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27a2f2758b
AI agents running inside OpenClaw / Hermes were routinely creating a parallel
app via `config init --new` instead of binding to the agent's existing app,
because every "not configured" hint and several deny errors hard-coded
`config init` regardless of workspace. Once bound, the same agents could
silently grant themselves user identity (impersonation) without the user
ever seeing a risk message in chat.
Changes:
- Introduce `core.NotConfiguredError` / `NoActiveProfileError` /
`reconfigureHint` helpers that branch on `CurrentWorkspace()`. In agent
workspaces they point at `lark-cli config bind --help` (a help page, not
a ready-to-run command) so AI must read the binding workflow and confirm
identity preset with the user before acting. In local terminals they
preserve the previous `config init --new` guidance.
- Migrate every `config init` hint that should be workspace-aware:
RequireConfigForProfile, default credential provider, credential provider
fallback, secret-resolve mismatch, config show, strict-mode entry-point
errors, default-as, profile use/rename/remove, auth list, doctor's
config_file check (which now also wraps the OS-level "no such file"
noise into the user-shaped "not configured" message).
- Refuse `config init` when run inside an OpenClaw / Hermes workspace by
default; add `--force-init` for the rare case the user genuinely wants
a parallel app. Without this guard, hint fixes were undone the moment
AI ignored them.
- Rewrite the strict-mode deny errors in cmd/auth/login.go, cmd/prune.go,
and internal/cmdutil/factory.go. The previous "AI agents are strictly
prohibited from modifying this setting" terminated AI reasoning while
providing no real gate. New errors point at `config strict-mode --help`
with the legitimate confirmation flow and explicitly note that switching
does NOT require re-bind. Integration test envelopes updated.
- Tighten `config bind --help` and `config strict-mode --help` to encode
the user-confirmation discipline directly: identity preset semantics
(bot-only vs user-default), "DO NOT switch without explicit user
confirmation", and a cross-reference clarifying that `config bind` is
for changing the underlying app while `config strict-mode` is the
policy-only switch (resolves an ambiguity an audit run found).
- Surface user-identity (impersonation) risk at every config write that
newly grants it, by reusing the canonical IdentityEscalationMessage
string from bind_messages.go:
- `noticeUserDefaultRisk` fires on flag-mode bind landing on
user-default, including the first-time case `warnIdentityEscalation`
misses (it requires a previous bot lock).
- `setStrictMode` warns when transitioning bot → user or bot → off
(newly permits user identity); stays quiet on narrowing changes
and on off → user (off already permitted user).
- Add tests: notconfigured_test.go (workspace branches),
init_guard_test.go (refuse + --force-init bypass), bind_warning_test.go
(user-default warning fires; bot-only does not), strict_mode_warning_test.go
(5 transitions covering both warn and no-warn paths).
Two follow-ups intentionally deferred: the keychain master-key hint at
internal/keychain/keychain.go:42 still suggests `config init` because the
keychain package can't import core (would be circular); fixing requires
either parameterizing the hint via callback or extracting workspace into
its own package. The lark-shared skill doc still tells AI to run
`config init` for first-time setup; updating the skill is in scope for
a follow-up PR.
Change-Id: I02273e044d9e061d211ceaa4f3ed5a3fb28325b3
63 lines
2.1 KiB
Go
63 lines
2.1 KiB
Go
// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
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package config
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import (
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"os"
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"path/filepath"
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"strings"
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"testing"
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"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/cmdutil"
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)
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// runHermesBindWithIdentity boots a Hermes-shaped fake env, runs `config bind`
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// with the given identity preset in flag (non-TUI) mode, and returns captured
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// stderr. Hermes is the simplest source to fake (single .env file).
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func runHermesBindWithIdentity(t *testing.T, identity string) string {
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t.Helper()
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saveWorkspace(t)
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configDir := t.TempDir()
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t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_CONFIG_DIR", configDir)
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hermesHome := t.TempDir()
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t.Setenv("HERMES_HOME", hermesHome)
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envContent := "FEISHU_APP_ID=cli_hermes_abc\nFEISHU_APP_SECRET=hermes_secret_123\nFEISHU_DOMAIN=lark\n"
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if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(hermesHome, ".env"), []byte(envContent), 0600); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("write .env: %v", err)
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}
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f, _, stderr, _ := cmdutil.TestFactory(t, nil)
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err := configBindRun(&BindOptions{
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Factory: f,
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Source: "hermes",
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Identity: identity,
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Lang: "zh",
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})
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("bind failed: %v", err)
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}
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return stderr.String()
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}
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// TestConfigBindRun_UserDefaultIdentity_WarnsAboutImpersonation covers the
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// gap that previously slipped through: a fresh flag-mode bind landing on
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// user-default. warnIdentityEscalation requires a previous bot lock to fire,
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// and IdentityUserDefaultDesc only renders in TUI selection — so without
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// noticeUserDefaultRisk the user/AI never see the impersonation risk on a
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// first-time user-default bind.
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func TestConfigBindRun_UserDefaultIdentity_WarnsAboutImpersonation(t *testing.T) {
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out := runHermesBindWithIdentity(t, "user-default")
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if !strings.Contains(out, bindMsgZh.IdentityEscalationMessage) {
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t.Errorf("user-default bind must surface IdentityEscalationMessage; got: %s", out)
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}
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}
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func TestConfigBindRun_BotOnlyIdentity_NoImpersonationWarning(t *testing.T) {
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out := runHermesBindWithIdentity(t, "bot-only")
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if strings.Contains(out, bindMsgZh.IdentityEscalationMessage) {
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t.Errorf("bot-only bind must NOT warn about impersonation; got: %s", out)
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}
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}
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