feat/drive-permission-get-setting

Add a Drive shortcut for reading a folder's own public permission settings through the v2 permission endpoint. This gives agents a typed, folder-specific path when raw permission.public get does not accept folder targets, without turning folder permission checks into recursive governance scans.

Key features:

- Accept exactly one folder locator through --url or --folder-token and validate non-folder inputs before API calls

- Return permission_public unchanged so callers can reason from server-provided fields

- Register the shortcut and cover unit plus dry-run E2E behavior

- Document when to use +folder-permission-get in lark-drive permission workflows

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -2,22 +2,6 @@
 
 All notable changes to this project will be documented in this file.
 
-## [v1.0.65] - 2026-07-03
-
-### Features
-
-- **doc**: Add `+history-list`, `+history-revert`, and `+history-revert-status` shortcuts for document version history (#1612)
-
-### Bug Fixes
-
-- **minutes**: `+speaker-replace` no longer refetches the speaker list — `--from-speaker-id` is passed through as-is (#1731)
-
-### Documentation
-
-- **drive**: Document 30-char query limit for `+search` (#1560)
-- **doc**: Add mindnote guidance to lark-doc skill (#1581)
-- **doc**: Sync lark-doc skill content from online-doc (#1701)
-
 ## [v1.0.64] - 2026-07-02
 
 ### Features
@@ -1371,7 +1355,6 @@ Bundled AI agent skills for intelligent assistance:
 - Bilingual documentation (English & Chinese).
 - CI/CD pipelines: linting, testing, coverage reporting, and automated releases.
 
-[v1.0.65]: https://github.com/larksuite/cli/releases/tag/v1.0.65
 [v1.0.64]: https://github.com/larksuite/cli/releases/tag/v1.0.64
 [v1.0.62]: https://github.com/larksuite/cli/releases/tag/v1.0.62
 [v1.0.61]: https://github.com/larksuite/cli/releases/tag/v1.0.61

cmd/auth/status.go

@@ -27,9 +27,6 @@ func NewCmdAuthStatus(f *cmdutil.Factory, runF func(*StatusOptions) error) *cobr
 	cmd := &cobra.Command{
 		Use:   "status",
 		Short: "View current auth status",
-		Long: `Show OAuth user login, token validity, and granted scopes.
-For token-validity checks, run lark-cli auth status --json --verify.
-This is not profile/app selection diagnostics; use lark-cli whoami for the effective app/profile identity used by an invocation.`,
 		RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
 			if runF != nil {
 				return runF(opts)

cmd/auth/status_test.go

@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ package auth
 import (
 	"encoding/json"
 	"net/http"
-	"strings"
 	"testing"
 
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/cmdutil"
@@ -14,20 +13,6 @@ import (
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/httpmock"
 )
 
-func TestAuthStatusHelpDistinguishesFromWhoami(t *testing.T) {
-	cmd := NewCmdAuthStatus(nil, nil)
-	for _, want := range []string{
-		"OAuth user login",
-		"auth status --json --verify",
-		"not profile/app selection diagnostics",
-		"lark-cli whoami",
-	} {
-		if !strings.Contains(cmd.Long, want) {
-			t.Errorf("auth status --help Long missing %q; got:\n%s", want, cmd.Long)
-		}
-	}
-}
-
 func TestAuthStatusRun_SplitsBotAndUserIdentity(t *testing.T) {
 	f, stdout, _, _ := cmdutil.TestFactory(t, &core.CliConfig{
 		AppID: "test-app", AppSecret: "secret", Brand: core.BrandFeishu,

cmd/bootstrap.go

@@ -6,10 +6,8 @@ package cmd
 import (
 	"errors"
 	"io"
-	"os"
 
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/cmdutil"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/envvars"
 	"github.com/spf13/pflag"
 )
 
@@ -28,13 +26,5 @@ func BootstrapInvocationContext(args []string) (cmdutil.InvocationContext, error
 	if err := fs.Parse(args); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, pflag.ErrHelp) {
 		return cmdutil.InvocationContext{}, err
 	}
-
-	profileFromFlag := globals.Profile != ""
-	if !profileFromFlag {
-		globals.Profile = os.Getenv(envvars.CliProfile)
-	}
-	return cmdutil.InvocationContext{
-		Profile:         globals.Profile,
-		ProfileFromFlag: profileFromFlag,
-	}, nil
+	return cmdutil.InvocationContext{Profile: globals.Profile}, nil
 }

cmd/bootstrap_test.go

@@ -3,11 +3,7 @@
 
 package cmd
 
-import (
-	"testing"
-
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/envvars"
-)
+import "testing"
 
 func TestBootstrapInvocationContext_ProfileFlag(t *testing.T) {
 	inv, err := BootstrapInvocationContext([]string{"--profile", "target", "auth", "status"})
@@ -74,45 +70,3 @@ func TestBootstrapInvocationContext_HelpWithProfile(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("profile = %q, want %q", inv.Profile, "target")
 	}
 }
-
-func TestBootstrapProfileEnvFallback(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Run("flag wins over env", func(t *testing.T) {
-		t.Setenv(envvars.CliProfile, "tenant_env")
-		inv, err := BootstrapInvocationContext([]string{"--profile", "tenant_flag", "whoami"})
-		if err != nil {
-			t.Fatalf("unexpected err: %v", err)
-		}
-		if inv.Profile != "tenant_flag" {
-			t.Errorf("got %q, want tenant_flag", inv.Profile)
-		}
-		if !inv.ProfileFromFlag {
-			t.Errorf("ProfileFromFlag = false, want true")
-		}
-	})
-	t.Run("env used when flag absent", func(t *testing.T) {
-		t.Setenv(envvars.CliProfile, "tenant_env")
-		inv, err := BootstrapInvocationContext([]string{"whoami"})
-		if err != nil {
-			t.Fatalf("unexpected err: %v", err)
-		}
-		if inv.Profile != "tenant_env" {
-			t.Errorf("got %q, want tenant_env", inv.Profile)
-		}
-		if inv.ProfileFromFlag {
-			t.Errorf("ProfileFromFlag = true, want false")
-		}
-	})
-	t.Run("empty when neither set", func(t *testing.T) {
-		t.Setenv(envvars.CliProfile, "")
-		inv, err := BootstrapInvocationContext([]string{"whoami"})
-		if err != nil {
-			t.Fatalf("unexpected err: %v", err)
-		}
-		if inv.Profile != "" {
-			t.Errorf("got %q, want empty", inv.Profile)
-		}
-		if inv.ProfileFromFlag {
-			t.Errorf("ProfileFromFlag = true, want false")
-		}
-	})
-}

cmd/profile/profile.go

@@ -14,13 +14,6 @@ func NewCmdProfile(f *cmdutil.Factory) *cobra.Command {
 	cmd := &cobra.Command{
 		Use:   "profile",
 		Short: "Manage configuration profiles",
-		Long: `Profiles are named app identities managed by lark-cli.
-
-Profile selection:
-  --profile <name>             Use a profile for this command only.
-  LARKSUITE_CLI_PROFILE        Use a profile for the current shell / agent session.
-  lark-cli whoami --json       Show which identity is actually used.
-  unset LARKSUITE_CLI_PROFILE  Clear the session profile and fall back to direct app env or configured default.`,
 	}
 	cmdutil.DisableAuthCheck(cmd)
 	cmdutil.SetTips(cmd, []string{

cmd/profile/profile_test.go

@@ -627,19 +627,6 @@ func TestProfileRemoveRun_ValidationErrors(t *testing.T) {
 	})
 }
 
-// TestProfileHelpHasSelectionSection asserts `profile --help` documents the
-// per-invocation flag and session-scoped env var for selecting a profile, so
-// users and AI agents can find LARKSUITE_CLI_PROFILE without reading source.
-func TestProfileHelpHasSelectionSection(t *testing.T) {
-	cmd := NewCmdProfile(nil)
-	if !strings.Contains(cmd.Long, "Profile selection:") {
-		t.Errorf("profile --help missing Profile selection section")
-	}
-	if !strings.Contains(cmd.Long, "LARKSUITE_CLI_PROFILE") {
-		t.Errorf("profile --help missing LARKSUITE_CLI_PROFILE")
-	}
-}
-
 func TestProfileListRun_InvalidConfigReturnsValidationError(t *testing.T) {
 	dir := setupProfileConfigDir(t)
 	if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, "config.json"), []byte("{invalid json"), 0600); err != nil {

cmd/whoami/whoami.go

@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@ import (
 
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/cmdutil"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/credential"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/identitydiag"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/output"
 )
@@ -34,15 +33,6 @@ type whoamiResult struct {
 	TokenStatus    string         `json:"tokenStatus"`
 	OnBehalfOf     *delegatedUser `json:"onBehalfOf,omitempty"`
 	Hint           string         `json:"hint,omitempty"`
-
-	// CredentialSource, Explicit, and DirectCredentialEnv surface the cached
-	// credential.IdentitySelection computed during resolution (not re-inferred
-	// here). CredentialSource can be empty ("") on the non-env
-	// extension-provider path (e.g. sidecar mode), where no selection kind
-	// applies; this is a documented, valid state, not an error.
-	CredentialSource    string                         `json:"credentialSource"`
-	Explicit            bool                           `json:"explicit"`
-	DirectCredentialEnv credential.DirectCredentialEnv `json:"directCredentialEnv"`
 }
 
 // delegatedUser is the user a user-identity acts on behalf of.
@@ -68,10 +58,6 @@ func NewCmdWhoami(f *cmdutil.Factory) *cobra.Command {
 	cmd := &cobra.Command{
 		Use:   "whoami",
 		Short: "Show the current effective identity, app, profile, and token status (JSON)",
-		Long: `Show the effective app identity used by this invocation. This is not OAuth login status;
-use ` + "`lark-cli auth status --json`" + ` for OAuth user/token state.
-The JSON output includes credentialSource, appId, brand, and whether direct app credential
-env is present and matches the selected profile.`,
 		RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
 			return whoamiRun(cmd, opts)
 		},
@@ -111,17 +97,7 @@ func whoamiRun(cmd *cobra.Command, opts *Options) error {
 		f.ResolveStrictMode(ctx).ForcedIdentity(),
 	)
 	diag := identitydiag.Diagnose(ctx, f, cfg, false)
-	// Read the cached selection computed during resolution; never re-infer it
-	// here. A resolution failure (e.g. under a non-env extension provider that
-	// doesn't populate a selection) degrades to the zero value rather than
-	// regressing whoami's own error/diagnostic path above.
-	var selection credential.IdentitySelection
-	if f.Credential != nil {
-		if sel, err := f.Credential.Selection(ctx); err == nil {
-			selection = sel
-		}
-	}
-	res := buildResult(cfg, as, source, diag, selection)
+	res := buildResult(cfg, as, source, diag)
 	output.PrintJson(f.IOStreams.Out, res)
 	return nil
 }
@@ -146,23 +122,18 @@ func resolveSource(changedAs bool, flagAs core.Identity, autoDetected bool, stri
 
 // buildResult maps the resolved identity and local diagnostics into the output.
 // ResolveAs only ever returns user or bot, so the default branch handles user.
-// selection is the cached credential.IdentitySelection from resolution; it is
-// read as-is, never recomputed.
-func buildResult(cfg *core.CliConfig, as core.Identity, source string, diag identitydiag.Result, selection credential.IdentitySelection) *whoamiResult {
+func buildResult(cfg *core.CliConfig, as core.Identity, source string, diag identitydiag.Result) *whoamiResult {
 	defaultAs := cfg.DefaultAs
 	if defaultAs == "" {
 		defaultAs = core.AsAuto
 	}
 	res := &whoamiResult{
-		Profile:             cfg.ProfileName,
-		AppID:               cfg.AppID,
-		Brand:               cfg.Brand,
-		DefaultAs:           string(defaultAs),
-		Identity:            string(as),
-		IdentitySource:      source,
-		CredentialSource:    string(selection.Source),
-		Explicit:            selection.Explicit(),
-		DirectCredentialEnv: selection.DirectCredentialEnv,
+		Profile:        cfg.ProfileName,
+		AppID:          cfg.AppID,
+		Brand:          cfg.Brand,
+		DefaultAs:      string(defaultAs),
+		Identity:       string(as),
+		IdentitySource: source,
 	}
 	// Use the diagnosed hint as-is: it is tailored to the credential source, so
 	// it never says "auth login" when that is blocked under an external provider.

cmd/whoami/whoami_test.go

@@ -15,13 +15,10 @@ import (
 
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/errs"
 	extcred "github.com/larksuite/cli/extension/credential"
-	envprovider "github.com/larksuite/cli/extension/credential/env"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/cmdutil"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/credential"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/envvars"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/identitydiag"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/keychain"
 )
 
 func TestResolveSource(t *testing.T) {
@@ -55,7 +52,7 @@ func TestBuildResult_UserValid(t *testing.T) {
 	diag := identitydiag.Result{
 		User: identitydiag.Identity{Available: true, Status: "ready", TokenStatus: "valid", OpenID: "ou_x", UserName: "Alice"},
 	}
-	r := buildResult(cfg, core.AsUser, "auto_detect", diag, credential.IdentitySelection{})
+	r := buildResult(cfg, core.AsUser, "auto_detect", diag)
 
 	if r.Identity != "user" || r.IdentitySource != "auto_detect" {
 		t.Fatalf("identity/source = %q/%q", r.Identity, r.IdentitySource)
@@ -80,7 +77,7 @@ func TestBuildResult_UserMissingToken(t *testing.T) {
 	diag := identitydiag.Result{
 		User: identitydiag.Identity{Available: false, Status: "missing", Hint: "run: lark-cli auth login --help"}, // never logged in
 	}
-	r := buildResult(cfg, core.AsUser, "auto_detect", diag, credential.IdentitySelection{})
+	r := buildResult(cfg, core.AsUser, "auto_detect", diag)
 
 	if r.Available {
 		t.Fatalf("available = true, want false")
@@ -103,7 +100,7 @@ func TestBuildResult_BotReady(t *testing.T) {
 	diag := identitydiag.Result{
 		Bot: identitydiag.Identity{Available: true, Status: "ready"},
 	}
-	r := buildResult(cfg, core.AsBot, "default_as", diag, credential.IdentitySelection{})
+	r := buildResult(cfg, core.AsBot, "default_as", diag)
 
 	if r.Identity != "bot" || r.IdentitySource != "default_as" {
 		t.Fatalf("identity/source = %q/%q", r.Identity, r.IdentitySource)
@@ -124,7 +121,7 @@ func TestBuildResult_BotNotConfigured(t *testing.T) {
 	diag := identitydiag.Result{
 		Bot: identitydiag.Identity{Available: false, Status: "not_configured", Hint: "run: lark-cli config --help"},
 	}
-	r := buildResult(cfg, core.AsBot, "auto_detect", diag, credential.IdentitySelection{})
+	r := buildResult(cfg, core.AsBot, "auto_detect", diag)
 
 	if r.Available {
 		t.Fatalf("available = true, want false")
@@ -321,94 +318,3 @@ func TestWhoami_ExternalProvider_UserHintNotKeychain(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("hint should explain external management: %q", got.Hint)
 	}
 }
-
-// noopWhoamiKeychain is a no-op KeychainAccess; the profile below uses a
-// plaintext secret, so no keychain lookup is actually required.
-type noopWhoamiKeychain struct{}
-
-func (noopWhoamiKeychain) Get(service, account string) (string, error) { return "", nil }
-func (noopWhoamiKeychain) Set(service, account, value string) error    { return nil }
-func (noopWhoamiKeychain) Remove(service, account string) error        { return nil }
-
-// credentialSourceSecret is the profile secret written to config for
-// TestWhoamiIncludesCredentialSource. It must never leak into whoami's output
-// (security §5.1).
-const credentialSourceSecret = "test-secret"
-
-// profileSelectionFactory builds a Factory whose CredentialProvider resolves
-// an explicit profile ("tenant_a") supplied via the LARKSUITE_CLI_PROFILE env
-// fallback (not --profile), so Selection().Source resolves to
-// env:LARKSUITE_CLI_PROFILE and Explicit() is true, with no direct
-// app-credential env vars present.
-func profileSelectionFactory(t *testing.T) (*cmdutil.Factory, *bytes.Buffer) {
-	t.Helper()
-	t.Setenv(envvars.CliAppID, "")
-	t.Setenv(envvars.CliAppSecret, "")
-	t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
-
-	multi := &core.MultiAppConfig{
-		CurrentApp: "tenant_a",
-		Apps: []core.AppConfig{{
-			Name:      "tenant_a",
-			AppId:     "cli_a",
-			AppSecret: core.PlainSecret(credentialSourceSecret),
-			Brand:     core.BrandFeishu,
-		}},
-	}
-	if err := core.SaveMultiAppConfig(multi); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("SaveMultiAppConfig: %v", err)
-	}
-
-	defaultAcct := credential.NewDefaultAccountProvider(func() keychain.KeychainAccess { return noopWhoamiKeychain{} }, "tenant_a")
-	cred := credential.NewCredentialProvider([]extcred.Provider{&envprovider.Provider{}}, defaultAcct, nil, nil)
-	cred.WithProfile("tenant_a", false) // fromFlag=false -> env:LARKSUITE_CLI_PROFILE
-
-	cfg := &core.CliConfig{ProfileName: "tenant_a", AppID: "cli_a", AppSecret: credentialSourceSecret, Brand: core.BrandFeishu}
-	out := &bytes.Buffer{}
-	f := &cmdutil.Factory{
-		Config:     func() (*core.CliConfig, error) { return cfg, nil },
-		Credential: cred,
-		IOStreams:  &cmdutil.IOStreams{Out: out, ErrOut: &bytes.Buffer{}},
-	}
-	return f, out
-}
-
-// TestWhoamiIncludesCredentialSource locks in the diagnostic fields surfaced
-// from the cached credential.IdentitySelection (Task 6): credentialSource,
-// explicit, and directCredentialEnv. whoami must read the cached selection
-// as-is, not re-infer it.
-func TestWhoamiIncludesCredentialSource(t *testing.T) {
-	f, out := profileSelectionFactory(t)
-
-	cmd := NewCmdWhoami(f)
-	cmd.SetArgs([]string{})
-	if err := cmd.Execute(); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("Execute() error = %v", err)
-	}
-
-	raw := out.String()
-	if strings.Contains(raw, credentialSourceSecret) {
-		t.Fatalf("whoami output leaked the profile secret: %s", raw)
-	}
-
-	var got whoamiResult
-	if err := json.Unmarshal(out.Bytes(), &got); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("json.Unmarshal() error = %v\n%s", err, raw)
-	}
-	if got.CredentialSource != string(credential.SourceEnvProfile) {
-		t.Fatalf("credentialSource = %q, want %q", got.CredentialSource, credential.SourceEnvProfile)
-	}
-	if !got.Explicit {
-		t.Fatalf("explicit = false, want true")
-	}
-	if got.DirectCredentialEnv.Present {
-		t.Fatalf("directCredentialEnv.present = true, want false: %#v", got.DirectCredentialEnv)
-	}
-	if !strings.Contains(raw, `"credentialSource": "env:LARKSUITE_CLI_PROFILE"`) {
-		t.Fatalf("raw JSON missing credentialSource literal: %s", raw)
-	}
-	if got.DirectCredentialEnv.Present || len(got.DirectCredentialEnv.Keys) != 0 ||
-		got.DirectCredentialEnv.AppID != "" || got.DirectCredentialEnv.Matched || got.DirectCredentialEnv.ConflictsWithProfile {
-		t.Fatalf("directCredentialEnv = %#v, want only present:false set", got.DirectCredentialEnv)
-	}
-}

errs/marshal_test.go

@@ -136,77 +136,6 @@ func TestConfigError_MarshalJSON(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-func TestConfigError_ProfileFieldsMarshalJSON(t *testing.T) {
-	ce := NewConfigError(SubtypeAppCredentialIncomplete, "incomplete").
-		WithMissingKeys("LARKSUITE_CLI_APP_ID", "LARKSUITE_CLI_APP_SECRET").
-		WithProfile("work").
-		WithAppID("cli_abc").
-		WithCredentialSource("flag:--profile")
-	b, err := json.Marshal(ce)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	s := string(b)
-	for _, want := range []string{
-		`"type":"config"`,
-		`"subtype":"app_credential_incomplete"`,
-		`"missing_keys":["LARKSUITE_CLI_APP_ID","LARKSUITE_CLI_APP_SECRET"]`,
-		`"profile":"work"`,
-		`"app_id":"cli_abc"`,
-		`"credential_source":"flag:--profile"`,
-	} {
-		if !strings.Contains(s, want) {
-			t.Errorf("missing %q in %s", want, s)
-		}
-	}
-
-	// omitempty: unset fields must not appear on the wire.
-	empty := NewConfigError(SubtypeProfileNotFound, "x")
-	b2, err := json.Marshal(empty)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	s2 := string(b2)
-	for _, notWant := range []string{`"missing_keys"`, `"profile"`, `"app_id"`, `"credential_source"`} {
-		if strings.Contains(s2, notWant) {
-			t.Errorf("%q should be omitted when empty; got %s", notWant, s2)
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-func TestValidationError_ProfileConflictMarshalJSON(t *testing.T) {
-	ve := NewValidationError(SubtypeProfileAppCredentialConflict, "conflict").
-		WithProfileAppConflict("cli_profile", "cli_env")
-	b, err := json.Marshal(ve)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	s := string(b)
-	for _, want := range []string{
-		`"type":"validation"`,
-		`"subtype":"profile_app_credential_conflict"`,
-		`"profile_app_id":"cli_profile"`,
-		`"env_app_id":"cli_env"`,
-	} {
-		if !strings.Contains(s, want) {
-			t.Errorf("missing %q in %s", want, s)
-		}
-	}
-
-	// omitempty: unset conflict fields must not appear on the wire.
-	empty := NewValidationError(SubtypeInvalidArgument, "x")
-	b2, err := json.Marshal(empty)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	s2 := string(b2)
-	for _, notWant := range []string{`"profile_app_id"`, `"env_app_id"`} {
-		if strings.Contains(s2, notWant) {
-			t.Errorf("%q should be omitted when empty; got %s", notWant, s2)
-		}
-	}
-}
-
 func TestNetworkError_MarshalJSON(t *testing.T) {
 	ne := &NetworkError{
 		Problem: Problem{Category: CategoryNetwork, Subtype: SubtypeNetworkTimeout, Message: "dial timeout"},

errs/subtypes.go

@@ -12,9 +12,8 @@ const (
 
 // CategoryValidation subtypes
 const (
-	SubtypeInvalidArgument              Subtype = "invalid_argument"                // user-supplied flag / arg failed validation (gRPC INVALID_ARGUMENT alignment)
-	SubtypeFailedPrecondition           Subtype = "failed_precondition"             // request is valid but the system/resource state is not in the state required to execute; caller must change state (not retry) — e.g. ambiguous remote mapping (gRPC FAILED_PRECONDITION alignment)
-	SubtypeProfileAppCredentialConflict Subtype = "profile_app_credential_conflict" // profile and direct app env both set but app_id differs
+	SubtypeInvalidArgument    Subtype = "invalid_argument"    // user-supplied flag / arg failed validation (gRPC INVALID_ARGUMENT alignment)
+	SubtypeFailedPrecondition Subtype = "failed_precondition" // request is valid but the system/resource state is not in the state required to execute; caller must change state (not retry) — e.g. ambiguous remote mapping (gRPC FAILED_PRECONDITION alignment)
 )
 
 // CategoryAuthentication subtypes
@@ -42,13 +41,9 @@ const (
 
 // CategoryConfig subtypes
 const (
-	SubtypeInvalidClient           Subtype = "invalid_client"            // app_id / app_secret incorrect (RFC 6749 §5.2 alignment)
-	SubtypeNotConfigured           Subtype = "not_configured"            // local config file absent (user has not run `config init`)
-	SubtypeInvalidConfig           Subtype = "invalid_config"            // local config file present but malformed
-	SubtypeProfileNotFound         Subtype = "profile_not_found"         // --profile / LARKSUITE_CLI_PROFILE points to a nonexistent profile
-	SubtypeNoActiveProfile         Subtype = "no_active_profile"         // no active identity input and no usable default profile
-	SubtypeAppCredentialIncomplete Subtype = "app_credential_incomplete" // direct app env missing app_id or app_secret
-	SubtypeProfileSecretInvalid    Subtype = "profile_secret_invalid"    // profile exists but its secret cannot be resolved locally
+	SubtypeInvalidClient Subtype = "invalid_client" // app_id / app_secret incorrect (RFC 6749 §5.2 alignment)
+	SubtypeNotConfigured Subtype = "not_configured" // local config file absent (user has not run `config init`)
+	SubtypeInvalidConfig Subtype = "invalid_config" // local config file present but malformed
 )
 
 // CategoryNetwork subtypes

errs/types.go

@@ -61,11 +61,9 @@ type TypedError interface {
 // it is intentionally not serialized.
 type ValidationError struct {
 	Problem
-	Param        string         `json:"param,omitempty"`
-	Params       []InvalidParam `json:"params,omitempty"`
-	ProfileAppID string         `json:"profile_app_id,omitempty"`
-	EnvAppID     string         `json:"env_app_id,omitempty"`
-	Cause        error          `json:"-"`
+	Param  string         `json:"param,omitempty"`
+	Params []InvalidParam `json:"params,omitempty"`
+	Cause  error          `json:"-"`
 }
 
 // InvalidParam is one structured validation diagnostic: the parameter that
@@ -152,12 +150,6 @@ func (e *ValidationError) WithCause(cause error) *ValidationError {
 	return e
 }
 
-func (e *ValidationError) WithProfileAppConflict(profileAppID, envAppID string) *ValidationError {
-	e.ProfileAppID = profileAppID
-	e.EnvAppID = envAppID
-	return e
-}
-
 // =========================== AuthenticationError =============================
 
 // AuthenticationError is the typed error for CategoryAuthentication.
@@ -323,17 +315,8 @@ func (e *PermissionError) WithCause(cause error) *PermissionError {
 // intentionally not serialized.
 type ConfigError struct {
 	Problem
-	Field       string   `json:"field,omitempty"`
-	MissingKeys []string `json:"missing_keys,omitempty"`
-	Profile     string   `json:"profile,omitempty"`
-	AppID       string   `json:"app_id,omitempty"`
-	// CredentialSource is the machine-readable App/credential selection source
-	// that produced this config error (e.g. "flag:--profile",
-	// "env:LARKSUITE_CLI_PROFILE", "config"). It is required on
-	// profile_not_found and no_active_profile (spec §5) so an agent can branch
-	// on how the identity was (or was not) chosen. It is never a secret.
-	CredentialSource string `json:"credential_source,omitempty"`
-	Cause            error  `json:"-"`
+	Field string `json:"field,omitempty"`
+	Cause error  `json:"-"`
 }
 
 // Unwrap is nil-receiver safe; see ValidationError.Unwrap.
@@ -387,29 +370,6 @@ func (e *ConfigError) WithField(field string) *ConfigError {
 	return e
 }
 
-func (e *ConfigError) WithMissingKeys(keys ...string) *ConfigError {
-	e.MissingKeys = slices.Clone(keys)
-	return e
-}
-
-func (e *ConfigError) WithProfile(name string) *ConfigError {
-	e.Profile = name
-	return e
-}
-
-func (e *ConfigError) WithAppID(appID string) *ConfigError {
-	e.AppID = appID
-	return e
-}
-
-// WithCredentialSource records the machine-readable credential-selection source
-// on the wire (snake_case credential_source). The value is an enum string
-// (e.g. "flag:--profile", "config"), never a secret.
-func (e *ConfigError) WithCredentialSource(source string) *ConfigError {
-	e.CredentialSource = source
-	return e
-}
-
 func (e *ConfigError) WithCause(cause error) *ConfigError {
 	e.Cause = cause
 	return e

errs/types_test.go

@@ -643,29 +643,3 @@ func TestBuilderSetter_DefensiveCopy(t *testing.T) {
 		}
 	})
 }
-
-// ======================= Profile selection error subtypes =======================
-
-func TestConfigErrorProfileFields(t *testing.T) {
-	e := errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeAppCredentialIncomplete, "incomplete").
-		WithMissingKeys("LARKSUITE_CLI_APP_ID").
-		WithCredentialSource("env:LARKSUITE_CLI_PROFILE")
-	p, ok := errs.ProblemOf(e)
-	if !ok || p.Subtype != errs.SubtypeAppCredentialIncomplete {
-		t.Fatalf("subtype mismatch: %+v", p)
-	}
-	if len(e.MissingKeys) != 1 || e.MissingKeys[0] != "LARKSUITE_CLI_APP_ID" {
-		t.Errorf("missing_keys not set: %v", e.MissingKeys)
-	}
-	if e.CredentialSource != "env:LARKSUITE_CLI_PROFILE" {
-		t.Errorf("credential_source not set: %q", e.CredentialSource)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestValidationErrorProfileConflict(t *testing.T) {
-	e := errs.NewValidationError(errs.SubtypeProfileAppCredentialConflict, "conflict").
-		WithProfileAppConflict("cli_profile", "cli_env")
-	if e.ProfileAppID != "cli_profile" || e.EnvAppID != "cli_env" {
-		t.Errorf("conflict fields not set: %q %q", e.ProfileAppID, e.EnvAppID)
-	}
-}

internal/cmdutil/factory.go

@@ -27,11 +27,6 @@ import (
 // In tests, replace any field to stub out external dependencies.
 type InvocationContext struct {
 	Profile string
-	// ProfileFromFlag is true when Profile was set via the --profile flag,
-	// and false when it came from the LARKSUITE_CLI_PROFILE env fallback
-	// (or neither was set). Downstream credential resolution uses this to
-	// report the correct profile source.
-	ProfileFromFlag bool
 }
 
 type Factory struct {

internal/cmdutil/factory_default.go

@@ -61,11 +61,10 @@ func NewDefault(streams *IOStreams, inv InvocationContext) *Factory {
 	// Phase 2: Credential (sole data source)
 	// Keychain is read via closure so callers can replace f.Keychain after construction.
 	f.Credential = buildCredentialProvider(credentialDeps{
-		Keychain:        func() keychain.KeychainAccess { return f.Keychain },
-		Profile:         inv.Profile,
-		ProfileFromFlag: inv.ProfileFromFlag,
-		HttpClient:      f.HttpClient,
-		ErrOut:          f.IOStreams.ErrOut,
+		Keychain:   func() keychain.KeychainAccess { return f.Keychain },
+		Profile:    inv.Profile,
+		HttpClient: f.HttpClient,
+		ErrOut:     f.IOStreams.ErrOut,
 	})
 
 	// Phase 3: Config derived from Credential via an explicit conversion boundary.
@@ -163,11 +162,10 @@ func buildSDKTransport() http.RoundTripper {
 }
 
 type credentialDeps struct {
-	Keychain        func() keychain.KeychainAccess
-	Profile         string
-	ProfileFromFlag bool
-	HttpClient      func() (*http.Client, error)
-	ErrOut          io.Writer
+	Keychain   func() keychain.KeychainAccess
+	Profile    string
+	HttpClient func() (*http.Client, error)
+	ErrOut     io.Writer
 }
 
 func buildCredentialProvider(deps credentialDeps) *credential.CredentialProvider {
@@ -180,6 +178,5 @@ func buildCredentialProvider(deps credentialDeps) *credential.CredentialProvider
 	// depend on. enrichUserInfo failures are already non-fatal (the
 	// provider clears unverified identity fields), so silencing the
 	// warning is safe.
-	return credential.NewCredentialProvider(providers, defaultAcct, defaultToken, deps.HttpClient).
-		WithProfile(deps.Profile, deps.ProfileFromFlag)
+	return credential.NewCredentialProvider(providers, defaultAcct, defaultToken, deps.HttpClient)
 }

internal/credential/credential_provider.go

@@ -9,21 +9,13 @@ import (
 	"fmt"
 	"io"
 	"net/http"
-	"os"
 	"sync"
 
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/errs"
 	extcred "github.com/larksuite/cli/extension/credential"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/auth"
 	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/envvars"
 )
 
-// directCredentialProviderName is the Name() of the env provider, the source
-// of direct app credentials (LARKSUITE_CLI_APP_ID / _APP_SECRET). Only its
-// incomplete blocks map to app_credential_incomplete (spec §3 step 1).
-const directCredentialProviderName = "env"
-
 // DefaultAccountResolver is implemented by the default account provider.
 type DefaultAccountResolver interface {
 	ResolveAccount(ctx context.Context) (*Account, error)
@@ -144,18 +136,10 @@ type CredentialProvider struct {
 	httpClient   func() (*http.Client, error)
 	warnOut      io.Writer
 
-	// profile is the active profile (from --profile or LARKSUITE_CLI_PROFILE).
-	// profileFromFlag discriminates the source for the reported selection.
-	profile         string
-	profileFromFlag bool
-
 	accountOnce    sync.Once
 	account        *Account
 	accountErr     error
 	selectedSource credentialSource
-	// selection is the explainable credential-selection result, populated by
-	// doResolveAccount under accountOnce. It never carries a secret (§5.1).
-	selection IdentitySelection
 
 	hintOnce sync.Once
 	hint     *IdentityHint
@@ -177,15 +161,6 @@ func (p *CredentialProvider) SetWarnOut(warnOut io.Writer) *CredentialProvider {
 	return p
 }
 
-// WithProfile records the active profile and whether it came from the
-// --profile flag (as opposed to the LARKSUITE_CLI_PROFILE env fallback).
-// It governs credential arbitration and the reported selection source.
-func (p *CredentialProvider) WithProfile(profile string, fromFlag bool) *CredentialProvider {
-	p.profile = profile
-	p.profileFromFlag = fromFlag
-	return p
-}
-
 // ResolveAccount resolves app credentials. Result is cached after first call.
 // NOTE: Uses sync.Once — only the context from the first call is used for resolution.
 // Subsequent calls return the cached result regardless of their context.
@@ -197,273 +172,40 @@ func (p *CredentialProvider) ResolveAccount(ctx context.Context) (*Account, erro
 	return p.account, p.accountErr
 }
 
-// doResolveAccount arbitrates the credential/App selection per the spec
-// resolution order (§3): env-partial → profile → env-complete → config default.
-// It populates p.selection (no secret; §5.1) and p.selectedSource on every
-// success path.
 func (p *CredentialProvider) doResolveAccount(ctx context.Context) (*Account, error) {
-	// Step 1 (spec §3): consult the extension providers. The env provider is
-	// the "direct app credential" source. An incomplete direct credential
-	// (only APP_ID or only APP_SECRET set) short-circuits to
-	// app_credential_incomplete regardless of the active profile.
-	var envAcct *Account
-	var envSource extensionTokenSource
 	for _, prov := range p.providers {
 		acct, err := prov.ResolveAccount(ctx)
 		if err != nil {
-			var blockErr *extcred.BlockError
-			// Only the env (direct-credential) provider maps an incomplete
-			// block to app_credential_incomplete. Other providers' blocks
-			// propagate unchanged so they still stop the chain (§3 step 1
-			// is specifically about direct app credential env vars).
-			if errors.As(err, &blockErr) && prov.Name() == directCredentialProviderName {
-				if missing := missingDirectCredentialKeys(); len(missing) > 0 {
-					return nil, errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeAppCredentialIncomplete,
-						"direct app credential is incomplete").
-						WithMissingKeys(missing...).
-						WithHint("set both %s and %s, or unset both and use --profile / a config default.",
-							envvars.CliAppID, envvars.CliAppSecret)
-				}
-				// Block for a reason other than incompleteness (e.g. an
-				// invalid identity/strict-mode value); preserve prior behavior.
-				return nil, err
-			}
 			return nil, err
 		}
 		if acct != nil {
-			// Only the env (direct-credential) provider feeds profile
-			// arbitration / conflict detection / DirectCredentialEnv reporting.
-			// This mirrors the block-path guard above. A non-env extension
-			// provider (e.g. sidecar) is NOT a direct-credential env account:
-			// it wins outright here, returning its account + token source
-			// unchanged (pre-diff behavior), without being misreported as a
-			// direct env credential (§4.2: Present = direct env vars actually
-			// set) or triggering a spurious profile_app_credential_conflict.
-			if prov.Name() != directCredentialProviderName {
-				internal := convertAccount(acct)
-				source := extensionTokenSource{provider: prov}
-				if err := p.enrichUserInfo(ctx, internal, source); err != nil {
-					if p.warnOut != nil {
-						_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(p.warnOut, "warning: unable to verify user identity from credential source %q: %v\n", source.Name(), err)
-					}
-					// enrichUserInfo failure is non-fatal: SupportedIdentities
-					// (used for strict mode) is already set by the provider.
-					// Clear unverified user identity for safety.
-					internal.UserOpenId = ""
-					internal.UserName = ""
+			internal := convertAccount(acct)
+			source := extensionTokenSource{provider: prov}
+			if err := p.enrichUserInfo(ctx, internal, source); err != nil {
+				if p.warnOut != nil {
+					_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(p.warnOut, "warning: unable to verify user identity from credential source %q: %v\n", source.Name(), err)
 				}
-				p.selectedSource = source
-				return internal, nil
+				// enrichUserInfo failure is non-fatal: SupportedIdentities
+				// (used for strict mode) is already set by the provider.
+				// Clear unverified user identity for safety.
+				internal.UserOpenId = ""
+				internal.UserName = ""
 			}
-			envAcct = convertAccount(acct)
-			envSource = extensionTokenSource{provider: prov}
-			break
+			p.selectedSource = source
+			return internal, nil
 		}
 	}
-
-	// Step 2 (spec §3): an explicit profile was requested.
-	if p.profile != "" {
-		multi, loadErr := core.LoadMultiAppConfig()
-		if errors.Is(loadErr, core.ErrMalformedConfig) {
-			// A malformed config must not be masked as profile_not_found (which
-			// would tell the user to run `profile list` and hide a real config
-			// problem). Pass the underlying error through unchanged so
-			// errors.Is / errors.Unwrap keep working. An absent config is not
-			// malformed and still falls through to the friendly
-			// profile_not_found below, since the requested profile cannot exist.
-			return nil, loadErr
-		}
-		var app *core.AppConfig
-		if loadErr == nil && multi != nil {
-			app = multi.FindApp(p.profile)
-		}
-		if app == nil {
-			return nil, errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeProfileNotFound,
-				"profile %q not found", p.profile).
-				WithProfile(p.profile).
-				WithCredentialSource(string(p.profileSource())).
-				WithHint("run `lark-cli profile list` to see available profiles.")
-		}
-		if envAcct != nil {
-			// E == complete: the direct env app_id must match the profile.
-			if app.AppId != envAcct.AppID {
-				return nil, errs.NewValidationError(errs.SubtypeProfileAppCredentialConflict,
-					"profile %q app_id does not match %s", p.profile, envvars.CliAppID).
-					WithProfileAppConflict(app.AppId, envAcct.AppID).
-					WithHint("unset %s/%s, or select a profile whose app_id matches the environment.",
-						envvars.CliAppID, envvars.CliAppSecret)
-			}
-			p.selection = IdentitySelection{
-				Source: p.profileSource(),
-				DirectCredentialEnv: DirectCredentialEnv{
-					Present: true,
-					Keys:    presentDirectCredentialKeys(),
-					AppID:   envAcct.AppID,
-					Matched: true,
-				},
-			}
-		} else {
-			p.selection = IdentitySelection{
-				Source:              p.profileSource(),
-				DirectCredentialEnv: DirectCredentialEnv{Present: false},
-			}
-		}
-		// Resolve the profile's own (keychain-backed) credential locally.
-		acct, err := p.defaultAcct.ResolveAccount(ctx)
-		if err != nil {
-			// SECURITY (§5.1): generic message — never embed the underlying
-			// error or any secret material.
-			p.selection = IdentitySelection{}
-			return nil, errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeProfileSecretInvalid,
-				"profile %q credential could not be resolved locally", p.profile).
-				WithProfile(p.profile).
-				WithAppID(app.AppId).
-				WithHint("verify the profile's app secret or re-add the profile with `lark-cli config`.")
-		}
-		p.selectedSource = defaultTokenSource{resolver: p.defaultToken}
-		return acct, nil
-	}
-
-	// Step 3 (spec §3): no explicit profile — direct env credential wins.
-	if envAcct != nil {
-		if err := p.enrichUserInfo(ctx, envAcct, envSource); err != nil {
-			if p.warnOut != nil {
-				_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(p.warnOut, "warning: unable to verify user identity from credential source %q: %v\n", envSource.Name(), err)
-			}
-			// enrichUserInfo failure is non-fatal: SupportedIdentities
-			// (used for strict mode) is already set by the provider.
-			// Clear unverified user identity for safety.
-			envAcct.UserOpenId = ""
-			envAcct.UserName = ""
-		}
-		p.selectedSource = envSource
-		p.selection = IdentitySelection{
-			Source: SourceEnvAppID,
-			DirectCredentialEnv: DirectCredentialEnv{
-				Present: true,
-				Keys:    presentDirectCredentialKeys(),
-				AppID:   envAcct.AppID,
-			},
-		}
-		return envAcct, nil
-	}
-
-	// No direct env credential and no profile → the config default.
 	if p.defaultAcct != nil {
 		acct, err := p.defaultAcct.ResolveAccount(ctx)
 		if err != nil {
-			// The config default failed to resolve. Distinguish (spec §3 step
-			// 3.2): a default profile that EXISTS (has an app_id) but whose
-			// secret cannot be resolved locally is a profile_secret_invalid —
-			// "identity is configured, its secret is broken" is more actionable
-			// than "no active profile". Only when there is genuinely no usable
-			// default profile do we report no_active_profile. Other typed
-			// failures (e.g. a specific config error) pass through unchanged.
-			if prob, ok := errs.ProblemOf(err); ok && prob.Subtype == errs.SubtypeNotConfigured {
-				if name, appID, ok := defaultProfileIdentity(); ok {
-					// SECURITY (§5.1): generic message — never embed the
-					// underlying error or any secret material. app_id is
-					// plaintext and safe to echo.
-					return nil, errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeProfileSecretInvalid,
-						"profile %q credential could not be resolved locally", name).
-						WithProfile(name).
-						WithAppID(appID).
-						WithHint("verify the profile's app secret or re-add the profile with `lark-cli config`.")
-				}
-				return nil, errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeNoActiveProfile, "no active profile").
-					WithCredentialSource(noActiveProfileCredentialSource).
-					WithHint("run `lark-cli config init` / `lark-cli profile add`, or set %s.", envvars.CliProfile)
-			}
 			return nil, err
 		}
-		multi, _ := core.LoadMultiAppConfig()
 		p.selectedSource = defaultTokenSource{resolver: p.defaultToken}
-		p.selection = IdentitySelection{Source: selectionSourceForDefault(multi)}
 		return acct, nil
 	}
 	return nil, core.NotConfiguredError()
 }
 
-// profileSource reports the credential source kind for a profile-backed
-// selection, discriminating the --profile flag from the env fallback.
-func (p *CredentialProvider) profileSource() CredentialSourceKind {
-	if p.profileFromFlag {
-		return SourceFlagProfile
-	}
-	return SourceEnvProfile
-}
-
-// noActiveProfileCredentialSource is the credential_source reported on the
-// no_active_profile error. Spec §5 fixes this to the literal "config": there is
-// no resolved default profile at all, so the more specific config:currentApp /
-// config:firstApp source values (used on successful config-default selections)
-// would be misleading. It is an enum string, never a secret.
-const noActiveProfileCredentialSource = "config"
-
-// defaultProfileIdentity reports the config default profile's display name and
-// app_id when a usable default profile actually EXISTS (currentApp > firstApp
-// resolves to an app with a non-empty app_id). It never touches the keychain or
-// any secret, so it can distinguish "default profile exists but its secret is
-// broken" (→ profile_secret_invalid) from "no usable default profile at all"
-// (→ no_active_profile), without risking a secret leak (§5.1).
-func defaultProfileIdentity() (name, appID string, ok bool) {
-	multi, err := core.LoadMultiAppConfig()
-	if err != nil || multi == nil {
-		return "", "", false
-	}
-	app := multi.CurrentAppConfig("")
-	if app == nil || app.AppId == "" {
-		return "", "", false
-	}
-	return app.ProfileName(), app.AppId, true
-}
-
-// selectionSourceForDefault reports whether the config default resolved to the
-// explicit currentApp or fell back to the first app (spec §3 step 3.2).
-func selectionSourceForDefault(multi *core.MultiAppConfig) CredentialSourceKind {
-	if multi != nil && multi.CurrentApp != "" {
-		return SourceConfigCurrentApp
-	}
-	return SourceConfigFirstApp
-}
-
-// missingDirectCredentialKeys returns the NAMES (never values) of the direct
-// app credential env vars that are absent. Used only when the env provider
-// blocks, to map an incomplete direct credential to app_credential_incomplete.
-func missingDirectCredentialKeys() []string {
-	var missing []string
-	if os.Getenv(envvars.CliAppID) == "" {
-		missing = append(missing, envvars.CliAppID)
-	}
-	if os.Getenv(envvars.CliAppSecret) == "" {
-		missing = append(missing, envvars.CliAppSecret)
-	}
-	return missing
-}
-
-// presentDirectCredentialKeys returns the NAMES (never values) of the direct
-// app credential env vars that are set. Used to annotate DirectCredentialEnv.
-func presentDirectCredentialKeys() []string {
-	var keys []string
-	if os.Getenv(envvars.CliAppID) != "" {
-		keys = append(keys, envvars.CliAppID)
-	}
-	if os.Getenv(envvars.CliAppSecret) != "" {
-		keys = append(keys, envvars.CliAppSecret)
-	}
-	return keys
-}
-
-// Selection resolves the account (once) and returns the cached, secret-free
-// explanation of how the credential/App was selected. It mirrors
-// selectedCredentialSource: resolve-then-return.
-func (p *CredentialProvider) Selection(ctx context.Context) (IdentitySelection, error) {
-	if _, err := p.ResolveAccount(ctx); err != nil {
-		return IdentitySelection{}, err
-	}
-	return p.selection, nil
-}
-
 // enrichUserInfo resolves user identity when extension provides a UAT.
 // If UAT is available, user_info API call is mandatory (security: verify token validity).
 // If no UAT from extension, falls back to provider-supplied OpenID.

internal/credential/credential_provider_selection_test.go

@@ -1,554 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
-
-package credential_test
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"errors"
-	"fmt"
-	"os"
-	"slices"
-	"strings"
-	"testing"
-
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/errs"
-	extcred "github.com/larksuite/cli/extension/credential"
-	envprovider "github.com/larksuite/cli/extension/credential/env"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/credential"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/envvars"
-	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/keychain"
-)
-
-func asConfigError(t *testing.T, err error) *errs.ConfigError {
-	t.Helper()
-	var ce *errs.ConfigError
-	if !errors.As(err, &ce) {
-		t.Fatalf("expected *errs.ConfigError, got %T: %v", err, err)
-	}
-	return ce
-}
-
-func asValidationError(t *testing.T, err error) *errs.ValidationError {
-	t.Helper()
-	var ve *errs.ValidationError
-	if !errors.As(err, &ve) {
-		t.Fatalf("expected *errs.ValidationError, got %T: %v", err, err)
-	}
-	return ve
-}
-
-// secretValue is the profile secret written to config. It must NEVER appear in
-// any error message or IdentitySelection (security §5.1).
-const secretValue = "your-secret"
-
-// envSecretValue is the direct env app secret. Same no-leak guarantee.
-const envSecretValue = "your-password"
-
-// writeConfigTenantA writes a config with a single profile "tenant_a" (app_id
-// "cli_a"). The secret is a plaintext secret stored in config, which resolves
-// locally without a keychain lookup.
-func writeConfigTenantA(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Helper()
-	t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
-	multi := &core.MultiAppConfig{
-		CurrentApp: "tenant_a",
-		Apps: []core.AppConfig{{
-			Name:      "tenant_a",
-			AppId:     "cli_a",
-			AppSecret: core.PlainSecret(secretValue),
-			Brand:     core.BrandFeishu,
-		}},
-	}
-	if err := core.SaveMultiAppConfig(multi); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("SaveMultiAppConfig: %v", err)
-	}
-}
-
-// writeConfigTenantABroken writes tenant_a with a keychain-backed secret ref
-// that cannot be resolved (noop keychain returns empty), so profile secret
-// resolution fails locally.
-func writeConfigTenantABroken(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Helper()
-	t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
-	// A keychain SecretRef whose key does NOT match app_id cli_a. Local secret
-	// resolution fails (ValidateSecretKeyMatch), exercising profile_secret_invalid.
-	multi := &core.MultiAppConfig{
-		CurrentApp: "tenant_a",
-		Apps: []core.AppConfig{{
-			Name:      "tenant_a",
-			AppId:     "cli_a",
-			AppSecret: core.SecretInput{Ref: &core.SecretRef{Source: "keychain", ID: "appsecret:wrong_key"}},
-			Brand:     core.BrandFeishu,
-		}},
-	}
-	if err := core.SaveMultiAppConfig(multi); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("SaveMultiAppConfig: %v", err)
-	}
-}
-
-func newProvider(t *testing.T, profile string, fromFlag bool) *credential.CredentialProvider {
-	t.Helper()
-	ep := &envprovider.Provider{}
-	defaultAcct := credential.NewDefaultAccountProvider(func() keychain.KeychainAccess { return &noopKC{} }, profile)
-	cp := credential.NewCredentialProvider([]extcred.Provider{ep}, defaultAcct, nil, nil)
-	cp.WithProfile(profile, fromFlag)
-	return cp
-}
-
-// assertNoSecretLeak fails if any secret value appears in the given strings.
-func assertNoSecretLeak(t *testing.T, where string, vals ...string) {
-	t.Helper()
-	for _, v := range vals {
-		if v == "" {
-			continue
-		}
-		if strings.Contains(v, secretValue) {
-			t.Errorf("%s leaked profile secret: %q", where, v)
-		}
-		if strings.Contains(v, envSecretValue) {
-			t.Errorf("%s leaked env secret: %q", where, v)
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-func subtypeOf(t *testing.T, err error) errs.Subtype {
-	t.Helper()
-	if err == nil {
-		t.Fatalf("expected error, got nil")
-	}
-	p, ok := errs.ProblemOf(err)
-	if !ok {
-		t.Fatalf("error is not a typed problem: %v", err)
-	}
-	return p.Subtype
-}
-
-// State #2: P none, E none, C none -> no_active_profile.
-func TestSelection_State2_NoActiveProfile(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Setenv(envvars.CliAppID, "")
-	t.Setenv(envvars.CliAppSecret, "")
-	t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir()) // empty dir -> no config
-	cp := newProvider(t, "", false)
-
-	sel, err := cp.Selection(context.Background())
-	if got := subtypeOf(t, err); got != errs.SubtypeNoActiveProfile {
-		t.Fatalf("subtype = %q, want %q", got, errs.SubtypeNoActiveProfile)
-	}
-	// Defect 1 (spec §5): no_active_profile must carry credential_source=config.
-	ce := asConfigError(t, err)
-	if ce.CredentialSource != "config" {
-		t.Errorf("credential_source = %q, want %q", ce.CredentialSource, "config")
-	}
-	assertNoSecretLeak(t, "state2", err.Error(), string(sel.Source))
-}
-
-// Config-default profile with a broken secret: P none, E none, C present but the
-// default profile's keychain secret ref is corrupted. Per spec §3 step 3.2 this
-// must be profile_secret_invalid (the identity IS configured, only its secret is
-// broken) — NOT no_active_profile (which is reserved for "no usable default").
-func TestSelection_ConfigDefaultBrokenSecret_ProfileSecretInvalid(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Setenv(envvars.CliAppID, "")
-	t.Setenv(envvars.CliAppSecret, "")
-	writeConfigTenantABroken(t) // CurrentApp = tenant_a (app_id cli_a), broken keychain ref
-	cp := newProvider(t, "", false)
-
-	_, err := cp.Selection(context.Background())
-	if got := subtypeOf(t, err); got != errs.SubtypeProfileSecretInvalid {
-		t.Fatalf("subtype = %q, want %q", got, errs.SubtypeProfileSecretInvalid)
-	}
-	ce := asConfigError(t, err)
-	if ce.Profile != "tenant_a" {
-		t.Errorf("profile = %q, want tenant_a", ce.Profile)
-	}
-	if ce.AppID != "cli_a" {
-		t.Errorf("app_id = %q, want cli_a", ce.AppID)
-	}
-	// §5.1: generic message, no cause, no secret anywhere.
-	if errors.Unwrap(ce) != nil {
-		t.Errorf("profile_secret_invalid must not attach a cause, got %v", errors.Unwrap(ce))
-	}
-	assertNoSecretLeak(t, "config-default-broken", ce.Message, ce.Hint, ce.AppID)
-}
-
-// Explicit profile requested but the config file is malformed. The load error
-// must be propagated (errors.Is ErrMalformedConfig) rather than masked as
-// profile_not_found, which would hide a real config problem and misdirect the
-// user to `profile list`. An absent config is separately still profile_not_found.
-func TestSelection_ExplicitProfile_MalformedConfig_PropagatesError(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Setenv(envvars.CliAppID, "")
-	t.Setenv(envvars.CliAppSecret, "")
-	t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
-	if err := os.MkdirAll(core.GetConfigDir(), 0o700); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("mkdir config dir: %v", err)
-	}
-	if err := os.WriteFile(core.GetConfigPath(), []byte("{ this is not valid json"), 0o600); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("write malformed config: %v", err)
-	}
-	cp := newProvider(t, "tenant_a", true)
-
-	_, err := cp.Selection(context.Background())
-	if err == nil {
-		t.Fatalf("expected error for malformed config, got nil")
-	}
-	if !errors.Is(err, core.ErrMalformedConfig) {
-		t.Fatalf("malformed config error not propagated: %v", err)
-	}
-	if prob, ok := errs.ProblemOf(err); ok && prob.Subtype == errs.SubtypeProfileNotFound {
-		t.Fatalf("malformed config masked as profile_not_found")
-	}
-}
-
-// State #3: P none, E partial (only APP_ID) -> app_credential_incomplete.
-func TestSelection_State3_EnvPartial(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Setenv(envvars.CliAppID, "cli_env")
-	t.Setenv(envvars.CliAppSecret, "")
-	writeConfigTenantA(t)
-	cp := newProvider(t, "", false)
-
-	_, err := cp.Selection(context.Background())
-	if got := subtypeOf(t, err); got != errs.SubtypeAppCredentialIncomplete {
-		t.Fatalf("subtype = %q, want %q", got, errs.SubtypeAppCredentialIncomplete)
-	}
-	prob, _ := errs.ProblemOf(err)
-	ce := asConfigError(t, err)
-	if !slices.Contains(ce.MissingKeys, envvars.CliAppSecret) {
-		t.Errorf("missing_keys = %v, want to contain %q", ce.MissingKeys, envvars.CliAppSecret)
-	}
-	// missing_keys must be NAMES only, never values.
-	for _, k := range ce.MissingKeys {
-		if strings.Contains(k, envSecretValue) || strings.Contains(k, secretValue) {
-			t.Errorf("missing_keys contains a value, not a name: %q", k)
-		}
-	}
-	assertNoSecretLeak(t, "state3", prob.Message, prob.Hint)
-}
-
-// State #4: P none, E complete -> env:LARKSUITE_CLI_APP_ID.
-func TestSelection_State4_EnvComplete(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Setenv(envvars.CliAppID, "cli_env")
-	t.Setenv(envvars.CliAppSecret, envSecretValue)
-	writeConfigTenantA(t)
-	cp := newProvider(t, "", false)
-
-	sel, err := cp.Selection(context.Background())
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
-	}
-	if sel.Source != credential.SourceEnvAppID {
-		t.Fatalf("source = %q, want %q", sel.Source, credential.SourceEnvAppID)
-	}
-	if !sel.DirectCredentialEnv.Present {
-		t.Errorf("DirectCredentialEnv.Present = false, want true")
-	}
-	assertNoSecretLeak(t, "state4", string(sel.Source), sel.DirectCredentialEnv.AppID)
-	assertNoSecretLeak(t, "state4-keys", sel.DirectCredentialEnv.Keys...)
-}
-
-// State #5: P valid, E none -> flag:--profile (fromFlag) source.
-func TestSelection_State5_ProfileOnly(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Setenv(envvars.CliAppID, "")
-	t.Setenv(envvars.CliAppSecret, "")
-	writeConfigTenantA(t)
-	cp := newProvider(t, "tenant_a", true)
-
-	sel, err := cp.Selection(context.Background())
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
-	}
-	if sel.Source != credential.SourceFlagProfile {
-		t.Fatalf("source = %q, want %q", sel.Source, credential.SourceFlagProfile)
-	}
-	if sel.DirectCredentialEnv.Present {
-		t.Errorf("DirectCredentialEnv.Present = true, want false")
-	}
-	assertNoSecretLeak(t, "state5", string(sel.Source))
-}
-
-// State #5b: P valid from env (not flag) -> env:LARKSUITE_CLI_PROFILE source.
-func TestSelection_State5_ProfileFromEnv(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Setenv(envvars.CliAppID, "")
-	t.Setenv(envvars.CliAppSecret, "")
-	writeConfigTenantA(t)
-	cp := newProvider(t, "tenant_a", false)
-
-	sel, err := cp.Selection(context.Background())
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
-	}
-	if sel.Source != credential.SourceEnvProfile {
-		t.Fatalf("source = %q, want %q", sel.Source, credential.SourceEnvProfile)
-	}
-}
-
-// State #6: P missing (nonexistent), E complete -> profile_not_found.
-func TestSelection_State6_ProfileNotFound(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Setenv(envvars.CliAppID, "cli_env")
-	t.Setenv(envvars.CliAppSecret, envSecretValue)
-	writeConfigTenantA(t)
-	cp := newProvider(t, "does_not_exist", true)
-
-	sel, err := cp.Selection(context.Background())
-	if got := subtypeOf(t, err); got != errs.SubtypeProfileNotFound {
-		t.Fatalf("subtype = %q, want %q", got, errs.SubtypeProfileNotFound)
-	}
-	prob, _ := errs.ProblemOf(err)
-	// Defect 1 (spec §5): profile_not_found must carry the credential_source that
-	// named the profile — here the --profile flag.
-	ce := asConfigError(t, err)
-	if ce.CredentialSource != string(credential.SourceFlagProfile) {
-		t.Errorf("credential_source = %q, want %q", ce.CredentialSource, credential.SourceFlagProfile)
-	}
-	assertNoSecretLeak(t, "state6", err.Error(), prob.Hint, string(sel.Source))
-}
-
-// State #7: P valid but secret broken, E none -> profile_secret_invalid.
-func TestSelection_State7_ProfileSecretInvalid(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Setenv(envvars.CliAppID, "")
-	t.Setenv(envvars.CliAppSecret, "")
-	writeConfigTenantABroken(t)
-	cp := newProvider(t, "tenant_a", true)
-
-	_, err := cp.Selection(context.Background())
-	if got := subtypeOf(t, err); got != errs.SubtypeProfileSecretInvalid {
-		t.Fatalf("subtype = %q, want %q", got, errs.SubtypeProfileSecretInvalid)
-	}
-	ce := asConfigError(t, err)
-	if ce.Profile != "tenant_a" {
-		t.Errorf("profile = %q, want tenant_a", ce.Profile)
-	}
-	if ce.AppID != "cli_a" {
-		t.Errorf("app_id = %q, want cli_a", ce.AppID)
-	}
-	assertNoSecretLeak(t, "state7", ce.Message, ce.Hint)
-}
-
-// secretMarkerValue is a distinctive string used to prove that the
-// profile_secret_invalid path drops the underlying error entirely, even when
-// that underlying error's own message CONTAINS a secret. Unlike
-// writeConfigTenantABroken (whose noop-keychain failure is a harmless empty
-// error), this uses a custom DefaultAccountResolver whose error text embeds
-// the marker, closing the gap where a leak could hide in a cause chain that
-// happens to be empty in the noop-keychain case.
-const secretMarkerValue = "your-access-token"
-
-// leakingSecretResolver is a DefaultAccountResolver stub whose ResolveAccount
-// fails with an error whose message contains secretMarkerValue, simulating a
-// real keychain/secret-resolution failure that echoes back sensitive material
-// (e.g. a keychain library including the attempted secret in its error text).
-type leakingSecretResolver struct{}
-
-func (leakingSecretResolver) ResolveAccount(ctx context.Context) (*credential.Account, error) {
-	return nil, fmt.Errorf("keychain decode failed for secret %s", secretMarkerValue)
-}
-
-// State #7 (secret-bearing underlying error): P valid, but the underlying
-// account/secret resolution fails with an error that itself contains a
-// secret. This locks the §5.1 design: doResolveAccount emits a generic
-// profile_secret_invalid ConfigError WITHOUT attaching the underlying cause,
-// so a secret embedded in that underlying error can never surface through
-// err.Error(), Message, Hint, the unwrapped cause chain, or Selection().
-func TestSelection_State7_UnderlyingErrorContainingSecret_NotLeaked(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Setenv(envvars.CliAppID, "")
-	t.Setenv(envvars.CliAppSecret, "")
-	writeConfigTenantA(t) // profile "tenant_a" exists with app_id "cli_a"
-
-	ep := &envprovider.Provider{}
-	cp := credential.NewCredentialProvider([]extcred.Provider{ep}, leakingSecretResolver{}, nil, nil)
-	cp.WithProfile("tenant_a", true)
-
-	sel, err := cp.Selection(context.Background())
-	if got := subtypeOf(t, err); got != errs.SubtypeProfileSecretInvalid {
-		t.Fatalf("subtype = %q, want %q", got, errs.SubtypeProfileSecretInvalid)
-	}
-	ce := asConfigError(t, err)
-	if ce.Profile != "tenant_a" {
-		t.Errorf("profile = %q, want tenant_a", ce.Profile)
-	}
-	if ce.AppID != "cli_a" {
-		t.Errorf("app_id = %q, want cli_a", ce.AppID)
-	}
-
-	// Walk the full unwrap chain. This is the assertion that would catch a
-	// regression where the profile_secret_invalid branch starts attaching the
-	// underlying error via WithCause: if it did, this loop would find the
-	// marker in a wrapped link even though err.Error()/Message/Hint (which
-	// only reflect the top-level ConfigError, not the chain) might look clean.
-	for cur := error(ce); cur != nil; cur = errors.Unwrap(cur) {
-		if strings.Contains(cur.Error(), secretMarkerValue) {
-			t.Errorf("cause chain leaked secret marker: %v", cur)
-		}
-	}
-
-	if strings.Contains(err.Error(), secretMarkerValue) {
-		t.Errorf("err.Error() leaked secret marker: %q", err.Error())
-	}
-	if strings.Contains(ce.Message, secretMarkerValue) {
-		t.Errorf("Message leaked secret marker: %q", ce.Message)
-	}
-	if strings.Contains(ce.Hint, secretMarkerValue) {
-		t.Errorf("Hint leaked secret marker: %q", ce.Hint)
-	}
-	if strings.Contains(string(sel.Source), secretMarkerValue) {
-		t.Errorf("Selection.Source leaked secret marker: %q", sel.Source)
-	}
-	if strings.Contains(sel.DirectCredentialEnv.AppID, secretMarkerValue) {
-		t.Errorf("Selection.DirectCredentialEnv.AppID leaked secret marker: %q", sel.DirectCredentialEnv.AppID)
-	}
-	for _, k := range sel.DirectCredentialEnv.Keys {
-		if strings.Contains(k, secretMarkerValue) {
-			t.Errorf("Selection.DirectCredentialEnv.Keys leaked secret marker: %q", k)
-		}
-	}
-	// State #7 always clears p.selection on the secret-invalid path (see
-	// doResolveAccount); assert it is zero-valued, which trivially implies no
-	// marker anywhere in it and guards against a future field being populated
-	// from the failed resolution.
-	if sel.Source != "" || sel.DirectCredentialEnv.Present ||
-		sel.DirectCredentialEnv.AppID != "" || len(sel.DirectCredentialEnv.Keys) != 0 {
-		t.Errorf("Selection() = %+v, want zero value on profile_secret_invalid", sel)
-	}
-}
-
-// State #8: P valid, E complete, app_id matches -> profile source, env present+matched.
-func TestSelection_State8_ProfileMatchesEnv(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Setenv(envvars.CliAppID, "cli_a") // matches profile app_id
-	t.Setenv(envvars.CliAppSecret, envSecretValue)
-	writeConfigTenantA(t)
-	cp := newProvider(t, "tenant_a", true)
-
-	sel, err := cp.Selection(context.Background())
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
-	}
-	if sel.Source != credential.SourceFlagProfile {
-		t.Fatalf("source = %q, want %q", sel.Source, credential.SourceFlagProfile)
-	}
-	if !sel.DirectCredentialEnv.Present || !sel.DirectCredentialEnv.Matched {
-		t.Fatalf("DirectCredentialEnv = %+v, want Present && Matched", sel.DirectCredentialEnv)
-	}
-	if sel.DirectCredentialEnv.AppID != "cli_a" {
-		t.Errorf("DirectCredentialEnv.AppID = %q, want cli_a", sel.DirectCredentialEnv.AppID)
-	}
-	assertNoSecretLeak(t, "state8", string(sel.Source), sel.DirectCredentialEnv.AppID)
-	assertNoSecretLeak(t, "state8-keys", sel.DirectCredentialEnv.Keys...)
-}
-
-// State #9: P valid, E complete, app_id mismatches -> profile_app_credential_conflict.
-func TestSelection_State9_Conflict(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Setenv(envvars.CliAppID, "cli_x") // mismatches profile app_id cli_a
-	t.Setenv(envvars.CliAppSecret, envSecretValue)
-	writeConfigTenantA(t)
-	cp := newProvider(t, "tenant_a", true)
-
-	_, err := cp.Selection(context.Background())
-	if got := subtypeOf(t, err); got != errs.SubtypeProfileAppCredentialConflict {
-		t.Fatalf("subtype = %q, want %q", got, errs.SubtypeProfileAppCredentialConflict)
-	}
-	ve := asValidationError(t, err)
-	if ve.ProfileAppID != "cli_a" {
-		t.Errorf("profile_app_id = %q, want cli_a", ve.ProfileAppID)
-	}
-	if ve.EnvAppID != "cli_x" {
-		t.Errorf("env_app_id = %q, want cli_x", ve.EnvAppID)
-	}
-	assertNoSecretLeak(t, "state9", ve.Message, ve.Hint)
-}
-
-// State #10: P valid, E partial -> app_credential_incomplete (env-partial wins).
-func TestSelection_State10_ProfileWithEnvPartial(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Setenv(envvars.CliAppID, "")
-	t.Setenv(envvars.CliAppSecret, envSecretValue) // only secret set
-	writeConfigTenantA(t)
-	cp := newProvider(t, "tenant_a", true)
-
-	_, err := cp.Selection(context.Background())
-	if got := subtypeOf(t, err); got != errs.SubtypeAppCredentialIncomplete {
-		t.Fatalf("subtype = %q, want %q", got, errs.SubtypeAppCredentialIncomplete)
-	}
-	ce := asConfigError(t, err)
-	if !slices.Contains(ce.MissingKeys, envvars.CliAppID) {
-		t.Errorf("missing_keys = %v, want to contain %q", ce.MissingKeys, envvars.CliAppID)
-	}
-	assertNoSecretLeak(t, "state10", ce.Message, ce.Hint)
-	assertNoSecretLeak(t, "state10-keys", ce.MissingKeys...)
-}
-
-// fakeSidecarProvider is a NON-env extension provider (Priority 0, Name !=
-// directCredentialProviderName) that always returns a non-nil account. It
-// stands in for the sidecar extension provider without needing a build tag.
-type fakeSidecarProvider struct {
-	appID string
-}
-
-func (f *fakeSidecarProvider) Name() string  { return "sidecar" }
-func (f *fakeSidecarProvider) Priority() int { return 0 }
-func (f *fakeSidecarProvider) ResolveAccount(ctx context.Context) (*extcred.Account, error) {
-	return &extcred.Account{AppID: f.appID, Brand: extcred.Brand("feishu")}, nil
-}
-func (f *fakeSidecarProvider) ResolveToken(ctx context.Context, req extcred.TokenSpec) (*extcred.Token, error) {
-	return &extcred.Token{Value: "sidecar-tok", Source: "sidecar"}, nil
-}
-
-// Regression: a NON-env extension provider (sidecar) that returns an account
-// must win outright even when a profile is set. It must NOT be treated as a
-// direct-credential env account: no profile arbitration, no
-// profile_app_credential_conflict (even though its app_id differs from the
-// profile's cli_a), and DirectCredentialEnv.Present must stay false (§4.2 —
-// no direct env vars are set). This proves the success-account provider gating
-// mirrors the block-path guard.
-func TestSelection_NonEnvExtensionProviderWinsOverProfile(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Setenv(envvars.CliAppID, "")     // no direct env credential
-	t.Setenv(envvars.CliAppSecret, "") // no direct env credential
-	writeConfigTenantA(t)              // profile tenant_a exists, app_id cli_a
-
-	sidecar := &fakeSidecarProvider{appID: "sidecar_app"} // differs from cli_a
-	defaultAcct := credential.NewDefaultAccountProvider(func() keychain.KeychainAccess { return &noopKC{} }, "tenant_a")
-	cp := credential.NewCredentialProvider([]extcred.Provider{sidecar}, defaultAcct, nil, nil)
-	cp.WithProfile("tenant_a", true)
-
-	acct, err := cp.ResolveAccount(context.Background())
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
-	}
-	// The sidecar account is used as-is, NOT overridden by profile arbitration.
-	if acct == nil || acct.AppID != "sidecar_app" {
-		t.Fatalf("account = %+v, want AppID sidecar_app (sidecar wins outright)", acct)
-	}
-
-	sel, err := cp.Selection(context.Background())
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("unexpected Selection error: %v", err)
-	}
-	// No misreported direct env credential (§4.2).
-	if sel.DirectCredentialEnv.Present {
-		t.Errorf("DirectCredentialEnv.Present = true, want false (no direct env vars set)")
-	}
-	// The mismatched app_id (sidecar_app vs profile cli_a) must NOT trigger a
-	// profile_app_credential_conflict: both ResolveAccount and Selection above
-	// returned nil errors, so no conflict (or any other) error was produced.
-	// Guard against a future regression that surfaces a conflict via Selection.
-	if _, selErr := cp.Selection(context.Background()); selErr != nil {
-		if subtypeOf(t, selErr) == errs.SubtypeProfileAppCredentialConflict {
-			t.Errorf("got profile_app_credential_conflict, want none for non-env provider")
-		}
-	}
-	assertNoSecretLeak(t, "nonenv-sidecar", string(sel.Source), sel.DirectCredentialEnv.AppID)
-}
-
-// State #1: P none, E none, C present -> config default (currentApp).
-func TestSelection_State1_ConfigDefault(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Setenv(envvars.CliAppID, "")
-	t.Setenv(envvars.CliAppSecret, "")
-	writeConfigTenantA(t) // CurrentApp = tenant_a
-	cp := newProvider(t, "", false)
-
-	sel, err := cp.Selection(context.Background())
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
-	}
-	if sel.Source != credential.SourceConfigCurrentApp {
-		t.Fatalf("source = %q, want %q", sel.Source, credential.SourceConfigCurrentApp)
-	}
-}

internal/credential/identity_selection.go

@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
-
-package credential
-
-// CredentialSourceKind is the wire-stable App/credential selection source.
-type CredentialSourceKind string
-
-const (
-	SourceFlagProfile      CredentialSourceKind = "flag:--profile"
-	SourceEnvProfile       CredentialSourceKind = "env:LARKSUITE_CLI_PROFILE"
-	SourceEnvAppID         CredentialSourceKind = "env:LARKSUITE_CLI_APP_ID"
-	SourceConfigCurrentApp CredentialSourceKind = "config:currentApp"
-	SourceConfigFirstApp   CredentialSourceKind = "config:firstApp"
-)
-
-// DirectCredentialEnv describes the state of direct app credential env vars.
-// It never carries a secret value — only names and the non-sensitive app_id.
-type DirectCredentialEnv struct {
-	Present              bool     `json:"present"`
-	Keys                 []string `json:"keys,omitempty"`
-	AppID                string   `json:"appId,omitempty"`
-	Matched              bool     `json:"matched,omitempty"`
-	ConflictsWithProfile bool     `json:"conflictsWithProfile,omitempty"`
-}
-
-// IdentitySelection is the explainable result of credential selection.
-// It carries NO secret value (security: §5.1).
-type IdentitySelection struct {
-	Source              CredentialSourceKind
-	DirectCredentialEnv DirectCredentialEnv
-}
-
-// Explicit reports whether the identity was actively specified by the
-// user/agent (flag or env), which governs no-fallback behavior.
-func (s IdentitySelection) Explicit() bool {
-	switch s.Source {
-	case SourceFlagProfile, SourceEnvProfile, SourceEnvAppID:
-		return true
-	default:
-		return false
-	}
-}

internal/credential/identity_selection_test.go

@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
-
-package credential
-
-import "testing"
-
-func TestIdentitySelectionExplicit(t *testing.T) {
-	cases := []struct {
-		src      CredentialSourceKind
-		explicit bool
-	}{
-		{SourceFlagProfile, true},
-		{SourceEnvProfile, true},
-		{SourceEnvAppID, true},
-		{SourceConfigCurrentApp, false},
-		{SourceConfigFirstApp, false},
-	}
-	for _, c := range cases {
-		sel := IdentitySelection{Source: c.src}
-		if sel.Explicit() != c.explicit {
-			t.Errorf("source %q: Explicit()=%v want %v", c.src, sel.Explicit(), c.explicit)
-		}
-	}
-}

internal/envvars/envvars.go

@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@ const (
 	CliUserAccessToken   = "LARKSUITE_CLI_USER_ACCESS_TOKEN"
 	CliTenantAccessToken = "LARKSUITE_CLI_TENANT_ACCESS_TOKEN"
 	CliDefaultAs         = "LARKSUITE_CLI_DEFAULT_AS"
-	CliProfile           = "LARKSUITE_CLI_PROFILE"
 	CliStrictMode        = "LARKSUITE_CLI_STRICT_MODE"
 
 	// Sidecar proxy (auth proxy mode)

package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@larksuite/cli",
-  "version": "1.0.65",
+  "version": "1.0.64",
   "description": "The official CLI for Lark/Feishu open platform",
   "bin": {
     "lark-cli": "scripts/run.js"

shortcuts/calendar/calendar_create.go

@@ -67,26 +67,6 @@ func parseAttendees(attendeesStr string, currentUserId string) ([]map[string]str
 	return attendees, nil
 }
 
-func attendeesIncludeRoom(attendees []map[string]string) bool {
-	for _, attendee := range attendees {
-		if attendee["type"] == "resource" || attendee["room_id"] != "" {
-			return true
-		}
-	}
-	return false
-}
-
-func guideApprovalRoomReasonError(err error, attendees []map[string]string) error {
-	if err == nil || !attendeesIncludeRoom(attendees) {
-		return err
-	}
-	p, ok := errs.ProblemOf(err)
-	if !ok || !strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(p.Hint), "approval_reason") {
-		return err
-	}
-	return withStepContext(err, "approval meeting rooms require attendees[].approval_reason; calendar +create does not expose this low-frequency field. Create the event with the raw API flow, then use `lark-cli calendar event.attendees create --as user` with attendees[].approval_reason for the room attendee.")
-}
-
 var CalendarCreate = common.Shortcut{
 	Service:     "calendar",
 	Command:     "+create",
@@ -245,7 +225,6 @@ var CalendarCreate = common.Shortcut{
 					"need_notification": true,
 				})
 			if err != nil {
-				err = guideApprovalRoomReasonError(err, attendees)
 				// Rollback: delete the event
 				_, rollbackErr := runtime.CallAPITyped("DELETE",
 					fmt.Sprintf("/open-apis/calendar/v4/calendars/%s/events/%s", validate.EncodePathSegment(calendarId), validate.EncodePathSegment(eventId)),

shortcuts/calendar/calendar_test.go

@@ -673,76 +673,6 @@ func TestCreate_WithAttendees_InvalidParamsWithDetail_RollsBack(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-func TestCreate_ApprovalRoomMissingReason_GuidesRawAttendeesAPI(t *testing.T) {
-	f, _, _, reg := cmdutil.TestFactory(t, defaultConfig())
-
-	reg.Register(&httpmock.Stub{
-		Method: "POST",
-		URL:    "/open-apis/calendar/v4/calendars/cal_test123/events",
-		Body: map[string]interface{}{
-			"code": 0, "msg": "ok",
-			"data": map[string]interface{}{
-				"event": map[string]interface{}{
-					"event_id":   "evt_approval_room",
-					"summary":    "Approval Room",
-					"start_time": map[string]interface{}{"timestamp": "1742515200"},
-					"end_time":   map[string]interface{}{"timestamp": "1742518800"},
-				},
-			},
-		},
-	})
-	reg.Register(&httpmock.Stub{
-		Method: "POST",
-		URL:    "/events/evt_approval_room/attendees",
-		Body: map[string]interface{}{
-			"code": codeInvalidParamsWithDetail,
-			"msg":  "invalid params",
-			"error": map[string]interface{}{
-				"details": []interface{}{
-					map[string]interface{}{"value": "attendees[0].approval_reason is required for approval meeting rooms"},
-				},
-			},
-		},
-	})
-	reg.Register(&httpmock.Stub{
-		Method: "DELETE",
-		URL:    "/events/evt_approval_room",
-		Body:   map[string]interface{}{"code": 0, "msg": "ok"},
-	})
-
-	err := mountAndRun(t, CalendarCreate, []string{
-		"+create",
-		"--summary", "Approval Room",
-		"--start", "2025-03-21T00:00:00+08:00",
-		"--end", "2025-03-21T01:00:00+08:00",
-		"--calendar-id", "cal_test123",
-		"--attendee-ids", "omm_room1",
-		"--as", "user",
-	}, f, nil)
-
-	if err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("expected error for approval room missing approval_reason, got nil")
-	}
-	p, ok := errs.ProblemOf(err)
-	if !ok {
-		t.Fatalf("ProblemOf returned !ok for %T", err)
-	}
-	if p.Category != errs.CategoryAPI {
-		t.Errorf("category=%q, want %q", p.Category, errs.CategoryAPI)
-	}
-	if p.Subtype != errs.SubtypeInvalidParameters {
-		t.Errorf("subtype=%q, want %q", p.Subtype, errs.SubtypeInvalidParameters)
-	}
-	if p.Code != codeInvalidParamsWithDetail {
-		t.Errorf("code=%d, want %d", p.Code, codeInvalidParamsWithDetail)
-	}
-	for _, want := range []string{"approval_reason", "calendar event.attendees create", "--as user", "rolled back successfully"} {
-		if !strings.Contains(p.Hint, want) {
-			t.Errorf("hint should contain %q, got: %q", want, p.Hint)
-		}
-	}
-}
-
 // When the add-attendees call fails AND the rollback DELETE also fails, the
 // primary error stays the add failure (classification preserved) and the Hint
 // must surface BOTH the rollback failure reason and the orphan event_id so the

shortcuts/drive/drive_import_common.go

@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ import (
 	"encoding/json"
 	"fmt"
 	"path/filepath"
-	"strconv"
 	"strings"
 	"time"
 
@@ -29,8 +28,6 @@ const (
 	driveImport500MBFileSizeLimit int64 = 500 * 1024 * 1024
 	driveImport600MBFileSizeLimit int64 = 600 * 1024 * 1024
 	driveImport800MBFileSizeLimit int64 = 800 * 1024 * 1024
-
-	driveImportConcurrentOperationHint = "This import conflict means another operation is running in the same Drive location. Run batch imports to the same folder/root or target bitable serially. Wait a few seconds before retrying each failed import; retry each failed item at most 3 times, then stop and report the conflict."
 )
 
 // driveImportExtToDocTypes defines which source file extensions can be imported
@@ -50,8 +47,6 @@ var driveImportExtToDocTypes = map[string][]string{
 	"pptx":     {"slides"},
 }
 
-var driveImportConcurrentOperationCodes = []int{232140101, 232140100, 233523001}
-
 // driveImportSpec contains the user-facing import inputs after normalization.
 type driveImportSpec struct {
 	FilePath    string
@@ -432,7 +427,11 @@ func pollDriveImportTask(runtime *common.RuntimeContext, ticket string) (driveIm
 			return status, true, nil
 		}
 		if status.Failed() {
-			return status, false, driveImportFailureError(status)
+			msg := strings.TrimSpace(status.JobErrorMsg)
+			if msg == "" {
+				msg = status.StatusLabel()
+			}
+			return status, false, errs.NewAPIError(errs.SubtypeServerError, "import failed with status %d: %s", status.JobStatus, msg)
 		}
 	}
 	if !hadSuccessfulPoll && lastErr != nil {
@@ -441,40 +440,3 @@ func pollDriveImportTask(runtime *common.RuntimeContext, ticket string) (driveIm
 
 	return lastStatus, false, nil
 }
-
-func driveImportFailureError(status driveImportStatus) *errs.APIError {
-	msg := strings.TrimSpace(status.JobErrorMsg)
-	if msg == "" {
-		msg = status.StatusLabel()
-	}
-
-	apiErr := errs.NewAPIError(errs.SubtypeServerError, "import failed with status %d: %s", status.JobStatus, msg)
-	if code, ok := driveImportConcurrentOperationCode(msg); ok {
-		apiErr = apiErr.WithCode(code).WithRetryable().WithHint(driveImportConcurrentOperationHint)
-	}
-	return apiErr
-}
-
-func driveImportConcurrentOperationCode(msg string) (int, bool) {
-	for _, code := range driveImportConcurrentOperationCodes {
-		codeText := strconv.Itoa(code)
-		for idx := strings.Index(msg, codeText); idx >= 0; {
-			end := idx + len(codeText)
-			if (idx == 0 || !isASCIIDigit(msg[idx-1])) && (end == len(msg) || !isASCIIDigit(msg[end])) {
-				return code, true
-			}
-
-			nextStart := idx + 1
-			next := strings.Index(msg[nextStart:], codeText)
-			if next < 0 {
-				break
-			}
-			idx = nextStart + next
-		}
-	}
-	return 0, false
-}
-
-func isASCIIDigit(ch byte) bool {
-	return ch >= '0' && ch <= '9'
-}

shortcuts/drive/drive_import_common_test.go

@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ import (
 	"bytes"
 	"errors"
 	"os"
-	"strconv"
 	"strings"
 	"testing"
 
@@ -212,82 +211,6 @@ func TestDriveImportStatusPendingWithoutToken(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-func TestDriveImportFailureErrorAddsConcurrentOperationGuidance(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	for _, code := range driveImportConcurrentOperationCodes {
-		t.Run(strconv.Itoa(code), func(t *testing.T) {
-			t.Parallel()
-
-			err := driveImportFailureError(driveImportStatus{
-				JobStatus:   3,
-				JobErrorMsg: "call CreateObjNode return error code, code: " + strconv.Itoa(code) + ", message:",
-			})
-			problem, ok := errs.ProblemOf(err)
-			if !ok {
-				t.Fatalf("expected typed error, got %T", err)
-			}
-			if problem.Category != errs.CategoryAPI {
-				t.Fatalf("category = %q, want %q", problem.Category, errs.CategoryAPI)
-			}
-			if problem.Subtype != errs.SubtypeServerError {
-				t.Fatalf("subtype = %q, want %q", problem.Subtype, errs.SubtypeServerError)
-			}
-			if problem.Code != code {
-				t.Fatalf("code = %d, want %d", problem.Code, code)
-			}
-			if !problem.Retryable {
-				t.Fatal("expected retryable error")
-			}
-			if problem.Hint != driveImportConcurrentOperationHint {
-				t.Fatalf("hint = %q, want %q", problem.Hint, driveImportConcurrentOperationHint)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-func TestDriveImportFailureErrorLeavesOtherFailuresUnchanged(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Parallel()
-
-	tests := []struct {
-		name string
-		msg  string
-	}{
-		{
-			name: "ordinary failure",
-			msg:  "unsupported conversion",
-		},
-		{
-			name: "longer numeric code containing known code",
-			msg:  "call CreateObjNode return error code, code: 12321401012, message:",
-		},
-	}
-
-	for _, tt := range tests {
-		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			t.Parallel()
-
-			err := driveImportFailureError(driveImportStatus{
-				JobStatus:   3,
-				JobErrorMsg: tt.msg,
-			})
-			problem, ok := errs.ProblemOf(err)
-			if !ok {
-				t.Fatalf("expected typed error, got %T", err)
-			}
-			if problem.Code != 0 {
-				t.Fatalf("code = %d, want 0", problem.Code)
-			}
-			if problem.Retryable {
-				t.Fatal("expected non-concurrency failure to remain non-retryable")
-			}
-			if problem.Hint != "" {
-				t.Fatalf("hint = %q, want empty", problem.Hint)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}
-
 func TestDriveImportTimeoutReturnsFollowUpCommand(t *testing.T) {
 	f, stdout, _, reg := cmdutil.TestFactory(t, driveTestConfig())
 	reg.Register(&httpmock.Stub{

shortcuts/drive/drive_permission_get_setting.go

@@ -0,0 +1,226 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package drive
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+	"net/url"
+	"strings"
+
+	"github.com/larksuite/cli/errs"
+	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/validate"
+	"github.com/larksuite/cli/shortcuts/common"
+)
+
+type drivePermissionGetSettingSpec struct {
+	Token string
+	Type  string
+}
+
+var drivePermissionGetSettingTypes = []string{
+	"doc", "sheet", "file", "wiki", "bitable", "docx",
+	"mindnote", "minutes", "slides", "folder",
+}
+
+var drivePermissionGetSettingURLPathToType = []struct {
+	Prefix string
+	Type   string
+}{
+	{"/drive/folder/", "folder"},
+	{"/docx/", "docx"},
+	{"/doc/", "doc"},
+	{"/sheets/", "sheet"},
+	{"/base/", "bitable"},
+	{"/bitable/", "bitable"},
+	{"/wiki/", "wiki"},
+	{"/file/", "file"},
+	{"/mindnotes/", "mindnote"},
+	{"/slides/", "slides"},
+	{"/minutes/", "minutes"},
+}
+
+func readDrivePermissionGetSettingSpec(runtime *common.RuntimeContext) (drivePermissionGetSettingSpec, error) {
+	rawToken := strings.TrimSpace(runtime.Str("token"))
+	explicitType := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(runtime.Str("type")))
+
+	if rawToken == "" {
+		return drivePermissionGetSettingSpec{}, errs.NewValidationError(
+			errs.SubtypeInvalidArgument,
+			"--token is required",
+		).WithParam("--token")
+	}
+
+	if explicitType != "" && !drivePermissionGetSettingTypeAllowed(explicitType) {
+		return drivePermissionGetSettingSpec{}, errs.NewValidationError(
+			errs.SubtypeInvalidArgument,
+			"invalid --type %q: allowed values are %s",
+			explicitType,
+			strings.Join(drivePermissionGetSettingTypes, ", "),
+		).WithParam("--type")
+	}
+
+	if strings.Contains(rawToken, "://") {
+		ref, ok := parseDrivePermissionGetSettingResourceURL(rawToken)
+		if !ok {
+			return drivePermissionGetSettingSpec{}, errs.NewValidationError(
+				errs.SubtypeInvalidArgument,
+				"unsupported --token URL %q: pass a recognized Lark Drive document/folder URL or a bare token with --type",
+				rawToken,
+			).WithParam("--token")
+		}
+		if explicitType != "" && explicitType != ref.Type {
+			return drivePermissionGetSettingSpec{}, errs.NewValidationError(
+				errs.SubtypeInvalidArgument,
+				"--type %q conflicts with URL path type %q; remove --type or use a matching value",
+				explicitType,
+				ref.Type,
+			).WithParam("--type")
+		}
+		if err := validate.ResourceName(ref.Token, "--token"); err != nil {
+			return drivePermissionGetSettingSpec{}, errs.NewValidationError(errs.SubtypeInvalidArgument, "%s", err).WithParam("--token")
+		}
+		return drivePermissionGetSettingSpec{Token: ref.Token, Type: ref.Type}, nil
+	}
+
+	if explicitType == "" {
+		return drivePermissionGetSettingSpec{}, errs.NewValidationError(
+			errs.SubtypeInvalidArgument,
+			"--type is required when --token is a bare token (allowed: %s)",
+			strings.Join(drivePermissionGetSettingTypes, ", "),
+		).WithParam("--type")
+	}
+
+	if err := validate.ResourceName(rawToken, "--token"); err != nil {
+		return drivePermissionGetSettingSpec{}, errs.NewValidationError(errs.SubtypeInvalidArgument, "%s", err).WithParam("--token")
+	}
+	return drivePermissionGetSettingSpec{Token: rawToken, Type: explicitType}, nil
+}
+
+func parseDrivePermissionGetSettingResourceURL(rawURL string) (common.ResourceRef, bool) {
+	parsed, err := url.Parse(strings.TrimSpace(rawURL))
+	if err != nil || parsed.Hostname() == "" {
+		return common.ResourceRef{}, false
+	}
+
+	for _, mapping := range drivePermissionGetSettingURLPathToType {
+		if !strings.HasPrefix(parsed.Path, mapping.Prefix) {
+			continue
+		}
+		token := parsed.Path[len(mapping.Prefix):]
+		token = strings.TrimRight(token, "/")
+		if idx := strings.IndexByte(token, '/'); idx >= 0 {
+			token = token[:idx]
+		}
+		token = strings.TrimSpace(token)
+		if token == "" {
+			return common.ResourceRef{}, false
+		}
+		return common.ResourceRef{Type: mapping.Type, Token: token}, true
+	}
+
+	return common.ResourceRef{}, false
+}
+
+func drivePermissionGetSettingTypeAllowed(docType string) bool {
+	for _, allowed := range drivePermissionGetSettingTypes {
+		if docType == allowed {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+func (s drivePermissionGetSettingSpec) url(runtime *common.RuntimeContext) string {
+	if runtime != nil && runtime.Config != nil {
+		if u := common.BuildResourceURL(runtime.Config.Brand, s.Type, s.Token); u != "" {
+			return u
+		}
+	}
+	return common.BuildResourceURL("", s.Type, s.Token)
+}
+
+func (s drivePermissionGetSettingSpec) params() map[string]interface{} {
+	return map[string]interface{}{"type": s.Type}
+}
+
+func (s drivePermissionGetSettingSpec) apiPath() string {
+	return drivePermissionPublicV2Path(s.Token)
+}
+
+func drivePermissionPublicV2Path(token string) string {
+	return fmt.Sprintf("/open-apis/drive/v2/permissions/%s/public", validate.EncodePathSegment(token))
+}
+
+func (s drivePermissionGetSettingSpec) output(runtime *common.RuntimeContext, data map[string]interface{}) map[string]interface{} {
+	permissionPublic := interface{}(data)
+	if nestedPermissionPublic := common.GetMap(data, "permission_public"); nestedPermissionPublic != nil {
+		permissionPublic = nestedPermissionPublic
+	}
+	return map[string]interface{}{
+		"permission_public": permissionPublic,
+	}
+}
+
+// DrivePermissionGetSetting queries permission_public settings for a Drive
+// document, file, wiki node, or folder.
+var DrivePermissionGetSetting = common.Shortcut{
+	Service:     "drive",
+	Command:     "+permission-get-setting",
+	Description: "Get public access, sharing, collaborator management, security, and comment permission settings",
+	Risk:        "read",
+	Scopes:      []string{"docs:permission.setting:read"},
+	AuthTypes:   []string{"user", "bot"},
+	HasFormat:   true,
+	Flags: []common.Flag{
+		{Name: "token", Desc: "target URL or bare token (doc/sheet/file/wiki/bitable/docx/mindnote/minutes/slides/folder)"},
+		{Name: "type", Desc: "target type; auto-inferred from URL, required for bare tokens", Enum: drivePermissionGetSettingTypes},
+	},
+	Tips: []string{
+		"--token accepts a Lark URL or bare token; pass --type when using a bare token.",
+		"Use --type folder for Drive folders. This shortcut reads the target's own permission settings; it does not recurse into child documents.",
+	},
+	Validate: func(ctx context.Context, runtime *common.RuntimeContext) error {
+		_, err := readDrivePermissionGetSettingSpec(runtime)
+		return err
+	},
+	DryRun: func(ctx context.Context, runtime *common.RuntimeContext) *common.DryRunAPI {
+		spec, err := readDrivePermissionGetSettingSpec(runtime)
+		if err != nil {
+			return common.NewDryRunAPI().Set("error", err.Error())
+		}
+		return common.NewDryRunAPI().
+			Desc("Get Drive permission settings").
+			GET(spec.apiPath()).
+			Params(spec.params())
+	},
+	Execute: func(ctx context.Context, runtime *common.RuntimeContext) error {
+		spec, err := readDrivePermissionGetSettingSpec(runtime)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+
+		fmt.Fprintf(runtime.IO().ErrOut, "Getting permission settings for %s %s...\n", spec.Type, common.MaskToken(spec.Token))
+		data, err := runtime.CallAPITyped(
+			"GET",
+			spec.apiPath(),
+			spec.params(),
+			nil,
+		)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+
+		out := spec.output(runtime, data)
+		runtime.OutFormat(out, nil, func(w io.Writer) {
+			fmt.Fprintf(w, "Type:  %s\n", spec.Type)
+			fmt.Fprintf(w, "Token: %s\n", spec.Token)
+			if url := spec.url(runtime); url != "" {
+				fmt.Fprintf(w, "URL:   %s\n", url)
+			}
+		})
+		return nil
+	},
+}

shortcuts/drive/drive_permission_get_setting_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,365 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package drive
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"reflect"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/spf13/cobra"
+
+	"github.com/larksuite/cli/errs"
+	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/cmdutil"
+	"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/httpmock"
+	"github.com/larksuite/cli/shortcuts/common"
+)
+
+func newDrivePermissionGetSettingRuntime(t *testing.T, token, docType string) *common.RuntimeContext {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	cmd := &cobra.Command{Use: "drive +permission-get-setting"}
+	cmd.Flags().String("token", "", "")
+	cmd.Flags().String("type", "", "")
+	if token != "" {
+		if err := cmd.Flags().Set("token", token); err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("set --token: %v", err)
+		}
+	}
+	if docType != "" {
+		if err := cmd.Flags().Set("type", docType); err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("set --type: %v", err)
+		}
+	}
+	return common.TestNewRuntimeContext(cmd, driveTestConfig())
+}
+
+func TestDrivePermissionGetSettingSpecResolvesTargets(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	tests := []struct {
+		name     string
+		token    string
+		docType  string
+		wantTok  string
+		wantType string
+	}{
+		{
+			name:     "folder URL",
+			token:    "https://example.feishu.cn/drive/folder/fldTok?from=share",
+			wantTok:  "fldTok",
+			wantType: "folder",
+		},
+		{
+			name:     "docx URL",
+			token:    "https://example.feishu.cn/docx/doxTok",
+			wantTok:  "doxTok",
+			wantType: "docx",
+		},
+		{
+			name:     "file URL",
+			token:    "https://example.feishu.cn/file/boxTok",
+			wantTok:  "boxTok",
+			wantType: "file",
+		},
+		{
+			name:     "wiki URL",
+			token:    "https://example.feishu.cn/wiki/wikTok",
+			wantTok:  "wikTok",
+			wantType: "wiki",
+		},
+		{
+			name:     "minutes URL",
+			token:    "https://example.feishu.cn/minutes/obTok",
+			wantTok:  "obTok",
+			wantType: "minutes",
+		},
+		{
+			name:     "mindnotes URL",
+			token:    "https://example.feishu.cn/mindnotes/mndTok",
+			wantTok:  "mndTok",
+			wantType: "mindnote",
+		},
+		{
+			name:     "bare folder token",
+			token:    " fldTok ",
+			docType:  " folder ",
+			wantTok:  "fldTok",
+			wantType: "folder",
+		},
+		{
+			name:     "bare file token",
+			token:    "boxTok",
+			docType:  "file",
+			wantTok:  "boxTok",
+			wantType: "file",
+		},
+		{
+			name:     "bare wiki token",
+			token:    "wikTok",
+			docType:  "wiki",
+			wantTok:  "wikTok",
+			wantType: "wiki",
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, temp := range tests {
+		tt := temp
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+
+			runtime := newDrivePermissionGetSettingRuntime(t, tt.token, tt.docType)
+			spec, err := readDrivePermissionGetSettingSpec(runtime)
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatalf("read spec: %v", err)
+			}
+			if spec.Token != tt.wantTok {
+				t.Fatalf("Token = %q, want %q", spec.Token, tt.wantTok)
+			}
+			if spec.Type != tt.wantType {
+				t.Fatalf("Type = %q, want %q", spec.Type, tt.wantType)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestDrivePermissionGetSettingSpecValidationErrorsAreTyped(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	tests := []struct {
+		name        string
+		token       string
+		docType     string
+		wantParam   string
+		wantMessage string
+	}{
+		{
+			name:        "missing token",
+			wantParam:   "--token",
+			wantMessage: "--token is required",
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "bare token without type",
+			token:       "doxTok",
+			wantParam:   "--type",
+			wantMessage: "--type is required",
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "unsupported URL",
+			token:       "https://example.feishu.cn/calendar/calTok",
+			wantParam:   "--token",
+			wantMessage: "unsupported --token URL",
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "URL type conflict",
+			token:       "https://example.feishu.cn/docx/doxTok",
+			docType:     "sheet",
+			wantParam:   "--type",
+			wantMessage: "conflicts with URL path type",
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "invalid bare token",
+			token:       "../bad",
+			docType:     "folder",
+			wantParam:   "--token",
+			wantMessage: "--token",
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "invalid type",
+			token:       "doxTok",
+			docType:     "comment",
+			wantParam:   "--type",
+			wantMessage: "invalid --type",
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, temp := range tests {
+		tt := temp
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+
+			runtime := newDrivePermissionGetSettingRuntime(t, tt.token, tt.docType)
+			_, err := readDrivePermissionGetSettingSpec(runtime)
+			if err == nil {
+				t.Fatal("expected validation error, got nil")
+			}
+			problem, ok := errs.ProblemOf(err)
+			if !ok {
+				t.Fatalf("error is not typed: %T %v", err, err)
+			}
+			if problem.Category != errs.CategoryValidation || problem.Subtype != errs.SubtypeInvalidArgument {
+				t.Fatalf("problem = %s/%s, want validation/invalid_argument", problem.Category, problem.Subtype)
+			}
+			if validationErr, ok := err.(*errs.ValidationError); ok {
+				if validationErr.Param != tt.wantParam {
+					t.Fatalf("param = %q, want %q", validationErr.Param, tt.wantParam)
+				}
+			} else {
+				t.Fatalf("error type = %T, want *errs.ValidationError", err)
+			}
+			if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), tt.wantMessage) {
+				t.Fatalf("error = %q, want substring %q", err.Error(), tt.wantMessage)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestDrivePermissionGetSettingDryRunIncludesGETRequest(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	tests := []struct {
+		name     string
+		token    string
+		docType  string
+		wantURL  string
+		wantType string
+	}{
+		{
+			name:     "folder URL",
+			token:    "https://example.feishu.cn/drive/folder/fldTok",
+			wantURL:  "/open-apis/drive/v2/permissions/fldTok/public",
+			wantType: "folder",
+		},
+		{
+			name:     "bare folder token",
+			token:    "fldTok",
+			docType:  "folder",
+			wantURL:  "/open-apis/drive/v2/permissions/fldTok/public",
+			wantType: "folder",
+		},
+		{
+			name:     "docx URL",
+			token:    "https://example.feishu.cn/docx/doxTok",
+			wantURL:  "/open-apis/drive/v2/permissions/doxTok/public",
+			wantType: "docx",
+		},
+		{
+			name:     "bare wiki token",
+			token:    "wikTok",
+			docType:  "wiki",
+			wantURL:  "/open-apis/drive/v2/permissions/wikTok/public",
+			wantType: "wiki",
+		},
+		{
+			name:     "file URL",
+			token:    "https://example.feishu.cn/file/boxTok",
+			wantURL:  "/open-apis/drive/v2/permissions/boxTok/public",
+			wantType: "file",
+		},
+		{
+			name:     "minutes URL",
+			token:    "https://example.feishu.cn/minutes/obTok",
+			wantURL:  "/open-apis/drive/v2/permissions/obTok/public",
+			wantType: "minutes",
+		},
+		{
+			name:     "mindnotes URL",
+			token:    "https://example.feishu.cn/mindnotes/mndTok",
+			wantURL:  "/open-apis/drive/v2/permissions/mndTok/public",
+			wantType: "mindnote",
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, temp := range tests {
+		tt := temp
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+
+			runtime := newDrivePermissionGetSettingRuntime(t, tt.token, tt.docType)
+			dry := DrivePermissionGetSetting.DryRun(context.Background(), runtime)
+			if dry == nil {
+				t.Fatal("DryRun returned nil")
+			}
+			data, err := json.Marshal(dry)
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatalf("marshal dry-run: %v", err)
+			}
+			out := string(data)
+			for _, want := range []string{
+				`"` + tt.wantURL + `"`,
+				`"GET"`,
+				`"type":"` + tt.wantType + `"`,
+			} {
+				if !strings.Contains(out, want) {
+					t.Fatalf("dry-run output missing %q:\n%s", want, out)
+				}
+			}
+			if strings.Contains(out, `"folder_token"`) {
+				t.Fatalf("dry-run output contains folder_token, want omitted:\n%s", out)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestDrivePermissionGetSettingExecutePreservesPermissionPublic(t *testing.T) {
+	f, stdout, _, reg := cmdutil.TestFactory(t, driveTestConfig())
+	reg.Register(&httpmock.Stub{
+		Method: "GET",
+		URL:    "/open-apis/drive/v2/permissions/doxTok/public?type=docx",
+		Body: map[string]interface{}{
+			"code": 0,
+			"msg":  "ok",
+			"data": map[string]interface{}{
+				"permission_public": map[string]interface{}{
+					"link_share_entity":          "closed",
+					"external_access_entity":     "closed",
+					"security_entity":            "anyone_can_view",
+					"comment_entity":             "anyone_can_view",
+					"share_entity":               "anyone",
+					"manage_collaborator_entity": "collaborator_can_view",
+					"lock_switch":                false,
+					"server_future_field":        "preserved",
+				},
+			},
+		},
+	})
+
+	err := mountAndRunDrive(t, DrivePermissionGetSetting, []string{
+		"+permission-get-setting",
+		"--token", "doxTok",
+		"--type", "docx",
+		"--as", "bot",
+	}, f, stdout)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	data := decodeDriveEnvelope(t, stdout)
+	for _, key := range []string{"type", "token", "url"} {
+		if _, ok := data[key]; ok {
+			t.Fatalf("data[%s] = %#v, want field omitted", key, data[key])
+		}
+	}
+	permissionPublic, _ := data["permission_public"].(map[string]interface{})
+	if permissionPublic == nil {
+		t.Fatalf("permission_public missing in output: %#v", data)
+	}
+	for key, want := range map[string]interface{}{
+		"link_share_entity":          "closed",
+		"external_access_entity":     "closed",
+		"security_entity":            "anyone_can_view",
+		"comment_entity":             "anyone_can_view",
+		"share_entity":               "anyone",
+		"manage_collaborator_entity": "collaborator_can_view",
+		"lock_switch":                false,
+		"server_future_field":        "preserved",
+	} {
+		if permissionPublic[key] != want {
+			t.Fatalf("permission_public[%s] = %#v, want %#v", key, permissionPublic[key], want)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestDrivePermissionGetSettingDeclaresScopeAndIdentities(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Parallel()
+
+	if !reflect.DeepEqual(DrivePermissionGetSetting.Scopes, []string{"docs:permission.setting:read"}) {
+		t.Fatalf("Scopes = %v, want docs:permission.setting:read", DrivePermissionGetSetting.Scopes)
+	}
+	if !reflect.DeepEqual(DrivePermissionGetSetting.AuthTypes, []string{"user", "bot"}) {
+		t.Fatalf("AuthTypes = %v, want [user bot]", DrivePermissionGetSetting.AuthTypes)
+	}
+}

shortcuts/drive/shortcuts.go

@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ func Shortcuts() []common.Shortcut {
 		DriveTaskResult,
 		DriveApplyPermission,
 		DriveMemberAdd,
+		DrivePermissionGetSetting,
 		DriveSecureLabelList,
 		DriveSecureLabelUpdate,
 		DriveSearch,

shortcuts/drive/shortcuts_test.go

@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ func TestShortcutsIncludesExpectedCommands(t *testing.T) {
 		"+task_result",
 		"+apply-permission",
 		"+member-add",
+		"+permission-get-setting",
 		"+secure-label-list",
 		"+secure-label-update",
 		"+search",

skill-template/domains/drive.md

@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@
 - 用户要把本地 `.xlsx` / `.csv` / `.base` 导入成 Base / 多维表格 / bitable，第一步必须使用 `lark-cli drive +import --type bitable`。
 - 用户要把本地 `.md` / `.docx` / `.doc` / `.txt` / `.html` 导入成在线文档，使用 `lark-cli drive +import --type docx`。
 - 用户要把本地 `.xlsx` / `.xls` / `.csv` 导入成电子表格，使用 `lark-cli drive +import --type sheet`。
-- 批量执行 `drive +import` 且目标是同一个位置（同一 `--folder-token`、默认根目录，或同一 `--target-token`）时，必须串行执行；不要并发导入到同一位置，服务端可能返回并发冲突错误。
 - 用户要在云空间里新建文件夹，优先使用 `lark-cli drive +create-folder`。
 - `lark-base` 只负责导入完成后的 Base 内部操作（表、字段、记录、视图），不要在“本地文件 -> Base”这一步提前切到 `lark-base`。
 
@@ -195,7 +194,6 @@ lark-cli drive file.comments list --params '{"file_token": "xxx", "file_type": "
 | `not exist` | 使用了错误的 token | 检查 token 类型，wiki 链接必须先查询获取 `obj_token` |
 | `permission denied` | 没有相关操作权限 | 引导用户检查当前身份对文档/文件是否有相应操作权限；如果需要，可以授予相应权限 |
 | `invalid file_type` | file_type 参数错误 | 根据 `obj_type` 传入正确的 file_type（docx/doc/sheet/slides/bitable） |
-| `232140101` / `232140100` / `233523001`（常见于 `drive +import` 的 `job_error_msg`） | 同一位置下存在并发导入 / 创建操作 | 批量导入到同一文件夹、根目录或同一 `--target-token` 时改为串行执行；每个失败项每次重试前等待几秒，总共最多重试 3 次，仍失败就停止并报告冲突 |
 
 ### 授权当前应用访问文档
 

skills/lark-calendar/SKILL.md

@@ -45,15 +45,13 @@ lark-cli calendar +agenda --as user
 | 场景 | 前置要求 |
 |------|----------|
 | 预约日程/会议、查会议室 | 先读 [lark-calendar-schedule-meeting.md](references/lark-calendar-schedule-meeting.md) |
-| 编辑已有日程 | 先定位目标日程 `event_id` |
-| 编辑/删除重复性日程 | 先读 [重复性日程操作规范](references/lark-calendar-recurring.md)，按操作范围（仅此次/全部/此次及后续）执行 |
+| 编辑已有日程 | 先定位目标日程 `event_id`；若是重复性日程，必须定位到具体实例的 `event_id`（禁止使用原重复日程 ID） |
 | 删除/修改后验证 | 等待 2 秒再查询（API 最终一致性），不要告知用户你等待了 |
 | 调用任何 Shortcut | 先读其对应 reference 文档 |
 
 ## 核心概念
 
-- **日程实例（Instance）**：重复性日程展开后的具体时间实例。「仅此次」操作时使用具体实例的 `event_id`；「全部」或「此次及后续」操作时需对原重复性日程操作（使用原日程 `event_id`），并按需处理例外。
-- **重复性日程例外（Exception）**：对重复性日程某次实例做过「仅此次」编辑后产生的独立日程（拥有独立 `event_id`）。删除/更新「全部」时必须同时处理例外，否则例外会残留。
+- **日程实例（Instance）**：重复性日程展开后的具体时间实例。操作重复日程的某次实例时，必须先定位该实例的 `event_id`，禁止使用原重复日程的 `event_id`。
 - **全天日程（All-day Event）**：只按日期占用、没有具体起止时刻的日程，结束日期是包含在日程时间内的。
 - **时间块 vs 时间范围**：时间块是具体确定的连续时间段（如 `14:00~15:00`），时间范围是泛指（如"今天下午"）。`+room-find` 必须基于确定时间块，不能基于模糊范围。
 - **会议室（Room）**："room"不是"房间"，是"会议室"。会议室是日程的一种参与人（resource attendee），不能脱离日程单独预定。
@@ -73,7 +71,6 @@ lark-cli calendar +agenda --as user
 | 从日程获取关联的视频会议 ID 或用户绑定的会议纪要文档 | 本 skill（`+meeting`） |
 | 从日程进一步拿 AI 智能纪要 / 逐字稿 / 妙记产物 | 先 `+meeting` 取 `meeting_id`，再 [`vc +detail`](../lark-vc/references/lark-vc-detail.md) → [`note +detail`](../lark-note/references/lark-note-detail.md) / [`minutes +detail`](../lark-minutes/references/lark-minutes-detail.md) |
 | 预约/改约日程、添加/移除参会人、添加/更换会议室、调整时间 | 先判断新建 vs 编辑，再进入 [schedule-meeting 工作流](references/lark-calendar-schedule-meeting.md) |
-| 编辑/删除重复性日程（「改这个重复日程」「删掉后面的」「全部取消」等） | 先读 [重复性日程操作规范](references/lark-calendar-recurring.md)，确认操作范围后执行 |
 
 ## 任务类型分流
 

skills/lark-calendar/references/lark-calendar-create.md

@@ -47,7 +47,6 @@ lark-cli calendar +create --summary "..." --start "..." --end "..." \
 > 自动设置 `reminders: [{"minutes": 5}]`，默认日程开始前 5 分钟提醒。
 > 自动设置 `vchat: {"vc_type": "vc"}`，默认日程包含飞书视频会议。如需其他视频会议类型或不含视频会议，请使用完整 API 命令。
 > 失败保护：若添加参会人失败（如 open_id 错误），CLI 会自动删除刚创建的空日程（回滚，不通知参会人）。
-> 审批会议室：`+create` 不暴露低频字段 `attendees[].approval_reason`。如果会议室要求审批，请使用用户身份先创建日程，再用完整 API `calendar event.attendees create --as user` 添加会议室并传 `approval_reason`。
 
 ## 高级用法（完整 API 命令）
 
@@ -73,16 +72,9 @@ lark-cli calendar events create \
 lark-cli schema calendar.event.attendees.create
 ## 添加参会人
 lark-cli calendar event.attendees create \
-  --as user \
   --params '{"calendar_id":"<CALENDAR_ID>","event_id":"<EVENT_ID>"}' \
   --data '{"attendees": [{"type": "user", "user_id": "ou_xxx"}]}'
 
-## 添加需要审批的会议室（approval_reason 最大 200 字符）
-lark-cli calendar event.attendees create \
-  --as user \
-  --params '{"calendar_id":"<CALENDAR_ID>","event_id":"<EVENT_ID>"}' \
-  --data '{"attendees": [{"type": "resource", "room_id": "omm_xxx", "approval_reason": "申请原因"}]}'
-
 # 可选第三步（推荐）：若第二步失败，回滚删除空日程
 ## 查看完整参数定义
 lark-cli schema calendar.events.delete

skills/lark-calendar/references/lark-calendar-recurring.md

@@ -1,90 +0,0 @@
-# 重复性日程操作规范
-
-重复性日程的编辑/删除分为三种范围：「仅此次」「全部」「此次及后续」。用户未明确范围时，**必须询问确认**。
-
-## 关键概念
-
-- **event_id 结构**：`event_id` 的格式为 `{event_uid}_{originalTime}`。普通日程或重复性日程本体的 `originalTime` 为 `0`；例外的 `originalTime > 0`，代表该例外在原重复性序列中本来的时间位置。因此 `{event_uid}_0` 即为原重复性日程的 `event_id`。
-- **原重复性日程**：携带 `rrule` 的日程本体，`event_id` 形如 `{event_uid}_0`。系列的所有属性（标题、时间、rrule、描述等）都挂在本体上。
-- **例外（Exception）**：对某次实例做过「仅此次」编辑后产生的独立日程，`event_id` 形如 `{event_uid}_{originalTime}`（`originalTime > 0`）。通过 `event_uid` 部分即可关联回原重复性日程。
-- 删除/更新原重复性日程 **不会** 级联处理例外——必须手动逐个处理。
-
-## 前置步骤（所有范围通用）
-
-1. 通过 `+agenda` 或 `+search-event` 定位重复性日程，获取原重复性日程的 `event_id`。
-2. 通过 `events instance_view` 或 `+agenda` 列出实例，识别哪些是例外（`event_id` 中 `originalTime > 0` 的即为例外）。
-3. 确认用户的操作范围。
-
-## 编辑全部（更新时间）
-
-| 步骤 | 命令 | 说明 |
-|------|------|------|
-| 1 | `lark-cli calendar +update --event-id <原重复日程ID> --start ... --end ...` | 更新原重复性日程的时间 |
-| 2 | `lark-cli calendar events delete --params '{"calendar_id":"<CAL_ID>","event_id":"<例外ID>","need_notification":false}'` （逐个） | 时间变更后例外已无意义，必须删除 |
-
-> 理由：更新时间会改变重复起止点，例外日程的原始占位已变，若保留会导致时间冲突或残留。
-
-## 编辑全部（更新非时间字段）
-
-| 步骤 | 命令 | 说明 |
-|------|------|------|
-| 1 | `lark-cli calendar +update --event-id <原重复日程ID> --summary ... --description ...` | 更新原重复性日程的标题/描述等 |
-| 2 | `lark-cli calendar +update --event-id <例外ID> --summary ... --description ...` （逐个） | 同步更新例外日程的对应字段 |
-
-> 理由：例外已脱离原重复性日程独立存在，不会自动继承原日程的更新。
-
-## 删除全部
-
-| 步骤 | 命令 | 说明 |
-|------|------|------|
-| 1 | `lark-cli calendar events delete --params '{"calendar_id":"<CAL_ID>","event_id":"<原重复日程ID>","need_notification":true}'` | 删除重复性日程本体 |
-| 2 | `lark-cli calendar events delete --params '{"calendar_id":"<CAL_ID>","event_id":"<例外ID>","need_notification":false}'` （逐个） | 删除所有例外日程 |
-
-> 理由：例外是独立实体，删除原重复性日程不会级联删除例外。
-
-## 编辑此次及后续
-
-| 步骤 | 命令 | 说明 |
-|------|------|------|
-| 1 | `lark-cli calendar +update --event-id <原重复日程ID> --rrule "FREQ=...;UNTIL=<截止日期>"` | 截短原重复性日程（UNTIL 设为指定时间前一次实例的日期） |
-| 2 | `lark-cli calendar events delete ...` （逐个） | 删除指定时间之后（含）的例外日程 |
-| 3 | `lark-cli calendar +create --summary ... --start <指定时间> --end ... --rrule "FREQ=..." --attendee-ids ...` | 从指定时间开始创建新的重复性日程（即「后续」部分，携带编辑后的内容） |
-
-> UNTIL 计算规则：若用户选择「从第 N 次开始编辑」，UNTIL 应设置为第 N-1 次实例的日期（即保留到指定时间之前的最后一次）。
-> 新日程应继承原日程的参会人、会议室等配置（除非用户明确要修改）。
-
-## 删除此次及后续
-
-| 步骤 | 命令 | 说明 |
-|------|------|------|
-| 1 | `lark-cli calendar +update --event-id <原重复日程ID> --rrule "FREQ=...;UNTIL=<截止日期>"` | 截短原重复性日程（UNTIL 设为指定时间前一次实例的日期） |
-| 2 | `lark-cli calendar events delete ...` （逐个） | 删除指定时间之后（含）的例外日程 |
-
-> 与「编辑此次及后续」的区别：不需要步骤 3（创建新的重复性日程），因为目标是删除后续而非替换。
-
-## 仅此次
-
-- **编辑仅此次**：通过 `+agenda` / `+search-event` 定位到具体实例的 `event_id`，然后正常调用 `+update`。
-- **删除仅此次**：定位到具体实例的 `event_id`，调用 `events delete`。
-
-## 用户意图映射
-
-| 用户表达 | 操作范围 |
-|----------|----------|
-| 「改这个重复日程的标题」「全部改」「每次都改」 | 编辑全部 |
-| 「删掉这个重复日程」「取消所有」 | 删除全部 |
-| 「从下周开始改时间」「后面的都改」 | 编辑此次及后续 |
-| 「从下周开始不要了」「后面的都删」 | 删除此次及后续 |
-| 「就改这一次」「只删这一次」 | 仅此次 |
-| 未明确范围 | **必须询问用户** |
-
-## 注意事项
-
-- 涉及时间戳计算（如推算 UNTIL 日期）时，必须调用系统命令或脚本，禁止心算。
-
-## 参考
-
-- [lark-calendar](../SKILL.md) — 日历全部命令
-- [lark-calendar-update](lark-calendar-update.md) — 更新日程 Shortcut
-- [lark-calendar-create](lark-calendar-create.md) — 创建日程 Shortcut
-- [lark-shared](../../lark-shared/SKILL.md) — 认证和全局参数

skills/lark-calendar/references/lark-calendar-update.md

@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ lark-cli calendar +update \
 
 | 参数 | 必填 | 说明 |
 |------|------|------|
-| `--event-id <id>` | 是 | 要更新的日程 ID。重复性日程请根据操作范围选择 ID，详见 [重复性日程操作规范](lark-calendar-recurring.md) |
+| `--event-id <id>` | 是 | 要更新的日程 ID。重复性日程要先定位到目标实例的 `event_id`，不要直接使用原重复日程 ID |
 | `--calendar-id <id>` | 否 | 日历 ID（省略则使用 `primary`） |
 | `--summary <text>` | 否 | 新日程标题。仅在显式传入 `--summary` 时更新；若传空字符串，会把标题清空 |
 | `--description <text>` | 否 | 新日程描述。目前 API 方式不支持编辑富文本描述；如果日程描述通过客户端编辑为富文本内容，则使用 API 更新描述会导致富文本格式丢失。仅在显式传入 `--description` 时更新；若传空字符串，会把描述清空 |
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ lark-cli calendar +update \
 - 只想修改标题、描述、时间或重复规则时，不需要同时传 `--add-attendee-ids` 或 `--remove-attendee-ids`。
 - 如需替换某个参与人、群组或会议室，使用 `--remove-attendee-ids <旧ID>` + `--add-attendee-ids <新ID>`。
 - 会议室是 resource attendee，必须使用 `omm_` ID 添加到参会人列表，不能脱离日程单独预定。
-- 更新重复性日程时，必须先确定操作范围（仅此次/全部/此次及后续），然后按 [重复性日程操作规范](lark-calendar-recurring.md) 执行。
+- 更新重复性日程的某一次实例时，必须先通过 `+agenda`、`+search-event` 或实例视图定位该实例的 `event_id`。
 - 如果需要验证更新结果，等待至少 2 秒后再查询，避免同步延迟导致读到旧数据。
 - 当同一次命令组合多个动作时，执行顺序为“日程字段 -> 移除参会人 -> 添加参会人”。若中途失败，不会自动回滚已成功步骤；错误信息会说明已完成的步骤。
 

skills/lark-drive/SKILL.md

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 ---
 name: lark-drive
 version: 1.0.0
-description: "飞书云空间（云盘/云存储）：管理 Drive 文件和文件夹，包含上传/下载、创建文件夹、复制/移动/删除、查看元数据、评论/权限/订阅、标题、版本和本地文件导入。用户需要整理云盘目录、处理云空间资源 URL/token，或导入 Word/Markdown/Excel/CSV/PPTX/.base 为 docx/sheet/bitable/slides 时使用；doubao.com 云空间 URL/token 也按资源路径和 token 路由，不回退 WebFetch。不负责：文档内容编辑（走 lark-doc）、表格/Base 表内数据操作（走 lark-sheets/lark-base）、知识空间节点/成员管理（走 lark-wiki）、原生 Markdown 文件读写/patch/diff（走 lark-markdown）。"
+description: "飞书云空间（云盘/云存储）：管理 Drive 文件和文件夹，包含上传/下载、创建文件夹、复制/移动/删除、查看元数据、查询权限设置、评论/权限/订阅、标题、版本和本地文件导入。用户需要整理云盘目录、处理云空间资源 URL/token，或导入 Word/Markdown/Excel/CSV/PPTX/.base 为 docx/sheet/bitable/slides 时使用；doubao.com 云空间 URL/token 也按资源路径和 token 路由，不回退 WebFetch。不负责：文档内容编辑（走 lark-doc）、表格/Base 表内数据操作（走 lark-sheets/lark-base）、知识空间节点/成员管理（走 lark-wiki）、原生 Markdown 文件读写/patch/diff（走 lark-markdown）。"
 metadata:
   requires:
     bins: ["lark-cli"]
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ metadata:
 
 - 用户要**复制文档 / 创建副本 / 另存为副本**时，使用 `lark-cli drive files copy`。先用 `lark-cli schema drive.files.copy --format json` 确认参数；如果来源是 wiki URL/token，先用 `lark-cli drive +inspect` 获取底层 `token` 和 `type`，不要把 wiki token 直接当 `file_token`。`params.file_token` 传源文档 token，`data.folder_token` 传目标文件夹 token，`data.name` 传副本名称，`data.type` 传源文件类型（如 `docx` / `sheet` / `bitable` / `slides`）。示例：`lark-cli drive files copy --params '{"file_token":"<DOC_TOKEN>"}' --data '{"folder_token":"<FOLDER_TOKEN>","name":"<COPY_NAME>","type":"docx"}'`。如返回 `confirmation_required`，按 `lark-shared` 高风险审批协议向用户确认后，在原命令末尾追加 `--yes` 重试。
 - 用户要**检查 / 治理文档权限、公开范围、链接分享、外部访问、复制下载权限、密级标签、owner 转移**，或要“权限风险报告、收紧权限、申请查看 / 编辑权限、转移 / 批量转移 owner”，必须先阅读 [`references/lark-drive-workflow.md`](references/lark-drive-workflow.md)，再按其中 `Workflow Registry` 进入 [`permission_governance`](references/lark-drive-workflow-permission-governance.md) workflow。
+- 用户要**查询文件、文件夹或云文档自身的公开访问、分享、协作者管理、安全与评论权限设置**，优先使用 `lark-cli drive +permission-get-setting`；它只读取目标自身设置，不递归审计文件夹子文档权限。裸 token 必须显式传 `--type`。
 - 用户要**整理云盘 / 文件夹 / 文档库 / 知识库 / 个人文档库**，或要“盘点目录结构、找出未归档/临时/重复/空目录、生成整理方案”，必须先阅读 [`references/lark-drive-workflow-knowledge-organize.md`](references/lark-drive-workflow-knowledge-organize.md)。默认只生成方案；创建目录、移动资源、申请权限都必须单独确认。
 - 用户要**搜文档 / Wiki / 电子表格 / 多维表格 / 云空间（云盘/云存储）对象**，优先使用 `lark-cli drive +search`。自然语言里"最近我编辑过的"、"我创建的"（→ `--created-by-me`，原始创建者语义）、"我负责/owner 的"（→ `--mine`，owner 语义）、"最近一周我打开过的 xxx"、"某人 owner 的 docx" 等直接映射到扁平 flag，避免手写嵌套 JSON。
 - 用户要**根据文档评论定位正文位置**，例如 根据评论 review 文档、根据评论内容回看文档、区分多处相同引用文本时，对于 docx 类型（`file_type=docx`）的文档支持通过 `need_relation=true` 返回评论位置，其他类型暂不支持，具体用法需要先阅读 [`references/lark-drive-comment-location.md`](references/lark-drive-comment-location.md) 了解。
@@ -29,7 +30,6 @@ metadata:
 - 用户要把本地 `.xlsx` / `.csv` / `.base` 导入成 Base / 多维表格 / bitable，第一步必须使用 `lark-cli drive +import --type bitable`。
 - 用户要把本地 `.md` / `.docx` / `.doc` / `.txt` / `.html` 导入成在线文档，使用 `lark-cli drive +import --type docx`。
 - 用户要把本地 `.pptx` 导入成飞书幻灯片，使用 `lark-cli drive +import --type slides`；当前 PPTX 导入上限是 500MB。
-- 批量执行 `drive +import` 且目标是同一个位置（同一 `--folder-token`、默认根目录，或同一 `--target-token`）时，必须串行执行；不要并发导入到同一位置，服务端可能返回并发冲突错误。
 - 用户要在 Drive 里上传、创建、读取、局部 patch 或覆盖更新**原生 `.md` 文件**（不是导入成 docx），切到 [`lark-markdown`](../lark-markdown/SKILL.md)。
 - 用户要比较原生 `.md` 文件的**历史版本差异**，或比较远端 Markdown 与本地草稿，切到 [`lark-markdown`](../lark-markdown/SKILL.md) 的 `lark-cli markdown +diff`；需要版本号时先用 `drive +version-history`。
 - 用户要查看、下载、回滚或删除文件的**历史版本**，使用 `drive +version-history`、`drive +version-get`、`drive +version-revert`、`drive +version-delete`；这组命令同时支持 `--as user` 和 `--as bot`，自动化场景优先 `--as bot`。
@@ -103,11 +103,11 @@ lark-cli drive +inspect --url 'https://xxx.feishu.cn/wiki/wikcnXXX'
 | `not exist` | 使用了错误的 token | 检查 token 类型，wiki 链接必须先查询获取 `obj_token` |
 | `permission denied` | 没有相关操作权限 | 引导用户检查当前身份对文档/文件是否有相应操作权限；如果需要，可以授予相应权限 |
 | `invalid file_type` | file_type 参数错误 | 根据 `obj_type` 传入正确的 file_type（docx/doc/sheet/slides/bitable） |
-| `232140101` / `232140100` / `233523001`（常见于 `drive +import` 的 `job_error_msg`） | 同一位置下存在并发导入 / 创建操作 | 批量导入到同一文件夹、根目录或同一 `--target-token` 时改为串行执行；每个失败项每次重试前等待几秒，总共最多重试 3 次，仍失败就停止并报告冲突 |
 
 ### 权限能力入口
 
 - 用户要管理 Drive 文档/文件协作者、公开权限、授权当前应用访问文档，或处理 `permission.public.patch` 的 `91009` / `91010` / `91011` / `91012` 错误时，先读 [`lark-drive-permission-guide.md`](references/lark-drive-permission-guide.md)。
+- 用户要查询文件、文件夹或云文档自身的公开访问、分享、协作者管理、安全与评论权限设置，使用 [`+permission-get-setting`](references/lark-drive-permission-get-setting.md)；如果要递归审计文件夹下子文档权限，再进入 [`permission_governance`](references/lark-drive-workflow-permission-governance.md) workflow。
 - 用户只是没有访问权限并希望向 owner 申请访问，优先使用 [`+apply-permission`](references/lark-drive-apply-permission.md)。
 - 普通 scope、身份或登录问题仍按 [`lark-shared`](../lark-shared/SKILL.md) 处理；不要把租户安全策略、对外分享、密级拦截简单归类为缺 scope。
 
@@ -150,6 +150,7 @@ Shortcut 是对常用操作的高级封装（`lark-cli drive +<verb> [flags]`）
 | [`+inspect`](references/lark-drive-inspect.md) | 检视 URL 的类型、标题和 canonical token；wiki URL 会自动解包到底层文档。 |
 | [`+apply-permission`](references/lark-drive-apply-permission.md) | 以 user 身份向文档 owner 申请访问权限。 |
 | [`+member-add`](references/lark-drive-member-add.md) | 添加一个或最多 10 个 Drive 文档、文件、文件夹或 wiki 节点协作者/授权成员；封装 Drive permission member create/batch_create，真实写入需要 `--yes`。 |
+| [`+permission-get-setting`](references/lark-drive-permission-get-setting.md) | 查询文件、文件夹或云文档自身的公开访问、分享、协作者管理、安全与评论权限设置；支持 URL 或裸 token + `--type`；不递归读取文件夹子文档权限。 |
 | [`+secure-label-list`](references/lark-drive-secure-label.md) | 列出当前用户可用的密级标签。 |
 | [`+secure-label-update`](references/lark-drive-secure-label.md) | 更新 Drive 文件或文档的密级标签。 |
 

skills/lark-drive/references/lark-drive-import.md

@@ -14,13 +14,6 @@
 > [!IMPORTANT]
 > 当用户**未传 `--name`** 时，文档标题默认取源文件名（去掉扩展名）。在执行导入前，先友好提示用户：「当前未指定文档标题，默认将使用"xxx"作为标题。如果文件内容中也包含相同标题，导入后可能造成视觉重复。是否需要重命名？」让用户确认后再继续。
 
-## 批量导入串行规则
-
-> [!IMPORTANT]
-> 批量执行 `drive +import` 且目标是同一个位置时，必须串行执行，不要并发发起导入任务。这里的“相同位置”包括同一个 `--folder-token`、都省略 `--folder-token` 导入到默认根目录，或使用同一个 `--target-token` 导入到已有 bitable。
->
-> 如果在同一位置下并发导入，服务端可能返回并发冲突错误。看到错误信息或 `job_error_msg` 中包含 `232140101`、`232140100`、`233523001` 任一错误码时，按同位置并发操作处理：停止并发导入，改为串行处理失败项；每个失败项每次重试前等待几秒，总共最多重试 3 次；仍失败就停止并向用户报告冲突。
-
 ## 命令
 
 ```bash
@@ -150,7 +143,6 @@ lark-cli drive +import --file ./README.md --type docx --dry-run
 - “超过 20MB 自动切换分片上传”只表示上传链路会切到 multipart，不代表所有格式都允许导入超过 20MB 的文件。
 
 - 若导入任务执行失败，会返回失败时的 `job_status` 及错误信息。
-- 若导入失败信息包含 `232140101`、`232140100`、`233523001`，通常表示同一位置下存在并发导入 / 创建操作；批量场景请改为串行执行，每个失败项每次重试前等待几秒，总共最多重试 3 次，仍失败就停止并报告冲突。
 - 若内置轮询超时但任务仍在处理中，shortcut 会成功返回，并带上：
   - `ready=false`
   - `timed_out=true`

skills/lark-drive/references/lark-drive-workflow-permission-governance-commands.md

@@ -15,6 +15,8 @@
 lark-cli drive +inspect --url '<url>' --as user --format json
 ```
 
+`drive +inspect` 不支持 Drive folder。`/drive/folder/<folder_token>` 直接解析为 `type=folder` + `token=<folder_token>`；需要读取文件夹自身权限设置时使用 `drive +permission-get-setting --token '<folder_token>' --type folder`。
+
 `/wiki/space/<space_id>` URL 是 Wiki space 范围，不要用 `drive +inspect` 当作单文档解析；直接提取 `space_id` 后进入 `DISCOVER_TARGETS`。
 
 ## 目标发现
@@ -61,11 +63,27 @@ lark-cli drive metas batch_query \
   --as user --format json
 ```
 
-读取 public permission：
+读取权限设置：
 
 ```bash
-lark-cli drive permission.public get \
-  --params '{"token":"<token>","type":"<type>"}' \
+lark-cli drive +permission-get-setting \
+  --token '<url-or-token>' --type '<type>' \
+  --as user --format json
+```
+
+裸 folder token 必须显式传 `--type folder`：
+
+```bash
+lark-cli drive +permission-get-setting \
+  --token '<folder_token>' --type folder \
+  --as user --format json
+```
+
+通过 URL 读取权限设置时可以省略 `--type`：
+
+```bash
+lark-cli drive +permission-get-setting \
+  --token '<url>' \
   --as user --format json
 ```
 

skills/lark-drive/references/lark-drive-workflow-permission-governance-outputs.md

@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@
 - 多目标明确列表默认输出逐目标诊断摘要；不要因为目标数大于 1 就套用容器递归发现报告。
 - 用户可见结论默认跟随用户当前语言。用户用中文提问时输出中文，用户用英文提问时输出英文；混合语言时跟随主要语言。
 - 单目标公开性判断默认输出业务表达，不直接展示 `link_share_entity`、`external_access_entity`、`external_access` 等底层字段名；只有用户要求 raw evidence、排障，或完整清单 / artifact 场景才展示底层字段。
-- 中文用户可见输出中，`permission_public` / `public permission` 默认译为“文档公共访问和协作权限设置”；可在摘要里简称“公共访问与协作设置”。它在官方语义中包含链接分享、对外分享、协作者管理、复制内容、创建副本、打印、下载和评论；具体可判断字段以当前 CLI schema 和实际响应为准。只有命令名、schema 字段、raw evidence、排障信息和完整 artifact 字段名保留英文原文。
+- 中文用户可见输出中，`permission_public` / `public permission` 默认译为“目标公共访问和协作权限设置”；可在摘要里简称“公共访问与协作设置”。优先按实际返回字段解释公开访问、分享、协作者管理、安全与评论设置；复制内容、创建副本、打印、下载等字段只有在当前 CLI schema 和实际响应返回时才可判断。只有命令名、schema 字段、raw evidence、排障信息和完整 artifact 字段名保留英文原文。
 - 容器目标默认输出安全诊断报告摘要：一句话结论、覆盖情况、风险分级、优先处理对象、建议下一步和剩余限制。
 - 容器目标不要把风险按数量机械排序；外部公开、允许对外分享、缺失密级标签优先于复制 / 下载 / 评论这类依赖策略的候选项。
 - 用户没有提供明确 policy 时，使用“候选风险 / 待复核 / 待策略确认”，不要写“违规 / 已泄露 / 已外部访问”。
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@
 - 当摘要未展示全部风险对象时，必须明确“完整清单包含 <count> 条”，并提供生成 Markdown / CSV / 飞书文档风险清单或整改 dry-run 的下一步。
 - 只要发现需要处理的对象，最终回复必须给出可执行下一步 CTA。不能因为默认只读，就只报告风险后结束。
 - 完整风险清单是后续治理选择的输入；Markdown / CSV / 飞书文档报告必须使用同一套字段和稳定 `risk_id`。
-- 写入前必须使用确认模板；权限申请、文档公共访问和协作权限设置修改、owner 转移、密级标签更新分别确认。
+- 写入前必须使用确认模板；权限申请、目标公共访问和协作权限设置修改、owner 转移、密级标签更新分别确认。
 - 最终回复必须包含已完成事项、验证结果和剩余限制；异步权限申请审批不能表述为已完成授权。
 
 ## Semantic Rendering
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@
 | `lock_switch=true` | `lock_state=locked_not_inheriting` | 已限制权限，不再继承父级页面权限 | The node is locked and no longer inherits parent-page permissions |
 | `lock_switch=false` | `lock_state=not_locked_or_inheriting` | 未限制权限，可能继承父级页面权限 | The node is not locked and may inherit parent-page permissions |
 | field absent / unsupported | `<state>=unknown` | 当前 schema 未返回，无法判断 | The current schema did not return this field, so it is unknown |
-| `check_scope=current_public_permission_only` | `check_scope=current_public_permission_only` | 本次判断的是当前文档公共访问和协作权限设置，不是协作者名单或历史权限变更审计 | This check covers current public access and collaboration settings, not collaborator-list or historical permission-change auditing |
+| `check_scope=current_public_permission_only` | `check_scope=current_public_permission_only` | 本次判断的是当前目标公共访问和协作权限设置，不是协作者名单或历史权限变更审计 | This check covers the target's current public access and collaboration settings, not collaborator-list or historical permission-change auditing |
 | `sec_label_name` missing | `sec_label=missing` | 缺少密级标签 | Security label is missing |
 
 ## 定位与治理动作
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ Evidence fields:
 
 覆盖情况：
 - 用户提供目标：<input_target_count>；成功解析：<resolved_count>
-- 成功读取文档公共访问和协作权限设置：<permission_checked_count>；读取失败 / 不支持 / 无权限：<failed_or_unsupported_count>
+- 成功读取目标公共访问和协作权限设置：<permission_checked_count>；读取失败 / 不支持 / 无权限：<failed_or_unsupported_count>
 
 逐目标结果（1-10 个目标默认全部展示；超过 10 个时按 `摘要清单展开规则` 展示，并提示生成完整风险清单）：
 
@@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ URL：<url-or-token-if-url-unavailable>
 
 覆盖情况：
 - 当前身份可见目标：<visible_count>
-- 已成功检查文档公共访问和协作权限设置：<permission_checked_count>
+- 已成功检查目标公共访问和协作权限设置：<permission_checked_count>
 - 读取失败 / 已删除 / 无权限：<failed_count>
 - 未覆盖能力：<collaborator_list / inheritance / audit_log / view_records / none>
 
@@ -355,8 +355,8 @@ Agent 必须回复：
 - 字段变更：
   - <risk_id> <path> (<url-or-token>): <field> <old> -> <new>
 - 跳过项：<unsupported / no manage_public / unsupported type / missing policy>
-- 验证方式：执行后重新读取 <元数据 / 文档公共访问和协作权限设置>
-- 有限回滚范围：<文档公共访问和协作权限设置快照字段 / 不适用>
+- 验证方式：执行后重新读取 <元数据 / 目标公共访问和协作权限设置>
+- 有限回滚范围：<目标公共访问和协作权限设置快照字段 / 不适用>
 
 请确认是否进入写入确认。
 ```
@@ -407,8 +407,8 @@ Agent 必须回复：
 - 风险：<risk_level>
 - 字段变更：
   - <field>: <old> -> <new>
-- 验证方式：执行后重新读取 <元数据 / 文档公共访问和协作权限设置>
-- 有限回滚材料：<文档公共访问和协作权限设置快照 / 不适用>
+- 验证方式：执行后重新读取 <元数据 / 目标公共访问和协作权限设置>
+- 有限回滚材料：<目标公共访问和协作权限设置快照 / 不适用>
 
 请确认是否执行。
 ```
@@ -419,6 +419,6 @@ Agent 必须回复：
 已完成：<read checks / writes>
 验证：<fresh read result or async permission-request approval note>
 清单状态：<risk_id status updates / not applicable>
-回滚材料：<文档公共访问和协作权限设置快照 / 不适用>
+回滚材料：<目标公共访问和协作权限设置快照 / 不适用>
 剩余限制：<unsupported_checks / partial facts / approvals>
 ```

skills/lark-drive/references/lark-drive-workflow-permission-governance.md

@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ Risk / Structure: `R2` / `S2`
 - 目录组织、迁移、归档或清理；这类需求应使用知识整理 workflow。
 - 内容审查、过期内容判断或知识质量评分。
 - backup owner 补充、部门 / 项目负责人绑定、协作者创建 / 撤销、成员列表审计；本 workflow 只支持把 owner 转移给每个目标明确指定的新 owner，不建模 backup owner 或负责人绑定关系。
-- 文件夹自身公开权限审计或修复。`drive permission.public get` / `patch` 不支持 `type=folder`；必须记录到 `unsupported_checks`，然后继续读取文件夹下其他支持的文档事实。
+- 文件夹自身公开权限审计或修复。文件夹自身权限设置可以用 `drive +permission-get-setting` 读取；写入是否支持必须以运行时 schema 和明确需求为准，不能猜测执行 `patch type=folder`。
 - 当前身份无法枚举到的不可见文档的完整发现；只能处理已发现目标，或用户显式提供的 URL / token。
 - 未按范围确认的批量写入。
 
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ Risk / Structure: `R2` / `S2`
 | `PARSE_INTENT` | 本文件、[`lark-drive-workflow.md`](lark-drive-workflow.md)、[`../../lark-shared/SKILL.md`](../../lark-shared/SKILL.md) |
 | `TARGET_INSPECT` | [`lark-drive-inspect.md`](lark-drive-inspect.md) |
 | `DISCOVER_TARGETS` | 容器范围时读取 [`../../lark-wiki/references/lark-wiki-node-list.md`](../../lark-wiki/references/lark-wiki-node-list.md) 或 [`lark-drive-files-list.md`](lark-drive-files-list.md) |
-| `FACT_READ` | `lark-cli schema drive.metas.batch_query`；涉及公开权限时再读取 `lark-cli schema drive.permission.public.get`；涉及活跃度、访问复核或生命周期判断时再读取 `lark-cli schema drive.file.statistics.get` 和 `lark-cli schema drive.file.view_records.list` |
+| `FACT_READ` | `lark-cli schema drive.metas.batch_query`；涉及权限设置读取时使用 `drive +permission-get-setting`；涉及活跃度、访问复核或生命周期判断时再读取 `lark-cli schema drive.file.statistics.get` 和 `lark-cli schema drive.file.view_records.list` |
 | `RISK_ASSESS` | 本文件的 `Risk Classification` |
 | `EXEC_CONFIRM` | 只为用户选择的动作读取 [`lark-drive-apply-permission.md`](lark-drive-apply-permission.md)、[`lark-drive-secure-label.md`](lark-drive-secure-label.md)，或 `lark-cli schema drive.permission.public.patch` / `lark-cli schema drive.permission.members.transfer_owner`；需要确认模板时读取 [`lark-drive-workflow-permission-governance-outputs.md`](lark-drive-workflow-permission-governance-outputs.md) |
 | `EXECUTE` | 复用 `EXEC_CONFIRM` 已加载且已确认的写命令上下文 |
@@ -76,9 +76,9 @@ Risk / Structure: `R2` / `S2`
 | State | Protocol Step | Agent MUST Do | User-Facing Output | wait_for_user | Next State |
 |-------|---------------|---------------|--------------------|---------------|------------|
 | `PARSE_INTENT` | `route` / `scope` | 解析 intent、target scope、desired policy，以及只读审计、单目标公开性判断、权限申请、owner 转移还是修复模式；单目标公开性判断设置 `intent=public_exposure_check`、`target_scope=single_resource` | 范围确认；如果缺少目标、新 owner 或期望动作，只问一个澄清问题 | 缺少 target / new owner / action，或容器范围需要用户确认时为 `true` | `TARGET_INSPECT` |
-| `TARGET_INSPECT` | `scope` | 解析单资源、明确列表、Wiki space / node、Drive folder；保留原始 URL、scope type、canonical token/type | 目标范围表，包含 scope、title/type/token status | 除非解析失败，否则为 `false` | `DISCOVER_TARGETS` or `FACT_READ` |
+| `TARGET_INSPECT` | `scope` | 解析单资源、明确列表、Wiki space / node、Drive folder；Drive folder 直接从 URL 路径或显式 `type=folder` 解析，不调用 `drive +inspect`；保留原始 URL、scope type、canonical token/type | 目标范围表，包含 scope、title/type/token status | 除非解析失败，否则为 `false` | `DISCOVER_TARGETS` or `FACT_READ` |
 | `DISCOVER_TARGETS` | `scope` / `read` | 对 Wiki space / node 或 Drive folder 递归只读枚举，归一化为 `discovered_targets`；记录 `discovery_blockers` | 发现进度和覆盖摘要；不展示内部 cursor/token，除非用户要求 | 除非发现范围无法确认或全部被阻断，否则为 `false` | `FACT_READ` |
-| `FACT_READ` | `read` | 对直接目标或 `discovered_targets` 执行 `drive metas batch_query`；对支持的非 folder 目标执行 `drive permission.public get`；当 `intent=public_exposure_check` 且 `target_scope=single_resource` 时，可复用 `drive +inspect` 返回的 title / URL / type，只补读文档公共访问和协作权限设置；在用户要求活跃度 / 访问复核 / 生命周期判断时读取访问统计和访问记录 | 权限事实摘要、coverage summary、activity facts 和 unsupported checks | 除非所有目标都被 auth 阻断，否则为 `false` | `RISK_ASSESS` |
+| `FACT_READ` | `read` | 对直接目标或 `discovered_targets` 执行 `drive metas batch_query`；对支持的文件、文件夹或云文档目标执行 `drive +permission-get-setting` 读取自身权限设置；当 `intent=public_exposure_check` 且 `target_scope=single_resource` 时，可复用 `drive +inspect` 返回的 title / URL / type，只补读目标公共访问和协作权限设置；在用户要求活跃度 / 访问复核 / 生命周期判断时读取访问统计和访问记录 | 权限事实摘要、coverage summary、activity facts 和 unsupported checks | 除非所有目标都被 auth 阻断，否则为 `false` | `RISK_ASSESS` |
 | `RISK_ASSESS` | `assess/plan` | 对每个可审计目标生成 `per_target_permission_assessment` 并分类证据；如用户提供 policy，则对照 policy；`public_exposure_check + single_resource` 只渲染单目标结论，不生成 `risk_id`；owner 转移路径生成 `owner_transfer_candidates` / `owner_transfer_plan`；治理路径构建可定位风险清单、访问复核清单、dry-run 整改计划或候选修复计划，完整清单必须生成稳定 `risk_id` | 带 priority、URL、risk_id、owner、sec_label 的 findings、confidence、review items、建议动作和下一步 CTA；单目标公开性判断只输出结论和关键字段 | 治理路径为 `true`，单目标公开性判断为 `false` | `EXEC_CONFIRM` or `DONE` |
 | `EXEC_CONFIRM` | `confirm` | 展示准确写入范围、command family、target count、risk、verification method | 确认请求 | `true` | `EXECUTE` or `DONE` |
 | `EXECUTE` | `execute` | 只执行 `Command Map` 中已确认的写入 | 进度 / 结果摘要 | 除非被阻断，否则为 `false` | `VERIFY` |
@@ -91,21 +91,21 @@ Risk / Structure: `R2` / `S2`
 
 | State | Allowed Command Families | Purpose |
 |-------|--------------------------|---------|
-| `TARGET_INSPECT` | `drive +inspect` | 解析 URL、type、canonical token、title 和 wiki unwrap data |
+| `TARGET_INSPECT` | `drive +inspect` | 解析非 folder URL、type、canonical token、title 和 wiki unwrap data；Drive folder 不支持 `+inspect`，必须从 URL 路径或显式 `type=folder` 直接解析 |
 | `DISCOVER_TARGETS` | `wiki +node-list` | 递归发现 Wiki space / node 下当前身份可见的节点 |
 | `DISCOVER_TARGETS` | `drive files list` | 递归发现 Drive folder 下当前身份可见的文件和子文件夹 |
 | `FACT_READ` | `drive metas batch_query` | 读取 title、URL、owner 和 secure-label metadata |
-| `FACT_READ` | `drive permission.public get` | 读取支持类型的文档公共访问和协作权限设置，包括链接分享、对外分享、协作者管理、复制内容、创建副本、打印、下载和评论 |
+| `FACT_READ` | `drive +permission-get-setting` | 读取支持类型的文件、文件夹或云文档自身权限设置，包括公开访问、分享、协作者管理、安全与评论 |
 | `FACT_READ` | `drive file.statistics get` | 在用户要求活跃度、闲置暴露、生命周期或访问复核时读取文件访问统计 |
 | `FACT_READ` | `drive file.view_records list` | 在用户要求最近访问人、访问复核或低活跃证据时读取访问记录 |
 | `EXEC_CONFIRM` | `drive +secure-label-list` | 提议 label update 前解析可用 secure-label IDs |
-| `EXEC_CONFIRM` | `drive permission.members auth` | 文档公共访问和协作权限设置修改前检查 `action=manage_public` |
+| `EXEC_CONFIRM` | `drive permission.members auth` | 目标公共访问和协作权限设置修改前检查 `action=manage_public` |
 | `EXEC_CONFIRM` | `lark-cli schema drive.permission.members.transfer_owner` | owner 转移前读取当前字段、支持类型和高风险写入门禁 |
 | `EXECUTE` | `drive +apply-permission` | 向 owner 提交 view/edit access request；只允许单目标、小列表或已明确确认的候选列表逐个执行 |
 | `EXECUTE` | `drive permission.public patch` | 修改已确认的 public/link settings；必须传 `--yes` |
 | `EXECUTE` | `drive permission.members transfer_owner` | 转移已确认目标的 owner；必须传 `--yes` |
 | `EXECUTE` | `drive +secure-label-update` | 设置已确认的 secure-label ID |
-| `VERIFY` | `drive metas batch_query`, `drive permission.public get` | 验证支持的 metadata，包括 owner、secure-label 和文档公共访问与协作权限设置变更；权限申请只能表述为已发起 |
+| `VERIFY` | `drive metas batch_query`, `drive +permission-get-setting` | 验证支持的 metadata，包括 owner、secure-label 和目标公共访问与协作权限设置变更；权限申请只能表述为已发起 |
 
 ## Command Patterns
 
@@ -119,9 +119,9 @@ Risk / Structure: `R2` / `S2`
 
 1. "所有文档"只表示当前身份在确认范围内可枚举到的文档。不可见、无权限、API 不返回或工具预算不足的部分必须进入 `discovery_blockers` 或 `unsupported_checks`。
 2. 发现阶段必须生成稳定 `path`。不要只保存 title；同名文档必须能通过 path 或 token 区分。
-3. 只把 `drive.permission.public.get` 当前 schema 支持的类型加入公开权限可审计目标。已知支持包括 `doc`、`sheet`、`file`、`wiki`、`bitable`、`docx`、`mindnote`、`minutes`、`slides`；未来新增类型以运行时 schema 为准。
+3. 权限设置读取使用 `drive +permission-get-setting`，目标类型包括 `doc`、`sheet`、`file`、`wiki`、`bitable`、`docx`、`mindnote`、`minutes`、`slides`、`folder`；未来新增类型以 shortcut 和 OpenAPI 元数据为准。
 4. `minutes` 只能作为 `partial_public_permission` 目标：可读取 / 修改公开权限和 owner 转移能力以运行时 schema 为准，但 `drive metas batch_query` 当前不支持 `minutes`，URL、owner、密级等 metadata 可能进入 `unsupported_checks`。
-5. `folder` 只作为递归容器，不执行 `permission.public get` / `patch`。如果用户明确要求 owner 转移且 schema 支持 `folder`，必须按 owner-transfer 写入规则单独确认。`shortcut`、`catalog` 或缺少 stable token/type 的条目必须记录为 unsupported，除非后续 API 明确解析出支持目标。
+5. `folder` 作为递归容器时先枚举子资源；如用户明确要查询文件夹自身权限设置，可对该文件夹单独执行 `drive +permission-get-setting --token <folder_token> --type folder`。不要执行 raw `permission.public patch type=folder`，除非 schema 和需求都明确支持。`shortcut`、`catalog` 或缺少 stable token/type 的条目必须记录为 unsupported，除非后续 API 明确解析出支持目标。
 6. 对大范围目标输出进度时，只展示已扫描容器数、已发现目标数、已审计目标数、剩余队列或 blocker；不要默认展示内部 page token / cursor。
 
 Wiki space / node 发现：
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ Wiki space / node 发现：
 
 Drive folder 发现：
 
-1. `/drive/folder/<folder_token>` 解析为 `target_scope=drive_folder`。文件夹自身公开权限不支持；继续枚举其子文档。
+1. `/drive/folder/<folder_token>` 解析为 `target_scope=drive_folder`。默认继续枚举其子文档；只有用户明确要求文件夹自身权限设置时，才额外调用 `drive +permission-get-setting --token <folder_token> --type folder` 读取该文件夹自身设置。
 2. 按 [`lark-drive-files-list.md`](lark-drive-files-list.md) 递归处理 `data.files`、`has_more` 和 `next_page_token`。不要把第一页数量当作完整范围。
 3. 只对返回项中的 `folder` 继续递归；对子文档按 `type + token` 归一化为 `discovered_targets`。
 4. 如果某个目录分页失败、无 continuation token、权限不足或 API 报错，只阻断该目录分支，并在 `discovery_blockers` 中记录；继续处理其他可枚举分支。
@@ -141,11 +141,11 @@ Drive folder 发现：
 ## Fact Read Rules
 
 1. `drive metas batch_query` 单次最多 200 个 `request_docs`；当 `targets` 或 `discovered_targets` 超过 200 个时，必须分批读取并合并结果。
-2. `drive permission.public get` 没有批量读取接口；对支持目标逐个读取。单个目标失败时记录 `unsupported_checks` 或 `partial`，不要阻断其他目标。
+2. `drive +permission-get-setting` 没有批量读取接口；对支持目标逐个读取。单个目标失败时记录 `unsupported_checks` 或 `partial`，不要阻断其他目标。
 3. 对 Wiki 发现目标，公开权限读取优先使用 `type=wiki` + `node_token`；metadata 可使用 `obj_type` + `obj_token` 补充 title、owner、URL 和 `sec_label_name`。
 4. 当 intent 是 `list_permission_settings` 时，只输出权限设置清单和覆盖限制，不主动生成修复计划。
 5. 单目标、多目标明确列表和容器发现目标都必须复用同一套逐目标事实读取与语义归一逻辑；差异只体现在目标来源、coverage summary 和输出聚合。
-6. `permission_public` 用户可见含义是“文档公共访问和协作权限设置”，语义以官方 OpenAPI 字段说明为准，同时兼容当前 CLI schema 返回的字段：优先使用 `external_access_entity`，缺失时才用 `external_access` boolean 映射为 `open` / `closed`；`manage_collaborator_entity`、`copy_entity`、`lock_switch` 等字段缺失时标记为 unknown，不要伪造；未识别字段保留在 raw evidence / partial note 中。
+6. `permission_public` 用户可见含义是“目标公共访问和协作权限设置”，语义以官方 OpenAPI 字段说明为准，同时兼容当前 CLI schema 返回的字段：优先使用 `external_access_entity`，缺失时才用 `external_access` boolean 映射为 `open` / `closed`；`manage_collaborator_entity`、`copy_entity`、`lock_switch` 等字段缺失时标记为 unknown，不要伪造；未识别字段保留在 raw evidence / partial note 中。
 7. `drive file.statistics get` 和 `drive file.view_records list` 只在用户要求最近访问、活跃度、闲置暴露、访问复核，或用户提供的 policy 明确依赖活跃度时执行；不要为普通权限审计默认读取访问记录。
 8. 访问统计 / 访问记录当前只对 `doc`、`docx`、`sheet`、`bitable`、`mindnote`、`wiki`、`file` 作为支持类型处理。其他类型必须进入 `unsupported_checks`，不能推断活跃度。
 9. `view_records` 是访问证据，不是权限列表。没有返回访问记录只能表述为“未获得最近访问证据”或“低活跃候选”，不能表述为“无人有权限”。
@@ -162,17 +162,17 @@ Drive folder 发现：
 - `PolicyReview`：复制、创建副本、打印、下载、评论等依赖 policy 的设置；没有明确 policy 时不要称为高风险。
 - `Unknown`：读取失败、已删除、无权限、API 不支持、协作者名单 / 继承链 / DLP / AI 索引 / 审计日志未覆盖。
 
-每个可审计目标都必须先归一化为 `per_target_permission_assessment`，再按 [`lark-drive-workflow-permission-governance-outputs.md`](lark-drive-workflow-permission-governance-outputs.md) 的 `Semantic Rendering` 渲染。`public_exposure_check` 只是 `target_count=1` 的轻量渲染模式；它和多目标、容器诊断复用同一套语义字段与风险分类。该判断只覆盖当前文档公共访问和协作权限设置，不审计协作者名单、历史权限变更、完整继承链或审计日志。
+每个可审计目标都必须先归一化为 `per_target_permission_assessment`，再按 [`lark-drive-workflow-permission-governance-outputs.md`](lark-drive-workflow-permission-governance-outputs.md) 的 `Semantic Rendering` 渲染。`public_exposure_check` 只是 `target_count=1` 的轻量渲染模式；它和多目标、容器诊断复用同一套语义字段与风险分类。该判断只覆盖当前目标公共访问和协作权限设置，不审计协作者名单、历史权限变更、完整继承链或审计日志。
 
 `AI 检索暴露候选风险` 只是基于权限和标签的代理标签。除非另有工具明确返回索引状态，否则不要声称某个文档已经被 Agent、Copilot 或 RAG 索引。
 
 ## 写入规则
 
-- 文档公共访问和协作权限设置修改（`drive permission.public patch`）属于高风险写入。请求确认前，必须展示 target title、token、current setting、desired setting 和准确 field changes。
+- 目标公共访问和协作权限设置修改（`drive permission.public patch`）属于高风险写入。请求确认前，必须展示 target title、token、current setting、desired setting 和准确 field changes。
 - 如果 `manage_public_auth.auth_result=false`，禁止 patch。告诉用户需要具备 manage-public 权限的用户，或由 owner 操作。
-- `drive permission.public get` 只用于 `drive +inspect` 或 `DISCOVER_TARGETS` 可解析且运行时 schema 支持的目标类型；类型集合不要硬编码，执行时以 `lark-cli schema drive.permission.public.get` 为准。
+- 权限设置读取使用 `drive +permission-get-setting`；裸 token 必须传 `--type`，URL 可以自动推断。写入仍使用 `drive permission.public patch`，只 patch 已解析且 schema 明确支持的类型和字段，不要把读取支持的 `folder` 自动外推为可写入。
 - 不要 patch 已解析类型不支持的字段。对于 wiki 目标，必须省略 schema 明确标注为 wiki 不支持的字段。
-- 不要在同一个写入确认中合并密级标签更新和文档公共访问与协作权限设置修改；必须分别确认。
+- 不要在同一个写入确认中合并密级标签更新和目标公共访问与协作权限设置修改；必须分别确认。
 - `drive +apply-permission` 默认不批量执行；每次调用都会向 owner 发送通知。
 - `permission_request_candidates` 可以来自用户直接提供的目标、明确列表或容器发现目标；只要能构造 token、type、权限类型和申请理由，就可以进入候选。不要因为目标不在 `discovered_targets` 中而拒绝单目标 / 小列表权限申请。
 - 容器范围内的"统一申请权限"必须先产出 `permission_request_candidates`。未展示候选目标、数量、权限类型和 owner 通知影响前，禁止调用 `drive +apply-permission`。
@@ -182,8 +182,8 @@ Drive folder 发现：
 - 批量 owner 转移必须逐个顺序执行；失败项进入结果清单，不要重复执行已成功目标。`remove_old_owner=true` 或 `old_owner_perm` 降权必须单独在确认中高亮。
 - 用户要求“生成整改方案 / dry-run / 先看看会改什么”时，只生成 `remediation_plan`，不执行任何写命令。dry-run 必须包含 target count、field changes、跳过原因、验证方式和有限回滚范围。
 - 用户基于完整风险清单选择对象时，必须先解析 `risk_id`、风险分组、URL 或 artifact 中 `selected=true` 的行，生成 `selected_risk_items`。无法匹配到当前 `risk_manifest` 的选择必须要求用户重新确认或重新读取清单。
-- 针对 `selected_risk_items` 生成 dry-run 前，必须重新读取所选目标的 `drive permission.public get`；如果当前设置和清单快照不同，标记为 `changed_since_report` 并跳过或要求用户确认更新后的计划。
-- 执行 `drive permission.public patch` 前，必须把当前 `public_permission_facts` 中会被改动的字段保存为 `public_permission_snapshots`。该快照只用于文档公共访问和协作权限设置字段的有限回滚说明，不覆盖协作者、owner、继承权限或密级标签。
+- 针对 `selected_risk_items` 生成 dry-run 前，必须重新读取所选目标的 `drive +permission-get-setting`；如果当前设置和清单快照不同，标记为 `changed_since_report` 并跳过或要求用户确认更新后的计划。
+- 执行 `drive permission.public patch` 前，必须把当前 `public_permission_facts` 中会被改动的字段保存为 `public_permission_snapshots`。该快照只用于目标公共访问和协作权限设置字段的有限回滚说明，不覆盖协作者、owner、继承权限或密级标签。
 - 如果用户要求批量收紧权限，必须按风险分层和目标顺序逐个执行；失败项进入结果清单，不要因为单个失败而重复执行已成功目标。
 - 遇到 secure-label downgrade error `1063013` 时，停止重试，并告诉用户需要在文档 UI 中完成审批。
 

skills/lark-shared/SKILL.md

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 ---
 name: lark-shared
 version: 1.0.0
-description: "Use for lark-cli setup/auth/profile-selection tasks: auth login/status/logout, user vs bot identity, business-domain permissions (--domain, including all/docs/drive), missing scopes, revoking authorization, handling _notice JSON, profile/tenant/app-identity selection, or any request to make this task/session (or all following lark-cli commands) run under a specific profile/tenant — via LARKSUITE_CLI_PROFILE, --profile, unset LARKSUITE_CLI_PROFILE, or whoami identity diagnostics."
+description: "Use for lark-cli setup/auth tasks: auth login/status/logout, user vs bot identity, business-domain permissions (--domain, including all/docs/drive), missing scopes, revoking authorization, or handling _notice JSON."
 ---
 
 # lark-cli 共享规则
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ lark-cli config init --new
 | 获取全部权限 | `lark-cli auth login --domain all --no-wait --json` |
 | 按业务域授权 | `lark-cli auth login --domain docs --domain drive --no-wait --json`；`--domain` 可重复，也可用逗号分隔 |
 | 指定单个 scope 授权 | `lark-cli auth login --scope "<scope>" --no-wait --json` |
-| 检查当前登录态、是谁登录、token 是否有效 | 必须运行 `lark-cli auth status --json --verify`；回答时引用 `identity`、`verified`、`identities.user.status`、`identities.user.userName`、`identities.user.openId`（用户 open id）、`identities.user.tokenStatus`、`identities.user.scope` |
+| 检查当前登录态、是谁登录、token 是否有效 | `lark-cli auth status --json --verify`；回答时引用 `identity`、`verified`、`identities.user.status`、`identities.user.userName`、`identities.user.openId`（用户 open id）、`identities.user.tokenStatus`、`identities.user.scope` |
 | 快速查看当前身份状态 | `lark-cli whoami`；实际生效的那一个身份 |
 | 退出当前机器的用户登录态 | `lark-cli auth logout --json`；`loggedOut:true` 表示注销成功 |
 | bot 缺少权限 | 不要执行 `auth login`；引导用户在开发者后台开通 bot scope，优先复用错误里的 `console_url` |
@@ -126,10 +126,6 @@ lark-cli auth login --device-code <device_code>
 - **不要在同一轮中展示 URL 后立刻执行 `--device-code`**，这会导致用户看不到 URL
 - **禁止缓存 `verification_url` 或 `device_code`**：每次需要授权时，必须重新执行 `lark-cli auth login --no-wait --json` 生成新的链接。不要将授权链接和 device code 存入上下文供后续复用
 
-## Profile 选择
-
-Profile selection: use `--profile <profile-or-appId>` for one command; for a task/session, prefix later `lark-cli` commands with `LARKSUITE_CLI_PROFILE=<profile-or-appId>` unless shell env persists, where you may `export` once and later `unset`. Ask if the selector is unknown; do not merely promise. Use `whoami` for the effective app/profile identity and `auth status --json --verify` for OAuth token state. Do not run `lark-cli profile use` unless changing the long-term default, and do not set `LARKSUITE_CLI_APP_ID`/`LARKSUITE_CLI_APP_SECRET` unless direct credentials are provided.
-
 ## 更新检查
 
 lark-cli 命令执行后，如果检测到新版本，JSON 输出中会包含 `_notice.update` 字段（含 `message`、`command` 等）。

tests/cli_e2e/drive/drive_permission_get_setting_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+package drive
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	clie2e "github.com/larksuite/cli/tests/cli_e2e"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+	"github.com/tidwall/gjson"
+)
+
+func TestDrive_PermissionGetSettingDryRun(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
+	t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_APP_ID", "app")
+	t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_APP_SECRET", "secret")
+	t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_BRAND", "feishu")
+
+	tests := []struct {
+		name     string
+		args     []string
+		wantURL  string
+		wantType string
+	}{
+		{
+			name: "bare folder token",
+			args: []string{
+				"drive", "+permission-get-setting",
+				"--token", "fldE2E001",
+				"--type", "folder",
+				"--dry-run",
+			},
+			wantURL:  "/open-apis/drive/v2/permissions/fldE2E001/public",
+			wantType: "folder",
+		},
+		{
+			name: "folder URL",
+			args: []string{
+				"drive", "+permission-get-setting",
+				"--token", "https://example.feishu.cn/drive/folder/fldE2E001?from=share",
+				"--dry-run",
+			},
+			wantURL:  "/open-apis/drive/v2/permissions/fldE2E001/public",
+			wantType: "folder",
+		},
+		{
+			name: "docx URL",
+			args: []string{
+				"drive", "+permission-get-setting",
+				"--token", "https://example.feishu.cn/docx/doxE2E001",
+				"--dry-run",
+			},
+			wantURL:  "/open-apis/drive/v2/permissions/doxE2E001/public",
+			wantType: "docx",
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, temp := range tests {
+		tt := temp
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 30*time.Second)
+			t.Cleanup(cancel)
+
+			result, err := clie2e.RunCmd(ctx, clie2e.Request{
+				Args:      tt.args,
+				DefaultAs: "bot",
+			})
+			require.NoError(t, err)
+			result.AssertExitCode(t, 0)
+
+			out := result.Stdout
+			if got := gjson.Get(out, "api.0.method").String(); got != "GET" {
+				t.Fatalf("method = %q, want GET\nstdout:\n%s", got, out)
+			}
+			if got := gjson.Get(out, "api.0.url").String(); got != tt.wantURL {
+				t.Fatalf("url = %q, want %q\nstdout:\n%s", got, tt.wantURL, out)
+			}
+			if got := gjson.Get(out, "api.0.params.type").String(); got != tt.wantType {
+				t.Fatalf("params.type = %q, want %q\nstdout:\n%s", got, tt.wantType, out)
+			}
+			if gjson.Get(out, "folder_token").Exists() {
+				t.Fatalf("folder_token exists in dry-run output, want omitted\nstdout:\n%s", out)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestDrive_PermissionGetSettingWorkflow(t *testing.T) {
+	parentT := t
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 2*time.Minute)
+	t.Cleanup(cancel)
+
+	folderName := "lark-cli-e2e-drive-permission-get-setting-" + clie2e.GenerateSuffix()
+	folderToken := createDriveFolderOrSkipPermission(t, parentT, ctx, folderName)
+
+	result, err := clie2e.RunCmd(ctx, clie2e.Request{
+		Args: []string{
+			"drive", "+permission-get-setting",
+			"--token", folderToken,
+			"--type", "folder",
+			"--format", "json",
+		},
+		DefaultAs: "bot",
+	})
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	if result.ExitCode != 0 {
+		combinedOutput := strings.ToLower(result.Stdout + "\n" + result.Stderr)
+		if strings.Contains(combinedOutput, "docs:permission.setting:read") ||
+			strings.Contains(combinedOutput, "app scope not enabled") ||
+			strings.Contains(combinedOutput, "missing required scope") ||
+			strings.Contains(combinedOutput, "99991672") {
+			t.Skipf("skip drive permission setting workflow due to missing bot scope docs:permission.setting:read: %s", strings.TrimSpace(result.Stdout+"\n"+result.Stderr))
+		}
+	}
+	result.AssertExitCode(t, 0)
+	result.AssertStdoutStatus(t, true)
+
+	if !gjson.Get(result.Stdout, "data.permission_public").Exists() {
+		t.Fatalf("permission_public missing in output\nstdout:\n%s", result.Stdout)
+	}
+}