Files
larksuite-cli/cmd/prune.go
evandance c5b5aece33 refactor: retire legacy error envelopes and enforce typed contract (#1449)
* refactor: retire legacy error envelopes and enforce typed contract

Consolidate all command error reporting onto the typed errs.* contract, remove
the legacy error surface that predated it, and tighten the lint guards so the
contract holds across the whole repository going forward.

Every failure now reaches stderr as one envelope shape: a category, an
optional subtype, a human- and agent-readable message, and a recovery hint,
with invalid parameters listed under `params`. The legacy ExitError envelope,
its constructors, and the boundary bridge that promoted untyped config and
authorization errors are deleted, leaving a single path from error to wire.
Predicate commands keep their silent-exit behavior through a dedicated signal
that carries only an exit code.

Infrastructure paths that still emitted ad-hoc envelopes — flag parsing,
unknown commands and subcommands, plugin and policy guards, confirmation
prompts, and auth/config failures — now classify into the same taxonomy.
Business, API, auth, and config exit codes are preserved; the one behavioral
change is that Cobra usage failures (missing required flag, unknown command,
bad arguments) now emit the typed validation envelope and exit 2, matching the
explicit flag and subcommand guards, instead of Cobra's plain-text exit 1.

Enforcement is repo-wide rather than per-path:
- The errscontract guards run by default everywhere instead of through a
  migration allowlist, so legacy envelopes cannot be reintroduced anywhere.
- errorlint runs across the whole repository: every error wrap must use %w and
  every comparison must use errors.Is/errors.As, so interior wraps stay legal
  but can no longer break the chain the typed boundary relies on.
- The errs-no-bare-wrap guard is keyed by structural prefix instead of an
  explicit per-domain allowlist, so new shortcut domains are covered without
  editing a list. It runs where forbidigo is enabled (the shortcut domains and
  the auth/config/service command groups); repo-wide chain integrity for the
  remaining command paths is carried by errorlint above.

* test: align cli_e2e success assertions to the ok envelope

The api and service success path now emits the {"ok":true} envelope, so the
cli_e2e workflow assertions that still expected the old {"code":0} shape via
AssertStdoutStatus(t, 0) fail once they run with live credentials. Switch those
workflow assertions to AssertStdoutStatus(t, true); the fake-payload helper test
in core_test.go keeps its code-shape assertion.
2026-06-17 19:42:38 +08:00

137 lines
5.1 KiB
Go

// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
package cmd
import (
"fmt"
"slices"
"github.com/spf13/cobra"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/errs"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/cmdpolicy"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/cmdutil"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
)
// pruneForStrictMode removes commands incompatible with the active strict mode.
func pruneForStrictMode(root *cobra.Command, mode core.StrictMode) {
pruneIncompatible(root, mode)
pruneEmpty(root)
}
// pruneIncompatible recursively replaces commands whose annotation declares
// identities incompatible with the forced identity. Commands without annotation are kept.
// Hidden stubs preserve direct execution so users get a strict-mode error instead
// of Cobra's generic "unknown flag" fallback from the parent command.
func pruneIncompatible(parent *cobra.Command, mode core.StrictMode) {
forced := string(mode.ForcedIdentity())
var toRemove []*cobra.Command
var toAdd []*cobra.Command
for _, child := range parent.Commands() {
ids := cmdutil.GetSupportedIdentities(child)
if ids != nil && !slices.Contains(ids, forced) {
toRemove = append(toRemove, child)
toAdd = append(toAdd, strictModeStubFrom(child, mode))
continue
}
pruneIncompatible(child, mode)
}
if len(toRemove) > 0 {
parent.RemoveCommand(toRemove...)
parent.AddCommand(toAdd...)
}
}
func strictModeStubFrom(child *cobra.Command, mode core.StrictMode) *cobra.Command {
// The denial annotations let the hook layer's populateInvocationDenial
// recognise this command as denied, so the Wrap chain is physically
// isolated (wrapRunE takes the DeniedByPolicy branch and calls the
// stub RunE directly). Without these, a plugin Wrapper registered
// against platform.All() could intercept and silently swallow the
// strict-mode error -- breaking strict-mode's "hard boundary" contract.
//
// Args + PersistentPreRunE overrides mirror cmdpolicy/apply.go::installDenyStub:
//
// - Args=ArbitraryArgs: with DisableFlagParsing the user's flags
// look like positional args; the original child's Args validator
// (e.g. cobra.NoArgs) would fire BEFORE RunE and produce a
// cobra usage error instead of our strict_mode envelope.
//
// - PersistentPreRunE no-op: cmd/auth/auth.go declares a parent
// PersistentPreRunE that returns external_provider when env
// credentials are set. Cobra's "first wins walking up" would
// pick auth's instead of our denial. A leaf-level no-op makes
// cobra stop here and proceed to the wrapped RunE.
//
// strict-mode keeps its short Message + independent Hint and wraps
// the CommandDeniedError as the Cause by hand; BuildDenialError
// would override Message with the CommandDeniedError.Error() long
// form.
stubMessage := fmt.Sprintf(
"strict mode is %q, only %s-identity commands are available",
mode, mode.ForcedIdentity())
const stubHint = "if the user explicitly wants to switch policy, see `lark-cli config strict-mode --help` (confirm with the user before switching; switching does NOT require re-bind)"
denial := cmdpolicy.Denial{
Layer: cmdpolicy.LayerStrictMode,
PolicySource: "strict-mode",
ReasonCode: "identity_not_supported",
Reason: stubMessage,
}
// Preserve the original command's annotations (risk_level,
// lark:supportedIdentities, cmdmeta.domain, ...) and help text so
// audit / compliance observers can still see what was denied.
// Stamp the denial annotations on top.
annotations := make(map[string]string, len(child.Annotations)+2)
for k, v := range child.Annotations {
annotations[k] = v
}
annotations[cmdpolicy.AnnotationDenialLayer] = cmdpolicy.LayerStrictMode
annotations[cmdpolicy.AnnotationDenialSource] = "strict-mode"
return &cobra.Command{
Use: child.Use,
Aliases: append([]string(nil), child.Aliases...),
Short: child.Short,
Long: child.Long,
Hidden: true,
DisableFlagParsing: true,
Args: cobra.ArbitraryArgs,
Annotations: annotations,
PersistentPreRunE: func(c *cobra.Command, _ []string) error {
c.SilenceUsage = true
return nil
},
RunE: func(c *cobra.Command, _ []string) error {
cd := cmdpolicy.CommandDeniedFromDenial(cmdpolicy.CanonicalPath(c), denial)
return errs.NewValidationError(errs.SubtypeFailedPrecondition, "%s", stubMessage).
WithHint("denied by %s policy (reason_code %s); %s", cd.Layer, cd.ReasonCode, stubHint).
WithCause(cd)
},
}
}
// pruneEmpty recursively removes group commands (no Run/RunE) that have
// no remaining subcommands after pruning. If only hidden stubs remain, keep
// the group hidden so direct execution still resolves to the stub path.
func pruneEmpty(parent *cobra.Command) {
var toRemove []*cobra.Command
for _, child := range parent.Commands() {
pruneEmpty(child)
if child.Run != nil || child.RunE != nil {
continue
}
switch {
case child.HasAvailableSubCommands():
case len(child.Commands()) > 0:
child.Hidden = true
default:
toRemove = append(toRemove, child)
}
}
if len(toRemove) > 0 {
parent.RemoveCommand(toRemove...)
}
}