, f *cmdutil.Factory, msg *initMsg) (*configInitResult, error) {
 	// Phase 1: Choose mode
 	var mode string
 	form1 := huh.NewForm(
@@ -60,18 +53,14 @@ func runInteractiveConfigInit(ctx context.Context, f *cmdutil.Factory, authMetho
 	}
 
 	if mode == "existing" {
-		return runExistingAppForm(ctx, f, authMethodFlag, msg)
+		return runExistingAppForm(f, msg)
 	}
 
-	return runCreateAppFlow(ctx, f, "", authMethodFlag, msg, "")
-}
-
-func existingAppRequiresSecret(requestedAuthMethod string) bool {
-	return requestedAuthMethod != core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT
+	return runCreateAppFlow(ctx, f, "", msg)
 }
 
 // runExistingAppForm shows a huh form for manually entering App ID / App Secret / Brand.
-func runExistingAppForm(ctx context.Context, f *cmdutil.Factory, requestedAuthMethod string, msg *initMsg) (*configInitResult, error) {
+func runExistingAppForm(f *cmdutil.Factory, msg *initMsg) (*configInitResult, error) {
 	// Load existing config for defaults
 	existing, _ := core.LoadMultiAppConfig()
 	var firstApp *core.AppConfig
@@ -105,31 +94,19 @@ func runExistingAppForm(ctx context.Context, f *cmdutil.Factory, requestedAuthMe
 		brand = string(firstApp.Brand)
 	}
 
-	brandSelect := huh.NewSelect[string]().
-		Title(msg.Platform).
-		Options(
-			huh.NewOption(msg.Feishu, "feishu"),
-			huh.NewOption("Lark", "lark"),
-		).
-		Value(&brand)
-
-	var form *huh.Form
-	if existingAppRequiresSecret(requestedAuthMethod) {
-		form = huh.NewForm(
-			huh.NewGroup(
-				appIDInput,
-				appSecretInput,
-				brandSelect,
-			),
-		).WithTheme(cmdutil.ThemeFeishu())
-	} else {
-		form = huh.NewForm(
-			huh.NewGroup(
-				appIDInput,
-				brandSelect,
-			),
-		).WithTheme(cmdutil.ThemeFeishu())
-	}
+	form := huh.NewForm(
+		huh.NewGroup(
+			appIDInput,
+			appSecretInput,
+			huh.NewSelect[string]().
+				Title(msg.Platform).
+				Options(
+					huh.NewOption(msg.Feishu, "feishu"),
+					huh.NewOption("Lark", "lark"),
+				).
+				Value(&brand),
+		),
+	).WithTheme(cmdutil.ThemeFeishu())
 
 	if err := form.Run(); err != nil {
 		if err == huh.ErrUserAborted {
@@ -142,13 +119,6 @@ func runExistingAppForm(ctx context.Context, f *cmdutil.Factory, requestedAuthMe
 	if appID == "" && firstApp != nil {
 		appID = firstApp.AppId
 	}
-	if !existingAppRequiresSecret(requestedAuthMethod) {
-		if appID == "" {
-			return nil, errs.NewValidationError(errs.SubtypeInvalidArgument, "App ID cannot be empty").
-				WithParam("--app-id")
-		}
-		return runCreateAppFlow(ctx, f, parseBrand(brand), core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT, msg, appID)
-	}
 	if appSecret == "" && firstApp != nil && !firstApp.AppSecret.IsZero() {
 		// Keep existing secret - caller will handle
 		return &configInitResult{
@@ -178,49 +148,9 @@ func runExistingAppForm(ctx context.Context, f *cmdutil.Factory, requestedAuthMe
 	}, nil
 }
 
-// resolveRegisterAuthMethod decides the auth method for a new-app registration.
-// An explicit private_key_jwt request wins; otherwise the default is
-// client_secret with no extra prompt.
-func resolveRegisterAuthMethod(ctx context.Context, _ *cmdutil.Factory, requested string) (string, error) {
-	const pkjwtUnsupportedMessage = "this machine does not support --private-key-jwt"
-
-	switch requested {
-	case core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT:
-		info, ok, err := keysigner.ProbeActiveHardware(ctx)
-		if !ok {
-			return "", errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeInvalidClient,
-				pkjwtUnsupportedMessage).
-				WithHint("omit --private-key-jwt to register with an app secret")
-		}
-		if err != nil {
-			return "", errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeInvalidClient,
-				pkjwtUnsupportedMessage).
-				WithCause(err).
-				WithHint("omit --private-key-jwt to register with an app secret")
-		}
-		if !info.Available {
-			return "", errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeInvalidClient,
-				pkjwtUnsupportedMessage).
-				WithHint("omit --private-key-jwt to register with an app secret")
-		}
-		return core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT, nil
-	case core.AuthMethodClientSecret:
-		return core.AuthMethodClientSecret, nil
-	case "":
-		return core.AuthMethodClientSecret, nil
-	default:
-		return "", errs.NewValidationError(errs.SubtypeInvalidArgument,
-			"unknown auth method %q (use client_secret or private_key_jwt)", requested)
-	}
-}
-
 // runCreateAppFlow runs the "create new app" flow via OpenClaw device flow.
 // If brandOverride is non-empty, skip the interactive brand selection.
-// requestedAuthMethod is the requested auth method; empty means client_secret.
-// restoreAppID, when non-empty, is sent on the registration begin request so the
-// server re-registers that existing app (credential recovery) instead of creating
-// a new one. Empty preserves the normal new-app flow.
-func runCreateAppFlow(ctx context.Context, f *cmdutil.Factory, brandOverride core.LarkBrand, requestedAuthMethod string, msg *initMsg, restoreAppID string) (*configInitResult, error) {
+func runCreateAppFlow(ctx context.Context, f *cmdutil.Factory, brandOverride core.LarkBrand, msg *initMsg) (*configInitResult, error) {
 	var larkBrand core.LarkBrand
 	if brandOverride != "" {
 		larkBrand = brandOverride
@@ -248,57 +178,17 @@ func runCreateAppFlow(ctx context.Context, f *cmdutil.Factory, brandOverride cor
 		larkBrand = parseBrand(brand)
 	}
 
-	authMethod, err := resolveRegisterAuthMethod(ctx, f, requestedAuthMethod)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-
-	// Step 1: Request app registration (begin).
-	// Use the shared proxy-plugin-aware transport so registration traffic is not
-	// a bypass of proxy plugin mode.
+	// Step 1: Request app registration (begin)
+	// Registration is platform traffic, so it must use the provider-aware
+	// transport as well as the shared proxy configuration.
 	httpClient := transport.NewHTTPClient(0)
-
-	// For private_key_jwt: init to obtain a nonce, then sign a TEE attestation
-	// (carrying the public key in its jwk header) to send with begin.
-	beginOpts := larkauth.AppRegistrationBeginOptions{}
-	keyLabel := ""
-	if authMethod == core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT {
-		initResp, initErr := larkauth.RequestAppRegistrationInit(ctx, httpClient)
-		if initErr != nil {
-			return nil, errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeInvalidClient, "app registration init failed: %v", initErr).WithCause(initErr)
-		}
-		// An empty SupportedAuthMethods is intentionally treated as "older server /
-		// unknown": len()==0 makes this guard false, so the requested
-		// private_key_jwt proceeds. This mirrors resolveFinalAuthMethod's
-		// back-compat fallback to the requested method. Only an explicit list that
-		// omits private_key_jwt rejects here.
-		if len(initResp.SupportedAuthMethods) > 0 && !slices.Contains(initResp.SupportedAuthMethods, core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT) {
-			return nil, errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeInvalidClient,
-				"server does not support private_key_jwt for this app type (supported: %s)", strings.Join(initResp.SupportedAuthMethods, ", ")).
-				WithHint("omit --private-key-jwt to register with an app secret instead")
-		}
-		keyLabel = keysigner.DefaultKeyLabel
-		signer := keysigner.Active() // non-nil, guaranteed by resolveRegisterAuthMethod
-		attestation, signErr := jwt.SignAttestation(ctx, signer, keysigner.KeyRef{Label: keyLabel}, initResp.Nonce, time.Now())
-		if signErr != nil {
-			return nil, errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeInvalidClient, "failed to sign registration attestation: %v", signErr).WithCause(signErr)
-		}
-		beginOpts = larkauth.AppRegistrationBeginOptions{
-			AuthMethod:      core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT,
-			AuthAttestation: attestation,
-		}
-	}
-
-	// Restore flow: re-register the existing app instead of creating a new one.
-	beginOpts.RestoreAppID = restoreAppID
-
-	authResp, err := larkauth.RequestAppRegistration(ctx, httpClient, larkBrand, beginOpts, f.IOStreams.ErrOut)
+	authResp, err := larkauth.RequestAppRegistration(ctx, httpClient, larkBrand, f.IOStreams.ErrOut)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, classifyRegistrationBeginError(err)
 	}
 
 	// Step 2: Build and display verification URL + QR code
-	verificationURL := larkauth.BuildVerificationURL(authResp.VerificationUriComplete, build.Version, restoreAppID)
+	verificationURL := larkauth.BuildVerificationURL(authResp.VerificationUriComplete, build.Version)
 
 	// Branch on TTY: human-friendly copy in interactive terminals,
 	// preserve original copy for AI / non-interactive callers.
@@ -327,42 +217,18 @@ func runCreateAppFlow(ctx context.Context, f *cmdutil.Factory, brandOverride cor
 		return nil, classifyRegistrationError(err)
 	}
 
-	// The final auth method is decided by the user/admin at confirmation and
-	// returned by poll — NOT necessarily what we requested. Selecting an existing
-	// client_secret app, for example, yields client_secret even though we sent
-	// private_key_jwt. Trust the result so we persist the truth.
-	finalMethod := resolveFinalAuthMethod(result.AuthMethods, authMethod)
-
-	if result.ClientID == "" {
-		return nil, errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeInvalidClient, "app registration succeeded but missing app_id")
-	}
-	if finalMethod != core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT && result.ClientSecret == "" {
-		return nil, errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeInvalidClient, "app registration succeeded but missing client_secret")
+	if result.ClientID == "" || result.ClientSecret == "" {
+		return nil, errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeInvalidClient, "app registration succeeded but missing client_id or client_secret")
 	}
 
-	// Surface a downgrade: requested private_key_jwt but the app resolved to a
-	// secret-based method (e.g. an existing app was selected). The key was NOT
-	// bound, so we must store the secret method, not private_key_jwt.
-	if authMethod == core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT && finalMethod != core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT {
-		fmt.Fprintf(f.IOStreams.ErrOut, "[lark-cli] note: requested private_key_jwt, but the app uses %q (e.g. an existing app was selected); storing %q.\n", finalMethod, finalMethod)
-	}
 	fmt.Fprintln(f.IOStreams.ErrOut)
 	output.PrintSuccess(f.IOStreams.ErrOut, fmt.Sprintf(msg.AppCreated, result.ClientID))
 
-	keyToStore := ""
-	if finalMethod == core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT {
-		keyToStore = keyLabel
-	}
-	if err := validatePKJWTKeyBinding(finalMethod, keyToStore); err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
 	return &configInitResult{
-		Mode:       "create",
-		Brand:      finalBrand,
-		AppID:      result.ClientID,
-		AppSecret:  result.ClientSecret, // empty for private_key_jwt; real secret otherwise
-		AuthMethod: finalMethod,
-		KeyLabel:   keyToStore,
+		Mode:      "create",
+		Brand:     finalBrand,
+		AppID:     result.ClientID,
+		AppSecret: result.ClientSecret,
 	}, nil
 }
 
@@ -402,41 +268,3 @@ func classifyRegistrationError(err error) error {
 		return errs.NewAuthenticationError(errs.SubtypeUnknown, "app registration failed: %v", err).WithCause(err)
 	}
 }
-
-// validatePKJWTKeyBinding rejects a registration that resolved to
-// private_key_jwt without a signing key bound to it. keyLabel is non-empty only
-// when the local flow chose private_key_jwt and signed a TEE attestation; a
-// resolved method of private_key_jwt with no key handle would save an unusable
-// config (rejected later at config load, surfacing as "saved OK, fails on first
-// use"), so it is caught here at registration time instead.
-func validatePKJWTKeyBinding(finalMethod, keyLabel string) error {
-	if finalMethod == core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT && keyLabel == "" {
-		return errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeInvalidClient,
-			"registration resolved to private_key_jwt but no signing key was bound to this app (an existing secret-based app may have been selected)").
-			WithHint("re-register with: lark-cli config init --new --private-key-jwt")
-	}
-	return nil
-}
-
-// resolveFinalAuthMethod picks the authoritative method from the poll result,
-// preferring private_key_jwt, then client_secret. It falls back to the requested
-// method when the server returns nothing (older servers).
-func resolveFinalAuthMethod(serverMethods []string, requested string) string {
-	if len(serverMethods) == 0 {
-		if requested == "" {
-			return core.AuthMethodClientSecret
-		}
-		return requested
-	}
-	for _, m := range serverMethods {
-		if m == core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT {
-			return core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT
-		}
-	}
-	for _, m := range serverMethods {
-		if m == core.AuthMethodClientSecret {
-			return core.AuthMethodClientSecret
-		}
-	}
-	return serverMethods[0]
-}

cmd/config/init_probe.go

@@ -16,7 +16,6 @@ import (
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/cmdutil"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/credential"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/keysigner"
 )
 
 // probeTimeout is the total wall-clock budget for the credential probe step
@@ -91,35 +90,3 @@ func runProbe(parent context.Context, factory *cmdutil.Factory, appID, appSecret
 	_, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, resp.Body)
 	return nil
 }
-
-// runProbePKJWT does a best-effort key-binding validation after a private_key_jwt
-// config is saved: it signs a client_assertion with the local platform key and
-// mints a token. A typed error (a deterministic server rejection — e.g. the key
-// is not bound to this app) is propagated so `config init` exits non-zero with
-// the canonical envelope; untyped errors (transport / HTTP / parse / timeout)
-// are swallowed (return nil). The mint itself is the probe — no second call.
-func runProbePKJWT(parent context.Context, factory *cmdutil.Factory, brand core.LarkBrand, clientID string, signer keysigner.Signer, keyLabel string) error {
-	if factory == nil {
-		return nil
-	}
-	if signer == nil {
-		return nil
-	}
-	httpClient, err := factory.HttpClient()
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil
-	}
-
-	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(parent, probeTimeout)
-	defer cancel()
-
-	if _, err := credential.FetchTATWithAssertion(ctx, httpClient, brand, clientID, signer, keyLabel); err != nil {
-		// Typed = deterministic credential rejection → propagate. Untyped
-		// (transport / HTTP / parse / timeout) is ambiguous → stay silent.
-		if errs.IsTyped(err) {
-			return err
-		}
-		return nil
-	}
-	return nil
-}

cmd/config/init_probe_test.go

@@ -6,11 +6,6 @@ package config
 import (
 	"bytes"
 	"context"
-	"crypto"
-	"crypto/ecdsa"
-	"crypto/elliptic"
-	crand "crypto/rand"
-	"crypto/sha256"
 	"errors"
 	"io"
 	"net/http"
@@ -22,17 +17,14 @@ import (
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/build"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/cmdutil"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/keysigner"
 )
 
 // fakeRT routes requests to per-path handlers and records what it saw.
 type fakeRT struct {
 	tatHandler   func(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error)
 	probeHandler func(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error)
-	oauthHandler func(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error)
 	tatCalls     int
 	probeCalls   int
-	oauthCalls   int
 	probeReq     *http.Request
 	probeBody    string
 }
@@ -56,50 +48,10 @@ func (f *fakeRT) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
 			return jsonResp(200, `{"code":0,"data":{},"msg":"success"}`), nil
 		}
 		return f.probeHandler(req)
-	case strings.HasSuffix(req.URL.Path, "/authen/v2/oauth/token"):
-		f.oauthCalls++
-		if f.oauthHandler == nil {
-			return jsonResp(200, `{"access_token":"test-token"}`), nil
-		}
-		return f.oauthHandler(req)
 	}
 	return nil, errors.New("unexpected URL: " + req.URL.String())
 }
 
-// probeTestSigner is an in-memory real ECDSA P-256 signer used to sign the
-// client_assertion in runProbePKJWT tests (authMethodTestSigner returns a nil
-// key and cannot sign).
-type probeTestSigner struct{ key *ecdsa.PrivateKey }
-
-func newProbeTestSigner(t *testing.T) *probeTestSigner {
-	t.Helper()
-	k, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), crand.Reader)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	return &probeTestSigner{key: k}
-}
-
-func (p *probeTestSigner) EnsureKey(context.Context, keysigner.KeyRef) (crypto.PublicKey, error) {
-	return p.key.Public(), nil
-}
-
-func (p *probeTestSigner) PublicKey(context.Context, keysigner.KeyRef) (crypto.PublicKey, error) {
-	return p.key.Public(), nil
-}
-
-func (p *probeTestSigner) Sign(_ context.Context, _ keysigner.KeyRef, in []byte) ([]byte, string, error) {
-	h := sha256.Sum256(in)
-	r, s, err := ecdsa.Sign(crand.Reader, p.key, h[:])
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, "", err
-	}
-	sig := make([]byte, 64)
-	r.FillBytes(sig[:32])
-	s.FillBytes(sig[32:])
-	return sig, keysigner.AlgES256, nil
-}
-
 func jsonResp(code int, body string) *http.Response {
 	return &http.Response{
 		StatusCode: code,
@@ -256,12 +208,10 @@ func TestRunProbe_TATSuccess_ProbeFails_Silent(t *testing.T) {
 	assertSilent(t, err, errBuf)
 }
 
-func TestProbeInitResult_ClientSecret(t *testing.T) {
+func TestRunProbe_TATSuccess_ProbeOK_Silent(t *testing.T) {
 	rt := &fakeRT{}
 	f, errBuf := fakeFactory(t, rt)
-	opts := &ConfigInitOptions{Ctx: context.Background()}
-	result := &configInitResult{AppID: "cli_x", AppSecret: "test-secret", Brand: core.BrandFeishu}
-	err := probeInitResult(opts, f, result)
+	err := runProbe(context.Background(), f, "cli_x", "secret_y", core.BrandFeishu)
 	if rt.tatCalls != 1 || rt.probeCalls != 1 {
 		t.Errorf("expected 1/1 calls, got tat=%d probe=%d", rt.tatCalls, rt.probeCalls)
 	}
@@ -335,47 +285,3 @@ func TestRunProbe_TimeoutHonored(t *testing.T) {
 	// must stay silent and not block.
 	assertSilent(t, err, errBuf)
 }
-
-// runProbePKJWT: a deterministic server rejection (invalid_client) is propagated
-// as a typed ConfigError so config init exits non-zero.
-func TestRunProbePKJWT_DeterministicReject_Propagates(t *testing.T) {
-	rt := &fakeRT{oauthHandler: func(*http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
-		return jsonResp(401, `{"error":"invalid_client","error_description":"unknown key"}`), nil
-	}}
-	f, errBuf := fakeFactory(t, rt)
-	err := runProbePKJWT(context.Background(), f, core.BrandFeishu, "cli_x", newProbeTestSigner(t), "agent-key")
-	if err == nil || !errs.IsTyped(err) {
-		t.Fatalf("expected propagated typed error, got %T %v", err, err)
-	}
-	if errBuf.Len() != 0 {
-		t.Errorf("runProbePKJWT must not write stderr, got %q", errBuf.String())
-	}
-}
-
-// runProbePKJWT: ambiguous upstream noise (HTTP 503) is swallowed — silent, exit 0.
-func TestRunProbePKJWT_Ambiguous_Silent(t *testing.T) {
-	rt := &fakeRT{oauthHandler: func(*http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
-		return jsonResp(503, `unavailable`), nil
-	}}
-	f, errBuf := fakeFactory(t, rt)
-	assertSilent(t, runProbePKJWT(context.Background(), f, core.BrandFeishu, "cli_x", newProbeTestSigner(t), "agent-key"), errBuf)
-}
-
-// probeInitResult dispatches private_key_jwt to the assertion-backed probe.
-func TestProbeInitResult_PrivateKeyJWT(t *testing.T) {
-	rt := &fakeRT{} // default oauth handler returns 200 + access_token
-	f, errBuf := fakeFactory(t, rt)
-	previous := keysigner.Active()
-	keysigner.Register(newProbeTestSigner(t))
-	t.Cleanup(func() { keysigner.Register(previous) })
-	opts := &ConfigInitOptions{Ctx: context.Background()}
-	result := &configInitResult{AppID: "cli_x", AuthMethod: core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT, KeyLabel: "agent-key", Brand: core.BrandFeishu}
-	assertSilent(t, probeInitResult(opts, f, result), errBuf)
-}
-
-// runProbePKJWT: a nil signer is a defensive no-op (should not be reached, must
-// not panic).
-func TestRunProbePKJWT_NilSigner_Silent(t *testing.T) {
-	f, errBuf := fakeFactory(t, &fakeRT{})
-	assertSilent(t, runProbePKJWT(context.Background(), f, core.BrandFeishu, "cli_x", nil, "k"), errBuf)
-}

cmd/config/init_test.go

@@ -10,25 +10,9 @@ import (
 
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/errs"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/keychain"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/output"
 )
 
-// TestRunRestoreFlow_NothingToRestore covers the early guards that return before
-// any network/registration call: no config at all, and a config whose resolved
-// app has no app id (nothing to send on begin).
-func TestRunRestoreFlow_NothingToRestore(t *testing.T) {
-	// No config on disk.
-	if err := runRestoreFlow(&ConfigInitOptions{}, nil, nil, nil); err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("expected error when there is no config to restore")
-	}
-	// Config present but the resolved app has no app id.
-	existing := &core.MultiAppConfig{Apps: []core.AppConfig{{AppId: ""}}}
-	if err := runRestoreFlow(&ConfigInitOptions{}, existing, nil, nil); err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("expected error when the resolved app has no app id")
-	}
-}
-
 // updateExistingProfileWithoutSecret guards four blank-input scenarios. Each
 // must surface as *ValidationError(SubtypeInvalidArgument) per RFC 6749 §5.2:
 // SubtypeInvalidClient is reserved for IAM rejection of malformed credentials,
@@ -135,58 +119,3 @@ func assertValidationParam(t *testing.T, err error, wantParam string) {
 		t.Errorf("Param = %q, want %q", valErr.Param, wantParam)
 	}
 }
-
-// countingKeychain is an in-memory KeychainAccess that records whether Remove
-// was invoked, so the stale-secret cleanup can be asserted without a real OS
-// keychain.
-type countingKeychain struct {
-	store        map[string]string
-	removeCalled bool
-}
-
-func newCountingKeychain() *countingKeychain {
-	return &countingKeychain{store: map[string]string{}}
-}
-
-func (k *countingKeychain) Get(service, account string) (string, error) {
-	v, ok := k.store[service+"/"+account]
-	if !ok {
-		return "", keychain.ErrNotFound
-	}
-	return v, nil
-}
-
-func (k *countingKeychain) Set(service, account, value string) error {
-	k.store[service+"/"+account] = value
-	return nil
-}
-
-func (k *countingKeychain) Remove(service, account string) error {
-	k.removeCalled = true
-	delete(k.store, service+"/"+account)
-	return nil
-}
-
-func TestRemoveStaleSecretForPKJWT_SameAppID(t *testing.T) {
-	kc := newCountingKeychain()
-	ref, err := core.ForStorage("cli_same", core.PlainSecret("old-secret"), kc) // → Source:"keychain"
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	existing := &core.MultiAppConfig{Apps: []core.AppConfig{{AppId: "cli_same", AppSecret: ref}}}
-	removeStaleSecretForPKJWT(existing, "", "cli_same", kc)
-	if !kc.removeCalled {
-		t.Error("same appId with keychain secret: expected kc.Remove to be invoked")
-	}
-}
-
-func TestRemoveStaleSecretForPKJWT_DifferentAppID(t *testing.T) {
-	kc := newCountingKeychain()
-	ref, _ := core.ForStorage("cli_old", core.PlainSecret("old-secret"), kc)
-	kc.removeCalled = false // ForStorage does not call Remove, but reset to be safe
-	existing := &core.MultiAppConfig{Apps: []core.AppConfig{{AppId: "cli_old", AppSecret: ref}}}
-	removeStaleSecretForPKJWT(existing, "", "cli_new", kc)
-	if kc.removeCalled {
-		t.Error("different appId: must NOT remove")
-	}
-}

cmd/config/keyless_bind.go

@@ -1,86 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
-
-package config
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"net/http"
-	"strings"
-	"time"
-
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/errs"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/credential"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/keylessprovider"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/keysigner"
-)
-
-const keylessBindProbeTimeout = 12 * time.Second
-
-var fetchTATForBind = fetchTATForFreshBind
-
-func fetchTATForFreshBind(ctx context.Context, httpClient *http.Client, brand core.LarkBrand, clientID string, signer keysigner.Signer, provider, keyRef string) (string, func() error, error) {
-	helper, commitProviderManifest, err := keylessprovider.PrepareRefresh(ctx, provider)
-	if err != nil {
-		return "", nil, err
-	}
-	token, err := credential.FetchTATWithAssertionWithHelper(ctx, httpClient, brand, clientID, signer, helper, keyRef)
-	if err != nil {
-		return "", nil, err
-	}
-	return token, commitProviderManifest, nil
-}
-
-// validateBindResult proves that an OpenClaw keyless account can be used by
-// the exact helper/keyRef/appID tuple that will be persisted. Minting a TAT is
-// intentional: pubkey alone only proves that the helper runs (and some signer
-// implementations create a missing key during pubkey); a successful token mint
-// proves that this public key is already registered to the selected app, so no
-// attach flow or second user authorization is needed.
-func validateBindResult(parent context.Context, opts *BindOptions, result *BindResult) error {
-	if result == nil || result.AppConfig == nil {
-		return errs.NewInternalError(errs.SubtypeSDKError, "config bind produced no app configuration")
-	}
-	app := result.AppConfig
-	if app.AuthMethod != core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT {
-		return nil
-	}
-	if app.KeyRef == nil || app.KeyRef.ID == "" {
-		return errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeInvalidConfig,
-			"private_key_jwt bind for app %s is missing keyRef", app.AppId)
-	}
-	if strings.TrimSpace(app.KeyRef.Provider) != core.KeylessProviderLarkSuite {
-		return errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeInvalidClient,
-			"OpenClaw private_key_jwt bind for app %s did not select provider %s", app.AppId, core.KeylessProviderLarkSuite)
-	}
-	if opts == nil || opts.Factory == nil || opts.Factory.HttpClient == nil {
-		return errs.NewInternalError(errs.SubtypeSDKError, "cannot validate keyless bind without an HTTP client")
-	}
-	httpClient, err := opts.Factory.HttpClient()
-	if err != nil {
-		return errs.NewNetworkError(errs.SubtypeNetworkTransport,
-			"cannot create HTTP client for keyless bind validation: %v", err).WithCause(err)
-	}
-
-	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(parent, keylessBindProbeTimeout)
-	defer cancel()
-	_, commitProviderManifest, err := fetchTATForBind(
-		ctx, httpClient, app.Brand, app.AppId, keysigner.Active(), app.KeyRef.Provider, app.KeyRef.ID,
-	)
-	if err != nil {
-		if errs.IsTyped(err) {
-			return err
-		}
-		return errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeInvalidClient,
-			"OpenClaw signer could not authenticate app %s: %v", app.AppId, err).
-			WithHint("repair or reinstall the OpenClaw Feishu plugin and its platform signer dependency, verify the keyless account, then retry config bind").
-			WithCause(err)
-	}
-	if commitProviderManifest == nil {
-		return errs.NewInternalError(errs.SubtypeStorage,
-			"OpenClaw signer validation did not produce a provider manifest commit")
-	}
-	result.commitProviderManifest = commitProviderManifest
-	return nil
-}

cmd/config/keyless_bind_test.go

@@ -1,438 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
-
-package config
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"encoding/json"
-	"errors"
-	"net/http"
-	"net/url"
-	"os"
-	"path/filepath"
-	"reflect"
-	"runtime"
-	"strings"
-	"testing"
-
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/errs"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/auth"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/cmdutil"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/httpmock"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/i18n"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/keysigner"
-)
-
-func TestConfigBindRun_OpenClawKeylessWritesProviderWithoutPath(t *testing.T) {
-	saveWorkspace(t)
-	clearAgentEnv(t)
-	t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
-	writeOpenClawKeylessConfig(t, "cli_keyless", "openclaw-lark")
-
-	var gotProvider, gotKeyRef, gotClientID string
-	var providerCommits int
-	var providerCommitSawWorkspace bool
-	replaceBindProbe(t, func(_ context.Context, _ *http.Client, _ core.LarkBrand, clientID string, _ keysigner.Signer, provider, keyRef string) (string, func() error, error) {
-		gotClientID, gotProvider, gotKeyRef = clientID, provider, keyRef
-		return "tat-ok", func() error {
-			providerCommits++
-			data, err := os.ReadFile(core.GetConfigPath())
-			if err != nil {
-				return err
-			}
-			providerCommitSawWorkspace = strings.Contains(string(data), "cli_keyless")
-			return nil
-		}, nil
-	})
-
-	f, stdout, _, _ := cmdutil.TestFactory(t, nil)
-	if err := configBindRun(&BindOptions{Factory: f, Source: "openclaw", Identity: "bot-only"}); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("configBindRun: %v", err)
-	}
-	if gotClientID != "cli_keyless" || gotProvider != core.KeylessProviderLarkSuite || gotKeyRef != "openclaw-lark" {
-		t.Fatalf("probe route = client %q provider %q keyRef %q", gotClientID, gotProvider, gotKeyRef)
-	}
-	multi, err := core.LoadMultiAppConfig()
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	app := multi.CurrentAppConfig("")
-	if app == nil || app.AuthMethod != core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT || app.KeyRef == nil ||
-		app.KeyRef.Provider != core.KeylessProviderLarkSuite || app.KeyRef.ID != "openclaw-lark" || !app.AppSecret.IsZero() {
-		t.Fatalf("persisted app = %#v", app)
-	}
-	if stdout.Len() == 0 {
-		t.Fatal("bind did not emit success envelope")
-	}
-	if providerCommits != 1 {
-		t.Fatalf("provider manifest commits = %d, want 1", providerCommits)
-	}
-	if !providerCommitSawWorkspace {
-		t.Fatal("provider manifest committed before the workspace config became readable")
-	}
-}
-
-func TestConfigBindRun_OpenClawOptionalSignerClosedLoop(t *testing.T) {
-	if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
-		t.Skip("test helper uses a POSIX shebang; Windows resolution is compile-checked separately")
-	}
-	saveWorkspace(t)
-	clearAgentEnv(t)
-	t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
-	signerPath := installOpenClawOptionalSigner(t)
-	writeOpenClawKeylessConfig(t, "cli_keyless_optional", "openclaw-lark")
-
-	f, _, _, registry := cmdutil.TestFactory(t, nil)
-	registry.Register(&httpmock.Stub{
-		Method: http.MethodPost,
-		URL:    auth.PathOAuthTokenV2,
-		Body:   map[string]any{"code": 0, "access_token": "tat-from-optional-signer"},
-		BodyFilter: func(body []byte) bool {
-			form, err := url.ParseQuery(string(body))
-			return err == nil &&
-				form.Get("client_id") == "cli_keyless_optional" &&
-				form.Get("client_assertion_type") == "urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:jwt-bearer" &&
-				form.Get("client_assertion") == "optional.jwt" &&
-				!form.Has("client_secret")
-		},
-	})
-
-	if err := configBindRun(&BindOptions{Factory: f, Source: "openclaw", Identity: "bot-only"}); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("configBindRun: %v", err)
-	}
-	data, err := os.ReadFile(core.GetConfigPath())
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if !strings.HasSuffix(string(data), "\n") || !strings.Contains(string(data), "\n  \"apps\": [") {
-		t.Fatalf("config is not formatted JSON with a trailing newline:\n%s", data)
-	}
-	if strings.Contains(string(data), signerPath) {
-		t.Fatalf("config persisted the discovered signer executable path:\n%s", data)
-	}
-	providerData, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(core.GetBaseConfigDir(), "signing-providers.json"))
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("read global signer manifest: %v", err)
-	}
-	if !strings.Contains(string(providerData), signerPath) {
-		t.Fatalf("global signer manifest did not record the verified executable")
-	}
-	multi, err := core.LoadMultiAppConfig()
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	app := multi.CurrentAppConfig("")
-	if app == nil || app.AppId != "cli_keyless_optional" || app.KeyRef == nil ||
-		app.KeyRef.Provider != core.KeylessProviderLarkSuite || app.KeyRef.ID != "openclaw-lark" || !app.AppSecret.IsZero() {
-		t.Fatalf("resolved config = %#v", app)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestConfigBindRun_OpenClawKeylessProbeFailureDoesNotWrite(t *testing.T) {
-	saveWorkspace(t)
-	clearAgentEnv(t)
-	base := t.TempDir()
-	t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_CONFIG_DIR", base)
-	writeOpenClawKeylessConfig(t, "cli_wrong_key", "openclaw-lark")
-	replaceBindProbe(t, func(context.Context, *http.Client, core.LarkBrand, string, keysigner.Signer, string, string) (string, func() error, error) {
-		return "", nil, errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeInvalidClient, "public key is not bound")
-	})
-
-	f, _, _, _ := cmdutil.TestFactory(t, nil)
-	if err := configBindRun(&BindOptions{Factory: f, Source: "openclaw", Identity: "bot-only"}); err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("expected probe error")
-	}
-	if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(base, "openclaw", "config.json")); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
-		t.Fatalf("config must not be written; stat error = %v", err)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestConfigBindRun_OpenClawKeylessMissingProviderCommitFailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
-	saveWorkspace(t)
-	clearAgentEnv(t)
-	base := t.TempDir()
-	t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_CONFIG_DIR", base)
-	writeOpenClawKeylessConfig(t, "cli_missing_commit", "openclaw-lark")
-	replaceBindProbe(t, func(context.Context, *http.Client, core.LarkBrand, string, keysigner.Signer, string, string) (string, func() error, error) {
-		return "tat-ok", nil, nil
-	})
-
-	f, _, _, _ := cmdutil.TestFactory(t, nil)
-	err := configBindRun(&BindOptions{Factory: f, Source: "openclaw", Identity: "bot-only"})
-	if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "did not produce a provider manifest commit") {
-		t.Fatalf("configBindRun error = %v", err)
-	}
-	if _, statErr := os.Stat(filepath.Join(base, "openclaw", "config.json")); !os.IsNotExist(statErr) {
-		t.Fatalf("config must not be written; stat error = %v", statErr)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestCommitBinding_ProviderManifestFailureRestoresWorkspace(t *testing.T) {
-	saveWorkspace(t)
-	base := t.TempDir()
-	t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_CONFIG_DIR", base)
-	core.SetCurrentWorkspace(core.WorkspaceOpenClaw)
-	configPath := core.GetConfigPath()
-	if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(configPath), 0700); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	previous := []byte("{\n  \"current_app\": \"old\",\n  \"apps\": [{\"name\": \"old\", \"app_id\": \"cli_old\", \"app_secret\": \"keep\"}]\n}\n")
-	if err := os.WriteFile(configPath, previous, 0600); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-
-	f, stdout, stderr, _ := cmdutil.TestFactory(t, nil)
-	commitCalls := 0
-	result := &BindResult{
-		AppConfig: &core.AppConfig{AppId: "cli_new", Brand: core.BrandFeishu},
-		commitProviderManifest: func() error {
-			commitCalls++
-			return errors.New("manifest write failed")
-		},
-	}
-	err := commitBinding(&BindOptions{Factory: f, Identity: "bot-only"}, result, previous, "openclaw", configPath)
-	if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "workspace config restored") {
-		t.Fatalf("commitBinding error = %v", err)
-	}
-	if commitCalls != 1 {
-		t.Fatalf("provider manifest commits = %d, want 1", commitCalls)
-	}
-	got, readErr := os.ReadFile(configPath)
-	if readErr != nil {
-		t.Fatal(readErr)
-	}
-	if string(got) != string(previous) {
-		t.Fatalf("workspace was not restored:\n%s", got)
-	}
-	if stdout.Len() != 0 || stderr.Len() != 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("failed bind emitted success output: stdout=%q stderr=%q", stdout.String(), stderr.String())
-	}
-}
-
-func TestCommitBinding_ProviderManifestFailureRemovesNewWorkspace(t *testing.T) {
-	saveWorkspace(t)
-	t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
-	core.SetCurrentWorkspace(core.WorkspaceOpenClaw)
-	configPath := core.GetConfigPath()
-	f, stdout, stderr, _ := cmdutil.TestFactory(t, nil)
-	result := &BindResult{
-		AppConfig: &core.AppConfig{AppId: "cli_new", Brand: core.BrandFeishu},
-		commitProviderManifest: func() error {
-			return errors.New("manifest write failed")
-		},
-	}
-	err := commitBinding(&BindOptions{Factory: f, Identity: "bot-only"}, result, nil, "openclaw", configPath)
-	if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "workspace config restored") {
-		t.Fatalf("commitBinding error = %v", err)
-	}
-	if _, statErr := os.Stat(configPath); !os.IsNotExist(statErr) {
-		t.Fatalf("new workspace config was not removed; stat error = %v", statErr)
-	}
-	if stdout.Len() != 0 || stderr.Len() != 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("failed bind emitted success output: stdout=%q stderr=%q", stdout.String(), stderr.String())
-	}
-}
-
-func TestCommitBinding_WorkspaceWriteFailureDoesNotCommitProvider(t *testing.T) {
-	saveWorkspace(t)
-	base := t.TempDir()
-	t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_CONFIG_DIR", base)
-	core.SetCurrentWorkspace(core.WorkspaceOpenClaw)
-	f, _, _, _ := cmdutil.TestFactory(t, nil)
-	providerCommitted := false
-	result := &BindResult{
-		AppConfig: &core.AppConfig{AppId: "cli_new", Brand: core.BrandFeishu},
-		commitProviderManifest: func() error {
-			providerCommitted = true
-			return nil
-		},
-	}
-	configPath := filepath.Join(base, "missing-parent", "config.json")
-	if err := commitBinding(&BindOptions{Factory: f, Identity: "bot-only"}, result, nil, "openclaw", configPath); err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("expected workspace write failure")
-	}
-	if providerCommitted {
-		t.Fatal("provider manifest was committed before the workspace config write succeeded")
-	}
-}
-
-func TestCommitBinding_ConcurrentWorkspaceChangeFailsBeforeProviderCommit(t *testing.T) {
-	saveWorkspace(t)
-	t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
-	core.SetCurrentWorkspace(core.WorkspaceOpenClaw)
-	configPath := core.GetConfigPath()
-	if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(configPath), 0700); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	previous := []byte(`{"apps":[{"app_id":"cli_old","app_secret":"old"}]}`)
-	concurrent := []byte(`{"apps":[{"app_id":"cli_other","app_secret":"newer"}]}`)
-	if err := os.WriteFile(configPath, concurrent, 0600); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	f, _, _, _ := cmdutil.TestFactory(t, nil)
-	providerCommitted := false
-	result := &BindResult{
-		AppConfig: &core.AppConfig{AppId: "cli_new", Brand: core.BrandFeishu},
-		commitProviderManifest: func() error {
-			providerCommitted = true
-			return nil
-		},
-	}
-	err := commitBinding(&BindOptions{Factory: f, Identity: "bot-only"}, result, previous, "openclaw", configPath)
-	if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "changed while the bind was being validated") {
-		t.Fatalf("commitBinding error = %v", err)
-	}
-	if providerCommitted {
-		t.Fatal("provider manifest was committed after a concurrent workspace change")
-	}
-	got, readErr := os.ReadFile(configPath)
-	if readErr != nil || string(got) != string(concurrent) {
-		t.Fatalf("concurrent workspace was overwritten: %q, %v", got, readErr)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestCommitBinding_ProviderFailureDoesNotOverwriteConcurrentWriter(t *testing.T) {
-	saveWorkspace(t)
-	t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
-	core.SetCurrentWorkspace(core.WorkspaceOpenClaw)
-	configPath := core.GetConfigPath()
-	if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(configPath), 0700); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	previous := []byte(`{"apps":[{"app_id":"cli_old","app_secret":"old"}]}`)
-	concurrent := []byte(`{"apps":[{"app_id":"cli_other","app_secret":"newer"}]}`)
-	if err := os.WriteFile(configPath, previous, 0600); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	f, stdout, stderr, _ := cmdutil.TestFactory(t, nil)
-	result := &BindResult{
-		AppConfig: &core.AppConfig{AppId: "cli_new", Brand: core.BrandFeishu},
-		commitProviderManifest: func() error {
-			if err := os.WriteFile(configPath, concurrent, 0600); err != nil {
-				return err
-			}
-			return errors.New("manifest write failed")
-		},
-	}
-	err := commitBinding(&BindOptions{Factory: f, Identity: "bot-only"}, result, previous, "openclaw", configPath)
-	if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "refusing to overwrite") {
-		t.Fatalf("commitBinding error = %v", err)
-	}
-	got, readErr := os.ReadFile(configPath)
-	if readErr != nil || string(got) != string(concurrent) {
-		t.Fatalf("concurrent workspace was overwritten: %q, %v", got, readErr)
-	}
-	if stdout.Len() != 0 || stderr.Len() != 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("failed bind emitted success output: stdout=%q stderr=%q", stdout.String(), stderr.String())
-	}
-}
-
-func TestMergeBoundApp_UpsertsAndActivatesWithoutClobberingSiblings(t *testing.T) {
-	lang := "en_us"
-	previous := &core.MultiAppConfig{
-		StrictMode: core.StrictModeUser,
-		CurrentApp: "other",
-		Apps: []core.AppConfig{
-			{Name: "bound", AppId: "cli_target", Brand: core.BrandLark, Lang: coreLang(lang), Users: []core.AppUser{{UserOpenId: "ou_1", UserName: "alice"}}},
-			{Name: "other", AppId: "cli_other", AppSecret: core.PlainSecret("keep"), Brand: core.BrandFeishu, Users: []core.AppUser{}},
-		},
-	}
-	beforeSibling := previous.Apps[1]
-	data := mustJSON(t, previous)
-	incoming := &core.AppConfig{AppId: "cli_target", Brand: core.BrandFeishu, AuthMethod: core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT,
-		KeyRef: &core.SecretRef{Source: core.SecretSourceTEE, Provider: core.KeylessProviderLarkSuite, ID: "openclaw-lark"}}
-
-	got, err := mergeBoundApp(incoming, data, false)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if len(got.Apps) != 2 || got.CurrentApp != "bound" || got.PreviousApp != "other" || got.StrictMode != previous.StrictMode {
-		t.Fatalf("merged root = %#v", got)
-	}
-	if !reflect.DeepEqual(got.Apps[1], beforeSibling) {
-		t.Fatalf("sibling changed: got %#v want %#v", got.Apps[1], beforeSibling)
-	}
-	if got.Apps[0].Name != "bound" || got.Apps[0].Lang != coreLang(lang) || !reflect.DeepEqual(got.Apps[0].Users, previous.Apps[0].Users) {
-		t.Fatalf("target-owned fields were lost: %#v", got.Apps[0])
-	}
-}
-
-func writeOpenClawKeylessConfig(t *testing.T, appID, keyRef string) {
-	t.Helper()
-	path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "openclaw.json")
-	data := []byte(`{"channels":{"feishu":{"appId":"` + appID + `","authMethod":"private_key_jwt","keyRef":"` + keyRef + `","domain":"feishu"}}}`)
-	if err := os.WriteFile(path, data, 0600); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	t.Setenv("OPENCLAW_CONFIG_PATH", path)
-}
-
-func replaceBindProbe(t *testing.T, fn func(context.Context, *http.Client, core.LarkBrand, string, keysigner.Signer, string, string) (string, func() error, error)) {
-	t.Helper()
-	previous := fetchTATForBind
-	fetchTATForBind = fn
-	t.Cleanup(func() { fetchTATForBind = previous })
-}
-
-func mustJSON(t *testing.T, value any) []byte {
-	t.Helper()
-	data, err := json.Marshal(value)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	return data
-}
-
-func coreLang(value string) i18n.Lang { return i18n.Lang(value) }
-
-func installOpenClawOptionalSigner(t *testing.T) string {
-	t.Helper()
-	// This closure specifically exercises the no-inspect compatibility path;
-	// keylessprovider tests separately cover authoritative managed-project
-	// discovery from `openclaw plugins inspect`.
-	t.Setenv("PATH", "")
-	type signerPackage struct {
-		name, npmOS, npmCPU, binary string
-	}
-	packages := map[string]signerPackage{
-		"darwin/arm64": {"@larksuite/lark-keyless-signer-darwin-arm64", "darwin", "arm64", "lark-keyless-signer"},
-		"darwin/amd64": {"@larksuite/lark-keyless-signer-darwin-x64", "darwin", "x64", "lark-keyless-signer"},
-		"linux/arm64":  {"@larksuite/lark-keyless-signer-linux-arm64", "linux", "arm64", "lark-keyless-signer"},
-		"linux/amd64":  {"@larksuite/lark-keyless-signer-linux-x64", "linux", "x64", "lark-keyless-signer"},
-	}
-	spec, ok := packages[runtime.GOOS+"/"+runtime.GOARCH]
-	if !ok {
-		t.Skipf("no optional signer package for %s/%s", runtime.GOOS, runtime.GOARCH)
-		return ""
-	}
-
-	stateDir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "openclaw state")
-	packageDir := filepath.Join(
-		stateDir, "extensions", "openclaw-lark", "node_modules", "@larksuite", strings.TrimPrefix(spec.name, "@larksuite/"),
-	)
-	binDir := filepath.Join(packageDir, "bin")
-	if err := os.MkdirAll(binDir, 0700); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	packageJSON, err := json.MarshalIndent(map[string]any{
-		"name": spec.name, "version": "1.2.3", "os": []string{spec.npmOS}, "cpu": []string{spec.npmCPU},
-	}, "", "  ")
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(packageDir, "package.json"), append(packageJSON, '\n'), 0600); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	script := "#!/bin/sh\n" +
-		"IFS= read -r request\n" +
-		"printf '%s\\n' '{\"ok\":true,\"client_assertion_type\":\"urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:jwt-bearer\",\"client_assertion\":\"optional.jwt\"}'\n"
-	signerPath := filepath.Join(binDir, spec.binary)
-	if err := os.WriteFile(signerPath, []byte(script), 0700); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	t.Setenv("OPENCLAW_STATE_DIR", stateDir)
-	t.Setenv("PATH", "")
-	return signerPath
-}

cmd/config/risk_control.go

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package config
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+
+	"github.com/spf13/cobra"
+
+	"github.com/larksuite/cli/errs"
+	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/cmdutil"
+	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
+)
+
+// NewCmdConfigRiskControl creates the workspace risk-control policy command.
+func NewCmdConfigRiskControl(f *cmdutil.Factory) *cobra.Command {
+	cmd := &cobra.Command{
+		Use:   "risk-control [on|off|default]",
+		Short: "Manage workspace account-protection policy",
+		Long: `View or set the account-protection risk-control policy for this workspace.
+
+Account protection is on by default. Use off to opt this workspace out, on to
+opt it back in explicitly, or default to remove the explicit preference.`,
+		Args: cobra.MaximumNArgs(1),
+		// This is persistent workspace policy, not credential management.
+		PersistentPreRunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, _ []string) error {
+			cmd.SilenceUsage = true
+			return nil
+		},
+		RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
+			config, err := core.LoadOrNotConfigured()
+			if err != nil {
+				return err
+			}
+			if len(args) == 0 {
+				printRiskControl(f, config)
+				return nil
+			}
+
+			switch args[0] {
+			case "on":
+				enabled := true
+				config.RiskControl = &enabled
+			case "off":
+				enabled := false
+				config.RiskControl = &enabled
+			case "default":
+				config.RiskControl = nil
+			default:
+				return errs.NewValidationError(errs.SubtypeInvalidArgument,
+					"invalid risk-control value %q, valid values: on | off | default", args[0])
+			}
+
+			if err := core.SaveMultiAppConfig(config); err != nil {
+				return errs.NewInternalError(errs.SubtypeStorage,
+					"failed to save risk-control policy: %v", err).WithCause(err)
+			}
+			fmt.Fprintf(f.IOStreams.ErrOut, "Risk control set to %s (workspace)\n", args[0])
+			return nil
+		},
+	}
+	cmdutil.SetRisk(cmd, cmdutil.RiskWrite)
+	return cmd
+}
+
+func printRiskControl(f *cmdutil.Factory, config *core.MultiAppConfig) {
+	source := "default"
+	if config.RiskControl != nil {
+		source = "workspace"
+	}
+	fmt.Fprintf(f.IOStreams.Out, "risk-control: %s (source: %s)\n", riskControlState(config.RiskControlEnabled()), source)
+}
+
+func riskControlState(enabled bool) string {
+	if enabled {
+		return "on"
+	}
+	return "off"
+}

cmd/config/risk_control_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package config
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/larksuite/cli/errs"
+	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/cmdutil"
+	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
+)
+
+func TestRiskControlWorkspacePolicy(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
+	config := &core.MultiAppConfig{Apps: []core.AppConfig{{
+		AppId: "cli_test", AppSecret: core.PlainSecret("secret"), Brand: core.BrandFeishu,
+	}}}
+	if err := core.SaveMultiAppConfig(config); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	f, stdout, stderr, _ := cmdutil.TestFactory(t, nil)
+	cmd := NewCmdConfigRiskControl(f)
+	cmd.SetArgs([]string{"off"})
+	if err := cmd.Execute(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("set off: %v", err)
+	}
+	loaded, err := core.LoadMultiAppConfig()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if loaded.RiskControl == nil || *loaded.RiskControl {
+		t.Fatalf("RiskControl = %v, want explicit false", loaded.RiskControl)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(stderr.String(), "set to off") {
+		t.Fatalf("stderr = %q", stderr.String())
+	}
+
+	stdout.Reset()
+	cmd = NewCmdConfigRiskControl(f)
+	if err := cmd.Execute(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("show: %v", err)
+	}
+	if got := stdout.String(); got != "risk-control: off (source: workspace)\n" {
+		t.Fatalf("stdout = %q", got)
+	}
+
+	cmd = NewCmdConfigRiskControl(f)
+	cmd.SetArgs([]string{"on"})
+	if err := cmd.Execute(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("set on: %v", err)
+	}
+	loaded, err = core.LoadMultiAppConfig()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if loaded.RiskControl == nil || !*loaded.RiskControl {
+		t.Fatalf("RiskControl = %v, want explicit true", loaded.RiskControl)
+	}
+
+	cmd = NewCmdConfigRiskControl(f)
+	cmd.SetArgs([]string{"default"})
+	if err := cmd.Execute(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("reset default: %v", err)
+	}
+	loaded, err = core.LoadMultiAppConfig()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if loaded.RiskControl != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("RiskControl = %v, want nil", loaded.RiskControl)
+	}
+
+	stdout.Reset()
+	cmd = NewCmdConfigRiskControl(f)
+	if err := cmd.Execute(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("show default: %v", err)
+	}
+	if got := stdout.String(); got != "risk-control: on (source: default)\n" {
+		t.Fatalf("stdout = %q", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRiskControlWorkspacePolicyRejectsInvalidValue(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
+	if err := core.SaveMultiAppConfig(&core.MultiAppConfig{Apps: []core.AppConfig{{
+		AppId: "cli_test", AppSecret: core.PlainSecret("secret"), Brand: core.BrandFeishu,
+	}}}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	f, _, _, _ := cmdutil.TestFactory(t, nil)
+	cmd := NewCmdConfigRiskControl(f)
+	cmd.SetArgs([]string{"invalid"})
+	err := cmd.Execute()
+	var validationErr *errs.ValidationError
+	if !errors.As(err, &validationErr) {
+		t.Fatalf("error = %T %v, want *errs.ValidationError", err, err)
+	}
+	if validationErr.Subtype != errs.SubtypeInvalidArgument {
+		t.Fatalf("subtype = %q, want %q", validationErr.Subtype, errs.SubtypeInvalidArgument)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRiskControlWorkspacePolicyAllowedWithExternalCredentials(t *testing.T) {
+	f := newConfigFactoryWithExternalProvider(t)
+	config := &core.MultiAppConfig{Apps: []core.AppConfig{{
+		AppId: "cli_test", AppSecret: core.PlainSecret("secret"), Brand: core.BrandFeishu,
+	}}}
+	if err := core.SaveMultiAppConfig(config); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	cmd := NewCmdConfig(f)
+	cmd.SetArgs([]string{"risk-control", "off"})
+	if err := cmd.Execute(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("set off with external credentials: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	loaded, err := core.LoadMultiAppConfig()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if loaded.RiskControl == nil || *loaded.RiskControl {
+		t.Fatalf("RiskControl = %v, want explicit false", loaded.RiskControl)
+	}
+}

cmd/doctor/doctor.go

@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ import (
 	"context"
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
-	"io"
 	"net/http"
 	"os"
 	"sync"
@@ -20,8 +19,6 @@ import (
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/cmdutil"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/identitydiag"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/keylessprovider"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/keysigner"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/output"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/transport"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/update"
@@ -138,9 +135,6 @@ func doctorRun(opts *DoctorOptions) error {
 		checks = append(checks, fail("identity_ready", "no usable bot or user identity is available", ""))
 	}
 
-	// ── 3b. private_key_jwt / TEE signer (local; runs even with --offline) ──
-	checks = append(checks, teeSignerCheck(opts.Ctx, cfg))
-
 	// ── 4 & 5. Endpoint reachability ──
 	checks = append(checks, networkChecks(opts.Ctx, opts, ep)...)
 
@@ -154,73 +148,6 @@ func identityCheck(name string, id identitydiag.Identity) checkResult {
 	return warn(name, id.Message, id.Hint)
 }
 
-const teeUnavailableHint = "ensure the device secure hardware is accessible (Linux TPM: add your user to the 'tss' group or run with sufficient privileges)"
-
-// teeSignerCheck reports the private_key_jwt signing backend (TEE/TPM) status.
-// The probe is local hardware only (no network), so it runs even with --offline;
-// in a build without a TEE signer it short-circuits without touching any
-// hardware. It is a hard requirement for private_key_jwt apps and purely
-// informational for client_secret apps.
-func teeSignerCheck(ctx context.Context, cfg *core.CliConfig) checkResult {
-	usesPKJWT := cfg != nil && cfg.AuthMethod == core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT
-	if usesPKJWT && cfg.KeyProvider != "" {
-		helper, err := keylessprovider.Resolve(ctx, cfg.KeyProvider)
-		if err != nil {
-			return fail("tee_signer", "external keyless signer is unavailable",
-				fmt.Sprintf("repair or reinstall the OpenClaw Feishu plugin and its platform signer dependency: %v", err))
-		}
-		keyLabel := ""
-		if cfg != nil {
-			keyLabel = cfg.KeyLabel
-		}
-		if err := helper.Probe(ctx, keyLabel); err != nil {
-			hint := fmt.Sprintf("fix the configured external keyless signer, or re-run config init to replace/remove it: %v", err)
-			if usesPKJWT {
-				return fail("tee_signer", "external keyless signer is unavailable", hint)
-			}
-			return warn("tee_signer", "external keyless signer is misconfigured", hint)
-		}
-		return pass("tee_signer", "external keyless signer available")
-	}
-	info, ok, err := keysigner.ProbeActiveHardware(ctx)
-	return teeCheckResult(info, ok, err, usesPKJWT)
-}
-
-// teeCheckResult maps a hardware probe to a doctor check. Split out from
-// teeSignerCheck so the full matrix is unit-testable without a TPM.
-func teeCheckResult(info keysigner.HardwareInfo, ok bool, probeErr error, usesPKJWT bool) checkResult {
-	const name = "tee_signer"
-
-	// No signer registered → private_key_jwt is unsupported on this build.
-	if !ok {
-		if usesPKJWT {
-			return fail(name,
-				"app uses private_key_jwt but this build has no TEE key signer",
-				"the platform key signer ships by default on macOS, Linux, and Windows/amd64; this platform (e.g. Windows/arm64) has none — use a supported platform or re-register without --private-key-jwt")
-		}
-		return skip(name, "no TEE signer in this build (only private_key_jwt is affected; client_secret is unaffected)")
-	}
-
-	backend := info.Backend
-	if backend == "" {
-		backend = "tee"
-	}
-
-	switch {
-	case probeErr != nil:
-		return warn(name, fmt.Sprintf("%s signer present but probe errored: %s", backend, probeErr), "")
-	case info.Available:
-		if info.VendorName != "" {
-			return pass(name, fmt.Sprintf("%s TEE available (%s)", backend, info.VendorName))
-		}
-		return pass(name, fmt.Sprintf("%s TEE available", backend))
-	case usesPKJWT:
-		return fail(name, fmt.Sprintf("%s signer present but TEE unavailable: %s", backend, info.Reason), teeUnavailableHint)
-	default:
-		return warn(name, fmt.Sprintf("%s signer present but TEE unavailable: %s", backend, info.Reason), teeUnavailableHint)
-	}
-}
-
 // networkChecks probes Open API and MCP endpoints concurrently.
 func networkChecks(ctx context.Context, opts *DoctorOptions, ep core.Endpoints) []checkResult {
 	if opts.Offline {
@@ -230,8 +157,8 @@ func networkChecks(ctx context.Context, opts *DoctorOptions, ep core.Endpoints)
 		}
 	}
 
-	// Use the shared proxy-plugin-aware transport so connectivity checks reflect
-	// the real egress path (and are blocked when proxy plugin fails closed).
+	// Connectivity checks are platform traffic and must exercise the same
+	// provider-aware route as real platform requests.
 	httpClient := transport.NewHTTPClient(0)
 	mcpURL := ep.MCP + "/mcp"
 
@@ -310,90 +237,14 @@ func finishDoctor(f *cmdutil.Factory, checks []checkResult) error {
 		}
 	}
 
-	workspace := core.CurrentWorkspace().Display()
-	// A terminal on STDOUT gets a readable report; pipes, redirects, scripts and
-	// tests keep the stable JSON contract (NO_COLOR disables ANSI styling).
-	// OutIsTerminal checks stdout specifically — IOStreams.IsTerminal reflects
-	// stdin, which would wrongly send the human report into `doctor | jq`.
-	if f.IOStreams.OutIsTerminal {
-		renderDoctorHuman(f.IOStreams.Out, workspace, checks, allOK, os.Getenv("NO_COLOR") == "")
-	} else {
-		output.PrintJson(f.IOStreams.Out, map[string]interface{}{
-			"ok":        allOK,
-			"workspace": workspace,
-			"checks":    checks,
-		})
+	result := map[string]interface{}{
+		"ok":        allOK,
+		"workspace": core.CurrentWorkspace().Display(),
+		"checks":    checks,
 	}
+	output.PrintJson(f.IOStreams.Out, result)
 	if !allOK {
 		return output.ErrBare(1)
 	}
 	return nil
 }
-
-// renderDoctorHuman writes a readable health report: one aligned line per check
-// with a colored status tag, an indented hint when present, and a summary line.
-func renderDoctorHuman(w io.Writer, workspace string, checks []checkResult, allOK, color bool) {
-	const (
-		green  = "\033[32m"
-		yellow = "\033[33m"
-		red    = "\033[31m"
-		gray   = "\033[90m"
-		bold   = "\033[1m"
-		reset  = "\033[0m"
-	)
-	colorOf := map[string]string{"pass": green, "warn": yellow, "fail": red, "skip": gray}
-	tagOf := map[string]string{"pass": "PASS", "warn": "WARN", "fail": "FAIL", "skip": "SKIP"}
-	paint := func(code, s string) string {
-		if !color || code == "" {
-			return s
-		}
-		return code + s + reset
-	}
-
-	nameW := 0
-	for _, c := range checks {
-		if len(c.Name) > nameW {
-			nameW = len(c.Name)
-		}
-	}
-
-	fmt.Fprintf(w, "\n%s  (workspace: %s)\n\n", paint(bold, "lark-cli doctor"), workspace)
-
-	var passN, warnN, failN, skipN int
-	for _, c := range checks {
-		tag := tagOf[c.Status]
-		if tag == "" {
-			tag = "????"
-		}
-		fmt.Fprintf(w, "  %s  %-*s  %s\n", paint(colorOf[c.Status], "["+tag+"]"), nameW, c.Name, c.Message)
-		if c.Hint != "" {
-			fmt.Fprintf(w, "         %-*s  %s\n", nameW, "", paint(gray, "↳ "+c.Hint))
-		}
-		switch c.Status {
-		case "pass":
-			passN++
-		case "warn":
-			warnN++
-		case "fail":
-			failN++
-		case "skip":
-			skipN++
-		}
-	}
-
-	headline := paint(green, "healthy")
-	if !allOK {
-		headline = paint(red, "problems found")
-	}
-	fmt.Fprintf(w, "\n  %s — %d passed", headline, passN)
-	if warnN > 0 {
-		fmt.Fprintf(w, ", %d warning(s)", warnN)
-	}
-	if failN > 0 {
-		fmt.Fprintf(w, ", %d failed", failN)
-	}
-	if skipN > 0 {
-		fmt.Fprintf(w, ", %d skipped", skipN)
-	}
-	fmt.Fprintln(w)
-}

cmd/doctor/doctor_test.go

@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ import (
 	"bytes"
 	"context"
 	"encoding/json"
-	"errors"
 	"net/http"
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
@@ -18,7 +17,6 @@ import (
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/cmdutil"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/credential"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/keysigner"
 )
 
 func TestNewCmdDoctor_FlagParsing(t *testing.T) {
@@ -146,107 +144,6 @@ func TestDoctorRun_SplitsBotAndMissingUserIdentity(t *testing.T) {
 	assertCheck(t, got.Checks, "identity_ready", "pass")
 }
 
-func TestTeeCheckResult(t *testing.T) {
-	avail := keysigner.HardwareInfo{Backend: "tpm2", Available: true, VendorName: "ACME"}
-	unavail := keysigner.HardwareInfo{Backend: "tpm2", Reason: "open /dev/tpmrm0: permission denied"}
-
-	cases := []struct {
-		name     string
-		info     keysigner.HardwareInfo
-		ok       bool
-		probeErr error
-		pkjwt    bool
-		want     string
-	}{
-		{"no signer + private_key_jwt → fail", keysigner.HardwareInfo{}, false, nil, true, "fail"},
-		{"no signer + client_secret → skip", keysigner.HardwareInfo{}, false, nil, false, "skip"},
-		{"available + private_key_jwt → pass", avail, true, nil, true, "pass"},
-		{"available + client_secret → pass", avail, true, nil, false, "pass"},
-		{"unavailable + private_key_jwt → fail", unavail, true, nil, true, "fail"},
-		{"unavailable + client_secret → warn", unavail, true, nil, false, "warn"},
-		{"probe error → warn", keysigner.HardwareInfo{Backend: "tpm2"}, true, errors.New("boom"), true, "warn"},
-	}
-	for _, tc := range cases {
-		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			got := teeCheckResult(tc.info, tc.ok, tc.probeErr, tc.pkjwt)
-			if got.Name != "tee_signer" {
-				t.Errorf("name = %q, want tee_signer", got.Name)
-			}
-			if got.Status != tc.want {
-				t.Errorf("status = %q, want %q (msg=%q)", got.Status, tc.want, got.Message)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-// TestDoctorRun_TeeSignerWired proves the tee_signer check is part of doctorRun.
-// It asserts the build-independent invariant (a client_secret app must never
-// FAIL on TEE) so the test passes whether or not a signer is compiled in.
-func TestDoctorRun_TeeSignerWired(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
-	if err := core.SaveMultiAppConfig(&core.MultiAppConfig{
-		CurrentApp: "default",
-		Apps: []core.AppConfig{{
-			Name: "default", AppId: "test-app",
-			AppSecret: core.PlainSecret("secret"), Brand: core.BrandFeishu,
-		}},
-	}); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("SaveMultiAppConfig() error = %v", err)
-	}
-	f, stdout, _, _ := cmdutil.TestFactory(t, &core.CliConfig{
-		AppID: "test-app", AppSecret: "secret", Brand: core.BrandFeishu,
-	})
-	if err := doctorRun(&DoctorOptions{Factory: f, Ctx: context.Background(), Offline: true}); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("doctorRun() error = %v", err)
-	}
-	var got struct {
-		Checks []checkResult `json:"checks"`
-	}
-	if err := json.Unmarshal(stdout.Bytes(), &got); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("json.Unmarshal() error = %v", err)
-	}
-	var c *checkResult
-	for i := range got.Checks {
-		if got.Checks[i].Name == "tee_signer" {
-			c = &got.Checks[i]
-		}
-	}
-	if c == nil {
-		t.Fatalf("tee_signer check not present in doctor output: %#v", got.Checks)
-	}
-	if c.Status == "fail" {
-		t.Errorf("tee_signer = fail for a client_secret app; want skip/warn/pass (msg=%q)", c.Message)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestRenderDoctorHuman(t *testing.T) {
-	var buf bytes.Buffer
-	checks := []checkResult{
-		pass("cli_version", "1.0.50"),
-		warn("tee_signer", "tpm2 signer present but TEE unavailable", "add your user to the 'tss' group"),
-		fail("identity_ready", "no usable identity", "run: lark-cli auth status --verify"),
-		skip("endpoint_open", "skipped (--offline)"),
-	}
-	renderDoctorHuman(&buf, "local", checks, false, false)
-	out := buf.String()
-
-	for _, want := range []string{
-		"lark-cli doctor", "workspace: local",
-		"[PASS]", "cli_version", "1.0.50",
-		"[WARN]", "tee_signer", "↳ add your user to the 'tss' group",
-		"[FAIL]", "identity_ready", "↳ run: lark-cli auth status --verify",
-		"[SKIP]", "endpoint_open",
-		"problems found", "1 passed", "1 warning(s)", "1 failed", "1 skipped",
-	} {
-		if !strings.Contains(out, want) {
-			t.Errorf("output missing %q\n---\n%s", want, out)
-		}
-	}
-	if strings.Contains(out, "\033[") {
-		t.Errorf("color=false but ANSI escapes present:\n%s", out)
-	}
-}
-
 func assertCheck(t *testing.T, checks []checkResult, name, status string) {
 	t.Helper()
 	if got := findCheck(t, checks, name); got.Status != status {

cmd/root_upgrade.go

@@ -65,7 +65,17 @@ func offerRootUpgrade(f *cmdutil.Factory, cmd *cobra.Command) {
 	if info == nil {
 		return
 	}
-	fmt.Fprintf(ios.ErrOut, "lark-cli %s available (current %s). Upgrade now? [y/N]: ", info.Latest, info.Current)
+	// Deliberately no target version here: info.Latest comes from the on-disk
+	// cache, which has no expiry (the 24h TTL only throttles refreshes, and a
+	// failed refresh leaves the old value in place), so it can name a version
+	// that is no longer the one npm would install. The version actually
+	// installed is resolved live by the update subcommand, which prints
+	// "Updating lark-cli <cur> -> <latest> via <pm> ..." before installing —
+	// that is where the user sees the real target. Keep going through the
+	// update subcommand rather than calling RunNpmInstall directly, otherwise
+	// that line disappears and the user approves a global install without ever
+	// being told what gets installed.
+	fmt.Fprintf(ios.ErrOut, "A newer lark-cli is available (current %s). Upgrade now? [y/N]: ", info.Current)
 	if !readYes(ios.In) {
 		return
 	}

cmd/root_upgrade_test.go

@@ -128,6 +128,17 @@ func TestOfferRootUpgrade(t *testing.T) {
 			if gotPrompt != tc.wantPrompt {
 				t.Errorf("prompt: got %v want %v (stderr=%q)", gotPrompt, tc.wantPrompt, errBuf.String())
 			}
+			// The prompt must not name a target version: info.Latest comes from
+			// the on-disk cache and can be stale, while the version actually
+			// installed is resolved live by the update subcommand.
+			if tc.wantPrompt {
+				if strings.Contains(errBuf.String(), tc.latest) {
+					t.Errorf("prompt must not name the cached target version %q (stderr=%q)", tc.latest, errBuf.String())
+				}
+				if !strings.Contains(errBuf.String(), build.Version) {
+					t.Errorf("prompt must name the current version %q (stderr=%q)", build.Version, errBuf.String())
+				}
+			}
 			if called != tc.wantRun {
 				t.Errorf("runRootUpgrade called: got %v want %v", called, tc.wantRun)
 			}

extension/transport/sidecar/interceptor_test.go

@@ -12,9 +12,18 @@ import (
 	"net/http"
 	"testing"
 
+	exttransport "github.com/larksuite/cli/extension/transport"
+	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/envvars"
+	internaltransport "github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/transport"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/sidecar"
 )
 
+type roundTripFunc func(*http.Request) (*http.Response, error)
+
+func (f roundTripFunc) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
+	return f(req)
+}
+
 // failingBody is a ReadCloser that errors on Read and tracks Close calls.
 type failingBody struct {
 	err      error
@@ -263,3 +272,55 @@ func TestInterceptor_EmptyBody(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Errorf("body SHA256 = %q, want empty-string SHA256 %q", sha, expectedEmpty)
 	}
 }
+
+func TestLegacySidecarProviderStillHandlesForcedExternalRequests(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Setenv(envvars.CliAuthProxy, "http://127.0.0.1:16384")
+	t.Setenv(envvars.CliProxyKey, "test-key")
+	previousProvider := exttransport.GetProvider()
+	exttransport.Register(&Provider{})
+	t.Cleanup(func() { exttransport.Register(previousProvider) })
+
+	seen := make(chan *http.Request, 2)
+	base := roundTripFunc(func(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
+		seen <- req.Clone(req.Context())
+		return &http.Response{StatusCode: http.StatusNoContent, Body: http.NoBody, Request: req}, nil
+	})
+	client := internaltransport.ClientForRequestClass(
+		&http.Client{Transport: internaltransport.NewHTTPPolicyRouter(base, base)},
+		exttransport.RequestClassExternal,
+	)
+
+	withSentinel, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "https://external.example/protected", nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	withSentinel.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+sidecar.SentinelUAT)
+	resp, err := client.Do(withSentinel)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	resp.Body.Close()
+
+	withoutSentinel, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "https://external.example/public", nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	resp, err = client.Do(withoutSentinel)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	resp.Body.Close()
+
+	proxied := <-seen
+	if proxied.URL.Scheme != "http" || proxied.URL.Host != "127.0.0.1:16384" {
+		t.Fatalf("sentinel request URL = %s, want sidecar route", proxied.URL)
+	}
+	if got := proxied.Header.Get(sidecar.HeaderProxyTarget); got != "https://external.example" {
+		t.Fatalf("sentinel request proxy target = %q", got)
+	}
+
+	passthrough := <-seen
+	if got := passthrough.URL.String(); got != "https://external.example/public" {
+		t.Fatalf("non-sentinel request URL = %q, want unchanged", got)
+	}
+}

extension/transport/types.go

@@ -15,6 +15,27 @@ type Provider interface {
 	ResolveInterceptor(ctx context.Context) Interceptor
 }
 
+// RequestClass describes the trust boundary of an outbound HTTP request.
+// Platform requests target endpoints owned by the CLI's endpoint resolver;
+// external requests target user-provided, pre-signed, CDN, registry, or other
+// non-platform URLs. Redirect targets are classified again from each hop's
+// logical URL; rewriting a host in an interceptor does not add that host to
+// the platform endpoint catalog.
+type RequestClass string
+
+const (
+	RequestClassPlatform RequestClass = "platform"
+	RequestClassExternal RequestClass = "external"
+)
+
+// ScopedProvider optionally limits a Provider to selected request classes.
+// Providers that do not implement this interface retain the original
+// behavior and apply to every request class.
+type ScopedProvider interface {
+	Provider
+	SupportsRequestClass(RequestClass) bool
+}
+
 // Interceptor defines network-layer customization via a pre/post hook pair.
 // The built-in transport chain always executes between PreRoundTrip and the
 // returned post function, and cannot be skipped or overridden by the extension.

go.mod

@@ -7,8 +7,6 @@ require (
 	github.com/bmatcuk/doublestar/v4 v4.10.0
 	github.com/charmbracelet/huh v1.0.0
 	github.com/charmbracelet/lipgloss v1.1.0
-	github.com/facebookincubator/flog v0.0.0-20190930132826-d2511d0ce33c
-	github.com/facebookincubator/sks v0.0.0-20251112220143-6823f23937b4
 	github.com/gofrs/flock v0.8.1
 	github.com/google/uuid v1.6.0
 	github.com/itchyny/gojq v0.12.17
@@ -29,10 +27,7 @@ require (
 	gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.1
 )
 
-require github.com/ebitengine/purego v0.10.1
-
 require (
-	github.com/StackExchange/wmi v1.2.1 // indirect
 	github.com/atotto/clipboard v0.1.4 // indirect
 	github.com/aymanbagabas/go-osc52/v2 v2.0.1 // indirect
 	github.com/catppuccin/go v0.3.0 // indirect
@@ -47,21 +42,12 @@ require (
 	github.com/davecgh/go-spew v1.1.1 // indirect
 	github.com/dustin/go-humanize v1.0.1 // indirect
 	github.com/erikgeiser/coninput v0.0.0-20211004153227-1c3628e74d0f // indirect
-	github.com/go-ole/go-ole v1.2.5 // indirect
 	github.com/godbus/dbus/v5 v5.2.2 // indirect
 	github.com/gogo/protobuf v1.3.2 // indirect
-	github.com/google/btree v1.1.2 // indirect
-	github.com/google/certificate-transparency-go v1.1.8 // indirect
-	github.com/google/certtostore v1.0.6 // indirect
-	github.com/google/deck v0.0.0-20230104221208-105ad94aa8ae // indirect
-	github.com/google/go-attestation v0.5.1 // indirect
-	github.com/google/go-tpm v0.9.0 // indirect
-	github.com/google/go-tspi v0.3.0 // indirect
 	github.com/gopherjs/gopherjs v1.17.2 // indirect
 	github.com/gorilla/websocket v1.5.0 // indirect
 	github.com/inconshreveable/mousetrap v1.1.0 // indirect
 	github.com/itchyny/timefmt-go v0.1.6 // indirect
-	github.com/jgoguen/go-utils v0.0.0-20200211015258-b42ad41486fd // indirect
 	github.com/jtolds/gls v4.20.0+incompatible // indirect
 	github.com/lucasb-eyer/go-colorful v1.2.0 // indirect
 	github.com/mattn/go-isatty v0.0.20 // indirect
@@ -71,12 +57,10 @@ require (
 	github.com/muesli/ansi v0.0.0-20230316100256-276c6243b2f6 // indirect
 	github.com/muesli/cancelreader v0.2.2 // indirect
 	github.com/muesli/termenv v0.16.0 // indirect
-	github.com/peterbourgon/diskv v2.0.1+incompatible // indirect
 	github.com/pmezard/go-difflib v1.0.0 // indirect
 	github.com/rivo/uniseg v0.4.7 // indirect
 	github.com/smarty/assertions v1.15.0 // indirect
 	github.com/tidwall/match v1.1.1 // indirect
 	github.com/tidwall/pretty v1.2.0 // indirect
 	github.com/xo/terminfo v0.0.0-20220910002029-abceb7e1c41e // indirect
-	golang.org/x/crypto v0.31.0 // indirect
 )

go.sum

@@ -2,8 +2,6 @@ github.com/MakeNowJust/heredoc v1.0.0 h1:cXCdzVdstXyiTqTvfqk9SDHpKNjxuom+DOlyEeQ
 github.com/MakeNowJust/heredoc v1.0.0/go.mod h1:mG5amYoWBHf8vpLOuehzbGGw0EHxpZZ6lCpQ4fNJ8LE=
 github.com/Microsoft/go-winio v0.6.2 h1:F2VQgta7ecxGYO8k3ZZz3RS8fVIXVxONVUPlNERoyfY=
 github.com/Microsoft/go-winio v0.6.2/go.mod h1:yd8OoFMLzJbo9gZq8j5qaps8bJ9aShtEA8Ipt1oGCvU=
-github.com/StackExchange/wmi v1.2.1 h1:VIkavFPXSjcnS+O8yTq7NI32k0R5Aj+v39y29VYDOSA=
-github.com/StackExchange/wmi v1.2.1/go.mod h1:rcmrprowKIVzvc+NUiLncP2uuArMWLCbu9SBzvHz7e8=
 github.com/atotto/clipboard v0.1.4 h1:EH0zSVneZPSuFR11BlR9YppQTVDbh5+16AmcJi4g1z4=
 github.com/atotto/clipboard v0.1.4/go.mod h1:ZY9tmq7sm5xIbd9bOK4onWV4S6X0u6GY7Vn0Yu86PYI=
 github.com/aymanbagabas/go-osc52/v2 v2.0.1 h1:HwpRHbFMcZLEVr42D4p7XBqjyuxQH5SMiErDT4WkJ2k=
@@ -52,42 +50,14 @@ github.com/davecgh/go-spew v1.1.1 h1:vj9j/u1bqnvCEfJOwUhtlOARqs3+rkHYY13jYWTU97c
 github.com/davecgh/go-spew v1.1.1/go.mod h1:J7Y8YcW2NihsgmVo/mv3lAwl/skON4iLHjSsI+c5H38=
 github.com/dustin/go-humanize v1.0.1 h1:GzkhY7T5VNhEkwH0PVJgjz+fX1rhBrR7pRT3mDkpeCY=
 github.com/dustin/go-humanize v1.0.1/go.mod h1:Mu1zIs6XwVuF/gI1OepvI0qD18qycQx+mFykh5fBlto=
-github.com/ebitengine/purego v0.10.1 h1:dewVBCBT2GaMu1SrNTYxQhgQBethzfhiwvZiLGP/qyY=
-github.com/ebitengine/purego v0.10.1/go.mod h1:iIjxzd6CiRiOG0UyXP+V1+jWqUXVjPKLAI0mRfJZTmQ=
 github.com/erikgeiser/coninput v0.0.0-20211004153227-1c3628e74d0f h1:Y/CXytFA4m6baUTXGLOoWe4PQhGxaX0KpnayAqC48p4=
 github.com/erikgeiser/coninput v0.0.0-20211004153227-1c3628e74d0f/go.mod h1:vw97MGsxSvLiUE2X8qFplwetxpGLQrlU1Q9AUEIzCaM=
-github.com/facebookincubator/flog v0.0.0-20190930132826-d2511d0ce33c h1:KqlxcP2nuOcMjudCvK0qME2K/aFBDH+xcvYv7HYQaYc=
-github.com/facebookincubator/flog v0.0.0-20190930132826-d2511d0ce33c/go.mod h1:QGzNH9ujQ2ZUr/CjDGZGWeDAVStrWNjHeEcjJL96Nuk=
-github.com/facebookincubator/sks v0.0.0-20251112220143-6823f23937b4 h1:z9oNXvtDZv73Rg8UjFhu+wMtDvGkhLm1NMTwZQ68gOM=
-github.com/facebookincubator/sks v0.0.0-20251112220143-6823f23937b4/go.mod h1:FEWpPBUpkMwxqAbprURvgWgdwjeGkge5QFDaZBsfRHQ=
-github.com/go-ole/go-ole v1.2.5 h1:t4MGB5xEDZvXI+0rMjjsfBsD7yAgp/s9ZDkL1JndXwY=
-github.com/go-ole/go-ole v1.2.5/go.mod h1:pprOEPIfldk/42T2oK7lQ4v4JSDwmV0As9GaiUsvbm0=
 github.com/godbus/dbus/v5 v5.2.2 h1:TUR3TgtSVDmjiXOgAAyaZbYmIeP3DPkld3jgKGV8mXQ=
 github.com/godbus/dbus/v5 v5.2.2/go.mod h1:3AAv2+hPq5rdnr5txxxRwiGjPXamgoIHgz9FPBfOp3c=
 github.com/gofrs/flock v0.8.1 h1:+gYjHKf32LDeiEEFhQaotPbLuUXjY5ZqxKgXy7n59aw=
 github.com/gofrs/flock v0.8.1/go.mod h1:F1TvTiK9OcQqauNUHlbJvyl9Qa1QvF/gOUDKA14jxHU=
 github.com/gogo/protobuf v1.3.2 h1:Ov1cvc58UF3b5XjBnZv7+opcTcQFZebYjWzi34vdm4Q=
 github.com/gogo/protobuf v1.3.2/go.mod h1:P1XiOD3dCwIKUDQYPy72D8LYyHL2YPYrpS2s69NZV8Q=
-github.com/google/btree v1.0.0/go.mod h1:lNA+9X1NB3Zf8V7Ke586lFgjr2dZNuvo3lPJSGZ5JPQ=
-github.com/google/btree v1.1.2 h1:xf4v41cLI2Z6FxbKm+8Bu+m8ifhj15JuZ9sa0jZCMUU=
-github.com/google/btree v1.1.2/go.mod h1:qOPhT0dTNdNzV6Z/lhRX0YXUafgPLFUh+gZMl761Gm4=
-github.com/google/certificate-transparency-go v1.0.21/go.mod h1:QeJfpSbVSfYc7RgB3gJFj9cbuQMMchQxrWXz8Ruopmg=
-github.com/google/certificate-transparency-go v1.1.8 h1:LGYKkgZF7satzgTak9R4yzfJXEeYVAjV6/EAEJOf1to=
-github.com/google/certificate-transparency-go v1.1.8/go.mod h1:bV/o8r0TBKRf1X//iiiSgWrvII4d7/8OiA+3vG26gI8=
-github.com/google/certtostore v1.0.6 h1:LlCIgyTvDxTlcncMPTSYZGo6lCsiHzO6Dy7ff6ltk/0=
-github.com/google/certtostore v1.0.6/go.mod h1:2N0ZPLkGvQWhYvXaiBGq02r71fnSLfq78VKIWQHr1wo=
-github.com/google/deck v0.0.0-20230104221208-105ad94aa8ae h1:Iy1Ad7L9qPtNAFJad+Ch2kwDXrcwu7QUBR0bfChjnEM=
-github.com/google/deck v0.0.0-20230104221208-105ad94aa8ae/go.mod h1:DoDv8G58DuLNZF0KysYn0bA/6ZWhmRW3fZE2VnGEH0w=
-github.com/google/go-attestation v0.5.1 h1:jqtOrLk5MNdliTKjPbIPrAaRKJaKW+0LIU2n/brJYms=
-github.com/google/go-attestation v0.5.1/go.mod h1:KqGatdUhg5kPFkokyzSBDxwSCFyRgIgtRkMp6c3lOBQ=
-github.com/google/go-cmp v0.6.0 h1:ofyhxvXcZhMsU5ulbFiLKl/XBFqE1GSq7atu8tAmTRI=
-github.com/google/go-cmp v0.6.0/go.mod h1:17dUlkBOakJ0+DkrSSNjCkIjxS6bF9zb3elmeNGIjoY=
-github.com/google/go-tpm v0.9.0 h1:sQF6YqWMi+SCXpsmS3fd21oPy/vSddwZry4JnmltHVk=
-github.com/google/go-tpm v0.9.0/go.mod h1:FkNVkc6C+IsvDI9Jw1OveJmxGZUUaKxtrpOS47QWKfU=
-github.com/google/go-tpm-tools v0.4.2 h1:iyaCPKt2N5Rd0yz0G8ANa022SgCNZkMpp+db6QELtvI=
-github.com/google/go-tpm-tools v0.4.2/go.mod h1:fGUDZu4tw3V4hUVuFHmiYgRd0c58/IXivn9v3Ea/ck4=
-github.com/google/go-tspi v0.3.0 h1:ADtq8RKfP+jrTyIWIZDIYcKOMecRqNJFOew2IT0Inus=
-github.com/google/go-tspi v0.3.0/go.mod h1:xfMGI3G0PhxCdNVcYr1C4C+EizojDg/TXuX5by8CiHI=
 github.com/google/uuid v1.6.0 h1:NIvaJDMOsjHA8n1jAhLSgzrAzy1Hgr+hNrb57e+94F0=
 github.com/google/uuid v1.6.0/go.mod h1:TIyPZe4MgqvfeYDBFedMoGGpEw/LqOeaOT+nhxU+yHo=
 github.com/gopherjs/gopherjs v1.17.2 h1:fQnZVsXk8uxXIStYb0N4bGk7jeyTalG/wsZjQ25dO0g=
@@ -100,8 +70,6 @@ github.com/itchyny/gojq v0.12.17 h1:8av8eGduDb5+rvEdaOO+zQUjA04MS0m3Ps8HiD+fceg=
 github.com/itchyny/gojq v0.12.17/go.mod h1:WBrEMkgAfAGO1LUcGOckBl5O726KPp+OlkKug0I/FEY=
 github.com/itchyny/timefmt-go v0.1.6 h1:ia3s54iciXDdzWzwaVKXZPbiXzxxnv1SPGFfM/myJ5Q=
 github.com/itchyny/timefmt-go v0.1.6/go.mod h1:RRDZYC5s9ErkjQvTvvU7keJjxUYzIISJGxm9/mAERQg=
-github.com/jgoguen/go-utils v0.0.0-20200211015258-b42ad41486fd h1:E3y4CkzAXArgOQAw9gzW0Exe7XQqF4MYH3rCYprAj+Q=
-github.com/jgoguen/go-utils v0.0.0-20200211015258-b42ad41486fd/go.mod h1:ayRB9iNq3dqzUb9oW2JkoVQkDBkJ88NJb66OH13CKSk=
 github.com/jtolds/gls v4.20.0+incompatible h1:xdiiI2gbIgH/gLH7ADydsJ1uDOEzR8yvV7C0MuV77Wo=
 github.com/jtolds/gls v4.20.0+incompatible/go.mod h1:QJZ7F/aHp+rZTRtaJ1ow/lLfFfVYBRgL+9YlvaHOwJU=
 github.com/kisielk/errcheck v1.5.0/go.mod h1:pFxgyoBC7bSaBwPgfKdkLd5X25qrDl4LWUI2bnpBCr8=
@@ -129,8 +97,6 @@ github.com/muesli/cancelreader v0.2.2 h1:3I4Kt4BQjOR54NavqnDogx/MIoWBFa0StPA8ELU
 github.com/muesli/cancelreader v0.2.2/go.mod h1:3XuTXfFS2VjM+HTLZY9Ak0l6eUKfijIfMUZ4EgX0QYo=
 github.com/muesli/termenv v0.16.0 h1:S5AlUN9dENB57rsbnkPyfdGuWIlkmzJjbFf0Tf5FWUc=
 github.com/muesli/termenv v0.16.0/go.mod h1:ZRfOIKPFDYQoDFF4Olj7/QJbW60Ol/kL1pU3VfY/Cnk=
-github.com/peterbourgon/diskv v2.0.1+incompatible h1:UBdAOUP5p4RWqPBg048CAvpKN+vxiaj6gdUUzhl4XmI=
-github.com/peterbourgon/diskv v2.0.1+incompatible/go.mod h1:uqqh8zWWbv1HBMNONnaR/tNboyR3/BZd58JJSHlUSCU=
 github.com/pmezard/go-difflib v1.0.0 h1:4DBwDE0NGyQoBHbLQYPwSUPoCMWR5BEzIk/f1lZbAQM=
 github.com/pmezard/go-difflib v1.0.0/go.mod h1:iKH77koFhYxTK1pcRnkKkqfTogsbg7gZNVY4sRDYZ/4=
 github.com/rivo/uniseg v0.2.0/go.mod h1:J6wj4VEh+S6ZtnVlnTBMWIodfgj8LQOQFoIToxlJtxc=
@@ -171,8 +137,6 @@ go.yaml.in/yaml/v3 v3.0.4/go.mod h1:DhzuOOF2ATzADvBadXxruRBLzYTpT36CKvDb3+aBEFg=
 golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20190308221718-c2843e01d9a2/go.mod h1:djNgcEr1/C05ACkg1iLfiJU5Ep61QUkGW8qpdssI0+w=
 golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20191011191535-87dc89f01550/go.mod h1:yigFU9vqHzYiE8UmvKecakEJjdnWj3jj499lnFckfCI=
 golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20200622213623-75b288015ac9/go.mod h1:LzIPMQfyMNhhGPhUkYOs5KpL4U8rLKemX1yGLhDgUto=
-golang.org/x/crypto v0.31.0 h1:ihbySMvVjLAeSH1IbfcRTkD/iNscyz8rGzjF/E5hV6U=
-golang.org/x/crypto v0.31.0/go.mod h1:kDsLvtWBEx7MV9tJOj9bnXsPbxwJQ6csT/x4KIN4Ssk=
 golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20231006140011-7918f672742d h1:jtJma62tbqLibJ5sFQz8bKtEM8rJBtfilJ2qTU199MI=
 golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20231006140011-7918f672742d/go.mod h1:ldy0pHrwJyGW56pPQzzkH36rKxoZW1tw7ZJpeKx+hdo=
 golang.org/x/mod v0.2.0/go.mod h1:s0Qsj1ACt9ePp/hMypM3fl4fZqREWJwdYDEqhRiZZUA=
@@ -190,7 +154,6 @@ golang.org/x/sync v0.15.0 h1:KWH3jNZsfyT6xfAfKiz6MRNmd46ByHDYaZ7KSkCtdW8=
 golang.org/x/sync v0.15.0/go.mod h1:1dzgHSNfp02xaA81J2MS99Qcpr2w7fw1gpm99rleRqA=
 golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20190215142949-d0b11bdaac8a/go.mod h1:STP8DvDyc/dI5b8T5hshtkjS+E42TnysNCUPdjciGhY=
 golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20190412213103-97732733099d/go.mod h1:h1NjWce9XRLGQEsW7wpKNCjG9DtNlClVuFLEZdDNbEs=
-golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20190916202348-b4ddaad3f8a3/go.mod h1:h1NjWce9XRLGQEsW7wpKNCjG9DtNlClVuFLEZdDNbEs=
 golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20200930185726-fdedc70b468f/go.mod h1:h1NjWce9XRLGQEsW7wpKNCjG9DtNlClVuFLEZdDNbEs=
 golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20210809222454-d867a43fc93e/go.mod h1:oPkhp1MJrh7nUepCBck5+mAzfO9JrbApNNgaTdGDITg=
 golang.org/x/sys v0.6.0/go.mod h1:oPkhp1MJrh7nUepCBck5+mAzfO9JrbApNNgaTdGDITg=

internal/auth/app_registration.go

@@ -65,7 +65,6 @@ type AppRegistrationResponse struct {
 	VerificationUriComplete string
 	ExpiresIn               int
 	Interval                int
-	RequestedAuthMethod     string
 }
 
 // AppRegistrationResult is the result of a successful app registration poll.
@@ -73,11 +72,6 @@ type AppRegistrationResult struct {
 	ClientID     string
 	ClientSecret string
 	UserInfo     *AppRegUserInfo
-	// AuthMethods is the authoritative auth method(s) the app must use, as
-	// returned by the registration service after user/admin confirmation. It may
-	// differ from what the client requested, for example when selecting an
-	// existing client_secret app. Empty is accepted for compatible older servers.
-	AuthMethods []string
 }
 
 // AppRegUserInfo contains user info returned from app registration.
@@ -91,81 +85,10 @@ func appRegistrationEndpoint(brand core.LarkBrand) string {
 	return core.ResolveEndpoints(brand).Accounts + PathAppRegistration
 }
 
-// AppRegistrationInit is the response from the app registration init endpoint.
-type AppRegistrationInit struct {
-	Nonce                string
-	SupportedAuthMethods []string // e.g. ["client_secret", "private_key_jwt"]
-}
-
-// AppRegistrationBeginOptions parametrizes the registration begin request.
-// A zero value selects the legacy client_secret flow, preserving prior behavior.
-type AppRegistrationBeginOptions struct {
-	AuthMethod      string // "" => client_secret; core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT
-	AuthAttestation string // private_key_jwt: the TEE-signed attestation JWT
-	RestoreAppID    string // when set, asks the server to re-register this existing app
-}
-
-// RequestAppRegistrationInit performs the init step of the registration flow,
-// returning a server nonce (to be embedded in a TEE-signed attestation JWT) and
-// the auth methods the server supports for this archetype.
-func RequestAppRegistrationInit(ctx context.Context, httpClient *http.Client) (*AppRegistrationInit, error) {
-	// Registration always begins against the Feishu accounts host (mirrors begin).
-	endpoint := appRegistrationEndpoint(registrationBootstrapBrand)
-	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, beginRequestTimeout)
-	defer cancel()
-
-	form := url.Values{}
-	form.Set("action", "init")
-	form.Set("archetype", "PersonalAgent")
-
-	req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "POST", endpoint, strings.NewReader(form.Encode()))
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-	req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
-
-	resp, err := httpClient.Do(req)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-	defer resp.Body.Close()
-	logHTTPResponse(resp)
-
-	body, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("app registration init failed: read body: %w", err)
-	}
-
-	var data map[string]interface{}
-	if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &data); err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("app registration init failed: HTTP %d – response not JSON", resp.StatusCode)
-	}
-
-	if _, hasError := data["error"]; resp.StatusCode >= 400 || hasError {
-		msg := getStr(data, "error_description")
-		if msg == "" {
-			msg = getStr(data, "error")
-		}
-		if msg == "" {
-			msg = "Unknown error"
-		}
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("app registration init failed: %s", msg)
-	}
-
-	out := &AppRegistrationInit{
-		Nonce:                getStr(data, "nonce"),
-		SupportedAuthMethods: parseAuthMethods(data["supported_auth_methods"]),
-	}
-	if out.Nonce == "" {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("app registration init failed: server returned no nonce")
-	}
-	return out, nil
-}
-
 // RequestAppRegistration initiates the device flow. The registration protocol
 // always bootstraps on Feishu; brand selects the user-facing verification host.
 // The request is bounded by ctx and a begin timeout.
-func RequestAppRegistration(ctx context.Context, httpClient *http.Client, brand core.LarkBrand, opts AppRegistrationBeginOptions, errOut io.Writer) (*AppRegistrationResponse, error) {
+func RequestAppRegistration(ctx context.Context, httpClient *http.Client, brand core.LarkBrand, errOut io.Writer) (*AppRegistrationResponse, error) {
 	if errOut == nil {
 		errOut = io.Discard
 	}
@@ -176,25 +99,11 @@ func RequestAppRegistration(ctx context.Context, httpClient *http.Client, brand
 	ep := core.ResolveEndpoints(brand)
 	endpoint := appRegistrationEndpoint(registrationBootstrapBrand)
 
-	authMethod := opts.AuthMethod
-	if authMethod == "" {
-		authMethod = core.AuthMethodClientSecret
-	}
-
 	form := url.Values{}
 	form.Set("action", "begin")
 	form.Set("archetype", "PersonalAgent")
-	form.Set("auth_method", authMethod)
+	form.Set("auth_method", "client_secret")
 	form.Set("request_user_info", "open_id tenant_brand")
-	if opts.AuthAttestation != "" {
-		form.Set("auth_attestation", opts.AuthAttestation)
-	}
-	// Restore flow: the registration service accepts the existing OAuth client
-	// identifier under client_id. The launcher URL still uses app_id; these are
-	// separate contracts and must not be changed together.
-	if opts.RestoreAppID != "" {
-		form.Set("client_id", opts.RestoreAppID)
-	}
 
 	req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "POST", endpoint, strings.NewReader(form.Encode()))
 	if err != nil {
@@ -247,24 +156,7 @@ func RequestAppRegistration(ctx context.Context, httpClient *http.Client, brand
 
 	userCode := getStr(data, "user_code")
 	verificationUri := getStr(data, "verification_uri")
-	// Prefer the server-provided complete URL (currently /page/launcher); fall
-	// back to building it from verification_uri, then to /page/launcher. The old
-	// hard-coded /page/cli is stale — the server now returns /page/launcher.
-	verificationUriComplete := getStr(data, "verification_uri_complete")
-	if verificationUriComplete == "" {
-		base := verificationUri
-		if base == "" {
-			base = ep.Open + "/page/launcher"
-		}
-		// The server may return verification_uri with its own query (e.g.
-		// app_id when registering against an existing app), so join with
-		// the same ?/& logic as BuildVerificationURL.
-		sep := "?"
-		if strings.Contains(base, "?") {
-			sep = "&"
-		}
-		verificationUriComplete = base + sep + "user_code=" + url.QueryEscape(userCode)
-	}
+	verificationUriComplete := fmt.Sprintf("%s/page/cli?user_code=%s", ep.Open, userCode)
 
 	return &AppRegistrationResponse{
 		DeviceCode:              deviceCode,
@@ -273,91 +165,18 @@ func RequestAppRegistration(ctx context.Context, httpClient *http.Client, brand
 		VerificationUriComplete: verificationUriComplete,
 		ExpiresIn:               expiresIn,
 		Interval:                interval,
-		RequestedAuthMethod:     authMethod,
 	}, nil
 }
 
-// parseAuthMethods normalizes the poll response `auth_method` field, which the
-// server returns as a JSON array of strings (e.g. ["private_key_jwt"]) — or, on
-// some variants, a single space-separated string.
-func parseAuthMethods(v interface{}) []string {
-	switch t := v.(type) {
-	case []interface{}:
-		out := make([]string, 0, len(t))
-		for _, m := range t {
-			if s, ok := m.(string); ok && s != "" {
-				out = append(out, s)
-			}
-		}
-		return out
-	case string:
-		return strings.Fields(t)
-	default:
-		return nil
-	}
-}
-
-func containsAuthMethod(methods []string, target string) bool {
-	for _, method := range methods {
-		if method == target {
-			return true
-		}
-	}
-	return false
-}
-
-func registrationResultComplete(result *AppRegistrationResult, requestedAuthMethod string) bool {
-	if result.ClientID == "" {
-		return false
-	}
-	if result.ClientSecret != "" {
-		return true
-	}
-	if len(result.AuthMethods) > 0 {
-		return containsAuthMethod(result.AuthMethods, core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT)
-	}
-	// Older servers may omit auth_method. In that case only a begin request
-	// explicitly made as private_key_jwt may complete without a client secret.
-	return requestedAuthMethod == core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT
-}
-
 // BuildVerificationURL appends CLI tracking parameters to the verification URL.
-// When targetAppID is non-empty, it is also included so the launcher can lock
-// authorization to that existing app.
-func BuildVerificationURL(baseURL, cliVersion string, targetAppID ...string) string {
-	u, err := url.Parse(baseURL)
-	if err != nil {
-		return appendVerificationURLFallback(baseURL, cliVersion, targetAppID...)
-	}
-	q := u.Query()
-	if q.Get("lpv") == "" {
-		q.Set("lpv", cliVersion)
-	}
-	if q.Get("ocv") == "" {
-		q.Set("ocv", cliVersion)
-	}
-	if q.Get("from") == "" {
-		q.Set("from", "cli")
-	}
-	if len(targetAppID) > 0 && targetAppID[0] != "" && q.Get("app_id") == "" {
-		q.Set("app_id", targetAppID[0])
-	}
-	u.RawQuery = q.Encode()
-	return u.String()
-}
-
-func appendVerificationURLFallback(baseURL, cliVersion string, targetAppID ...string) string {
+func BuildVerificationURL(baseURL, cliVersion string) string {
 	sep := "&"
 	if !strings.Contains(baseURL, "?") {
 		sep = "?"
 	}
-	out := baseURL + sep + "lpv=" + url.QueryEscape(cliVersion) +
+	return baseURL + sep + "lpv=" + url.QueryEscape(cliVersion) +
 		"&ocv=" + url.QueryEscape(cliVersion) +
 		"&from=cli"
-	if len(targetAppID) > 0 && targetAppID[0] != "" && !strings.Contains(baseURL, "app_id=") {
-		out += "&app_id=" + url.QueryEscape(targetAppID[0])
-	}
-	return out
 }
 
 // pollOnce performs one ctx-bound poll request and decodes the payload.
@@ -454,7 +273,6 @@ func RegisterAppWithDiscovery(ctx context.Context, httpClient *http.Client, resp
 			result := &AppRegistrationResult{
 				ClientID:     getStr(data, "client_id"),
 				ClientSecret: getStr(data, "client_secret"),
-				AuthMethods:  parseAuthMethods(data["auth_method"]),
 			}
 			if userInfoRaw, ok := data["user_info"].(map[string]interface{}); ok {
 				result.UserInfo = &AppRegUserInfo{
@@ -463,7 +281,7 @@ func RegisterAppWithDiscovery(ctx context.Context, httpClient *http.Client, resp
 				}
 			}
 
-			if registrationResultComplete(result, resp.RequestedAuthMethod) {
+			if result.ClientID != "" && result.ClientSecret != "" {
 				// The issuing domain is authoritative; a contradictory final
 				// tenant report is a protocol violation, not a brand override.
 				if result.UserInfo != nil && result.UserInfo.TenantBrand != "" &&

internal/auth/app_registration_test.go

@@ -8,8 +8,6 @@ import (
 	"errors"
 	"io"
 	"net/http"
-	"net/url"
-	"slices"
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
 	"time"
@@ -32,14 +30,10 @@ func jsonResponse(body string) *http.Response {
 func Test_BuildVerificationURL(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Run("URL不含问号则添加?分隔符", func(t *testing.T) {
 		result := BuildVerificationURL("https://example.com/verify", "1.0.0")
-		got, err := url.Parse(result)
-		if err != nil {
-			t.Fatal(err)
-		}
 		convey.Convey("should add ? separator", t, func() {
-			convey.So(got.Query().Get("lpv"), convey.ShouldEqual, "1.0.0")
-			convey.So(got.Query().Get("ocv"), convey.ShouldEqual, "1.0.0")
-			convey.So(got.Query().Get("from"), convey.ShouldEqual, "cli")
+			convey.So(result, convey.ShouldContainSubstring, "?lpv=1.0.0")
+			convey.So(result, convey.ShouldContainSubstring, "&ocv=1.0.0")
+			convey.So(result, convey.ShouldContainSubstring, "&from=cli")
 			convey.So(result, convey.ShouldStartWith, "https://example.com/verify?")
 		})
 	})
@@ -53,237 +47,6 @@ func Test_BuildVerificationURL(t *testing.T) {
 			convey.So(result, convey.ShouldNotContainSubstring, "?lpv=")
 		})
 	})
-
-	t.Run("指定已有应用时添加app_id", func(t *testing.T) {
-		result := BuildVerificationURL("https://example.com/verify?user_code=abc", "2.0.0", "cli_existing")
-		got, err := url.Parse(result)
-		if err != nil {
-			t.Fatal(err)
-		}
-		convey.Convey("should include target app_id", t, func() {
-			convey.So(got.Query().Get("app_id"), convey.ShouldEqual, "cli_existing")
-			convey.So(got.Query().Get("client_id"), convey.ShouldEqual, "")
-			convey.So(got.Query().Get("lpv"), convey.ShouldEqual, "2.0.0")
-		})
-	})
-
-	t.Run("服务端已返回app_id时不覆盖", func(t *testing.T) {
-		result := BuildVerificationURL("https://example.com/verify?app_id=cli_server&user_code=abc", "2.0.0", "cli_existing")
-		got, err := url.Parse(result)
-		if err != nil {
-			t.Fatal(err)
-		}
-		convey.Convey("should keep server app_id", t, func() {
-			convey.So(got.Query().Get("app_id"), convey.ShouldEqual, "cli_server")
-		})
-	})
-}
-
-// captureClient returns an http.Client that records the last request's form body
-// and replies with the given JSON payload.
-func captureClient(gotBody *url.Values, respJSON string) *http.Client {
-	return &http.Client{
-		Transport: roundTripFunc(func(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
-			if req.Body != nil {
-				b, _ := io.ReadAll(req.Body)
-				v, _ := url.ParseQuery(string(b))
-				*gotBody = v
-			}
-			return &http.Response{
-				StatusCode: http.StatusOK,
-				Header:     make(http.Header),
-				Body:       io.NopCloser(strings.NewReader(respJSON)),
-			}, nil
-		}),
-	}
-}
-
-func TestRequestAppRegistrationInit_ParsesNonceAndMethods(t *testing.T) {
-	var body url.Values
-	hc := captureClient(&body, `{"nonce":"n-123","supported_auth_methods":["client_secret","private_key_jwt"]}`)
-
-	out, err := RequestAppRegistrationInit(context.Background(), hc)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if out.Nonce != "n-123" {
-		t.Errorf("nonce = %q, want n-123", out.Nonce)
-	}
-	if len(out.SupportedAuthMethods) != 2 || out.SupportedAuthMethods[1] != "private_key_jwt" {
-		t.Errorf("methods = %v", out.SupportedAuthMethods)
-	}
-	if body.Get("action") != "init" {
-		t.Errorf("action = %q, want init", body.Get("action"))
-	}
-}
-
-func TestRequestAppRegistrationInit_ErrorOnMissingNonce(t *testing.T) {
-	var body url.Values
-	hc := captureClient(&body, `{"supported_auth_methods":["client_secret"]}`)
-	if _, err := RequestAppRegistrationInit(context.Background(), hc); err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("expected error when server returns no nonce")
-	}
-}
-
-// TestRequestAppRegistrationInit_EmptySupportedAuthMethods covers the older-server
-// back-compat path: an empty supported_auth_methods array parses to an empty
-// slice, so the init guard in cmd/config/init_interactive.go
-// (`len(SupportedAuthMethods) > 0 && !slices.Contains(...)`) stays false and does
-// NOT reject the requested private_key_jwt. This aligns with
-// resolveFinalAuthMethod(nil/[], private_key_jwt) == private_key_jwt
-// (see cmd/config TestResolveFinalAuthMethod).
-func TestRequestAppRegistrationInit_EmptySupportedAuthMethods(t *testing.T) {
-	var body url.Values
-	hc := captureClient(&body, `{"nonce":"n-1","supported_auth_methods":[]}`)
-
-	out, err := RequestAppRegistrationInit(context.Background(), hc)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if out.Nonce != "n-1" {
-		t.Errorf("nonce = %q, want n-1", out.Nonce)
-	}
-	if len(out.SupportedAuthMethods) != 0 {
-		t.Errorf("SupportedAuthMethods = %v, want empty", out.SupportedAuthMethods)
-	}
-	// Reproduce the init guard expression on the real parsed result: an empty
-	// slice must NOT reject private_key_jwt.
-	rejected := len(out.SupportedAuthMethods) > 0 &&
-		!slices.Contains(out.SupportedAuthMethods, core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT)
-	if rejected {
-		t.Error("empty SupportedAuthMethods must allow private_key_jwt (older-server back-compat)")
-	}
-}
-
-const beginRespJSON = `{"device_code":"dc","user_code":"uc","verification_uri":"https://example/verify","expires_in":300,"interval":5}`
-
-func TestRequestAppRegistration_BeginDefaultsToClientSecret(t *testing.T) {
-	var body url.Values
-	hc := captureClient(&body, beginRespJSON)
-
-	if _, err := RequestAppRegistration(context.Background(), hc, core.BrandFeishu, AppRegistrationBeginOptions{}, nil); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if body.Get("action") != "begin" {
-		t.Errorf("action = %q", body.Get("action"))
-	}
-	if body.Get("auth_method") != "client_secret" {
-		t.Errorf("auth_method = %q, want client_secret (default)", body.Get("auth_method"))
-	}
-	if body.Has("auth_attestation") {
-		t.Errorf("auth_attestation should be absent for client_secret, got %q", body.Get("auth_attestation"))
-	}
-	// Normal (non-restore) begin must NOT carry client_id.
-	if body.Has("client_id") {
-		t.Errorf("client_id should be absent when RestoreAppID is empty, got %q", body.Get("client_id"))
-	}
-}
-
-// TestRequestAppRegistration_BeginRestoreAppID verifies the restore flow sends the
-// existing app id on begin so the server re-registers that app.
-func TestRequestAppRegistration_BeginRestoreAppID(t *testing.T) {
-	var body url.Values
-	hc := captureClient(&body, beginRespJSON)
-
-	opts := AppRegistrationBeginOptions{RestoreAppID: "cli_restore_me"}
-	if _, err := RequestAppRegistration(context.Background(), hc, core.BrandFeishu, opts, nil); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if body.Get("action") != "begin" {
-		t.Errorf("action = %q, want begin", body.Get("action"))
-	}
-	if body.Get("client_id") != "cli_restore_me" {
-		t.Errorf("client_id = %q, want cli_restore_me", body.Get("client_id"))
-	}
-	if body.Has("app_id") {
-		t.Errorf("begin form app_id must be absent, got %q", body.Get("app_id"))
-	}
-}
-
-func TestRequestAppRegistration_VerificationURICompleteFallback(t *testing.T) {
-	cases := []struct {
-		name string
-		resp string
-		want string
-	}{
-		{
-			name: "bare verification_uri",
-			resp: `{"device_code":"dc","user_code":"uc","verification_uri":"https://example/verify","expires_in":300,"interval":5}`,
-			want: "https://example/verify?user_code=uc",
-		},
-		{
-			name: "verification_uri with existing query",
-			resp: `{"device_code":"dc","user_code":"uc","verification_uri":"https://example/verify?app_id=cli_x","expires_in":300,"interval":5}`,
-			want: "https://example/verify?app_id=cli_x&user_code=uc",
-		},
-	}
-	for _, tc := range cases {
-		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			var body url.Values
-			hc := captureClient(&body, tc.resp)
-			got, err := RequestAppRegistration(context.Background(), hc, core.BrandFeishu, AppRegistrationBeginOptions{}, nil)
-			if err != nil {
-				t.Fatal(err)
-			}
-			if got.VerificationUriComplete != tc.want {
-				t.Errorf("VerificationUriComplete = %q, want %q", got.VerificationUriComplete, tc.want)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-func TestParseAuthMethods(t *testing.T) {
-	if got := parseAuthMethods([]interface{}{"private_key_jwt", "client_secret"}); len(got) != 2 || got[0] != "private_key_jwt" {
-		t.Errorf("array form = %v", got)
-	}
-	if got := parseAuthMethods("client_secret private_key_jwt"); len(got) != 2 || got[1] != "private_key_jwt" {
-		t.Errorf("string form = %v", got)
-	}
-	if got := parseAuthMethods(nil); got != nil {
-		t.Errorf("nil form = %v, want nil", got)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestRequestAppRegistration_BeginPrivateKeyJWT(t *testing.T) {
-	var body url.Values
-	hc := captureClient(&body, beginRespJSON)
-
-	opts := AppRegistrationBeginOptions{
-		AuthMethod:      core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT,
-		AuthAttestation: "header.claims.sig",
-	}
-	if _, err := RequestAppRegistration(context.Background(), hc, core.BrandFeishu, opts, nil); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if body.Get("auth_method") != "private_key_jwt" {
-		t.Errorf("auth_method = %q, want private_key_jwt", body.Get("auth_method"))
-	}
-	if body.Get("auth_attestation") != "header.claims.sig" {
-		t.Errorf("auth_attestation = %q", body.Get("auth_attestation"))
-	}
-}
-
-func TestRequestAppRegistration_BeginPrivateKeyJWTExistingAppID(t *testing.T) {
-	var body url.Values
-	hc := captureClient(&body, beginRespJSON)
-
-	opts := AppRegistrationBeginOptions{
-		AuthMethod:      core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT,
-		AuthAttestation: "header.claims.sig",
-		RestoreAppID:    "cli_existing",
-	}
-	if _, err := RequestAppRegistration(context.Background(), hc, core.BrandFeishu, opts, nil); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if body.Get("auth_method") != "private_key_jwt" {
-		t.Errorf("auth_method = %q, want private_key_jwt", body.Get("auth_method"))
-	}
-	if body.Get("auth_attestation") != "header.claims.sig" {
-		t.Errorf("auth_attestation = %q", body.Get("auth_attestation"))
-	}
-	if body.Get("client_id") != "cli_existing" {
-		t.Errorf("client_id = %q, want cli_existing", body.Get("client_id"))
-	}
 }
 
 func TestAppRegistrationEndpoint(t *testing.T) {
@@ -317,11 +80,11 @@ func TestRequestAppRegistration_UsesFeishuBootstrapAndConfiguredVerificationBran
 				}
 				return jsonResponse(`{"device_code":"d","user_code":"TEST-CODE","expire_in":60,"interval":5}`), nil
 			})}
-			resp, err := RequestAppRegistration(context.Background(), client, c.brand, AppRegistrationBeginOptions{}, io.Discard)
+			resp, err := RequestAppRegistration(context.Background(), client, c.brand, io.Discard)
 			if err != nil {
 				t.Fatalf("RequestAppRegistration(%q) error = %v", c.brand, err)
 			}
-			if !strings.HasPrefix(resp.VerificationUriComplete, "https://"+c.verificationHost+"/page/launcher?") {
+			if !strings.HasPrefix(resp.VerificationUriComplete, "https://"+c.verificationHost+"/page/cli?") {
 				t.Errorf("verification URL = %q, want host %q", resp.VerificationUriComplete, c.verificationHost)
 			}
 		})
@@ -352,11 +115,11 @@ func TestRegisterAppWithDiscovery_LarkFlowUsesProtocolBootstrap(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Errorf("unexpected host polled: %s", r.URL.Host)
 		return jsonResponse(`{}`), nil
 	})}
-	resp, err := RequestAppRegistration(context.Background(), client, core.BrandLark, AppRegistrationBeginOptions{}, io.Discard)
+	resp, err := RequestAppRegistration(context.Background(), client, core.BrandLark, io.Discard)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("RequestAppRegistration error = %v", err)
 	}
-	if got, want := resp.VerificationUriComplete, "https://open.larksuite.com/page/launcher?user_code=TEST-CODE"; got != want {
+	if got, want := resp.VerificationUriComplete, "https://open.larksuite.com/page/cli?user_code=TEST-CODE"; got != want {
 		t.Errorf("verification URL = %q, want %q", got, want)
 	}
 
@@ -456,51 +219,6 @@ func TestRegisterAppWithDiscovery_PollsUntilCredentials(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-func TestRegisterAppWithDiscovery_KeylessCompletesWithoutSecret(t *testing.T) {
-	tests := []struct {
-		name                string
-		response            string
-		requestedAuthMethod string
-	}{
-		{
-			name:     "server explicitly returns private_key_jwt",
-			response: `{"client_id":"cli_keyless","auth_method":["private_key_jwt"]}`,
-		},
-		{
-			name:                "older server omits auth_method for a keyless begin",
-			response:            `{"client_id":"cli_keyless"}`,
-			requestedAuthMethod: core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT,
-		},
-	}
-
-	for _, tt := range tests {
-		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			polls := 0
-			client := &http.Client{Transport: roundTripFunc(func(r *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
-				polls++
-				return jsonResponse(tt.response), nil
-			})}
-			resp := &AppRegistrationResponse{
-				DeviceCode:          "device",
-				Interval:            0,
-				ExpiresIn:           5,
-				RequestedAuthMethod: tt.requestedAuthMethod,
-			}
-
-			result, _, err := RegisterAppWithDiscovery(context.Background(), client, resp, io.Discard)
-			if err != nil {
-				t.Fatalf("RegisterAppWithDiscovery error = %v, want nil", err)
-			}
-			if polls != 1 {
-				t.Errorf("polls = %d, want 1", polls)
-			}
-			if result.ClientID != "cli_keyless" || result.ClientSecret != "" {
-				t.Errorf("result = (%q, %q), want (cli_keyless, empty secret)", result.ClientID, result.ClientSecret)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}
-
 // Neither the first poll nor the cross-brand switch waits out the interval
 // (a 5s interval would blow the elapsed bound).
 func TestRegisterAppWithDiscovery_ImmediateFirstPollAndSwitch(t *testing.T) {
@@ -568,7 +286,7 @@ func TestRequestAppRegistration_ProtocolFields(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 
 	resp, err := RequestAppRegistration(context.Background(),
-		serve(`{"device_code":"d","expire_in":60,"interval":3}`), core.BrandFeishu, AppRegistrationBeginOptions{}, io.Discard)
+		serve(`{"device_code":"d","expire_in":60,"interval":3}`), core.BrandFeishu, io.Discard)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("begin error = %v", err)
 	}
@@ -577,7 +295,7 @@ func TestRequestAppRegistration_ProtocolFields(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 
 	resp, err = RequestAppRegistration(context.Background(),
-		serve(`{"device_code":"d","expires_in":45}`), core.BrandFeishu, AppRegistrationBeginOptions{}, io.Discard)
+		serve(`{"device_code":"d","expires_in":45}`), core.BrandFeishu, io.Discard)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("legacy begin error = %v", err)
 	}
@@ -586,7 +304,7 @@ func TestRequestAppRegistration_ProtocolFields(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 
 	resp, err = RequestAppRegistration(context.Background(),
-		serve(`{"device_code":"d","interval":0}`), core.BrandFeishu, AppRegistrationBeginOptions{}, io.Discard)
+		serve(`{"device_code":"d","interval":0}`), core.BrandFeishu, io.Discard)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("defaults begin error = %v", err)
 	}
@@ -595,7 +313,7 @@ func TestRequestAppRegistration_ProtocolFields(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 
 	if _, err := RequestAppRegistration(context.Background(),
-		serve(`{"interval":5}`), core.BrandFeishu, AppRegistrationBeginOptions{}, io.Discard); err == nil {
+		serve(`{"interval":5}`), core.BrandFeishu, io.Discard); err == nil {
 		t.Error("missing device_code: expected error, got nil")
 	}
 }
@@ -676,7 +394,7 @@ func TestRequestAppRegistration_BodyReadCancelKeepsCause(t *testing.T) {
 			Header:     make(http.Header),
 		}, nil
 	})}
-	_, err := RequestAppRegistration(context.Background(), client, core.BrandFeishu, AppRegistrationBeginOptions{}, io.Discard)
+	_, err := RequestAppRegistration(context.Background(), client, core.BrandFeishu, io.Discard)
 	if !errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) {
 		t.Errorf("err = %v, want a context.Canceled cause", err)
 	}

internal/auth/client_auth.go

@@ -1,124 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
-
-package auth
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"fmt"
-	"net/url"
-	"time"
-
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/auth/jwt"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/keylesshelper"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/keylessprovider"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/keysigner"
-)
-
-// ClientAuth describes how to authenticate the OAuth client at the token
-// endpoint: with a client_secret (default) or a TEE-signed client_assertion
-// (private_key_jwt).
-type ClientAuth struct {
-	AppID       string
-	AppSecret   string
-	AuthMethod  string // "" == client_secret; core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT
-	Signer      keysigner.Signer
-	KeyLabel    string
-	KeyProvider string
-
-	// externalSigner is a verified provider snapshot prepared once for a
-	// multi-request operation (for example a device-flow poll loop). The helper
-	// still re-verifies its binary and mints a fresh assertion on every call.
-	externalSigner clientAssertionSigner
-}
-
-type clientAssertionSigner interface {
-	SignClientAssertion(context.Context, string, string, string) (string, string, error)
-}
-
-var resolveExternalAssertionSigner = func(ctx context.Context, provider string) (clientAssertionSigner, error) {
-	return keylessprovider.Resolve(ctx, provider)
-}
-
-// ClientAuthFromConfig builds a ClientAuth from resolved config, picking up the
-// active key signer for private_key_jwt apps.
-func ClientAuthFromConfig(cfg *core.CliConfig) ClientAuth {
-	if cfg == nil {
-		return ClientAuth{}
-	}
-	return ClientAuth{
-		AppID:       cfg.AppID,
-		AppSecret:   cfg.AppSecret,
-		AuthMethod:  cfg.AuthMethod,
-		KeyLabel:    cfg.KeyLabel,
-		KeyProvider: cfg.KeyProvider,
-		Signer:      keysigner.Active(),
-	}
-}
-
-func (c ClientAuth) isPrivateKeyJWT() bool { return c.AuthMethod == core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT }
-
-// ResolveSigner prepares the external private_key_jwt signer for reuse within
-// one operation and returns the prepared copy. Built-in signers and
-// client_secret authentication need no provider discovery. Keeping the
-// resolved helper on ClientAuth separates expensive provider discovery from
-// assertion minting: callers may reuse the returned value, while every call to
-// applyClientAssertion still asks the signer for a fresh assertion.
-func (c ClientAuth) ResolveSigner(ctx context.Context) (ClientAuth, error) {
-	if !c.isPrivateKeyJWT() || c.KeyProvider == "" || c.externalSigner != nil {
-		return c, nil
-	}
-	helper, err := resolveExternalAssertionSigner(ctx, c.KeyProvider)
-	if err != nil {
-		return c, err
-	}
-	if helper == nil {
-		return c, fmt.Errorf("private_key_jwt provider %q resolved without a signer", c.KeyProvider)
-	}
-	c.externalSigner = helper
-	return c, nil
-}
-
-// SignClientAssertion signs with a resolved external helper when present,
-// otherwise with the platform signer.
-func SignClientAssertion(ctx context.Context, signer keysigner.Signer, helper *keylesshelper.Command, keyLabel, clientID, audience string) (string, string, error) {
-	if helper != nil {
-		return helper.SignClientAssertion(ctx, keyLabel, clientID, audience)
-	}
-	assertion, err := jwt.SignClientAssertion(ctx, signer, keysigner.KeyRef{Label: keyLabel}, clientID, audience, time.Now())
-	return jwt.ClientAssertionType, assertion, err
-}
-
-// applyClientAssertion adds client_assertion(+type) to a token-endpoint form for
-// private_key_jwt and returns true. For client_secret it returns false, leaving
-// the caller to apply its own secret-based authentication. audience is the token
-// endpoint URL (the assertion's aud claim).
-func (c ClientAuth) applyClientAssertion(ctx context.Context, form url.Values, audience string) (bool, error) {
-	if !c.isPrivateKeyJWT() {
-		return false, nil
-	}
-	var err error
-	if c.KeyProvider != "" {
-		c, err = c.ResolveSigner(ctx)
-		if err != nil {
-			return false, err
-		}
-	}
-	helper := c.externalSigner
-	if helper == nil && c.Signer == nil {
-		return false, fmt.Errorf("private_key_jwt requires a key signer, but none is available on this build")
-	}
-	var assertionType, assertion string
-	if helper != nil {
-		assertionType, assertion, err = helper.SignClientAssertion(ctx, c.KeyLabel, c.AppID, audience)
-	} else {
-		assertionType, assertion, err = SignClientAssertion(ctx, c.Signer, nil, c.KeyLabel, c.AppID, audience)
-	}
-	if err != nil {
-		return false, err
-	}
-	form.Set("client_assertion_type", assertionType)
-	form.Set("client_assertion", assertion)
-	return true, nil
-}

internal/auth/client_auth_test.go

@@ -1,227 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
-
-package auth
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"crypto"
-	"crypto/ecdsa"
-	"crypto/elliptic"
-	"crypto/rand"
-	"crypto/sha256"
-	"fmt"
-	"net/url"
-	"testing"
-
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/auth/jwt"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/keysigner"
-)
-
-// fakeAuthSigner is a real in-memory ECDSA P-256 signer for client-auth tests.
-type fakeAuthSigner struct{ key *ecdsa.PrivateKey }
-
-type fakeExternalAssertionSigner struct {
-	keyRef, clientID, audience string
-	calls                      int
-}
-
-func (f *fakeExternalAssertionSigner) SignClientAssertion(_ context.Context, keyRef, clientID, audience string) (string, string, error) {
-	f.keyRef, f.clientID, f.audience = keyRef, clientID, audience
-	f.calls++
-	return jwt.ClientAssertionType, fmt.Sprintf("external.jwt.%d", f.calls), nil
-}
-
-func newFakeAuthSigner(t *testing.T) *fakeAuthSigner {
-	t.Helper()
-	t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
-	k, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	return &fakeAuthSigner{key: k}
-}
-
-func (f *fakeAuthSigner) EnsureKey(context.Context, keysigner.KeyRef) (crypto.PublicKey, error) {
-	return f.key.Public(), nil
-}
-func (f *fakeAuthSigner) PublicKey(context.Context, keysigner.KeyRef) (crypto.PublicKey, error) {
-	return f.key.Public(), nil
-}
-func (f *fakeAuthSigner) Sign(_ context.Context, _ keysigner.KeyRef, in []byte) ([]byte, string, error) {
-	h := sha256.Sum256(in)
-	r, s, err := ecdsa.Sign(rand.Reader, f.key, h[:])
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, "", err
-	}
-	sig := make([]byte, 64)
-	r.FillBytes(sig[:32])
-	s.FillBytes(sig[32:])
-	return sig, keysigner.AlgES256, nil
-}
-
-func TestClientAuth_applyClientAssertion_ClientSecret(t *testing.T) {
-	ca := ClientAuth{AppID: "cli_a", AppSecret: "test-secret"} // AuthMethod "" => client_secret
-	form := url.Values{}
-	used, err := ca.applyClientAssertion(context.Background(), form, "https://aud/token")
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if used {
-		t.Error("client_secret must not produce a client_assertion")
-	}
-	if form.Has("client_assertion") || form.Has("client_assertion_type") {
-		t.Errorf("form should be untouched, got %v", form)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestClientAuth_applyClientAssertion_PrivateKeyJWT(t *testing.T) {
-	ca := ClientAuth{
-		AppID:      "cli_a",
-		AuthMethod: core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT,
-		Signer:     newFakeAuthSigner(t),
-		KeyLabel:   "k",
-	}
-	form := url.Values{}
-	used, err := ca.applyClientAssertion(context.Background(), form, "https://accounts.feishu.cn/open-apis/authen/v2/oauth/token")
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if !used {
-		t.Fatal("expected client_assertion to be applied")
-	}
-	if form.Get("client_assertion_type") != jwt.ClientAssertionType {
-		t.Errorf("client_assertion_type = %q", form.Get("client_assertion_type"))
-	}
-	if form.Get("client_assertion") == "" {
-		t.Error("client_assertion is empty")
-	}
-	if form.Has("client_secret") {
-		t.Error("client_secret must NOT be present for private_key_jwt")
-	}
-}
-
-func TestClientAuth_applyClientAssertion_NilSigner(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
-	ca := ClientAuth{AppID: "cli_a", AuthMethod: core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT} // Signer nil
-	if _, err := ca.applyClientAssertion(context.Background(), url.Values{}, "aud"); err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("expected error when private_key_jwt has no signer")
-	}
-}
-
-func TestClientAuth_applyClientAssertion_UnknownProviderFailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
-	ca := ClientAuth{AppID: "cli_a", AuthMethod: core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT, Signer: newFakeAuthSigner(t), KeyLabel: "k", KeyProvider: "evil.provider"}
-	form := url.Values{}
-	used, err := ca.applyClientAssertion(context.Background(), form, "aud")
-	if err == nil || used || form.Has("client_assertion") {
-		t.Fatalf("unknown provider must fail closed: used=%v form=%v err=%v", used, form, err)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestClientAuth_applyClientAssertion_NilExternalProviderDoesNotFallback(t *testing.T) {
-	previous := resolveExternalAssertionSigner
-	resolveExternalAssertionSigner = func(context.Context, string) (clientAssertionSigner, error) {
-		return nil, nil
-	}
-	t.Cleanup(func() { resolveExternalAssertionSigner = previous })
-
-	ca := ClientAuth{
-		AppID: "cli_a", AppSecret: "must-not-send", AuthMethod: core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT,
-		Signer: newFakeAuthSigner(t), KeyLabel: "k", KeyProvider: core.KeylessProviderLarkSuite,
-	}
-	form := url.Values{}
-	used, err := ca.applyClientAssertion(context.Background(), form, "aud")
-	if err == nil || used || form.Has("client_assertion") || form.Has("client_secret") {
-		t.Fatalf("nil external provider must fail closed: used=%v form=%v err=%v", used, form, err)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestClientAuth_applyClientAssertion_ExplicitProviderDoesNotUseBuiltinOrSecret(t *testing.T) {
-	fake := &fakeExternalAssertionSigner{}
-	previous := resolveExternalAssertionSigner
-	resolveExternalAssertionSigner = func(_ context.Context, provider string) (clientAssertionSigner, error) {
-		if provider != core.KeylessProviderLarkSuite {
-			t.Fatalf("provider = %q", provider)
-		}
-		return fake, nil
-	}
-	t.Cleanup(func() { resolveExternalAssertionSigner = previous })
-
-	ca := ClientAuth{
-		AppID: "cli_external", AppSecret: "must-not-send", AuthMethod: core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT,
-		Signer: newFakeAuthSigner(t), KeyLabel: "openclaw-lark", KeyProvider: core.KeylessProviderLarkSuite,
-	}
-	form := url.Values{}
-	used, err := ca.applyClientAssertion(context.Background(), form, "open.feishu.cn")
-	if err != nil || !used {
-		t.Fatalf("applyClientAssertion = used %v err %v", used, err)
-	}
-	if form.Get("client_assertion") != "external.jwt.1" || form.Has("client_secret") ||
-		fake.keyRef != "openclaw-lark" || fake.clientID != "cli_external" || fake.audience != "open.feishu.cn" {
-		t.Fatalf("form=%v signer=(%q,%q,%q)", form, fake.keyRef, fake.clientID, fake.audience)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestClientAuth_ResolveSignerPreparedCopyReusesResolutionAndRemintsAssertions(t *testing.T) {
-	fake := &fakeExternalAssertionSigner{}
-	resolveCalls := 0
-	previous := resolveExternalAssertionSigner
-	resolveExternalAssertionSigner = func(_ context.Context, provider string) (clientAssertionSigner, error) {
-		resolveCalls++
-		if provider != core.KeylessProviderLarkSuite {
-			t.Fatalf("provider = %q", provider)
-		}
-		return fake, nil
-	}
-	t.Cleanup(func() { resolveExternalAssertionSigner = previous })
-
-	original := ClientAuth{
-		AppID: "cli_external", AuthMethod: core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT,
-		KeyLabel: "openclaw-lark", KeyProvider: core.KeylessProviderLarkSuite,
-	}
-	prepared, err := original.ResolveSigner(context.Background())
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if original.externalSigner != nil {
-		t.Fatal("ResolveSigner must return a prepared copy without mutating the original")
-	}
-
-	forms := []url.Values{{}, {}}
-	for _, form := range forms {
-		used, err := prepared.applyClientAssertion(context.Background(), form, "open.feishu.cn")
-		if err != nil || !used {
-			t.Fatalf("applyClientAssertion = used %v err %v", used, err)
-		}
-	}
-
-	if resolveCalls != 1 {
-		t.Fatalf("provider resolution calls = %d, want 1", resolveCalls)
-	}
-	if fake.calls != 2 {
-		t.Fatalf("assertion signing calls = %d, want 2", fake.calls)
-	}
-	first := forms[0].Get("client_assertion")
-	second := forms[1].Get("client_assertion")
-	if first == "" || second == "" || first == second {
-		t.Fatalf("assertions = (%q, %q), want two fresh values", first, second)
-	}
-	for _, form := range forms {
-		if form.Has("client_secret") {
-			t.Fatalf("private_key_jwt form leaked client_secret: %v", form)
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-func TestClientAuthFromConfig(t *testing.T) {
-	ca := ClientAuthFromConfig(&core.CliConfig{
-		AppID:      "cli_x",
-		AppSecret:  "test-secret",
-		AuthMethod: core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT,
-		KeyLabel:   "label-1",
-	})
-	if ca.AppID != "cli_x" || ca.AppSecret != "test-secret" || ca.AuthMethod != core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT || ca.KeyLabel != "label-1" {
-		t.Errorf("ClientAuth = %+v", ca)
-	}
-}

internal/auth/device_flow.go

@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ func ResolveOAuthEndpoints(brand core.LarkBrand) OAuthEndpoints {
 }
 
 // RequestDeviceAuthorization requests a device authorization code.
-func RequestDeviceAuthorization(ctx context.Context, httpClient *http.Client, ca ClientAuth, brand core.LarkBrand, scope string, errOut io.Writer) (*DeviceAuthResponse, error) {
+func RequestDeviceAuthorization(httpClient *http.Client, appId, appSecret string, brand core.LarkBrand, scope string, errOut io.Writer) (*DeviceAuthResponse, error) {
 	if errOut == nil {
 		errOut = io.Discard
 	}
@@ -77,26 +77,18 @@ func RequestDeviceAuthorization(ctx context.Context, httpClient *http.Client, ca
 		}
 	}
 
+	basicAuth := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(appId + ":" + appSecret))
+
 	form := url.Values{}
-	form.Set("client_id", ca.AppID)
+	form.Set("client_id", appId)
 	form.Set("scope", scope)
 
-	// private_key_jwt authenticates the client with a signed assertion in the
-	// body; client_secret uses HTTP Basic.
-	usedAssertion, err := ca.applyClientAssertion(ctx, form, core.OpenAPIAudience(brand))
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-
-	req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "POST", endpoints.DeviceAuthorization, strings.NewReader(form.Encode()))
+	req, err := http.NewRequest("POST", endpoints.DeviceAuthorization, strings.NewReader(form.Encode()))
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}
 	req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
-	if !usedAssertion {
-		basicAuth := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(ca.AppID + ":" + ca.AppSecret))
-		req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Basic "+basicAuth)
-	}
+	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Basic "+basicAuth)
 
 	resp, err := httpClient.Do(req)
 	if err != nil {
@@ -147,7 +139,7 @@ func RequestDeviceAuthorization(ctx context.Context, httpClient *http.Client, ca
 }
 
 // PollDeviceToken polls the token endpoint until authorization completes or times out.
-func PollDeviceToken(ctx context.Context, httpClient *http.Client, ca ClientAuth, brand core.LarkBrand, deviceCode string, interval, expiresIn int, errOut io.Writer) *DeviceFlowResult {
+func PollDeviceToken(ctx context.Context, httpClient *http.Client, appId, appSecret string, brand core.LarkBrand, deviceCode string, interval, expiresIn int, errOut io.Writer) *DeviceFlowResult {
 	if errOut == nil {
 		errOut = io.Discard
 	}
@@ -179,16 +171,10 @@ func PollDeviceToken(ctx context.Context, httpClient *http.Client, ca ClientAuth
 		form := url.Values{}
 		form.Set("grant_type", "urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:device_code")
 		form.Set("device_code", deviceCode)
-		form.Set("client_id", ca.AppID)
-		usedAssertion, caErr := ca.applyClientAssertion(ctx, form, core.OpenAPIAudience(brand))
-		if caErr != nil {
-			return &DeviceFlowResult{OK: false, Error: "invalid_client", Message: caErr.Error()}
-		}
-		if !usedAssertion {
-			form.Set("client_secret", ca.AppSecret)
-		}
+		form.Set("client_id", appId)
+		form.Set("client_secret", appSecret)
 
-		req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "POST", endpoints.Token, strings.NewReader(form.Encode()))
+		req, err := http.NewRequest("POST", endpoints.Token, strings.NewReader(form.Encode()))
 		if err != nil {
 			continue
 		}

internal/auth/device_flow_test.go

@@ -7,10 +7,8 @@ import (
 	"bytes"
 	"context"
 	"fmt"
-	"io"
 	"log"
 	"net/http"
-	"net/url"
 	"strings"
 	"sync/atomic"
 	"testing"
@@ -85,7 +83,7 @@ func TestRequestDeviceAuthorization_LogsResponse(t *testing.T) {
 	})
 	t.Cleanup(restore)
 
-	_, err := RequestDeviceAuthorization(context.Background(), httpmock.NewClient(reg), ClientAuth{AppID: "cli_a", AppSecret: "test-secret"}, core.BrandFeishu, "", nil)
+	_, err := RequestDeviceAuthorization(httpmock.NewClient(reg), "cli_a", "secret_b", core.BrandFeishu, "", nil)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("RequestDeviceAuthorization() error: %v", err)
 	}
@@ -108,66 +106,6 @@ func TestRequestDeviceAuthorization_LogsResponse(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-// captureRT records the last request + body and returns a canned device-auth response.
-func captureDeviceAuthClient(gotReq **http.Request, gotBody *string, respJSON string) *http.Client {
-	return &http.Client{Transport: roundTripFunc(func(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
-		*gotReq = req
-		if req.Body != nil {
-			b, _ := io.ReadAll(req.Body)
-			*gotBody = string(b)
-		}
-		return &http.Response{
-			StatusCode: http.StatusOK,
-			Header:     make(http.Header),
-			Body:       io.NopCloser(strings.NewReader(respJSON)),
-		}, nil
-	})}
-}
-
-const deviceAuthRespJSON = `{"device_code":"dc","user_code":"uc","verification_uri":"https://example/verify","expires_in":300,"interval":5}`
-
-func TestRequestDeviceAuthorization_PrivateKeyJWT_UsesAssertionNotBasic(t *testing.T) {
-	var req *http.Request
-	var body string
-	client := captureDeviceAuthClient(&req, &body, deviceAuthRespJSON)
-
-	ca := ClientAuth{AppID: "cli_a", AuthMethod: core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT, Signer: newFakeAuthSigner(t), KeyLabel: "k"}
-	if _, err := RequestDeviceAuthorization(context.Background(), client, ca, core.BrandFeishu, "im:message:send", nil); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if req.Header.Get("Authorization") != "" {
-		t.Errorf("private_key_jwt must NOT send Basic auth, got %q", req.Header.Get("Authorization"))
-	}
-	form, _ := url.ParseQuery(body)
-	if form.Get("client_assertion") == "" {
-		t.Error("missing client_assertion")
-	}
-	if form.Get("client_assertion_type") != "urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:jwt-bearer" {
-		t.Errorf("client_assertion_type = %q", form.Get("client_assertion_type"))
-	}
-	if form.Has("client_secret") {
-		t.Error("client_secret must not be present for private_key_jwt")
-	}
-}
-
-func TestRequestDeviceAuthorization_ClientSecret_UsesBasic(t *testing.T) {
-	var req *http.Request
-	var body string
-	client := captureDeviceAuthClient(&req, &body, deviceAuthRespJSON)
-
-	ca := ClientAuth{AppID: "cli_a", AppSecret: "test-secret"} // client_secret
-	if _, err := RequestDeviceAuthorization(context.Background(), client, ca, core.BrandFeishu, "", nil); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if !strings.HasPrefix(req.Header.Get("Authorization"), "Basic ") {
-		t.Errorf("client_secret should use Basic auth, got %q", req.Header.Get("Authorization"))
-	}
-	form, _ := url.ParseQuery(body)
-	if form.Has("client_assertion") {
-		t.Error("client_secret must not send a client_assertion")
-	}
-}
-
 // TestFormatAuthCmdline_TruncatesExtraArgs verifies that long command lines are truncated.
 func TestFormatAuthCmdline_TruncatesExtraArgs(t *testing.T) {
 	got := keychain.FormatAuthCmdline([]string{
@@ -267,7 +205,7 @@ func TestPollDeviceToken_DefaultsZeroIntervalToFiveSeconds(t *testing.T) {
 	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 100*time.Millisecond)
 	t.Cleanup(cancel)
 
-	result := PollDeviceToken(ctx, client, ClientAuth{AppID: "cli_a", AppSecret: "test-secret"}, core.BrandFeishu, "device-code", 0, 10, nil)
+	result := PollDeviceToken(ctx, client, "cli_a", "secret_b", core.BrandFeishu, "device-code", 0, 10, nil)
 	if result == nil {
 		t.Fatal("PollDeviceToken() returned nil result")
 	}

internal/auth/jwt/jwt.go

@@ -1,152 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
-
-// Package jwt builds compact JWS tokens signed by a keysigner.Signer.
-//
-// It deliberately depends only on the standard library plus the existing
-// google/uuid dependency — no third-party JWT library is introduced, keeping
-// go.mod free of new dependencies. The actual signing (and, for ECDSA, the
-// ASN.1->r||s conversion) is delegated to the Signer implementation.
-package jwt
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"encoding/base64"
-	"encoding/json"
-	"fmt"
-	"time"
-
-	"github.com/google/uuid"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/keysigner"
-)
-
-func b64(b []byte) string { return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(b) }
-
-// buildSignedJWT builds a compact JWS:
-//
-//	base64url(header).base64url(claims).base64url(signature)
-//
-// alg is written into the header (it is part of the signed input) and verified
-// against the alg the signer reports, guarding against a header/key mismatch.
-// typ defaults to "JWT" because the client-assertion endpoint requires that
-// protected-header value, even though some protocol examples show only alg.
-func buildSignedJWT(ctx context.Context, signer keysigner.Signer, ref keysigner.KeyRef, alg string, header, claims map[string]any) (string, error) {
-	if signer == nil {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("jwt: no signer available (private_key_jwt unsupported on this build)")
-	}
-	if header == nil {
-		header = map[string]any{}
-	}
-	header["alg"] = alg
-	if _, ok := header["typ"]; !ok {
-		header["typ"] = "JWT"
-	}
-
-	hb, err := json.Marshal(header)
-	if err != nil {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("jwt: marshal header: %w", err)
-	}
-	cb, err := json.Marshal(claims)
-	if err != nil {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("jwt: marshal claims: %w", err)
-	}
-
-	signingInput := b64(hb) + "." + b64(cb)
-	sig, gotAlg, err := signer.Sign(ctx, ref, []byte(signingInput))
-	if err != nil {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("jwt: sign: %w", err)
-	}
-	if gotAlg != alg {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("jwt: signer alg %q does not match header alg %q", gotAlg, alg)
-	}
-	return signingInput + "." + b64(sig), nil
-}
-
-// newJTI returns a random unique token identifier.
-func newJTI() string { return uuid.NewString() }
-
-// attestationTTL bounds the attestation JWT's lifetime. The init nonce (60s,
-// single-use) is the real anti-replay constraint; this is a modest margin for
-// clock skew on top of the immediate init→sign→begin round-trip.
-const attestationTTL = 2 * time.Minute
-
-// attestationClaims builds the registration attestation claim set per the App
-// Registration JWT spec: jti, iat, exp (all required) and the init-issued nonce.
-func attestationClaims(nonce string, now time.Time) map[string]any {
-	return map[string]any{
-		"jti":   newJTI(),
-		"iat":   now.Unix(),
-		"exp":   now.Add(attestationTTL).Unix(),
-		"nonce": nonce,
-	}
-}
-
-// clientAssertionClaims builds an RFC 7523 client_assertion claim set used to
-// mint tokens in place of client_secret. aud is the brand's token endpoint URL.
-func clientAssertionClaims(clientID, aud string, now time.Time, ttl time.Duration) map[string]any {
-	return map[string]any{
-		"iss": clientID,
-		"sub": clientID,
-		"aud": aud,
-		"iat": now.Unix(),
-		"exp": now.Add(ttl).Unix(),
-		"jti": newJTI(),
-	}
-}
-
-// ClientAssertionType is the RFC 7523 client_assertion_type value used for JWT
-// bearer client authentication at the token endpoint.
-const ClientAssertionType = "urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:jwt-bearer"
-
-// defaultAssertionTTL bounds a client_assertion's lifetime.
-const defaultAssertionTTL = 5 * time.Minute
-
-// SignAttestation signs the registration attestation JWT. The public key is
-// embedded in the JWS "jwk" header so the registration backend can bind it to
-// the app during action=begin; the claims carry the server nonce as a
-// proof-of-possession challenge.
-func SignAttestation(ctx context.Context, signer keysigner.Signer, ref keysigner.KeyRef, nonce string, now time.Time) (string, error) {
-	if signer == nil {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("jwt: no signer available (private_key_jwt unsupported on this build)")
-	}
-	pub, err := signer.EnsureKey(ctx, ref)
-	if err != nil {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("jwt: ensure key: %w", err)
-	}
-	alg, err := keysigner.AlgForKey(pub)
-	if err != nil {
-		return "", err
-	}
-	jwk, err := keysigner.PublicKeyJWK(pub)
-	if err != nil {
-		return "", err
-	}
-	return buildSignedJWT(ctx, signer, ref, alg, map[string]any{"jwk": jwk}, attestationClaims(nonce, now))
-}
-
-// SignClientAssertion mints a short-lived RFC 7523 client_assertion: it reads the
-// registered key (it must already exist — bound at registration; a missing key is
-// an error, not a reason to create a new unbound one), derives the JWS alg from
-// the public key, and signs an assertion whose audience is the brand's Open API
-// host. The server, holding the public key bound at registration, verifies it in
-// place of client_secret. The assertion header carries only alg (no jwk/kid);
-// the server locates the key via iss/sub = client_id.
-//
-// This is the model-independent glue: the assertion JWT is identical whether the
-// server augments an existing grant (device_code/refresh_token) with client
-// authentication or uses a dedicated jwt-bearer grant — only where the caller
-// attaches it differs.
-func SignClientAssertion(ctx context.Context, signer keysigner.Signer, ref keysigner.KeyRef, clientID, audience string, now time.Time) (string, error) {
-	if signer == nil {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("jwt: no signer available (private_key_jwt unsupported on this build)")
-	}
-	pub, err := signer.PublicKey(ctx, ref)
-	if err != nil {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("jwt: public key: %w", err)
-	}
-	alg, err := keysigner.AlgForKey(pub)
-	if err != nil {
-		return "", err
-	}
-	return buildSignedJWT(ctx, signer, ref, alg, map[string]any{}, clientAssertionClaims(clientID, audience, now, defaultAssertionTTL))
-}

internal/auth/jwt/jwt_test.go

@@ -1,254 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
-
-package jwt
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"crypto"
-	"crypto/ecdsa"
-	"crypto/elliptic"
-	"crypto/rand"
-	"crypto/sha256"
-	"encoding/base64"
-	"encoding/json"
-	"math/big"
-	"strings"
-	"testing"
-	"time"
-
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/keysigner"
-)
-
-// fakeSigner is a real in-memory ECDSA P-256 signer, so tests exercise the full
-// JWS path and the produced token is actually cryptographically verifiable.
-type fakeSigner struct{ key *ecdsa.PrivateKey }
-
-func newFakeSigner(t *testing.T) *fakeSigner {
-	t.Helper()
-	k, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	return &fakeSigner{key: k}
-}
-
-func (f *fakeSigner) EnsureKey(context.Context, keysigner.KeyRef) (crypto.PublicKey, error) {
-	return f.key.Public(), nil
-}
-func (f *fakeSigner) PublicKey(context.Context, keysigner.KeyRef) (crypto.PublicKey, error) {
-	return f.key.Public(), nil
-}
-func (f *fakeSigner) Sign(_ context.Context, _ keysigner.KeyRef, in []byte) ([]byte, string, error) {
-	h := sha256.Sum256(in)
-	r, s, err := ecdsa.Sign(rand.Reader, f.key, h[:])
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, "", err
-	}
-	// JOSE ES256: fixed-width big-endian r||s (32 bytes each for P-256).
-	sig := make([]byte, 64)
-	r.FillBytes(sig[:32])
-	s.FillBytes(sig[32:])
-	return sig, keysigner.AlgES256, nil
-}
-
-func TestBuildSignedJWT_VerifiableES256(t *testing.T) {
-	f := newFakeSigner(t)
-	now := time.Unix(1700000000, 0)
-
-	tok, err := buildSignedJWT(context.Background(), f, keysigner.KeyRef{Label: "x"}, keysigner.AlgES256,
-		map[string]any{}, clientAssertionClaims("cli_app", "https://accounts.example/token", now, 5*time.Minute))
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-
-	parts := strings.Split(tok, ".")
-	if len(parts) != 3 {
-		t.Fatalf("want 3 JWS parts, got %d", len(parts))
-	}
-
-	hb, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(parts[0])
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("header not base64url: %v", err)
-	}
-	var hdr map[string]any
-	if err := json.Unmarshal(hb, &hdr); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if hdr["alg"] != "ES256" || hdr["typ"] != "JWT" {
-		t.Errorf("header = %v, want alg=ES256 typ=JWT", hdr)
-	}
-
-	cb, _ := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(parts[1])
-	var claims map[string]any
-	if err := json.Unmarshal(cb, &claims); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if claims["iss"] != "cli_app" || claims["sub"] != "cli_app" || claims["aud"] != "https://accounts.example/token" {
-		t.Errorf("claims = %v", claims)
-	}
-
-	// Cryptographically verify the signature against the signing input.
-	sig, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(parts[2])
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("sig not base64url: %v", err)
-	}
-	if len(sig) != 64 {
-		t.Fatalf("ES256 sig len = %d, want 64", len(sig))
-	}
-	r := new(big.Int).SetBytes(sig[:32])
-	s := new(big.Int).SetBytes(sig[32:])
-	h := sha256.Sum256([]byte(parts[0] + "." + parts[1]))
-	if !ecdsa.Verify(f.key.Public().(*ecdsa.PublicKey), h[:], r, s) {
-		t.Error("signature did not verify")
-	}
-}
-
-func TestBuildSignedJWT_NilSigner(t *testing.T) {
-	if _, err := buildSignedJWT(context.Background(), nil, keysigner.KeyRef{}, "ES256", nil, nil); err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("expected error for nil signer")
-	}
-}
-
-func TestBuildSignedJWT_AlgMismatch(t *testing.T) {
-	f := newFakeSigner(t) // always reports ES256
-	if _, err := buildSignedJWT(context.Background(), f, keysigner.KeyRef{}, keysigner.AlgRS256, nil, nil); err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("expected error when header alg != signer alg")
-	}
-}
-
-func TestBuildSignedJWT_MarshalErrors(t *testing.T) {
-	f := newFakeSigner(t)
-	ctx := context.Background()
-
-	_, err := buildSignedJWT(ctx, f, keysigner.KeyRef{}, keysigner.AlgES256,
-		map[string]any{"bad": func() {}}, nil)
-	if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "jwt: marshal header") {
-		t.Fatalf("header marshal error = %v, want prefix %q", err, "jwt: marshal header")
-	}
-
-	_, err = buildSignedJWT(ctx, f, keysigner.KeyRef{}, keysigner.AlgES256,
-		nil, map[string]any{"bad": make(chan int)})
-	if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "jwt: marshal claims") {
-		t.Fatalf("claims marshal error = %v, want prefix %q", err, "jwt: marshal claims")
-	}
-}
-
-func TestSignClientAssertion(t *testing.T) {
-	f := newFakeSigner(t)
-	now := time.Unix(1700000000, 0)
-	const aud = "https://accounts.feishu.cn/open-apis/authen/v2/oauth/token"
-
-	tok, err := SignClientAssertion(context.Background(), f, keysigner.KeyRef{Label: "k"}, "cli_app", aud, now)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-
-	parts := strings.Split(tok, ".")
-	if len(parts) != 3 {
-		t.Fatalf("want 3 parts, got %d", len(parts))
-	}
-	cb, _ := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(parts[1])
-	var claims map[string]any
-	if err := json.Unmarshal(cb, &claims); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if claims["iss"] != "cli_app" || claims["aud"] != aud {
-		t.Errorf("claims = %v", claims)
-	}
-
-	// Signature must verify against the key's public half.
-	sig, _ := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(parts[2])
-	r := new(big.Int).SetBytes(sig[:32])
-	s := new(big.Int).SetBytes(sig[32:])
-	h := sha256.Sum256([]byte(parts[0] + "." + parts[1]))
-	if !ecdsa.Verify(f.key.Public().(*ecdsa.PublicKey), h[:], r, s) {
-		t.Error("client_assertion signature did not verify")
-	}
-}
-
-func TestSignClientAssertion_NilSigner(t *testing.T) {
-	if _, err := SignClientAssertion(context.Background(), nil, keysigner.KeyRef{}, "cli_app", "aud", time.Unix(0, 0)); err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("expected error for nil signer")
-	}
-}
-
-func TestSignAttestation(t *testing.T) {
-	f := newFakeSigner(t)
-	now := time.Unix(1700000000, 0)
-
-	tok, err := SignAttestation(context.Background(), f, keysigner.KeyRef{Label: "k"}, "nonce-abc", now)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	parts := strings.Split(tok, ".")
-	if len(parts) != 3 {
-		t.Fatalf("want 3 parts, got %d", len(parts))
-	}
-
-	hb, _ := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(parts[0])
-	var hdr map[string]any
-	if err := json.Unmarshal(hb, &hdr); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	jwk, ok := hdr["jwk"].(map[string]any)
-	if !ok {
-		t.Fatalf("attestation header missing jwk: %v", hdr)
-	}
-	if jwk["kty"] != "EC" || jwk["crv"] != "P-256" || jwk["use"] != "sig" {
-		t.Errorf("jwk = %v", jwk)
-	}
-
-	cb, _ := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(parts[1])
-	var claims map[string]any
-	if err := json.Unmarshal(cb, &claims); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if claims["nonce"] != "nonce-abc" {
-		t.Errorf("nonce = %v", claims["nonce"])
-	}
-	// jti, iat, exp are all required by the attestation spec.
-	iat, iatOK := claims["iat"].(float64)
-	exp, expOK := claims["exp"].(float64)
-	if !iatOK || !expOK || exp <= iat {
-		t.Errorf("claims iat/exp invalid: iat=%v exp=%v", claims["iat"], claims["exp"])
-	}
-	if jti, _ := claims["jti"].(string); jti == "" {
-		t.Error("claims jti empty")
-	}
-
-	// Signature verifies against the embedded key.
-	sig, _ := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(parts[2])
-	r := new(big.Int).SetBytes(sig[:32])
-	s := new(big.Int).SetBytes(sig[32:])
-	h := sha256.Sum256([]byte(parts[0] + "." + parts[1]))
-	if !ecdsa.Verify(f.key.Public().(*ecdsa.PublicKey), h[:], r, s) {
-		t.Error("attestation signature did not verify")
-	}
-}
-
-func TestSignAttestation_NilSigner(t *testing.T) {
-	if _, err := SignAttestation(context.Background(), nil, keysigner.KeyRef{}, "n", time.Unix(0, 0)); err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("expected error for nil signer")
-	}
-}
-
-func TestClaimFactories(t *testing.T) {
-	now := time.Unix(1700000000, 0)
-
-	a := attestationClaims("nonce-xyz", now)
-	if a["nonce"] != "nonce-xyz" || a["iat"] != now.Unix() {
-		t.Errorf("attestation claims = %v", a)
-	}
-	if a["exp"] != now.Add(attestationTTL).Unix() {
-		t.Errorf("attestation exp = %v, want %v", a["exp"], now.Add(attestationTTL).Unix())
-	}
-	if jti, _ := a["jti"].(string); jti == "" {
-		t.Error("attestation jti empty")
-	}
-
-	c := clientAssertionClaims("cli_app", "aud", now, time.Minute)
-	if c["exp"].(int64) != now.Add(time.Minute).Unix() {
-		t.Errorf("client_assertion exp = %v", c["exp"])
-	}
-}

internal/auth/transport.go

@@ -17,6 +17,8 @@ import (
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/transport"
 )
 
+var _ transport.RoundTripperDecorator = (*SecurityPolicyTransport)(nil)
+
 // SecurityPolicyTransport is an http.RoundTripper that intercepts all responses
 // and checks for security policy errors.
 type SecurityPolicyTransport struct {
@@ -31,6 +33,16 @@ func (t *SecurityPolicyTransport) base() http.RoundTripper {
 	return transport.Fallback()
 }
 
+func (t *SecurityPolicyTransport) BaseRoundTripper() http.RoundTripper {
+	return t.base()
+}
+
+func (t *SecurityPolicyTransport) WithBaseRoundTripper(base http.RoundTripper) http.RoundTripper {
+	cloned := *t
+	cloned.Base = base
+	return &cloned
+}
+
 // RoundTrip implements http.RoundTripper.
 func (t *SecurityPolicyTransport) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
 	resp, err := t.base().RoundTrip(req)

internal/auth/uat_client.go

@@ -21,7 +21,6 @@ import (
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/errs"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/errclass"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/keysigner"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/vfs"
 )
 
@@ -34,15 +33,11 @@ func sanitizeID(id string) string {
 
 // UATCallOptions contains options for UAT API calls.
 type UATCallOptions struct {
-	UserOpenId  string
-	AppId       string
-	AppSecret   string
-	Domain      core.LarkBrand
-	AuthMethod  string           // "" == client_secret; core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT
-	KeyLabel    string           // TEE key handle for private_key_jwt
-	KeyProvider string           // empty == built-in signer; explicit external route otherwise
-	Signer      keysigner.Signer // active signer for private_key_jwt
-	ErrOut      io.Writer        // diagnostic/status output (caller injects f.IOStreams.ErrOut)
+	UserOpenId string
+	AppId      string
+	AppSecret  string
+	Domain     core.LarkBrand
+	ErrOut     io.Writer // diagnostic/status output (caller injects f.IOStreams.ErrOut)
 }
 
 // UATStatus represents the status of a user access token.
@@ -62,15 +57,11 @@ func NewUATCallOptions(cfg *core.CliConfig, errOut io.Writer) UATCallOptions {
 		errOut = os.Stderr
 	}
 	return UATCallOptions{
-		UserOpenId:  cfg.UserOpenId,
-		AppId:       cfg.AppID,
-		AppSecret:   cfg.AppSecret,
-		Domain:      cfg.Brand,
-		AuthMethod:  cfg.AuthMethod,
-		KeyLabel:    cfg.KeyLabel,
-		KeyProvider: cfg.KeyProvider,
-		Signer:      keysigner.Active(),
-		ErrOut:      errOut,
+		UserOpenId: cfg.UserOpenId,
+		AppId:      cfg.AppID,
+		AppSecret:  cfg.AppSecret,
+		Domain:     cfg.Brand,
+		ErrOut:     errOut,
 	}
 }
 
@@ -196,31 +187,13 @@ func doRefreshToken(httpClient *http.Client, opts UATCallOptions, stored *Stored
 	}
 
 	endpoints := ResolveOAuthEndpoints(opts.Domain)
-	clientAuth := ClientAuth{
-		AppID:       opts.AppId,
-		AppSecret:   opts.AppSecret,
-		AuthMethod:  opts.AuthMethod,
-		Signer:      opts.Signer,
-		KeyLabel:    opts.KeyLabel,
-		KeyProvider: opts.KeyProvider,
-	}
-	clientAuth, err := clientAuth.ResolveSigner(context.Background())
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
 
 	callEndpoint := func() (map[string]interface{}, error) {
 		form := url.Values{}
 		form.Set("grant_type", "refresh_token")
 		form.Set("refresh_token", stored.RefreshToken)
 		form.Set("client_id", opts.AppId)
-		usedAssertion, caErr := clientAuth.applyClientAssertion(context.Background(), form, core.OpenAPIAudience(opts.Domain))
-		if caErr != nil {
-			return nil, caErr
-		}
-		if !usedAssertion {
-			form.Set("client_secret", opts.AppSecret)
-		}
+		form.Set("client_secret", opts.AppSecret)
 
 		req, err := http.NewRequest("POST", endpoints.Token, strings.NewReader(form.Encode()))
 		if err != nil {

internal/auth/uat_client_options_test.go

@@ -38,27 +38,3 @@ func TestNewUATCallOptions(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Error("ErrOut not set correctly")
 	}
 }
-
-// TestNewUATCallOptions_PrivateKeyJWT verifies the auth-method fields propagate
-// so the refresh path can mint a client_assertion instead of sending a secret.
-func TestNewUATCallOptions_PrivateKeyJWT(t *testing.T) {
-	cfg := &core.CliConfig{
-		AppID:       "cli_pk",
-		Brand:       core.BrandFeishu,
-		UserOpenId:  "ou_test",
-		AuthMethod:  core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT,
-		KeyLabel:    "agent-key",
-		KeyProvider: core.KeylessProviderLarkSuite,
-	}
-	opts := NewUATCallOptions(cfg, &bytes.Buffer{})
-
-	if opts.AuthMethod != core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT {
-		t.Errorf("AuthMethod = %q, want private_key_jwt", opts.AuthMethod)
-	}
-	if opts.KeyLabel != "agent-key" {
-		t.Errorf("KeyLabel = %q, want agent-key", opts.KeyLabel)
-	}
-	if opts.KeyProvider != core.KeylessProviderLarkSuite {
-		t.Errorf("KeyProvider = %q, want %q", opts.KeyProvider, core.KeylessProviderLarkSuite)
-	}
-}

internal/auth/uat_client_test.go

@@ -1,122 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
-
-package auth
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"fmt"
-	"io"
-	"net/http"
-	"net/url"
-	"strings"
-	"testing"
-	"time"
-
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/auth/jwt"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
-)
-
-type uatRoundTripFunc func(*http.Request) (*http.Response, error)
-
-func (fn uatRoundTripFunc) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
-	return fn(req)
-}
-
-type retryExternalAssertionSigner struct {
-	calls int
-}
-
-func (s *retryExternalAssertionSigner) SignClientAssertion(_ context.Context, _, _, _ string) (string, string, error) {
-	s.calls++
-	return jwt.ClientAssertionType, fmt.Sprintf("refresh.jwt.%d", s.calls), nil
-}
-
-func TestDoRefreshToken_PrivateKeyJWTRetryResolvesOnceAndRemintsAssertion(t *testing.T) {
-	signer := &retryExternalAssertionSigner{}
-	resolveCalls := 0
-	previous := resolveExternalAssertionSigner
-	resolveExternalAssertionSigner = func(_ context.Context, provider string) (clientAssertionSigner, error) {
-		resolveCalls++
-		if provider != core.KeylessProviderLarkSuite {
-			t.Fatalf("provider = %q", provider)
-		}
-		return signer, nil
-	}
-	t.Cleanup(func() { resolveExternalAssertionSigner = previous })
-
-	var forms []url.Values
-	httpClient := &http.Client{Transport: uatRoundTripFunc(func(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
-		body, err := io.ReadAll(req.Body)
-		if err != nil {
-			return nil, err
-		}
-		form, err := url.ParseQuery(string(body))
-		if err != nil {
-			return nil, err
-		}
-		forms = append(forms, form)
-
-		responseBody := `{"code":20050,"error":"server_error","error_description":"retry"}`
-		if len(forms) == 2 {
-			// A success-shaped response without a token lets the test exercise the
-			// retry without writing platform keychain state.
-			responseBody = `{"code":0}`
-		}
-		return &http.Response{
-			StatusCode: http.StatusOK,
-			Header:     make(http.Header),
-			Body:       io.NopCloser(strings.NewReader(responseBody)),
-			Request:    req,
-		}, nil
-	})}
-
-	now := time.Now().UnixMilli()
-	stored := &StoredUAToken{
-		UserOpenId:       "ou_test",
-		AppId:            "cli_external",
-		RefreshToken:     "refresh-token",
-		RefreshExpiresAt: now + int64(time.Hour/time.Millisecond),
-		Scope:            "offline_access",
-		GrantedAt:        now,
-	}
-	opts := UATCallOptions{
-		UserOpenId:  stored.UserOpenId,
-		AppId:       stored.AppId,
-		Domain:      core.BrandFeishu,
-		AuthMethod:  core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT,
-		KeyLabel:    "openclaw-lark",
-		KeyProvider: core.KeylessProviderLarkSuite,
-		ErrOut:      io.Discard,
-	}
-
-	updated, err := doRefreshToken(httpClient, opts, stored)
-	if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "no access_token") {
-		t.Fatalf("doRefreshToken error = %v, want missing access_token after retry", err)
-	}
-	if updated != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("updated token = %#v, want nil", updated)
-	}
-	if resolveCalls != 1 {
-		t.Fatalf("provider resolution calls = %d, want 1", resolveCalls)
-	}
-	if signer.calls != 2 {
-		t.Fatalf("assertion signing calls = %d, want 2", signer.calls)
-	}
-	if len(forms) != 2 {
-		t.Fatalf("token endpoint requests = %d, want 2", len(forms))
-	}
-	first := forms[0].Get("client_assertion")
-	second := forms[1].Get("client_assertion")
-	if first == "" || second == "" || first == second {
-		t.Fatalf("assertions = (%q, %q), want two fresh values", first, second)
-	}
-	for _, form := range forms {
-		if form.Get("grant_type") != "refresh_token" {
-			t.Fatalf("grant_type = %q, want refresh_token", form.Get("grant_type"))
-		}
-		if form.Has("client_secret") {
-			t.Fatalf("private_key_jwt form leaked client_secret: %v", form)
-		}
-	}
-}

internal/binding/keyless_types_test.go

@@ -1,112 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
-
-package binding
-
-import "testing"
-
-func TestListCandidateApps_KeylessSingleAccount(t *testing.T) {
-	apps := ListCandidateApps(&FeishuChannel{
-		AppID:      "cli_keyless",
-		Brand:      "feishu",
-		AuthMethod: AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT,
-		KeyRef:     "openclaw-lark",
-	})
-	if len(apps) != 1 {
-		t.Fatalf("count = %d, want 1", len(apps))
-	}
-	if !apps[0].IsKeyless() {
-		t.Fatalf("candidate = %#v, want keyless", apps[0])
-	}
-	if apps[0].KeyRef != "openclaw-lark" {
-		t.Fatalf("KeyRef = %q, want openclaw-lark", apps[0].KeyRef)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestListCandidateApps_KeylessMultiAccountInheritance(t *testing.T) {
-	apps := ListCandidateApps(&FeishuChannel{
-		AppID:      "cli_top",
-		Brand:      "lark",
-		AuthMethod: AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT,
-		KeyRef:     "openclaw-lark",
-		Accounts: map[string]*FeishuAccount{
-			"work": {},
-		},
-	})
-	if len(apps) != 2 {
-		t.Fatalf("count = %d, want 2 (implicit default + work)", len(apps))
-	}
-	app := candidateByLabel(t, apps, "work")
-	if app.Label != "work" || app.AppID != "cli_top" || app.Brand != "lark" {
-		t.Fatalf("candidate identity = %#v", app)
-	}
-	if app.AuthMethod != AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT || app.KeyRef != "openclaw-lark" || !app.IsKeyless() {
-		t.Fatalf("candidate keyless fields = %#v", app)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestListCandidateApps_KeylessAccountOverride(t *testing.T) {
-	apps := ListCandidateApps(&FeishuChannel{
-		AppID:      "cli_top",
-		AuthMethod: AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT,
-		KeyRef:     "top-key",
-		Accounts: map[string]*FeishuAccount{
-			"work": {AppID: "cli_work", KeyRef: "work-key"},
-		},
-	})
-	if len(apps) != 2 {
-		t.Fatalf("count = %d, want 2 (implicit default + work)", len(apps))
-	}
-	if got := candidateByLabel(t, apps, "work"); got.AppID != "cli_work" || got.KeyRef != "work-key" || !got.IsKeyless() {
-		t.Fatalf("candidate = %#v", got)
-	}
-}
-
-func candidateByLabel(t *testing.T, apps []CandidateApp, label string) CandidateApp {
-	t.Helper()
-	for _, app := range apps {
-		if app.Label == label {
-			return app
-		}
-	}
-	t.Fatalf("candidate %q not found in %#v", label, apps)
-	return CandidateApp{}
-}
-
-func TestCandidateApp_SecretTakesPrecedenceOverKeyless(t *testing.T) {
-	app := CandidateApp{
-		AppID:      "cli_both",
-		AppSecret:  SecretInput{Plain: "secret"},
-		AuthMethod: AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT,
-		KeyRef:     "openclaw-lark",
-	}
-	if app.IsKeyless() {
-		t.Fatal("an appSecret-backed OpenClaw account must not be treated as keyless")
-	}
-}
-
-func TestCandidateApp_KeylessRequiresKeyRef(t *testing.T) {
-	app := CandidateApp{AppID: "cli_missing_key", AuthMethod: AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT}
-	if app.IsKeyless() {
-		t.Fatal("private_key_jwt without keyRef must not be treated as usable keyless")
-	}
-}
-
-func TestListCandidateApps_KeylessImplicitDefault(t *testing.T) {
-	apps := ListCandidateApps(&FeishuChannel{
-		AppID:      "cli_default",
-		AuthMethod: AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT,
-		KeyRef:     "openclaw-lark",
-		Accounts: map[string]*FeishuAccount{
-			"work": {AppID: "cli_work", AuthMethod: AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT, KeyRef: "work-key"},
-		},
-	})
-	if len(apps) != 2 {
-		t.Fatalf("count = %d, want 2", len(apps))
-	}
-	for _, app := range apps {
-		if !app.IsKeyless() {
-			t.Fatalf("candidate = %#v, want keyless", app)
-		}
-	}
-}

internal/binding/types.go

@@ -31,24 +31,20 @@ type ChannelsRoot struct {
 // `Brand` stays aligned with our internal terminology, but the JSON
 // tag matches OpenClaw's on-disk format.
 type FeishuChannel struct {
-	Enabled    *bool                     `json:"enabled,omitempty"` // nil = default enabled
-	AppID      string                    `json:"appId,omitempty"`
-	AppSecret  SecretInput               `json:"appSecret,omitempty"`
-	Brand      string                    `json:"domain,omitempty"`
-	Accounts   map[string]*FeishuAccount `json:"accounts,omitempty"`
-	AuthMethod string                    `json:"authMethod,omitempty"`
-	KeyRef     string                    `json:"keyRef,omitempty"`
+	Enabled   *bool                     `json:"enabled,omitempty"` // nil = default enabled
+	AppID     string                    `json:"appId,omitempty"`
+	AppSecret SecretInput               `json:"appSecret,omitempty"`
+	Brand     string                    `json:"domain,omitempty"`
+	Accounts  map[string]*FeishuAccount `json:"accounts,omitempty"`
 }
 
 // FeishuAccount is a single account entry within Accounts.
 // Like FeishuChannel, `Brand` maps to OpenClaw's `domain` key.
 type FeishuAccount struct {
-	Enabled    *bool       `json:"enabled,omitempty"` // nil = default enabled
-	AppID      string      `json:"appId,omitempty"`
-	AppSecret  SecretInput `json:"appSecret,omitempty"`
-	Brand      string      `json:"domain,omitempty"`
-	AuthMethod string      `json:"authMethod,omitempty"`
-	KeyRef     string      `json:"keyRef,omitempty"`
+	Enabled   *bool       `json:"enabled,omitempty"` // nil = default enabled
+	AppID     string      `json:"appId,omitempty"`
+	AppSecret SecretInput `json:"appSecret,omitempty"`
+	Brand     string      `json:"domain,omitempty"`
 }
 
 // isEnabled returns true if the enabled field is nil (default) or explicitly true.
@@ -232,25 +228,10 @@ func LookupProvider(ref *SecretRef, cfg *SecretsConfig) (*ProviderConfig, error)
 
 // CandidateApp represents a bindable app from OpenClaw's feishu channel config.
 type CandidateApp struct {
-	Label      string
-	AppID      string
-	AppSecret  SecretInput
-	Brand      string
-	AuthMethod string
-	KeyRef     string
-}
-
-const AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT = "private_key_jwt"
-
-// IsKeyless mirrors openclaw-lark's resolved-account precedence: an app
-// secret wins when both credential shapes are present. Only a secretless
-// private_key_jwt account with a keyRef is eligible for helper reuse.
-func (c CandidateApp) IsKeyless() bool {
-	return c.AppSecret.IsZero() && c.AuthMethod == AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT && strings.TrimSpace(c.KeyRef) != ""
-}
-
-func bindableCredential(secret SecretInput, authMethod, keyRef string) bool {
-	return !secret.IsZero() || (authMethod == AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT && strings.TrimSpace(keyRef) != "")
+	Label     string
+	AppID     string
+	AppSecret SecretInput
+	Brand     string
 }
 
 // ListCandidateApps enumerates all bindable (enabled) apps from a FeishuChannel.
@@ -262,7 +243,7 @@ func ListCandidateApps(ch *FeishuChannel) []CandidateApp {
 	if len(ch.Accounts) > 0 {
 		apps := make([]CandidateApp, 0, len(ch.Accounts)+1)
 
-		// When accounts exist AND top-level has its own bindable credential,
+		// When accounts exist AND top-level has its own appId+appSecret,
 		// include the top-level as a "default" candidate — aligned with
 		// openclaw-lark getLarkAccountIds() which adds DEFAULT_ACCOUNT_ID
 		// when top-level credentials are present and no explicit "default" exists.
@@ -273,15 +254,12 @@ func ListCandidateApps(ch *FeishuChannel) []CandidateApp {
 				break
 			}
 		}
-		if !hasDefault && ch.AppID != "" && isEnabled(ch.Enabled) &&
-			bindableCredential(ch.AppSecret, ch.AuthMethod, ch.KeyRef) {
+		if !hasDefault && ch.AppID != "" && !ch.AppSecret.IsZero() && isEnabled(ch.Enabled) {
 			apps = append(apps, CandidateApp{
-				Label:      "default",
-				AppID:      ch.AppID,
-				AppSecret:  ch.AppSecret,
-				Brand:      ch.Brand,
-				AuthMethod: ch.AuthMethod,
-				KeyRef:     ch.KeyRef,
+				Label:     "default",
+				AppID:     ch.AppID,
+				AppSecret: ch.AppSecret,
+				Brand:     ch.Brand,
 			})
 		}
 
@@ -304,21 +282,11 @@ func ListCandidateApps(ch *FeishuChannel) []CandidateApp {
 			if brand == "" {
 				brand = ch.Brand
 			}
-			authMethod := acct.AuthMethod
-			if authMethod == "" {
-				authMethod = ch.AuthMethod
-			}
-			keyRef := acct.KeyRef
-			if keyRef == "" {
-				keyRef = ch.KeyRef
-			}
 			apps = append(apps, CandidateApp{
-				Label:      label,
-				AppID:      appID,
-				AppSecret:  appSecret,
-				Brand:      brand,
-				AuthMethod: authMethod,
-				KeyRef:     keyRef,
+				Label:     label,
+				AppID:     appID,
+				AppSecret: appSecret,
+				Brand:     brand,
 			})
 		}
 		return apps
@@ -327,12 +295,10 @@ func ListCandidateApps(ch *FeishuChannel) []CandidateApp {
 	// Single account at top level — check if channel itself is enabled
 	if ch.AppID != "" && isEnabled(ch.Enabled) {
 		return []CandidateApp{{
-			Label:      "",
-			AppID:      ch.AppID,
-			AppSecret:  ch.AppSecret,
-			Brand:      ch.Brand,
-			AuthMethod: ch.AuthMethod,
-			KeyRef:     ch.KeyRef,
+			Label:     "",
+			AppID:     ch.AppID,
+			AppSecret: ch.AppSecret,
+			Brand:     ch.Brand,
 		}}
 	}
 

internal/client/client.go

@@ -212,6 +212,9 @@ func (c *APIClient) DoStream(ctx context.Context, req *larkcore.ApiReq, as core.
 	resp, err := httpClient.Do(httpReq)
 	if err != nil {
 		cancel()
+		if _, ok := errs.ProblemOf(err); ok {
+			return nil, err
+		}
 		return nil, errs.NewNetworkError(classifyNetworkSubtype(err), "stream request failed: %s", err).WithCause(err)
 	}
 	resp.Body = &cancelOnCloseBody{ReadCloser: resp.Body, cancel: cancel}

internal/client/client_test.go

@@ -518,6 +518,29 @@ func TestDoStream_TransportFailureSplitsSubtype(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+func TestDoStream_PreservesTypedTransportError(t *testing.T) {
+	policyErr := errs.NewSecurityPolicyError(errs.SubtypeAccessDenied, "blocked redirect")
+	ac := &APIClient{
+		HTTP: &http.Client{Transport: roundTripFunc(func(*http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
+			return nil, policyErr
+		})},
+		Credential: credential.NewCredentialProvider(nil, nil, &staticTokenResolver{}, nil),
+		Config:     &core.CliConfig{AppID: "test-app", AppSecret: "test-secret", Brand: core.BrandFeishu},
+	}
+
+	_, err := ac.DoStream(context.Background(), &larkcore.ApiReq{
+		HttpMethod: http.MethodGet,
+		ApiPath:    "/open-apis/drive/v1/files/file_token/download",
+	}, core.AsBot)
+	problem, ok := errs.ProblemOf(err)
+	if !ok || problem.Category != errs.CategoryPolicy || problem.Subtype != errs.SubtypeAccessDenied {
+		t.Fatalf("DoStream() problem = %#v, %v; want policy/access_denied", problem, ok)
+	}
+	if !errors.Is(err, policyErr) {
+		t.Fatal("DoStream() did not preserve the typed transport error")
+	}
+}
+
 // failingTokenResolver always returns TokenUnavailableError, exercising the
 // auth/credential failure path through resolveAccessToken.
 type failingTokenResolver struct{}

internal/cmdutil/factory.go

@@ -16,10 +16,12 @@ import (
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/errs"
 	extcred "github.com/larksuite/cli/extension/credential"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/extension/fileio"
+	exttransport "github.com/larksuite/cli/extension/transport"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/client"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/credential"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/keychain"
+	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/transport"
 )
 
 // Factory holds shared dependencies injected into every command.
@@ -31,7 +33,7 @@ type InvocationContext struct {
 
 type Factory struct {
 	Config     func() (*core.CliConfig, error) // lazily loads app config from Credential
-	HttpClient func() (*http.Client, error)    // HTTP client for non-Lark API calls (with retry and security headers)
+	HttpClient func() (*http.Client, error)    // policy-routed HTTP client for direct requests
 	LarkClient func() (*lark.Client, error)    // Lark SDK client for all Open API calls
 	IOStreams  *IOStreams                      // stdin/stdout/stderr streams
 
@@ -48,6 +50,18 @@ type Factory struct {
 	SkillContent fs.FS // embedded skill tree (rooted at the skill list); nil when the build embeds no skills
 }
 
+// ExternalHTTPClient returns a clone of the existing Factory client whose
+// requests are explicitly classified as external. The underlying client,
+// redirect policy, timeout, proxy configuration, and legacy transport provider
+// behavior are preserved.
+func (f *Factory) ExternalHTTPClient() (*http.Client, error) {
+	client, err := f.HttpClient()
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return transport.ClientForRequestClass(client, exttransport.RequestClassExternal), nil
+}
+
 // ResolveFileIO resolves a FileIO instance using the current execution context.
 // The provider controls whether the returned instance is fresh or cached.
 func (f *Factory) ResolveFileIO(ctx context.Context) fileio.FileIO {

internal/cmdutil/factory_default.go

@@ -5,16 +5,18 @@ package cmdutil
 
 import (
 	"context"
-	"fmt"
 	"io"
 	"net/http"
+	"net/url"
 	"os"
+	"strings"
 	"sync"
 	"time"
 
 	lark "github.com/larksuite/oapi-sdk-go/v3"
 	larkcore "github.com/larksuite/oapi-sdk-go/v3/core"
 
+	"github.com/larksuite/cli/errs"
 	extcred "github.com/larksuite/cli/extension/credential"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/extension/fileio"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/auth"
@@ -22,6 +24,7 @@ import (
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/credential"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/keychain"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/registry"
+	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/riskcontrol"
 	_ "github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/security/contentsafety" // register content safety provider
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/transport"
 	_ "github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/vfs/localfileio" // register default FileIO provider
@@ -33,7 +36,7 @@ import (
 //	Phase 1: HttpClient (no credential dependency)
 //	Phase 2: Credential (sole data source for account info)
 //	Phase 3: Config derived from Credential
-//	Phase 4: LarkClient derived from Credential
+//	Phase 4: LarkClient derived from Credential and workspace policy
 func NewDefault(streams *IOStreams, inv InvocationContext) *Factory {
 	streams = normalizeStreams(streams)
 	f := &Factory{
@@ -47,6 +50,19 @@ func NewDefault(streams *IOStreams, inv InvocationContext) *Factory {
 	// workspace-scoped. Default is WorkspaceLocal — existing behavior unchanged.
 	ws := core.DetectWorkspaceFromEnv(os.Getenv)
 	core.SetCurrentWorkspace(ws)
+	workspaceConfig := core.NewConfigSnapshot()
+	bootstrapHostSignalSource := sync.OnceValue(func() riskcontrol.Source {
+		return resolveSDKHostSignalSource(workspaceConfig)
+	})
+	// Install after workspace selection so the dependency bootstrap bridge uses
+	// the correct shared proxy configuration. NewDefault is also used by cmd.Build
+	// consumers, so this keeps their request routing identical to cmd.Execute.
+	transport.InstallSDKTransportBridge(func(base http.RoundTripper) http.RoundTripper {
+		return buildSDKPlatformTransportWithBase(
+			base,
+			bootstrapHostSignalSource(),
+		)
+	})
 
 	// Inject workspace-aware dir into keychain's log system.
 	// This breaks the core↔keychain import cycle by using a function variable.
@@ -56,7 +72,7 @@ func NewDefault(streams *IOStreams, inv InvocationContext) *Factory {
 	f.FileIOProvider = fileio.GetProvider()
 
 	// Phase 1: HttpClient (no credential dependency)
-	f.HttpClient = cachedHttpClientFunc(f)
+	f.HttpClient = cachedHttpClientFunc(f, workspaceConfig)
 
 	// Phase 2: Credential (sole data source)
 	// Keychain is read via closure so callers can replace f.Keychain after construction.
@@ -67,7 +83,7 @@ func NewDefault(streams *IOStreams, inv InvocationContext) *Factory {
 		ErrOut:     f.IOStreams.ErrOut,
 	})
 
-	// Phase 3: Config derived from Credential via an explicit conversion boundary.
+	// Phase 3: Runtime config contains resolved account data only.
 	f.Config = sync.OnceValues(func() (*core.CliConfig, error) {
 		acct, err := f.Credential.ResolveAccount(context.Background())
 		if err != nil {
@@ -78,21 +94,52 @@ func NewDefault(streams *IOStreams, inv InvocationContext) *Factory {
 		return cfg, nil
 	})
 
-	// Phase 4: LarkClient from Credential (placeholder AppSecret)
-	f.LarkClient = cachedLarkClientFunc(f)
+	// Phase 4: LarkClient composes account data and workspace policy at the SDK
+	// transport boundary.
+	f.LarkClient = cachedLarkClientFunc(f, workspaceConfig)
 
 	return f
 }
 
-// safeRedirectPolicy prevents credential headers from being forwarded
-// when a response redirects to a different host (e.g. Lark API 302 → CDN).
-// Strips Authorization, X-Lark-MCP-UAT, and X-Lark-MCP-TAT on cross-host
-// redirects; other headers like X-Cli-* pass through.
+// safeRedirectPolicy permits cross-origin redirects only for bodyless GET and
+// HEAD requests. This allows API download redirects while preventing OAuth or
+// other credential-bearing request bodies from being replayed to another
+// origin. HTTPS requests can never be downgraded to HTTP.
 func safeRedirectPolicy(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
 	if len(via) >= 10 {
-		return fmt.Errorf("too many redirects")
+		return errs.NewNetworkError(errs.SubtypeNetworkTransport, "too many redirects")
 	}
-	if len(via) > 0 && req.URL.Host != via[0].URL.Host {
+	if len(via) == 0 {
+		return nil
+	}
+	original := via[0]
+	previous := via[len(via)-1]
+	if previous.URL != nil && req.URL != nil && strings.EqualFold(previous.URL.Scheme, "https") && !strings.EqualFold(req.URL.Scheme, "https") {
+		return errs.NewSecurityPolicyError(
+			errs.SubtypeAccessDenied,
+			"redirect from HTTPS to %s is not allowed",
+			req.URL.Scheme,
+		)
+	}
+	if !sameRedirectOrigin(previous.URL, req.URL) {
+		if req.Method != http.MethodGet && req.Method != http.MethodHead {
+			return errs.NewSecurityPolicyError(
+				errs.SubtypeAccessDenied,
+				"cross-origin redirect for HTTP method %s is not allowed",
+				req.Method,
+			)
+		}
+		if req.Body != nil || req.GetBody != nil {
+			return errs.NewSecurityPolicyError(
+				errs.SubtypeAccessDenied,
+				"cross-origin redirect with a request body is not allowed",
+			)
+		}
+	}
+	// net/http copies initial headers onto every redirect request. Continue
+	// stripping credentials for every hop outside the initial origin, even when
+	// two consecutive redirect targets share an origin.
+	if !sameRedirectOrigin(original.URL, req.URL) {
 		req.Header.Del("Authorization")
 		req.Header.Del("X-Lark-MCP-UAT")
 		req.Header.Del("X-Lark-MCP-TAT")
@@ -100,6 +147,29 @@ func safeRedirectPolicy(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
 	return nil
 }
 
+func sameRedirectOrigin(left, right *url.URL) bool {
+	if left == nil || right == nil {
+		return false
+	}
+	return strings.EqualFold(left.Scheme, right.Scheme) &&
+		strings.EqualFold(left.Hostname(), right.Hostname()) &&
+		effectivePort(left) == effectivePort(right)
+}
+
+func effectivePort(candidate *url.URL) string {
+	if port := candidate.Port(); port != "" {
+		return port
+	}
+	switch strings.ToLower(candidate.Scheme) {
+	case "http":
+		return "80"
+	case "https":
+		return "443"
+	default:
+		return ""
+	}
+}
+
 // warnIfProxied is a test seam for the proxy-warning gate. Production wires it
 // to transport.WarnIfProxied; tests swap in a spy to count invocations. It is
 // needed because the real function is guarded by an internal sync.Once, so
@@ -108,19 +178,19 @@ func safeRedirectPolicy(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
 // .StderrIsTerminal field, which tests set directly.
 var warnIfProxied = transport.WarnIfProxied
 
-func cachedHttpClientFunc(f *Factory) func() (*http.Client, error) {
+func cachedHttpClientFunc(f *Factory, workspaceConfig workspaceConfigSource) func() (*http.Client, error) {
 	return sync.OnceValues(func() (*http.Client, error) {
 		if f.IOStreams.StderrIsTerminal {
 			warnIfProxied(f.IOStreams.ErrOut)
 		}
 
-		var rt http.RoundTripper = transport.Shared()
-		rt = &RetryTransport{Base: rt}
-		rt = &SecurityHeaderTransport{Base: rt}
-		rt = &auth.SecurityPolicyTransport{Base: rt} // Add our global response interceptor
-		rt = wrapWithExtension(rt)
+		hostSignalSource := resolveSDKHostSignalSource(workspaceConfig)
+		shared := transport.Shared()
+		outbound := riskcontrol.NewTransport(shared, hostSignalSource)
+		platform := buildDirectHTTPTransport(outbound, true)
+		external := buildDirectHTTPTransport(outbound, false)
 		client := &http.Client{
-			Transport:     rt,
+			Transport:     transport.NewHTTPPolicyRouter(platform, external),
 			Timeout:       30 * time.Second,
 			CheckRedirect: safeRedirectPolicy,
 		}
@@ -128,7 +198,16 @@ func cachedHttpClientFunc(f *Factory) func() (*http.Client, error) {
 	})
 }
 
-func cachedLarkClientFunc(f *Factory) func() (*lark.Client, error) {
+func buildDirectHTTPTransport(base http.RoundTripper, platform bool) http.RoundTripper {
+	var builtIn http.RoundTripper = &RetryTransport{Base: base}
+	builtIn = &SecurityHeaderTransport{Base: builtIn}
+	if platform {
+		builtIn = &auth.SecurityPolicyTransport{Base: builtIn}
+	}
+	return builtIn
+}
+
+func cachedLarkClientFunc(f *Factory, workspaceConfig workspaceConfigSource) func() (*lark.Client, error) {
 	return sync.OnceValues(func() (*lark.Client, error) {
 		acct, err := f.Credential.ResolveAccount(context.Background())
 		if err != nil {
@@ -142,8 +221,9 @@ func cachedLarkClientFunc(f *Factory) func() (*lark.Client, error) {
 		if f.IOStreams.StderrIsTerminal {
 			warnIfProxied(f.IOStreams.ErrOut)
 		}
+		hostSignalSource := resolveSDKHostSignalSource(workspaceConfig)
 		opts = append(opts, lark.WithHttpClient(&http.Client{
-			Transport:     buildSDKTransport(),
+			Transport:     buildSDKTransport(hostSignalSource),
 			CheckRedirect: safeRedirectPolicy,
 		}))
 		ep := core.ResolveEndpoints(acct.Brand)
@@ -152,13 +232,41 @@ func cachedLarkClientFunc(f *Factory) func() (*lark.Client, error) {
 	})
 }
 
-func buildSDKTransport() http.RoundTripper {
-	var sdkTransport http.RoundTripper = transport.Shared()
-	sdkTransport = &RetryTransport{Base: sdkTransport}
-	sdkTransport = &UserAgentTransport{Base: sdkTransport}
-	sdkTransport = &BuildHeaderTransport{Base: sdkTransport}
-	sdkTransport = &auth.SecurityPolicyTransport{Base: sdkTransport}
-	return wrapWithExtension(sdkTransport)
+func buildSDKTransport(hostSignalSource riskcontrol.Source) http.RoundTripper {
+	return buildSDKTransportWithBase(transport.Shared(), hostSignalSource)
+}
+
+func buildSDKPlatformTransportWithBase(
+	base http.RoundTripper,
+	hostSignalSource riskcontrol.Source,
+) http.RoundTripper {
+	outbound := riskcontrol.NewTransport(base, hostSignalSource)
+	return buildSDKHTTPTransport(outbound, true)
+}
+
+func buildSDKTransportWithBase(
+	base http.RoundTripper,
+	hostSignalSource riskcontrol.Source,
+) http.RoundTripper {
+	// Risk control is the innermost trusted boundary for both request classes.
+	// It therefore observes the final URL and strips extension-supplied reserved
+	// headers immediately before the network transport.
+	outbound := riskcontrol.NewTransport(base, hostSignalSource)
+	return transport.NewHTTPPolicyRouter(
+		buildSDKHTTPTransport(outbound, true),
+		buildSDKHTTPTransport(outbound, false),
+	)
+}
+
+func buildSDKHTTPTransport(base http.RoundTripper, platform bool) http.RoundTripper {
+	var builtIn http.RoundTripper = &RetryTransport{Base: base}
+	builtIn = &UserAgentTransport{Base: builtIn}
+	builtIn = &BuildHeaderTransport{Base: builtIn}
+	builtIn = &SecurityHeaderTransport{Base: builtIn}
+	if platform {
+		builtIn = &auth.SecurityPolicyTransport{Base: builtIn}
+	}
+	return builtIn
 }
 
 type credentialDeps struct {

internal/cmdutil/factory_http_test.go

@@ -4,12 +4,24 @@
 package cmdutil
 
 import (
+	"errors"
 	"io"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"strings"
 	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/larksuite/cli/errs"
+	exttransport "github.com/larksuite/cli/extension/transport"
+	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
+	internaltransport "github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/transport"
 )
 
-func TestCachedHttpClientFunc_ReturnsSameInstance(t *testing.T) {
-	fn := cachedHttpClientFunc(&Factory{IOStreams: &IOStreams{ErrOut: io.Discard}})
+func TestCachedHTTPClientFunc_ReturnsSameInstance(t *testing.T) {
+	isEnabled := false
+	f, _, _, _ := TestFactory(t, &core.CliConfig{AppID: "test-app"})
+	f.IOStreams.ErrOut = io.Discard
+	fn := cachedHttpClientFunc(f, staticWorkspaceConfig{config: &core.MultiAppConfig{RiskControl: &isEnabled}})
 
 	c1, err := fn()
 	if err != nil {
@@ -28,18 +40,304 @@ func TestCachedHttpClientFunc_ReturnsSameInstance(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-func TestCachedHttpClientFunc_HasTimeout(t *testing.T) {
-	fn := cachedHttpClientFunc(&Factory{IOStreams: &IOStreams{ErrOut: io.Discard}})
+func TestCachedHTTPClientFunc_HasTimeout(t *testing.T) {
+	isEnabled := false
+	f, _, _, _ := TestFactory(t, &core.CliConfig{AppID: "test-app"})
+	f.IOStreams.ErrOut = io.Discard
+	fn := cachedHttpClientFunc(f, staticWorkspaceConfig{config: &core.MultiAppConfig{RiskControl: &isEnabled}})
 	c, _ := fn()
 	if c.Timeout == 0 {
 		t.Error("expected non-zero timeout")
 	}
 }
 
-func TestCachedHttpClientFunc_HasRedirectPolicy(t *testing.T) {
-	fn := cachedHttpClientFunc(&Factory{IOStreams: &IOStreams{ErrOut: io.Discard}})
+func TestCachedHTTPClientFunc_HasRedirectPolicy(t *testing.T) {
+	isEnabled := false
+	f, _, _, _ := TestFactory(t, &core.CliConfig{AppID: "test-app"})
+	f.IOStreams.ErrOut = io.Discard
+	fn := cachedHttpClientFunc(f, staticWorkspaceConfig{config: &core.MultiAppConfig{RiskControl: &isEnabled}})
 	c, _ := fn()
 	if c.CheckRedirect == nil {
 		t.Error("expected CheckRedirect to be set (safeRedirectPolicy)")
 	}
 }
+
+func TestFactoryExternalHTTPClientClonesExistingClient(t *testing.T) {
+	base := &http.Client{Timeout: 17, CheckRedirect: safeRedirectPolicy}
+	factory := &Factory{HttpClient: func() (*http.Client, error) { return base, nil }}
+
+	external, err := factory.ExternalHTTPClient()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if external == base {
+		t.Fatal("ExternalHTTPClient returned the cached client instead of a clone")
+	}
+	if external.Timeout != base.Timeout || external.CheckRedirect == nil {
+		t.Fatal("ExternalHTTPClient did not preserve client policy")
+	}
+	if base.Transport != nil {
+		t.Fatal("ExternalHTTPClient mutated the cached client's transport")
+	}
+}
+
+type platformOnlyStubProvider struct {
+	*stubTransportProvider
+}
+
+func (*platformOnlyStubProvider) SupportsRequestClass(class exttransport.RequestClass) bool {
+	return class == exttransport.RequestClassPlatform
+}
+
+func TestFactoryHTTPClientRoutesPoliciesByRequestClass(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_NO_PROXY", "1")
+
+	interceptor := &headerCapturingInterceptor{}
+	exttransport.Register(&platformOnlyStubProvider{stubTransportProvider: &stubTransportProvider{interceptor: interceptor}})
+	t.Cleanup(func() { exttransport.Register(nil) })
+
+	received := make(chan http.Header, 2)
+	server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
+		received <- req.Header.Clone()
+		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
+	}))
+	t.Cleanup(server.Close)
+
+	factory := &Factory{IOStreams: &IOStreams{ErrOut: io.Discard}}
+	client, err := cachedHttpClientFunc(factory, nil)()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	factory.HttpClient = func() (*http.Client, error) { return client, nil }
+	platformClient := internaltransport.ClientForRequestClass(client, exttransport.RequestClassPlatform)
+	externalClient, err := factory.ExternalHTTPClient()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	for _, client := range []*http.Client{platformClient, externalClient} {
+		resp, err := client.Get(server.URL)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		resp.Body.Close()
+	}
+
+	platformHeaders := <-received
+	if got := platformHeaders.Get("X-Custom-Trace"); got != "ext-trace-123" {
+		t.Fatalf("platform extension header = %q, want ext-trace-123", got)
+	}
+	if got := platformHeaders.Get(HeaderSource); got != SourceValue {
+		t.Fatalf("platform security header = %q, want %q", got, SourceValue)
+	}
+
+	externalHeaders := <-received
+	if got := externalHeaders.Get("X-Custom-Trace"); got != "" {
+		t.Fatalf("external request leaked extension header %q", got)
+	}
+	for header, values := range BaseSecurityHeaders() {
+		if len(values) == 0 {
+			continue
+		}
+		want := values[len(values)-1]
+		if got := externalHeaders.Get(header); got != want {
+			t.Fatalf("external security header %s = %q, want preserved value %q", header, got, want)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestFactoryExternalHTTPClientDoesNotParsePlatformErrorProtocol(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_NO_PROXY", "1")
+	exttransport.Register(nil)
+
+	server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
+		w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+		_, _ = io.WriteString(w, `{"code":21000,"msg":"application-defined external response","data":{"cli_hint":"external-defined"}}`)
+	}))
+	t.Cleanup(server.Close)
+
+	factory := &Factory{IOStreams: &IOStreams{ErrOut: io.Discard}}
+	client, err := cachedHttpClientFunc(factory, nil)()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	factory.HttpClient = func() (*http.Client, error) { return client, nil }
+
+	platform := internaltransport.ClientForRequestClass(client, exttransport.RequestClassPlatform)
+	if _, err := platform.Get(server.URL); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("platform request error = nil, want security policy classification")
+	} else {
+		var policyErr *errs.SecurityPolicyError
+		if !errors.As(err, &policyErr) {
+			t.Fatalf("platform request error type = %T, want *errs.SecurityPolicyError", err)
+		}
+	}
+
+	external, err := factory.ExternalHTTPClient()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	resp, err := external.Get(server.URL)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("external request parsed platform error protocol: %v", err)
+	}
+	resp.Body.Close()
+}
+
+func TestSafeRedirectPolicyAllowsBodylessCrossOriginGetAndStripsCredentials(t *testing.T) {
+	original, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "https://open.feishu.cn/start", nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	redirect, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "https://cdn.example.com/file", nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	for _, header := range []string{"Authorization", "X-Lark-MCP-UAT", "X-Lark-MCP-TAT"} {
+		redirect.Header.Set(header, "secret")
+	}
+
+	if err := safeRedirectPolicy(redirect, []*http.Request{original}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("safeRedirectPolicy() error = %v, want allowed GET redirect", err)
+	}
+	for _, header := range []string{"Authorization", "X-Lark-MCP-UAT", "X-Lark-MCP-TAT"} {
+		if got := redirect.Header.Get(header); got != "" {
+			t.Fatalf("redirect retained %s=%q", header, got)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSafeRedirectPolicyRejectsHTTPSDowngrade(t *testing.T) {
+	original, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "https://open.feishu.cn/start", nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	redirect, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://open.feishu.cn/next", nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	err = safeRedirectPolicy(redirect, []*http.Request{original})
+	if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "HTTPS") {
+		t.Fatalf("safeRedirectPolicy() error = %v, want HTTPS downgrade rejection", err)
+	}
+	requireRedirectProblem(t, err, errs.CategoryPolicy, errs.SubtypeAccessDenied)
+}
+
+func TestSafeRedirectPolicyRejectsCrossOriginMethod(t *testing.T) {
+	original, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "https://accounts.feishu.cn/token", nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	redirect, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "https://external.example/token", nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	err = safeRedirectPolicy(redirect, []*http.Request{original})
+	if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "HTTP method POST") {
+		t.Fatalf("safeRedirectPolicy() error = %v, want cross-origin method rejection", err)
+	}
+	requireRedirectProblem(t, err, errs.CategoryPolicy, errs.SubtypeAccessDenied)
+}
+
+func TestSafeRedirectPolicyRejectsCrossOriginRequestBody(t *testing.T) {
+	original, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "https://accounts.feishu.cn/token", nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	redirect, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "https://external.example/token", strings.NewReader("client_secret=secret"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	err = safeRedirectPolicy(redirect, []*http.Request{original})
+	if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "request body") {
+		t.Fatalf("safeRedirectPolicy() error = %v, want cross-origin body rejection", err)
+	}
+	requireRedirectProblem(t, err, errs.CategoryPolicy, errs.SubtypeAccessDenied)
+}
+
+func TestSafeRedirectPolicyRejectsTooManyRedirects(t *testing.T) {
+	err := safeRedirectPolicy(&http.Request{}, make([]*http.Request, 10))
+	if err == nil || err.Error() != "too many redirects" {
+		t.Fatalf("safeRedirectPolicy() error = %v, want redirect limit rejection", err)
+	}
+	requireRedirectProblem(t, err, errs.CategoryNetwork, errs.SubtypeNetworkTransport)
+}
+
+func TestSafeRedirectPolicyTreatsDefaultHTTPSPortAsSameOrigin(t *testing.T) {
+	original, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "https://accounts.feishu.cn/token", strings.NewReader("secret"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	redirect, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "https://accounts.feishu.cn:443/token-next", strings.NewReader("secret"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	if err := safeRedirectPolicy(redirect, []*http.Request{original}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("safeRedirectPolicy() error = %v, want same-origin redirect", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSafeRedirectPolicyKeepsCredentialsStrippedAcrossExternalHops(t *testing.T) {
+	original, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "https://open.feishu.cn/start", nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	previous, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "https://cdn.example.com/first", nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	redirect, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "https://cdn.example.com/second", nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	redirect.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer copied-from-initial-request")
+
+	if err := safeRedirectPolicy(redirect, []*http.Request{original, previous}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("safeRedirectPolicy() error = %v, want same-CDN redirect", err)
+	}
+	if got := redirect.Header.Get("Authorization"); got != "" {
+		t.Fatalf("redirect retained Authorization=%q outside the initial origin", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSafeRedirectPolicyRejectsDowngradeOnLaterHop(t *testing.T) {
+	original, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://source.example/start", nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	previous, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "https://cdn.example.com/secure", nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	redirect, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://cdn.example.com/plain", nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	err = safeRedirectPolicy(redirect, []*http.Request{original, previous})
+	if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "HTTPS") {
+		t.Fatalf("safeRedirectPolicy() error = %v, want later-hop HTTPS downgrade rejection", err)
+	}
+	requireRedirectProblem(t, err, errs.CategoryPolicy, errs.SubtypeAccessDenied)
+}
+
+func requireRedirectProblem(t *testing.T, err error, category errs.Category, subtype errs.Subtype) {
+	t.Helper()
+	problem, ok := errs.ProblemOf(err)
+	if !ok {
+		t.Fatalf("error type = %T, want typed error", err)
+	}
+	if problem.Category != category || problem.Subtype != subtype {
+		t.Fatalf(
+			"error category/subtype = %s/%s, want %s/%s",
+			problem.Category,
+			problem.Subtype,
+			category,
+			subtype,
+		)
+	}
+}

internal/cmdutil/factory_proxy_warn_test.go

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import (
 	"testing"
 
 	_ "github.com/larksuite/cli/extension/credential/env" // registers the env-backed account provider
+	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/envvars"
 )
 
@@ -33,16 +34,18 @@ var proxyWarnGateCases = []struct {
 	{"non-terminal stderr stays silent", false, 0},
 }
 
-// TestCachedHttpClientFunc_ProxyWarnGate verifies the http-client init path
+// TestCachedHTTPClientFunc_ProxyWarnGate verifies the HTTP client init path
 // invokes WarnIfProxied only when stderr is an interactive terminal.
-func TestCachedHttpClientFunc_ProxyWarnGate(t *testing.T) {
+func TestCachedHTTPClientFunc_ProxyWarnGate(t *testing.T) {
+	isEnabled := false
 	for _, tc := range proxyWarnGateCases {
 		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
 			calls := installProxyWarnSpy(t)
 
-			fn := cachedHttpClientFunc(&Factory{IOStreams: &IOStreams{
-				ErrOut: io.Discard, StderrIsTerminal: tc.terminal,
-			}})
+			f, _, _, _ := TestFactory(t, &core.CliConfig{AppID: "test-app"})
+			f.IOStreams.ErrOut = io.Discard
+			f.IOStreams.StderrIsTerminal = tc.terminal
+			fn := cachedHttpClientFunc(f, staticWorkspaceConfig{config: &core.MultiAppConfig{RiskControl: &isEnabled}})
 			if _, err := fn(); err != nil {
 				t.Fatalf("http client init: %v", err)
 			}
@@ -73,7 +76,7 @@ func TestCachedLarkClientFunc_ProxyWarnGate(t *testing.T) {
 			// normalizeStreams copies the struct (out := *s), so the
 			// StderrIsTerminal field survives into f.IOStreams.
 			f := NewDefault(&IOStreams{ErrOut: io.Discard, StderrIsTerminal: tc.terminal}, InvocationContext{})
-			if _, err := cachedLarkClientFunc(f)(); err != nil {
+			if _, err := cachedLarkClientFunc(f, nil)(); err != nil {
 				t.Fatalf("lark client init: %v", err)
 			}
 

internal/cmdutil/localfile.go

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package cmdutil
+
+import (
+	"io/fs"
+
+	"github.com/larksuite/cli/extension/fileio"
+	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/validate"
+	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/vfs"
+)
+
+// StatLocalFile returns metadata for a path in the process filesystem namespace.
+// It is intended for advisory validation; callers must validate the opened file
+// again before using its contents.
+func StatLocalFile(path string) (fs.FileInfo, error) {
+	localPath, err := validate.LocalInputPath(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, &fileio.PathValidationError{Err: err}
+	}
+	return vfs.Stat(localPath)
+}
+
+// OpenLocalFile opens a path in the process filesystem namespace.
+// Absolute and relative paths are accepted. It is the shared replacement for
+// direct os.Open/os.ReadFile use in commands that intentionally read local
+// paths outside the workspace sandbox. Callers inspect the returned descriptor
+// before reading so validation and use apply to the same opened file.
+func OpenLocalFile(path string) (fs.File, error) {
+	localPath, err := validate.LocalInputPath(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, &fileio.PathValidationError{Err: err}
+	}
+	return vfs.Open(localPath)
+}

internal/cmdutil/localfile_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package cmdutil
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"io"
+	"io/fs"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/larksuite/cli/extension/fileio"
+	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/vfs"
+)
+
+func TestOpenLocalFile_AcceptsAbsoluteAndParentRelativePaths(t *testing.T) {
+	root := t.TempDir()
+	workDir := filepath.Join(root, "work")
+	if err := os.Mkdir(workDir, 0o755); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	path := filepath.Join(root, "input.txt")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte("content"), 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	TestChdir(t, workDir)
+
+	for _, input := range []string{path, filepath.Join("..", "input.txt")} {
+		f, err := OpenLocalFile(input)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("OpenLocalFile(%q) error = %v", input, err)
+		}
+		got, readErr := io.ReadAll(f)
+		closeErr := f.Close()
+		if readErr != nil || closeErr != nil || string(got) != "content" {
+			t.Fatalf("OpenLocalFile(%q) content=%q read=%v close=%v", input, got, readErr, closeErr)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestOpenLocalFile_RejectsInvalidInput(t *testing.T) {
+	if _, err := OpenLocalFile("input\n.txt"); !errors.Is(err, fileio.ErrPathValidation) {
+		t.Fatalf("OpenLocalFile() error = %v, want ErrPathValidation", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestStatLocalFile_ReturnsMetadata(t *testing.T) {
+	info, err := StatLocalFile(t.TempDir())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("StatLocalFile() error = %v", err)
+	}
+	if !info.IsDir() {
+		t.Fatalf("StatLocalFile() mode = %v, want directory", info.Mode())
+	}
+}
+
+func TestOpenLocalFile_DoesNotStatBeforeOpen(t *testing.T) {
+	path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "input.txt")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte("content"), 0o600); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	previous := vfs.DefaultFS
+	counting := &countingLocalFileFS{FS: previous}
+	vfs.DefaultFS = counting
+	t.Cleanup(func() { vfs.DefaultFS = previous })
+
+	f, err := OpenLocalFile(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("OpenLocalFile() error = %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := f.Close(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if counting.openCalls != 1 || counting.statCalls != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("OpenLocalFile() calls: Open=%d Stat=%d, want Open=1 Stat=0", counting.openCalls, counting.statCalls)
+	}
+}
+
+type countingLocalFileFS struct {
+	vfs.FS
+	openCalls int
+	statCalls int
+}
+
+func (f *countingLocalFileFS) Open(name string) (*os.File, error) {
+	f.openCalls++
+	return f.FS.Open(name)
+}
+
+func (f *countingLocalFileFS) Stat(name string) (fs.FileInfo, error) {
+	f.statCalls++
+	return f.FS.Stat(name)
+}

internal/cmdutil/risk_control.go

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package cmdutil
+
+import (
+	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
+	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/riskcontrol"
+)
+
+type workspaceConfigSource interface {
+	MultiAppConfig() (*core.MultiAppConfig, error)
+}
+
+// resolveSDKHostSignalSource applies workspace policy at the SDK transport
+// boundary.
+func resolveSDKHostSignalSource(config workspaceConfigSource) riskcontrol.Source {
+	if config == nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+	workspace, configErr := config.MultiAppConfig()
+	// Default-on means an existing config with no explicit preference. Absent
+	// or unreadable config cannot authorize host-signal collection.
+	if configErr != nil || !workspace.RiskControlEnabled() {
+		return nil
+	}
+	return riskcontrol.NewHostSource()
+}

internal/cmdutil/risk_control_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package cmdutil
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
+)
+
+type staticWorkspaceConfig struct {
+	config *core.MultiAppConfig
+	err    error
+}
+
+func (s staticWorkspaceConfig) MultiAppConfig() (*core.MultiAppConfig, error) {
+	return s.config, s.err
+}
+
+func TestResolveSDKHostSignalSource(t *testing.T) {
+	disabled := false
+	tests := []struct {
+		name       string
+		config     workspaceConfigSource
+		wantSource bool
+	}{
+		{name: "workspace default on", config: staticWorkspaceConfig{config: &core.MultiAppConfig{}}, wantSource: true},
+		{name: "workspace opt-out", config: staticWorkspaceConfig{config: &core.MultiAppConfig{RiskControl: &disabled}}},
+		{name: "missing config", config: staticWorkspaceConfig{err: errors.New("file does not exist")}},
+		{name: "unreadable config", config: staticWorkspaceConfig{err: errors.New("permission denied")}},
+		{name: "nil config value", config: staticWorkspaceConfig{}},
+		{name: "nil config source"},
+	}
+
+	for _, test := range tests {
+		t.Run(test.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			got := resolveSDKHostSignalSource(test.config)
+			if (got != nil) != test.wantSource {
+				t.Fatalf("resolveSDKHostSignalSource() = %T, wantSource %t", got, test.wantSource)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}

internal/cmdutil/secheader.go

@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ const (
 	HeaderShortcut    = "X-Cli-Shortcut"
 	HeaderExecutionId = "X-Cli-Execution-Id"
 	HeaderAgentTrace  = "X-Agent-Trace"
+	HeaderAgentName   = "X-Agent-Name"
 
 	SourceValue = "lark-cli"
 
@@ -55,6 +56,9 @@ func BaseSecurityHeaders() http.Header {
 	if v := envvars.AgentTrace(); v != "" {
 		h.Set(HeaderAgentTrace, v)
 	}
+	if v := envvars.AgentName(); v != "" {
+		h.Set(HeaderAgentName, v)
+	}
 	return h
 }
 

internal/cmdutil/secheader_test.go

@@ -263,9 +263,34 @@ func TestBaseSecurityHeaders_AllRequiredHeaders(t *testing.T) {
 }
 
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-// HeaderAgentTrace injection (via BaseSecurityHeaders)
+// Agent headers injected via BaseSecurityHeaders
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
+func TestBaseSecurityHeaders_NoAgentNameHeaderWhenEnvUnset(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Setenv(envvars.CliAgentName, "")
+	h := BaseSecurityHeaders()
+	if v := h.Get(HeaderAgentName); v != "" {
+		t.Fatalf("BaseSecurityHeaders() included %s = %q, want absent when env unset", HeaderAgentName, v)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestBaseSecurityHeaders_IncludesAgentNameHeaderWhenEnvSet(t *testing.T) {
+	const agentName = "sample-agent"
+	t.Setenv(envvars.CliAgentName, agentName)
+	h := BaseSecurityHeaders()
+	if v := h.Get(HeaderAgentName); v != agentName {
+		t.Fatalf("BaseSecurityHeaders()[%s] = %q, want %q", HeaderAgentName, v, agentName)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestBaseSecurityHeaders_NoAgentNameHeaderWhenEnvInvalid(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Setenv(envvars.CliAgentName, "agent\r\nX-Evil: attack")
+	h := BaseSecurityHeaders()
+	if v := h.Get(HeaderAgentName); v != "" {
+		t.Fatalf("BaseSecurityHeaders() included %s = %q, want absent for invalid input", HeaderAgentName, v)
+	}
+}
+
 func TestBaseSecurityHeaders_NoAgentTraceHeaderWhenEnvUnset(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Setenv(envvars.CliAgentTrace, "")
 	h := BaseSecurityHeaders()

internal/cmdutil/testing_test.go

@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ func TestTestFactory_ReplacesGlobals(t *testing.T) {
 		URL:  "/test",
 		Body: "ok",
 	})
-	// Use the stub via Factory HttpClient
+	// Use the stub via Factory HttpClient.
 	httpClient, err := f.HttpClient()
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("HttpClient() error: %v", err)

internal/cmdutil/transport.go

@@ -4,14 +4,19 @@
 package cmdutil
 
 import (
-	"context"
 	"net/http"
 	"time"
 
-	exttransport "github.com/larksuite/cli/extension/transport"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/transport"
 )
 
+var (
+	_ transport.RoundTripperDecorator = (*RetryTransport)(nil)
+	_ transport.RoundTripperDecorator = (*UserAgentTransport)(nil)
+	_ transport.RoundTripperDecorator = (*BuildHeaderTransport)(nil)
+	_ transport.RoundTripperDecorator = (*SecurityHeaderTransport)(nil)
+)
+
 // RetryTransport is an http.RoundTripper that retries on 5xx responses
 // and network errors. MaxRetries defaults to 0 (no retries).
 type RetryTransport struct {
@@ -27,6 +32,16 @@ func (t *RetryTransport) base() http.RoundTripper {
 	return transport.Fallback()
 }
 
+func (t *RetryTransport) BaseRoundTripper() http.RoundTripper {
+	return t.base()
+}
+
+func (t *RetryTransport) WithBaseRoundTripper(base http.RoundTripper) http.RoundTripper {
+	cloned := *t
+	cloned.Base = base
+	return &cloned
+}
+
 func (t *RetryTransport) delay() time.Duration {
 	if t.Delay > 0 {
 		return t.Delay
@@ -63,6 +78,19 @@ type UserAgentTransport struct {
 	Base http.RoundTripper
 }
 
+func (t *UserAgentTransport) BaseRoundTripper() http.RoundTripper {
+	if t.Base != nil {
+		return t.Base
+	}
+	return transport.Fallback()
+}
+
+func (t *UserAgentTransport) WithBaseRoundTripper(base http.RoundTripper) http.RoundTripper {
+	cloned := *t
+	cloned.Base = base
+	return &cloned
+}
+
 func (t *UserAgentTransport) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
 	req = req.Clone(req.Context())
 	req.Header.Set(HeaderUserAgent, UserAgentValue())
@@ -73,14 +101,25 @@ func (t *UserAgentTransport) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error
 }
 
 // BuildHeaderTransport is an http.RoundTripper that force-writes the
-// X-Cli-Build header before every request. Used in the SDK transport chain,
-// where SecurityHeaderTransport is not installed, to prevent extensions from
-// tampering with the build classification. The direct HTTP chain is already
-// covered by SecurityHeaderTransport iterating BaseSecurityHeaders.
+// X-Cli-Build header before every request. It remains in the SDK transport
+// chain as a narrow defense-in-depth layer alongside SecurityHeaderTransport.
 type BuildHeaderTransport struct {
 	Base http.RoundTripper
 }
 
+func (t *BuildHeaderTransport) BaseRoundTripper() http.RoundTripper {
+	if t.Base != nil {
+		return t.Base
+	}
+	return transport.Fallback()
+}
+
+func (t *BuildHeaderTransport) WithBaseRoundTripper(base http.RoundTripper) http.RoundTripper {
+	cloned := *t
+	cloned.Base = base
+	return &cloned
+}
+
 func (t *BuildHeaderTransport) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
 	req = req.Clone(req.Context())
 	req.Header.Set(HeaderBuild, DetectBuildKind())
@@ -103,6 +142,16 @@ func (t *SecurityHeaderTransport) base() http.RoundTripper {
 	return transport.Fallback()
 }
 
+func (t *SecurityHeaderTransport) BaseRoundTripper() http.RoundTripper {
+	return t.base()
+}
+
+func (t *SecurityHeaderTransport) WithBaseRoundTripper(base http.RoundTripper) http.RoundTripper {
+	cloned := *t
+	cloned.Base = base
+	return &cloned
+}
+
 // RoundTrip implements http.RoundTripper.
 func (t *SecurityHeaderTransport) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
 	req = req.Clone(req.Context())
@@ -120,67 +169,3 @@ func (t *SecurityHeaderTransport) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response,
 	}
 	return t.base().RoundTrip(req)
 }
-
-// extensionMiddleware wraps the built-in transport chain with pre/post hooks.
-// The built-in chain always executes unless the extension is an
-// exttransport.AbortableInterceptor and its PreRoundTripE returns a non-nil
-// error; it cannot otherwise be skipped or overridden.
-//
-// The original request context is restored after the pre hook to prevent
-// extensions from tampering with cancellation, deadlines, or built-in values.
-// Cloning the request isolates header/URL/etc. mutations from the caller's
-// request object; req.Body is intentionally shared — extensions that consume
-// it are responsible for rewinding (see Interceptor doc).
-type extensionMiddleware struct {
-	Base    http.RoundTripper
-	Ext     exttransport.Interceptor
-	ExtName string // Provider.Name(), captured at wrap time for *AbortError.Extension
-}
-
-// RoundTrip invokes the interceptor pre hook, restores the original context,
-// executes the built-in chain (unless aborted), then calls the post hook if
-// non-nil. When the extension implements AbortableInterceptor and returns a
-// non-nil error from PreRoundTripE, the built-in chain is skipped and an
-// *exttransport.AbortError is returned; the post hook is still invoked with
-// (nil, reason) so extensions can unwind resources.
-func (m *extensionMiddleware) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
-	origCtx := req.Context()
-	req = req.Clone(origCtx)
-
-	var (
-		post    func(*http.Response, error)
-		abortEr error
-	)
-	if a, ok := m.Ext.(exttransport.AbortableInterceptor); ok {
-		post, abortEr = a.PreRoundTripE(req)
-	} else {
-		post = m.Ext.PreRoundTrip(req)
-	}
-	if abortEr != nil {
-		if post != nil {
-			post(nil, abortEr)
-		}
-		return nil, &exttransport.AbortError{Extension: m.ExtName, Reason: abortEr}
-	}
-
-	req = req.WithContext(origCtx) // restore original context
-	resp, err := m.Base.RoundTrip(req)
-	if post != nil {
-		post(resp, err)
-	}
-	return resp, err
-}
-
-// wrapWithExtension wraps transport with the registered extension middleware.
-// If no extension is registered, returns transport unchanged.
-func wrapWithExtension(transport http.RoundTripper) http.RoundTripper {
-	p := exttransport.GetProvider()
-	if p == nil {
-		return transport
-	}
-	tr := p.ResolveInterceptor(context.Background())
-	if tr == nil {
-		return transport
-	}
-	return &extensionMiddleware{Base: transport, Ext: tr, ExtName: p.Name()}
-}

internal/cmdutil/transport_test.go

@@ -14,7 +14,8 @@ import (
 	"time"
 
 	exttransport "github.com/larksuite/cli/extension/transport"
-	internalauth "github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/auth"
+	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/riskcontrol"
+	internaltransport "github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/transport"
 )
 
 type roundTripFunc func(*http.Request) (*http.Response, error)
@@ -90,79 +91,107 @@ func TestRetryTransport_DefaultNoRetry(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-// buildSDKTransport chain composition
+// buildSDKTransport policy behavior
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
-func TestBuildSDKTransport_IncludesRetryTransport(t *testing.T) {
-	transport := buildSDKTransport()
+func TestBuildSDKTransportAppliesSecurityHeadersToEveryRequestClass(t *testing.T) {
+	exttransport.Register(nil)
+	received := make(chan http.Header, 2)
+	server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
+		received <- req.Header.Clone()
+		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
+	}))
+	t.Cleanup(server.Close)
 
-	// Chain: SecurityPolicy → BuildHeader → UserAgent → Retry → Base
-	sec, ok := transport.(*internalauth.SecurityPolicyTransport)
-	if !ok {
-		t.Fatalf("outer transport type = %T, want *auth.SecurityPolicyTransport", transport)
-	}
-	bh, ok := sec.Base.(*BuildHeaderTransport)
-	if !ok {
-		t.Fatalf("layer after SecurityPolicy = %T, want *BuildHeaderTransport", sec.Base)
-	}
-	ua, ok := bh.Base.(*UserAgentTransport)
-	if !ok {
-		t.Fatalf("layer after BuildHeader = %T, want *UserAgentTransport", bh.Base)
-	}
-	if _, ok := ua.Base.(*RetryTransport); !ok {
-		t.Fatalf("inner transport type = %T, want *RetryTransport", ua.Base)
+	for _, class := range []exttransport.RequestClass{
+		exttransport.RequestClassPlatform,
+		exttransport.RequestClassExternal,
+	} {
+		client := internaltransport.ClientForRequestClass(
+			&http.Client{Transport: buildSDKTransport(nil)},
+			class,
+		)
+		resp, err := client.Get(server.URL)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		resp.Body.Close()
+
+		headers := <-received
+		for header, values := range BaseSecurityHeaders() {
+			if len(values) == 0 {
+				continue
+			}
+			want := values[len(values)-1]
+			if got := headers.Get(header); got != want {
+				t.Fatalf("SDK %s header %s = %q, want %q", class, header, got, want)
+			}
+		}
 	}
 }
 
 func TestBuildSDKTransport_WithExtension(t *testing.T) {
-	exttransport.Register(&stubTransportProvider{})
-	t.Cleanup(func() { exttransport.Register(nil) })
+	previous := exttransport.GetProvider()
+	interceptor := &headerCapturingInterceptor{}
+	exttransport.Register(&platformOnlyStubProvider{
+		stubTransportProvider: &stubTransportProvider{interceptor: interceptor},
+	})
+	t.Cleanup(func() { exttransport.Register(previous) })
 
-	transport := buildSDKTransport()
+	server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
+		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
+	}))
+	t.Cleanup(server.Close)
 
-	// Chain: extensionMiddleware → SecurityPolicy → BuildHeader → UserAgent → Retry → Base
-	mid, ok := transport.(*extensionMiddleware)
-	if !ok {
-		t.Fatalf("outer transport type = %T, want *extensionMiddleware", transport)
+	client := internaltransport.ClientForRequestClass(
+		&http.Client{Transport: buildSDKTransport(nil)},
+		exttransport.RequestClassPlatform,
+	)
+	resp, err := client.Get(server.URL)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
 	}
-	sec, ok := mid.Base.(*internalauth.SecurityPolicyTransport)
-	if !ok {
-		t.Fatalf("transport type = %T, want *auth.SecurityPolicyTransport", mid.Base)
-	}
-	bh, ok := sec.Base.(*BuildHeaderTransport)
-	if !ok {
-		t.Fatalf("layer after SecurityPolicy = %T, want *BuildHeaderTransport", sec.Base)
-	}
-	ua, ok := bh.Base.(*UserAgentTransport)
-	if !ok {
-		t.Fatalf("layer after BuildHeader = %T, want *UserAgentTransport", bh.Base)
-	}
-	if _, ok := ua.Base.(*RetryTransport); !ok {
-		t.Fatalf("innermost transport type = %T, want *RetryTransport", ua.Base)
+	resp.Body.Close()
+	if !interceptor.preCalled || !interceptor.postCalled {
+		t.Fatal("SDK platform request did not execute extension pre/post hooks")
 	}
 }
 
 func TestBuildSDKTransport_WithoutExtension(t *testing.T) {
+	previous := exttransport.GetProvider()
 	exttransport.Register(nil)
+	t.Cleanup(func() { exttransport.Register(previous) })
 
-	transport := buildSDKTransport()
+	if _, ok := buildSDKTransport(nil).(*internaltransport.HTTPPolicyRouter); !ok {
+		t.Fatalf(
+			"buildSDKTransport() type = %T, want *transport.HTTPPolicyRouter",
+			buildSDKTransport(nil),
+		)
+	}
+}
 
-	// Chain: SecurityPolicy → BuildHeader → UserAgent → Retry → Base
-	sec, ok := transport.(*internalauth.SecurityPolicyTransport)
+func TestBuildSDKTransportSupportsPolicyLeafCloning(t *testing.T) {
+	previous := exttransport.GetProvider()
+	exttransport.Register(nil)
+	t.Cleanup(func() { exttransport.Register(previous) })
+
+	base := &http.Transport{}
+	client := internaltransport.ClientForRequestClass(
+		&http.Client{Transport: buildSDKTransportWithBase(base, nil)},
+		exttransport.RequestClassExternal,
+	)
+	source, ok := client.Transport.(interface {
+		CloneHTTPTransport() (http.RoundTripper, *http.Transport, bool)
+	})
 	if !ok {
-		t.Fatalf("outer transport type = %T, want *auth.SecurityPolicyTransport", transport)
+		t.Fatalf("SDK request-class transport type = %T, want clone capability", client.Transport)
 	}
-	bh, ok := sec.Base.(*BuildHeaderTransport)
-	if !ok {
-		t.Fatalf("layer after SecurityPolicy = %T, want *BuildHeaderTransport", sec.Base)
+	rebuilt, concrete, ok := source.CloneHTTPTransport()
+	if !ok || rebuilt == nil || concrete == nil {
+		t.Fatal("SDK policy graph could not clone its HTTP transport leaf")
 	}
-	ua, ok := bh.Base.(*UserAgentTransport)
-	if !ok {
-		t.Fatalf("layer after BuildHeader = %T, want *UserAgentTransport", bh.Base)
-	}
-	if _, ok := ua.Base.(*RetryTransport); !ok {
-		t.Fatalf("inner transport type = %T, want *RetryTransport", ua.Base)
+	if concrete == base {
+		t.Fatal("SDK policy graph reused the original HTTP transport")
 	}
 }
 
@@ -222,7 +251,7 @@ func TestExtensionInterceptor_ExecutionOrder(t *testing.T) {
 	var base http.RoundTripper = http.DefaultTransport
 	base = &RetryTransport{Base: base}
 	base = &SecurityHeaderTransport{Base: base}
-	transport := wrapWithExtension(base)
+	transport := internaltransport.WrapWithExtension(base)
 	client := &http.Client{Transport: transport}
 
 	req, _ := http.NewRequest("GET", srv.URL, nil)
@@ -250,26 +279,132 @@ func TestExtensionInterceptor_ExecutionOrder(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-// buildTamperingInterceptor tries to delete and spoof X-Cli-Build via
-// PreRoundTrip. The SDK chain's BuildHeaderTransport must restore the real
-// value before the request leaves the process.
+// buildTamperingInterceptor tries to delete and spoof security headers via
+// PreRoundTrip. The SDK built-in chain must restore the real values before the
+// request leaves the process.
 type buildTamperingInterceptor struct{}
 
 func (buildTamperingInterceptor) PreRoundTrip(req *http.Request) func(*http.Response, error) {
 	req.Header.Del(HeaderBuild)
 	req.Header.Set(HeaderBuild, "ext-tampered-build")
+	req.Header.Del(HeaderSource)
+	req.Header.Set(HeaderSource, "ext-tampered-source")
 	return nil
 }
 
+type riskHeaderTamperingInterceptor struct{}
+
+func (riskHeaderTamperingInterceptor) PreRoundTrip(req *http.Request) func(*http.Response, error) {
+	req.Header.Set(riskcontrol.HeaderOSType, "extension-value")
+	req.Header.Set(riskcontrol.HeaderProductModel, "extension-value")
+	return nil
+}
+
+type bootstrapPolicyTamperingInterceptor struct{}
+
+func (bootstrapPolicyTamperingInterceptor) PreRoundTrip(req *http.Request) func(*http.Response, error) {
+	req.Header.Set(HeaderSource, "extension-value")
+	req.Header.Set(riskcontrol.HeaderOSType, "extension-value")
+	return nil
+}
+
+func TestNewDefaultInstallsSDKBootstrapSecurityPolicy(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
+	oldTransport := http.DefaultClient.Transport
+	oldCheckRedirect := http.DefaultClient.CheckRedirect
+	t.Cleanup(func() {
+		http.DefaultClient.Transport = oldTransport
+		http.DefaultClient.CheckRedirect = oldCheckRedirect
+	})
+
+	previous := exttransport.GetProvider()
+	exttransport.Register(&platformOnlyStubProvider{
+		stubTransportProvider: &stubTransportProvider{
+			interceptor: bootstrapPolicyTamperingInterceptor{},
+		},
+	})
+	t.Cleanup(func() { exttransport.Register(previous) })
+
+	var received http.Header
+	network := roundTripFunc(func(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
+		received = req.Header.Clone()
+		return &http.Response{
+			StatusCode: http.StatusNoContent,
+			Body:       http.NoBody,
+			Request:    req,
+		}, nil
+	})
+	http.DefaultClient.Transport = network
+	http.DefaultClient.CheckRedirect = nil
+	_ = NewDefault(nil, InvocationContext{})
+
+	req, err := http.NewRequest(
+		http.MethodPost,
+		"https://open.feishu.cn/callback/ws/endpoint",
+		strings.NewReader(`{"app_secret":"secret"}`),
+	)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	resp.Body.Close()
+
+	if got := received.Get(HeaderSource); got != SourceValue {
+		t.Fatalf("%s = %q, want trusted value %q", HeaderSource, got, SourceValue)
+	}
+	if got := received.Get(riskcontrol.HeaderOSType); got != "" {
+		t.Fatalf("%s = %q, want extension value stripped", riskcontrol.HeaderOSType, got)
+	}
+	if got := received.Get(HeaderBuild); got != DetectBuildKind() {
+		t.Fatalf("%s = %q, want %q", HeaderBuild, got, DetectBuildKind())
+	}
+	if got := received.Get(HeaderUserAgent); got != UserAgentValue() {
+		t.Fatalf("%s = %q, want %q", HeaderUserAgent, got, UserAgentValue())
+	}
+}
+
+func TestBuildSDKTransport_StripsExtensionRiskHeaders(t *testing.T) {
+	previous := exttransport.GetProvider()
+	exttransport.Register(&stubTransportProvider{interceptor: riskHeaderTamperingInterceptor{}})
+	t.Cleanup(func() { exttransport.Register(previous) })
+
+	var received http.Header
+	network := roundTripFunc(func(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
+		received = req.Header.Clone()
+		return &http.Response{StatusCode: http.StatusOK, Body: http.NoBody}, nil
+	})
+	req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "https://open.feishu.cn/open-apis/test", nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer token")
+
+	client := internaltransport.ClientForRequestClass(
+		&http.Client{Transport: buildSDKTransportWithBase(network, nil)},
+		exttransport.RequestClassPlatform,
+	)
+	resp, err := client.Do(req)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	resp.Body.Close()
+	if received.Get(riskcontrol.HeaderOSType) != "" || received.Get(riskcontrol.HeaderProductModel) != "" {
+		t.Fatalf("extension risk headers reached network: %v", received)
+	}
+}
+
 // TestBuildHeaderTransport_SDKChain_OverridesTamperedHeader verifies that the
-// X-Cli-Build header is force-written by BuildHeaderTransport in the SDK
-// transport chain, even when an extension tries to delete or spoof it. This
-// closes the gap where the SDK chain had no equivalent of
-// SecurityHeaderTransport (see design doc §3.3.3).
+// SDK chain restores both the build classification and the full security
+// header set after an extension runs.
 func TestBuildHeaderTransport_SDKChain_OverridesTamperedHeader(t *testing.T) {
-	var receivedBuild string
+	var receivedBuild, receivedSource string
 	srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		receivedBuild = r.Header.Get(HeaderBuild)
+		receivedSource = r.Header.Get(HeaderSource)
 		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
 	}))
 	defer srv.Close()
@@ -277,12 +412,13 @@ func TestBuildHeaderTransport_SDKChain_OverridesTamperedHeader(t *testing.T) {
 	exttransport.Register(&stubTransportProvider{interceptor: buildTamperingInterceptor{}})
 	t.Cleanup(func() { exttransport.Register(nil) })
 
-	// Replicate the SDK chain layering used by buildSDKTransport.
+	// Replicate the SDK built-in chain inside buildSDKTransport.
 	var base http.RoundTripper = http.DefaultTransport
 	base = &RetryTransport{Base: base}
 	base = &UserAgentTransport{Base: base}
 	base = &BuildHeaderTransport{Base: base}
-	transport := wrapWithExtension(base)
+	base = &SecurityHeaderTransport{Base: base}
+	transport := internaltransport.WrapWithExtension(base)
 	client := &http.Client{Transport: transport}
 
 	req, _ := http.NewRequest("GET", srv.URL, nil)
@@ -299,6 +435,9 @@ func TestBuildHeaderTransport_SDKChain_OverridesTamperedHeader(t *testing.T) {
 	if receivedBuild != want {
 		t.Fatalf("%s = %q, want %q", HeaderBuild, receivedBuild, want)
 	}
+	if receivedSource != SourceValue {
+		t.Fatalf("%s = %q, want %q", HeaderSource, receivedSource, SourceValue)
+	}
 }
 
 // TestBuildHeaderTransport_OverridesEvenWithoutTamper verifies that even if
@@ -388,7 +527,7 @@ func TestExtensionInterceptor_ContextTamperPrevented(t *testing.T) {
 		return nil
 	})
 
-	mid := &extensionMiddleware{Base: capturer, Ext: tamperIC}
+	mid := &internaltransport.ExtensionMiddleware{Base: capturer, Ext: tamperIC}
 
 	origCtx := context.WithValue(context.Background(), testKey, "original")
 	req, _ := http.NewRequestWithContext(origCtx, "GET", srv.URL, nil)
@@ -450,7 +589,7 @@ func TestExtensionMiddleware_PreRoundTripEAbort(t *testing.T) {
 			return &http.Response{StatusCode: http.StatusOK, Body: http.NoBody}, nil
 		})
 
-		mid := &extensionMiddleware{Base: base, Ext: ic, ExtName: "stub"}
+		mid := &internaltransport.ExtensionMiddleware{Base: base, Ext: ic, ExtName: "stub"}
 		req, _ := http.NewRequest("GET", "http://example.invalid/", nil)
 		resp, err := mid.RoundTrip(req)
 
@@ -491,7 +630,7 @@ func TestExtensionMiddleware_PreRoundTripEAbort(t *testing.T) {
 			return nil, nil
 		})
 
-		mid := &extensionMiddleware{Base: base, Ext: ic, ExtName: "stub"}
+		mid := &internaltransport.ExtensionMiddleware{Base: base, Ext: ic, ExtName: "stub"}
 		req, _ := http.NewRequest("GET", "http://example.invalid/", nil)
 		_, err := mid.RoundTrip(req)
 
@@ -510,7 +649,7 @@ func TestExtensionMiddleware_PreRoundTripEHappyPath(t *testing.T) {
 		return &http.Response{StatusCode: http.StatusOK, Body: http.NoBody}, nil
 	})
 
-	mid := &extensionMiddleware{Base: base, Ext: ic, ExtName: "stub"}
+	mid := &internaltransport.ExtensionMiddleware{Base: base, Ext: ic, ExtName: "stub"}
 	req, _ := http.NewRequest("GET", "http://example.invalid/", nil)
 	resp, err := mid.RoundTrip(req)
 	if err != nil {

internal/core/config.go

@@ -36,14 +36,6 @@ type AppUser struct {
 	UserName   string `json:"userName"`
 }
 
-// Auth methods for app credentials. An empty AppConfig.AuthMethod means the
-// default, client_secret.
-const (
-	AuthMethodClientSecret  = "client_secret"   // app_id + app_secret
-	authMethodPKJWTValue    = "private_key_jwt" // TEE-signed client_assertion; no app secret
-	AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT = authMethodPKJWTValue
-)
-
 // AppConfig is a per-app configuration entry (stored format — secrets may be unresolved).
 type AppConfig struct {
 	Name       string      `json:"name,omitempty"`
@@ -54,15 +46,6 @@ type AppConfig struct {
 	DefaultAs  Identity    `json:"defaultAs,omitempty"` // AsUser | AsBot | AsAuto
 	StrictMode *StrictMode `json:"strictMode,omitempty"`
 	Users      []AppUser   `json:"users"`
-
-	// AuthMethod selects how tokens are minted. Empty == AuthMethodClientSecret
-	// (back-compat). AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT uses a TEE-held key (see KeyRef) to
-	// sign client_assertion JWTs instead of sending an app secret.
-	AuthMethod string `json:"authMethod,omitempty"`
-	// KeyRef references the non-exportable signing key for private_key_jwt.
-	// Source is "tee" and ID is the backend key label; the actual key never
-	// leaves the secure backend, so this is a handle, not secret material.
-	KeyRef *SecretRef `json:"keyRef,omitempty"`
 }
 
 // ProfileName returns the display name for this app config.
@@ -77,11 +60,18 @@ func (a *AppConfig) ProfileName() string {
 // MultiAppConfig is the multi-app config file format.
 type MultiAppConfig struct {
 	StrictMode  StrictMode  `json:"strictMode,omitempty"`
+	RiskControl *bool       `json:"riskControl,omitempty"`
 	CurrentApp  string      `json:"currentApp,omitempty"`
 	PreviousApp string      `json:"previousApp,omitempty"`
 	Apps        []AppConfig `json:"apps"`
 }
 
+// RiskControlEnabled resolves the workspace policy. An omitted preference
+// keeps the default-on account-protection behavior.
+func (m *MultiAppConfig) RiskControlEnabled() bool {
+	return m != nil && (m.RiskControl == nil || *m.RiskControl)
+}
+
 // CurrentAppConfig returns the currently active app config.
 // Resolution priority: profileOverride > CurrentApp field > Apps[0].
 func (m *MultiAppConfig) CurrentAppConfig(profileOverride string) *AppConfig {
@@ -178,10 +168,7 @@ type CliConfig struct {
 	UserOpenId          string
 	UserName            string
 	Lang                i18n.Lang
-	SupportedIdentities uint8  `json:"-"` // bitflag: 1=user, 2=bot; set by credential provider
-	AuthMethod          string // "" == client_secret; AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT
-	KeyLabel            string // resolved TEE key handle for private_key_jwt
-	KeyProvider         string // empty == built-in signer; otherwise an explicit external signer route
+	SupportedIdentities uint8 `json:"-"` // bitflag: 1=user, 2=bot; set by credential provider
 }
 
 // identityBotBit is the bit flag for bot identity in SupportedIdentities.
@@ -267,67 +254,31 @@ func ResolveConfigFromMulti(raw *MultiAppConfig, kc keychain.KeychainAccess, pro
 			WithHint("available profiles: %s", formatProfileNames(raw.ProfileNames()))
 	}
 
-	// Validate the auth method first so a malformed profile fails here rather
-	// than silently degrading to client_secret (unknown method) or failing later
-	// at token-signing. Empty stays empty — downstream treats it as client_secret
-	// (back-compat).
-	switch app.AuthMethod {
-	case "", AuthMethodClientSecret, AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT:
-	default:
-		return nil, errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeInvalidConfig, "unknown authMethod %q", app.AuthMethod).
-			WithHint("supported: %s, %s (empty defaults to %s)", AuthMethodClientSecret, AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT, AuthMethodClientSecret)
+	if err := ValidateSecretKeyMatch(app.AppId, app.AppSecret); err != nil {
+		return nil, errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeNotConfigured, "appId and appSecret keychain key are out of sync").
+			WithHint("%s", err.Error()).
+			WithCause(err)
 	}
 
-	// private_key_jwt carries no secret: validate the key handle and skip secret
-	// resolution entirely, so a stale/broken AppSecret ref never produces a
-	// confusing secret-resolution error for an otherwise-valid pkjwt profile.
-	var secret string
-	if app.AuthMethod == AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT {
-		if app.KeyRef == nil || app.KeyRef.Source != "tee" || app.KeyRef.ID == "" {
-			return nil, errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeInvalidConfig, "private_key_jwt requires a key handle (keyRef) but none is configured").
-				WithHint("re-run: lark-cli config init --new --private-key-jwt")
+	secret, err := ResolveSecretInput(app.AppSecret, kc)
+	if err != nil {
+		if errs.IsTyped(err) {
+			return nil, err
 		}
-		provider := strings.TrimSpace(app.KeyRef.Provider)
-		switch provider {
-		case "", KeylessProviderLarkSuite:
-		default:
-			return nil, errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeInvalidConfig,
-				"unknown keyless signer provider %q", app.KeyRef.Provider).
-				WithHint("supported external provider: %s; omit provider to use the built-in signer", KeylessProviderLarkSuite)
-		}
-	} else {
-		if err := ValidateSecretKeyMatch(app.AppId, app.AppSecret); err != nil {
-			return nil, errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeNotConfigured, "appId and appSecret keychain key are out of sync").
-				WithHint("%s", err.Error()).
-				WithCause(err)
-		}
-		var resolveErr error
-		secret, resolveErr = ResolveSecretInput(app.AppSecret, kc)
-		if resolveErr != nil {
-			if errs.IsTyped(resolveErr) {
-				return nil, resolveErr
-			}
-			subtype := errs.SubtypeNotConfigured
-			if isMalformedConfigError(resolveErr) {
-				subtype = errs.SubtypeInvalidConfig
-			}
-			return nil, errs.NewConfigError(subtype, "%s", resolveErr.Error()).WithCause(resolveErr)
+		subtype := errs.SubtypeNotConfigured
+		if isMalformedConfigError(err) {
+			subtype = errs.SubtypeInvalidConfig
 		}
+		return nil, errs.NewConfigError(subtype, "%s", err.Error()).WithCause(err)
 	}
-
 	cfg := &CliConfig{
 		ProfileName: app.ProfileName(),
 		AppID:       app.AppId,
 		AppSecret:   secret,
 		Brand:       ParseBrand(string(app.Brand)),
 		Lang:        app.Lang,
-		AuthMethod:  app.AuthMethod,
 		DefaultAs:   app.DefaultAs,
 	}
-	if app.KeyRef != nil {
-		cfg.KeyLabel = app.KeyRef.ID
-		cfg.KeyProvider = strings.TrimSpace(app.KeyRef.Provider)
-	}
 	if len(app.Users) > 0 {
 		cfg.UserOpenId = app.Users[0].UserOpenId
 		cfg.UserName = app.Users[0].UserName

internal/core/config_snapshot.go

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package core
+
+import (
+	"io/fs"
+	"sync"
+)
+
+// ConfigSnapshot lazily captures one stable view of config.json for a CLI
+// invocation. All runtime consumers share the same load result so account and
+// workspace policy resolution cannot observe different file revisions. Callers
+// must treat the returned config as read-only.
+type ConfigSnapshot struct {
+	load func() (*MultiAppConfig, error)
+}
+
+// NewConfigSnapshot creates a lazily loaded invocation-scoped config snapshot.
+func NewConfigSnapshot() *ConfigSnapshot {
+	return newConfigSnapshot(LoadMultiAppConfig)
+}
+
+func newConfigSnapshot(load func() (*MultiAppConfig, error)) *ConfigSnapshot {
+	if load == nil {
+		return &ConfigSnapshot{}
+	}
+	return &ConfigSnapshot{load: sync.OnceValues(load)}
+}
+
+// MultiAppConfig returns the captured persistent config and load error.
+func (s *ConfigSnapshot) MultiAppConfig() (*MultiAppConfig, error) {
+	if s == nil || s.load == nil {
+		return nil, fs.ErrNotExist
+	}
+	return s.load()
+}

internal/core/config_snapshot_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package core
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"io/fs"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func TestConfigSnapshotLoadsOnce(t *testing.T) {
+	calls := 0
+	want := &MultiAppConfig{}
+	snapshot := newConfigSnapshot(func() (*MultiAppConfig, error) {
+		calls++
+		return want, nil
+	})
+
+	for range 2 {
+		config, err := snapshot.MultiAppConfig()
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		if config != want {
+			t.Fatal("snapshot returned a different config instance")
+		}
+	}
+	if calls != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("config loads = %d, want 1", calls)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestConfigSnapshotZeroValueIsMissing(t *testing.T) {
+	config, err := (&ConfigSnapshot{}).MultiAppConfig()
+	if config != nil || !errors.Is(err, fs.ErrNotExist) {
+		t.Fatalf("MultiAppConfig() = (%v, %v), want (nil, fs.ErrNotExist)", config, err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestConfigSnapshotCachesError(t *testing.T) {
+	calls := 0
+	want := errors.New("load failed")
+	snapshot := newConfigSnapshot(func() (*MultiAppConfig, error) {
+		calls++
+		return nil, want
+	})
+
+	for range 2 {
+		config, err := snapshot.MultiAppConfig()
+		if config != nil || !errors.Is(err, want) {
+			t.Fatalf("MultiAppConfig() = (%v, %v), want (nil, %v)", config, err, want)
+		}
+	}
+	if calls != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("config loads = %d, want 1", calls)
+	}
+}

internal/core/config_test.go

@@ -60,7 +60,9 @@ func TestAppConfig_LangOmitEmpty(t *testing.T) {
 }
 
 func TestMultiAppConfig_RoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
+	disabled := false
 	config := &MultiAppConfig{
+		RiskControl: &disabled,
 		Apps: []AppConfig{{
 			AppId: "cli_test", AppSecret: PlainSecret("s"),
 			Brand: BrandLark, Lang: "zh", Users: []AppUser{},
@@ -84,34 +86,8 @@ func TestMultiAppConfig_RoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
 	if got.Apps[0].Brand != BrandLark {
 		t.Errorf("Brand = %q, want %q", got.Apps[0].Brand, BrandLark)
 	}
-}
-
-func TestResolveConfigFromMulti_KeyProviderRouting(t *testing.T) {
-	base := AppConfig{
-		AppId: "cli_pk", Brand: BrandFeishu, AuthMethod: AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT,
-		KeyRef: &SecretRef{Source: SecretSourceTEE, ID: "key-1"}, Users: []AppUser{},
-	}
-
-	for _, provider := range []string{"", KeylessProviderLarkSuite} {
-		app := base
-		ref := *base.KeyRef
-		ref.Provider = provider
-		app.KeyRef = &ref
-		cfg, err := ResolveConfigFromMulti(&MultiAppConfig{Apps: []AppConfig{app}}, stubKeychain{}, "")
-		if err != nil {
-			t.Fatalf("provider %q: %v", provider, err)
-		}
-		if cfg.KeyProvider != provider {
-			t.Fatalf("KeyProvider = %q, want %q", cfg.KeyProvider, provider)
-		}
-	}
-
-	app := base
-	ref := *base.KeyRef
-	ref.Provider = "unknown.provider"
-	app.KeyRef = &ref
-	if _, err := ResolveConfigFromMulti(&MultiAppConfig{Apps: []AppConfig{app}}, stubKeychain{}, ""); err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("unknown provider must fail closed")
+	if got.RiskControl == nil || *got.RiskControl {
+		t.Errorf("RiskControl = %v, want explicit false", got.RiskControl)
 	}
 }
 
@@ -162,108 +138,6 @@ func TestResolveConfigFromMulti_AcceptsPlainSecret(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-// TestResolveConfigFromMulti_RejectsUnknownAuthMethod ensures an unsupported
-// authMethod fails at resolution rather than silently degrading to client_secret.
-func TestResolveConfigFromMulti_RejectsUnknownAuthMethod(t *testing.T) {
-	raw := &MultiAppConfig{
-		Apps: []AppConfig{
-			{
-				AppId:      "cli_abc",
-				AppSecret:  PlainSecret("my-secret"),
-				Brand:      BrandFeishu,
-				AuthMethod: "bogus_method",
-			},
-		},
-	}
-
-	_, err := ResolveConfigFromMulti(raw, nil, "")
-	if err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("expected error for unknown authMethod")
-	}
-	var cfgErr *errs.ConfigError
-	if !errors.As(err, &cfgErr) {
-		t.Fatalf("expected ConfigError, got %T: %v", err, err)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestResolveConfigFromMulti_PrivateKeyJWTRequiresKeyRef ensures private_key_jwt
-// without a key handle fails at resolution rather than later at token-signing.
-func TestResolveConfigFromMulti_PrivateKeyJWTRequiresKeyRef(t *testing.T) {
-	raw := &MultiAppConfig{
-		Apps: []AppConfig{
-			{
-				AppId:      "cli_abc",
-				AppSecret:  SecretInput{}, // private_key_jwt carries no app secret
-				Brand:      BrandFeishu,
-				AuthMethod: AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT,
-				// KeyRef intentionally nil
-			},
-		},
-	}
-
-	_, err := ResolveConfigFromMulti(raw, nil, "")
-	if err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("expected error for private_key_jwt without keyRef")
-	}
-	var cfgErr *errs.ConfigError
-	if !errors.As(err, &cfgErr) {
-		t.Fatalf("expected ConfigError, got %T: %v", err, err)
-	}
-
-	// Control: same config WITH a keyRef resolves cleanly and sets KeyLabel.
-	raw.Apps[0].KeyRef = &SecretRef{Source: "tee", ID: "larksuite-cli-agent"}
-	cfg, err := ResolveConfigFromMulti(raw, nil, "")
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("unexpected error with keyRef present: %v", err)
-	}
-	if cfg.KeyLabel != "larksuite-cli-agent" {
-		t.Errorf("KeyLabel = %q, want larksuite-cli-agent", cfg.KeyLabel)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestResolveConfigFromMulti_PKJWTSkipsSecretResolution ensures a private_key_jwt
-// profile that carries a stale/broken AppSecret ref still resolves cleanly: the
-// auth method is judged before any secret handling, so the stale ref is ignored
-// instead of producing a confusing secret-resolution failure.
-func TestResolveConfigFromMulti_PKJWTSkipsSecretResolution(t *testing.T) {
-	raw := &MultiAppConfig{
-		Apps: []AppConfig{{
-			AppId: "cli_pk",
-			// Stale keychain ref whose ID does not match appId — would trip
-			// ValidateSecretKeyMatch / ResolveSecretInput if it were reached.
-			AppSecret:  SecretInput{Ref: &SecretRef{Source: "keychain", ID: "appsecret:cli_OTHER"}},
-			Brand:      BrandFeishu,
-			AuthMethod: AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT,
-			KeyRef:     &SecretRef{Source: "tee", ID: "agent-key"},
-			Users:      []AppUser{},
-		}},
-	}
-	cfg, err := ResolveConfigFromMulti(raw, stubKeychain{}, "")
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("pkjwt with stale secret ref must skip secret resolution, got %v", err)
-	}
-	if cfg.AuthMethod != AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT || cfg.KeyLabel != "agent-key" {
-		t.Errorf("got authMethod=%q keyLabel=%q", cfg.AuthMethod, cfg.KeyLabel)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestResolveConfigFromMulti_PKJWTRejectsBadKeyRef ensures the stricter keyRef
-// check (Source=="tee" && ID!="") rejects malformed handles.
-func TestResolveConfigFromMulti_PKJWTRejectsBadKeyRef(t *testing.T) {
-	for i, ref := range []*SecretRef{
-		{Source: "keychain", ID: "x"}, // wrong source
-		{Source: "tee", ID: ""},       // empty id
-	} {
-		raw := &MultiAppConfig{Apps: []AppConfig{{
-			AppId: "cli_pk", Brand: BrandFeishu,
-			AuthMethod: AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT, KeyRef: ref, Users: []AppUser{},
-		}}}
-		if _, err := ResolveConfigFromMulti(raw, stubKeychain{}, ""); err == nil {
-			t.Errorf("case %d: expected ConfigError for bad keyRef", i)
-		}
-	}
-}
-
 func TestResolveConfigFromMulti_CarriesLang(t *testing.T) {
 	raw := &MultiAppConfig{
 		Apps: []AppConfig{

internal/core/secret.go

@@ -19,12 +19,6 @@ type SecretRef struct {
 	ID       string `json:"id"`                 // env var name / file path / command / keychain key
 }
 
-// KeylessProviderLarkSuite is the only external private_key_jwt signer route.
-// An absent or empty provider always means the CLI's built-in signer.
-const KeylessProviderLarkSuite = "larksuite.keyless"
-
-const SecretSourceTEE = "tee"
-
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 // SecretInput — union type: plain string or SecretRef
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

internal/core/types.go

@@ -3,7 +3,10 @@
 
 package core
 
-import "strings"
+import (
+	"net/url"
+	"strings"
+)
 
 // LarkBrand represents the Lark platform brand.
 // "feishu" targets China-mainland, "lark" targets international.
@@ -64,9 +67,38 @@ func ResolveOpenBaseURL(brand LarkBrand) string {
 	return ResolveEndpoints(brand).Open
 }
 
-// OpenAPIAudience returns the client_assertion `aud` value for the brand: the
-// bare Open API host per the App Authentication JWT spec — "open.feishu.cn" or
-// "open.larksuite.com" — not the full token endpoint URL.
-func OpenAPIAudience(brand LarkBrand) string {
-	return strings.TrimPrefix(ResolveOpenBaseURL(brand), "https://")
+var platformEndpointHosts = func() map[string]struct{} {
+	hosts := make(map[string]struct{})
+	for _, brand := range []LarkBrand{BrandFeishu, BrandLark} {
+		endpoints := ResolveEndpoints(brand)
+		for _, rawURL := range []string{endpoints.Open, endpoints.Accounts, endpoints.MCP, endpoints.AppLink} {
+			parsed, err := url.Parse(rawURL)
+			if err == nil && parsed.Hostname() != "" {
+				hosts[strings.ToLower(parsed.Hostname())] = struct{}{}
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return hosts
+}()
+
+// IsPlatformEndpointHost reports whether hostname exactly matches one of the
+// endpoint hosts produced by ResolveEndpoints. It intentionally does not use a
+// suffix match: lookalike external domains must never enter the platform
+// transport extension.
+func IsPlatformEndpointHost(hostname string) bool {
+	_, ok := platformEndpointHosts[strings.ToLower(hostname)]
+	return ok
+}
+
+// IsPlatformEndpointURL reports whether candidate uses a secure origin for a
+// configured platform endpoint. Non-TLS and non-standard-port lookalikes are
+// excluded even when their hostname matches.
+func IsPlatformEndpointURL(candidate *url.URL) bool {
+	if candidate == nil || !strings.EqualFold(candidate.Scheme, "https") {
+		return false
+	}
+	if port := candidate.Port(); port != "" && port != "443" {
+		return false
+	}
+	return IsPlatformEndpointHost(candidate.Hostname())
 }

internal/core/types_test.go

@@ -3,7 +3,11 @@
 
 package core
 
-import "testing"
+import (
+	"net/url"
+	"reflect"
+	"testing"
+)
 
 func TestResolveEndpoints_Feishu(t *testing.T) {
 	ep := ResolveEndpoints(BrandFeishu)
@@ -92,11 +96,84 @@ func TestResolveEndpoints_NormalizesBrand(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-func TestOpenAPIAudience(t *testing.T) {
-	if got := OpenAPIAudience(BrandFeishu); got != "open.feishu.cn" {
-		t.Errorf("OpenAPIAudience(feishu) = %q, want open.feishu.cn", got)
+func TestIsPlatformEndpointHost_ExactMatchOnly(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, host := range []string{
+		"open.feishu.cn",
+		"accounts.feishu.cn",
+		"mcp.feishu.cn",
+		"applink.feishu.cn",
+		"open.larksuite.com",
+		"accounts.larksuite.com",
+		"mcp.larksuite.com",
+		"applink.larksuite.com",
+	} {
+		if !IsPlatformEndpointHost(host) {
+			t.Errorf("IsPlatformEndpointHost(%q) = false, want true", host)
+		}
 	}
-	if got := OpenAPIAudience(BrandLark); got != "open.larksuite.com" {
-		t.Errorf("OpenAPIAudience(lark) = %q, want open.larksuite.com", got)
+
+	for _, host := range []string{
+		"example.com",
+		"open.feishu.cn.example.com",
+		"notopen.feishu.cn",
+		"",
+	} {
+		if IsPlatformEndpointHost(host) {
+			t.Errorf("IsPlatformEndpointHost(%q) = true, want false", host)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestIsPlatformEndpointHost_CoversEveryResolvedEndpoint(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, brand := range []LarkBrand{BrandFeishu, BrandLark} {
+		endpoints := reflect.ValueOf(ResolveEndpoints(brand))
+		for i := 0; i < endpoints.NumField(); i++ {
+			rawURL := endpoints.Field(i).String()
+			parsed, err := url.Parse(rawURL)
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatalf("ResolveEndpoints(%q) field %d URL %q: %v", brand, i, rawURL, err)
+			}
+			if !IsPlatformEndpointHost(parsed.Hostname()) {
+				t.Errorf("ResolveEndpoints(%q) field %d host %q is missing from the platform transport boundary", brand, i, parsed.Hostname())
+			}
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestIsPlatformEndpointURL_RequiresSecureStandardOrigin(t *testing.T) {
+	if IsPlatformEndpointURL(nil) {
+		t.Error("IsPlatformEndpointURL(nil) = true, want false")
+	}
+	uppercaseScheme := &url.URL{Scheme: "HTTPS", Host: "open.feishu.cn", Path: "/path"}
+	if !IsPlatformEndpointURL(uppercaseScheme) {
+		t.Error("IsPlatformEndpointURL() rejected uppercase HTTPS scheme")
+	}
+
+	for _, rawURL := range []string{
+		"http://open.feishu.cn/path",
+		"https://open.feishu.cn:8443/path",
+		"https://open.feishu.cn.example.com/path",
+	} {
+		candidate, err := url.Parse(rawURL)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		if IsPlatformEndpointURL(candidate) {
+			t.Errorf("IsPlatformEndpointURL(%q) = true, want false", rawURL)
+		}
+	}
+
+	for _, rawURL := range []string{
+		"https://open.feishu.cn/path",
+		"https://open.feishu.cn:443/path",
+		"https://OPEN.FEISHU.CN/path",
+	} {
+		candidate, err := url.Parse(rawURL)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		if !IsPlatformEndpointURL(candidate) {
+			t.Errorf("IsPlatformEndpointURL(%q) = false, want true", rawURL)
+		}
 	}
 }

internal/credential/default_provider.go

@@ -17,7 +17,6 @@ import (
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/keychain"
 
 	extcred "github.com/larksuite/cli/extension/credential"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/keysigner"
 )
 
 // classifyTATResponseCode wraps a deterministic (non-transient) failure from the
@@ -176,18 +175,6 @@ func (p *DefaultTokenProvider) doResolveTAT(ctx context.Context) (*TokenResult,
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}
-
-	// private_key_jwt apps have no app secret: mint via the jwt-bearer grant
-	// using a TEE-signed client_assertion instead.
-	if acct.AuthMethod == core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT {
-		signer := keysigner.Active()
-		token, err := FetchTATWithAssertionForProvider(ctx, httpClient, acct.Brand, acct.AppID, signer, acct.KeyProvider, acct.KeyLabel)
-		if err != nil {
-			return nil, err
-		}
-		return &TokenResult{Token: token}, nil
-	}
-
 	token, err := FetchTAT(ctx, httpClient, acct.Brand, acct.AppID, acct.AppSecret)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err

internal/credential/tat_fetch.go

@@ -12,12 +12,7 @@ import (
 	"net/url"
 	"strings"
 
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/errs"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/auth"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/keylesshelper"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/keylessprovider"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/keysigner"
 )
 
 // FetchTAT performs a single HTTP POST to mint a tenant access token via the
@@ -105,120 +100,3 @@ func FetchTAT(ctx context.Context, httpClient *http.Client, brand core.LarkBrand
 	}
 	return "", classifyTATResponseCode(result.Code, result.Error, desc, string(brand), appID)
 }
-
-// FetchTATWithAssertion mints a tenant access token for a private_key_jwt app via
-// the RFC 7523 jwt-bearer grant: it signs a short-lived client_assertion with the
-// TEE-held key and posts it to the unified OAuth token endpoint, replacing the
-// app_secret entirely.
-//
-// The unified v2 token endpoint returns the minted token as access_token
-// (tenant_access_token is accepted as a fallback).
-func FetchTATWithAssertion(ctx context.Context, httpClient *http.Client, brand core.LarkBrand, clientID string, signer keysigner.Signer, keyLabel string) (string, error) {
-	return FetchTATWithAssertionForProvider(ctx, httpClient, brand, clientID, signer, "", keyLabel)
-}
-
-// FetchTATWithAssertionForProvider routes one app authentication by its
-// persisted keyRef.provider. Empty is the stable built-in signer route;
-// larksuite.keyless is resolved afresh for this operation; all other values
-// fail closed in keylessprovider.Resolve.
-func FetchTATWithAssertionForProvider(ctx context.Context, httpClient *http.Client, brand core.LarkBrand, clientID string, signer keysigner.Signer, provider, keyLabel string) (string, error) {
-	var helper *keylesshelper.Command
-	var err error
-	if strings.TrimSpace(provider) != "" {
-		helper, err = keylessprovider.Resolve(ctx, provider)
-		if err != nil {
-			return "", err
-		}
-	}
-	return FetchTATWithAssertionWithHelper(ctx, httpClient, brand, clientID, signer, helper, keyLabel)
-}
-
-// FetchTATWithAssertionWithHelper is the single-resolution variant used when
-// the caller must make a preflight decision from the same helper snapshot.
-func FetchTATWithAssertionWithHelper(ctx context.Context, httpClient *http.Client, brand core.LarkBrand, clientID string, signer keysigner.Signer, helper *keylesshelper.Command, keyLabel string) (string, error) {
-	if signer == nil && helper == nil {
-		return "", errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeInvalidClient,
-			"profile uses private_key_jwt but no TEE key signer is available on this build").
-			WithHint("install a build with the platform key-signer extension, configure an external keyless signer, or reconfigure the app to use an app secret")
-	}
-	ep := core.ResolveEndpoints(brand)
-	endpoint := ep.Open + auth.PathOAuthTokenV2
-
-	assertionType, assertion, err := auth.SignClientAssertion(ctx, signer, helper, keyLabel, clientID, core.OpenAPIAudience(brand))
-	if err != nil {
-		return "", err
-	}
-
-	form := url.Values{}
-	form.Set("grant_type", "urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:jwt-bearer")
-	form.Set("client_id", clientID)
-	form.Set("client_assertion_type", assertionType)
-	form.Set("client_assertion", assertion)
-
-	req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodPost, endpoint, strings.NewReader(form.Encode()))
-	if err != nil {
-		return "", err
-	}
-	req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
-
-	resp, err := httpClient.Do(req)
-	if err != nil {
-		return "", err
-	}
-	defer resp.Body.Close()
-
-	body, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 1<<20))
-	if err != nil {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("read token response: %w", err)
-	}
-
-	var result struct {
-		Code              int    `json:"code"`
-		Msg               string `json:"msg"`
-		Error             string `json:"error"`
-		ErrorDescription  string `json:"error_description"`
-		AccessToken       string `json:"access_token"`
-		TenantAccessToken string `json:"tenant_access_token"`
-	}
-	_ = json.Unmarshal(body, &result) // best-effort; error body may not be JSON
-
-	token := result.AccessToken
-	if token == "" {
-		token = result.TenantAccessToken
-	}
-	if resp.StatusCode == http.StatusOK && token != "" && result.Error == "" && result.Code == 0 {
-		return token, nil
-	}
-
-	// Surface the server's reason, preferring the OAuth `error` code (e.g.
-	// unauthorized_client) which is more diagnostic than the description alone.
-	detail := result.ErrorDescription
-	if detail == "" {
-		detail = result.Msg
-	}
-	if detail == "" {
-		detail = strings.TrimSpace(string(body))
-	}
-	if result.Error != "" {
-		return "", classifyAssertionError(result.Error, resp.StatusCode, detail)
-	}
-	return "", fmt.Errorf("token endpoint HTTP %d (code=%d): %s", resp.StatusCode, result.Code, detail)
-}
-
-// classifyAssertionError maps the OAuth token endpoint's `error` field to a
-// typed or untyped error. Only deterministic client-credential rejections get a
-// typed errs.ConfigError (so runProbePKJWT can tell "this key is not bound to
-// this app" apart from upstream noise); every other error (e.g.
-// temporarily_unavailable) stays untyped and is swallowed by the probe. detail
-// carries only the server's error_description / msg / body text — it never
-// echoes the client_assertion or private key (the assertion lives only in the
-// request form).
-func classifyAssertionError(oauthError string, httpStatus int, detail string) error {
-	switch oauthError {
-	case "invalid_client", "unauthorized_client", "invalid_grant":
-		return errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeInvalidClient,
-			"token endpoint rejected the key (%s): %s", oauthError, detail)
-	default:
-		return fmt.Errorf("token endpoint HTTP %d (%s): %s", httpStatus, oauthError, detail)
-	}
-}

internal/credential/tat_fetch_test.go

@@ -5,22 +5,15 @@ package credential
 
 import (
 	"context"
-	"crypto"
-	"crypto/ecdsa"
-	"crypto/elliptic"
-	"crypto/rand"
-	"crypto/sha256"
 	"errors"
 	"io"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/http/httptest"
-	"net/url"
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
 
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/errs"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/keysigner"
 )
 
 // stubRoundTripper lets us assert request shape and return canned responses.
@@ -314,141 +307,3 @@ func (r *urlRewriteRT) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
 	req2.Header = req.Header
 	return http.DefaultTransport.RoundTrip(req2)
 }
-
-// fakeTATSigner is a real in-memory ECDSA P-256 signer for assertion tests.
-type fakeTATSigner struct{ key *ecdsa.PrivateKey }
-
-func newFakeTATSigner(t *testing.T) *fakeTATSigner {
-	t.Helper()
-	t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
-	k, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	return &fakeTATSigner{key: k}
-}
-
-func (f *fakeTATSigner) EnsureKey(context.Context, keysigner.KeyRef) (crypto.PublicKey, error) {
-	return f.key.Public(), nil
-}
-func (f *fakeTATSigner) PublicKey(context.Context, keysigner.KeyRef) (crypto.PublicKey, error) {
-	return f.key.Public(), nil
-}
-func (f *fakeTATSigner) Sign(_ context.Context, _ keysigner.KeyRef, in []byte) ([]byte, string, error) {
-	h := sha256.Sum256(in)
-	r, s, err := ecdsa.Sign(rand.Reader, f.key, h[:])
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, "", err
-	}
-	sig := make([]byte, 64)
-	r.FillBytes(sig[:32])
-	s.FillBytes(sig[32:])
-	return sig, keysigner.AlgES256, nil
-}
-
-func TestFetchTATWithAssertion_Success(t *testing.T) {
-	rt := &stubRoundTripper{respCode: 200, respBody: `{"access_token":"test-token","token_type":"Bearer","expires_in":7200}`}
-	hc := &http.Client{Transport: rt}
-
-	token, err := FetchTATWithAssertion(context.Background(), hc, core.BrandFeishu, "cli_app", newFakeTATSigner(t), "agent-key")
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
-	}
-	if token != "test-token" {
-		t.Errorf("token = %q, want test-token", token)
-	}
-	if rt.gotReq.URL.String() != "https://open.feishu.cn/open-apis/authen/v2/oauth/token" {
-		t.Errorf("url = %s", rt.gotReq.URL.String())
-	}
-
-	form, err := url.ParseQuery(rt.gotBody)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if form.Get("grant_type") != "urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:jwt-bearer" {
-		t.Errorf("grant_type = %q", form.Get("grant_type"))
-	}
-	if form.Get("client_assertion_type") != "urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:jwt-bearer" {
-		t.Errorf("client_assertion_type = %q", form.Get("client_assertion_type"))
-	}
-	if form.Get("client_assertion") == "" {
-		t.Error("client_assertion is empty")
-	}
-	if form.Has("client_secret") {
-		t.Error("client_secret must NOT be sent for private_key_jwt")
-	}
-	if form.Get("client_id") != "cli_app" {
-		t.Errorf("client_id = %q", form.Get("client_id"))
-	}
-}
-
-func TestFetchTATWithAssertion_NilSigner(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
-	hc := &http.Client{Transport: &stubRoundTripper{respCode: 200, respBody: `{}`}}
-	if _, err := FetchTATWithAssertion(context.Background(), hc, core.BrandFeishu, "cli_app", nil, "k"); err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("expected error when signer is nil")
-	}
-}
-
-func TestFetchTATWithAssertion_ServerError(t *testing.T) {
-	rt := &stubRoundTripper{respCode: 200, respBody: `{"error":"invalid_client","error_description":"unknown key"}`}
-	hc := &http.Client{Transport: rt}
-	if _, err := FetchTATWithAssertion(context.Background(), hc, core.BrandFeishu, "cli_app", newFakeTATSigner(t), "k"); err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("expected error for invalid_client response")
-	}
-}
-
-func TestFetchTATWithAssertion_LimitsErrorBody(t *testing.T) {
-	rt := &stubRoundTripper{respCode: 502, respBody: strings.Repeat("x", 2<<20)}
-	hc := &http.Client{Transport: rt}
-
-	_, err := FetchTATWithAssertion(context.Background(), hc, core.BrandFeishu, "cli_app", newFakeTATSigner(t), "k")
-	if err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("expected error")
-	}
-	if len(err.Error()) > (1<<20)+512 {
-		t.Fatalf("error length = %d, want bounded", len(err.Error()))
-	}
-}
-
-// Deterministic OAuth client rejections must be typed (ConfigError /
-// SubtypeInvalidClient) so runProbePKJWT can tell "the key is not bound to this
-// app" apart from transport noise.
-func TestFetchTATWithAssertion_DeterministicReject_Typed(t *testing.T) {
-	for _, oauthErr := range []string{"invalid_client", "unauthorized_client", "invalid_grant"} {
-		rt := &stubRoundTripper{respCode: 401, respBody: `{"error":"` + oauthErr + `","error_description":"bad key"}`}
-		hc := &http.Client{Transport: rt}
-		_, err := FetchTATWithAssertion(context.Background(), hc, core.BrandFeishu, "cli_app", newFakeTATSigner(t), "k")
-		if err == nil {
-			t.Fatalf("%s: expected error", oauthErr)
-		}
-		if !errs.IsTyped(err) {
-			t.Errorf("%s: must be typed, got %T", oauthErr, err)
-		}
-		var cfgErr *errs.ConfigError
-		if !errors.As(err, &cfgErr) || cfgErr.Subtype != errs.SubtypeInvalidClient {
-			t.Errorf("%s: want ConfigError/InvalidClient, got %T %v", oauthErr, err, err)
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-// Unrecognized OAuth errors and non-payload noise stay UNTYPED so the probe
-// treats them as upstream noise and stays silent.
-func TestFetchTATWithAssertion_AmbiguousError_Untyped(t *testing.T) {
-	cases := []string{
-		`{"error":"temporarily_unavailable","error_description":"retry"}`,
-		`{"code":99999,"msg":"weird"}`,
-		`not json`,
-	}
-	for _, body := range cases {
-		rt := &stubRoundTripper{respCode: 503, respBody: body}
-		hc := &http.Client{Transport: rt}
-		_, err := FetchTATWithAssertion(context.Background(), hc, core.BrandFeishu, "cli_app", newFakeTATSigner(t), "k")
-		if err == nil {
-			t.Fatalf("body %q: expected error", body)
-		}
-		if errs.IsTyped(err) {
-			t.Errorf("body %q: must be UNTYPED, got typed %T", body, err)
-		}
-	}
-}

internal/credential/types.go

@@ -26,9 +26,6 @@ type Account struct {
 	UserName            string
 	Lang                i18n.Lang
 	SupportedIdentities uint8
-	AuthMethod          string // "" == client_secret; core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT
-	KeyLabel            string // resolved TEE key handle for private_key_jwt
-	KeyProvider         string // empty == built-in signer; explicit external provider otherwise
 }
 
 const runtimePlaceholderAppSecret = "__LARKSUITE_CLI_TOKEN_ONLY__"
@@ -72,9 +69,6 @@ func AccountFromCliConfig(cfg *core.CliConfig) *Account {
 		UserName:            cfg.UserName,
 		Lang:                cfg.Lang,
 		SupportedIdentities: cfg.SupportedIdentities,
-		AuthMethod:          cfg.AuthMethod,
-		KeyLabel:            cfg.KeyLabel,
-		KeyProvider:         cfg.KeyProvider,
 	}
 }
 
@@ -94,9 +88,6 @@ func (a *Account) ToCliConfig() *core.CliConfig {
 		UserName:            a.UserName,
 		Lang:                a.Lang,
 		SupportedIdentities: a.SupportedIdentities,
-		AuthMethod:          a.AuthMethod,
-		KeyLabel:            a.KeyLabel,
-		KeyProvider:         a.KeyProvider,
 	}
 }
 

internal/credential/types_test.go

@@ -56,16 +56,13 @@ func TestAccountFromCliConfigAndBack_ReturnCopies(t *testing.T) {
 		UserName:            "alice",
 		Lang:                i18n.LangJaJP,
 		SupportedIdentities: 3,
-		AuthMethod:          core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT,
-		KeyLabel:            "openclaw-lark",
-		KeyProvider:         core.KeylessProviderLarkSuite,
 	}
 
 	acct := AccountFromCliConfig(cfg)
 	if acct == nil {
 		t.Fatal("AccountFromCliConfig() = nil")
 	}
-	if acct.AppID != cfg.AppID || acct.ProfileName != cfg.ProfileName || acct.UserName != cfg.UserName || acct.KeyProvider != cfg.KeyProvider {
+	if acct.AppID != cfg.AppID || acct.ProfileName != cfg.ProfileName || acct.UserName != cfg.UserName {
 		t.Fatalf("AccountFromCliConfig() = %#v, want copied fields from %#v", acct, cfg)
 	}
 	if acct.Lang != cfg.Lang {
@@ -76,7 +73,7 @@ func TestAccountFromCliConfigAndBack_ReturnCopies(t *testing.T) {
 	if roundtrip == nil {
 		t.Fatal("ToCliConfig() = nil")
 	}
-	if roundtrip.AppID != cfg.AppID || roundtrip.ProfileName != cfg.ProfileName || roundtrip.UserName != cfg.UserName || roundtrip.KeyProvider != cfg.KeyProvider {
+	if roundtrip.AppID != cfg.AppID || roundtrip.ProfileName != cfg.ProfileName || roundtrip.UserName != cfg.UserName {
 		t.Fatalf("ToCliConfig() = %#v, want copied fields from %#v", roundtrip, cfg)
 	}
 	if roundtrip.Lang != cfg.Lang {

internal/envvars/read_test.go

@@ -16,16 +16,18 @@ func TestAgentName_EmptyWhenEnvUnset(t *testing.T) {
 }
 
 func TestAgentName_ReturnsCleanValue(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Setenv(CliAgentName, "claude-code")
-	if got := AgentName(); got != "claude-code" {
-		t.Fatalf("AgentName() = %q, want %q", got, "claude-code")
+	const agentName = "sample-agent"
+	t.Setenv(CliAgentName, agentName)
+	if got := AgentName(); got != agentName {
+		t.Fatalf("AgentName() = %q, want %q", got, agentName)
 	}
 }
 
 func TestAgentName_TrimsWhitespace(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Setenv(CliAgentName, "  cursor  ")
-	if got := AgentName(); got != "cursor" {
-		t.Fatalf("AgentName() = %q, want %q (whitespace trimmed)", got, "cursor")
+	const agentName = "sample-agent"
+	t.Setenv(CliAgentName, "  "+agentName+"  ")
+	if got := AgentName(); got != agentName {
+		t.Fatalf("AgentName() = %q, want %q (whitespace trimmed)", got, agentName)
 	}
 }
 

internal/httpmock/registry.go

@@ -38,6 +38,10 @@ type Stub struct {
 	// matches after the first hit. Each match appends to CapturedBodies.
 	Reusable bool
 
+	// Optional (optional): when true, Verify does not require this stub to be
+	// matched. Useful for negative assertions via OnMatch.
+	Optional bool
+
 	// CapturedHeaders records the request headers of the matched request.
 	// Populated after RoundTrip matches this stub.
 	CapturedHeaders http.Header
@@ -137,6 +141,9 @@ func (r *Registry) Verify(t testing.TB) {
 		if s.matched {
 			continue
 		}
+		if s.Optional {
+			continue
+		}
 		// Reusable stubs never set s.matched; treat any captured hit as a match.
 		if s.Reusable && len(s.CapturedBodies) > 0 {
 			continue

internal/identitydiag/diagnostics.go

@@ -202,9 +202,7 @@ func diagnoseBot(ctx context.Context, f *cmdutil.Factory, cfg *core.CliConfig, v
 			Hint:    "check strict mode or the active credential provider",
 		}
 	}
-	// private_key_jwt apps have no app secret — the bot/tenant token is minted via
-	// a TEE-signed client_assertion — so absence of a secret is NOT "unconfigured".
-	if cfg.SupportedIdentities == 0 && !credential.HasRealAppSecret(cfg.AppSecret) && cfg.AuthMethod != core.AuthMethodPrivateKeyJWT {
+	if cfg.SupportedIdentities == 0 && !credential.HasRealAppSecret(cfg.AppSecret) {
 		return Identity{
 			Status:  StatusNotConfigured,
 			Message: "Bot identity: not configured (missing app secret or bot token)",

internal/keylesshelper/helper.go

@@ -1,287 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
-
-// Package keylesshelper invokes a signer generation that has already been
-// resolved and verified by internal/keylessprovider.
-package keylesshelper
-
-import (
-	"bytes"
-	"context"
-	"crypto/sha256"
-	"encoding/hex"
-	"encoding/json"
-	"errors"
-	"fmt"
-	"io"
-	"os"
-	"os/exec"
-	"strings"
-	"time"
-
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/keysigner"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/vfs"
-)
-
-const (
-	helperOutputLimit      = 1 << 20
-	helperStderrLimit      = 64 << 10
-	helperExecutionTimeout = 10 * time.Second
-)
-
-type request struct {
-	Op       string `json:"op"`
-	KeyRef   string `json:"keyRef,omitempty"`
-	Nonce    string `json:"nonce,omitempty"`
-	ClientID string `json:"clientId,omitempty"`
-	Audience string `json:"aud,omitempty"`
-}
-
-type response struct {
-	OK                  bool           `json:"ok"`
-	Error               *protocolError `json:"error,omitempty"`
-	Attestation         string         `json:"attestation,omitempty"`
-	ClientAssertionType string         `json:"client_assertion_type,omitempty"`
-	ClientAssertion     string         `json:"client_assertion,omitempty"`
-}
-
-type protocolError struct {
-	Type    string `json:"type"`
-	Message string `json:"message"`
-}
-
-// Command is one verified provider executable. It is intentionally impossible
-// to construct from an app-config path, argv, or environment variable.
-type Command struct {
-	argv         []string
-	providerCWD  string
-	providerHome string
-	providerSHA  string
-}
-
-// NewProviderCommand builds the fixed empty-argv command used by a verified
-// provider executable. Provider execution never accepts argv from app config or
-// the environment.
-func NewProviderCommand(binaryPath, providerRoot, signerHome, expectedSHA256 string) (*Command, error) {
-	if strings.TrimSpace(binaryPath) == "" || strings.TrimSpace(providerRoot) == "" {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("provider binary path and root must be non-empty")
-	}
-	if len(expectedSHA256) != 64 {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("provider binary digest must be a SHA-256 hex string")
-	}
-	return &Command{argv: []string{binaryPath}, providerCWD: providerRoot, providerHome: signerHome, providerSHA: expectedSHA256}, nil
-}
-
-// Probe asks this resolved helper for its public key.
-func (c *Command) Probe(ctx context.Context, keyRef string) error {
-	resp, err := c.execute(ctx, request{
-		Op:     "pubkey",
-		KeyRef: defaultKeyRef(keyRef),
-	})
-	if err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	return validateResponse(resp)
-}
-
-// SignAttestation asks this resolved helper to mint a registration attestation JWT.
-func (c *Command) SignAttestation(ctx context.Context, keyRef, nonce string) (string, error) {
-	resp, err := c.execute(ctx, request{
-		Op:     "sign-attestation",
-		KeyRef: defaultKeyRef(keyRef),
-		Nonce:  nonce,
-	})
-	if err != nil {
-		return "", err
-	}
-	if err := validateResponse(resp); err != nil {
-		return "", err
-	}
-	if resp.Attestation == "" {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("keyless helper returned empty attestation")
-	}
-	return resp.Attestation, nil
-}
-
-// SignClientAssertion asks this resolved helper to mint a token-endpoint client_assertion.
-func (c *Command) SignClientAssertion(ctx context.Context, keyRef, clientID, audience string) (string, string, error) {
-	resp, err := c.execute(ctx, request{
-		Op:       "sign-assertion",
-		KeyRef:   defaultKeyRef(keyRef),
-		ClientID: clientID,
-		Audience: audience,
-	})
-	if err != nil {
-		return "", "", err
-	}
-	if err := validateResponse(resp); err != nil {
-		return "", "", err
-	}
-	if resp.ClientAssertionType == "" {
-		return "", "", fmt.Errorf("keyless helper returned empty client_assertion_type")
-	}
-	if resp.ClientAssertion == "" {
-		return "", "", fmt.Errorf("keyless helper returned empty client_assertion")
-	}
-	return resp.ClientAssertionType, resp.ClientAssertion, nil
-}
-
-func (c *Command) execute(ctx context.Context, req request) (response, error) {
-	if err := verifyProviderBinary(c.argv[0], c.providerSHA); err != nil {
-		return response{}, err
-	}
-	return runCommandConfigured(ctx, c.argv, req, c.providerCWD, providerEnvironment(c.providerHome))
-}
-
-func verifyProviderBinary(path, expectedSHA string) error {
-	info, err := vfs.Lstat(path)
-	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("recheck provider signer: %w", err)
-	}
-	if !info.Mode().IsRegular() || info.Mode()&os.ModeSymlink != 0 || info.Size() <= 0 || info.Size() > 512<<20 {
-		return fmt.Errorf("provider signer changed before execution")
-	}
-	f, err := vfs.Open(path)
-	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("reopen provider signer: %w", err)
-	}
-	defer f.Close()
-	h := sha256.New()
-	n, err := io.Copy(h, io.LimitReader(f, 512<<20+1))
-	if err != nil || n != info.Size() {
-		return fmt.Errorf("rehash provider signer: file changed while reading")
-	}
-	if hex.EncodeToString(h.Sum(nil)) != expectedSHA {
-		return fmt.Errorf("provider signer digest changed before execution")
-	}
-	return nil
-}
-
-func validateResponse(resp response) error {
-	if resp.Error != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("keyless helper %s: %s", resp.Error.Type, resp.Error.Message)
-	}
-	if !resp.OK {
-		return fmt.Errorf("keyless helper returned ok=false")
-	}
-	return nil
-}
-
-func defaultKeyRef(keyRef string) string {
-	if keyRef != "" {
-		return keyRef
-	}
-	return keysigner.DefaultKeyLabel
-}
-
-func runCommand(ctx context.Context, argv []string, req request) (response, error) {
-	return runCommandConfigured(ctx, argv, req, "", nil)
-}
-
-func runCommandConfigured(ctx context.Context, argv []string, req request, cwd string, env []string) (response, error) {
-	body, err := json.Marshal(req)
-	if err != nil {
-		return response{}, fmt.Errorf("marshal keyless helper request: %w", err)
-	}
-	body = append(body, '\n')
-
-	helperCtx, cancel := withExecutionTimeout(ctx)
-	defer cancel()
-
-	// CommandContext's default cancellation kills the helper process. This is
-	// important for unattended agent calls: a signer blocked on platform UI must
-	// not hold the caller indefinitely.
-	cmd := exec.CommandContext(helperCtx, argv[0], argv[1:]...)
-	if cwd != "" {
-		cmd.Dir = cwd
-		cmd.Env = env
-	}
-	cmd.Stdin = bytes.NewReader(body)
-	stdout := &limitedBuffer{limit: helperOutputLimit}
-	stderr := &limitedBuffer{limit: helperStderrLimit}
-	cmd.Stdout = stdout
-	cmd.Stderr = stderr
-
-	runErr := cmd.Run()
-	if err := helperCtx.Err(); err != nil {
-		// Never parse or include helper output on cancellation. A partially written
-		// response may contain a client assertion or other credential material.
-		if errors.Is(err, context.DeadlineExceeded) {
-			return response{}, fmt.Errorf("keyless helper timed out: %w", context.DeadlineExceeded)
-		}
-		return response{}, fmt.Errorf("keyless helper canceled: %w", err)
-	}
-	var resp response
-	if err := json.Unmarshal(stdout.Bytes(), &resp); err != nil {
-		if runErr != nil {
-			return response{}, helperRunError(runErr, stderr.String())
-		}
-		return response{}, fmt.Errorf("keyless helper produced invalid JSON: %w", err)
-	}
-	if runErr != nil && resp.Error == nil {
-		return response{}, helperRunError(runErr, stderr.String())
-	}
-	return resp, nil
-}
-
-func providerEnvironment(homeOverride string) []string {
-	// Signer implementations use OS facilities and must not inherit language
-	// runtime/proxy/library injection variables. HOME/TMPDIR/SystemRoot are the
-	// minimal cross-platform values currently needed by supported backends.
-	keep := map[string]bool{"HOME": true, "TMPDIR": true, "TEMP": true, "TMP": true, "SystemRoot": true, "WINDIR": true}
-	var env []string
-	for _, entry := range os.Environ() {
-		name := entry
-		if idx := strings.IndexByte(entry, '='); idx >= 0 {
-			name = entry[:idx]
-		}
-		if keep[name] && !(name == "HOME" && homeOverride != "") {
-			env = append(env, entry)
-		}
-	}
-	if homeOverride != "" {
-		env = append(env, "HOME="+homeOverride)
-	}
-	return env
-}
-
-func withExecutionTimeout(ctx context.Context) (context.Context, context.CancelFunc) {
-	return context.WithTimeout(ctx, helperExecutionTimeout)
-}
-
-func helperRunError(runErr error, stderr string) error {
-	if errors.Is(runErr, os.ErrNotExist) {
-		return fmt.Errorf("keyless helper executable no longer exists; repair or reinstall the OpenClaw Feishu plugin: %w", runErr)
-	}
-	if strings.TrimSpace(stderr) != "" {
-		return fmt.Errorf("keyless helper failed: %w (stderr omitted)", runErr)
-	}
-	return fmt.Errorf("keyless helper failed: %w", runErr)
-}
-
-type limitedBuffer struct {
-	buf   bytes.Buffer
-	limit int
-}
-
-func (b *limitedBuffer) Write(p []byte) (int, error) {
-	if b.limit <= 0 {
-		return len(p), nil
-	}
-	remaining := b.limit - b.buf.Len()
-	if remaining > 0 {
-		if len(p) < remaining {
-			remaining = len(p)
-		}
-		_, _ = b.buf.Write(p[:remaining])
-	}
-	return len(p), nil
-}
-
-func (b *limitedBuffer) Bytes() []byte {
-	return b.buf.Bytes()
-}
-
-func (b *limitedBuffer) String() string {
-	return b.buf.String()
-}

internal/keylesshelper/helper_test.go

@@ -1,91 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
-
-package keylesshelper
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"crypto/sha256"
-	"encoding/hex"
-	"encoding/json"
-	"errors"
-	"io"
-	"os"
-	"path/filepath"
-	"strings"
-	"testing"
-	"time"
-)
-
-const helperProcessMode = "GO_WANT_KEYLESS_PROVIDER_HELPER"
-
-func TestRunCommandProtocol(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Setenv(helperProcessMode, "reply")
-	resp, err := runCommand(context.Background(), []string{os.Args[0], "-test.run=^TestHelperProcess$"}, request{
-		Op: "sign-assertion", KeyRef: "key-1", ClientID: "cli_a", Audience: "aud",
-	})
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if !resp.OK || resp.ClientAssertion != "helper.jwt" {
-		t.Fatalf("response = %#v", resp)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestRunCommandTimeoutDoesNotLeakOutput(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Setenv(helperProcessMode, "hang")
-	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 100*time.Millisecond)
-	defer cancel()
-	_, err := runCommand(ctx, []string{os.Args[0], "-test.run=^TestHelperProcess$"}, request{Op: "pubkey", KeyRef: "key-1"})
-	if !errors.Is(err, context.DeadlineExceeded) || strings.Contains(err.Error(), "secret.jwt") {
-		t.Fatalf("error = %v", err)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestProviderCommandRechecksDigestBeforeSpawn(t *testing.T) {
-	root := t.TempDir()
-	binary := filepath.Join(root, "signer")
-	if err := os.WriteFile(binary, []byte("first"), 0700); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	digest := sha256.Sum256([]byte("first"))
-	command, err := NewProviderCommand(binary, root, "", hex.EncodeToString(digest[:]))
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if err := os.WriteFile(binary, []byte("second"), 0700); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if err := command.Probe(context.Background(), "key-1"); err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "digest changed") {
-		t.Fatalf("Probe error = %v", err)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestProviderEnvironmentOverridesOnlyPinnedHome(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Setenv("HOME", "/original")
-	t.Setenv("HTTPS_PROXY", "http://untrusted.invalid")
-	env := providerEnvironment("/isolated")
-	joined := strings.Join(env, "\n")
-	if !strings.Contains(joined, "HOME=/isolated") || strings.Contains(joined, "HOME=/original") || strings.Contains(joined, "HTTPS_PROXY") {
-		t.Fatalf("provider environment = %q", joined)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestHelperProcess(t *testing.T) {
-	switch os.Getenv(helperProcessMode) {
-	case "reply":
-		var req request
-		if err := json.NewDecoder(os.Stdin).Decode(&req); err != nil {
-			os.Exit(2)
-		}
-		_ = json.NewEncoder(os.Stdout).Encode(response{
-			OK: true, ClientAssertionType: "urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:jwt-bearer", ClientAssertion: "helper.jwt",
-		})
-		os.Exit(0)
-	case "hang":
-		_, _ = io.WriteString(os.Stdout, `{"ok":true,"client_assertion":"secret.jwt"`)
-		for {
-			time.Sleep(time.Hour)
-		}
-	}
-}

internal/keylessprovider/inspect_command_unix.go

@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
-
-//go:build darwin || linux
-
-package keylessprovider
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"os/exec"
-)
-
-func newOpenClawInspectCommand(ctx context.Context, executable string, env []string) (*exec.Cmd, error) {
-	cmd := exec.CommandContext(ctx, executable, "plugins", "inspect", pluginID, "--json")
-	cmd.Env = env
-	return cmd, nil
-}

internal/keylessprovider/inspect_command_windows.go

@@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
-
-//go:build windows
-
-package keylessprovider
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"fmt"
-	"os/exec"
-	"path/filepath"
-	"strings"
-	"syscall"
-
-	"golang.org/x/sys/windows"
-)
-
-const inspectLauncherEnv = "LARK_CLI_OPENCLAW_INSPECT_LAUNCHER"
-
-// newOpenClawInspectCommand runs native launchers directly and npm's .cmd/.bat
-// launchers through the OS-owned command interpreter. The launcher path travels
-// in a dedicated environment variable and is expanded once inside a quoted
-// command, while delayed expansion is disabled. This avoids interpolating a
-// user-controlled path into cmd.exe syntax.
-func newOpenClawInspectCommand(ctx context.Context, executable string, env []string) (*exec.Cmd, error) {
-	ext := strings.ToLower(filepath.Ext(executable))
-	if ext == ".exe" || ext == ".com" {
-		cmd := exec.CommandContext(ctx, executable, "plugins", "inspect", pluginID, "--json")
-		cmd.Env = env
-		return cmd, nil
-	}
-	if ext != ".cmd" && ext != ".bat" {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("unsupported Windows OpenClaw launcher extension %q", ext)
-	}
-
-	systemDir, err := windows.GetSystemDirectory()
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("resolve Windows system directory: %w", err)
-	}
-	commandInterpreter := filepath.Join(systemDir, "cmd.exe")
-	cmd := exec.CommandContext(ctx, commandInterpreter)
-	cmd.Args = nil
-	cmd.Env = append(append([]string(nil), env...), inspectLauncherEnv+"="+executable)
-	cmd.SysProcAttr = &syscall.SysProcAttr{
-		CmdLine: `/d /q /s /v:off /c ""%` + inspectLauncherEnv + `%" plugins inspect ` + pluginID + ` --json"`,
-	}
-	return cmd, nil
-}

internal/keylessprovider/inspect_command_windows_test.go

@@ -1,54 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
-
-//go:build windows
-
-package keylessprovider
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"path/filepath"
-	"strings"
-	"testing"
-)
-
-func TestNewOpenClawInspectCommand_WindowsBatchUsesSystemCmdWithoutPathInterpolation(t *testing.T) {
-	launcher := `C:\Users\A B&(team)%literal%\openclaw.cmd`
-	cmd, err := newOpenClawInspectCommand(context.Background(), launcher, []string{"PATH=C:\\Windows\\System32"})
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if !strings.EqualFold(filepath.Base(cmd.Path), "cmd.exe") {
-		t.Fatalf("command path = %q, want System32 cmd.exe", cmd.Path)
-	}
-	if cmd.SysProcAttr == nil || !strings.Contains(cmd.SysProcAttr.CmdLine, "/d /q /s /v:off /c") {
-		t.Fatalf("cmd line = %#v", cmd.SysProcAttr)
-	}
-	if strings.Contains(cmd.SysProcAttr.CmdLine, launcher) {
-		t.Fatalf("launcher path was interpolated into cmd syntax: %q", cmd.SysProcAttr.CmdLine)
-	}
-	if !strings.Contains(strings.Join(cmd.Env, "\n"), inspectLauncherEnv+"="+launcher) {
-		t.Fatalf("launcher environment missing: %q", cmd.Env)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestNewOpenClawInspectCommand_WindowsNativeExecutableIsDirect(t *testing.T) {
-	launcher := `C:\Program Files\OpenClaw\openclaw.exe`
-	cmd, err := newOpenClawInspectCommand(context.Background(), launcher, []string{"TEMP=C:\\Temp"})
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if cmd.Path != launcher || cmd.SysProcAttr != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("native command = path %q sys %#v", cmd.Path, cmd.SysProcAttr)
-	}
-	wantArgs := []string{launcher, "plugins", "inspect", pluginID, "--json"}
-	if strings.Join(cmd.Args, "\x00") != strings.Join(wantArgs, "\x00") {
-		t.Fatalf("args = %#v, want %#v", cmd.Args, wantArgs)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestNewOpenClawInspectCommand_WindowsRejectsUnknownLauncher(t *testing.T) {
-	if _, err := newOpenClawInspectCommand(context.Background(), `C:\\OpenClaw\\openclaw.ps1`, nil); err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("PowerShell launcher unexpectedly accepted")
-	}
-}

internal/keylessprovider/manifest.go

@@ -1,155 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
-
-package keylessprovider
-
-import (
-	"encoding/json"
-	"os"
-	"path/filepath"
-	"sync"
-
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/validate"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/vfs"
-)
-
-const (
-	providerManifestFormatVersion = 1
-	providerManifestFileName      = "signing-providers.json"
-)
-
-type providerManifest struct {
-	Version   int                              `json:"version"`
-	Providers map[string]providerManifestEntry `json:"providers"`
-}
-
-type providerManifestEntry struct {
-	PluginID         string `json:"pluginId"`
-	PluginPackage    string `json:"pluginPackage"`
-	SignerPackage    string `json:"signerPackage"`
-	StateDir         string `json:"stateDir"`
-	PluginDir        string `json:"pluginDir"`
-	PackageDir       string `json:"packageDir"`
-	BinaryPath       string `json:"binaryPath"`
-	PackageVersion   string `json:"packageVersion"`
-	OS               string `json:"os"`
-	Arch             string `json:"arch"`
-	SHA256           string `json:"sha256"`
-	PackageSize      int64  `json:"packageSize"`
-	PackageModTimeNS int64  `json:"packageModTimeNs"`
-	BinarySize       int64  `json:"binarySize"`
-	BinaryModTimeNS  int64  `json:"binaryModTimeNs"`
-}
-
-var providerManifestMu sync.Mutex
-
-func providerManifestPath() string {
-	return filepath.Join(core.GetBaseConfigDir(), providerManifestFileName)
-}
-
-// resolveFromProviderManifest uses the global manifest only as a location
-// index. resolvePackage revalidates the full path, ownership, permissions,
-// package metadata, and binary digest before a cached location can be used.
-func resolveFromProviderManifest(stateDir, goos, goarch string) (resolvedProvider, bool) {
-	manifest, err := readProviderManifest()
-	if err != nil || manifest.Version != providerManifestFormatVersion {
-		return resolvedProvider{}, false
-	}
-	entry, ok := manifest.Providers[ProviderID]
-	if !ok || entry.PluginID != pluginID || entry.PluginPackage != pluginPackageName ||
-		entry.StateDir != stateDir || entry.OS != goos || entry.Arch != goarch {
-		return resolvedProvider{}, false
-	}
-	spec, err := signerPackageFor(goos, goarch)
-	if err != nil {
-		return resolvedProvider{}, false
-	}
-	if !allowedPackageLocation(entry.PluginDir, entry.PackageDir, spec, goos) {
-		return resolvedProvider{}, false
-	}
-	resolved, err := resolvePackage(stateDir, entry.PluginDir, entry.PackageDir, spec, goos)
-	if err != nil {
-		return resolvedProvider{}, false
-	}
-	if entry.SignerPackage != spec.name ||
-		!samePath(resolved.binaryPath, entry.BinaryPath, goos) ||
-		resolved.packageVersion != entry.PackageVersion ||
-		resolved.digest != entry.SHA256 ||
-		resolved.packageSize != entry.PackageSize ||
-		resolved.packageModTimeNS != entry.PackageModTimeNS ||
-		resolved.binarySize != entry.BinarySize ||
-		resolved.binaryModTimeNS != entry.BinaryModTimeNS {
-		return resolvedProvider{}, false
-	}
-	return resolved, true
-}
-
-func readProviderManifest() (providerManifest, error) {
-	path := providerManifestPath()
-	if err := validateProviderObject(path, false); err != nil {
-		return providerManifest{}, err
-	}
-	data, err := readMetadata(path)
-	if err != nil {
-		return providerManifest{}, err
-	}
-	var manifest providerManifest
-	if err := decodeJSONObject(data, &manifest); err != nil {
-		return providerManifest{}, err
-	}
-	if manifest.Providers == nil {
-		manifest.Providers = make(map[string]providerManifestEntry)
-	}
-	return manifest, nil
-}
-
-func saveProviderManifest(resolved resolvedProvider, goos, goarch string) error {
-	providerManifestMu.Lock()
-	defer providerManifestMu.Unlock()
-	spec, err := signerPackageFor(goos, goarch)
-	if err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-
-	baseDir := core.GetBaseConfigDir()
-	if err := vfs.MkdirAll(baseDir, 0700); err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	if err := validateProviderObject(baseDir, true); err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-
-	manifest, err := readProviderManifest()
-	if err != nil || manifest.Version != providerManifestFormatVersion {
-		manifest = providerManifest{
-			Version:   providerManifestFormatVersion,
-			Providers: make(map[string]providerManifestEntry),
-		}
-	}
-	if manifest.Providers == nil {
-		manifest.Providers = make(map[string]providerManifestEntry)
-	}
-	manifest.Providers[ProviderID] = providerManifestEntry{
-		PluginID:         pluginID,
-		PluginPackage:    pluginPackageName,
-		SignerPackage:    spec.name,
-		StateDir:         resolved.stateDir,
-		PluginDir:        resolved.pluginDir,
-		PackageDir:       resolved.packageDir,
-		BinaryPath:       resolved.binaryPath,
-		PackageVersion:   resolved.packageVersion,
-		OS:               goos,
-		Arch:             goarch,
-		SHA256:           resolved.digest,
-		PackageSize:      resolved.packageSize,
-		PackageModTimeNS: resolved.packageModTimeNS,
-		BinarySize:       resolved.binarySize,
-		BinaryModTimeNS:  resolved.binaryModTimeNS,
-	}
-	data, err := json.MarshalIndent(manifest, "", "  ")
-	if err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	return validate.AtomicWrite(providerManifestPath(), append(data, '\n'), os.FileMode(0600))
-}

internal/keylessprovider/manifest_test.go

@@ -1,493 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
-
-package keylessprovider
-
-import (
-	"bytes"
-	"context"
-	"encoding/json"
-	"errors"
-	"os"
-	"path/filepath"
-	"runtime"
-	"sync"
-	"sync/atomic"
-	"testing"
-)
-
-func TestResolve_ManifestMissPersistsAndHitSkipsInspect(t *testing.T) {
-	configDir := useIsolatedProviderManifest(t)
-	fx := newManagedPackageFixture(t, runtime.GOOS, runtime.GOARCH, true)
-	t.Setenv(openClawStateDirEnv, fx.stateDir)
-	data := marshalInspectDocument(t, inspectPluginDocument(fx, pluginID, fx.packageDir))
-
-	var calls atomic.Int32
-	stubInspectFunction(t, func(context.Context, string) ([]byte, error) {
-		calls.Add(1)
-		return data, nil
-	})
-	if command, err := Resolve(context.Background(), ProviderID); err != nil || command == nil {
-		t.Fatalf("first Resolve = %v, %v", command, err)
-	}
-	if calls.Load() != 1 {
-		t.Fatalf("inspect calls after miss = %d, want 1", calls.Load())
-	}
-
-	path := filepath.Join(configDir, providerManifestFileName)
-	manifestData, err := os.ReadFile(path)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	var manifest providerManifest
-	if err := json.Unmarshal(manifestData, &manifest); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("manifest is not valid JSON: %v", err)
-	}
-	entry := manifest.Providers[ProviderID]
-	if manifest.Version != providerManifestFormatVersion || entry.PackageDir != fx.packageDir ||
-		entry.BinaryPath != fx.binary || entry.SHA256 != fx.binaryDigest || entry.PackageVersion != "1.2.3" {
-		t.Fatalf("persisted manifest = %#v", manifest)
-	}
-	if runtime.GOOS != "windows" {
-		if info, err := os.Stat(path); err != nil || info.Mode().Perm() != 0600 {
-			t.Fatalf("manifest permissions = %v, %v", info, err)
-		}
-	}
-
-	if command, err := Resolve(context.Background(), ProviderID); err != nil || command == nil {
-		t.Fatalf("cached Resolve = %v, %v", command, err)
-	}
-	if calls.Load() != 1 {
-		t.Fatalf("manifest hit restarted inspect; calls = %d", calls.Load())
-	}
-}
-
-func TestResolve_ManifestMutationRefreshes(t *testing.T) {
-	useIsolatedProviderManifest(t)
-	fx := newManagedPackageFixture(t, runtime.GOOS, runtime.GOARCH, true)
-	t.Setenv(openClawStateDirEnv, fx.stateDir)
-	data := marshalInspectDocument(t, inspectPluginDocument(fx, pluginID, fx.packageDir))
-
-	var calls atomic.Int32
-	stubInspectFunction(t, func(context.Context, string) ([]byte, error) {
-		calls.Add(1)
-		return data, nil
-	})
-	if _, err := Resolve(context.Background(), ProviderID); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-
-	changed := []byte("TEST optional-package signer") // same length, different digest
-	if info, err := os.Stat(fx.binary); err != nil || info.Size() != int64(len(changed)) {
-		t.Fatalf("fixture length precondition failed: %v, %v", info, err)
-	}
-	if err := os.WriteFile(fx.binary, changed, 0700); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if _, err := Resolve(context.Background(), ProviderID); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if calls.Load() != 2 {
-		t.Fatalf("inspect calls after binary mutation = %d, want 2", calls.Load())
-	}
-
-	manifest, err := readProviderManifest()
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	entry := manifest.Providers[ProviderID]
-	if entry.SHA256 == fx.binaryDigest {
-		t.Fatal("manifest retained the stale signer digest")
-	}
-}
-
-func TestRefresh_BypassesValidManifest(t *testing.T) {
-	useIsolatedProviderManifest(t)
-	oldFx := newManagedPackageFixture(t, runtime.GOOS, runtime.GOARCH, true)
-	newFx := newManagedPackageFixtureInState(t, oldFx.stateDir, runtime.GOOS, runtime.GOARCH, true)
-	t.Setenv(openClawStateDirEnv, oldFx.stateDir)
-
-	var current = oldFx
-	var calls atomic.Int32
-	stubInspectFunction(t, func(context.Context, string) ([]byte, error) {
-		calls.Add(1)
-		return marshalInspectDocument(t, inspectPluginDocument(current, pluginID, current.packageDir)), nil
-	})
-	if _, err := Resolve(context.Background(), ProviderID); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	current = newFx
-	if _, err := Resolve(context.Background(), ProviderID); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if calls.Load() != 1 {
-		t.Fatalf("normal Resolve should retain valid binding; calls = %d", calls.Load())
-	}
-	if _, err := Refresh(context.Background(), ProviderID); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if calls.Load() != 2 {
-		t.Fatalf("Refresh did not inspect; calls = %d", calls.Load())
-	}
-	manifest, err := readProviderManifest()
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if got := manifest.Providers[ProviderID].PackageDir; got != newFx.packageDir {
-		t.Fatalf("refreshed packageDir = %q, want %q", got, newFx.packageDir)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestPrepareRefresh_AbandonedCommitPreservesManifestBytes(t *testing.T) {
-	configDir := useIsolatedProviderManifest(t)
-	oldFx := newManagedPackageFixture(t, runtime.GOOS, runtime.GOARCH, true)
-	newFx := newManagedPackageFixtureInState(t, oldFx.stateDir, runtime.GOOS, runtime.GOARCH, true)
-	t.Setenv(openClawStateDirEnv, oldFx.stateDir)
-
-	current := oldFx
-	stubInspectFunction(t, func(context.Context, string) ([]byte, error) {
-		return marshalInspectDocument(t, inspectPluginDocument(current, pluginID, current.packageDir)), nil
-	})
-	if _, err := Resolve(context.Background(), ProviderID); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	manifestPath := filepath.Join(configDir, providerManifestFileName)
-	before, err := os.ReadFile(manifestPath)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-
-	current = newFx
-	command, commit, err := PrepareRefresh(context.Background(), ProviderID)
-	if err != nil || command == nil || commit == nil {
-		t.Fatalf("PrepareRefresh = %v, commit %v, %v", command, commit != nil, err)
-	}
-	afterPrepare, err := os.ReadFile(manifestPath)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if !bytes.Equal(afterPrepare, before) {
-		t.Fatal("PrepareRefresh changed the manifest before its commit callback ran")
-	}
-
-	const committers = 8
-	errs := make(chan error, committers)
-	var wg sync.WaitGroup
-	for i := 0; i < committers; i++ {
-		wg.Add(1)
-		go func() {
-			defer wg.Done()
-			errs <- commit()
-		}()
-	}
-	wg.Wait()
-	close(errs)
-	for err := range errs {
-		if err != nil {
-			t.Fatal(err)
-		}
-	}
-	manifest, err := readProviderManifest()
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if got := manifest.Providers[ProviderID].PackageDir; got != newFx.packageDir {
-		t.Fatalf("committed packageDir = %q, want %q", got, newFx.packageDir)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestPrepareRefresh_CommitReturnsFirstErrorWithoutRetry(t *testing.T) {
-	configDir := useIsolatedProviderManifest(t)
-	fx := newManagedPackageFixture(t, runtime.GOOS, runtime.GOARCH, true)
-	t.Setenv(openClawStateDirEnv, fx.stateDir)
-	stubInspectFunction(t, func(context.Context, string) ([]byte, error) {
-		return marshalInspectDocument(t, inspectPluginDocument(fx, pluginID, fx.packageDir)), nil
-	})
-	_, commit, err := PrepareRefresh(context.Background(), ProviderID)
-	if err != nil || commit == nil {
-		t.Fatalf("PrepareRefresh commit %v, error %v", commit != nil, err)
-	}
-
-	if err := os.RemoveAll(configDir); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if err := os.WriteFile(configDir, []byte("block manifest directory"), 0600); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	firstErr := commit()
-	if firstErr == nil {
-		t.Fatal("first commit unexpectedly succeeded")
-	}
-	if err := os.Remove(configDir); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if err := os.Mkdir(configDir, 0700); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	secondErr := commit()
-	if secondErr != firstErr {
-		t.Fatalf("second commit error = %v; want cached first error %v", secondErr, firstErr)
-	}
-	if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(configDir, providerManifestFileName)); !os.IsNotExist(err) {
-		t.Fatalf("second commit retried manifest write: %v", err)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestPrepareRefresh_CommitRejectsSameStampBinaryMutation(t *testing.T) {
-	configDir := useIsolatedProviderManifest(t)
-	oldFx := newManagedPackageFixture(t, runtime.GOOS, runtime.GOARCH, true)
-	newFx := newManagedPackageFixtureInState(t, oldFx.stateDir, runtime.GOOS, runtime.GOARCH, true)
-	t.Setenv(openClawStateDirEnv, oldFx.stateDir)
-
-	current := oldFx
-	stubInspectFunction(t, func(context.Context, string) ([]byte, error) {
-		return marshalInspectDocument(t, inspectPluginDocument(current, pluginID, current.packageDir)), nil
-	})
-	if _, err := Resolve(context.Background(), ProviderID); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	manifestPath := filepath.Join(configDir, providerManifestFileName)
-	before, err := os.ReadFile(manifestPath)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-
-	current = newFx
-	_, commit, err := PrepareRefresh(context.Background(), ProviderID)
-	if err != nil || commit == nil {
-		t.Fatalf("PrepareRefresh commit %v, error %v", commit != nil, err)
-	}
-	info, err := os.Stat(newFx.binary)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	changed := []byte("TEST optional-package signer")
-	if info.Size() != int64(len(changed)) {
-		t.Fatalf("fixture size = %d, mutated size = %d", info.Size(), len(changed))
-	}
-	if err := os.WriteFile(newFx.binary, changed, 0700); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if err := os.Chtimes(newFx.binary, info.ModTime(), info.ModTime()); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	mutatedInfo, err := os.Stat(newFx.binary)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if mutatedInfo.Size() != info.Size() || !mutatedInfo.ModTime().Equal(info.ModTime()) {
-		t.Fatalf("mutation did not preserve size/mtime: before %d/%v, after %d/%v",
-			info.Size(), info.ModTime(), mutatedInfo.Size(), mutatedInfo.ModTime())
-	}
-
-	if err := commit(); err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("commit accepted a signer binary changed after PrepareRefresh")
-	}
-	after, err := os.ReadFile(manifestPath)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if !bytes.Equal(after, before) {
-		t.Fatal("failed commit changed the previous manifest")
-	}
-}
-
-func TestRefresh_BypassesLiveInspectResultCache(t *testing.T) {
-	if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
-		t.Skip("test fixture uses a POSIX shell executable")
-	}
-	useIsolatedProviderManifest(t)
-	oldFx := newManagedPackageFixture(t, runtime.GOOS, runtime.GOARCH, true)
-	newFx := newManagedPackageFixtureInState(t, oldFx.stateDir, runtime.GOOS, runtime.GOARCH, true)
-	t.Setenv(openClawStateDirEnv, oldFx.stateDir)
-	t.Setenv(openClawConfigEnv, "")
-
-	inspectOutput := filepath.Join(oldFx.stateDir, "inspect-output.json")
-	writeInspectOutput := func(fx optionalPackageFixture) {
-		t.Helper()
-		data := marshalInspectDocument(t, inspectPluginDocument(fx, pluginID, fx.packageDir))
-		if err := os.WriteFile(inspectOutput, data, 0600); err != nil {
-			t.Fatal(err)
-		}
-	}
-	writeInspectOutput(oldFx)
-
-	binDir := t.TempDir()
-	openClawPath := filepath.Join(binDir, "openclaw")
-	const script = "#!/bin/sh\n/bin/cat \"$OPENCLAW_STATE_DIR/inspect-output.json\"\n"
-	if err := os.WriteFile(openClawPath, []byte(script), 0700); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	t.Setenv("PATH", binDir)
-
-	previousCached, previousFresh := runOpenClawInspect, runOpenClawInspectFresh
-	runOpenClawInspect, runOpenClawInspectFresh = executeOpenClawInspect, executeOpenClawInspectFresh
-	t.Cleanup(func() {
-		runOpenClawInspect, runOpenClawInspectFresh = previousCached, previousFresh
-	})
-
-	// This normal resolution populates the real process cache with oldFx. The
-	// cache key is unchanged when only inspect-output.json is replaced.
-	if _, err := Resolve(context.Background(), ProviderID); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	writeInspectOutput(newFx)
-	cachedData, err := executeOpenClawInspect(context.Background(), oldFx.stateDir)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	cachedPlugin, err := decodeInspectedPlugin(cachedData)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if cachedPlugin.RootDir != oldFx.pluginDir {
-		t.Fatalf("cache precondition failed: rootDir = %q, want old %q", cachedPlugin.RootDir, oldFx.pluginDir)
-	}
-	if _, err := Refresh(context.Background(), ProviderID); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	manifest, err := readProviderManifest()
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if got := manifest.Providers[ProviderID].PackageDir; got != newFx.packageDir {
-		t.Fatalf("Refresh reused cached packageDir %q; want fresh %q", got, newFx.packageDir)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestResolve_CorruptManifestSelfHeals(t *testing.T) {
-	configDir := useIsolatedProviderManifest(t)
-	fx := newManagedPackageFixture(t, runtime.GOOS, runtime.GOARCH, true)
-	t.Setenv(openClawStateDirEnv, fx.stateDir)
-	if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(configDir, providerManifestFileName), []byte(`{"version":`), 0600); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	data := marshalInspectDocument(t, inspectPluginDocument(fx, pluginID, fx.packageDir))
-	var calls atomic.Int32
-	stubInspectFunction(t, func(context.Context, string) ([]byte, error) {
-		calls.Add(1)
-		return data, nil
-	})
-	if _, err := Resolve(context.Background(), ProviderID); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if calls.Load() != 1 {
-		t.Fatalf("inspect calls = %d, want 1", calls.Load())
-	}
-	if _, err := readProviderManifest(); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("manifest was not repaired: %v", err)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestResolve_UnsafeManifestIsIgnoredAndReplaced(t *testing.T) {
-	if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
-		t.Skip("POSIX mode and symlink test")
-	}
-	configDir := useIsolatedProviderManifest(t)
-	fx := newManagedPackageFixture(t, runtime.GOOS, runtime.GOARCH, true)
-	t.Setenv(openClawStateDirEnv, fx.stateDir)
-	data := marshalInspectDocument(t, inspectPluginDocument(fx, pluginID, fx.packageDir))
-	var calls atomic.Int32
-	stubInspectFunction(t, func(context.Context, string) ([]byte, error) {
-		calls.Add(1)
-		return data, nil
-	})
-	if _, err := Resolve(context.Background(), ProviderID); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-
-	path := filepath.Join(configDir, providerManifestFileName)
-	if err := os.Chmod(path, 0666); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if _, err := Resolve(context.Background(), ProviderID); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if calls.Load() != 2 {
-		t.Fatalf("unsafe mode did not trigger discovery; calls = %d", calls.Load())
-	}
-	if info, err := os.Stat(path); err != nil || info.Mode().Perm() != 0600 {
-		t.Fatalf("repaired manifest permissions = %v, %v", info, err)
-	}
-
-	target := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "must-not-overwrite.json")
-	const targetContents = "outside"
-	if err := os.WriteFile(target, []byte(targetContents), 0600); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if err := os.Remove(path); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if err := os.Symlink(target, path); err != nil {
-		t.Skipf("symlink unavailable: %v", err)
-	}
-	if _, err := Resolve(context.Background(), ProviderID); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if calls.Load() != 3 {
-		t.Fatalf("manifest symlink did not trigger discovery; calls = %d", calls.Load())
-	}
-	if info, err := os.Lstat(path); err != nil || info.Mode()&os.ModeSymlink != 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("manifest symlink was not safely replaced: %v, %v", info, err)
-	}
-	if contents, err := os.ReadFile(target); err != nil || string(contents) != targetContents {
-		t.Fatalf("symlink target changed: %q, %v", contents, err)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestResolve_InvalidManifestDoesNotFallBackToStaleCommand(t *testing.T) {
-	useIsolatedProviderManifest(t)
-	fx := newManagedPackageFixture(t, runtime.GOOS, runtime.GOARCH, true)
-	t.Setenv(openClawStateDirEnv, fx.stateDir)
-	data := marshalInspectDocument(t, inspectPluginDocument(fx, pluginID, fx.packageDir))
-	stubInspectFunction(t, func(context.Context, string) ([]byte, error) { return data, nil })
-	if _, err := Resolve(context.Background(), ProviderID); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if err := os.Remove(fx.binary); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	stubInspectFunction(t, func(context.Context, string) ([]byte, error) {
-		return nil, errors.New("inspection unavailable")
-	})
-	if _, err := Resolve(context.Background(), ProviderID); err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("Resolve reused an invalid manifest entry")
-	}
-}
-
-func marshalInspectDocument(t *testing.T, document any) []byte {
-	t.Helper()
-	data, err := json.Marshal(document)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	return data
-}
-
-func stubInspectFunction(t *testing.T, fn func(context.Context, string) ([]byte, error)) {
-	t.Helper()
-	previousCached, previousFresh := runOpenClawInspect, runOpenClawInspectFresh
-	runOpenClawInspect, runOpenClawInspectFresh = fn, fn
-	t.Cleanup(func() {
-		runOpenClawInspect, runOpenClawInspectFresh = previousCached, previousFresh
-	})
-}
-
-func newManagedPackageFixtureInState(t *testing.T, stateDir, goos, goarch string, hoisted bool) optionalPackageFixture {
-	t.Helper()
-	spec, err := signerPackageFor(goos, goarch)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Skipf("host platform has no optional package: %v", err)
-	}
-	projectDir := filepath.Join(stateDir, "npm", "projects", "larksuite-openclaw-lark-next-generation")
-	nodeModules := filepath.Join(projectDir, "node_modules")
-	pluginDir := filepath.Join(nodeModules, signerPackageScope, pluginPackageName[len(signerPackageScope)+1:])
-	packageNodeModules := filepath.Join(pluginDir, "node_modules")
-	if hoisted {
-		packageNodeModules = nodeModules
-	}
-	return writeOptionalPackageFixture(t, optionalPackageFixture{
-		stateDir: stateDir, projectDir: projectDir, pluginDir: pluginDir,
-		packageDir: signerPackageUnder(packageNodeModules, spec), spec: spec,
-	})
-}

internal/keylessprovider/provider.go

@@ -1,858 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
-
-// Package keylessprovider resolves the fixed keyless signer optional dependency
-// installed with the OpenClaw Feishu plugin. Application config contains only
-// the logical provider ID and keyRef; executable paths and argv are never read
-// from application config, environment variables, or PATH.
-package keylessprovider
-
-import (
-	"bytes"
-	"context"
-	"crypto/sha256"
-	"encoding/hex"
-	"encoding/json"
-	"errors"
-	"fmt"
-	"io"
-	"os"
-	"os/exec"
-	"path/filepath"
-	"regexp"
-	"runtime"
-	"strings"
-	"sync"
-	"time"
-
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/keylesshelper"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/vfs"
-	"golang.org/x/sync/singleflight"
-)
-
-const (
-	ProviderID = core.KeylessProviderLarkSuite
-
-	openClawStateDirEnv = "OPENCLAW_STATE_DIR"
-	openClawHomeEnv     = "OPENCLAW_HOME"
-	openClawConfigEnv   = "OPENCLAW_CONFIG_PATH"
-	openClawDirName     = ".openclaw"
-	pluginID            = "openclaw-lark"
-	pluginPackageName   = "@larksuite/openclaw-lark"
-	signerPackageScope  = "@larksuite"
-	signerBinaryBase    = "lark-keyless-signer"
-
-	metadataMaxBytes    = 64 << 10
-	binaryMaxBytes      = 512 << 20
-	inspectStdoutLimit  = 4 << 20
-	inspectStderrLimit  = 64 << 10
-	inspectCommandLimit = 30 * time.Second
-	inspectCacheTTL     = 3 * time.Second
-)
-
-var semver = regexp.MustCompile(`^(0|[1-9][0-9]*)\.(0|[1-9][0-9]*)\.(0|[1-9][0-9]*)(?:-[0-9A-Za-z-]+(?:\.[0-9A-Za-z-]+)*)?(?:\+[0-9A-Za-z-]+(?:\.[0-9A-Za-z-]+)*)?$`)
-
-type platformPackage struct {
-	name       string
-	npmOS      string
-	npmCPU     string
-	binaryName string
-}
-
-type packageManifest struct {
-	Name    string   `json:"name"`
-	Version string   `json:"version"`
-	OS      []string `json:"os"`
-	CPU     []string `json:"cpu"`
-}
-
-type resolvedProvider struct {
-	stateDir         string
-	pluginDir        string
-	packageDir       string
-	binaryPath       string
-	packageVersion   string
-	packageSize      int64
-	packageModTimeNS int64
-	binarySize       int64
-	binaryModTimeNS  int64
-	digest           string
-}
-
-type inspectDependency struct {
-	Name         string `json:"name"`
-	Installed    bool   `json:"installed"`
-	Optional     bool   `json:"optional"`
-	ResolvedPath string `json:"resolvedPath"`
-}
-
-type inspectedPlugin struct {
-	ID               string `json:"id"`
-	Name             string `json:"name"`
-	PackageName      string `json:"packageName"`
-	RootDir          string `json:"rootDir"`
-	Status           string `json:"status"`
-	DependencyStatus struct {
-		OptionalDependencies []inspectDependency `json:"optionalDependencies"`
-	} `json:"dependencyStatus"`
-}
-
-type inspectUnavailableError struct{ cause error }
-
-func (e *inspectUnavailableError) Error() string { return e.cause.Error() }
-func (e *inspectUnavailableError) Unwrap() error { return e.cause }
-
-var (
-	runOpenClawInspect      = executeOpenClawInspect
-	runOpenClawInspectFresh = executeOpenClawInspectFresh
-)
-
-type inspectCacheEntry struct {
-	data      []byte
-	expiresAt time.Time
-}
-
-// inspectResultCache caches only OpenClaw's discovery document. Callers still
-// validate the complete directory tree, package metadata, binary mode, and
-// binary digest after every lookup, and keylesshelper re-hashes before exec.
-// The short TTL removes duplicate OpenClaw startups within one CLI process
-// without persisting an executable path across processes or plugin upgrades.
-type inspectResultCache struct {
-	mu      sync.Mutex
-	entries map[string]inspectCacheEntry
-	flights singleflight.Group
-}
-
-var openClawInspectCache inspectResultCache
-
-// Resolve returns a freshly verified command for one provider operation. A
-// global manifest avoids restarting OpenClaw when the previously bound package
-// is unchanged; the package tree and binary digest are still revalidated.
-func Resolve(ctx context.Context, provider string) (*keylesshelper.Command, error) {
-	command, resolved, err := resolve(ctx, provider, false)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-	if resolved != nil {
-		// The manifest is a rebuildable performance index, not an
-		// authentication source. Runtime resolution remains available if its
-		// best-effort cache write fails.
-		_ = saveProviderManifest(*resolved, runtime.GOOS, runtime.GOARCH)
-	}
-	return command, nil
-}
-
-// PrepareRefresh bypasses both the global manifest and the short-lived
-// in-process OpenClaw inspection cache. It returns a freshly verified command
-// and a deferred manifest commit. Callers that validate the signer before
-// changing binding state must invoke commit only after that validation
-// succeeds; abandoning the callback leaves the existing manifest unchanged.
-func PrepareRefresh(ctx context.Context, provider string) (*keylesshelper.Command, func() error, error) {
-	command, resolved, err := resolve(ctx, provider, true)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, nil, err
-	}
-	if resolved == nil {
-		return command, func() error { return nil }, nil
-	}
-	candidate := *resolved
-	var once sync.Once
-	var commitErr error
-	commit := func() error {
-		once.Do(func() {
-			commitErr = revalidatePreparedProvider(candidate, runtime.GOOS, runtime.GOARCH)
-			if commitErr != nil {
-				return
-			}
-			commitErr = saveProviderManifest(candidate, runtime.GOOS, runtime.GOARCH)
-		})
-		return commitErr
-	}
-	return command, commit, nil
-}
-
-// revalidatePreparedProvider closes the gap between signer validation and a
-// deferred manifest commit. It repeats the complete package validation and
-// requires every captured property to remain identical before the candidate is
-// allowed to replace the current manifest entry.
-func revalidatePreparedProvider(candidate resolvedProvider, goos, goarch string) error {
-	spec, err := signerPackageFor(goos, goarch)
-	if err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	verified, err := resolvePackage(candidate.stateDir, candidate.pluginDir, candidate.packageDir, spec, goos)
-	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("revalidate prepared keyless signer: %w", err)
-	}
-	if verified != candidate {
-		return fmt.Errorf("prepared keyless signer changed before manifest commit")
-	}
-	return nil
-}
-
-// Refresh bypasses the global manifest and both discovers and records the
-// signer reported by the current OpenClaw installation. Transactional bind
-// flows should use PrepareRefresh so a failed signer validation cannot replace
-// a previously working manifest entry.
-func Refresh(ctx context.Context, provider string) (*keylesshelper.Command, error) {
-	command, commit, err := PrepareRefresh(ctx, provider)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-	if commit != nil {
-		if err := commit(); err != nil {
-			return nil, fmt.Errorf("persist refreshed keyless signer manifest: %w", err)
-		}
-	}
-	return command, nil
-}
-
-// resolve returns a non-nil resolvedProvider only for a newly discovered
-// package. A manifest hit has already been persisted and therefore returns a
-// nil resolvedProvider.
-func resolve(ctx context.Context, provider string, forceRefresh bool) (*keylesshelper.Command, *resolvedProvider, error) {
-	if ctx == nil {
-		ctx = context.Background()
-	}
-	provider = strings.TrimSpace(provider)
-	if provider == "" {
-		return nil, nil, nil
-	}
-	if provider != ProviderID {
-		return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("unknown keyless signer provider %q", provider)
-	}
-
-	stateDir, err := openClawStateDir()
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("resolve OpenClaw state directory: %w", err)
-	}
-	if !forceRefresh {
-		resolved, manifestHit := resolveFromProviderManifest(stateDir, runtime.GOOS, runtime.GOARCH)
-		if manifestHit {
-			command, err := keylesshelper.NewProviderCommand(resolved.binaryPath, resolved.packageDir, "", resolved.digest)
-			return command, nil, err
-		}
-	}
-
-	inspectResolver := resolveFromInspect
-	if forceRefresh {
-		inspectResolver = resolveFromInspectFresh
-	}
-	resolved, inspectErr := inspectResolver(ctx, stateDir, runtime.GOOS, runtime.GOARCH)
-	if inspectErr != nil {
-		if err := ctx.Err(); err != nil {
-			return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("%s provider inspection canceled: %w", ProviderID, err)
-		}
-		var unavailable *inspectUnavailableError
-		if !errors.As(inspectErr, &unavailable) {
-			return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("%s provider is unavailable: %w", ProviderID, inspectErr)
-		}
-		// Older/local OpenClaw installations may not expose `plugins inspect`.
-		// The only fallback is the fixed extension-local package path; managed
-		// npm project directories are never scanned or guessed.
-		resolved, err = resolveFromStateDir(stateDir, runtime.GOOS, runtime.GOARCH)
-		if err != nil {
-			return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("%s provider is unavailable: OpenClaw inspect failed (%w); fixed extension fallback failed: %w", ProviderID, inspectErr, err)
-		}
-	}
-
-	// An empty home override deliberately preserves the recipient user's normal
-	// HOME. The helper still supplies a minimal environment and never inherits
-	// PATH, proxy, language-runtime, or loader injection variables.
-	command, err := keylesshelper.NewProviderCommand(resolved.binaryPath, resolved.packageDir, "", resolved.digest)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, nil, err
-	}
-	return command, &resolved, nil
-}
-
-func resolveFromStateDir(stateDir, goos, goarch string) (resolvedProvider, error) {
-	spec, err := signerPackageFor(goos, goarch)
-	if err != nil {
-		return resolvedProvider{}, err
-	}
-
-	stateDir, err = cleanAbsolutePath(stateDir)
-	if err != nil {
-		return resolvedProvider{}, fmt.Errorf("invalid OpenClaw state directory: %w", err)
-	}
-	pluginDir := filepath.Join(stateDir, "extensions", pluginID)
-	packageDir := signerPackageUnder(filepath.Join(pluginDir, "node_modules"), spec)
-	return resolvePackage(stateDir, pluginDir, packageDir, spec, goos)
-}
-
-func resolveFromInspect(ctx context.Context, stateDir, goos, goarch string) (resolvedProvider, error) {
-	return resolveFromInspectUsing(ctx, stateDir, goos, goarch, runOpenClawInspect)
-}
-
-func resolveFromInspectFresh(ctx context.Context, stateDir, goos, goarch string) (resolvedProvider, error) {
-	return resolveFromInspectUsing(ctx, stateDir, goos, goarch, runOpenClawInspectFresh)
-}
-
-func resolveFromInspectUsing(
-	ctx context.Context,
-	stateDir, goos, goarch string,
-	inspect func(context.Context, string) ([]byte, error),
-) (resolvedProvider, error) {
-	spec, err := signerPackageFor(goos, goarch)
-	if err != nil {
-		return resolvedProvider{}, err
-	}
-	stateDir, err = cleanAbsolutePath(stateDir)
-	if err != nil {
-		return resolvedProvider{}, fmt.Errorf("invalid OpenClaw state directory: %w", err)
-	}
-	data, err := inspect(ctx, stateDir)
-	if err != nil {
-		return resolvedProvider{}, err
-	}
-	plugin, err := decodeInspectedPlugin(data)
-	if err != nil {
-		return resolvedProvider{}, fmt.Errorf("parse OpenClaw plugin inspection: %w", err)
-	}
-	if plugin.ID != pluginID {
-		return resolvedProvider{}, fmt.Errorf("OpenClaw inspected unexpected plugin %q", plugin.ID)
-	}
-	if plugin.PackageName != "" && plugin.PackageName != pluginPackageName {
-		return resolvedProvider{}, fmt.Errorf("OpenClaw plugin package %q does not match %q", plugin.PackageName, pluginPackageName)
-	}
-	if plugin.Name != "" && plugin.Name != pluginPackageName && plugin.Name != "Feishu" {
-		return resolvedProvider{}, fmt.Errorf("OpenClaw plugin name %q is not recognized", plugin.Name)
-	}
-	if plugin.Status != "" && plugin.Status != "loaded" {
-		return resolvedProvider{}, fmt.Errorf("OpenClaw plugin is not loaded (status %q)", plugin.Status)
-	}
-
-	pluginDir, err := cleanAbsolutePath(plugin.RootDir)
-	if err != nil {
-		return resolvedProvider{}, fmt.Errorf("invalid inspected plugin root: %w", err)
-	}
-	if err := ensureWithin(stateDir, pluginDir); err != nil {
-		return resolvedProvider{}, fmt.Errorf("inspected plugin root is outside OpenClaw state: %w", err)
-	}
-
-	var dependency *inspectDependency
-	for i := range plugin.DependencyStatus.OptionalDependencies {
-		candidate := &plugin.DependencyStatus.OptionalDependencies[i]
-		if candidate.Name != spec.name {
-			continue
-		}
-		if dependency != nil {
-			return resolvedProvider{}, fmt.Errorf("OpenClaw inspection contains duplicate signer dependency %q", spec.name)
-		}
-		dependency = candidate
-	}
-	if dependency == nil || !dependency.Optional || !dependency.Installed || strings.TrimSpace(dependency.ResolvedPath) == "" {
-		return resolvedProvider{}, fmt.Errorf("OpenClaw plugin optional signer dependency %q is not installed", spec.name)
-	}
-	packageDir, err := cleanAbsolutePath(dependency.ResolvedPath)
-	if err != nil {
-		return resolvedProvider{}, fmt.Errorf("invalid inspected signer package path: %w", err)
-	}
-	if err := ensureWithin(stateDir, packageDir); err != nil {
-		return resolvedProvider{}, fmt.Errorf("inspected signer package is outside OpenClaw state: %w", err)
-	}
-	if !allowedPackageLocation(pluginDir, packageDir, spec, goos) {
-		return resolvedProvider{}, fmt.Errorf("inspected signer package is neither plugin-local nor managed-project-hoisted")
-	}
-	return resolvePackage(stateDir, pluginDir, packageDir, spec, goos)
-}
-
-func resolvePackage(stateDir, pluginDir, packageDir string, spec platformPackage, goos string) (resolvedProvider, error) {
-	packageJSON := filepath.Join(packageDir, "package.json")
-	binDir := filepath.Join(packageDir, "bin")
-	binaryPath := filepath.Join(binDir, spec.binaryName)
-	for _, dir := range []string{pluginDir, packageDir, binDir} {
-		if err := validateDirectoryTree(stateDir, dir); err != nil {
-			return resolvedProvider{}, err
-		}
-	}
-	for _, file := range []string{packageJSON, binaryPath} {
-		if err := ensureWithin(stateDir, file); err != nil {
-			return resolvedProvider{}, err
-		}
-		if err := validateProviderObject(file, false); err != nil {
-			return resolvedProvider{}, err
-		}
-	}
-
-	data, err := readMetadata(packageJSON)
-	if err != nil {
-		return resolvedProvider{}, fmt.Errorf("read signer package metadata: %w", err)
-	}
-	var manifest packageManifest
-	if err := decodeJSONObject(data, &manifest); err != nil {
-		return resolvedProvider{}, fmt.Errorf("parse signer package metadata: %w", err)
-	}
-	if manifest.Name != spec.name {
-		return resolvedProvider{}, fmt.Errorf("signer package name %q does not match %q", manifest.Name, spec.name)
-	}
-	if !semver.MatchString(manifest.Version) {
-		return resolvedProvider{}, fmt.Errorf("signer package version %q is not valid semver", manifest.Version)
-	}
-	if len(manifest.OS) != 1 || manifest.OS[0] != spec.npmOS {
-		return resolvedProvider{}, fmt.Errorf("signer package os metadata does not match %s", spec.npmOS)
-	}
-	if len(manifest.CPU) != 1 || manifest.CPU[0] != spec.npmCPU {
-		return resolvedProvider{}, fmt.Errorf("signer package cpu metadata does not match %s", spec.npmCPU)
-	}
-	packageInfo, err := vfs.Lstat(packageJSON)
-	if err != nil {
-		return resolvedProvider{}, fmt.Errorf("stat signer package metadata: %w", err)
-	}
-
-	info, err := vfs.Lstat(binaryPath)
-	if err != nil {
-		return resolvedProvider{}, fmt.Errorf("stat signer binary: %w", err)
-	}
-	if !info.Mode().IsRegular() || info.Mode()&os.ModeSymlink != 0 {
-		return resolvedProvider{}, fmt.Errorf("signer binary is not a regular file")
-	}
-	if goos != "windows" && info.Mode().Perm()&0o111 == 0 {
-		return resolvedProvider{}, fmt.Errorf("signer binary is not executable")
-	}
-	digest, err := hashRegularFile(binaryPath, binaryMaxBytes)
-	if err != nil {
-		return resolvedProvider{}, fmt.Errorf("hash signer binary: %w", err)
-	}
-
-	return resolvedProvider{
-		stateDir:         stateDir,
-		pluginDir:        pluginDir,
-		packageDir:       packageDir,
-		binaryPath:       binaryPath,
-		packageVersion:   manifest.Version,
-		packageSize:      packageInfo.Size(),
-		packageModTimeNS: packageInfo.ModTime().UnixNano(),
-		binarySize:       info.Size(),
-		binaryModTimeNS:  info.ModTime().UnixNano(),
-		digest:           digest,
-	}, nil
-}
-
-func signerPackageFor(goos, goarch string) (platformPackage, error) {
-	key := goos + "/" + goarch
-	packages := map[string]platformPackage{
-		"darwin/arm64":  {"@larksuite/lark-keyless-signer-darwin-arm64", "darwin", "arm64", signerBinaryBase},
-		"darwin/amd64":  {"@larksuite/lark-keyless-signer-darwin-x64", "darwin", "x64", signerBinaryBase},
-		"linux/arm64":   {"@larksuite/lark-keyless-signer-linux-arm64", "linux", "arm64", signerBinaryBase},
-		"linux/amd64":   {"@larksuite/lark-keyless-signer-linux-x64", "linux", "x64", signerBinaryBase},
-		"windows/amd64": {"@larksuite/lark-keyless-signer-win32-x64", "win32", "x64", signerBinaryBase + ".exe"},
-	}
-	if spec, ok := packages[key]; ok {
-		return spec, nil
-	}
-	return platformPackage{}, fmt.Errorf("OpenClaw keyless signer optional package is unsupported on %s/%s", goos, goarch)
-}
-
-func signerPackageUnder(nodeModules string, spec platformPackage) string {
-	return filepath.Join(nodeModules, signerPackageScope, strings.TrimPrefix(spec.name, signerPackageScope+"/"))
-}
-
-func allowedPackageLocation(pluginDir, packageDir string, spec platformPackage, goos string) bool {
-	pluginLocal := signerPackageUnder(filepath.Join(pluginDir, "node_modules"), spec)
-	if samePath(pluginLocal, packageDir, goos) {
-		return true
-	}
-
-	// npm-pack managed projects may hoist the optional dependency beside the
-	// plugin package:
-	//   <project>/node_modules/@larksuite/openclaw-lark
-	//   <project>/node_modules/@larksuite/lark-keyless-signer-...
-	pluginNodeModules := filepath.Dir(filepath.Dir(pluginDir))
-	expectedPlugin := filepath.Join(pluginNodeModules, signerPackageScope, strings.TrimPrefix(pluginPackageName, signerPackageScope+"/"))
-	if filepath.Base(pluginNodeModules) != "node_modules" || !samePath(expectedPlugin, pluginDir, goos) {
-		return false
-	}
-	return samePath(signerPackageUnder(pluginNodeModules, spec), packageDir, goos)
-}
-
-func samePath(left, right, goos string) bool {
-	left, right = filepath.Clean(left), filepath.Clean(right)
-	if goos == "windows" {
-		return strings.EqualFold(left, right)
-	}
-	return left == right
-}
-
-func decodeInspectedPlugin(data []byte) (inspectedPlugin, error) {
-	if len(data) == 0 || len(data) > inspectStdoutLimit {
-		return inspectedPlugin{}, fmt.Errorf("inspection output size is invalid")
-	}
-	var envelope struct {
-		Plugin json.RawMessage `json:"plugin"`
-	}
-	if err := decodeJSONObject(data, &envelope); err != nil {
-		return inspectedPlugin{}, err
-	}
-	var plugin inspectedPlugin
-	if len(envelope.Plugin) != 0 && string(envelope.Plugin) != "null" {
-		if err := decodeJSONObject(envelope.Plugin, &plugin); err != nil {
-			return inspectedPlugin{}, err
-		}
-	} else if err := decodeJSONObject(data, &plugin); err != nil {
-		return inspectedPlugin{}, err
-	}
-	return plugin, nil
-}
-
-func executeOpenClawInspect(ctx context.Context, stateDir string) ([]byte, error) {
-	if ctx == nil {
-		ctx = context.Background()
-	}
-	executable, cacheKey, err := prepareOpenClawInspect(stateDir)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-	return openClawInspectCache.load(ctx, cacheKey, func(loadCtx context.Context) ([]byte, error) {
-		return executeOpenClawInspectCommand(loadCtx, stateDir, executable)
-	})
-}
-
-// executeOpenClawInspectFresh deliberately skips inspectResultCache, including
-// its in-flight singleflight results. Bind/repair discovery must observe the
-// current plugin generation even if normal resolution inspected the same
-// OpenClaw installation during the preceding few seconds.
-func executeOpenClawInspectFresh(ctx context.Context, stateDir string) ([]byte, error) {
-	if ctx == nil {
-		ctx = context.Background()
-	}
-	executable, _, err := prepareOpenClawInspect(stateDir)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-	return executeOpenClawInspectCommand(ctx, stateDir, executable)
-}
-
-func prepareOpenClawInspect(stateDir string) (string, string, error) {
-	executable, err := exec.LookPath("openclaw")
-	if err != nil {
-		return "", "", &inspectUnavailableError{cause: fmt.Errorf("openclaw executable not found: %w", err)}
-	}
-	if !filepath.IsAbs(executable) {
-		cwd, cwdErr := vfs.Getwd()
-		if cwdErr != nil {
-			return "", "", fmt.Errorf("resolve current directory for openclaw executable: %w", cwdErr)
-		}
-		executable = filepath.Join(cwd, executable)
-	}
-	executable, err = vfs.EvalSymlinks(executable)
-	if err != nil {
-		return "", "", fmt.Errorf("resolve openclaw executable symlinks: %w", err)
-	}
-	executable, err = cleanAbsolutePath(executable)
-	if err != nil {
-		return "", "", fmt.Errorf("validate openclaw executable path: %w", err)
-	}
-	if err := validateInspectExecutable(executable); err != nil {
-		return "", "", fmt.Errorf("validate openclaw executable: %w", err)
-	}
-	info, err := vfs.Lstat(executable)
-	if err != nil || runtime.GOOS != "windows" && info.Mode().Perm()&0o111 == 0 {
-		return "", "", fmt.Errorf("openclaw executable is not executable")
-	}
-	cacheKey := strings.Join([]string{
-		stateDir,
-		executable,
-		fmt.Sprintf("%d", info.Size()),
-		fmt.Sprintf("%d", info.ModTime().UnixNano()),
-		strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv(openClawConfigEnv)),
-	}, "\x00")
-	return executable, cacheKey, nil
-}
-
-func (c *inspectResultCache) load(ctx context.Context, key string, loader func(context.Context) ([]byte, error)) ([]byte, error) {
-	now := time.Now()
-	c.mu.Lock()
-	if entry, ok := c.entries[key]; ok && now.Before(entry.expiresAt) {
-		data := append([]byte(nil), entry.data...)
-		c.mu.Unlock()
-		return data, nil
-	}
-	c.mu.Unlock()
-
-	resultCh := c.flights.DoChan(key, func() (any, error) {
-		now := time.Now()
-		c.mu.Lock()
-		if entry, ok := c.entries[key]; ok && now.Before(entry.expiresAt) {
-			data := append([]byte(nil), entry.data...)
-			c.mu.Unlock()
-			return data, nil
-		}
-		c.mu.Unlock()
-
-		data, err := loader(ctx)
-		if err != nil {
-			return nil, err
-		}
-		data = append([]byte(nil), data...)
-		c.mu.Lock()
-		if c.entries == nil {
-			c.entries = make(map[string]inspectCacheEntry)
-		}
-		c.entries[key] = inspectCacheEntry{data: data, expiresAt: time.Now().Add(inspectCacheTTL)}
-		c.mu.Unlock()
-		return append([]byte(nil), data...), nil
-	})
-
-	select {
-	case <-ctx.Done():
-		return nil, ctx.Err()
-	case result := <-resultCh:
-		if result.Err != nil {
-			return nil, result.Err
-		}
-		data, ok := result.Val.([]byte)
-		if !ok {
-			return nil, fmt.Errorf("OpenClaw inspect cache returned an invalid result")
-		}
-		return append([]byte(nil), data...), nil
-	}
-}
-
-func executeOpenClawInspectCommand(ctx context.Context, stateDir, executable string) ([]byte, error) {
-	inspectCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, inspectCommandLimit)
-	defer cancel()
-	cmd, err := newOpenClawInspectCommand(inspectCtx, executable, openClawInspectEnvironment(stateDir))
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, &inspectUnavailableError{cause: fmt.Errorf("prepare openclaw plugin inspection: %w", err)}
-	}
-
-	stdout := &cappedBuffer{limit: inspectStdoutLimit}
-	stderr := &cappedBuffer{limit: inspectStderrLimit}
-	cmd.Stdout = stdout
-	cmd.Stderr = stderr
-	if err := cmd.Run(); err != nil {
-		if inspectCtx.Err() != nil {
-			return nil, &inspectUnavailableError{cause: fmt.Errorf("openclaw plugin inspection stopped: %w", inspectCtx.Err())}
-		}
-		return nil, &inspectUnavailableError{cause: fmt.Errorf("openclaw plugin inspection failed: %w (stderr omitted)", err)}
-	}
-	if stdout.exceeded {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("openclaw plugin inspection stdout exceeds %d bytes", inspectStdoutLimit)
-	}
-	if stderr.exceeded {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("openclaw plugin inspection stderr exceeds %d bytes", inspectStderrLimit)
-	}
-	return append([]byte(nil), stdout.Bytes()...), nil
-}
-
-func openClawInspectEnvironment(stateDir string) []string {
-	keep := map[string]bool{
-		"HOME": true, "PATH": true, "PATHEXT": true, "TMPDIR": true, "TEMP": true, "TMP": true,
-		"LANG": true, "LC_ALL": true, "USERPROFILE": true, "SYSTEMROOT": true, "WINDIR": true,
-		"COMSPEC": true, "APPDATA": true, "LOCALAPPDATA": true,
-		"OPENCLAW_HOME": true, openClawConfigEnv: true,
-	}
-	env := make([]string, 0, len(keep)+1)
-	for _, entry := range os.Environ() {
-		name := entry
-		if idx := strings.IndexByte(entry, '='); idx >= 0 {
-			name = entry[:idx]
-		}
-		if keep[strings.ToUpper(name)] {
-			env = append(env, entry)
-		}
-	}
-	return append(env, openClawStateDirEnv+"="+stateDir)
-}
-
-type cappedBuffer struct {
-	bytes.Buffer
-	limit    int
-	exceeded bool
-}
-
-func (b *cappedBuffer) Write(data []byte) (int, error) {
-	originalLen := len(data)
-	remaining := b.limit - b.Len()
-	if remaining < len(data) {
-		b.exceeded = true
-		if remaining < 0 {
-			remaining = 0
-		}
-		data = data[:remaining]
-	}
-	_, _ = b.Buffer.Write(data)
-	return originalLen, nil
-}
-
-func validateDirectoryTree(root, target string) error {
-	root, err := cleanAbsolutePath(root)
-	if err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	target, err = cleanAbsolutePath(target)
-	if err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	if err := ensureWithin(root, target); err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	if err := validateProviderObject(root, true); err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	rel, err := filepath.Rel(root, target)
-	if err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	current := root
-	if rel == "." {
-		return nil
-	}
-	for _, part := range strings.Split(rel, string(filepath.Separator)) {
-		if part == "" || part == "." || part == ".." {
-			return fmt.Errorf("provider directory tree contains invalid component %q", part)
-		}
-		current = filepath.Join(current, part)
-		if err := validateProviderObject(current, true); err != nil {
-			return err
-		}
-	}
-	return nil
-}
-
-func openClawStateDir() (string, error) {
-	if stateDir := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv(openClawStateDirEnv)); stateDir != "" {
-		return resolveOpenClawPath(stateDir)
-	}
-	if configPath := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv(openClawConfigEnv)); configPath != "" {
-		resolved, err := resolveOpenClawPath(configPath)
-		if err != nil {
-			return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid %s: %w", openClawConfigEnv, err)
-		}
-		return cleanAbsolutePath(filepath.Dir(resolved))
-	}
-	home, err := openClawEffectiveHome()
-	if err != nil {
-		return "", err
-	}
-	return cleanAbsolutePath(filepath.Join(home, openClawDirName))
-}
-
-func resolveOpenClawPath(path string) (string, error) {
-	home, err := openClawEffectiveHome()
-	if err != nil {
-		return "", err
-	}
-	return expandWithHomeAndClean(path, home)
-}
-
-func openClawEffectiveHome() (string, error) {
-	osHome, err := vfs.UserHomeDir()
-	if err != nil || strings.TrimSpace(osHome) == "" {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("resolve user home: %w", err)
-	}
-	osHome, err = cleanAbsolutePath(filepath.Clean(osHome))
-	if err != nil {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid user home: %w", err)
-	}
-	if configured := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv(openClawHomeEnv)); configured != "" {
-		home, err := expandWithHomeAndClean(configured, osHome)
-		if err != nil {
-			return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid %s: %w", openClawHomeEnv, err)
-		}
-		return home, nil
-	}
-	return osHome, nil
-}
-
-func expandWithHomeAndClean(path, home string) (string, error) {
-	if path == "~" || strings.HasPrefix(path, "~/") || strings.HasPrefix(path, `~\`) {
-		if path == "~" {
-			path = home
-		} else {
-			path = filepath.Join(home, path[2:])
-		}
-	} else if strings.HasPrefix(path, "~") {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("named-user home expansion is not supported")
-	}
-	return cleanAbsolutePath(path)
-}
-
-func cleanAbsolutePath(path string) (string, error) {
-	if strings.IndexByte(path, 0) >= 0 {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("path contains NUL")
-	}
-	if !filepath.IsAbs(path) {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("path must be absolute")
-	}
-	clean := filepath.Clean(path)
-	if clean != path {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("path must be clean (got %q)", path)
-	}
-	return clean, nil
-}
-
-func ensureWithin(root, path string) error {
-	rel, err := filepath.Rel(root, path)
-	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("check signer path boundary: %w", err)
-	}
-	if rel == ".." || filepath.IsAbs(rel) || strings.HasPrefix(rel, ".."+string(filepath.Separator)) {
-		return fmt.Errorf("signer path escapes OpenClaw state directory")
-	}
-	return nil
-}
-
-func decodeJSONObject(data []byte, out any) error {
-	trimmed := strings.TrimSpace(string(data))
-	if !strings.HasPrefix(trimmed, "{") || !strings.HasSuffix(trimmed, "}") {
-		return fmt.Errorf("expected JSON object")
-	}
-	decoder := json.NewDecoder(strings.NewReader(trimmed))
-	if err := decoder.Decode(out); err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	var trailing any
-	if err := decoder.Decode(&trailing); err != io.EOF {
-		if err == nil {
-			return fmt.Errorf("multiple JSON values are not allowed")
-		}
-		return err
-	}
-	return nil
-}
-
-func readMetadata(path string) ([]byte, error) {
-	info, err := vfs.Lstat(path)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-	if !info.Mode().IsRegular() || info.Mode()&os.ModeSymlink != 0 || info.Size() < 2 || info.Size() > metadataMaxBytes {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("metadata size/type is invalid")
-	}
-	data, err := vfs.ReadFile(path)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-	if len(data) > metadataMaxBytes {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("metadata exceeds %d bytes", metadataMaxBytes)
-	}
-	return data, nil
-}
-
-func hashRegularFile(path string, maxSize int64) (string, error) {
-	info, err := vfs.Lstat(path)
-	if err != nil {
-		return "", err
-	}
-	if !info.Mode().IsRegular() || info.Mode()&os.ModeSymlink != 0 || info.Size() <= 0 || info.Size() > maxSize {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("file size/type is invalid")
-	}
-	f, err := vfs.Open(path)
-	if err != nil {
-		return "", err
-	}
-	defer f.Close()
-	h := sha256.New()
-	n, err := io.Copy(h, io.LimitReader(f, maxSize+1))
-	if err != nil {
-		return "", err
-	}
-	if n != info.Size() || n > maxSize {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("file changed while hashing")
-	}
-	return hex.EncodeToString(h.Sum(nil)), nil
-}

internal/keylessprovider/provider_test.go

@@ -1,537 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
-
-package keylessprovider
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"crypto/sha256"
-	"encoding/hex"
-	"encoding/json"
-	"errors"
-	"os"
-	"path/filepath"
-	"runtime"
-	"strings"
-	"sync"
-	"sync/atomic"
-	"testing"
-)
-
-type optionalPackageFixture struct {
-	stateDir, projectDir, pluginDir         string
-	packageDir, packageJSON, binDir, binary string
-	spec                                    platformPackage
-	binaryDigest                            string
-}
-
-func TestSignerPackageFor(t *testing.T) {
-	tests := []struct {
-		goos, goarch, name, npmOS, npmCPU, binary string
-	}{
-		{"darwin", "arm64", "@larksuite/lark-keyless-signer-darwin-arm64", "darwin", "arm64", signerBinaryBase},
-		{"darwin", "amd64", "@larksuite/lark-keyless-signer-darwin-x64", "darwin", "x64", signerBinaryBase},
-		{"linux", "arm64", "@larksuite/lark-keyless-signer-linux-arm64", "linux", "arm64", signerBinaryBase},
-		{"linux", "amd64", "@larksuite/lark-keyless-signer-linux-x64", "linux", "x64", signerBinaryBase},
-		{"windows", "amd64", "@larksuite/lark-keyless-signer-win32-x64", "win32", "x64", signerBinaryBase + ".exe"},
-	}
-	for _, test := range tests {
-		t.Run(test.goos+"_"+test.goarch, func(t *testing.T) {
-			got, err := signerPackageFor(test.goos, test.goarch)
-			if err != nil {
-				t.Fatal(err)
-			}
-			if got.name != test.name || got.npmOS != test.npmOS || got.npmCPU != test.npmCPU || got.binaryName != test.binary {
-				t.Fatalf("spec = %#v", got)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-	for _, unsupported := range [][2]string{{"windows", "arm64"}, {"linux", "riscv64"}, {"freebsd", "amd64"}} {
-		if _, err := signerPackageFor(unsupported[0], unsupported[1]); err == nil {
-			t.Fatalf("%s/%s unexpectedly supported", unsupported[0], unsupported[1])
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-func TestResolveFromStateDir_OptionalPackage(t *testing.T) {
-	fx := newOptionalPackageFixture(t, runtime.GOOS, runtime.GOARCH)
-	got, err := resolveFromStateDir(fx.stateDir, runtime.GOOS, runtime.GOARCH)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if got.binaryPath != fx.binary || got.packageDir != fx.packageDir || got.digest != fx.binaryDigest {
-		t.Fatalf("resolved = %#v, fixture = %#v", got, fx)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestResolve_UsesOpenClawStateDirAndFixedExtensionFallback(t *testing.T) {
-	useIsolatedProviderManifest(t)
-	fx := newOptionalPackageFixture(t, runtime.GOOS, runtime.GOARCH)
-	t.Setenv(openClawStateDirEnv, fx.stateDir)
-	t.Setenv(openClawHomeEnv, filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "must-not-win"))
-	t.Setenv("PATH", "") // force the fixed extensions fallback
-	command, err := Resolve(context.Background(), ProviderID)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if command == nil {
-		t.Fatal("Resolve returned nil command")
-	}
-}
-
-func TestResolveFromInspect_ManagedProjectPluginLocal(t *testing.T) {
-	fx := newManagedPackageFixture(t, runtime.GOOS, runtime.GOARCH, false)
-	got, err := resolveFromInspectDocument(t, fx, inspectPluginDocument(fx, pluginID, fx.packageDir))
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	assertResolvedFixture(t, got, fx)
-}
-
-func TestResolveFromInspect_ManagedProjectHoisted(t *testing.T) {
-	fx := newManagedPackageFixture(t, runtime.GOOS, runtime.GOARCH, true)
-	got, err := resolveFromInspectDocument(t, fx, inspectPluginDocument(fx, pluginID, fx.packageDir))
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	assertResolvedFixture(t, got, fx)
-}
-
-func TestResolveFromInspect_RejectsWrongPluginAndEscapingPaths(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Run("wrong plugin", func(t *testing.T) {
-		fx := newManagedPackageFixture(t, runtime.GOOS, runtime.GOARCH, true)
-		_, err := resolveFromInspectDocument(t, fx, inspectPluginDocument(fx, "evil-plugin", fx.packageDir))
-		if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "unexpected plugin") {
-			t.Fatalf("error = %v", err)
-		}
-	})
-	t.Run("package outside state", func(t *testing.T) {
-		fx := newManagedPackageFixture(t, runtime.GOOS, runtime.GOARCH, true)
-		outside := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "node_modules", signerPackageScope, strings.TrimPrefix(fx.spec.name, signerPackageScope+"/"))
-		_, err := resolveFromInspectDocument(t, fx, inspectPluginDocument(fx, pluginID, outside))
-		if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "outside OpenClaw state") {
-			t.Fatalf("error = %v", err)
-		}
-	})
-	t.Run("unrelated package inside state", func(t *testing.T) {
-		fx := newManagedPackageFixture(t, runtime.GOOS, runtime.GOARCH, true)
-		unrelated := signerPackageUnder(filepath.Join(fx.stateDir, "other", "node_modules"), fx.spec)
-		_, err := resolveFromInspectDocument(t, fx, inspectPluginDocument(fx, pluginID, unrelated))
-		if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "neither plugin-local nor managed-project-hoisted") {
-			t.Fatalf("error = %v", err)
-		}
-	})
-	t.Run("plugin outside state", func(t *testing.T) {
-		fx := newManagedPackageFixture(t, runtime.GOOS, runtime.GOARCH, true)
-		document := inspectPluginDocument(fx, pluginID, fx.packageDir)
-		plugin := document["plugin"].(map[string]any)
-		plugin["rootDir"] = filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "openclaw-lark")
-		_, err := resolveFromInspectDocument(t, fx, document)
-		if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "outside OpenClaw state") {
-			t.Fatalf("error = %v", err)
-		}
-	})
-}
-
-func TestResolve_InspectUnavailableUsesOnlyFixedExtensionFallback(t *testing.T) {
-	useIsolatedProviderManifest(t)
-	fx := newOptionalPackageFixture(t, runtime.GOOS, runtime.GOARCH)
-	t.Setenv(openClawStateDirEnv, fx.stateDir)
-	stubOpenClawInspect(t, nil, &inspectUnavailableError{cause: errors.New("not installed")})
-	command, err := Resolve(context.Background(), ProviderID)
-	if err != nil || command == nil {
-		t.Fatalf("Resolve = %v, %v", command, err)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestResolve_InspectUnavailableDoesNotScanManagedProjects(t *testing.T) {
-	useIsolatedProviderManifest(t)
-	fx := newManagedPackageFixture(t, runtime.GOOS, runtime.GOARCH, true)
-	t.Setenv(openClawStateDirEnv, fx.stateDir)
-	stubOpenClawInspect(t, nil, &inspectUnavailableError{cause: errors.New("not installed")})
-	if _, err := Resolve(context.Background(), ProviderID); err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "fixed extension fallback failed") {
-		t.Fatalf("error = %v", err)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestResolve_InvalidInspectDoesNotFallBack(t *testing.T) {
-	useIsolatedProviderManifest(t)
-	fx := newOptionalPackageFixture(t, runtime.GOOS, runtime.GOARCH)
-	t.Setenv(openClawStateDirEnv, fx.stateDir)
-	stubOpenClawInspect(t, []byte(`{"plugin":`), nil)
-	if _, err := Resolve(context.Background(), ProviderID); err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "parse OpenClaw") {
-		t.Fatalf("error = %v", err)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestResolve_InspectCancellationHonorsCallerContext(t *testing.T) {
-	useIsolatedProviderManifest(t)
-	fx := newOptionalPackageFixture(t, runtime.GOOS, runtime.GOARCH)
-	t.Setenv(openClawStateDirEnv, fx.stateDir)
-	previous := runOpenClawInspect
-	runOpenClawInspect = func(ctx context.Context, _ string) ([]byte, error) {
-		<-ctx.Done()
-		return nil, &inspectUnavailableError{cause: ctx.Err()}
-	}
-	t.Cleanup(func() { runOpenClawInspect = previous })
-
-	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
-	cancel()
-	if _, err := Resolve(ctx, ProviderID); !errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) {
-		t.Fatalf("Resolve error = %v, want context.Canceled", err)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestInspectResultCache_ShortLivedAndSingleflight(t *testing.T) {
-	var cache inspectResultCache
-	var calls atomic.Int32
-	started := make(chan struct{})
-	release := make(chan struct{})
-	loader := func(context.Context) ([]byte, error) {
-		if calls.Add(1) == 1 {
-			close(started)
-		}
-		<-release
-		return []byte(`{"plugin":{"id":"openclaw-lark"}}`), nil
-	}
-
-	const callers = 8
-	results := make(chan []byte, callers)
-	errs := make(chan error, callers)
-	var wg sync.WaitGroup
-	for i := 0; i < callers; i++ {
-		wg.Add(1)
-		go func() {
-			defer wg.Done()
-			data, err := cache.load(context.Background(), "same-install", loader)
-			results <- data
-			errs <- err
-		}()
-	}
-	<-started
-	close(release)
-	wg.Wait()
-	close(results)
-	close(errs)
-	for err := range errs {
-		if err != nil {
-			t.Fatal(err)
-		}
-	}
-	for data := range results {
-		if string(data) != `{"plugin":{"id":"openclaw-lark"}}` {
-			t.Fatalf("cached data = %q", data)
-		}
-		if len(data) > 0 {
-			data[0] = 'x'
-		}
-	}
-	if got := calls.Load(); got != 1 {
-		t.Fatalf("loader calls = %d, want 1", got)
-	}
-	data, err := cache.load(context.Background(), "same-install", loader)
-	if err != nil || string(data) != `{"plugin":{"id":"openclaw-lark"}}` || calls.Load() != 1 {
-		t.Fatalf("cache hit = %q, %v, calls %d", data, err, calls.Load())
-	}
-}
-
-func TestInspectResultCache_WaiterHonorsContext(t *testing.T) {
-	var cache inspectResultCache
-	started := make(chan struct{})
-	release := make(chan struct{})
-	loader := func(context.Context) ([]byte, error) {
-		close(started)
-		<-release
-		return []byte(`{}`), nil
-	}
-	go func() {
-		_, _ = cache.load(context.Background(), "busy", loader)
-	}()
-	<-started
-
-	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
-	cancel()
-	if _, err := cache.load(ctx, "busy", loader); !errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) {
-		t.Fatalf("cache waiter error = %v, want context.Canceled", err)
-	}
-	close(release)
-}
-
-func TestInspectOutputAndEnvironmentAreBounded(t *testing.T) {
-	buffer := &cappedBuffer{limit: 4}
-	if n, err := buffer.Write([]byte("123456")); err != nil || n != 6 || !buffer.exceeded || buffer.String() != "1234" {
-		t.Fatalf("bounded write = n %d exceeded %v data %q err %v", n, buffer.exceeded, buffer.String(), err)
-	}
-	t.Setenv("HOME", "/safe-home")
-	t.Setenv("NODE_OPTIONS", "--require=/must-not-load")
-	t.Setenv(openClawStateDirEnv, "/must-not-win")
-	env := strings.Join(openClawInspectEnvironment("/selected-state"), "\n")
-	if !strings.Contains(env, "HOME=/safe-home") || !strings.Contains(env, openClawStateDirEnv+"=/selected-state") ||
-		strings.Contains(env, "NODE_OPTIONS") || strings.Contains(env, openClawStateDirEnv+"=/must-not-win") {
-		t.Fatalf("inspect environment = %q", env)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestResolve_UnknownProviderFailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
-	useIsolatedProviderManifest(t)
-	if _, err := Resolve(context.Background(), "evil.provider"); err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "unknown") {
-		t.Fatalf("error = %v", err)
-	}
-}
-
-func useIsolatedProviderManifest(t *testing.T) string {
-	t.Helper()
-	dir := t.TempDir()
-	t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_CONFIG_DIR", dir)
-	return dir
-}
-
-func TestOpenClawStateDirPriorityAndExpansion(t *testing.T) {
-	home := t.TempDir()
-	state := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "custom state")
-	t.Setenv("HOME", home)
-	t.Setenv(openClawConfigEnv, "")
-	t.Setenv(openClawHomeEnv, filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "must-not-win"))
-	t.Setenv(openClawStateDirEnv, state)
-	if got, err := openClawStateDir(); err != nil || got != state {
-		t.Fatalf("state dir = %q, %v", got, err)
-	}
-
-	t.Setenv(openClawStateDirEnv, "")
-	openClawHome := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "openclaw home")
-	t.Setenv(openClawHomeEnv, openClawHome)
-	if got, err := openClawStateDir(); err != nil || got != filepath.Join(openClawHome, openClawDirName) {
-		t.Fatalf("OPENCLAW_HOME state dir = %q, %v", got, err)
-	}
-
-	t.Setenv(openClawHomeEnv, "")
-	t.Setenv(openClawStateDirEnv, "~/custom-openclaw")
-	if got, err := openClawStateDir(); err != nil || got != filepath.Join(home, "custom-openclaw") {
-		t.Fatalf("expanded state dir = %q, %v", got, err)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestOpenClawStateDir_ConfigPathPrecedesHome(t *testing.T) {
-	osHome := t.TempDir()
-	openClawHome := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "openclaw-home")
-	t.Setenv("HOME", osHome)
-	t.Setenv(openClawStateDirEnv, "")
-	t.Setenv(openClawHomeEnv, openClawHome)
-	t.Setenv(openClawConfigEnv, "~/profiles/team/openclaw.json")
-
-	want := filepath.Join(openClawHome, "profiles", "team")
-	if got, err := openClawStateDir(); err != nil || got != want {
-		t.Fatalf("state dir = %q, %v; want %q", got, err, want)
-	}
-
-	explicitState := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "state-wins")
-	t.Setenv(openClawStateDirEnv, explicitState)
-	if got, err := openClawStateDir(); err != nil || got != explicitState {
-		t.Fatalf("explicit state dir = %q, %v; want %q", got, err, explicitState)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestOpenClawStateDirRejectsRelativeOrUncleanPath(t *testing.T) {
-	unclean := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "child") + string(filepath.Separator) + ".." + string(filepath.Separator) + "state"
-	for _, path := range []string{"relative/state", unclean} {
-		t.Run(strings.ReplaceAll(path, string(filepath.Separator), "_"), func(t *testing.T) {
-			t.Setenv(openClawStateDirEnv, path)
-			if _, err := openClawStateDir(); err == nil {
-				t.Fatalf("path %q was accepted", path)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-func TestResolveFromStateDir_ValidatesPackageMetadata(t *testing.T) {
-	tests := []struct {
-		name   string
-		mutate func(*packageManifest)
-		want   string
-	}{
-		{"name", func(m *packageManifest) { m.Name = "@evil/signer" }, "name"},
-		{"version", func(m *packageManifest) { m.Version = "latest" }, "version"},
-		{"os", func(m *packageManifest) { m.OS = []string{"other"} }, "os metadata"},
-		{"cpu", func(m *packageManifest) { m.CPU = []string{"other"} }, "cpu metadata"},
-		{"multiple os", func(m *packageManifest) { m.OS = append(m.OS, "other") }, "os metadata"},
-	}
-	for _, test := range tests {
-		t.Run(test.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			fx := newOptionalPackageFixture(t, runtime.GOOS, runtime.GOARCH)
-			manifest := validManifest(fx.spec)
-			test.mutate(&manifest)
-			writeJSON(t, fx.packageJSON, manifest, 0600)
-			if _, err := resolveFromStateDir(fx.stateDir, runtime.GOOS, runtime.GOARCH); err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), test.want) {
-				t.Fatalf("error = %v", err)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-func TestResolveFromStateDir_RejectsParentAndBinarySymlinks(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Run("parent", func(t *testing.T) {
-		fx := newOptionalPackageFixture(t, runtime.GOOS, runtime.GOARCH)
-		realBin := fx.binDir + "-real"
-		if err := os.Rename(fx.binDir, realBin); err != nil {
-			t.Fatal(err)
-		}
-		if err := os.Symlink(realBin, fx.binDir); err != nil {
-			t.Skipf("symlink unavailable: %v", err)
-		}
-		if _, err := resolveFromStateDir(fx.stateDir, runtime.GOOS, runtime.GOARCH); err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "symlink") {
-			t.Fatalf("error = %v", err)
-		}
-	})
-
-	t.Run("binary", func(t *testing.T) {
-		fx := newOptionalPackageFixture(t, runtime.GOOS, runtime.GOARCH)
-		realBinary := fx.binary + "-real"
-		if err := os.Rename(fx.binary, realBinary); err != nil {
-			t.Fatal(err)
-		}
-		if err := os.Symlink(realBinary, fx.binary); err != nil {
-			t.Skipf("symlink unavailable: %v", err)
-		}
-		if _, err := resolveFromStateDir(fx.stateDir, runtime.GOOS, runtime.GOARCH); err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "symlink") {
-			t.Fatalf("error = %v", err)
-		}
-	})
-}
-
-func TestResolveFromStateDir_RejectsInsecureModeAndNonExecutable(t *testing.T) {
-	if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
-		t.Skip("POSIX mode test")
-	}
-	t.Run("writable parent", func(t *testing.T) {
-		fx := newOptionalPackageFixture(t, runtime.GOOS, runtime.GOARCH)
-		if err := os.Chmod(fx.packageDir, 0777); err != nil {
-			t.Fatal(err)
-		}
-		if _, err := resolveFromStateDir(fx.stateDir, runtime.GOOS, runtime.GOARCH); err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "writable") {
-			t.Fatalf("error = %v", err)
-		}
-	})
-	t.Run("non executable", func(t *testing.T) {
-		fx := newOptionalPackageFixture(t, runtime.GOOS, runtime.GOARCH)
-		if err := os.Chmod(fx.binary, 0600); err != nil {
-			t.Fatal(err)
-		}
-		if _, err := resolveFromStateDir(fx.stateDir, runtime.GOOS, runtime.GOARCH); err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "executable") {
-			t.Fatalf("error = %v", err)
-		}
-	})
-}
-
-func TestResolveFromStateDir_MissingPackageFailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
-	stateDir := t.TempDir()
-	if _, err := resolveFromStateDir(stateDir, runtime.GOOS, runtime.GOARCH); err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("missing optional package was accepted")
-	}
-}
-
-func newOptionalPackageFixture(t *testing.T, goos, goarch string) optionalPackageFixture {
-	t.Helper()
-	spec, err := signerPackageFor(goos, goarch)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Skipf("host platform has no optional package: %v", err)
-	}
-	stateDir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "openclaw state")
-	pluginDir := filepath.Join(stateDir, "extensions", pluginID)
-	packageDir := signerPackageUnder(filepath.Join(pluginDir, "node_modules"), spec)
-	return writeOptionalPackageFixture(t, optionalPackageFixture{
-		stateDir: stateDir, pluginDir: pluginDir, packageDir: packageDir, spec: spec,
-	})
-}
-
-func newManagedPackageFixture(t *testing.T, goos, goarch string, hoisted bool) optionalPackageFixture {
-	t.Helper()
-	spec, err := signerPackageFor(goos, goarch)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Skipf("host platform has no optional package: %v", err)
-	}
-	stateDir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "custom OpenClaw state")
-	projectDir := filepath.Join(stateDir, "npm", "projects", "larksuite-openclaw-lark-test-generation")
-	nodeModules := filepath.Join(projectDir, "node_modules")
-	pluginDir := filepath.Join(nodeModules, signerPackageScope, strings.TrimPrefix(pluginPackageName, signerPackageScope+"/"))
-	packageNodeModules := filepath.Join(pluginDir, "node_modules")
-	if hoisted {
-		packageNodeModules = nodeModules
-	}
-	packageDir := signerPackageUnder(packageNodeModules, spec)
-	return writeOptionalPackageFixture(t, optionalPackageFixture{
-		stateDir: stateDir, projectDir: projectDir, pluginDir: pluginDir, packageDir: packageDir, spec: spec,
-	})
-}
-
-func writeOptionalPackageFixture(t *testing.T, fx optionalPackageFixture) optionalPackageFixture {
-	t.Helper()
-	if err := os.MkdirAll(fx.pluginDir, 0700); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	packageDir := fx.packageDir
-	binDir := filepath.Join(packageDir, "bin")
-	if err := os.MkdirAll(binDir, 0700); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	packageJSON := filepath.Join(packageDir, "package.json")
-	writeJSON(t, packageJSON, validManifest(fx.spec), 0600)
-	binary := filepath.Join(binDir, fx.spec.binaryName)
-	binaryBytes := []byte("test optional-package signer")
-	if err := os.WriteFile(binary, binaryBytes, 0700); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	digest := sha256.Sum256(binaryBytes)
-	fx.packageJSON, fx.binDir, fx.binary = packageJSON, binDir, binary
-	fx.binaryDigest = hex.EncodeToString(digest[:])
-	return fx
-}
-
-func inspectPluginDocument(fx optionalPackageFixture, inspectedID, resolvedPath string) map[string]any {
-	return map[string]any{"plugin": map[string]any{
-		"id": inspectedID, "name": pluginPackageName, "packageName": pluginPackageName,
-		"rootDir": fx.pluginDir, "status": "loaded",
-		"dependencyStatus": map[string]any{"optionalDependencies": []map[string]any{{
-			"name": fx.spec.name, "installed": true, "optional": true, "resolvedPath": resolvedPath,
-		}}},
-	}}
-}
-
-func resolveFromInspectDocument(t *testing.T, fx optionalPackageFixture, document any) (resolvedProvider, error) {
-	t.Helper()
-	data, err := json.Marshal(document)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	stubOpenClawInspect(t, data, nil)
-	return resolveFromInspect(context.Background(), fx.stateDir, runtime.GOOS, runtime.GOARCH)
-}
-
-func stubOpenClawInspect(t *testing.T, data []byte, err error) {
-	t.Helper()
-	previous := runOpenClawInspect
-	runOpenClawInspect = func(context.Context, string) ([]byte, error) { return data, err }
-	t.Cleanup(func() { runOpenClawInspect = previous })
-}
-
-func assertResolvedFixture(t *testing.T, got resolvedProvider, fx optionalPackageFixture) {
-	t.Helper()
-	if got.binaryPath != fx.binary || got.packageDir != fx.packageDir || got.digest != fx.binaryDigest {
-		t.Fatalf("resolved = %#v, fixture = %#v", got, fx)
-	}
-}
-
-func validManifest(spec platformPackage) packageManifest {
-	return packageManifest{Name: spec.name, Version: "1.2.3", OS: []string{spec.npmOS}, CPU: []string{spec.npmCPU}}
-}
-
-func writeJSON(t *testing.T, path string, value any, mode os.FileMode) {
-	t.Helper()
-	data, err := json.MarshalIndent(value, "", "  ")
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	data = append(data, '\n')
-	if err := os.WriteFile(path, data, mode); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-}

internal/keylessprovider/security_unix.go

@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
-
-//go:build darwin || linux
-
-package keylessprovider
-
-import (
-	"fmt"
-	"os"
-	"syscall"
-
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/vfs"
-)
-
-func validateProviderObject(path string, wantDir bool) error {
-	return validateOwnedObject(path, wantDir)
-}
-
-func validateInspectExecutable(path string) error {
-	info, err := vfs.Lstat(path)
-	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("inspect OpenClaw executable: %w", err)
-	}
-	if info.Mode()&os.ModeSymlink != 0 || !info.Mode().IsRegular() {
-		return fmt.Errorf("OpenClaw executable must be a regular non-symlink file")
-	}
-	if info.Mode().Perm()&0o022 != 0 {
-		return fmt.Errorf("OpenClaw executable is group/world writable")
-	}
-	stat, ok := info.Sys().(*syscall.Stat_t)
-	if !ok || int(stat.Uid) != os.Getuid() && stat.Uid != 0 {
-		return fmt.Errorf("OpenClaw executable is not owned by the current user or root")
-	}
-	if stat.Nlink != 1 {
-		return fmt.Errorf("OpenClaw executable must have exactly one hard link")
-	}
-	return nil
-}
-
-func validateOwnedObject(path string, wantDir bool) error {
-	info, err := vfs.Lstat(path)
-	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("inspect provider object %s: %w", path, err)
-	}
-	if info.Mode()&os.ModeSymlink != 0 {
-		return fmt.Errorf("provider object must not be a symlink: %s", path)
-	}
-	if wantDir != info.IsDir() || (!wantDir && !info.Mode().IsRegular()) {
-		return fmt.Errorf("provider object has unexpected type: %s", path)
-	}
-	if info.Mode().Perm()&0o022 != 0 {
-		return fmt.Errorf("provider object is group/world writable: %s (mode %o)", path, info.Mode().Perm())
-	}
-	stat, ok := info.Sys().(*syscall.Stat_t)
-	if !ok || int(stat.Uid) != os.Getuid() {
-		return fmt.Errorf("provider object is not owned by the current user: %s", path)
-	}
-	if !wantDir && stat.Nlink != 1 {
-		return fmt.Errorf("provider file must have exactly one hard link: %s", path)
-	}
-	return nil
-}

internal/keylessprovider/security_windows.go

@@ -1,149 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
-
-//go:build windows
-
-package keylessprovider
-
-import (
-	"fmt"
-	"os"
-	"unsafe"
-
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/vfs"
-	"golang.org/x/sys/windows"
-)
-
-func validateProviderObject(path string, wantDir bool) error {
-	info, err := vfs.Lstat(path)
-	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("inspect provider object %s: %w", path, err)
-	}
-	if info.Mode()&os.ModeSymlink != 0 {
-		return fmt.Errorf("provider object must not be a symlink: %s", path)
-	}
-	if wantDir != info.IsDir() || (!wantDir && !info.Mode().IsRegular()) {
-		return fmt.Errorf("provider object has unexpected type: %s", path)
-	}
-
-	path16, err := windows.UTF16PtrFromString(path)
-	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("encode provider object path: %w", err)
-	}
-	attrs, err := windows.GetFileAttributes(path16)
-	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("inspect provider object attributes: %w", err)
-	}
-	if attrs&windows.FILE_ATTRIBUTE_REPARSE_POINT != 0 {
-		return fmt.Errorf("provider object must not be a reparse point: %s", path)
-	}
-
-	sd, err := windows.GetNamedSecurityInfo(
-		path,
-		windows.SE_FILE_OBJECT,
-		windows.OWNER_SECURITY_INFORMATION|windows.DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION,
-	)
-	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("inspect provider object security descriptor: %w", err)
-	}
-	owner, _, err := sd.Owner()
-	if err != nil || owner == nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("inspect provider object owner: %w", err)
-	}
-	user, err := windows.GetCurrentProcessToken().GetTokenUser()
-	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("inspect current Windows user: %w", err)
-	}
-	if !owner.Equals(user.User.Sid) {
-		return fmt.Errorf("provider object is not owned by the current user: %s", path)
-	}
-	if err := validateWindowsDACL(sd, user.User.Sid); err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("provider object has unsafe permissions: %s: %w", path, err)
-	}
-	return nil
-}
-
-func validateInspectExecutable(path string) error {
-	info, err := vfs.Lstat(path)
-	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("inspect OpenClaw executable: %w", err)
-	}
-	if info.Mode()&os.ModeSymlink != 0 || !info.Mode().IsRegular() {
-		return fmt.Errorf("OpenClaw executable must be a regular non-symlink file")
-	}
-	path16, err := windows.UTF16PtrFromString(path)
-	if err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	attrs, err := windows.GetFileAttributes(path16)
-	if err != nil || attrs&windows.FILE_ATTRIBUTE_REPARSE_POINT != 0 {
-		return fmt.Errorf("OpenClaw executable must not be a reparse point")
-	}
-	sd, err := windows.GetNamedSecurityInfo(
-		path,
-		windows.SE_FILE_OBJECT,
-		windows.OWNER_SECURITY_INFORMATION|windows.DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION,
-	)
-	if err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	owner, _, err := sd.Owner()
-	if err != nil || owner == nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("inspect OpenClaw executable owner: %w", err)
-	}
-	user, err := windows.GetCurrentProcessToken().GetTokenUser()
-	if err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	if !owner.Equals(user.User.Sid) &&
-		!owner.IsWellKnown(windows.WinLocalSystemSid) &&
-		!owner.IsWellKnown(windows.WinBuiltinAdministratorsSid) {
-		return fmt.Errorf("OpenClaw executable has an untrusted owner")
-	}
-	if err := validateWindowsDACL(sd, user.User.Sid); err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("OpenClaw executable has unsafe permissions: %w", err)
-	}
-	return nil
-}
-
-func validateWindowsDACL(sd *windows.SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR, currentUser *windows.SID) error {
-	dacl, _, err := sd.DACL()
-	if err != nil || dacl == nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("missing or unreadable DACL")
-	}
-	const (
-		fileDeleteChild windows.ACCESS_MASK = 0x00000040
-		writeMask                           = windows.GENERIC_ALL | windows.GENERIC_WRITE |
-			windows.WRITE_DAC | windows.WRITE_OWNER | windows.DELETE |
-			windows.FILE_WRITE_DATA | windows.FILE_APPEND_DATA |
-			windows.FILE_WRITE_EA | windows.FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES | fileDeleteChild
-	)
-	for i := uint16(0); i < dacl.AceCount; i++ {
-		var ace *windows.ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE
-		if err := windows.GetAce(dacl, uint32(i), &ace); err != nil {
-			return fmt.Errorf("read ACL entry %d: %w", i, err)
-		}
-		if ace == nil || ace.Header.AceType == windows.ACCESS_DENIED_ACE_TYPE {
-			continue
-		}
-		if ace.Header.AceType != windows.ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE {
-			return fmt.Errorf("unsupported allow ACL entry type %d", ace.Header.AceType)
-		}
-		if ace.Mask&writeMask == 0 {
-			continue
-		}
-		sid := (*windows.SID)(unsafe.Pointer(&ace.SidStart))
-		if sid == nil || !sid.IsValid() {
-			return fmt.Errorf("ACL entry %d has invalid SID", i)
-		}
-		if sid.Equals(currentUser) ||
-			sid.IsWellKnown(windows.WinLocalSystemSid) ||
-			sid.IsWellKnown(windows.WinBuiltinAdministratorsSid) ||
-			sid.IsWellKnown(windows.WinCreatorOwnerSid) ||
-			sid.IsWellKnown(windows.WinCreatorOwnerRightsSid) {
-			continue
-		}
-		return fmt.Errorf("write access is granted to SID %s", sid.String())
-	}
-	return nil
-}

internal/keysigner/keysigner.go

@@ -1,210 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
-
-// Package keysigner defines the pluggable signing abstraction used by the
-// private_key_jwt registration and authentication flow.
-//
-// Platform implementations hold non-exportable private keys in TPM 2.0 on
-// supported Linux/Windows targets and in Keychain on macOS. Build constraints
-// select the implementation for each target, and each backend registers itself
-// through Register from init().
-package keysigner
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"crypto"
-	"crypto/ecdsa"
-	"crypto/elliptic"
-	"crypto/rsa"
-	"crypto/x509"
-	"encoding/asn1"
-	"encoding/base64"
-	"errors"
-	"fmt"
-	"math/big"
-	"strings"
-)
-
-// KeyRef identifies a non-exportable signing key held by a backend
-// (TEE/TPM/Keychain). It is a stable handle (label), never the key material.
-type KeyRef struct {
-	// Label is the backend key label/tag (e.g. "larksuite-cli-agent").
-	Label string
-}
-
-// Signer signs JWS signing inputs with a non-exportable key.
-type Signer interface {
-	// EnsureKey returns the public key for ref, creating the key if absent.
-	EnsureKey(ctx context.Context, ref KeyRef) (crypto.PublicKey, error)
-	// PublicKey returns the public key for ref without creating it.
-	PublicKey(ctx context.Context, ref KeyRef) (crypto.PublicKey, error)
-	// Sign signs signingInput and returns a JOSE-format signature plus the JWS
-	// alg ("ES256"/"RS256"). Implementations apply the alg's hash and, for
-	// ECDSA, MUST return the fixed-width r||s form required by RFC 7518 §3.4
-	// (not ASN.1 DER), because the backend (TPM/Keychain) typically yields DER.
-	Sign(ctx context.Context, ref KeyRef, signingInput []byte) (sig []byte, alg string, err error)
-}
-
-// Supported JWS algorithms.
-const (
-	AlgES256 = "ES256"
-	AlgRS256 = "RS256"
-)
-
-// DefaultKeyLabel is the backend key label lark-cli uses for its device signing
-// key. One non-exportable key is created on first private_key_jwt registration
-// and reused across subsequent app registrations on the same device.
-const DefaultKeyLabel = "larksuite-cli-agent"
-
-// HardwareInfo describes the secure hardware backing a Signer, as reported by a
-// HardwareProber. It is advisory/diagnostic: it tells a user whether
-// private_key_jwt can use a real TEE on this device.
-type HardwareInfo struct {
-	Backend    string // backing technology, e.g. "tpm2" or "keychain"
-	Available  bool   // the hardware is present and usable for signing
-	VendorName string // hardware vendor/manufacturer, when known
-	VendorInfo string // additional vendor detail, when known
-	Reason     string // when Available is false, a human-readable cause
-}
-
-// HardwareProber is an optional capability a Signer may implement to report on
-// the secure hardware backing it (TPM/TEE vendor and availability) WITHOUT
-// creating or using a key. Probing never mutates key state.
-type HardwareProber interface {
-	ProbeHardware(ctx context.Context) (HardwareInfo, error)
-}
-
-// ProbeActiveHardware probes the active signer's secure hardware. ok is false
-// when there is no active signer or it does not implement HardwareProber — in
-// which case private_key_jwt is unsupported on this build. When ok is true, info
-// reports availability and, if unavailable, info.Reason explains why.
-func ProbeActiveHardware(ctx context.Context) (info HardwareInfo, ok bool, err error) {
-	return probeHardware(ctx, Active())
-}
-
-// probeHardware is the registry-independent core of ProbeActiveHardware, so it
-// can be unit-tested without touching the global signer.
-func probeHardware(ctx context.Context, s Signer) (HardwareInfo, bool, error) {
-	p, ok := s.(HardwareProber)
-	if !ok {
-		return HardwareInfo{}, false, nil
-	}
-	info, err := p.ProbeHardware(ctx)
-	return info, true, err
-}
-
-// cleanProbeError renders err's message with redundant re-wraps collapsed. Some
-// backends (e.g. facebookincubator/sks) wrap an error twice with the SAME "%w"
-// prefix, yielding "P: P: cause"; this peels each outer layer whose only
-// contribution is to repeat the prefix already present in the wrapped error,
-// leaving a single "P: cause". A layer that adds genuinely new context is kept.
-func cleanProbeError(err error) string {
-	if err == nil {
-		return ""
-	}
-	msg := err.Error()
-	for {
-		inner := errors.Unwrap(err)
-		if inner == nil {
-			break
-		}
-		innerMsg := inner.Error()
-		prefix, ok := strings.CutSuffix(msg, innerMsg)
-		if !ok || prefix == "" || !strings.HasPrefix(innerMsg, prefix) {
-			break
-		}
-		msg, err = innerMsg, inner
-	}
-	return msg
-}
-
-// AlgForKey returns the JWS alg for a public key: EC P-256 -> ES256, RSA -> RS256.
-// The signer backend chooses the key type (the macOS keychain signer uses an
-// RSA-2048 key, hence RS256).
-func AlgForKey(pub crypto.PublicKey) (string, error) {
-	switch k := pub.(type) {
-	case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
-		if k.Curve == elliptic.P256() {
-			return AlgES256, nil
-		}
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("keysigner: unsupported EC curve %q (only P-256/ES256)", k.Curve.Params().Name)
-	case *rsa.PublicKey:
-		return AlgRS256, nil
-	default:
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("keysigner: unsupported public key type %T", pub)
-	}
-}
-
-// ecdsaDERToJOSE converts an ASN.1 DER-encoded ECDSA signature — the form most
-// TEE/TPM backends emit (e.g. facebookincubator/sks marshals the TPM's r,s with
-// asn1.Marshal) — into the fixed-width r||s form JWS requires for ES256
-// (RFC 7518 §3.4). byteLen is the curve coordinate size (32 for P-256), so the
-// result is exactly 2*byteLen bytes with r and s each left-zero-padded.
-//
-// This is intentionally part of the pure-stdlib core (not a platform signer) so
-// it can be unit-tested with a software key on any machine, including TPM-less CI.
-func ecdsaDERToJOSE(der []byte, byteLen int) ([]byte, error) {
-	var sig struct{ R, S *big.Int }
-	rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(der, &sig)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("keysigner: parse ECDSA DER signature: %w", err)
-	}
-	if len(rest) != 0 {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("keysigner: %d trailing byte(s) after ECDSA DER signature", len(rest))
-	}
-	if sig.R == nil || sig.S == nil || sig.R.Sign() <= 0 || sig.S.Sign() <= 0 {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("keysigner: ECDSA signature has non-positive r/s")
-	}
-	// Guard before FillBytes, which panics if the scalar does not fit in byteLen.
-	if sig.R.BitLen() > byteLen*8 || sig.S.BitLen() > byteLen*8 {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("keysigner: ECDSA r/s exceeds %d-byte coordinate", byteLen)
-	}
-	out := make([]byte, 2*byteLen)
-	sig.R.FillBytes(out[:byteLen])
-	sig.S.FillBytes(out[byteLen:])
-	return out, nil
-}
-
-// EncodePublicKey marshals pub to PKIX DER and base64-encodes it (std encoding),
-// matching the public-key form the registration backend binds to the app.
-func EncodePublicKey(pub crypto.PublicKey) (string, error) {
-	der, err := x509.MarshalPKIXPublicKey(pub)
-	if err != nil {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("keysigner: encode public key: %w", err)
-	}
-	return base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(der), nil
-}
-
-// PublicKeyJWK returns the RFC 7517 JSON Web Key for pub, used to embed the
-// public key in the attestation JWT's "jwk" header so the registration backend
-// can bind it to the app. EC keys use base64url fixed-width coordinates
-// (RFC 7518 §6.2.1); RSA keys use base64url-encoded modulus and exponent.
-func PublicKeyJWK(pub crypto.PublicKey) (map[string]any, error) {
-	switch k := pub.(type) {
-	case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
-		if k.Curve != elliptic.P256() {
-			return nil, fmt.Errorf("keysigner: JWK supports EC P-256 only, got %q", k.Curve.Params().Name)
-		}
-		const coordLen = 32 // P-256 field element size
-		x := make([]byte, coordLen)
-		y := make([]byte, coordLen)
-		k.X.FillBytes(x)
-		k.Y.FillBytes(y)
-		return map[string]any{
-			"use": "sig",
-			"kty": "EC",
-			"crv": "P-256",
-			"x":   base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(x),
-			"y":   base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(y),
-		}, nil
-	case *rsa.PublicKey:
-		return map[string]any{
-			"use": "sig",
-			"kty": "RSA",
-			"n":   base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(k.N.Bytes()),
-			"e":   base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(big.NewInt(int64(k.E)).Bytes()),
-		}, nil
-	default:
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("keysigner: unsupported public key type %T for JWK", pub)
-	}
-}

internal/keysigner/keysigner_test.go

@@ -1,240 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
-
-package keysigner
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"crypto"
-	"crypto/ecdsa"
-	"crypto/elliptic"
-	"crypto/rand"
-	"crypto/rsa"
-	"crypto/sha256"
-	"crypto/x509"
-	"encoding/base64"
-	"errors"
-	"fmt"
-	"math/big"
-	"reflect"
-	"testing"
-)
-
-func TestAlgForKey(t *testing.T) {
-	ec, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if alg, err := AlgForKey(ec.Public()); err != nil || alg != AlgES256 {
-		t.Errorf("P-256: alg=%q err=%v, want ES256/nil", alg, err)
-	}
-
-	rsaKey, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if alg, err := AlgForKey(rsaKey.Public()); err != nil || alg != AlgRS256 {
-		t.Errorf("RSA: alg=%q err=%v, want RS256/nil", alg, err)
-	}
-
-	ec384, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P384(), rand.Reader)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if _, err := AlgForKey(ec384.Public()); err == nil {
-		t.Error("P-384: expected unsupported-curve error")
-	}
-
-	if _, err := AlgForKey("not a key"); err == nil {
-		t.Error("string: expected unsupported-type error")
-	}
-}
-
-func TestEncodePublicKeyRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
-	ec, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	enc, err := EncodePublicKey(ec.Public())
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	der, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(enc)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("not valid base64: %v", err)
-	}
-	pub, err := x509.ParsePKIXPublicKey(der)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("not valid PKIX: %v", err)
-	}
-	if !reflect.DeepEqual(pub, ec.Public()) {
-		t.Error("public key did not round-trip")
-	}
-}
-
-func TestPublicKeyJWK_EC(t *testing.T) {
-	ec, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	jwk, err := PublicKeyJWK(ec.Public())
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if jwk["kty"] != "EC" || jwk["crv"] != "P-256" {
-		t.Errorf("jwk = %v, want kty=EC crv=P-256", jwk)
-	}
-	if jwk["use"] != "sig" {
-		t.Errorf("jwk use = %v, want sig", jwk["use"])
-	}
-	x, _ := jwk["x"].(string)
-	xb, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(x)
-	if err != nil || len(xb) != 32 {
-		t.Errorf("x = %q (decoded %d bytes), want 32-byte base64url", x, len(xb))
-	}
-	if _, ok := jwk["y"].(string); !ok {
-		t.Error("jwk missing y")
-	}
-}
-
-func TestPublicKeyJWK_RSA(t *testing.T) {
-	rsaKey, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	jwk, err := PublicKeyJWK(rsaKey.Public())
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if jwk["kty"] != "RSA" || jwk["n"] == "" || jwk["e"] == "" {
-		t.Errorf("jwk = %v, want kty=RSA with n,e", jwk)
-	}
-	if jwk["use"] != "sig" {
-		t.Errorf("jwk use = %v, want sig", jwk["use"])
-	}
-}
-
-func TestPublicKeyJWK_UnsupportedCurve(t *testing.T) {
-	ec384, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P384(), rand.Reader)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if _, err := PublicKeyJWK(ec384.Public()); err == nil {
-		t.Error("P-384: expected error")
-	}
-}
-
-func TestECDSADERToJOSE(t *testing.T) {
-	key, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	// Iterate so we hit signatures whose r or s has its high bit set (ASN.1 pads
-	// those with a leading 0x00) and whose scalars are short (need left-zero
-	// padding) — verifying fixed-width conversion in both directions.
-	for i := 0; i < 64; i++ {
-		digest := sha256.Sum256([]byte{byte(i), byte(i >> 8), 'j', 'w', 't'})
-		der, err := ecdsa.SignASN1(rand.Reader, key, digest[:])
-		if err != nil {
-			t.Fatal(err)
-		}
-		jose, err := ecdsaDERToJOSE(der, 32)
-		if err != nil {
-			t.Fatalf("iter %d: %v", i, err)
-		}
-		if len(jose) != 64 {
-			t.Fatalf("iter %d: len(jose)=%d, want 64 (fixed-width r||s)", i, len(jose))
-		}
-		r := new(big.Int).SetBytes(jose[:32])
-		s := new(big.Int).SetBytes(jose[32:])
-		if !ecdsa.Verify(&key.PublicKey, digest[:], r, s) {
-			t.Fatalf("iter %d: converted r||s did not verify against the public key", i)
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-func TestECDSADERToJOSE_Errors(t *testing.T) {
-	if _, err := ecdsaDERToJOSE([]byte{0x01, 0x02, 0x03}, 32); err == nil {
-		t.Error("garbage DER: expected error")
-	}
-	key, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	digest := sha256.Sum256([]byte("trailing"))
-	der, err := ecdsa.SignASN1(rand.Reader, key, digest[:])
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if _, err := ecdsaDERToJOSE(append(der, 0x00), 32); err == nil {
-		t.Error("DER with trailing byte: expected error")
-	}
-}
-
-type stubSigner struct{}
-
-func (stubSigner) EnsureKey(context.Context, KeyRef) (crypto.PublicKey, error)  { return nil, nil }
-func (stubSigner) PublicKey(context.Context, KeyRef) (crypto.PublicKey, error)  { return nil, nil }
-func (stubSigner) Sign(context.Context, KeyRef, []byte) ([]byte, string, error) { return nil, "", nil }
-
-func TestCleanProbeError(t *testing.T) {
-	cause := errors.New("open /dev/tpmrm0: permission denied")
-	const p = "sks: error fetching Secure Hardware Vendor Data: "
-
-	// sks double-wraps with the same %w prefix → collapse to a single prefix.
-	doubled := fmt.Errorf(p+"%w", fmt.Errorf(p+"%w", cause))
-	if got, want := cleanProbeError(doubled), p+cause.Error(); got != want {
-		t.Errorf("doubled: got %q, want %q", got, want)
-	}
-	// Triple wrap collapses too.
-	if got, want := cleanProbeError(fmt.Errorf(p+"%w", doubled)), p+cause.Error(); got != want {
-		t.Errorf("tripled: got %q, want %q", got, want)
-	}
-	// A layer adding genuinely new context is preserved.
-	if got, want := cleanProbeError(fmt.Errorf("load: %w", cause)), "load: "+cause.Error(); got != want {
-		t.Errorf("distinct prefix: got %q, want %q", got, want)
-	}
-	// nil and unwrapped-leaf cases.
-	if got := cleanProbeError(nil); got != "" {
-		t.Errorf("nil: got %q, want empty", got)
-	}
-	if got := cleanProbeError(cause); got != cause.Error() {
-		t.Errorf("leaf: got %q, want %q", got, cause.Error())
-	}
-}
-
-type proberSigner struct {
-	stubSigner
-	info HardwareInfo
-}
-
-func (p proberSigner) ProbeHardware(context.Context) (HardwareInfo, error) { return p.info, nil }
-
-func TestProbeHardware(t *testing.T) {
-	// nil signer and a signer that does not implement HardwareProber both yield ok=false.
-	if _, ok, _ := probeHardware(context.Background(), nil); ok {
-		t.Error("nil signer: ok should be false")
-	}
-	if _, ok, _ := probeHardware(context.Background(), stubSigner{}); ok {
-		t.Error("non-prober signer: ok should be false")
-	}
-
-	want := HardwareInfo{Backend: "tpm2", Available: true, VendorName: "ACME"}
-	info, ok, err := probeHardware(context.Background(), proberSigner{info: want})
-	if err != nil || !ok {
-		t.Fatalf("prober: ok=%v err=%v, want true/nil", ok, err)
-	}
-	if info != want {
-		t.Errorf("info = %+v, want %+v", info, want)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestRegistry(t *testing.T) {
-	if Active() != nil {
-		t.Skip("a signer is already registered in this build")
-	}
-	Register(stubSigner{})
-	if _, ok := Active().(stubSigner); !ok {
-		t.Error("Active did not return the registered signer")
-	}
-}

internal/keysigner/registry.go

@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
-
-package keysigner
-
-import "sync"
-
-var (
-	mu     sync.RWMutex
-	active Signer
-)
-
-// Register sets the active Signer. It is typically called from the init() of a
-// build-tagged or extension package that provides the platform TEE/Keychain
-// implementation. The last registration wins (one backend per platform).
-func Register(s Signer) {
-	mu.Lock()
-	defer mu.Unlock()
-	active = s
-}
-
-// Active returns the registered Signer, or nil if none is available — in which
-// case private_key_jwt is unsupported on this build and only client_secret auth
-// can be used.
-func Active() Signer {
-	mu.RLock()
-	defer mu.RUnlock()
-	return active
-}

internal/keysigner/signer_keychain_darwin.go

@@ -1,760 +0,0 @@
-//go:build darwin
-
-// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
-
-// macOS non-exportable Keychain signer (compiled into every darwin build).
-//
-// It does NOT use the Secure Enclave / hardware TEE (which would require
-// code-signing entitlements that are unfriendly to open source). Instead it
-// generates an RSA-2048 key directly inside a dedicated app keychain. The
-// private key is permanent, sensitive, and non-extractable; it is never present
-// in Go memory or a temporary file. Its access list trusts only the creating
-// application by default. Signing is RSASSA-PKCS1v15-SHA256 (RS256).
-//
-// Security and CoreFoundation are called through runtime FFI
-// (github.com/ebitengine/purego). Key generation and signing stay inside the OS
-// APIs while the binary remains CGO-free and can be cross-compiled for darwin.
-//
-// Build with:  go build   (cgo-free; compiled into every darwin build, no tag)
-package keysigner
-
-import (
-	"bytes"
-	"context"
-	"crypto"
-	"crypto/rand"
-	"crypto/sha1"
-	"crypto/sha256"
-	"crypto/x509"
-	"encoding/base64"
-	"encoding/hex"
-	"encoding/json"
-	"fmt"
-	"os"
-	"path/filepath"
-	"runtime"
-	"sync"
-	"unsafe"
-
-	"github.com/ebitengine/purego"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/vfs"
-)
-
-// ---- Security / CoreFoundation runtime bindings (purego, no cgo) ----
-
-const (
-	cfFrameworkPath  = "/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreFoundation.framework/CoreFoundation"
-	secFrameworkPath = "/System/Library/Frameworks/Security.framework/Security"
-
-	// kCFStringEncodingUTF8 (CFStringBuiltInEncodings).
-	cfStringEncodingUTF8 = 0x08000100
-
-	// OSStatus values.
-	errSecSuccess = 0
-
-	// Legacy Security.framework key-generation values from cssmtype.h. The
-	// legacy API is used because it can target a dedicated file keychain and set
-	// both a non-extractable attribute and an application-only SecAccess ACL.
-	cssmAlgIDRSA           = 42
-	cssmKeyUseSign         = 0x00000004
-	cssmKeyUseVerify       = 0x00000008
-	cssmKeyAttrPermanent   = 0x00000001
-	cssmKeyAttrSensitive   = 0x00000008
-	cssmKeyAttrExtractable = 0x00000020
-
-	publicKeyAttributes  = cssmKeyAttrPermanent | cssmKeyAttrExtractable
-	privateKeyAttributes = cssmKeyAttrPermanent | cssmKeyAttrSensitive
-)
-
-var (
-	ffiOnce sync.Once
-	ffiErr  error
-
-	cfDataCreate          func(alloc uintptr, bytes *byte, length int) uintptr
-	cfDataGetLength       func(d uintptr) int
-	cfDataGetBytePtr      func(d uintptr) unsafe.Pointer
-	cfStringCreate        func(alloc uintptr, cstr *byte, encoding uint32) uintptr
-	cfArrayCreate         func(alloc uintptr, values *uintptr, numValues int, cb uintptr) uintptr
-	cfDictCreateMutable   func(alloc uintptr, capacity int, keyCB, valCB uintptr) uintptr
-	cfDictSetValue        func(dict, key, val uintptr)
-	cfRelease             func(ref uintptr)
-	cfErrorGetCode        func(e uintptr) int
-	dlsymDataPointer      func(handle uintptr, name string) *uintptr
-	secKeychainCreate     func(path *byte, passwordLength uint32, password unsafe.Pointer, promptUser uint8, initialAccess uintptr, out *uintptr) int32
-	secKeychainOpen       func(path *byte, out *uintptr) int32
-	secKeychainUnlock     func(keychain uintptr, passwordLength uint32, password unsafe.Pointer, usePassword uint8) int32
-	secAccessCreate       func(descriptor, trustedList uintptr, out *uintptr) int32
-	secKeyCreatePair      func(keychain uintptr, algorithm, keySize uint32, contextHandle uint64, publicKeyUsage, publicKeyAttr, privateKeyUsage, privateKeyAttr uint32, initialAccess uintptr, publicKey, privateKey *uintptr) int32
-	secKeyCopyExternal    func(key uintptr, errOut *uintptr) uintptr
-	secKeychainItemDelete func(item uintptr) int32
-	secItemCopyMatching   func(query uintptr, result *uintptr) int32
-	secItemUpdate         func(query, attrs uintptr) int32
-	secKeyCreateSignature func(key, algo, data uintptr, errOut *uintptr) uintptr
-
-	// CFTypeRef data-symbol constants (deref to obtain the held ref value).
-	kSecClass                uintptr
-	kSecClassKey             uintptr
-	kSecAttrKeyClass         uintptr
-	kSecAttrKeyClassPrivate  uintptr
-	kSecAttrKeyType          uintptr
-	kSecAttrKeyTypeRSA       uintptr
-	kSecAttrApplicationLabel uintptr
-	kSecReturnRef            uintptr
-	kSecMatchSearchList      uintptr
-	kSecAttrLabel            uintptr
-	kCFBooleanTrue           uintptr
-	algRSAPKCS1SHA256        uintptr
-
-	// Struct-symbol constants (passed BY ADDRESS, not dereferenced).
-	cbTypeArray uintptr
-	cbDictKey   uintptr
-	cbDictValue uintptr
-)
-
-// loadFFI resolves the framework functions and constants once. Any failure
-// (framework missing, symbol absent) is returned to every caller so signing
-// fails cleanly rather than crashing.
-func loadFFI() error {
-	ffiOnce.Do(func() {
-		// RegisterLibFunc panics when a symbol is unavailable. Convert that into
-		// the same stable availability error as dlopen/dlsym failures so doctor
-		// and auth commands never crash on a future macOS without a legacy symbol.
-		defer func() {
-			if recovered := recover(); recovered != nil {
-				ffiErr = fmt.Errorf("keysigner: load Security framework bindings: %v", recovered)
-			}
-		}()
-		cf, err := purego.Dlopen(cfFrameworkPath, purego.RTLD_NOW|purego.RTLD_GLOBAL)
-		if err != nil {
-			ffiErr = fmt.Errorf("keysigner: dlopen CoreFoundation: %w", err)
-			return
-		}
-		sec, err := purego.Dlopen(secFrameworkPath, purego.RTLD_NOW|purego.RTLD_GLOBAL)
-		if err != nil {
-			ffiErr = fmt.Errorf("keysigner: dlopen Security: %w", err)
-			return
-		}
-
-		purego.RegisterLibFunc(&cfDataCreate, cf, "CFDataCreate")
-		purego.RegisterLibFunc(&cfDataGetLength, cf, "CFDataGetLength")
-		purego.RegisterLibFunc(&cfDataGetBytePtr, cf, "CFDataGetBytePtr")
-		purego.RegisterLibFunc(&cfStringCreate, cf, "CFStringCreateWithCString")
-		purego.RegisterLibFunc(&cfArrayCreate, cf, "CFArrayCreate")
-		purego.RegisterLibFunc(&cfDictCreateMutable, cf, "CFDictionaryCreateMutable")
-		purego.RegisterLibFunc(&cfDictSetValue, cf, "CFDictionarySetValue")
-		purego.RegisterLibFunc(&cfRelease, cf, "CFRelease")
-		purego.RegisterLibFunc(&cfErrorGetCode, cf, "CFErrorGetCode")
-		// purego.Dlsym exposes symbol addresses as uintptr. Bind dlsym with a
-		// pointer return for data symbols so reading exported CFTypeRef variables
-		// never performs a uintptr-to-pointer conversion in Go.
-		purego.RegisterLibFunc(&dlsymDataPointer, purego.RTLD_DEFAULT, "dlsym")
-		purego.RegisterLibFunc(&secKeychainCreate, sec, "SecKeychainCreate")
-		purego.RegisterLibFunc(&secKeychainOpen, sec, "SecKeychainOpen")
-		purego.RegisterLibFunc(&secKeychainUnlock, sec, "SecKeychainUnlock")
-		purego.RegisterLibFunc(&secAccessCreate, sec, "SecAccessCreate")
-		purego.RegisterLibFunc(&secKeyCreatePair, sec, "SecKeyCreatePair")
-		purego.RegisterLibFunc(&secKeyCopyExternal, sec, "SecKeyCopyExternalRepresentation")
-		purego.RegisterLibFunc(&secKeychainItemDelete, sec, "SecKeychainItemDelete")
-		purego.RegisterLibFunc(&secItemCopyMatching, sec, "SecItemCopyMatching")
-		purego.RegisterLibFunc(&secItemUpdate, sec, "SecItemUpdate")
-		purego.RegisterLibFunc(&secKeyCreateSignature, sec, "SecKeyCreateSignature")
-
-		// CFStringRef/CFBooleanRef constants: Dlsym gives the address of the
-		// exported variable; deref once to read the ref it holds.
-		derefs := []struct {
-			dst    *uintptr
-			handle uintptr
-			name   string
-		}{
-			{&kSecClass, sec, "kSecClass"},
-			{&kSecClassKey, sec, "kSecClassKey"},
-			{&kSecAttrKeyClass, sec, "kSecAttrKeyClass"},
-			{&kSecAttrKeyClassPrivate, sec, "kSecAttrKeyClassPrivate"},
-			{&kSecAttrKeyType, sec, "kSecAttrKeyType"},
-			{&kSecAttrKeyTypeRSA, sec, "kSecAttrKeyTypeRSA"},
-			{&kSecAttrApplicationLabel, sec, "kSecAttrApplicationLabel"},
-			{&kSecReturnRef, sec, "kSecReturnRef"},
-			{&kSecMatchSearchList, sec, "kSecMatchSearchList"},
-			{&kSecAttrLabel, sec, "kSecAttrLabel"},
-			{&kCFBooleanTrue, cf, "kCFBooleanTrue"},
-			{&algRSAPKCS1SHA256, sec, "kSecKeyAlgorithmRSASignatureDigestPKCS1v15SHA256"},
-		}
-		for _, d := range derefs {
-			sym := dlsymDataPointer(d.handle, d.name)
-			if sym == nil {
-				ffiErr = fmt.Errorf("keysigner: dlsym %s returned zero address", d.name)
-				return
-			}
-			*d.dst = *sym
-			if *d.dst == 0 {
-				ffiErr = fmt.Errorf("keysigner: data symbol %s contains a zero reference", d.name)
-				return
-			}
-		}
-
-		// Callback structs are passed by address (no deref).
-		addrs := []struct {
-			dst    *uintptr
-			handle uintptr
-			name   string
-		}{
-			{&cbTypeArray, cf, "kCFTypeArrayCallBacks"},
-			{&cbDictKey, cf, "kCFTypeDictionaryKeyCallBacks"},
-			{&cbDictValue, cf, "kCFTypeDictionaryValueCallBacks"},
-		}
-		for _, a := range addrs {
-			sym, e := purego.Dlsym(a.handle, a.name)
-			if e != nil {
-				ffiErr = fmt.Errorf("keysigner: dlsym %s: %w", a.name, e)
-				return
-			}
-			if sym == 0 {
-				ffiErr = fmt.Errorf("keysigner: dlsym %s returned zero address", a.name)
-				return
-			}
-			*a.dst = sym
-		}
-	})
-	return ffiErr
-}
-
-// cstr returns a pointer to a NUL-terminated copy of s. The backing array stays
-// alive while the returned pointer is reachable.
-func cstr(s string) *byte {
-	b := append([]byte(s), 0)
-	return &b[0]
-}
-
-// cfBytes wraps Go bytes in a CFData (CFDataCreate copies the bytes). Caller
-// releases the returned CFDataRef.
-func cfBytes(b []byte) uintptr {
-	var p *byte
-	if len(b) > 0 {
-		p = &b[0]
-	}
-	d := cfDataCreate(0, p, len(b))
-	runtime.KeepAlive(b)
-	return d
-}
-
-// keychainSearchArray opens the dedicated keychain file and wraps it in a
-// CFArray for kSecMatchSearchList. Caller releases the returned array.
-//
-// NOTE: SecKeychainOpen / the file-based keychain are deprecated by Apple in
-// favor of the data-protection keychain. They still function on current macOS;
-// migrating off them is tracked separately and is independent of the cgo→purego
-// change (the original cgo version used the same APIs).
-func keychainSearchArray(keychainPath string) (uintptr, error) {
-	var kc uintptr
-	if st := secKeychainOpen(cstr(keychainPath), &kc); st != errSecSuccess {
-		return 0, keychainError("open keychain", int(st))
-	}
-	vals := [1]uintptr{kc}
-	arr := cfArrayCreate(0, &vals[0], 1, cbTypeArray)
-	cfRelease(kc) // the array retains it
-	if arr == 0 {
-		return 0, fmt.Errorf("keysigner: CFArrayCreate(search list) failed")
-	}
-	return arr, nil
-}
-
-// findPrivateKey locates the non-extractable private key by its application
-// label within the dedicated keychain. Caller releases the returned SecKeyRef.
-func findPrivateKey(appLabel []byte, keychainPath string) (uintptr, error) {
-	search, err := keychainSearchArray(keychainPath)
-	if err != nil {
-		return 0, err
-	}
-	defer cfRelease(search)
-
-	labelData := cfBytes(appLabel)
-	defer cfRelease(labelData)
-
-	q := cfDictCreateMutable(0, 0, cbDictKey, cbDictValue)
-	if q == 0 {
-		return 0, fmt.Errorf("keysigner: CFDictionaryCreateMutable(query) failed")
-	}
-	defer cfRelease(q)
-	cfDictSetValue(q, kSecClass, kSecClassKey)
-	cfDictSetValue(q, kSecAttrKeyClass, kSecAttrKeyClassPrivate)
-	cfDictSetValue(q, kSecAttrKeyType, kSecAttrKeyTypeRSA)
-	cfDictSetValue(q, kSecAttrApplicationLabel, labelData)
-	cfDictSetValue(q, kSecReturnRef, kCFBooleanTrue)
-	cfDictSetValue(q, kSecMatchSearchList, search)
-
-	var keyRef uintptr
-	if st := secItemCopyMatching(q, &keyRef); st != errSecSuccess {
-		return 0, keychainError("find private key", int(st))
-	}
-	return keyRef, nil
-}
-
-// These seams keep lifecycle tests hermetic. Production calls Security.framework
-// directly, so the generated keychain password never appears in process argv.
-var (
-	createKeychainFile = createKeychainFileFFI
-	unlockKeychainFile = unlockKeychainFileFFI
-)
-
-// keychainSigner implements Signer using a macOS non-exportable Keychain key.
-type keychainSigner struct{}
-
-func init() { Register(keychainSigner{}) }
-
-// ProbeHardware reports the macOS Keychain backend backing this signer. The
-// keychain signer is compiled into every darwin build and needs no special
-// hardware, so it reports available whenever its framework bindings load.
-// It performs no key access, so it never prompts. Implementing HardwareProber
-// is what lets `doctor` report the signer as present rather than treating the
-// (prober-less) signer as "no platform signer in this build".
-func (keychainSigner) ProbeHardware(_ context.Context) (HardwareInfo, error) {
-	info := HardwareInfo{Backend: "keychain", VendorName: "macOS Keychain"}
-	// A missing framework or symbol is a status (Available=false via Reason),
-	// not a probe error. Loading symbols does not touch the keychain or prompt.
-	if err := loadFFI(); err != nil {
-		info.Reason = err.Error()
-		return info, nil //nolint:nilerr // absence is reported via Reason, not as an error
-	}
-	info.Available = true
-	return info, nil
-}
-
-func (keychainSigner) EnsureKey(_ context.Context, ref KeyRef) (crypto.PublicKey, error) {
-	if md, err := readKeyMetadata(ref.Label); err == nil {
-		return decodePublicKey(md.PublicKey)
-	} else if !os.IsNotExist(err) {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-	return createKeychainKey(ref.Label)
-}
-
-func (keychainSigner) PublicKey(_ context.Context, ref KeyRef) (crypto.PublicKey, error) {
-	md, err := readKeyMetadata(ref.Label)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-	return decodePublicKey(md.PublicKey)
-}
-
-func (keychainSigner) Sign(_ context.Context, ref KeyRef, signingInput []byte) ([]byte, string, error) {
-	if err := loadFFI(); err != nil {
-		return nil, "", err
-	}
-	md, err := readKeyMetadata(ref.Label)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, "", err
-	}
-	appLabel, err := hex.DecodeString(md.AppLabel)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("keysigner: decode app label: %w", err)
-	}
-	if len(appLabel) == 0 {
-		// Guard the &appLabel[0] pointer below against corrupted metadata.
-		return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("keysigner: key metadata for %q has empty app label", ref.Label)
-	}
-	keychain, err := ensureKeychain()
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, "", err
-	}
-
-	keyRef, err := findPrivateKey(appLabel, keychain)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, "", err
-	}
-	defer cfRelease(keyRef)
-
-	digest := sha256.Sum256(signingInput)
-	digestData := cfBytes(digest[:])
-	defer cfRelease(digestData)
-
-	var errRef uintptr
-	sigRef := secKeyCreateSignature(keyRef, algRSAPKCS1SHA256, digestData, &errRef)
-	if sigRef == 0 {
-		code := 0
-		if errRef != 0 {
-			code = cfErrorGetCode(errRef)
-			cfRelease(errRef)
-		}
-		return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("keysigner: SecKeyCreateSignature failed (CFError %d)", code)
-	}
-	defer cfRelease(sigRef)
-
-	n := cfDataGetLength(sigRef)
-	bp := cfDataGetBytePtr(sigRef)
-	out := make([]byte, n)
-	copy(out, unsafe.Slice((*byte)(bp), n))
-	// RS256: the SecKey PKCS1v15-SHA256 signature is the JOSE signature as-is.
-	return out, AlgRS256, nil
-}
-
-// keyMetadata records the public key + the keychain application-label used to
-// locate the non-extractable private key.
-type keyMetadata struct {
-	PublicKey string `json:"public_key"` // PKIX DER, std base64 (see EncodePublicKey)
-	AppLabel  string `json:"app_label"`  // hex(sha1(PKCS1 public key))
-}
-
-func createKeychainKey(label string) (crypto.PublicKey, error) {
-	metadataPath, err := keyMetadataPath(label)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-	if err := loadFFI(); err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-	keychain, err := ensureKeychain()
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-
-	var keychainRef uintptr
-	if st := secKeychainOpen(cstr(keychain), &keychainRef); st != errSecSuccess {
-		return nil, keychainError("open keychain for key generation", int(st))
-	}
-	if keychainRef == 0 {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("keysigner: open keychain for key generation returned an empty reference")
-	}
-	defer cfRelease(keychainRef)
-
-	descriptor := cfStringCreate(0, cstr(label), cfStringEncodingUTF8)
-	if descriptor == 0 {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("keysigner: create key access descriptor failed")
-	}
-	defer cfRelease(descriptor)
-
-	// A nil trusted list means only this application is trusted without a
-	// confirmation dialog. This is intentionally stricter than security(1) -A.
-	var access uintptr
-	if st := secAccessCreate(descriptor, 0, &access); st != errSecSuccess {
-		return nil, keychainError("create key access policy", int(st))
-	}
-	if access == 0 {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("keysigner: create key access policy returned an empty reference")
-	}
-	defer cfRelease(access)
-
-	var publicKeyRef, privateKeyRef uintptr
-	status := secKeyCreatePair(
-		keychainRef,
-		cssmAlgIDRSA,
-		2048,
-		0,
-		cssmKeyUseVerify,
-		publicKeyAttributes,
-		cssmKeyUseSign,
-		privateKeyAttributes,
-		access,
-		&publicKeyRef,
-		&privateKeyRef,
-	)
-	deleteAndRelease := func(keyRef uintptr) {
-		if keyRef != 0 {
-			_ = secKeychainItemDelete(keyRef)
-			cfRelease(keyRef)
-		}
-	}
-	if status != errSecSuccess {
-		deleteAndRelease(privateKeyRef)
-		deleteAndRelease(publicKeyRef)
-		return nil, keychainError("generate non-extractable RSA key", int(status))
-	}
-	if publicKeyRef == 0 || privateKeyRef == 0 {
-		deleteAndRelease(privateKeyRef)
-		deleteAndRelease(publicKeyRef)
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("keysigner: key generation returned an empty key reference")
-	}
-	defer cfRelease(publicKeyRef)
-	defer cfRelease(privateKeyRef)
-
-	committed := false
-	defer func() {
-		if !committed {
-			_ = secKeychainItemDelete(privateKeyRef)
-			_ = secKeychainItemDelete(publicKeyRef)
-		}
-	}()
-
-	var exportErr uintptr
-	publicDERRef := secKeyCopyExternal(publicKeyRef, &exportErr)
-	if publicDERRef == 0 {
-		code := 0
-		if exportErr != 0 {
-			code = cfErrorGetCode(exportErr)
-			cfRelease(exportErr)
-		}
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("keysigner: export public key failed (CFError %d)", code)
-	}
-	defer cfRelease(publicDERRef)
-	publicDERLength := cfDataGetLength(publicDERRef)
-	publicDERPointer := cfDataGetBytePtr(publicDERRef)
-	if publicDERLength <= 0 || publicDERPointer == nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("keysigner: exported public key is empty")
-	}
-	publicDER := make([]byte, publicDERLength)
-	copy(publicDER, unsafe.Slice((*byte)(publicDERPointer), publicDERLength))
-	publicKey, err := x509.ParsePKCS1PublicKey(publicDER)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("keysigner: parse generated RSA public key: %w", err)
-	}
-	appLabel := sha1.Sum(publicDER)
-
-	if err := setKeychainKeyLabel(appLabel[:], keychain, label); err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-
-	encodedPub, err := EncodePublicKey(publicKey)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-	if err := writeKeyMetadata(metadataPath, keyMetadata{PublicKey: encodedPub, AppLabel: hex.EncodeToString(appLabel[:])}); err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-	committed = true
-	return publicKey, nil
-}
-
-func setKeychainKeyLabel(appLabel []byte, keychain, label string) error {
-	if err := loadFFI(); err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	search, err := keychainSearchArray(keychain)
-	if err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	defer cfRelease(search)
-
-	labelData := cfBytes(appLabel)
-	defer cfRelease(labelData)
-
-	q := cfDictCreateMutable(0, 0, cbDictKey, cbDictValue)
-	if q == 0 {
-		return fmt.Errorf("keysigner: CFDictionaryCreateMutable(query) failed")
-	}
-	defer cfRelease(q)
-	cfDictSetValue(q, kSecClass, kSecClassKey)
-	cfDictSetValue(q, kSecAttrKeyClass, kSecAttrKeyClassPrivate)
-	cfDictSetValue(q, kSecAttrKeyType, kSecAttrKeyTypeRSA)
-	cfDictSetValue(q, kSecAttrApplicationLabel, labelData)
-	cfDictSetValue(q, kSecMatchSearchList, search)
-
-	cfLabel := cfStringCreate(0, cstr(label), cfStringEncodingUTF8)
-	if cfLabel == 0 {
-		return fmt.Errorf("keysigner: CFStringCreateWithCString failed")
-	}
-	defer cfRelease(cfLabel)
-	attrs := cfDictCreateMutable(0, 0, cbDictKey, cbDictValue)
-	if attrs == 0 {
-		return fmt.Errorf("keysigner: CFDictionaryCreateMutable(attrs) failed")
-	}
-	defer cfRelease(attrs)
-	cfDictSetValue(attrs, kSecAttrLabel, cfLabel)
-
-	if st := secItemUpdate(q, attrs); st != errSecSuccess {
-		return keychainError("set keychain key label", int(st))
-	}
-	return nil
-}
-
-func decodePublicKey(encoded string) (crypto.PublicKey, error) {
-	der, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(encoded)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("keysigner: decode public key: %w", err)
-	}
-	return x509.ParsePKIXPublicKey(der)
-}
-
-func readKeyMetadata(label string) (*keyMetadata, error) {
-	path, err := keyMetadataPath(label)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-	data, err := vfs.ReadFile(path)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err // preserves os.ErrNotExist for EnsureKey
-	}
-	var md keyMetadata
-	if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &md); err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("keysigner: parse key metadata: %w", err)
-	}
-	return &md, nil
-}
-
-func writeKeyMetadata(path string, md keyMetadata) error {
-	if err := vfs.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(path), 0700); err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	data, err := json.MarshalIndent(md, "", "  ")
-	if err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	return vfs.WriteFile(path, data, 0600)
-}
-
-func ensureKeychain() (string, error) {
-	keychainPath, err := keychainFilePath()
-	if err != nil {
-		return "", err
-	}
-	password, err := keychainPassword()
-	if err != nil {
-		return "", err
-	}
-	defer clear(password)
-	if _, err := vfs.Stat(keychainPath); err != nil {
-		if !os.IsNotExist(err) {
-			return "", fmt.Errorf("keysigner: stat keychain: %w", err)
-		}
-		if err := vfs.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(keychainPath), 0700); err != nil {
-			return "", err
-		}
-		if err := createKeychainFile(keychainPath, password); err != nil {
-			return "", err
-		}
-	}
-
-	// A file keychain can be locked after logout, reboot, an idle interval, or an
-	// explicit `security lock-keychain`. SecKeychainOpen may still succeed while
-	// it is locked; the failure then appears later at signing time (commonly as
-	// SecKeyCreateSignature CFError -128). Always unlock the dedicated keychain
-	// before returning it, including when the file already existed.
-	if err := unlockKeychainFile(keychainPath, password); err != nil {
-		return "", err
-	}
-	return keychainPath, nil
-}
-
-func createKeychainFileFFI(path string, password []byte) error {
-	if err := loadFFI(); err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	pathBytes := append([]byte(path), 0)
-	var keychain uintptr
-	status := secKeychainCreate(
-		&pathBytes[0],
-		uint32(len(password)),
-		byteSlicePointer(password),
-		0, // promptUser=false: unattended creation must never display UI.
-		0, // initialAccess is ignored; Apple documents passing NULL.
-		&keychain,
-	)
-	runtime.KeepAlive(pathBytes)
-	runtime.KeepAlive(password)
-	if status != errSecSuccess {
-		return keychainError("create keychain", int(status))
-	}
-	if keychain == 0 {
-		return fmt.Errorf("keysigner: create keychain returned an empty reference")
-	}
-	defer cfRelease(keychain)
-
-	// Keep the system's default lock policy. ensureKeychain explicitly unlocks
-	// this dedicated keychain with its generated password before every use, so
-	// changing settings here would be unnecessary and could trigger system UI.
-	return nil
-}
-
-func unlockKeychainFileFFI(path string, password []byte) error {
-	if err := loadFFI(); err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	pathBytes := append([]byte(path), 0)
-	var keychain uintptr
-	status := secKeychainOpen(&pathBytes[0], &keychain)
-	runtime.KeepAlive(pathBytes)
-	if status != errSecSuccess {
-		return keychainError("open keychain for unlock", int(status))
-	}
-	if keychain == 0 {
-		return fmt.Errorf("keysigner: open keychain for unlock returned an empty reference")
-	}
-	defer cfRelease(keychain)
-
-	status = secKeychainUnlock(keychain, uint32(len(password)), byteSlicePointer(password), 1)
-	runtime.KeepAlive(password)
-	if status != errSecSuccess {
-		return keychainError("unlock keychain", int(status))
-	}
-	return nil
-}
-
-func byteSlicePointer(data []byte) unsafe.Pointer {
-	if len(data) == 0 {
-		return nil
-	}
-	return unsafe.Pointer(&data[0])
-}
-
-func keysignerDir() (string, error) {
-	configDir, err := os.UserConfigDir()
-	if err != nil {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("keysigner: resolve config dir: %w", err)
-	}
-	return filepath.Join(configDir, "lark-cli", "keysigner"), nil
-}
-
-func keychainFilePath() (string, error) {
-	dir, err := keysignerDir()
-	if err != nil {
-		return "", err
-	}
-	return filepath.Join(dir, "lark-cli.keychain"), nil
-}
-
-func keychainPassword() ([]byte, error) {
-	dir, err := keysignerDir()
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-	path := filepath.Join(dir, "keychain.pass")
-	if data, err := vfs.ReadFile(path); err == nil {
-		defer clear(data)
-		if pw := bytes.TrimSpace(data); len(pw) != 0 {
-			return append([]byte(nil), pw...), nil
-		}
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("keysigner: empty keychain password")
-	} else if !os.IsNotExist(err) {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-	buf := make([]byte, 32)
-	if _, err := rand.Read(buf); err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-	defer clear(buf)
-	pw := make([]byte, hex.EncodedLen(len(buf)))
-	hex.Encode(pw, buf)
-	if err := vfs.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(path), 0700); err != nil {
-		clear(pw)
-		return nil, err
-	}
-	stored := append(append([]byte(nil), pw...), '\n')
-	if err := vfs.WriteFile(path, stored, 0600); err != nil {
-		clear(stored)
-		clear(pw)
-		return nil, err
-	}
-	clear(stored)
-	return pw, nil
-}
-
-func keyMetadataPath(label string) (string, error) {
-	dir, err := keysignerDir()
-	if err != nil {
-		return "", err
-	}
-	id := sha256.Sum256([]byte(label))
-	return filepath.Join(dir, "keys", hex.EncodeToString(id[:])+".json"), nil
-}
-
-func keychainError(operation string, status int) error {
-	switch status {
-	case -25299:
-		return fmt.Errorf("keysigner: %s: key already exists", operation)
-	case -25300:
-		return fmt.Errorf("keysigner: %s: key not found", operation)
-	case -2:
-		return fmt.Errorf("keysigner: %s: allocation failed", operation)
-	default:
-		return fmt.Errorf("keysigner: %s: Security framework status %d", operation, status)
-	}
-}

internal/keysigner/signer_keychain_darwin_test.go

@@ -1,282 +0,0 @@
-//go:build darwin
-
-// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
-
-package keysigner
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"crypto"
-	"crypto/rsa"
-	"crypto/sha256"
-	"encoding/hex"
-	"errors"
-	"os"
-	"path/filepath"
-	"reflect"
-	"strings"
-	"testing"
-)
-
-// TestKeychainSignerRegistered confirms every Darwin build self-registers the
-// signer (init → Register), so keysigner.Active() is non-nil. No keychain access.
-func TestKeychainSignerRegistered(t *testing.T) {
-	if _, ok := Active().(keychainSigner); !ok {
-		t.Fatalf("Active() = %T, want keychainSigner (Darwin build must self-register)", Active())
-	}
-}
-
-func TestKeychainFFIBindings(t *testing.T) {
-	if err := loadFFI(); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("loadFFI: %v", err)
-	}
-	if secKeychainCreate == nil || secKeychainOpen == nil || secKeychainUnlock == nil ||
-		secAccessCreate == nil || secKeyCreatePair == nil || secKeyCopyExternal == nil || secKeychainItemDelete == nil {
-		t.Fatal("one or more keychain functions were not registered")
-	}
-}
-
-func TestPrivateKeyGenerationAttributesAreNonExtractable(t *testing.T) {
-	if privateKeyAttributes&cssmKeyAttrPermanent == 0 {
-		t.Fatal("private key must be stored permanently in the dedicated keychain")
-	}
-	if privateKeyAttributes&cssmKeyAttrSensitive == 0 {
-		t.Fatal("private key must be marked sensitive")
-	}
-	if privateKeyAttributes&cssmKeyAttrExtractable != 0 {
-		t.Fatal("private key must not be extractable")
-	}
-	if publicKeyAttributes&cssmKeyAttrExtractable == 0 {
-		t.Fatal("public key must remain exportable")
-	}
-}
-
-// TestEnsureKeychainUnlocksExistingKeychain covers the recovery path for a
-// dedicated file keychain that was created in an earlier process and has since
-// become locked. No real Security.framework call is executed.
-func TestEnsureKeychainUnlocksExistingKeychain(t *testing.T) {
-	home := t.TempDir()
-	t.Setenv("HOME", home)
-
-	dir := filepath.Join(home, "Library", "Application Support", "lark-cli", "keysigner")
-	if err := os.MkdirAll(dir, 0700); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	keychainPath := filepath.Join(dir, "lark-cli.keychain")
-	if err := os.WriteFile(keychainPath, []byte("not-a-real-keychain"), 0600); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, "keychain.pass"), []byte("test-password\n"), 0600); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-
-	previousCreate := createKeychainFile
-	previousUnlock := unlockKeychainFile
-	createKeychainFile = func(string, []byte) error {
-		t.Fatal("createKeychainFile called for an existing keychain")
-		return nil
-	}
-	type unlockCall struct {
-		path     string
-		password []byte
-	}
-	var calls []unlockCall
-	var borrowedPassword []byte
-	unlockKeychainFile = func(path string, password []byte) error {
-		borrowedPassword = password
-		calls = append(calls, unlockCall{path: path, password: append([]byte(nil), password...)})
-		return nil
-	}
-	t.Cleanup(func() {
-		createKeychainFile = previousCreate
-		unlockKeychainFile = previousUnlock
-	})
-
-	got, err := ensureKeychain()
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("ensureKeychain: %v", err)
-	}
-	if got != keychainPath {
-		t.Fatalf("ensureKeychain path = %q, want %q", got, keychainPath)
-	}
-	want := []unlockCall{{path: keychainPath, password: []byte("test-password")}}
-	if !reflect.DeepEqual(calls, want) {
-		t.Fatalf("unlock calls = %#v, want %#v", calls, want)
-	}
-	for i, value := range borrowedPassword {
-		if value != 0 {
-			t.Fatalf("borrowed password byte %d was not cleared after use", i)
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-func TestEnsureKeychainNewKeychainStillUnlocksAfterCreation(t *testing.T) {
-	home := t.TempDir()
-	t.Setenv("HOME", home)
-
-	type lifecycleCall struct {
-		op       string
-		path     string
-		password []byte
-	}
-	var calls []lifecycleCall
-	previousCreate := createKeychainFile
-	previousUnlock := unlockKeychainFile
-	createKeychainFile = func(path string, password []byte) error {
-		calls = append(calls, lifecycleCall{op: "create", path: path, password: append([]byte(nil), password...)})
-		return nil
-	}
-	unlockKeychainFile = func(path string, password []byte) error {
-		calls = append(calls, lifecycleCall{op: "unlock", path: path, password: append([]byte(nil), password...)})
-		return nil
-	}
-	t.Cleanup(func() {
-		createKeychainFile = previousCreate
-		unlockKeychainFile = previousUnlock
-	})
-
-	keychainPath, err := ensureKeychain()
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("ensureKeychain: %v", err)
-	}
-	if len(calls) != 2 || calls[0].op != "create" || calls[1].op != "unlock" {
-		t.Fatalf("lifecycle calls = %#v, want create then unlock", calls)
-	}
-	for _, call := range calls {
-		if call.path != keychainPath || len(call.password) != 64 {
-			t.Fatalf("lifecycle call = %#v, want path %q and generated 64-byte password", call, keychainPath)
-		}
-	}
-	if !reflect.DeepEqual(calls[0].password, calls[1].password) {
-		t.Fatal("create and unlock did not receive the same generated password")
-	}
-}
-
-func TestEnsureKeychainExistingUnlockErrorIsReturned(t *testing.T) {
-	home := t.TempDir()
-	t.Setenv("HOME", home)
-
-	dir := filepath.Join(home, "Library", "Application Support", "lark-cli", "keysigner")
-	if err := os.MkdirAll(dir, 0700); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, "lark-cli.keychain"), []byte("not-a-real-keychain"), 0600); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, "keychain.pass"), []byte("test-password\n"), 0600); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-
-	previousCreate := createKeychainFile
-	previousUnlock := unlockKeychainFile
-	createKeychainFile = func(string, []byte) error {
-		t.Fatal("createKeychainFile called for an existing keychain")
-		return nil
-	}
-	unlockKeychainFile = func(string, []byte) error {
-		return errors.New("keysigner: unlock keychain: Security framework status -25293")
-	}
-	t.Cleanup(func() {
-		createKeychainFile = previousCreate
-		unlockKeychainFile = previousUnlock
-	})
-
-	_, err := ensureKeychain()
-	if err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("ensureKeychain returned nil error")
-	}
-	if got := err.Error(); !strings.Contains(got, "unlock keychain") || !strings.Contains(got, "-25293") {
-		t.Fatalf("ensureKeychain error = %q", got)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestEnsureKeychainCreateErrorStopsBeforeUnlock(t *testing.T) {
-	home := t.TempDir()
-	t.Setenv("HOME", home)
-
-	previousCreate := createKeychainFile
-	previousUnlock := unlockKeychainFile
-	createKeychainFile = func(string, []byte) error {
-		return errors.New("keysigner: create keychain: Security framework status -50")
-	}
-	unlockKeychainFile = func(string, []byte) error {
-		t.Fatal("unlockKeychainFile called after creation failed")
-		return nil
-	}
-	t.Cleanup(func() {
-		createKeychainFile = previousCreate
-		unlockKeychainFile = previousUnlock
-	})
-
-	_, err := ensureKeychain()
-	if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "create keychain") || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "-50") {
-		t.Fatalf("ensureKeychain error = %v", err)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestKeychainSignerRoundTrip creates a real non-extractable RSA key, signs, and
-// verifies RS256 against the returned public key. Gated by LARK_KEYCHAIN_IT
-// because it mutates the dedicated lark-cli keychain store. The signer is now
-// cgo-free (purego runtime FFI), so it runs with CGO_ENABLED=0. Run with:
-//
-//	LARK_KEYCHAIN_IT=1 go test -run RoundTrip ./internal/keysigner/
-func TestKeychainSignerRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
-	if os.Getenv("LARK_KEYCHAIN_IT") == "" {
-		t.Skip("set LARK_KEYCHAIN_IT=1 to run the macOS Keychain integration test")
-	}
-	t.Setenv("HOME", t.TempDir())
-	s := keychainSigner{}
-	ref := KeyRef{Label: "lark-cli-keychain-it"}
-
-	pub, err := s.EnsureKey(context.Background(), ref)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("EnsureKey: %v", err)
-	}
-	rsaPub, ok := pub.(*rsa.PublicKey)
-	if !ok {
-		t.Fatalf("public key = %T, want *rsa.PublicKey", pub)
-	}
-	if alg, err := AlgForKey(pub); err != nil || alg != AlgRS256 {
-		t.Fatalf("AlgForKey = %q, %v; want RS256", alg, err)
-	}
-
-	input := []byte("header.payload")
-	sig, alg, err := s.Sign(context.Background(), ref, input)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("Sign: %v", err)
-	}
-	if alg != AlgRS256 {
-		t.Errorf("Sign alg = %q, want RS256", alg)
-	}
-	h := sha256.Sum256(input)
-	if err := rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15(rsaPub, crypto.SHA256, h[:], sig); err != nil {
-		t.Errorf("RS256 signature did not verify: %v", err)
-	}
-
-	md, err := readKeyMetadata(ref.Label)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("read metadata: %v", err)
-	}
-	appLabel, err := hex.DecodeString(md.AppLabel)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("decode app label: %v", err)
-	}
-	keychain, err := ensureKeychain()
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("ensure keychain for export check: %v", err)
-	}
-	privateKeyRef, err := findPrivateKey(appLabel, keychain)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("find private key for export check: %v", err)
-	}
-	defer cfRelease(privateKeyRef)
-	var exportErr uintptr
-	if exported := secKeyCopyExternal(privateKeyRef, &exportErr); exported != 0 {
-		cfRelease(exported)
-		t.Fatal("private key was exportable")
-	}
-	if exportErr != 0 {
-		cfRelease(exportErr)
-	}
-}

internal/keysigner/signer_sks.go

@@ -1,135 +0,0 @@
-//go:build linux || (windows && amd64)
-
-// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
-
-// TPM 2.0 signer (compiled into every linux and windows/amd64 build, no build
-// tag required), backed by github.com/facebookincubator/sks.
-//
-// sks holds a non-exportable ECDSA P-256 key in the platform TPM and signs
-// SHA-256 digests. On Linux it talks to /dev/tpmrm0; on Windows it uses the
-// Microsoft Platform Crypto Provider (CNG). Both backends return an ASN.1 DER
-// ECDSA signature, which we convert to the fixed-width r||s form JWS requires for
-// ES256 (see ecdsaDERToJOSE). One key is created on the first private_key_jwt
-// registration (DefaultKeyLabel) and reused for subsequent app registrations and
-// every client_assertion on the same device.
-//
-// Excluded from windows/arm64: the sks Windows dependency stack (go-ole) has no
-// arm64 VARIANT and fails to compile, so windows/arm64 falls back to
-// client_secret only (keysigner.Active() is nil). On darwin the keychain signer
-// is used instead. CGO is never required.
-package keysigner
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"crypto"
-	"crypto/ecdsa"
-	"crypto/sha256"
-	"fmt"
-	"io"
-
-	"github.com/facebookincubator/flog"
-	"github.com/facebookincubator/sks"
-)
-
-// p256ByteLen is the P-256 coordinate width. sks regular keys are always ECDSA
-// P-256, so ES256 signatures are 2*p256ByteLen bytes of r||s.
-const p256ByteLen = 32
-
-// keyTag is the sks key tag. Both the Linux and Windows sks backends address
-// keys by label and ignore the tag, but the macOS backend uses it, so we set a
-// stable namespaced value for forward compatibility.
-const keyTag = "com.larksuite.cli"
-
-// sksSigner implements Signer (and HardwareProber) using a non-exportable
-// TPM 2.0 ECDSA key via sks.
-type sksSigner struct{}
-
-func init() {
-	Register(sksSigner{})
-	// This sks version logs verbose TPM-operation chatter to stderr via flog (a
-	// glog fork it owns exclusively) — e.g. "Loaded TPM device", "Found handle
-	// for key" on every sign. The CLI does not use flog, so silence it
-	// process-wide here; real failures are returned as errors, never relied upon
-	// from these logs. (Newer sks switched to slog, but that lands only on its
-	// go-1.24 line, which we avoid to keep the module on go 1.23.)
-	flog.SetOutput(io.Discard)
-}
-
-// EnsureKey returns the public key for ref, creating the TPM key if absent.
-// sks.NewKey is find-or-create: it returns the existing key when one is present.
-func (sksSigner) EnsureKey(_ context.Context, ref KeyRef) (crypto.PublicKey, error) {
-	key, err := sks.NewKey(ref.Label, keyTag, false, true, nil)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("keysigner: ensure TPM key %q: %w", ref.Label, err)
-	}
-	defer key.Close()
-	return ecdsaPublic(ref.Label, key.Public())
-}
-
-// PublicKey returns the public key for ref without creating it. FromLabelTag does
-// not touch the TPM until Public() loads the sealed key; a missing key yields a
-// nil public key, which we surface as an error — at runtime the key MUST already
-// exist (it was bound to the app at registration), so we never silently mint a
-// new, unbound one here.
-func (sksSigner) PublicKey(_ context.Context, ref KeyRef) (crypto.PublicKey, error) {
-	pub := sks.FromLabelTag(ref.Label).Public()
-	if pub == nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("keysigner: TPM key %q not found", ref.Label)
-	}
-	return ecdsaPublic(ref.Label, pub)
-}
-
-// Sign signs signingInput with the TPM key and returns a JOSE-format ES256
-// signature (fixed-width r||s) plus its alg.
-func (sksSigner) Sign(_ context.Context, ref KeyRef, signingInput []byte) ([]byte, string, error) {
-	key, err := sks.NewKey(ref.Label, keyTag, false, true, nil)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("keysigner: load TPM key %q: %w", ref.Label, err)
-	}
-	defer key.Close()
-
-	// ES256 signs the SHA-256 digest of the JWS signing input.
-	digest := sha256.Sum256(signingInput)
-	der, err := key.Sign(nil, digest[:], crypto.SHA256)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("keysigner: TPM sign with key %q: %w", ref.Label, err)
-	}
-	// Both sks backends emit ASN.1 DER; JWS ES256 requires fixed-width r||s
-	// (RFC 7518 §3.4).
-	rs, err := ecdsaDERToJOSE(der, p256ByteLen)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, "", err
-	}
-	return rs, AlgES256, nil
-}
-
-// ProbeHardware reports on the TPM backing this signer without touching any key.
-// A failure to reach the TPM (no device, permission denied, not TPM 2.0) is
-// reported as Available=false with Reason set, NOT as a Go error — the probe
-// still succeeded in determining that the TEE is currently unusable.
-func (sksSigner) ProbeHardware(_ context.Context) (HardwareInfo, error) {
-	info := HardwareInfo{Backend: "tpm2"}
-	data, err := sks.GetSecureHardwareVendorData()
-	if err != nil {
-		info.Reason = cleanProbeError(err)
-		return info, nil
-	}
-	info.VendorName = data.VendorName
-	info.VendorInfo = data.VendorInfo
-	info.Available = data.IsTPM20CompliantDevice
-	if !info.Available {
-		info.Reason = "secure hardware is not a TPM 2.0 compliant device"
-	}
-	return info, nil
-}
-
-// ecdsaPublic asserts that an sks public key is an ECDSA key (it always is for
-// regular sks keys) so the caller gets the concrete type AlgForKey/PublicKeyJWK expect.
-func ecdsaPublic(label string, pub crypto.PublicKey) (*ecdsa.PublicKey, error) {
-	ecPub, ok := pub.(*ecdsa.PublicKey)
-	if !ok {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("keysigner: TPM key %q public is %T, want *ecdsa.PublicKey", label, pub)
-	}
-	return ecPub, nil
-}

internal/keysigner/signer_sks_test.go

@@ -1,122 +0,0 @@
-//go:build linux || (windows && amd64)
-
-// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
-
-package keysigner
-
-import (
-	"bytes"
-	"context"
-	"crypto/ecdsa"
-	"crypto/sha256"
-	"io"
-	"math/big"
-	"strings"
-	"testing"
-
-	"github.com/facebookincubator/flog"
-	"github.com/facebookincubator/sks"
-)
-
-// TestFlogSilenced verifies the mechanism init() relies on to keep sks's flog
-// TPM chatter off the CLI's stderr: SetOutput redirects flog, and io.Discard
-// drops it. Cleanup restores io.Discard so init()'s silencing holds for the
-// rest of the package's tests.
-func TestFlogSilenced(t *testing.T) {
-	var buf bytes.Buffer
-	flog.SetOutput(&buf)
-	t.Cleanup(func() { flog.SetOutput(io.Discard) })
-
-	flog.Info("captured-line")
-	if !strings.Contains(buf.String(), "captured-line") {
-		t.Fatalf("flog.SetOutput(buffer) did not capture output: %q", buf.String())
-	}
-
-	flog.SetOutput(io.Discard)
-	buf.Reset()
-	flog.Info("should-be-discarded")
-	if buf.Len() != 0 {
-		t.Errorf("flog output not discarded: %q", buf.String())
-	}
-}
-
-// requireTEE skips the test unless the TPM is present and usable. On a Linux
-// machine with a TPM but a restrictive device owner (`/dev/tpmrm0` is `tss:tss`
-// by default), grant access with `sudo usermod -aG tss $USER` then re-login, or
-// run the test under sudo.
-func requireTEE(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Helper()
-	info, err := sksSigner{}.ProbeHardware(context.Background())
-	if err != nil || !info.Available {
-		reason := info.Reason
-		if err != nil {
-			reason = err.Error()
-		}
-		t.Skipf("TEE not available (%s)", reason)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestSKSSignerRoundTrip exercises the full registration→assertion contract
-// against the real TPM: create the key, read it back without creating, derive
-// the JWS alg + JWK, sign, and verify the fixed-width r||s output.
-func TestSKSSignerRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
-	requireTEE(t)
-
-	var s sksSigner
-	ctx := context.Background()
-	ref := KeyRef{Label: "larksuite-cli-test"}
-
-	// Best-effort cleanup so the test key does not linger in the TPM-sealed store.
-	t.Cleanup(func() {
-		if k, err := sks.NewKey(ref.Label, keyTag, false, true, nil); err == nil {
-			_ = k.Remove()
-			_ = k.Close()
-		}
-	})
-
-	pub, err := s.EnsureKey(ctx, ref)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("EnsureKey: %v", err)
-	}
-	ecPub, ok := pub.(*ecdsa.PublicKey)
-	if !ok {
-		t.Fatalf("EnsureKey returned %T, want *ecdsa.PublicKey", pub)
-	}
-
-	// PublicKey (no-create) must return the same key bound at EnsureKey.
-	pub2, err := s.PublicKey(ctx, ref)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("PublicKey: %v", err)
-	}
-	if !ecPub.Equal(pub2) {
-		t.Fatal("PublicKey returned a different key than EnsureKey")
-	}
-
-	// The JWT layer derives alg + JWK from the public key; both must work.
-	if alg, err := AlgForKey(pub); err != nil || alg != AlgES256 {
-		t.Fatalf("AlgForKey = %q, %v; want ES256", alg, err)
-	}
-	if _, err := PublicKeyJWK(pub); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("PublicKeyJWK: %v", err)
-	}
-
-	// Sign a representative JWS signing input and verify the converted r||s.
-	input := []byte("eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiJ9.eyJzdWIiOiJjbGkifQ")
-	sig, alg, err := s.Sign(ctx, ref, input)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("Sign: %v", err)
-	}
-	if alg != AlgES256 {
-		t.Fatalf("Sign alg = %q, want ES256", alg)
-	}
-	if len(sig) != 2*p256ByteLen {
-		t.Fatalf("len(sig) = %d, want %d (fixed-width r||s)", len(sig), 2*p256ByteLen)
-	}
-	digest := sha256.Sum256(input)
-	r := new(big.Int).SetBytes(sig[:p256ByteLen])
-	ss := new(big.Int).SetBytes(sig[p256ByteLen:])
-	if !ecdsa.Verify(ecPub, digest[:], r, ss) {
-		t.Fatal("TPM signature did not verify against the public key")
-	}
-}

internal/qualitygate/config/README.md

@@ -45,6 +45,18 @@ Adding a new row requires approval from the matching CODEOWNERS or quality gate
 
 `legacy-commands.txt` only covers hand-authored legacy commands. Generated OpenAPI service commands are intentionally excluded from `command-manifest.json`; they are included in `command-index.json` only so command references can be checked against the real CLI surface.
 
+## Public Domain Allowlists
+
+`internal/qualitygate/config/allowlists/public-domains.txt` contains supported public hostnames approved for Go source. `fixture-domains.txt` contains test-only hostnames used by `*_test.go`, the repository-root `tests/` directory, or any `testdata/` directory; fixture entries do not apply to production Go files or `skills/`.
+
+Keep one lowercase exact hostname per line, sorted alphabetically. Wildcards, suffix rules, duplicates, schemes, ports, and paths are rejected; approving `larkoffice.com` does not approve its subdomains.
+
+RFC 2606 reserves the `.test`, `.example`, `.invalid`, and `.localhost` namespaces plus the exact names `example.com`, `example.net`, and `example.org`. These names are accepted without an allowlist entry and must not be listed.
+
+Every public entry needs a current non-fixture Go use, evidence that it is a supported public endpoint, and CODEOWNER approval. Other test-only hostnames belong in the fixture list. Tenant-specific, private-control-plane, and internal API hostnames are not eligible.
+
+`lint/domaincontract` validates both lists and scans complete Go files. In CI, unapproved-host findings are limited to values whose expressions intersect added lines; list validation and unused-entry checks remain repository-wide. See `lint/README.md` for scanner semantics.
+
 ## Semantic Blocker Policy
 
 The semantic reviewer can propose findings, but the local gatekeeper recomputes whether each finding is reproducible from `facts.json`. A finding blocks only when all of these are true:

internal/qualitygate/config/allowlists/fixture-domains.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+# Exact test-only hostnames. Keep sorted.
+abc.feishu.cn
+attacker.example.com
+bytedance.feishu.cn
+cdn.feishu.cn
+evil.example.com
+example.feishu.cn
+example.larkoffice.com
+example.larksuite.com
+feishu.cn
+feishu.doubao.com
+gateway.docker.internal
+host.containers.internal
+host.docker.internal
+host.lima.internal
+lf3-static.bytednsdoc.com
+meetings.feishu.cn
+meetings.larksuite.com
+p3-lark-file.byteimg.com
+passport.feishu.cn
+sample.feishu.cn
+x.feishu.cn
+xxx.feishu.cn
+xxx.larksuite.com

internal/qualitygate/config/allowlists/public-domains.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+# Exact public hostnames. Keep sorted.
+accounts.feishu.cn
+accounts.larksuite.com
+applink.feishu.cn
+applink.larksuite.com
+ark.ap-southeast.bytepluses.com
+github.com
+larkoffice.com
+lf-larkemail.bytetos.com
+mcp.feishu.cn
+mcp.larksuite.com
+open.feishu.cn
+open.larksuite.com
+registry.npmjs.org
+registry.npmmirror.com
+sf16-sg.tiktokcdn.com
+www.feishu.cn
+www.larksuite.com