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3 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
shike.11
27b38f8bb9 chore: switch PPE lane to ppe_bot_user_id for view_url test
Debug-only: change x-tt-env from ppe_agent_view to ppe_bot_user_id so
requests land in the bot-user-id PPE lane. Not for merge into main.
2026-07-27 21:32:32 +08:00
shike.11
3958bc047e chore: point feishu brand to PPE for view_url integration test
Debug-only: switch the default Open endpoint to open.feishu-pre.cn and
inject x-tt-env: ppe_agent_view so requests land in the PPE lane. Not
for merge into main.
2026-07-27 21:32:22 +08:00
zhangjun.1
215fe8a614 feat: support bot identity 2026-07-27 21:07:54 +08:00
200 changed files with 1086 additions and 11811 deletions

View File

@@ -9,40 +9,7 @@ permissions:
contents: read
jobs:
preflight:
runs-on: ubuntu-22.04
permissions:
contents: read
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
with:
fetch-depth: 0
- uses: actions/setup-node@249970729cb0ef3589644e2896645e5dc5ba9c38 # v6
with:
node-version: '22.14.0'
- name: Validate tag and commit
env:
TAG: ${{ github.ref_name }}
run: |
set -euo pipefail
node scripts/release-preflight.js --tag "$TAG"
git fetch origin main
HEAD_SHA="$(git rev-parse --verify 'HEAD^{commit}')"
MAIN_SHA="$(git rev-parse --verify 'FETCH_HEAD^{commit}')"
TAG_SHA="$(git rev-parse --verify "refs/tags/${TAG}^{commit}")"
if [[ "$TAG_SHA" != "$HEAD_SHA" ]]; then
echo "Tag ${TAG} does not resolve to the checked-out HEAD commit." >&2
exit 1
fi
if ! git merge-base --is-ancestor "$HEAD_SHA" "$MAIN_SHA"; then
echo "Tag ${TAG} does not point to a commit contained in origin/main." >&2
exit 1
fi
build-release:
needs: preflight
goreleaser:
runs-on: ubuntu-22.04
permissions:
contents: write
@@ -59,79 +26,35 @@ jobs:
with:
python-version: '3.x'
- uses: actions/setup-node@249970729cb0ef3589644e2896645e5dc5ba9c38 # v6
with:
node-version: '22.14.0'
registry-url: 'https://registry.npmjs.org'
package-manager-cache: false
- name: Install pinned npm
run: npm install --global npm@11.16.0
- name: Run GoReleaser
uses: goreleaser/goreleaser-action@e435ccd777264be153ace6237001ef4d979d3a7a # v6
with:
version: '~> v2'
args: release --clean
env:
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
- name: Include release checksums
run: |
set -euo pipefail
test -s dist/checksums.txt
(cd dist && sha256sum --check checksums.txt)
cp dist/checksums.txt checksums.txt
- name: Collect release asset
run: |
set -euo pipefail
mkdir npm-publish-asset
cp dist/*.tar.gz dist/*.zip dist/checksums.txt npm-publish-asset/
- name: Upload release asset
uses: actions/upload-artifact@ea165f8d65b6e75b540449e92b4886f43607fa02 # v4
with:
name: npm-publish-asset-${{ github.run_id }}
path: npm-publish-asset/
if-no-files-found: error
overwrite: true
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
publish-npm:
needs: build-release
needs: goreleaser
runs-on: ubuntu-22.04
environment: npm-production
permissions:
contents: read
id-token: write
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4
- uses: actions/setup-node@249970729cb0ef3589644e2896645e5dc5ba9c38 # v6
- uses: actions/setup-node@49933ea5288caeca8642d1e84afbd3f7d6820020 # v4
with:
node-version: '22.14.0'
node-version: '20'
registry-url: 'https://registry.npmjs.org'
package-manager-cache: false
- name: Install pinned npm
run: npm install --global npm@11.16.0
- name: Download release asset
uses: actions/download-artifact@3e5f45b2cfb9172054b4087a40e8e0b5a5461e7c # v8
with:
name: npm-publish-asset-${{ github.run_id }}
path: npm-publish-asset
- name: Verify npm publish asset
- name: Download checksums from release
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
run: |
set -euo pipefail
(cd npm-publish-asset && sha256sum --check checksums.txt)
cp npm-publish-asset/checksums.txt checksums.txt
PACK_JSON="$(npm pack --ignore-scripts --json)"
PACK_FILE="$(node -e 'const p=JSON.parse(process.argv[1]); if(p.length!==1 || !p[0].filename) process.exit(1); process.stdout.write(p[0].filename)' "$PACK_JSON")"
test -s "$PACK_FILE"
tar -tzf "$PACK_FILE" | grep -qx 'package/checksums.txt'
rm "$PACK_FILE"
TAG="${GITHUB_REF_NAME}"
gh release download "${TAG}" --pattern checksums.txt --dir .
test -s checksums.txt || { echo "checksums.txt missing or empty for ${TAG}"; exit 1; }
- name: Publish to npm
env:
NODE_AUTH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.NPM_TOKEN }}
run: npm publish --access public

View File

@@ -2,65 +2,6 @@
All notable changes to this project will be documented in this file.
## [v1.0.77] - 2026-07-24
### Features
- introducing official card icon (#1973)
- **apps**: validate +file-list --page-size against server (0, 200] range (#2007)
- **apps**: support absolute and relative upload paths (#2005)
- **slides**: fill xml-schema-quick-ref gaps that forced XSD fallback (#2026)
- **slides**: add layout density lint for sparse/empty containers (#2022)
- add risk-control protection (#1910)
### Bug Fixes
- **slides**: normalize presentation flag aliases (#2032)
- **base**: classify +form-submit as high-risk-write (#1969)
- **slides**: declare screenshot scope
- **slides**: support CSV multi-value for --slide-id in screenshot (#2047)
### Documentation
- **skill**: clarify scope handling for query expansion (#2030)
- **base**: clarify complete and partial updates (#1993)
- **skills**: clarify callout child rules (#2048)
### Misc
- fix/task id handling (#2023)
- fix/task search pagination (#2041)
## [v1.0.75] - 2026-07-22
### Features
- add okr single create shortcut & skill text opti (#1941)
- **calendar**: auto-add bot self as attendee and note user-only search (#1991)
### Bug Fixes
- **base**: improve table shortcut behavior & guidance (#1803)
- issue#1935 & whiteboard shortcut reformat (#1980)
- remove legacy shortcut (#1997)
- **e2e**: inject shared credentials by identity (#1995)
### Documentation
- **skill**: describe html5 block xml usage (#1380)
- clarify fetch metadata and user cites (#1981)
- add topic move collector workflow (#1473)
- update lark doc HTML size limit (#2001)
- **base**: align record write schema guidance (#2000)
### Tests
- **e2e**: declare request identities explicitly (#2004)
### Misc
- harden npm release publishing (#1918)
## [v1.0.74] - 2026-07-21
### Features
@@ -1667,8 +1608,6 @@ Bundled AI agent skills for intelligent assistance:
- Bilingual documentation (English & Chinese).
- CI/CD pipelines: linting, testing, coverage reporting, and automated releases.
[v1.0.77]: https://github.com/larksuite/cli/releases/tag/v1.0.77
[v1.0.75]: https://github.com/larksuite/cli/releases/tag/v1.0.75
[v1.0.74]: https://github.com/larksuite/cli/releases/tag/v1.0.74
[v1.0.73]: https://github.com/larksuite/cli/releases/tag/v1.0.73
[v1.0.72]: https://github.com/larksuite/cli/releases/tag/v1.0.72

View File

@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ script-test:
bash scripts/resolve-changed-from.test.sh
bash scripts/ci-workflow.test.sh
bash scripts/semantic-review-workflow.test.sh
$(NODE) --test scripts/e2e_domains.test.js scripts/fetch_e2e_tat.test.js scripts/install.test.js scripts/release-preflight.test.js scripts/semantic-review-verify-artifact.test.js scripts/pr-quality-summary.test.js scripts/semantic-review-publish.test.js scripts/ci-quality-summary-publish.test.js
$(NODE) --test scripts/e2e_domains.test.js scripts/fetch_e2e_tat.test.js scripts/semantic-review-verify-artifact.test.js scripts/pr-quality-summary.test.js scripts/semantic-review-publish.test.js scripts/ci-quality-summary-publish.test.js
# ./extension/... keeps the public plugin SDK in the default test matrix.
unit-test: fetch_meta

View File

@@ -285,29 +285,6 @@ To reduce these risks, the tool enables default security protections at multiple
We recommend using the Lark/Feishu bot integrated with this tool as a private conversational assistant. Do not add it to group chats or allow other users to interact with it, to avoid abuse of permissions or data leakage.
To reduce the security risks associated with access token theft, the CLI sends a minimal set of risk-control signals with OpenAPI requests made to exact official Feishu/Lark HTTPS domains. These signals are used to help identify anomalous API activity. This protection is enabled by default. The information sent is limited to:
- Operating system type: macOS, Windows, or Linux
- Device hardware model: for example, Mac17,9
To disable this protection for the current workspace, run:
```bash
lark-cli config risk-control off
```
To enable this protection for the current workspace, run:
```bash
lark-cli config risk-control on
```
To restore the default policy for the current workspace, run:
```bash
lark-cli config risk-control default
```
Please fully understand all usage risks. By using this tool, you are deemed to voluntarily assume all related responsibilities.
## Star History

View File

@@ -286,29 +286,6 @@ lark-cli schema im.messages.delete
我们建议您将对接本工具的飞书机器人作为私人对话助手使用,请勿将其拉入群聊或允许其他用户与其交互,以避免权限被滥用或数据泄露。
为降低访问令牌被盗用后的安全风险CLI 在向飞书/Lark 官方 HTTPS 精确域名发起 OpenAPI 请求时,会随请求发送一组最小化的风控信号,用于辅助识别异常调用行为。该保护默认开启,发送的信息仅包括:
- 操作系统类型macOS、Windows 或 Linux
- 设备的硬件产品型号:例如 Mac17,9
如需让当前 workspace 退出该保护,可执行以下命令:
```bash
lark-cli config risk-control off
```
如需开启当前 workspace 的保护,可执行以下命令:
```bash
lark-cli config risk-control on
```
恢复当前 workspace 默认策略可执行:
```bash
lark-cli config risk-control default
```
请您充分知悉全部使用风险,使用本工具即视为您自愿承担相关所有责任。
## Star History

View File

@@ -386,7 +386,7 @@ func TestAuthScopesRun_UsesTenantAccessTokenFromCredentialProvider(t *testing.T)
AppID: "test-app", AppSecret: "", Brand: core.BrandFeishu,
})
tokenResolver := &authScopesTokenResolver{}
f.Credential = newAuthTestCredentialProvider("test-app", tokenResolver)
f.Credential = credential.NewCredentialProvider(nil, nil, tokenResolver, nil)
appInfoStub := &httpmock.Stub{
Method: http.MethodGet,
@@ -442,7 +442,7 @@ func TestAuthScopesRun_LarkPermissionError_TypedAsPermissionError(t *testing.T)
AppID: "test-app", AppSecret: "test-secret", Brand: core.BrandFeishu,
})
tokenResolver := &authScopesTokenResolver{}
f.Credential = newAuthTestCredentialProvider("test-app", tokenResolver)
f.Credential = credential.NewCredentialProvider(nil, nil, tokenResolver, nil)
reg.Register(&httpmock.Stub{
Method: http.MethodGet,
@@ -485,18 +485,6 @@ type authScopesTokenResolver struct {
requests []credential.TokenSpec
}
type authTestAccountResolver struct {
appID string
}
func (r authTestAccountResolver) ResolveAccount(context.Context) (*credential.Account, error) {
return &credential.Account{AppID: r.appID, Brand: core.BrandFeishu}, nil
}
func newAuthTestCredentialProvider(appID string, tokenResolver credential.DefaultTokenResolver) *credential.CredentialProvider {
return credential.NewCredentialProvider(nil, authTestAccountResolver{appID: appID}, tokenResolver, nil)
}
func (r *authScopesTokenResolver) ResolveToken(ctx context.Context, req credential.TokenSpec) (*credential.TokenResult, error) {
r.requests = append(r.requests, req)
switch req.Type {

View File

@@ -27,9 +27,6 @@ func NewCmdAuthStatus(f *cmdutil.Factory, runF func(*StatusOptions) error) *cobr
cmd := &cobra.Command{
Use: "status",
Short: "View current auth status",
Long: `Show OAuth user login, token validity, and granted scopes.
For token-validity checks, run lark-cli auth status --json --verify.
This is not profile/app selection diagnostics; use lark-cli whoami for the effective app/profile identity used by an invocation.`,
RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
if runF != nil {
return runF(opts)

View File

@@ -4,35 +4,15 @@
package auth
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"net/http"
"strings"
"testing"
extcred "github.com/larksuite/cli/extension/credential"
envprovider "github.com/larksuite/cli/extension/credential/env"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/cmdutil"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/credential"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/envvars"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/httpmock"
)
func TestAuthStatusHelpDistinguishesFromWhoami(t *testing.T) {
cmd := NewCmdAuthStatus(nil, nil)
for _, want := range []string{
"OAuth user login",
"auth status --json --verify",
"not profile/app selection diagnostics",
"lark-cli whoami",
} {
if !strings.Contains(cmd.Long, want) {
t.Errorf("auth status --help Long missing %q; got:\n%s", want, cmd.Long)
}
}
}
func TestAuthStatusRun_SplitsBotAndUserIdentity(t *testing.T) {
f, stdout, _, _ := cmdutil.TestFactory(t, &core.CliConfig{
AppID: "test-app", AppSecret: "secret", Brand: core.BrandFeishu,
@@ -99,51 +79,6 @@ func TestAuthStatusRun_VerifyReportsBotIdentity(t *testing.T) {
}
}
type fixedStatusAccountResolver struct {
account *credential.Account
}
func (r *fixedStatusAccountResolver) ResolveAccount(context.Context) (*credential.Account, error) {
return r.account, nil
}
func TestAuthStatus_AllowsMatchingAppIDOnlySelectedProfile(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
t.Setenv(envvars.CliAppID, "cli_a")
t.Setenv(envvars.CliAppSecret, "")
t.Setenv(envvars.CliUserAccessToken, "")
t.Setenv(envvars.CliTenantAccessToken, "")
if err := core.SaveMultiAppConfig(&core.MultiAppConfig{
CurrentApp: "tenant_a",
Apps: []core.AppConfig{{
Name: "tenant_a",
AppId: "cli_a",
AppSecret: core.PlainSecret("test-secret"),
Brand: core.BrandFeishu,
}},
}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("SaveMultiAppConfig: %v", err)
}
config := &core.CliConfig{ProfileName: "tenant_a", AppID: "cli_a", AppSecret: "test-secret", Brand: core.BrandFeishu}
f, stdout, _, _ := cmdutil.TestFactory(t, config)
f.Credential = credential.NewCredentialProvider(
[]extcred.Provider{&envprovider.Provider{}},
&fixedStatusAccountResolver{account: credential.AccountFromCliConfig(config)},
nil,
nil,
).WithProfileFromFlag("tenant_a")
cmd := NewCmdAuth(f)
cmd.SetArgs([]string{"status", "--json"})
if err := cmd.Execute(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("auth status should use the selected built-in profile: %v", err)
}
if strings.Contains(stdout.String(), "credentials are provided externally") {
t.Fatalf("matching APP_ID-only env was misclassified as external:\n%s", stdout.String())
}
}
type statusOutput struct {
Identity string `json:"identity"`
Verified *bool `json:"verified"`

View File

@@ -6,10 +6,8 @@ package cmd
import (
"errors"
"io"
"os"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/cmdutil"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/envvars"
"github.com/spf13/pflag"
)
@@ -28,13 +26,5 @@ func BootstrapInvocationContext(args []string) (cmdutil.InvocationContext, error
if err := fs.Parse(args); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, pflag.ErrHelp) {
return cmdutil.InvocationContext{}, err
}
profileFromFlag := fs.Changed("profile")
if !profileFromFlag {
globals.Profile = os.Getenv(envvars.CliProfile)
}
return cmdutil.InvocationContext{
Profile: globals.Profile,
ProfileFromFlag: profileFromFlag,
}, nil
return cmdutil.InvocationContext{Profile: globals.Profile}, nil
}

View File

@@ -3,11 +3,7 @@
package cmd
import (
"testing"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/envvars"
)
import "testing"
func TestBootstrapInvocationContext_ProfileFlag(t *testing.T) {
inv, err := BootstrapInvocationContext([]string{"--profile", "target", "auth", "status"})
@@ -74,58 +70,3 @@ func TestBootstrapInvocationContext_HelpWithProfile(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("profile = %q, want %q", inv.Profile, "target")
}
}
func TestBootstrapProfileEnvFallback(t *testing.T) {
t.Run("flag wins over env", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv(envvars.CliProfile, "tenant_env")
inv, err := BootstrapInvocationContext([]string{"--profile", "tenant_flag", "whoami"})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected err: %v", err)
}
if inv.Profile != "tenant_flag" {
t.Errorf("got %q, want tenant_flag", inv.Profile)
}
if !inv.ProfileFromFlag {
t.Errorf("ProfileFromFlag = false, want true")
}
})
t.Run("explicit empty flag clears env selection", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv(envvars.CliProfile, "tenant_env")
inv, err := BootstrapInvocationContext([]string{"--profile=", "whoami"})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected err: %v", err)
}
if inv.Profile != "" {
t.Errorf("got %q, want empty", inv.Profile)
}
if !inv.ProfileFromFlag {
t.Errorf("ProfileFromFlag = false, want true")
}
})
t.Run("env used when flag absent", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv(envvars.CliProfile, "tenant_env")
inv, err := BootstrapInvocationContext([]string{"whoami"})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected err: %v", err)
}
if inv.Profile != "tenant_env" {
t.Errorf("got %q, want tenant_env", inv.Profile)
}
if inv.ProfileFromFlag {
t.Errorf("ProfileFromFlag = true, want false")
}
})
t.Run("empty when neither set", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv(envvars.CliProfile, "")
inv, err := BootstrapInvocationContext([]string{"whoami"})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected err: %v", err)
}
if inv.Profile != "" {
t.Errorf("got %q, want empty", inv.Profile)
}
if inv.ProfileFromFlag {
t.Errorf("ProfileFromFlag = true, want false")
}
})
}

View File

@@ -31,7 +31,6 @@ func NewCmdConfig(f *cmdutil.Factory) *cobra.Command {
cmd.AddCommand(NewCmdConfigShow(f, nil))
cmd.AddCommand(NewCmdConfigDefaultAs(f))
cmd.AddCommand(NewCmdConfigStrictMode(f))
cmd.AddCommand(NewCmdConfigRiskControl(f))
cmd.AddCommand(NewCmdConfigPolicy(f))
cmd.AddCommand(NewCmdConfigPlugins(f))
cmd.AddCommand(NewCmdConfigKeychainDowngrade(f))

View File

@@ -84,16 +84,6 @@ func TestConfigShowCmd_FlagParsing(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestConfigShowHelpClarifiesSavedConfig(t *testing.T) {
cmd := NewCmdConfigShow(nil, nil)
if !strings.Contains(cmd.Short, "saved config") {
t.Errorf("config show short = %q, want saved config", cmd.Short)
}
if !strings.Contains(cmd.Long, "lark-cli whoami --json") {
t.Errorf("config show help missing whoami route")
}
}
func TestConfigShowRun_NotConfiguredReturnsStructuredError(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
@@ -116,77 +106,6 @@ func TestConfigShowRun_NotConfiguredReturnsStructuredError(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// config show promises "saved config, not current usage" (help + skill
// routing): the session profile (--profile / LARKSUITE_CLI_PROFILE) must not
// change what it shows.
func TestConfigShowRun_IgnoresSessionProfile(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
multi := &core.MultiAppConfig{
CurrentApp: "tenant_a",
Apps: []core.AppConfig{
{Name: "tenant_a", AppId: "cli_a", AppSecret: core.PlainSecret("your-secret-a"), Brand: core.BrandFeishu},
{Name: "tenant_b", AppId: "cli_b", AppSecret: core.PlainSecret("your-secret-b"), Brand: core.BrandFeishu},
},
}
if err := core.SaveMultiAppConfig(multi); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("SaveMultiAppConfig: %v", err)
}
f, stdout, _, _ := cmdutil.TestFactory(t, nil)
f.Invocation.Profile = "tenant_b" // session selection must not leak in
if err := configShowRun(&ConfigShowOptions{Factory: f}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("configShowRun: %v", err)
}
out := stdout.String()
if !strings.Contains(out, `"cli_a"`) || !strings.Contains(out, `"tenant_a"`) {
t.Fatalf("output = %s, want the saved default tenant_a/cli_a", out)
}
if strings.Contains(out, `"cli_b"`) {
t.Fatalf("output = %s, session profile tenant_b must not change saved-config view", out)
}
}
// engagedEnvStub simulates a fully engaged external credential provider.
type engagedEnvStub struct{}
func (engagedEnvStub) Name() string { return "env" }
func (engagedEnvStub) Priority() int { return 10 }
func (engagedEnvStub) ResolveAccount(context.Context) (*extcred.Account, error) {
return &extcred.Account{AppID: "cli_env", AppSecret: "your-password"}, nil // managed takeover
}
func (engagedEnvStub) ResolveToken(context.Context, extcred.TokenSpec) (*extcred.Token, error) {
return nil, nil
}
// config show inspects the SAVED config only, so the parent command's
// external-credential gate must not apply: even with a fully engaged direct
// env credential, `config show` still answers from the saved config.
func TestConfigShow_BypassesExternalCredentialGate(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
multi := &core.MultiAppConfig{
CurrentApp: "tenant_a",
Apps: []core.AppConfig{{
Name: "tenant_a", AppId: "cli_a", AppSecret: core.PlainSecret("your-secret-a"), Brand: core.BrandFeishu,
}},
}
if err := core.SaveMultiAppConfig(multi); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("SaveMultiAppConfig: %v", err)
}
f, stdout, _, _ := cmdutil.TestFactory(t, nil)
f.Credential = credential.NewCredentialProvider([]extcred.Provider{engagedEnvStub{}}, nil, nil, nil)
cmd := NewCmdConfig(f)
cmd.SetArgs([]string{"show"})
if err := cmd.Execute(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("config show must bypass the external-credential gate: %v", err)
}
if out := stdout.String(); !strings.Contains(out, `"cli_a"`) {
t.Fatalf("output = %s, want the saved config shown", out)
}
}
func TestConfigShowRun_NoActiveProfileReturnsStructuredError(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
multi := &core.MultiAppConfig{
@@ -562,8 +481,7 @@ func TestConfigBlockedByExternalProvider(t *testing.T) {
}{
{"init", []string{"init", "--app-id", "x", "--app-secret-stdin"}},
{"remove", []string{"remove"}},
// "show" is deliberately absent: it inspects the SAVED config only
// and bypasses this gate (TestConfigShow_BypassesExternalCredentialGate).
{"show", []string{"show"}},
{"default-as", []string{"default-as", "user"}},
{"strict-mode", []string{"strict-mode", "off"}},
}

View File

@@ -1,80 +0,0 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
package config
import (
"fmt"
"github.com/spf13/cobra"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/errs"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/cmdutil"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
)
// NewCmdConfigRiskControl creates the workspace risk-control policy command.
func NewCmdConfigRiskControl(f *cmdutil.Factory) *cobra.Command {
cmd := &cobra.Command{
Use: "risk-control [on|off|default]",
Short: "Manage workspace account-protection policy",
Long: `View or set the account-protection risk-control policy for this workspace.
Account protection is on by default. Use off to opt this workspace out, on to
opt it back in explicitly, or default to remove the explicit preference.`,
Args: cobra.MaximumNArgs(1),
// This is persistent workspace policy, not credential management.
PersistentPreRunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, _ []string) error {
cmd.SilenceUsage = true
return nil
},
RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
config, err := core.LoadOrNotConfigured()
if err != nil {
return err
}
if len(args) == 0 {
printRiskControl(f, config)
return nil
}
switch args[0] {
case "on":
enabled := true
config.RiskControl = &enabled
case "off":
enabled := false
config.RiskControl = &enabled
case "default":
config.RiskControl = nil
default:
return errs.NewValidationError(errs.SubtypeInvalidArgument,
"invalid risk-control value %q, valid values: on | off | default", args[0])
}
if err := core.SaveMultiAppConfig(config); err != nil {
return errs.NewInternalError(errs.SubtypeStorage,
"failed to save risk-control policy: %v", err).WithCause(err)
}
fmt.Fprintf(f.IOStreams.ErrOut, "Risk control set to %s (workspace)\n", args[0])
return nil
},
}
cmdutil.SetRisk(cmd, cmdutil.RiskWrite)
return cmd
}
func printRiskControl(f *cmdutil.Factory, config *core.MultiAppConfig) {
source := "default"
if config.RiskControl != nil {
source = "workspace"
}
fmt.Fprintf(f.IOStreams.Out, "risk-control: %s (source: %s)\n", riskControlState(config.RiskControlEnabled()), source)
}
func riskControlState(enabled bool) string {
if enabled {
return "on"
}
return "off"
}

View File

@@ -1,130 +0,0 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
package config
import (
"errors"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/errs"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/cmdutil"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
)
func TestRiskControlWorkspacePolicy(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
config := &core.MultiAppConfig{Apps: []core.AppConfig{{
AppId: "cli_test", AppSecret: core.PlainSecret("secret"), Brand: core.BrandFeishu,
}}}
if err := core.SaveMultiAppConfig(config); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
f, stdout, stderr, _ := cmdutil.TestFactory(t, nil)
cmd := NewCmdConfigRiskControl(f)
cmd.SetArgs([]string{"off"})
if err := cmd.Execute(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("set off: %v", err)
}
loaded, err := core.LoadMultiAppConfig()
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if loaded.RiskControl == nil || *loaded.RiskControl {
t.Fatalf("RiskControl = %v, want explicit false", loaded.RiskControl)
}
if !strings.Contains(stderr.String(), "set to off") {
t.Fatalf("stderr = %q", stderr.String())
}
stdout.Reset()
cmd = NewCmdConfigRiskControl(f)
if err := cmd.Execute(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("show: %v", err)
}
if got := stdout.String(); got != "risk-control: off (source: workspace)\n" {
t.Fatalf("stdout = %q", got)
}
cmd = NewCmdConfigRiskControl(f)
cmd.SetArgs([]string{"on"})
if err := cmd.Execute(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("set on: %v", err)
}
loaded, err = core.LoadMultiAppConfig()
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if loaded.RiskControl == nil || !*loaded.RiskControl {
t.Fatalf("RiskControl = %v, want explicit true", loaded.RiskControl)
}
cmd = NewCmdConfigRiskControl(f)
cmd.SetArgs([]string{"default"})
if err := cmd.Execute(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("reset default: %v", err)
}
loaded, err = core.LoadMultiAppConfig()
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if loaded.RiskControl != nil {
t.Fatalf("RiskControl = %v, want nil", loaded.RiskControl)
}
stdout.Reset()
cmd = NewCmdConfigRiskControl(f)
if err := cmd.Execute(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("show default: %v", err)
}
if got := stdout.String(); got != "risk-control: on (source: default)\n" {
t.Fatalf("stdout = %q", got)
}
}
func TestRiskControlWorkspacePolicyRejectsInvalidValue(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
if err := core.SaveMultiAppConfig(&core.MultiAppConfig{Apps: []core.AppConfig{{
AppId: "cli_test", AppSecret: core.PlainSecret("secret"), Brand: core.BrandFeishu,
}}}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
f, _, _, _ := cmdutil.TestFactory(t, nil)
cmd := NewCmdConfigRiskControl(f)
cmd.SetArgs([]string{"invalid"})
err := cmd.Execute()
var validationErr *errs.ValidationError
if !errors.As(err, &validationErr) {
t.Fatalf("error = %T %v, want *errs.ValidationError", err, err)
}
if validationErr.Subtype != errs.SubtypeInvalidArgument {
t.Fatalf("subtype = %q, want %q", validationErr.Subtype, errs.SubtypeInvalidArgument)
}
}
func TestRiskControlWorkspacePolicyAllowedWithExternalCredentials(t *testing.T) {
f := newConfigFactoryWithExternalProvider(t)
config := &core.MultiAppConfig{Apps: []core.AppConfig{{
AppId: "cli_test", AppSecret: core.PlainSecret("secret"), Brand: core.BrandFeishu,
}}}
if err := core.SaveMultiAppConfig(config); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
cmd := NewCmdConfig(f)
cmd.SetArgs([]string{"risk-control", "off"})
if err := cmd.Execute(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("set off with external credentials: %v", err)
}
loaded, err := core.LoadMultiAppConfig()
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if loaded.RiskControl == nil || *loaded.RiskControl {
t.Fatalf("RiskControl = %v, want explicit false", loaded.RiskControl)
}
}

View File

@@ -27,16 +27,7 @@ func NewCmdConfigShow(f *cmdutil.Factory, runF func(*ConfigShowOptions) error) *
cmd := &cobra.Command{
Use: "show",
Short: "Show saved config",
Long: "Shows saved config. To see the app/profile lark-cli is using now, run `lark-cli whoami --json`.",
// Override parent's RequireBuiltinCredentialProvider check: this
// command reads the SAVED config only (its own help promises "saved
// config, not current usage"), so the currently effective credential
// source — external or otherwise — must not gate it.
PersistentPreRunE: func(c *cobra.Command, _ []string) error {
c.SilenceUsage = true
return nil
},
Short: "Show current configuration",
RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
if runF != nil {
return runF(opts)
@@ -62,10 +53,7 @@ func configShowRun(opts *ConfigShowOptions) error {
if config == nil || len(config.Apps) == 0 {
return core.NotConfiguredError()
}
// Saved config only: the session profile (--profile / LARKSUITE_CLI_PROFILE)
// must not change what this command shows — the help and skill routing
// promise "saved config, not current usage" (use whoami for that).
app := config.CurrentAppConfig("")
app := config.CurrentAppConfig(f.Invocation.Profile)
if app == nil {
return errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeNotConfigured, "no active profile").WithHint("run: lark-cli profile list")
}

View File

@@ -110,20 +110,8 @@ func (failingTokenResolver) ResolveToken(_ context.Context, _ credential.TokenSp
return nil, errors.New("backend unavailable")
}
type eventTestAccountResolver struct {
appID string
}
func (r eventTestAccountResolver) ResolveAccount(context.Context) (*credential.Account, error) {
return &credential.Account{AppID: r.appID}, nil
}
func newEventTestCredentialProvider(appID string, tokenResolver credential.DefaultTokenResolver) *credential.CredentialProvider {
return credential.NewCredentialProvider(nil, eventTestAccountResolver{appID: appID}, tokenResolver, nil)
}
func factoryWithResolver(r credential.DefaultTokenResolver) *cmdutil.Factory {
return &cmdutil.Factory{Credential: newEventTestCredentialProvider("cli_x", r)}
return &cmdutil.Factory{Credential: credential.NewCredentialProvider(nil, nil, r, nil)}
}
func TestResolveTenantToken_EmptyTokenResult(t *testing.T) {

View File

@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ func newTestConsumeRuntime(rt http.RoundTripper) *consumeRuntime {
client: &client.APIClient{
SDK: sdk,
ErrOut: io.Discard,
Credential: newEventTestCredentialProvider("test-app", &staticTokenResolver{}),
Credential: credential.NewCredentialProvider(nil, nil, &staticTokenResolver{}, nil),
Config: &core.CliConfig{AppID: "test-app", AppSecret: "test-secret", Brand: core.BrandFeishu},
},
accessIdentity: core.AsBot,

View File

@@ -17,14 +17,11 @@ import (
)
// profileListItem is the JSON output for a single profile entry.
// `default` (formerly `active`, renamed in this feature as a declared
// breaking change) marks the saved default profile — never the identity
// effective for the current invocation; that is whoami's job.
type profileListItem struct {
Name string `json:"name"`
AppID string `json:"appId"`
Brand core.LarkBrand `json:"brand"`
Default bool `json:"default"`
Active bool `json:"active"`
User string `json:"user,omitempty"`
TokenStatus string `json:"tokenStatus,omitempty"`
}
@@ -33,8 +30,7 @@ type profileListItem struct {
func NewCmdProfileList(f *cmdutil.Factory) *cobra.Command {
cmd := &cobra.Command{
Use: "list",
Short: "List saved profiles",
Long: "Lists saved profiles. To see the app/profile lark-cli is using now, run `lark-cli whoami --json`.",
Short: "List all profiles",
RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
return profileListRun(f)
},
@@ -57,7 +53,7 @@ func profileListRun(f *cmdutil.Factory) error {
return nil
}
// Intentionally uses "" to show the saved default profile, not the ephemeral --profile override.
// Intentionally uses "" to show the persistent active profile, not the ephemeral --profile override.
currentApp := multi.CurrentAppConfig("")
currentName := ""
if currentApp != nil {
@@ -70,10 +66,10 @@ func profileListRun(f *cmdutil.Factory) error {
name := app.ProfileName()
item := profileListItem{
Name: name,
AppID: app.AppId,
Brand: app.Brand,
Default: name == currentName,
Name: name,
AppID: app.AppId,
Brand: app.Brand,
Active: name == currentName,
}
if len(app.Users) > 0 {

View File

@@ -14,17 +14,6 @@ func NewCmdProfile(f *cmdutil.Factory) *cobra.Command {
cmd := &cobra.Command{
Use: "profile",
Short: "Manage configuration profiles",
Long: `Profiles are named app identities managed by lark-cli.
Identity diagnostics and profile selection:
lark-cli whoami --json Show the app/profile lark-cli is using now.
lark-cli auth status --json --verify Verify OAuth login and token state.
--profile <name> Use a profile for this command only.
LARKSUITE_CLI_PROFILE Use a profile for the current shell / agent session.
config show / profile list Inspect saved config, not current usage.
unset LARKSUITE_CLI_PROFILE Clear the session profile and fall back to direct app env or configured default.
A selected profile takes precedence over matching direct env credentials and tokens.`,
}
cmdutil.DisableAuthCheck(cmd)
cmdutil.SetTips(cmd, []string{

View File

@@ -306,24 +306,14 @@ func TestProfileListRun_OutputsProfiles(t *testing.T) {
if err := json.Unmarshal(stdout.Bytes(), &got); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Unmarshal() error = %v; output=%s", err, stdout.String())
}
raw := stdout.String()
// `active` is renamed to `default` as a declared breaking change: keeping
// a permanently mirrored alias would keep misleading agents into reading
// it as the currently effective identity (whoami's job).
if strings.Contains(raw, `"active"`) {
t.Fatalf("profile list output contains renamed active field: %s", raw)
}
if !strings.Contains(raw, `"default"`) {
t.Fatalf("profile list output missing default field: %s", raw)
}
if len(got) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("len(got) = %d, want 2", len(got))
}
if got[0].Name != "default" || !got[0].Default {
t.Fatalf("got[0] = %#v, want configured default profile", got[0])
if got[0].Name != "default" || !got[0].Active {
t.Fatalf("got[0] = %#v, want active default profile", got[0])
}
if got[1].Name != "target" || got[1].Default {
t.Fatalf("got[1] = %#v, want non-default target profile", got[1])
if got[1].Name != "target" || got[1].Active {
t.Fatalf("got[1] = %#v, want inactive target profile", got[1])
}
}
@@ -637,39 +627,6 @@ func TestProfileRemoveRun_ValidationErrors(t *testing.T) {
})
}
// TestProfileHelpHasSelectionSection asserts `profile --help` documents the
// per-invocation flag and session-scoped env var for selecting a profile, so
// users and AI agents can find LARKSUITE_CLI_PROFILE without reading source.
func TestProfileHelpHasSelectionSection(t *testing.T) {
cmd := NewCmdProfile(nil)
if !strings.Contains(cmd.Long, "Identity diagnostics and profile selection:") {
t.Errorf("profile --help missing identity diagnostics and profile selection section")
}
if !strings.Contains(cmd.Long, "LARKSUITE_CLI_PROFILE") {
t.Errorf("profile --help missing LARKSUITE_CLI_PROFILE")
}
if !strings.Contains(cmd.Long, "lark-cli whoami --json") {
t.Errorf("profile --help missing whoami identity route")
}
if !strings.Contains(cmd.Long, "config show / profile list") {
t.Errorf("profile --help missing saved-config boundary")
}
const precedence = "A selected profile takes precedence over matching direct env credentials and tokens."
if !strings.Contains(cmd.Long, precedence) {
t.Errorf("profile --help missing precedence statement %q", precedence)
}
}
func TestProfileListHelpClarifiesSavedProfiles(t *testing.T) {
cmd := NewCmdProfileList(nil)
if !strings.Contains(cmd.Short, "saved profiles") {
t.Errorf("profile list short = %q, want saved profiles", cmd.Short)
}
if !strings.Contains(cmd.Long, "lark-cli whoami --json") {
t.Errorf("profile list help missing whoami route")
}
}
func TestProfileListRun_InvalidConfigReturnsValidationError(t *testing.T) {
dir := setupProfileConfigDir(t)
if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, "config.json"), []byte("{invalid json"), 0600); err != nil {

View File

@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@ import (
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/cmdutil"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/credential"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/identitydiag"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/output"
)
@@ -34,15 +33,6 @@ type whoamiResult struct {
TokenStatus string `json:"tokenStatus"`
OnBehalfOf *delegatedUser `json:"onBehalfOf,omitempty"`
Hint string `json:"hint,omitempty"`
// CredentialSource, Explicit, and DirectCredentialEnv surface the cached
// credential.IdentitySelection computed during resolution (not re-inferred
// here). On the non-env extension-provider path CredentialSource is
// "extension:<provider>" (e.g. "extension:sidecar"); an empty value only
// means the selection was never resolved.
CredentialSource string `json:"credentialSource"`
Explicit bool `json:"explicit"`
DirectCredentialEnv credential.DirectCredentialEnv `json:"directCredentialEnv"`
}
// delegatedUser is the user a user-identity acts on behalf of.
@@ -68,10 +58,6 @@ func NewCmdWhoami(f *cmdutil.Factory) *cobra.Command {
cmd := &cobra.Command{
Use: "whoami",
Short: "Show the current effective identity, app, profile, and token status (JSON)",
Long: `Show the effective app identity used by this invocation. This is not OAuth login status;
use ` + "`lark-cli auth status --json`" + ` for OAuth user/token state.
The JSON output includes credentialSource, appId, brand, and whether direct app credential
env is present and matches the selected profile.`,
RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
return whoamiRun(cmd, opts)
},
@@ -111,17 +97,7 @@ func whoamiRun(cmd *cobra.Command, opts *Options) error {
f.ResolveStrictMode(ctx).ForcedIdentity(),
)
diag := identitydiag.Diagnose(ctx, f, cfg, false)
// Read the cached selection computed during resolution; never re-infer it
// here. A resolution failure (e.g. under a non-env extension provider that
// doesn't populate a selection) degrades to the zero value rather than
// regressing whoami's own error/diagnostic path above.
var selection credential.IdentitySelection
if f.Credential != nil {
if sel, err := f.Credential.Selection(ctx); err == nil {
selection = sel
}
}
res := buildResult(cfg, as, source, diag, selection)
res := buildResult(cfg, as, source, diag)
output.PrintJson(f.IOStreams.Out, res)
return nil
}
@@ -146,23 +122,18 @@ func resolveSource(changedAs bool, flagAs core.Identity, autoDetected bool, stri
// buildResult maps the resolved identity and local diagnostics into the output.
// ResolveAs only ever returns user or bot, so the default branch handles user.
// selection is the cached credential.IdentitySelection from resolution; it is
// read as-is, never recomputed.
func buildResult(cfg *core.CliConfig, as core.Identity, source string, diag identitydiag.Result, selection credential.IdentitySelection) *whoamiResult {
func buildResult(cfg *core.CliConfig, as core.Identity, source string, diag identitydiag.Result) *whoamiResult {
defaultAs := cfg.DefaultAs
if defaultAs == "" {
defaultAs = core.AsAuto
}
res := &whoamiResult{
Profile: cfg.ProfileName,
AppID: cfg.AppID,
Brand: cfg.Brand,
DefaultAs: string(defaultAs),
Identity: string(as),
IdentitySource: source,
CredentialSource: string(selection.Source),
Explicit: selection.Explicit(),
DirectCredentialEnv: selection.DirectCredentialEnv,
Profile: cfg.ProfileName,
AppID: cfg.AppID,
Brand: cfg.Brand,
DefaultAs: string(defaultAs),
Identity: string(as),
IdentitySource: source,
}
// Use the diagnosed hint as-is: it is tailored to the credential source, so
// it never says "auth login" when that is blocked under an external provider.

View File

@@ -15,13 +15,10 @@ import (
"github.com/larksuite/cli/errs"
extcred "github.com/larksuite/cli/extension/credential"
envprovider "github.com/larksuite/cli/extension/credential/env"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/cmdutil"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/credential"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/envvars"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/identitydiag"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/keychain"
)
func TestResolveSource(t *testing.T) {
@@ -55,7 +52,7 @@ func TestBuildResult_UserValid(t *testing.T) {
diag := identitydiag.Result{
User: identitydiag.Identity{Available: true, Status: "ready", TokenStatus: "valid", OpenID: "ou_x", UserName: "Alice"},
}
r := buildResult(cfg, core.AsUser, "auto_detect", diag, credential.IdentitySelection{})
r := buildResult(cfg, core.AsUser, "auto_detect", diag)
if r.Identity != "user" || r.IdentitySource != "auto_detect" {
t.Fatalf("identity/source = %q/%q", r.Identity, r.IdentitySource)
@@ -80,7 +77,7 @@ func TestBuildResult_UserMissingToken(t *testing.T) {
diag := identitydiag.Result{
User: identitydiag.Identity{Available: false, Status: "missing", Hint: "run: lark-cli auth login --help"}, // never logged in
}
r := buildResult(cfg, core.AsUser, "auto_detect", diag, credential.IdentitySelection{})
r := buildResult(cfg, core.AsUser, "auto_detect", diag)
if r.Available {
t.Fatalf("available = true, want false")
@@ -103,7 +100,7 @@ func TestBuildResult_BotReady(t *testing.T) {
diag := identitydiag.Result{
Bot: identitydiag.Identity{Available: true, Status: "ready"},
}
r := buildResult(cfg, core.AsBot, "default_as", diag, credential.IdentitySelection{})
r := buildResult(cfg, core.AsBot, "default_as", diag)
if r.Identity != "bot" || r.IdentitySource != "default_as" {
t.Fatalf("identity/source = %q/%q", r.Identity, r.IdentitySource)
@@ -124,7 +121,7 @@ func TestBuildResult_BotNotConfigured(t *testing.T) {
diag := identitydiag.Result{
Bot: identitydiag.Identity{Available: false, Status: "not_configured", Hint: "run: lark-cli config --help"},
}
r := buildResult(cfg, core.AsBot, "auto_detect", diag, credential.IdentitySelection{})
r := buildResult(cfg, core.AsBot, "auto_detect", diag)
if r.Available {
t.Fatalf("available = true, want false")
@@ -321,94 +318,3 @@ func TestWhoami_ExternalProvider_UserHintNotKeychain(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("hint should explain external management: %q", got.Hint)
}
}
// noopWhoamiKeychain is a no-op KeychainAccess; the profile below uses a
// plaintext secret, so no keychain lookup is actually required.
type noopWhoamiKeychain struct{}
func (noopWhoamiKeychain) Get(service, account string) (string, error) { return "", nil }
func (noopWhoamiKeychain) Set(service, account, value string) error { return nil }
func (noopWhoamiKeychain) Remove(service, account string) error { return nil }
// credentialSourceSecret is the profile secret written to config for
// TestWhoamiIncludesCredentialSource. It must never leak into whoami's output
// (security: never leak a secret).
const credentialSourceSecret = "test-secret"
// profileSelectionFactory builds a Factory whose CredentialProvider resolves
// an explicit profile ("tenant_a") supplied via the LARKSUITE_CLI_PROFILE env
// fallback (not --profile), so Selection().Source resolves to
// env:LARKSUITE_CLI_PROFILE and Explicit() is true, with no direct
// app-credential env vars present.
func profileSelectionFactory(t *testing.T) (*cmdutil.Factory, *bytes.Buffer) {
t.Helper()
t.Setenv(envvars.CliAppID, "")
t.Setenv(envvars.CliAppSecret, "")
t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
multi := &core.MultiAppConfig{
CurrentApp: "tenant_a",
Apps: []core.AppConfig{{
Name: "tenant_a",
AppId: "cli_a",
AppSecret: core.PlainSecret(credentialSourceSecret),
Brand: core.BrandFeishu,
}},
}
if err := core.SaveMultiAppConfig(multi); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("SaveMultiAppConfig: %v", err)
}
defaultAcct := credential.NewDefaultAccountProvider(func() keychain.KeychainAccess { return noopWhoamiKeychain{} }, "tenant_a")
cred := credential.NewCredentialProvider([]extcred.Provider{&envprovider.Provider{}}, defaultAcct, nil, nil)
cred.WithProfileFromEnv("tenant_a")
cfg := &core.CliConfig{ProfileName: "tenant_a", AppID: "cli_a", AppSecret: credentialSourceSecret, Brand: core.BrandFeishu}
out := &bytes.Buffer{}
f := &cmdutil.Factory{
Config: func() (*core.CliConfig, error) { return cfg, nil },
Credential: cred,
IOStreams: &cmdutil.IOStreams{Out: out, ErrOut: &bytes.Buffer{}},
}
return f, out
}
// TestWhoamiIncludesCredentialSource locks in the diagnostic fields surfaced
// from the cached credential.IdentitySelection: credentialSource,
// explicit, and directCredentialEnv. whoami must read the cached selection
// as-is, not re-infer it.
func TestWhoamiIncludesCredentialSource(t *testing.T) {
f, out := profileSelectionFactory(t)
cmd := NewCmdWhoami(f)
cmd.SetArgs([]string{})
if err := cmd.Execute(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Execute() error = %v", err)
}
raw := out.String()
if strings.Contains(raw, credentialSourceSecret) {
t.Fatalf("whoami output leaked the profile secret: %s", raw)
}
var got whoamiResult
if err := json.Unmarshal(out.Bytes(), &got); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("json.Unmarshal() error = %v\n%s", err, raw)
}
if got.CredentialSource != string(credential.SourceEnvProfile) {
t.Fatalf("credentialSource = %q, want %q", got.CredentialSource, credential.SourceEnvProfile)
}
if !got.Explicit {
t.Fatalf("explicit = false, want true")
}
if got.DirectCredentialEnv.Present {
t.Fatalf("directCredentialEnv.present = true, want false: %#v", got.DirectCredentialEnv)
}
if !strings.Contains(raw, `"credentialSource": "env:LARKSUITE_CLI_PROFILE"`) {
t.Fatalf("raw JSON missing credentialSource literal: %s", raw)
}
if got.DirectCredentialEnv.Present || len(got.DirectCredentialEnv.Keys) != 0 ||
got.DirectCredentialEnv.AppID != "" || got.DirectCredentialEnv.Matched || got.DirectCredentialEnv.ConflictsWithProfile {
t.Fatalf("directCredentialEnv = %#v, want only present:false set", got.DirectCredentialEnv)
}
}

View File

@@ -67,17 +67,6 @@ Typed errors render to **stderr** as one JSON object per process exit:
| `error.params` | per-Subtype-stable | per-parameter validation detail array (`ValidationError`); see **Validation parameters** |
| per-Subtype extension fields | per-Subtype-stable | e.g. `missing_scopes`, `console_url`, `challenge_url` |
Credential/identity-selection extension fields (per-Subtype-stable):
| Field | Carrier | Subtypes | Notes |
|-------|---------|----------|-------|
| `missing_keys` | `ConfigError` | `app_credential_incomplete` | env var NAMES that must all be set; never values |
| `required_any_of` | `ConfigError` | `app_credential_incomplete` | env var NAMES where any one completes the credential; mutually exclusive with `missing_keys` |
| `profile` | `ConfigError` | `profile_not_found`, `profile_secret_invalid` | requested profile name |
| `app_id` | `ConfigError` | `profile_secret_invalid` | plaintext app id; never a secret |
| `credential_source` | `ConfigError` | `profile_not_found`, `no_active_profile` | how the identity was (not) chosen: `flag:--profile` \| `env:LARKSUITE_CLI_PROFILE` \| `config` |
| `profile_app_id`, `env_app_id` | `ValidationError` | `profile_app_credential_conflict` | the two conflicting plaintext app ids |
`SecurityPolicyError` renders through the same typed envelope as every
other category. `error.type` is `"policy"`, `error.subtype` is one of
`challenge_required` / `access_denied`, and process exit is `6` via

View File

@@ -136,79 +136,6 @@ func TestConfigError_MarshalJSON(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestConfigError_ProfileFieldsMarshalJSON(t *testing.T) {
ce := NewConfigError(SubtypeAppCredentialIncomplete, "incomplete").
WithMissingKeys("LARKSUITE_CLI_APP_ID", "LARKSUITE_CLI_APP_SECRET").
WithRequiredAnyOf("LARKSUITE_CLI_APP_SECRET", "LARKSUITE_CLI_USER_ACCESS_TOKEN").
WithProfile("work").
WithAppID("cli_abc").
WithCredentialSource("flag:--profile")
b, err := json.Marshal(ce)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
s := string(b)
for _, want := range []string{
`"type":"config"`,
`"subtype":"app_credential_incomplete"`,
`"missing_keys":["LARKSUITE_CLI_APP_ID","LARKSUITE_CLI_APP_SECRET"]`,
`"required_any_of":["LARKSUITE_CLI_APP_SECRET","LARKSUITE_CLI_USER_ACCESS_TOKEN"]`,
`"profile":"work"`,
`"app_id":"cli_abc"`,
`"credential_source":"flag:--profile"`,
} {
if !strings.Contains(s, want) {
t.Errorf("missing %q in %s", want, s)
}
}
// omitempty: unset fields must not appear on the wire.
empty := NewConfigError(SubtypeProfileNotFound, "x")
b2, err := json.Marshal(empty)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
s2 := string(b2)
for _, notWant := range []string{`"missing_keys"`, `"required_any_of"`, `"profile"`, `"app_id"`, `"credential_source"`} {
if strings.Contains(s2, notWant) {
t.Errorf("%q should be omitted when empty; got %s", notWant, s2)
}
}
}
func TestValidationError_ProfileConflictMarshalJSON(t *testing.T) {
ve := NewValidationError(SubtypeProfileAppCredentialConflict, "conflict").
WithProfileAppConflict("cli_profile", "cli_env")
b, err := json.Marshal(ve)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
s := string(b)
for _, want := range []string{
`"type":"validation"`,
`"subtype":"profile_app_credential_conflict"`,
`"profile_app_id":"cli_profile"`,
`"env_app_id":"cli_env"`,
} {
if !strings.Contains(s, want) {
t.Errorf("missing %q in %s", want, s)
}
}
// omitempty: unset conflict fields must not appear on the wire.
empty := NewValidationError(SubtypeInvalidArgument, "x")
b2, err := json.Marshal(empty)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
s2 := string(b2)
for _, notWant := range []string{`"profile_app_id"`, `"env_app_id"`} {
if strings.Contains(s2, notWant) {
t.Errorf("%q should be omitted when empty; got %s", notWant, s2)
}
}
}
func TestNetworkError_MarshalJSON(t *testing.T) {
ne := &NetworkError{
Problem: Problem{Category: CategoryNetwork, Subtype: SubtypeNetworkTimeout, Message: "dial timeout"},

View File

@@ -12,9 +12,8 @@ const (
// CategoryValidation subtypes
const (
SubtypeInvalidArgument Subtype = "invalid_argument" // user-supplied flag / arg failed validation (gRPC INVALID_ARGUMENT alignment)
SubtypeFailedPrecondition Subtype = "failed_precondition" // request is valid but the system/resource state is not in the state required to execute; caller must change state (not retry) — e.g. ambiguous remote mapping (gRPC FAILED_PRECONDITION alignment)
SubtypeProfileAppCredentialConflict Subtype = "profile_app_credential_conflict" // profile and direct app env both set but app_id differs
SubtypeInvalidArgument Subtype = "invalid_argument" // user-supplied flag / arg failed validation (gRPC INVALID_ARGUMENT alignment)
SubtypeFailedPrecondition Subtype = "failed_precondition" // request is valid but the system/resource state is not in the state required to execute; caller must change state (not retry) — e.g. ambiguous remote mapping (gRPC FAILED_PRECONDITION alignment)
)
// CategoryAuthentication subtypes
@@ -42,13 +41,9 @@ const (
// CategoryConfig subtypes
const (
SubtypeInvalidClient Subtype = "invalid_client" // app_id / app_secret incorrect (RFC 6749 §5.2 alignment)
SubtypeNotConfigured Subtype = "not_configured" // local config file absent (user has not run `config init`)
SubtypeInvalidConfig Subtype = "invalid_config" // local config file present but malformed
SubtypeProfileNotFound Subtype = "profile_not_found" // --profile / LARKSUITE_CLI_PROFILE points to a nonexistent profile
SubtypeNoActiveProfile Subtype = "no_active_profile" // no active identity input and no usable default profile
SubtypeAppCredentialIncomplete Subtype = "app_credential_incomplete" // direct app env missing app_id or app_secret
SubtypeProfileSecretInvalid Subtype = "profile_secret_invalid" // profile exists but its secret cannot be resolved locally
SubtypeInvalidClient Subtype = "invalid_client" // app_id / app_secret incorrect (RFC 6749 §5.2 alignment)
SubtypeNotConfigured Subtype = "not_configured" // local config file absent (user has not run `config init`)
SubtypeInvalidConfig Subtype = "invalid_config" // local config file present but malformed
)
// CategoryNetwork subtypes

View File

@@ -61,11 +61,9 @@ type TypedError interface {
// it is intentionally not serialized.
type ValidationError struct {
Problem
Param string `json:"param,omitempty"`
Params []InvalidParam `json:"params,omitempty"`
ProfileAppID string `json:"profile_app_id,omitempty"`
EnvAppID string `json:"env_app_id,omitempty"`
Cause error `json:"-"`
Param string `json:"param,omitempty"`
Params []InvalidParam `json:"params,omitempty"`
Cause error `json:"-"`
}
// InvalidParam is one structured validation diagnostic: the parameter that
@@ -152,12 +150,6 @@ func (e *ValidationError) WithCause(cause error) *ValidationError {
return e
}
func (e *ValidationError) WithProfileAppConflict(profileAppID, envAppID string) *ValidationError {
e.ProfileAppID = profileAppID
e.EnvAppID = envAppID
return e
}
// =========================== AuthenticationError =============================
// AuthenticationError is the typed error for CategoryAuthentication.
@@ -323,18 +315,8 @@ func (e *PermissionError) WithCause(cause error) *PermissionError {
// intentionally not serialized.
type ConfigError struct {
Problem
Field string `json:"field,omitempty"`
MissingKeys []string `json:"missing_keys,omitempty"`
RequiredAnyOf []string `json:"required_any_of,omitempty"`
Profile string `json:"profile,omitempty"`
AppID string `json:"app_id,omitempty"`
// CredentialSource is the machine-readable App/credential selection source
// that produced this config error (e.g. "flag:--profile",
// "env:LARKSUITE_CLI_PROFILE", "config"). It is required on
// profile_not_found and no_active_profile so an agent can branch
// on how the identity was (or was not) chosen. It is never a secret.
CredentialSource string `json:"credential_source,omitempty"`
Cause error `json:"-"`
Field string `json:"field,omitempty"`
Cause error `json:"-"`
}
// Unwrap is nil-receiver safe; see ValidationError.Unwrap.
@@ -388,34 +370,6 @@ func (e *ConfigError) WithField(field string) *ConfigError {
return e
}
func (e *ConfigError) WithMissingKeys(keys ...string) *ConfigError {
e.MissingKeys = slices.Clone(keys)
return e
}
func (e *ConfigError) WithRequiredAnyOf(keys ...string) *ConfigError {
e.RequiredAnyOf = slices.Clone(keys)
return e
}
func (e *ConfigError) WithProfile(name string) *ConfigError {
e.Profile = name
return e
}
func (e *ConfigError) WithAppID(appID string) *ConfigError {
e.AppID = appID
return e
}
// WithCredentialSource records the machine-readable credential-selection source
// on the wire (snake_case credential_source). The value is an enum string
// (e.g. "flag:--profile", "config"), never a secret.
func (e *ConfigError) WithCredentialSource(source string) *ConfigError {
e.CredentialSource = source
return e
}
func (e *ConfigError) WithCause(cause error) *ConfigError {
e.Cause = cause
return e

View File

@@ -643,29 +643,3 @@ func TestBuilderSetter_DefensiveCopy(t *testing.T) {
}
})
}
// ======================= Profile selection error subtypes =======================
func TestConfigErrorProfileFields(t *testing.T) {
e := errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeAppCredentialIncomplete, "incomplete").
WithMissingKeys("LARKSUITE_CLI_APP_ID").
WithCredentialSource("env:LARKSUITE_CLI_PROFILE")
p, ok := errs.ProblemOf(e)
if !ok || p.Subtype != errs.SubtypeAppCredentialIncomplete {
t.Fatalf("subtype mismatch: %+v", p)
}
if len(e.MissingKeys) != 1 || e.MissingKeys[0] != "LARKSUITE_CLI_APP_ID" {
t.Errorf("missing_keys not set: %v", e.MissingKeys)
}
if e.CredentialSource != "env:LARKSUITE_CLI_PROFILE" {
t.Errorf("credential_source not set: %q", e.CredentialSource)
}
}
func TestValidationErrorProfileConflict(t *testing.T) {
e := errs.NewValidationError(errs.SubtypeProfileAppCredentialConflict, "conflict").
WithProfileAppConflict("cli_profile", "cli_env")
if e.ProfileAppID != "cli_profile" || e.EnvAppID != "cli_env" {
t.Errorf("conflict fields not set: %q %q", e.ProfileAppID, e.EnvAppID)
}
}

View File

@@ -23,89 +23,63 @@ func (p *Provider) ResolveAccount(ctx context.Context) (*credential.Account, err
appSecret := os.Getenv(envvars.CliAppSecret)
hasUAT := os.Getenv(envvars.CliUserAccessToken) != ""
hasTAT := os.Getenv(envvars.CliTenantAccessToken) != ""
presentKeys := presentCredentialEnvKeys(appID, appSecret, hasUAT, hasTAT)
if len(presentKeys) == 0 {
return nil, nil
if appID == "" && appSecret == "" {
switch {
case hasUAT:
return nil, &credential.BlockError{Provider: "env", Reason: envvars.CliUserAccessToken + " is set but " + envvars.CliAppID + " is missing"}
case hasTAT:
return nil, &credential.BlockError{Provider: "env", Reason: envvars.CliTenantAccessToken + " is set but " + envvars.CliAppID + " is missing"}
default:
return nil, nil
}
}
if appID == "" {
return nil, &credential.BlockError{Provider: "env", Reason: envvars.CliAppSecret + " is set but " + envvars.CliAppID + " is missing"}
}
if appSecret == "" && !hasUAT && !hasTAT {
return nil, &credential.BlockError{
Provider: "env",
Reason: envvars.CliAppID + " is set but no app secret or access token is available",
}
}
brand := credential.Brand(core.ParseBrand(os.Getenv(envvars.CliBrand)))
acct := &credential.Account{AppID: appID, AppSecret: appSecret, Brand: brand}
// Identity policy variables are validated whenever a direct credential
// input is present. Their errors must not be hidden by a later credential
// completeness check or profile arbitration.
defaultAs := credential.Identity(os.Getenv(envvars.CliDefaultAs))
switch defaultAs {
case "", credential.IdentityAuto, credential.IdentityUser, credential.IdentityBot:
switch id := credential.Identity(os.Getenv(envvars.CliDefaultAs)); id {
case "", credential.IdentityAuto:
acct.DefaultAs = id
case credential.IdentityUser, credential.IdentityBot:
acct.DefaultAs = id
default:
return nil, &credential.BlockError{
Provider: "env",
Reason: fmt.Sprintf("invalid %s %q (want user, bot, or auto)", envvars.CliDefaultAs, defaultAs),
Code: credential.BlockReasonInvalidPolicy,
Param: envvars.CliDefaultAs,
Reason: fmt.Sprintf("invalid %s %q (want user, bot, or auto)", envvars.CliDefaultAs, id),
}
}
strictMode := os.Getenv(envvars.CliStrictMode)
var supported credential.IdentitySupport
switch strictMode {
// Explicit strict mode policy takes priority
switch strictMode := os.Getenv(envvars.CliStrictMode); strictMode {
case "bot":
supported = credential.SupportsBot
acct.SupportedIdentities = credential.SupportsBot
case "user":
supported = credential.SupportsUser
acct.SupportedIdentities = credential.SupportsUser
case "off":
supported = credential.SupportsAll
acct.SupportedIdentities = credential.SupportsAll
case "":
// Infer from available tokens
if hasUAT {
supported |= credential.SupportsUser
acct.SupportedIdentities |= credential.SupportsUser
}
if hasTAT {
supported |= credential.SupportsBot
acct.SupportedIdentities |= credential.SupportsBot
}
default:
return nil, &credential.BlockError{
Provider: "env",
Reason: fmt.Sprintf("invalid %s %q (want bot, user, or off)", envvars.CliStrictMode, strictMode),
Code: credential.BlockReasonInvalidPolicy,
Param: envvars.CliStrictMode,
}
}
if appID == "" && appSecret == "" {
switch {
case hasUAT:
return nil, incompleteCredentialError(
appID,
envvars.CliUserAccessToken+" is set but "+envvars.CliAppID+" is missing",
[]string{envvars.CliAppID}, nil, presentKeys)
case hasTAT:
return nil, incompleteCredentialError(
appID,
envvars.CliTenantAccessToken+" is set but "+envvars.CliAppID+" is missing",
[]string{envvars.CliAppID}, nil, presentKeys)
}
}
if appID == "" {
return nil, incompleteCredentialError(
appID,
envvars.CliAppSecret+" is set but "+envvars.CliAppID+" is missing",
[]string{envvars.CliAppID}, nil, presentKeys)
}
if appSecret == "" && !hasUAT && !hasTAT {
return nil, incompleteCredentialError(
appID,
envvars.CliAppID+" is set but no app secret or access token is available",
nil,
[]string{envvars.CliAppSecret, envvars.CliUserAccessToken, envvars.CliTenantAccessToken},
presentKeys)
}
brand := credential.Brand(core.ParseBrand(os.Getenv(envvars.CliBrand)))
acct := &credential.Account{
AppID: appID,
AppSecret: appSecret,
Brand: brand,
DefaultAs: defaultAs,
SupportedIdentities: supported,
Kind: credential.AccountDirect,
}
if acct.DefaultAs == "" {
switch {
case hasUAT:
@@ -118,35 +92,6 @@ func (p *Provider) ResolveAccount(ctx context.Context) (*credential.Account, err
return acct, nil
}
func incompleteCredentialError(appID, reason string, missingKeys, requiredAnyOf, presentKeys []string) *credential.BlockError {
return &credential.BlockError{
Provider: "env",
Reason: reason,
Code: credential.BlockReasonCredentialIncomplete,
MissingKeys: missingKeys,
RequiredAnyOf: requiredAnyOf,
PresentKeys: presentKeys,
AppID: appID,
}
}
func presentCredentialEnvKeys(appID, appSecret string, hasUAT, hasTAT bool) []string {
var keys []string
if appID != "" {
keys = append(keys, envvars.CliAppID)
}
if appSecret != "" {
keys = append(keys, envvars.CliAppSecret)
}
if hasUAT {
keys = append(keys, envvars.CliUserAccessToken)
}
if hasTAT {
keys = append(keys, envvars.CliTenantAccessToken)
}
return keys
}
func (p *Provider) ResolveToken(ctx context.Context, req credential.TokenSpec) (*credential.Token, error) {
var envKey string
switch req.Type {

View File

@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ package env
import (
"context"
"errors"
"slices"
"strings"
"testing"
@@ -48,22 +47,6 @@ func TestResolveAccount_OnlyIDSet(t *testing.T) {
if !errors.As(err, &blockErr) {
t.Fatalf("expected BlockError, got %v", err)
}
if blockErr.Code != credential.BlockReasonCredentialIncomplete {
t.Fatalf("Code = %q, want %q", blockErr.Code, credential.BlockReasonCredentialIncomplete)
}
want := []string{envvars.CliAppSecret, envvars.CliUserAccessToken, envvars.CliTenantAccessToken}
if !slices.Equal(blockErr.RequiredAnyOf, want) {
t.Fatalf("RequiredAnyOf = %v, want %v", blockErr.RequiredAnyOf, want)
}
if len(blockErr.MissingKeys) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("MissingKeys = %v, want empty", blockErr.MissingKeys)
}
if !slices.Equal(blockErr.PresentKeys, []string{envvars.CliAppID}) {
t.Fatalf("PresentKeys = %v, want [%s]", blockErr.PresentKeys, envvars.CliAppID)
}
if blockErr.AppID != "cli_test" {
t.Fatalf("AppID = %q, want cli_test", blockErr.AppID)
}
}
func TestResolveAccount_AppIDAndUserTokenWithoutSecret(t *testing.T) {
@@ -92,81 +75,18 @@ func TestResolveAccount_OnlySecretSet(t *testing.T) {
if !errors.As(err, &blockErr) {
t.Fatalf("expected BlockError, got %v", err)
}
if blockErr.Code != credential.BlockReasonCredentialIncomplete ||
!slices.Equal(blockErr.MissingKeys, []string{envvars.CliAppID}) ||
!slices.Equal(blockErr.PresentKeys, []string{envvars.CliAppSecret}) {
t.Fatalf("BlockError = %+v, want incomplete with missing APP_ID and present APP_SECRET", blockErr)
}
if len(blockErr.RequiredAnyOf) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("RequiredAnyOf = %v, want empty for APP_SECRET-only", blockErr.RequiredAnyOf)
}
}
func TestResolveAccount_OnlyTokenSetWithoutAppID(t *testing.T) {
for _, tt := range []struct {
name string
key string
}{
{name: "UAT", key: envvars.CliUserAccessToken},
{name: "TAT", key: envvars.CliTenantAccessToken},
} {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv(envvars.CliAppID, "")
t.Setenv(envvars.CliAppSecret, "")
t.Setenv(envvars.CliUserAccessToken, "")
t.Setenv(envvars.CliTenantAccessToken, "")
t.Setenv(tt.key, "token_test")
t.Setenv(envvars.CliUserAccessToken, "uat_test")
_, err := (&Provider{}).ResolveAccount(context.Background())
var blockErr *credential.BlockError
if !errors.As(err, &blockErr) {
t.Fatalf("expected BlockError, got %v", err)
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), envvars.CliAppID) {
t.Fatalf("error = %v, want mention of %s", err, envvars.CliAppID)
}
if blockErr.Code != credential.BlockReasonCredentialIncomplete ||
!slices.Equal(blockErr.MissingKeys, []string{envvars.CliAppID}) ||
!slices.Equal(blockErr.PresentKeys, []string{tt.key}) {
t.Fatalf("BlockError = %+v, want incomplete for %s", blockErr, tt.key)
}
if len(blockErr.RequiredAnyOf) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("RequiredAnyOf = %v, want empty for %s-only", blockErr.RequiredAnyOf, tt.name)
}
})
_, err := (&Provider{}).ResolveAccount(context.Background())
var blockErr *credential.BlockError
if !errors.As(err, &blockErr) {
t.Fatalf("expected BlockError, got %v", err)
}
}
func TestResolveAccount_InvalidPolicyRejectedBeforeIncomplete(t *testing.T) {
for _, tt := range []struct {
name string
key string
}{
{name: "DEFAULT_AS", key: envvars.CliDefaultAs},
{name: "STRICT_MODE", key: envvars.CliStrictMode},
} {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv(envvars.CliAppID, "cli_test")
t.Setenv(envvars.CliAppSecret, "")
t.Setenv(envvars.CliUserAccessToken, "")
t.Setenv(envvars.CliTenantAccessToken, "")
t.Setenv(tt.key, "banana")
_, err := (&Provider{}).ResolveAccount(context.Background())
var blockErr *credential.BlockError
if !errors.As(err, &blockErr) {
t.Fatalf("error = %T %v, want BlockError", err, err)
}
if blockErr.Code != credential.BlockReasonInvalidPolicy {
t.Fatalf("Code = %q, want %q", blockErr.Code, credential.BlockReasonInvalidPolicy)
}
if blockErr.Param != tt.key {
t.Fatalf("Param = %q, want %q", blockErr.Param, tt.key)
}
if !strings.Contains(blockErr.Reason, tt.key) {
t.Fatalf("reason = %q, want %s", blockErr.Reason, tt.key)
}
})
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), envvars.CliAppID) {
t.Fatalf("error = %v, want mention of %s", err, envvars.CliAppID)
}
}
@@ -338,9 +258,6 @@ func TestResolveAccount_InvalidStrictModeRejected(t *testing.T) {
if !errors.As(err, &blockErr) {
t.Fatalf("expected BlockError, got %T", err)
}
if blockErr.Code != credential.BlockReasonInvalidPolicy || blockErr.Param != envvars.CliStrictMode {
t.Fatalf("BlockError = %+v, want invalid_policy with Param %s", blockErr, envvars.CliStrictMode)
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), envvars.CliStrictMode) {
t.Fatalf("error = %v, want mention of %s", err, envvars.CliStrictMode)
}
@@ -359,9 +276,6 @@ func TestResolveAccount_InvalidDefaultAsRejected(t *testing.T) {
if !errors.As(err, &blockErr) {
t.Fatalf("expected BlockError, got %T", err)
}
if blockErr.Code != credential.BlockReasonInvalidPolicy || blockErr.Param != envvars.CliDefaultAs {
t.Fatalf("BlockError = %+v, want invalid_policy with Param %s", blockErr, envvars.CliDefaultAs)
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), envvars.CliDefaultAs) {
t.Fatalf("error = %v, want mention of %s", err, envvars.CliDefaultAs)
}

View File

@@ -77,8 +77,6 @@ func (p *Provider) ResolveAccount(ctx context.Context) (*credential.Account, err
return nil, &credential.BlockError{
Provider: "sidecar",
Reason: fmt.Sprintf("invalid %s %q (want user, bot, or auto)", envvars.CliDefaultAs, id),
Code: credential.BlockReasonInvalidPolicy,
Param: envvars.CliDefaultAs,
}
}
@@ -94,8 +92,6 @@ func (p *Provider) ResolveAccount(ctx context.Context) (*credential.Account, err
return nil, &credential.BlockError{
Provider: "sidecar",
Reason: fmt.Sprintf("invalid %s %q (want bot, user, or off)", envvars.CliStrictMode, strictMode),
Code: credential.BlockReasonInvalidPolicy,
Param: envvars.CliStrictMode,
}
}

View File

@@ -7,9 +7,7 @@ package sidecar
import (
"context"
"errors"
"os"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/extension/credential"
@@ -148,57 +146,6 @@ func TestResolveAccount_StrictMode(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestResolveAccount_InvalidPolicyClassified(t *testing.T) {
setEnv(t, envvars.CliAuthProxy, "http://127.0.0.1:16384")
setEnv(t, envvars.CliProxyKey, "test-key")
setEnv(t, envvars.CliAppID, "cli_test")
tests := []struct {
name string
key string
value string
supportedText string
}{
{
name: "default as",
key: envvars.CliDefaultAs,
value: "banana",
supportedText: "want user, bot, or auto",
},
{
name: "strict mode",
key: envvars.CliStrictMode,
value: "banana",
supportedText: "want bot, user, or off",
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
unsetEnv(t, envvars.CliDefaultAs)
unsetEnv(t, envvars.CliStrictMode)
setEnv(t, tt.key, tt.value)
_, err := (&Provider{}).ResolveAccount(context.Background())
var blockErr *credential.BlockError
if !errors.As(err, &blockErr) {
t.Fatalf("error = %T %v, want BlockError", err, err)
}
if blockErr.Code != credential.BlockReasonInvalidPolicy {
t.Fatalf("Code = %q, want %q", blockErr.Code, credential.BlockReasonInvalidPolicy)
}
if blockErr.Param != tt.key {
t.Fatalf("Param = %q, want %q", blockErr.Param, tt.key)
}
if !strings.Contains(blockErr.Reason, tt.key) ||
!strings.Contains(blockErr.Reason, tt.value) ||
!strings.Contains(blockErr.Reason, tt.supportedText) {
t.Fatalf("Reason = %q, want variable, invalid value, and supported values", blockErr.Reason)
}
})
}
}
func TestResolveToken_NotActive(t *testing.T) {
unsetEnv(t, envvars.CliAuthProxy)

View File

@@ -44,27 +44,6 @@ func (s IdentitySupport) UserOnly() bool { return s == SupportsUser }
// BotOnly returns true if only bot identity is supported.
func (s IdentitySupport) BotOnly() bool { return s == SupportsBot }
// AccountKind declares how an account participates in credential arbitration.
type AccountKind int
const (
// AccountManaged means the provider owns the whole identity; winning it
// ends arbitration outright. The zero value, so existing providers are
// unchanged.
AccountManaged AccountKind = iota
// AccountDirect marks an actively supplied raw credential (the env
// provider's LARKSUITE_CLI_* variables). It participates in profile
// arbitration and conflict detection instead of winning outright.
//
// RESERVED: only the builtin env provider may declare AccountDirect
// today — the arbitration's direct-credential diagnostics are defined in
// terms of the process environment, and the caller rejects AccountDirect
// from any other provider. Third-party providers must return
// AccountManaged until the SPI carries provider-reported input
// descriptors.
AccountDirect
)
// Account holds resolved app credentials and configuration.
type Account struct {
AppID string
@@ -74,7 +53,6 @@ type Account struct {
ProfileName string
OpenID string // optional; if UAT is available, API result takes precedence
SupportedIdentities IdentitySupport // zero = provider did not declare; treat as no restriction
Kind AccountKind // AccountManaged (default) or AccountDirect
}
// Token holds a resolved access token and optional metadata.
@@ -98,38 +76,11 @@ type TokenSpec struct {
AppID string
}
// BlockReason classifies provider-originated block conditions that callers may
// safely map to a more specific public error contract.
type BlockReason string
const (
// BlockReasonCredentialIncomplete marks incomplete inputs from the builtin
// process-env credential provider. It is reserved for that provider because
// direct-credential arbitration and diagnostics currently name the fixed
// LARKSUITE_CLI_* env surface. Third-party providers must return an
// unclassified BlockError until the SPI carries provider-owned input
// descriptors. Blocks without a Code propagate unchanged.
BlockReasonCredentialIncomplete BlockReason = "credential_incomplete"
// BlockReasonInvalidPolicy marks a user-supplied policy input (e.g.
// LARKSUITE_CLI_DEFAULT_AS / LARKSUITE_CLI_STRICT_MODE) that failed
// validation. The caller maps it to a typed validation error carrying
// Param and a repair hint, so user input mistakes never surface as
// internal errors.
BlockReasonInvalidPolicy BlockReason = "invalid_policy"
)
// BlockError is returned by a Provider to actively reject a request
// and prevent subsequent providers in the chain from being consulted.
type BlockError struct {
Provider string
Reason string
Code BlockReason
MissingKeys []string // environment variable names only; never values
RequiredAnyOf []string // environment variable names only; never values
PresentKeys []string // environment variable names only; never values
AppID string // plaintext app identifier used only for source comparison; never a secret
Param string // name of the invalid input variable on invalid_policy blocks; never a value
Provider string
Reason string
}
func (e *BlockError) Error() string {

View File

@@ -48,18 +48,6 @@ func (s *staticTokenResolver) ResolveToken(_ context.Context, _ credential.Token
return &credential.TokenResult{Token: "test-token"}, nil
}
type clientTestAccountResolver struct {
appID string
}
func (r clientTestAccountResolver) ResolveAccount(context.Context) (*credential.Account, error) {
return &credential.Account{AppID: r.appID, Brand: core.BrandFeishu}, nil
}
func newClientTestCredentialProvider(appID string, tokenResolver credential.DefaultTokenResolver) *credential.CredentialProvider {
return credential.NewCredentialProvider(nil, clientTestAccountResolver{appID: appID}, tokenResolver, nil)
}
// newTestAPIClient creates an APIClient with a mock HTTP transport.
func newTestAPIClient(t *testing.T, rt http.RoundTripper) (*APIClient, *bytes.Buffer) {
t.Helper()
@@ -70,7 +58,7 @@ func newTestAPIClient(t *testing.T, rt http.RoundTripper) (*APIClient, *bytes.Bu
lark.WithLogLevel(larkcore.LogLevelError),
lark.WithHttpClient(httpClient),
)
testCred := newClientTestCredentialProvider("test-app", &staticTokenResolver{})
testCred := credential.NewCredentialProvider(nil, nil, &staticTokenResolver{}, nil)
cfg := &core.CliConfig{AppID: "test-app", AppSecret: "test-secret", Brand: core.BrandFeishu}
return &APIClient{
SDK: sdk,
@@ -475,7 +463,7 @@ func TestDoStream_IgnoresBaseHTTPClientTimeout(t *testing.T) {
ac := &APIClient{
HTTP: &http.Client{Timeout: 5 * time.Millisecond},
Credential: newClientTestCredentialProvider("test-app", &staticTokenResolver{}),
Credential: credential.NewCredentialProvider(nil, nil, &staticTokenResolver{}, nil),
Config: &core.CliConfig{AppID: "test-app", AppSecret: "test-secret", Brand: core.BrandFeishu},
}
@@ -510,7 +498,7 @@ func TestDoStream_TransportFailureSplitsSubtype(t *testing.T) {
})
ac := &APIClient{
HTTP: &http.Client{Transport: rt},
Credential: newClientTestCredentialProvider("test-app", &staticTokenResolver{}),
Credential: credential.NewCredentialProvider(nil, nil, &staticTokenResolver{}, nil),
Config: &core.CliConfig{AppID: "test-app", AppSecret: "test-secret", Brand: core.BrandFeishu},
}
@@ -544,7 +532,7 @@ func (f *failingTokenResolver) ResolveToken(_ context.Context, spec credential.T
func TestResolveAccessToken_NoToken_ReturnsTypedAuthenticationError(t *testing.T) {
ac := &APIClient{
HTTP: &http.Client{},
Credential: newClientTestCredentialProvider("test-app", &failingTokenResolver{}),
Credential: credential.NewCredentialProvider(nil, nil, &failingTokenResolver{}, nil),
Config: &core.CliConfig{AppID: "test-app", AppSecret: "test-secret", Brand: core.BrandFeishu},
}
@@ -584,7 +572,7 @@ func (f *needAuthTokenResolver) ResolveToken(_ context.Context, _ credential.Tok
func TestResolveAccessToken_NeedAuthorization_SurfacesAsTypedAuthentication(t *testing.T) {
ac := &APIClient{
HTTP: &http.Client{},
Credential: newClientTestCredentialProvider("test-app", &needAuthTokenResolver{userOpenID: "ou_test_user"}),
Credential: credential.NewCredentialProvider(nil, nil, &needAuthTokenResolver{userOpenID: "ou_test_user"}, nil),
Config: &core.CliConfig{AppID: "test-app", AppSecret: "test-secret", Brand: core.BrandFeishu},
}
@@ -624,7 +612,7 @@ func TestResolveAccessToken_NeedAuthorization_SurfacesAsTypedAuthentication(t *t
func TestDoSDKRequest_AuthFailureSurfacesTypedAuthenticationError(t *testing.T) {
ac := &APIClient{
HTTP: &http.Client{},
Credential: newClientTestCredentialProvider("test-app", &failingTokenResolver{}),
Credential: credential.NewCredentialProvider(nil, nil, &failingTokenResolver{}, nil),
Config: &core.CliConfig{AppID: "test-app", AppSecret: "test-secret", Brand: core.BrandFeishu},
}

View File

@@ -27,11 +27,6 @@ import (
// In tests, replace any field to stub out external dependencies.
type InvocationContext struct {
Profile string
// ProfileFromFlag is true when Profile was set via the --profile flag,
// and false when it came from the LARKSUITE_CLI_PROFILE env fallback
// (or neither was set). Downstream credential resolution uses this to
// report the correct profile source.
ProfileFromFlag bool
}
type Factory struct {

View File

@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ import (
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/credential"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/keychain"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/registry"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/riskcontrol"
_ "github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/security/contentsafety" // register content safety provider
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/transport"
_ "github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/vfs/localfileio" // register default FileIO provider
@@ -34,7 +33,7 @@ import (
// Phase 1: HttpClient (no credential dependency)
// Phase 2: Credential (sole data source for account info)
// Phase 3: Config derived from Credential
// Phase 4: LarkClient derived from Credential and workspace policy
// Phase 4: LarkClient derived from Credential
func NewDefault(streams *IOStreams, inv InvocationContext) *Factory {
streams = normalizeStreams(streams)
f := &Factory{
@@ -55,22 +54,20 @@ func NewDefault(streams *IOStreams, inv InvocationContext) *Factory {
// Phase 0: FileIO provider (no dependency)
f.FileIOProvider = fileio.GetProvider()
workspaceConfig := core.NewConfigSnapshot()
// Phase 1: HttpClient (no credential dependency)
f.HttpClient = cachedHttpClientFunc(f, workspaceConfig)
f.HttpClient = cachedHttpClientFunc(f)
// Phase 2: Credential (sole data source)
// Keychain is read via closure so callers can replace f.Keychain after construction.
f.Credential = buildCredentialProvider(credentialDeps{
Keychain: func() keychain.KeychainAccess { return f.Keychain },
Profile: inv.Profile,
ProfileFromFlag: inv.ProfileFromFlag,
HttpClient: f.HttpClient,
ErrOut: f.IOStreams.ErrOut,
Keychain: func() keychain.KeychainAccess { return f.Keychain },
Profile: inv.Profile,
HttpClient: f.HttpClient,
ErrOut: f.IOStreams.ErrOut,
})
// Phase 3: Runtime config contains resolved account data only.
// Phase 3: Config derived from Credential via an explicit conversion boundary.
f.Config = sync.OnceValues(func() (*core.CliConfig, error) {
acct, err := f.Credential.ResolveAccount(context.Background())
if err != nil {
@@ -81,9 +78,8 @@ func NewDefault(streams *IOStreams, inv InvocationContext) *Factory {
return cfg, nil
})
// Phase 4: LarkClient composes account data and workspace policy at the SDK
// transport boundary.
f.LarkClient = cachedLarkClientFunc(f, workspaceConfig)
// Phase 4: LarkClient from Credential (placeholder AppSecret)
f.LarkClient = cachedLarkClientFunc(f)
return f
}
@@ -112,16 +108,13 @@ func safeRedirectPolicy(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
// .StderrIsTerminal field, which tests set directly.
var warnIfProxied = transport.WarnIfProxied
func cachedHttpClientFunc(f *Factory, workspaceConfig workspaceConfigSource) func() (*http.Client, error) {
func cachedHttpClientFunc(f *Factory) func() (*http.Client, error) {
return sync.OnceValues(func() (*http.Client, error) {
if f.IOStreams.StderrIsTerminal {
warnIfProxied(f.IOStreams.ErrOut)
}
hostSignalSource := resolveSDKHostSignalSource(workspaceConfig)
var rt http.RoundTripper = transport.Shared()
rt = riskcontrol.NewTransport(rt, hostSignalSource)
rt = &RetryTransport{Base: rt}
rt = &SecurityHeaderTransport{Base: rt}
rt = &auth.SecurityPolicyTransport{Base: rt} // Add our global response interceptor
@@ -135,7 +128,7 @@ func cachedHttpClientFunc(f *Factory, workspaceConfig workspaceConfigSource) fun
})
}
func cachedLarkClientFunc(f *Factory, workspaceConfig workspaceConfigSource) func() (*lark.Client, error) {
func cachedLarkClientFunc(f *Factory) func() (*lark.Client, error) {
return sync.OnceValues(func() (*lark.Client, error) {
acct, err := f.Credential.ResolveAccount(context.Background())
if err != nil {
@@ -149,15 +142,8 @@ func cachedLarkClientFunc(f *Factory, workspaceConfig workspaceConfigSource) fun
if f.IOStreams.StderrIsTerminal {
warnIfProxied(f.IOStreams.ErrOut)
}
hostSignalSource := resolveSDKHostSignalSource(workspaceConfig)
var sdkBase http.RoundTripper = transport.Shared()
// The innermost SDK boundary always strips reserved host-signal headers;
// a nil source makes it strip-only when workspace policy disables signal
// collection.
sdkBase = riskcontrol.NewTransport(sdkBase, hostSignalSource)
sdkTransport := wrapSDKTransport(sdkBase)
opts = append(opts, lark.WithHttpClient(&http.Client{
Transport: sdkTransport,
Transport: buildSDKTransport(),
CheckRedirect: safeRedirectPolicy,
}))
ep := core.ResolveEndpoints(acct.Brand)
@@ -166,8 +152,9 @@ func cachedLarkClientFunc(f *Factory, workspaceConfig workspaceConfigSource) fun
})
}
func wrapSDKTransport(next http.RoundTripper) http.RoundTripper {
var sdkTransport http.RoundTripper = &RetryTransport{Base: next}
func buildSDKTransport() http.RoundTripper {
var sdkTransport http.RoundTripper = transport.Shared()
sdkTransport = &RetryTransport{Base: sdkTransport}
sdkTransport = &UserAgentTransport{Base: sdkTransport}
sdkTransport = &BuildHeaderTransport{Base: sdkTransport}
sdkTransport = &auth.SecurityPolicyTransport{Base: sdkTransport}
@@ -175,11 +162,10 @@ func wrapSDKTransport(next http.RoundTripper) http.RoundTripper {
}
type credentialDeps struct {
Keychain func() keychain.KeychainAccess
Profile string
ProfileFromFlag bool
HttpClient func() (*http.Client, error)
ErrOut io.Writer
Keychain func() keychain.KeychainAccess
Profile string
HttpClient func() (*http.Client, error)
ErrOut io.Writer
}
func buildCredentialProvider(deps credentialDeps) *credential.CredentialProvider {
@@ -192,13 +178,5 @@ func buildCredentialProvider(deps credentialDeps) *credential.CredentialProvider
// depend on. enrichUserInfo failures are already non-fatal (the
// provider clears unverified identity fields), so silencing the
// warning is safe.
cred := credential.NewCredentialProvider(providers, defaultAcct, defaultToken, deps.HttpClient)
if deps.Profile == "" {
// No profile selected — don't record a phantom env source.
return cred
}
if deps.ProfileFromFlag {
return cred.WithProfileFromFlag(deps.Profile)
}
return cred.WithProfileFromEnv(deps.Profile)
return credential.NewCredentialProvider(providers, defaultAcct, defaultToken, deps.HttpClient)
}

View File

@@ -6,15 +6,10 @@ package cmdutil
import (
"io"
"testing"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
)
func TestCachedHttpClientFunc_ReturnsSameInstance(t *testing.T) {
isEnabled := false
f, _, _, _ := TestFactory(t, &core.CliConfig{AppID: "test-app"})
f.IOStreams.ErrOut = io.Discard
fn := cachedHttpClientFunc(f, staticWorkspaceConfig{config: &core.MultiAppConfig{RiskControl: &isEnabled}})
fn := cachedHttpClientFunc(&Factory{IOStreams: &IOStreams{ErrOut: io.Discard}})
c1, err := fn()
if err != nil {
@@ -34,10 +29,7 @@ func TestCachedHttpClientFunc_ReturnsSameInstance(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestCachedHttpClientFunc_HasTimeout(t *testing.T) {
isEnabled := false
f, _, _, _ := TestFactory(t, &core.CliConfig{AppID: "test-app"})
f.IOStreams.ErrOut = io.Discard
fn := cachedHttpClientFunc(f, staticWorkspaceConfig{config: &core.MultiAppConfig{RiskControl: &isEnabled}})
fn := cachedHttpClientFunc(&Factory{IOStreams: &IOStreams{ErrOut: io.Discard}})
c, _ := fn()
if c.Timeout == 0 {
t.Error("expected non-zero timeout")
@@ -45,10 +37,7 @@ func TestCachedHttpClientFunc_HasTimeout(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestCachedHttpClientFunc_HasRedirectPolicy(t *testing.T) {
isEnabled := false
f, _, _, _ := TestFactory(t, &core.CliConfig{AppID: "test-app"})
f.IOStreams.ErrOut = io.Discard
fn := cachedHttpClientFunc(f, staticWorkspaceConfig{config: &core.MultiAppConfig{RiskControl: &isEnabled}})
fn := cachedHttpClientFunc(&Factory{IOStreams: &IOStreams{ErrOut: io.Discard}})
c, _ := fn()
if c.CheckRedirect == nil {
t.Error("expected CheckRedirect to be set (safeRedirectPolicy)")

View File

@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ import (
"testing"
_ "github.com/larksuite/cli/extension/credential/env" // registers the env-backed account provider
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/envvars"
)
@@ -37,15 +36,13 @@ var proxyWarnGateCases = []struct {
// TestCachedHttpClientFunc_ProxyWarnGate verifies the http-client init path
// invokes WarnIfProxied only when stderr is an interactive terminal.
func TestCachedHttpClientFunc_ProxyWarnGate(t *testing.T) {
isEnabled := false
for _, tc := range proxyWarnGateCases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
calls := installProxyWarnSpy(t)
f, _, _, _ := TestFactory(t, &core.CliConfig{AppID: "test-app"})
f.IOStreams.ErrOut = io.Discard
f.IOStreams.StderrIsTerminal = tc.terminal
fn := cachedHttpClientFunc(f, staticWorkspaceConfig{config: &core.MultiAppConfig{RiskControl: &isEnabled}})
fn := cachedHttpClientFunc(&Factory{IOStreams: &IOStreams{
ErrOut: io.Discard, StderrIsTerminal: tc.terminal,
}})
if _, err := fn(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("http client init: %v", err)
}
@@ -76,7 +73,7 @@ func TestCachedLarkClientFunc_ProxyWarnGate(t *testing.T) {
// normalizeStreams copies the struct (out := *s), so the
// StderrIsTerminal field survives into f.IOStreams.
f := NewDefault(&IOStreams{ErrOut: io.Discard, StderrIsTerminal: tc.terminal}, InvocationContext{})
if _, err := cachedLarkClientFunc(f, nil)(); err != nil {
if _, err := cachedLarkClientFunc(f)(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("lark client init: %v", err)
}

View File

@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@ import (
"github.com/larksuite/cli/errs"
extcred "github.com/larksuite/cli/extension/credential"
envprovider "github.com/larksuite/cli/extension/credential/env"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/credential"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/envvars"
@@ -406,14 +405,6 @@ type stubExtProvider struct {
err error
}
type stubDefaultAccountResolver struct {
acct *credential.Account
}
func (s *stubDefaultAccountResolver) ResolveAccount(_ context.Context) (*credential.Account, error) {
return s.acct, nil
}
func (s *stubExtProvider) Name() string { return s.name }
func (s *stubExtProvider) ResolveAccount(_ context.Context) (*extcred.Account, error) {
return s.acct, s.err
@@ -457,86 +448,6 @@ func TestRequireBuiltinCredentialProvider_AllowsBuiltinProvider(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestRequireBuiltinCredentialProvider_AllowsMatchingAppIDOnlyProfile(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
t.Setenv(envvars.CliAppID, "cli_a")
t.Setenv(envvars.CliAppSecret, "")
t.Setenv(envvars.CliUserAccessToken, "")
t.Setenv(envvars.CliTenantAccessToken, "")
if err := core.SaveMultiAppConfig(&core.MultiAppConfig{
CurrentApp: "tenant_a",
Apps: []core.AppConfig{{
Name: "tenant_a",
AppId: "cli_a",
AppSecret: core.PlainSecret("test-secret"),
Brand: core.BrandFeishu,
}},
}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("SaveMultiAppConfig: %v", err)
}
cred := credential.NewCredentialProvider(
[]extcred.Provider{&envprovider.Provider{}},
&stubDefaultAccountResolver{acct: &credential.Account{AppID: "cli_a", AppSecret: "test-secret"}},
nil,
nil,
).WithProfileFromFlag("tenant_a")
f, _, _, _ := TestFactory(t, nil)
f.Credential = cred
if err := f.RequireBuiltinCredentialProvider(context.Background(), "auth"); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("matching APP_ID-only profile should use builtin credentials: %v", err)
}
}
// A stale LARKSUITE_CLI_PROFILE (profile that cannot resolve) must not lock
// the user out of the builtin setup/repair commands this gate guards: the
// probe falls back to provider engagement and lets the command run.
func TestRequireBuiltinCredentialProvider_StaleProfileDoesNotLockOut(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir()) // no config -> "ghost" cannot resolve
stub := &stubExtProvider{name: "env"} // not engaged: returns nil, nil
cred := credential.NewCredentialProvider(
[]extcred.Provider{stub},
&stubDefaultAccountResolver{},
nil,
nil,
).WithProfileFromEnv("ghost")
f, _, _, _ := TestFactory(t, nil)
f.Credential = cred
if err := f.RequireBuiltinCredentialProvider(context.Background(), "config"); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("stale profile must not lock out builtin auth/config commands: %v", err)
}
}
// An invalid policy variable (e.g. LARKSUITE_CLI_DEFAULT_AS=banana) is a user
// input error, not an external credential takeover: the gate surfaces the
// same typed validation error as formal arbitration instead of a misleading
// "provided externally" refusal.
func TestRequireBuiltinCredentialProvider_InvalidPolicySurfacesTypedError(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
stub := &stubExtProvider{name: "env", err: &extcred.BlockError{
Provider: "env",
Reason: "invalid LARKSUITE_CLI_DEFAULT_AS \"banana\" (want user, bot, or auto)",
Code: extcred.BlockReasonInvalidPolicy,
Param: envvars.CliDefaultAs,
}}
cred := credential.NewCredentialProvider([]extcred.Provider{stub}, &stubDefaultAccountResolver{}, nil, nil)
f, _, _, _ := TestFactory(t, nil)
f.Credential = cred
err := f.RequireBuiltinCredentialProvider(context.Background(), "auth")
prob, ok := errs.ProblemOf(err)
if !ok || prob.Subtype != errs.SubtypeInvalidArgument {
t.Fatalf("err = %v, want typed invalid_argument (same as formal arbitration)", err)
}
if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "provided externally") {
t.Fatalf("err = %v, must not read as external takeover", err)
}
}
func TestRequireBuiltinCredentialProvider_NilCredential(t *testing.T) {
f, _, _, _ := TestFactory(t, nil)
f.Credential = nil

View File

@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
package cmdutil
import (
"io/fs"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/extension/fileio"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/validate"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/vfs"
)
// StatLocalFile returns metadata for a path in the process filesystem namespace.
// It is intended for advisory validation; callers must validate the opened file
// again before using its contents.
func StatLocalFile(path string) (fs.FileInfo, error) {
localPath, err := validate.LocalInputPath(path)
if err != nil {
return nil, &fileio.PathValidationError{Err: err}
}
return vfs.Stat(localPath)
}
// OpenLocalFile opens a path in the process filesystem namespace.
// Absolute and relative paths are accepted. It is the shared replacement for
// direct os.Open/os.ReadFile use in commands that intentionally read local
// paths outside the workspace sandbox. Callers inspect the returned descriptor
// before reading so validation and use apply to the same opened file.
func OpenLocalFile(path string) (fs.File, error) {
localPath, err := validate.LocalInputPath(path)
if err != nil {
return nil, &fileio.PathValidationError{Err: err}
}
return vfs.Open(localPath)
}

View File

@@ -1,96 +0,0 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
package cmdutil
import (
"errors"
"io"
"io/fs"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/extension/fileio"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/vfs"
)
func TestOpenLocalFile_AcceptsAbsoluteAndParentRelativePaths(t *testing.T) {
root := t.TempDir()
workDir := filepath.Join(root, "work")
if err := os.Mkdir(workDir, 0o755); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
path := filepath.Join(root, "input.txt")
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte("content"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
TestChdir(t, workDir)
for _, input := range []string{path, filepath.Join("..", "input.txt")} {
f, err := OpenLocalFile(input)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("OpenLocalFile(%q) error = %v", input, err)
}
got, readErr := io.ReadAll(f)
closeErr := f.Close()
if readErr != nil || closeErr != nil || string(got) != "content" {
t.Fatalf("OpenLocalFile(%q) content=%q read=%v close=%v", input, got, readErr, closeErr)
}
}
}
func TestOpenLocalFile_RejectsInvalidInput(t *testing.T) {
if _, err := OpenLocalFile("input\n.txt"); !errors.Is(err, fileio.ErrPathValidation) {
t.Fatalf("OpenLocalFile() error = %v, want ErrPathValidation", err)
}
}
func TestStatLocalFile_ReturnsMetadata(t *testing.T) {
info, err := StatLocalFile(t.TempDir())
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("StatLocalFile() error = %v", err)
}
if !info.IsDir() {
t.Fatalf("StatLocalFile() mode = %v, want directory", info.Mode())
}
}
func TestOpenLocalFile_DoesNotStatBeforeOpen(t *testing.T) {
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "input.txt")
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte("content"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
previous := vfs.DefaultFS
counting := &countingLocalFileFS{FS: previous}
vfs.DefaultFS = counting
t.Cleanup(func() { vfs.DefaultFS = previous })
f, err := OpenLocalFile(path)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("OpenLocalFile() error = %v", err)
}
if err := f.Close(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if counting.openCalls != 1 || counting.statCalls != 0 {
t.Fatalf("OpenLocalFile() calls: Open=%d Stat=%d, want Open=1 Stat=0", counting.openCalls, counting.statCalls)
}
}
type countingLocalFileFS struct {
vfs.FS
openCalls int
statCalls int
}
func (f *countingLocalFileFS) Open(name string) (*os.File, error) {
f.openCalls++
return f.FS.Open(name)
}
func (f *countingLocalFileFS) Stat(name string) (fs.FileInfo, error) {
f.statCalls++
return f.FS.Stat(name)
}

View File

@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
package cmdutil
import (
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/riskcontrol"
)
type workspaceConfigSource interface {
MultiAppConfig() (*core.MultiAppConfig, error)
}
// resolveSDKHostSignalSource applies workspace policy at the SDK transport
// boundary.
func resolveSDKHostSignalSource(config workspaceConfigSource) riskcontrol.Source {
if config == nil {
return nil
}
workspace, configErr := config.MultiAppConfig()
// Default-on means an existing config with no explicit preference. Absent
// or unreadable config cannot authorize host-signal collection.
if configErr != nil || !workspace.RiskControlEnabled() {
return nil
}
return riskcontrol.NewHostSource()
}

View File

@@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
package cmdutil
import (
"errors"
"testing"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
)
type staticWorkspaceConfig struct {
config *core.MultiAppConfig
err error
}
func (s staticWorkspaceConfig) MultiAppConfig() (*core.MultiAppConfig, error) {
return s.config, s.err
}
func TestResolveSDKHostSignalSource(t *testing.T) {
disabled := false
tests := []struct {
name string
config workspaceConfigSource
wantSource bool
}{
{name: "workspace default on", config: staticWorkspaceConfig{config: &core.MultiAppConfig{}}, wantSource: true},
{name: "workspace opt-out", config: staticWorkspaceConfig{config: &core.MultiAppConfig{RiskControl: &disabled}}},
{name: "missing config", config: staticWorkspaceConfig{err: errors.New("file does not exist")}},
{name: "unreadable config", config: staticWorkspaceConfig{err: errors.New("permission denied")}},
{name: "nil config value", config: staticWorkspaceConfig{}},
{name: "nil config source"},
}
for _, test := range tests {
t.Run(test.name, func(t *testing.T) {
got := resolveSDKHostSignalSource(test.config)
if (got != nil) != test.wantSource {
t.Fatalf("resolveSDKHostSignalSource() = %T, wantSource %t", got, test.wantSource)
}
})
}
}

View File

@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ func BaseSecurityHeaders() http.Header {
if v := envvars.AgentTrace(); v != "" {
h.Set(HeaderAgentTrace, v)
}
h.Set("x-tt-env", "ppe_bot_user_id")
return h
}

View File

@@ -15,7 +15,6 @@ import (
exttransport "github.com/larksuite/cli/extension/transport"
internalauth "github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/auth"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/riskcontrol"
)
type roundTripFunc func(*http.Request) (*http.Response, error)
@@ -92,13 +91,13 @@ func TestRetryTransport_DefaultNoRetry(t *testing.T) {
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// wrapSDKTransport chain composition
// buildSDKTransport chain composition
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
func TestWrapSDKTransport_IncludesRetryTransport(t *testing.T) {
transport := wrapSDKTransport(riskcontrol.NewTransport(http.DefaultTransport, nil))
func TestBuildSDKTransport_IncludesRetryTransport(t *testing.T) {
transport := buildSDKTransport()
// Chain: SecurityPolicy → BuildHeader → UserAgent → Retry → RiskControl → Base
// Chain: SecurityPolicy → BuildHeader → UserAgent → Retry → Base
sec, ok := transport.(*internalauth.SecurityPolicyTransport)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("outer transport type = %T, want *auth.SecurityPolicyTransport", transport)
@@ -111,23 +110,18 @@ func TestWrapSDKTransport_IncludesRetryTransport(t *testing.T) {
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("layer after BuildHeader = %T, want *UserAgentTransport", bh.Base)
}
retry, ok := ua.Base.(*RetryTransport)
if !ok {
if _, ok := ua.Base.(*RetryTransport); !ok {
t.Fatalf("inner transport type = %T, want *RetryTransport", ua.Base)
}
if _, ok := retry.Base.(*riskcontrol.Transport); !ok {
t.Fatalf("layer after Retry = %T, want *riskcontrol.Transport", retry.Base)
}
}
func TestWrapSDKTransport_WithExtension(t *testing.T) {
previous := exttransport.GetProvider()
func TestBuildSDKTransport_WithExtension(t *testing.T) {
exttransport.Register(&stubTransportProvider{})
t.Cleanup(func() { exttransport.Register(previous) })
t.Cleanup(func() { exttransport.Register(nil) })
transport := wrapSDKTransport(riskcontrol.NewTransport(http.DefaultTransport, nil))
transport := buildSDKTransport()
// Chain: extensionMiddleware → SecurityPolicy → BuildHeader → UserAgent → Retry → RiskControl → Base
// Chain: extensionMiddleware → SecurityPolicy → BuildHeader → UserAgent → Retry → Base
mid, ok := transport.(*extensionMiddleware)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("outer transport type = %T, want *extensionMiddleware", transport)
@@ -144,23 +138,17 @@ func TestWrapSDKTransport_WithExtension(t *testing.T) {
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("layer after BuildHeader = %T, want *UserAgentTransport", bh.Base)
}
retry, ok := ua.Base.(*RetryTransport)
if !ok {
if _, ok := ua.Base.(*RetryTransport); !ok {
t.Fatalf("innermost transport type = %T, want *RetryTransport", ua.Base)
}
if _, ok := retry.Base.(*riskcontrol.Transport); !ok {
t.Fatalf("layer after Retry = %T, want *riskcontrol.Transport", retry.Base)
}
}
func TestWrapSDKTransport_WithoutExtension(t *testing.T) {
previous := exttransport.GetProvider()
func TestBuildSDKTransport_WithoutExtension(t *testing.T) {
exttransport.Register(nil)
t.Cleanup(func() { exttransport.Register(previous) })
transport := wrapSDKTransport(riskcontrol.NewTransport(http.DefaultTransport, nil))
transport := buildSDKTransport()
// Chain: SecurityPolicy → BuildHeader → UserAgent → Retry → RiskControl → Base
// Chain: SecurityPolicy → BuildHeader → UserAgent → Retry → Base
sec, ok := transport.(*internalauth.SecurityPolicyTransport)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("outer transport type = %T, want *auth.SecurityPolicyTransport", transport)
@@ -173,13 +161,9 @@ func TestWrapSDKTransport_WithoutExtension(t *testing.T) {
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("layer after BuildHeader = %T, want *UserAgentTransport", bh.Base)
}
retry, ok := ua.Base.(*RetryTransport)
if !ok {
if _, ok := ua.Base.(*RetryTransport); !ok {
t.Fatalf("inner transport type = %T, want *RetryTransport", ua.Base)
}
if _, ok := retry.Base.(*riskcontrol.Transport); !ok {
t.Fatalf("layer after Retry = %T, want *riskcontrol.Transport", retry.Base)
}
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -277,40 +261,6 @@ func (buildTamperingInterceptor) PreRoundTrip(req *http.Request) func(*http.Resp
return nil
}
type riskHeaderTamperingInterceptor struct{}
func (riskHeaderTamperingInterceptor) PreRoundTrip(req *http.Request) func(*http.Response, error) {
req.Header.Set(riskcontrol.HeaderOSType, "extension-value")
req.Header.Set(riskcontrol.HeaderProductModel, "extension-value")
return nil
}
func TestWrapSDKTransport_StripsExtensionRiskHeaders(t *testing.T) {
previous := exttransport.GetProvider()
exttransport.Register(&stubTransportProvider{interceptor: riskHeaderTamperingInterceptor{}})
t.Cleanup(func() { exttransport.Register(previous) })
var received http.Header
network := roundTripFunc(func(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
received = req.Header.Clone()
return &http.Response{StatusCode: http.StatusOK, Body: http.NoBody}, nil
})
req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "https://open.feishu.cn/open-apis/test", nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer token")
resp, err := wrapSDKTransport(riskcontrol.NewTransport(network, nil)).RoundTrip(req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
resp.Body.Close()
if received.Get(riskcontrol.HeaderOSType) != "" || received.Get(riskcontrol.HeaderProductModel) != "" {
t.Fatalf("extension risk headers reached network: %v", received)
}
}
// TestBuildHeaderTransport_SDKChain_OverridesTamperedHeader verifies that the
// X-Cli-Build header is force-written by BuildHeaderTransport in the SDK
// transport chain, even when an extension tries to delete or spoof it. This
@@ -327,7 +277,7 @@ func TestBuildHeaderTransport_SDKChain_OverridesTamperedHeader(t *testing.T) {
exttransport.Register(&stubTransportProvider{interceptor: buildTamperingInterceptor{}})
t.Cleanup(func() { exttransport.Register(nil) })
// Replicate the SDK chain layering used by wrapSDKTransport.
// Replicate the SDK chain layering used by buildSDKTransport.
var base http.RoundTripper = http.DefaultTransport
base = &RetryTransport{Base: base}
base = &UserAgentTransport{Base: base}

View File

@@ -60,18 +60,11 @@ func (a *AppConfig) ProfileName() string {
// MultiAppConfig is the multi-app config file format.
type MultiAppConfig struct {
StrictMode StrictMode `json:"strictMode,omitempty"`
RiskControl *bool `json:"riskControl,omitempty"`
CurrentApp string `json:"currentApp,omitempty"`
PreviousApp string `json:"previousApp,omitempty"`
Apps []AppConfig `json:"apps"`
}
// RiskControlEnabled resolves the workspace policy. An omitted preference
// keeps the default-on account-protection behavior.
func (m *MultiAppConfig) RiskControlEnabled() bool {
return m != nil && (m.RiskControl == nil || *m.RiskControl)
}
// CurrentAppConfig returns the currently active app config.
// Resolution priority: profileOverride > CurrentApp field > Apps[0].
func (m *MultiAppConfig) CurrentAppConfig(profileOverride string) *AppConfig {
@@ -255,11 +248,7 @@ func ResolveConfigFromMulti(raw *MultiAppConfig, kc keychain.KeychainAccess, pro
}
if err := ValidateSecretKeyMatch(app.AppId, app.AppSecret); err != nil {
// invalid_config, not not_configured: the config exists but is
// internally inconsistent. not_configured would let callers degrade
// this into a generic "secret invalid" answer and destroy the precise
// repair hint (which names the expected keychain key — never a value).
return nil, errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeInvalidConfig, "appId and appSecret keychain key are out of sync").
return nil, errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeNotConfigured, "appId and appSecret keychain key are out of sync").
WithHint("%s", err.Error()).
WithCause(err)
}

View File

@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
package core
import (
"io/fs"
"sync"
)
// ConfigSnapshot lazily captures one stable view of config.json for a CLI
// invocation. All runtime consumers share the same load result so account and
// workspace policy resolution cannot observe different file revisions. Callers
// must treat the returned config as read-only.
type ConfigSnapshot struct {
load func() (*MultiAppConfig, error)
}
// NewConfigSnapshot creates a lazily loaded invocation-scoped config snapshot.
func NewConfigSnapshot() *ConfigSnapshot {
return newConfigSnapshot(LoadMultiAppConfig)
}
func newConfigSnapshot(load func() (*MultiAppConfig, error)) *ConfigSnapshot {
if load == nil {
return &ConfigSnapshot{}
}
return &ConfigSnapshot{load: sync.OnceValues(load)}
}
// MultiAppConfig returns the captured persistent config and load error.
func (s *ConfigSnapshot) MultiAppConfig() (*MultiAppConfig, error) {
if s == nil || s.load == nil {
return nil, fs.ErrNotExist
}
return s.load()
}

View File

@@ -1,58 +0,0 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
package core
import (
"errors"
"io/fs"
"testing"
)
func TestConfigSnapshotLoadsOnce(t *testing.T) {
calls := 0
want := &MultiAppConfig{}
snapshot := newConfigSnapshot(func() (*MultiAppConfig, error) {
calls++
return want, nil
})
for range 2 {
config, err := snapshot.MultiAppConfig()
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if config != want {
t.Fatal("snapshot returned a different config instance")
}
}
if calls != 1 {
t.Fatalf("config loads = %d, want 1", calls)
}
}
func TestConfigSnapshotZeroValueIsMissing(t *testing.T) {
config, err := (&ConfigSnapshot{}).MultiAppConfig()
if config != nil || !errors.Is(err, fs.ErrNotExist) {
t.Fatalf("MultiAppConfig() = (%v, %v), want (nil, fs.ErrNotExist)", config, err)
}
}
func TestConfigSnapshotCachesError(t *testing.T) {
calls := 0
want := errors.New("load failed")
snapshot := newConfigSnapshot(func() (*MultiAppConfig, error) {
calls++
return nil, want
})
for range 2 {
config, err := snapshot.MultiAppConfig()
if config != nil || !errors.Is(err, want) {
t.Fatalf("MultiAppConfig() = (%v, %v), want (nil, %v)", config, err, want)
}
}
if calls != 1 {
t.Fatalf("config loads = %d, want 1", calls)
}
}

View File

@@ -60,9 +60,7 @@ func TestAppConfig_LangOmitEmpty(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestMultiAppConfig_RoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
disabled := false
config := &MultiAppConfig{
RiskControl: &disabled,
Apps: []AppConfig{{
AppId: "cli_test", AppSecret: PlainSecret("s"),
Brand: BrandLark, Lang: "zh", Users: []AppUser{},
@@ -86,9 +84,6 @@ func TestMultiAppConfig_RoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
if got.Apps[0].Brand != BrandLark {
t.Errorf("Brand = %q, want %q", got.Apps[0].Brand, BrandLark)
}
if got.RiskControl == nil || *got.RiskControl {
t.Errorf("RiskControl = %v, want explicit false", got.RiskControl)
}
}
func TestResolveConfigFromMulti_RejectsSecretKeyMismatch(t *testing.T) {

View File

@@ -36,13 +36,16 @@ func LoadOrNotConfigured() (*MultiAppConfig, error) {
if errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) {
return nil, NotConfiguredError()
}
// Surface the real cause so the user can fix the broken file. Every
// non-ENOENT load failure — malformed JSON, permission denied, I/O
// error — means a config EXISTS but cannot be used: invalid_config.
// Only a genuinely absent config is not_configured; anything else
// classified as not_configured would let callers degrade it into
// profile_not_found / no_active_profile and hide the real cause.
return nil, errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeInvalidConfig, "failed to load config: %v", err).WithCause(err)
// Surface the real cause (parse error, permission denied, etc.)
// so the user can fix the broken file. A malformed file is
// invalid_config; anything else (permission denied, etc.) is
// not_configured. Both stay on the typed structured-envelope path
// at the root command's error sink.
subtype := errs.SubtypeNotConfigured
if isMalformedConfigError(err) {
subtype = errs.SubtypeInvalidConfig
}
return nil, errs.NewConfigError(subtype, "failed to load config: %v", err).WithCause(err)
}
if multi == nil || len(multi.Apps) == 0 {
return nil, NotConfiguredError()

View File

@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ func ResolveEndpoints(brand LarkBrand) Endpoints {
}
default:
return Endpoints{
Open: "https://open.feishu.cn",
Open: "https://open.feishu-pre.cn",
Accounts: "https://accounts.feishu.cn",
MCP: "https://mcp.feishu.cn",
AppLink: "https://applink.feishu.cn",

View File

@@ -1,154 +0,0 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
//go:build authsidecar
package credential_test
import (
"context"
"errors"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/errs"
extcred "github.com/larksuite/cli/extension/credential"
sidecarprovider "github.com/larksuite/cli/extension/credential/sidecar"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/credential"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/envvars"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/output"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/sidecar"
)
func newRealSidecarCredentialProvider(t *testing.T) *credential.CredentialProvider {
t.Helper()
t.Setenv(envvars.CliAuthProxy, "http://127.0.0.1:16384")
t.Setenv(envvars.CliProxyKey, "test-key")
t.Setenv(envvars.CliAppID, "cli_sidecar")
t.Setenv(envvars.CliAppSecret, "")
t.Setenv(envvars.CliUserAccessToken, "")
t.Setenv(envvars.CliTenantAccessToken, "")
t.Setenv(envvars.CliDefaultAs, "")
t.Setenv(envvars.CliStrictMode, "")
t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
return credential.NewCredentialProvider(
[]extcred.Provider{&sidecarprovider.Provider{}},
nil,
nil,
nil,
)
}
func TestAuthSidecarInvalidPolicyUsesValidationContract(t *testing.T) {
for _, tt := range []struct {
name string
key string
}{
{name: "default as", key: envvars.CliDefaultAs},
{name: "strict mode", key: envvars.CliStrictMode},
} {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
cp := newRealSidecarCredentialProvider(t)
t.Setenv(tt.key, "banana")
_, err := cp.ResolveAccount(context.Background())
problem, ok := errs.ProblemOf(err)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("error = %T %v, want typed validation error", err, err)
}
if problem.Category != errs.CategoryValidation || problem.Subtype != errs.SubtypeInvalidArgument {
t.Fatalf("problem = %s/%s, want %s/%s", problem.Category, problem.Subtype, errs.CategoryValidation, errs.SubtypeInvalidArgument)
}
var validationErr *errs.ValidationError
if !errors.As(err, &validationErr) {
t.Fatalf("error = %T %v, want ValidationError", err, err)
}
if validationErr.Param != tt.key {
t.Fatalf("param = %q, want %q", validationErr.Param, tt.key)
}
if got := output.ExitCodeOf(err); got != output.ExitValidation {
t.Fatalf("exit code = %d, want %d", got, output.ExitValidation)
}
if !strings.Contains(problem.Hint, tt.key) {
t.Fatalf("hint = %q, want variable name %s", problem.Hint, tt.key)
}
var blockErr *extcred.BlockError
if !errors.As(err, &blockErr) ||
blockErr.Code != extcred.BlockReasonInvalidPolicy ||
blockErr.Param != tt.key {
t.Fatalf("cause = %T %v, want classified BlockError for %s", err, err, tt.key)
}
})
}
}
func TestAuthSidecarGateProbeUsesValidationContract(t *testing.T) {
cp := newRealSidecarCredentialProvider(t)
t.Setenv(envvars.CliStrictMode, "banana")
name, err := cp.ActiveExtensionProviderName(context.Background())
if name != "" {
t.Fatalf("provider name = %q, want empty on invalid policy", name)
}
problem, ok := errs.ProblemOf(err)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("error = %T %v, want typed validation error", err, err)
}
var validationErr *errs.ValidationError
if !errors.As(err, &validationErr) {
t.Fatalf("error = %T %v, want ValidationError", err, err)
}
if problem.Category != errs.CategoryValidation ||
problem.Subtype != errs.SubtypeInvalidArgument ||
validationErr.Param != envvars.CliStrictMode {
t.Fatalf("problem = %+v param = %q, want validation/invalid_argument param %s", problem, validationErr.Param, envvars.CliStrictMode)
}
}
func TestAuthSidecarTokenHonorsSelectedAppID(t *testing.T) {
t.Run("matching app returns sentinel", func(t *testing.T) {
cp := newRealSidecarCredentialProvider(t)
result, err := cp.ResolveToken(context.Background(), credential.TokenSpec{
Type: credential.TokenTypeUAT,
AppID: "cli_sidecar",
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ResolveToken: %v", err)
}
if result == nil || result.Token != sidecar.SentinelUAT {
t.Fatalf("result = %+v, want sidecar UAT sentinel", result)
}
})
for _, tt := range []struct {
name string
appID string
}{
{name: "empty app id", appID: ""},
{name: "conflicting app id", appID: "cli_other"},
} {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
cp := newRealSidecarCredentialProvider(t)
result, err := cp.ResolveToken(context.Background(), credential.TokenSpec{
Type: credential.TokenTypeUAT,
AppID: tt.appID,
})
if result != nil {
t.Fatalf("result = %+v, want no sidecar sentinel", result)
}
problem, ok := errs.ProblemOf(err)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("error = %T %v, want typed internal error", err, err)
}
if problem.Category != errs.CategoryInternal || problem.Subtype != errs.SubtypeUnknown {
t.Fatalf("problem = %s/%s, want %s/%s", problem.Category, problem.Subtype, errs.CategoryInternal, errs.SubtypeUnknown)
}
if strings.Contains(err.Error(), sidecar.SentinelUAT) {
t.Fatalf("error leaked sidecar sentinel: %v", err)
}
})
}
}

View File

@@ -9,17 +9,11 @@ import (
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"os"
"slices"
"strings"
"sync"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/errs"
extcred "github.com/larksuite/cli/extension/credential"
envprovider "github.com/larksuite/cli/extension/credential/env"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/auth"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/envvars"
)
// DefaultAccountResolver is implemented by the default account provider.
@@ -142,21 +136,10 @@ type CredentialProvider struct {
httpClient func() (*http.Client, error)
warnOut io.Writer
// profile is the active profile (from --profile or LARKSUITE_CLI_PROFILE);
// profileSrc records which of the two supplied it, for the reported
// selection and error attribution.
profile string
profileSrc CredentialSourceKind
accountOnce sync.Once
account *Account
accountErr error
selectedSource credentialSource
// selection is the explainable credential-selection result, populated by
// doResolveAccount under accountOnce. It never carries a secret.
selection IdentitySelection
enrichOnce sync.Once
hintOnce sync.Once
hint *IdentityHint
@@ -178,521 +161,49 @@ func (p *CredentialProvider) SetWarnOut(warnOut io.Writer) *CredentialProvider {
return p
}
// WithProfileFromFlag records the --profile flag value as the active profile.
// It governs credential arbitration and the reported selection source.
func (p *CredentialProvider) WithProfileFromFlag(profile string) *CredentialProvider {
p.profile = profile
p.profileSrc = SourceFlagProfile
return p
}
// WithProfileFromEnv records the LARKSUITE_CLI_PROFILE env fallback as the
// active profile. It governs credential arbitration and the reported
// selection source.
func (p *CredentialProvider) WithProfileFromEnv(profile string) *CredentialProvider {
p.profile = profile
p.profileSrc = SourceEnvProfile
return p
}
// ResolveAccount resolves app credentials. Result is cached after first call.
// NOTE: Uses sync.Once — only the context from the first call is used for resolution.
// Subsequent calls return the cached result regardless of their context.
// This is acceptable for CLI (single invocation per process) but not for long-running servers.
func (p *CredentialProvider) ResolveAccount(ctx context.Context) (*Account, error) {
acct, err := p.resolveAccountSelection(ctx)
if err != nil || acct == nil {
return acct, err
}
if _, ok := p.selectedSource.(extensionTokenSource); ok {
p.enrichOnce.Do(func() {
p.enrichOrClearIdentity(ctx, acct, p.selectedSource)
})
}
return acct, nil
}
// resolveAccountSelection performs and caches only credential selection. It
// deliberately does not resolve tokens or user_info, so callers can validate
// the selected app before any token work begins.
func (p *CredentialProvider) resolveAccountSelection(ctx context.Context) (*Account, error) {
p.accountOnce.Do(func() {
p.account, p.accountErr = p.doResolveAccount(ctx)
})
return p.account, p.accountErr
}
// doResolveAccount arbitrates the credential/App selection in three phases:
// gather all arbitration inputs in a single I/O pass, decide the route with a
// pure function, then execute the remaining I/O for the chosen route.
//
// Resolution order (encoded in decideIdentity): a managed extension provider
// (e.g. sidecar) wins outright; then an explicit profile (--profile /
// LARKSUITE_CLI_PROFILE) arbitrates against the direct env credential
// (matching app_id → profile supplies credential and tokens; mismatch → hard
// conflict; incomplete env without a usable app_id → repair error); then a
// complete direct env credential; then the config default (currentApp →
// firstApp).
//
// It populates p.selection (never carries a secret) and p.selectedSource on
// every success path.
func (p *CredentialProvider) doResolveAccount(ctx context.Context) (*Account, error) {
in, err := p.gatherIdentityInputs(ctx)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
d, err := decideIdentity(in)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
acct, source, err := p.execute(ctx, d, in)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
p.selectedSource = source
// Assigned only after full success: error paths can never leave a
// partial selection behind.
p.selection = d.selection
return acct, nil
}
// providerAccount pairs an extension-provider account with its token source.
type providerAccount struct {
acct *Account
source extensionTokenSource
}
// identityInputs is one invocation's complete arbitration input, gathered in
// a single pass by gatherIdentityInputs. It is read-only after gathering;
// decideIdentity consumes it without further I/O.
type identityInputs struct {
profile string
profileSrc CredentialSourceKind
managed *providerAccount // managed extension account; wins arbitration outright
direct *providerAccount // complete direct env credential
// directBlock is a provider's explicit incomplete-direct-credential
// classification (BlockError.Code == credential_incomplete). It
// participates in profile arbitration instead of failing outright.
directBlock *extcred.BlockError
// directKeys / conflictKeys describe the BUILTIN process-env direct
// credential surface (LARKSUITE_CLI_* variable NAMES, never values).
// They annotate DirectCredentialEnv and conflict hints; a third-party
// AccountDirect provider reports its own inputs via BlockError metadata
// (PresentKeys/AppID), not through these.
directKeys []string
conflictKeys []string
config *core.MultiAppConfig
configErr error
}
// gatherIdentityInputs performs the arbitration's read phase: it consults the
// extension providers and snapshots the config. Providers classify their own
// failures at the source (BlockError.Code); this layer must not infer them by
// re-reading environment variables or parsing Reason.
func (p *CredentialProvider) gatherIdentityInputs(ctx context.Context) (identityInputs, error) {
in := identityInputs{
profile: p.profile,
profileSrc: p.profileSrc,
directKeys: presentDirectCredentialKeys(),
conflictKeys: presentDirectCredentialInputKeys(),
}
for _, prov := range p.providers {
acct, err := prov.ResolveAccount(ctx)
if err != nil {
var blockErr *extcred.BlockError
if errors.As(err, &blockErr) {
switch blockErr.Code {
case extcred.BlockReasonCredentialIncomplete:
// app_credential_incomplete, profile matching, and
// DirectCredentialEnv diagnostics are defined in terms of
// the builtin LARKSUITE_CLI_* env surface. Until the SPI
// carries provider-owned input descriptors, accepting this
// classification from another provider would produce
// contradictory arbitration and repair hints.
if _, builtin := prov.(*envprovider.Provider); !builtin {
return in, newCredentialIncompleteProviderContractError(prov)
}
in.directBlock = blockErr
case extcred.BlockReasonInvalidPolicy:
// A user-supplied policy value failed validation; that is
// a validation error, never an internal one.
return in, newInvalidPolicyError(blockErr)
default:
// Blocks without a recognized Code preserve their
// original attribution.
return in, err
return nil, err
}
if acct != nil {
internal := convertAccount(acct)
source := extensionTokenSource{provider: prov}
if err := p.enrichUserInfo(ctx, internal, source); err != nil {
if p.warnOut != nil {
_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(p.warnOut, "warning: unable to verify user identity from credential source %q: %v\n", source.Name(), err)
}
break
// enrichUserInfo failure is non-fatal: SupportedIdentities
// (used for strict mode) is already set by the provider.
// Clear unverified user identity for safety.
internal.UserOpenId = ""
internal.UserName = ""
}
// Any other provider error preserves its original attribution.
return in, err
}
if acct == nil {
continue
}
pa := &providerAccount{acct: convertAccount(acct), source: extensionTokenSource{provider: prov}}
switch acct.Kind {
case extcred.AccountDirect:
// The arbitration's direct-credential surface — DirectCredentialEnv,
// the env:LARKSUITE_CLI_APP_ID selection source, conflict-hint
// keys — is defined in terms of the builtin process-env variables.
// Until the SPI carries provider-reported input descriptors, only
// the builtin env provider may declare AccountDirect; accepting it
// from anyone else would produce self-contradictory diagnostics
// (e.g. credentialSource "env:LARKSUITE_CLI_APP_ID" with
// directCredentialEnv.present=false). The check is by concrete
// type: the registry reserves neither names nor uniqueness, so a
// Name() comparison would be forgeable.
if _, builtin := prov.(*envprovider.Provider); !builtin {
return in, errs.NewInternalError(errs.SubtypeUnknown,
"credential provider %q declared AccountDirect, which is reserved for the builtin env provider", prov.Name())
}
in.direct = pa
case extcred.AccountManaged:
in.managed = pa
default:
return in, errs.NewInternalError(errs.SubtypeUnknown,
"credential provider %q returned unknown AccountKind %d", prov.Name(), acct.Kind)
}
break // the first engaged provider ends the scan (registry priority order)
}
// The config snapshot backs profile lookup, the config-default route, and
// config-default failure attribution. A winning managed or direct-env
// identity without a profile never needs it — and managed identities must
// keep working when the config is absent or malformed.
if in.managed == nil && (in.profile != "" || in.direct == nil) {
in.config, in.configErr = core.LoadOrNotConfigured()
}
return in, nil
}
// credentialRoute names which source serves the selected account and tokens.
type credentialRoute int
const (
routeManaged credentialRoute = iota
routeProfile
routeDirectEnv
routeConfigDefault
)
// decision is decideIdentity's complete verdict. Nothing in it touched I/O.
type decision struct {
route credentialRoute
selection IdentitySelection
// profileAppID is set on routeProfile; app_id is plaintext and safe to
// echo in the secret-invalid error.
profileAppID string
}
// decideIdentity holds every selection rule in one place: precedence
// (managed > profile > direct env > config default), profile/direct-env
// conflict detection, and error attribution. It is pure — same inputs, same
// verdict — so the full selection matrix is table-testable without env vars
// or config fixtures.
func decideIdentity(in identityInputs) (decision, error) {
// DirectCredentialEnv reports the direct env vars truthfully on every
// route: Present always means "direct credential env vars are set".
directEnv := DirectCredentialEnv{Present: len(in.directKeys) > 0, Keys: in.directKeys}
if in.direct != nil {
directEnv.AppID = in.direct.acct.AppID
}
switch {
case in.managed != nil:
return decision{route: routeManaged, selection: IdentitySelection{
Source: SourceExtension(in.managed.source.Name()),
DirectCredentialEnv: directEnv,
}}, nil
case in.profile != "":
return decideProfile(in, directEnv)
case in.directBlock != nil:
return decision{}, newAppCredentialIncompleteError(in.directBlock, false)
case in.direct != nil:
return decision{route: routeDirectEnv, selection: IdentitySelection{
Source: SourceEnvAppID,
DirectCredentialEnv: directEnv,
}}, nil
default:
return decision{route: routeConfigDefault, selection: IdentitySelection{
Source: selectionSourceForDefault(in.config),
DirectCredentialEnv: directEnv,
}}, nil
}
}
// decideProfile arbitrates an explicit profile against the direct env
// credential state.
func decideProfile(in identityInputs, directEnv DirectCredentialEnv) (decision, error) {
app, err := findProfile(in)
if err != nil {
return decision{}, err
}
if in.directBlock != nil {
// APP_ID-only is sufficient to compare sources: a matching selected
// profile supplies the credential and tokens; a mismatch is the same
// hard conflict as a complete direct env. Anything less than a usable
// app_id keeps the provider's repair error, extended with the
// unset-to-use-the-profile path.
if in.directBlock.AppID == "" || !slices.Contains(in.directBlock.PresentKeys, envvars.CliAppID) {
return decision{}, newAppCredentialIncompleteError(in.directBlock, true)
}
if app.AppId != in.directBlock.AppID {
return decision{}, newProfileAppCredentialConflict(
in.profile, app.AppId, in.directBlock.AppID, in.directBlock.PresentKeys)
}
directEnv.AppID = in.directBlock.AppID
directEnv.Matched = true
}
if in.direct != nil {
// E == complete: the direct env app_id must match the profile.
if app.AppId != in.direct.acct.AppID {
return decision{}, newProfileAppCredentialConflict(
in.profile, app.AppId, in.direct.acct.AppID, in.conflictKeys)
}
directEnv.Matched = true
}
return decision{
route: routeProfile,
selection: IdentitySelection{Source: in.profileSrc, DirectCredentialEnv: directEnv},
profileAppID: app.AppId,
}, nil
}
// findProfile resolves the requested profile against the config snapshot.
// A malformed config must surface its real typed cause (invalid_config):
// reporting it as profile_not_found would send the user to `profile list`
// and hide the broken file. Only a genuinely absent config degrades to
// profile_not_found, because the profile then cannot exist anywhere. Both
// deliberately outrank an incomplete direct env: fixing the profile side is
// what makes the selected profile usable.
func findProfile(in identityInputs) (*core.AppConfig, error) {
if in.configErr != nil {
if prob, ok := errs.ProblemOf(in.configErr); !ok || prob.Subtype != errs.SubtypeNotConfigured {
return nil, in.configErr
p.selectedSource = source
return internal, nil
}
}
if in.config != nil {
if app := in.config.FindApp(in.profile); app != nil {
return app, nil
}
}
return nil, errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeProfileNotFound,
"profile %q not found", in.profile).
WithProfile(in.profile).
WithCredentialSource(string(in.profileSrc)).
WithHint("run `lark-cli profile list` to see available profiles.")
}
// execute performs the remaining I/O for the decided route and returns the
// account together with its token source.
func (p *CredentialProvider) execute(ctx context.Context, d decision, in identityInputs) (*Account, credentialSource, error) {
switch d.route {
case routeManaged:
return in.managed.acct, in.managed.source, nil
case routeDirectEnv:
return in.direct.acct, in.direct.source, nil
case routeProfile:
// Resolve the profile's own (keychain-backed) credential locally.
if p.defaultAcct != nil {
acct, err := p.defaultAcct.ResolveAccount(ctx)
if err != nil {
// A typed failure other than not_configured carries its own
// precise, secret-free diagnosis (typed errors never embed secret
// material per the error contract) — pass it through instead of
// flattening it into the generic secret error. Untyped failures
// and a config that vanished mid-resolution stay masked: their
// content is not guaranteed secret-free.
if prob, ok := errs.ProblemOf(err); ok && prob.Subtype != errs.SubtypeNotConfigured {
return nil, nil, err
}
return nil, nil, newProfileSecretInvalidError(in.profile, d.profileAppID)
return nil, err
}
// The resolver re-reads the config; a concurrent profile edit between
// gather and here could hand back a different app. Refuse the mismatch
// instead of silently using credentials the arbitration never checked.
if acct.AppID != d.profileAppID {
return nil, nil, errs.NewInternalError(errs.SubtypeUnknown,
"config changed during resolution: profile %q resolved to a different app", in.profile).
WithHint("retry the command.")
}
return acct, defaultTokenSource{resolver: p.defaultToken}, nil
default: // routeConfigDefault
if p.defaultAcct == nil {
return nil, nil, core.NotConfiguredError()
}
acct, err := p.defaultAcct.ResolveAccount(ctx)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, translateConfigDefaultFailure(err, in.config)
}
return acct, defaultTokenSource{resolver: p.defaultToken}, nil
p.selectedSource = defaultTokenSource{resolver: p.defaultToken}
return acct, nil
}
}
// translateConfigDefaultFailure attributes a config-default failure from the
// snapshot: a default profile that EXISTS (has an app_id) but whose secret
// cannot be resolved locally is profile_secret_invalid — "identity is
// configured, its secret is broken" is more actionable than "no active
// profile". Only when there is genuinely no usable default profile do we
// report no_active_profile. Other typed failures pass through unchanged.
func translateConfigDefaultFailure(err error, multi *core.MultiAppConfig) error {
if prob, ok := errs.ProblemOf(err); !ok || prob.Subtype != errs.SubtypeNotConfigured {
return err
}
if multi != nil {
if app := multi.CurrentAppConfig(""); app != nil && app.AppId != "" {
return newProfileSecretInvalidError(app.ProfileName(), app.AppId)
}
}
return errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeNoActiveProfile, "no active profile").
WithCredentialSource(noActiveProfileCredentialSource).
WithHint("run `lark-cli config init` / `lark-cli profile add`, or set %s.", envvars.CliProfile)
}
func newProfileAppCredentialConflict(profile, profileAppID, envAppID string, presentKeys []string) error {
err := errs.NewValidationError(errs.SubtypeProfileAppCredentialConflict,
"profile %q app_id does not match %s", profile, envvars.CliAppID).
WithProfileAppConflict(profileAppID, envAppID)
if len(presentKeys) > 0 {
return err.WithHint("unset %s, or select a profile whose app_id matches the environment.",
humanList(presentKeys, "and"))
}
return err.WithHint("unset the direct credential environment variables, or select a profile whose app_id matches the environment.")
}
func newAppCredentialIncompleteError(blockErr *extcred.BlockError, selectedProfileAvailable bool) *errs.ConfigError {
err := errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeAppCredentialIncomplete, "%s", blockErr.Reason).
WithCause(blockErr)
if len(blockErr.MissingKeys) > 0 {
err.WithMissingKeys(blockErr.MissingKeys...)
}
if len(blockErr.RequiredAnyOf) > 0 {
err.WithRequiredAnyOf(blockErr.RequiredAnyOf...)
}
hint := credentialRepairHint(blockErr)
if selectedProfileAvailable && len(blockErr.PresentKeys) > 0 {
hint += fmt.Sprintf(", or unset %s to use the selected profile", humanList(blockErr.PresentKeys, "and"))
}
return err.WithHint("%s.", hint)
}
func credentialRepairHint(blockErr *extcred.BlockError) string {
if len(blockErr.RequiredAnyOf) > 0 {
return "set " + humanList(blockErr.RequiredAnyOf, "or")
}
return "set " + humanList(blockErr.MissingKeys, "and")
}
func humanList(items []string, conjunction string) string {
switch len(items) {
case 0:
return "the missing direct credential variables"
case 1:
return items[0]
case 2:
return items[0] + " " + conjunction + " " + items[1]
default:
return strings.Join(items[:len(items)-1], ", ") + ", " + conjunction + " " + items[len(items)-1]
}
}
// newInvalidPolicyError translates a provider's invalid-policy block into the
// typed validation contract: the failed variable name travels in param, the
// repair path in the hint, and the original block stays on the cause chain.
// Reason carries only the variable name and its non-secret value.
func newInvalidPolicyError(blockErr *extcred.BlockError) error {
return errs.NewValidationError(errs.SubtypeInvalidArgument, "%s", blockErr.Reason).
WithParam(blockErr.Param).
WithCause(blockErr).
WithHint("set %s to a supported value or unset it.", blockErr.Param)
}
func newCredentialIncompleteProviderContractError(prov extcred.Provider) error {
return errs.NewInternalError(errs.SubtypeUnknown,
"credential provider %q returned credential_incomplete, which is reserved for the builtin env provider", prov.Name())
}
// newProfileSecretInvalidError is deliberately generic (SECURITY): the
// underlying cause may carry secret material, so neither it nor its message
// may reach the envelope. app_id is plaintext and safe to echo.
func newProfileSecretInvalidError(profile, appID string) error {
return errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeProfileSecretInvalid,
"profile %q credential could not be resolved locally", profile).
WithProfile(profile).
WithAppID(appID).
WithHint("verify the profile's app secret or re-add the profile with `lark-cli config`.")
}
// enrichOrClearIdentity verifies a provider-supplied user identity via
// enrichUserInfo. Verification failure is non-fatal — SupportedIdentities
// (used for strict mode) is already set by the provider — but an unverified
// identity must not survive it: a stale OpenID would attribute calls to a
// user the token can no longer act for.
func (p *CredentialProvider) enrichOrClearIdentity(ctx context.Context, acct *Account, source credentialSource) {
err := p.enrichUserInfo(ctx, acct, source)
if err == nil {
return
}
if p.warnOut != nil {
_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(p.warnOut, "warning: unable to verify user identity from credential source %q: %v\n", source.Name(), err)
}
acct.UserOpenId = ""
acct.UserName = ""
}
// noActiveProfileCredentialSource is the credential_source reported on the
// no_active_profile error. The error contract fixes this to the literal "config": there is
// no resolved default profile at all, so the more specific config:currentApp /
// config:firstApp source values (used on successful config-default selections)
// would be misleading. It is an enum string, never a secret.
const noActiveProfileCredentialSource = "config"
// selectionSourceForDefault reports whether the config default resolved to the
// explicit currentApp or fell back to the first app.
func selectionSourceForDefault(multi *core.MultiAppConfig) CredentialSourceKind {
if multi != nil && multi.CurrentApp != "" {
return SourceConfigCurrentApp
}
return SourceConfigFirstApp
}
// presentDirectCredentialKeys returns the NAMES (never values) of the direct
// app credential env vars that are set. Used to annotate DirectCredentialEnv.
func presentDirectCredentialKeys() []string {
var keys []string
if os.Getenv(envvars.CliAppID) != "" {
keys = append(keys, envvars.CliAppID)
}
if os.Getenv(envvars.CliAppSecret) != "" {
keys = append(keys, envvars.CliAppSecret)
}
return keys
}
// presentDirectCredentialInputKeys returns all direct env input names that
// must be cleared together to remove a profile/app_id conflict. Values are
// never returned.
func presentDirectCredentialInputKeys() []string {
keys := presentDirectCredentialKeys()
if os.Getenv(envvars.CliUserAccessToken) != "" {
keys = append(keys, envvars.CliUserAccessToken)
}
if os.Getenv(envvars.CliTenantAccessToken) != "" {
keys = append(keys, envvars.CliTenantAccessToken)
}
return keys
}
// Selection resolves the account (once) and returns the cached, secret-free
// explanation of how the credential/App was selected. It mirrors
// selectedCredentialSource: resolve-then-return.
func (p *CredentialProvider) Selection(ctx context.Context) (IdentitySelection, error) {
if _, err := p.ResolveAccount(ctx); err != nil {
return IdentitySelection{}, err
}
return p.selection, nil
return nil, core.NotConfiguredError()
}
// enrichUserInfo resolves user identity when extension provides a UAT.
@@ -728,13 +239,17 @@ func (p *CredentialProvider) enrichUserInfo(ctx context.Context, acct *Account,
}
func (p *CredentialProvider) selectedCredentialSource(ctx context.Context) (credentialSource, error) {
if _, err := p.resolveAccountSelection(ctx); err != nil {
if p.selectedSource != nil {
return p.selectedSource, nil
}
if p.defaultAcct == nil {
return nil, nil
}
if _, err := p.ResolveAccount(ctx); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if p.selectedSource == nil {
return nil, errs.NewInternalError(errs.SubtypeUnknown,
"credential provider resolved an account without selecting a token source").
WithHint("retry the command.")
return nil, fmt.Errorf("credential provider resolved an account without selecting a token source")
}
return p.selectedSource, nil
}
@@ -787,88 +302,51 @@ func (p *CredentialProvider) doResolveIdentityHint(ctx context.Context) (*Identi
// ResolveToken resolves an access token.
func (p *CredentialProvider) ResolveToken(ctx context.Context, req TokenSpec) (*TokenResult, error) {
acct, err := p.resolveAccountSelection(ctx)
source, err := p.selectedCredentialSource(ctx)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if acct == nil {
return nil, errs.NewInternalError(errs.SubtypeUnknown,
"credential provider resolved no account before %s token resolution", req.Type).
WithHint("retry the command.")
if source != nil {
return resolveTokenFromSource(ctx, source, req)
}
source := p.selectedSource
if source == nil {
return nil, errs.NewInternalError(errs.SubtypeUnknown,
"credential provider resolved app %q without selecting a token source", acct.AppID).
WithHint("retry the command.")
for _, prov := range p.providers {
source := extensionTokenSource{provider: prov}
result, found, err := source.TryResolveToken(ctx, req)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if found {
return result, nil
}
}
if req.AppID == "" {
return nil, errs.NewInternalError(errs.SubtypeUnknown,
"TokenSpec.AppID is required for %s token resolution", req.Type).
WithHint("retry the command.")
source = defaultTokenSource{resolver: p.defaultToken}
result, found, err := source.TryResolveToken(ctx, req)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if req.AppID != acct.AppID {
return nil, errs.NewInternalError(errs.SubtypeUnknown,
"token requested for app %q but the selected account belongs to app %q", req.AppID, acct.AppID).
WithHint("retry the command.")
if found {
return result, nil
}
return resolveTokenFromSource(ctx, source, req)
return nil, &TokenUnavailableError{Type: req.Type}
}
// ActiveExtensionProviderName reports whether an extension provider is managing
// the credentials that actually win selection. With an explicit profile that
// resolves successfully it reuses ResolveAccount's cached arbitration result;
// otherwise it probes extension providers directly and returns the first
// engaged provider.
// credentials. It probes p.providers (extension providers only, not defaultAcct)
// and returns the name of the first engaged provider.
//
// "Engaged" means: ResolveAccount returns a non-nil account, OR returns a
// *extcred.BlockError (provider configured but misconfigured — still counts as
// external). Any other probe error is propagated to the caller.
//
// A failed profile resolution (profile not found, broken secret, malformed
// config, incomplete direct env, ...) deliberately does NOT propagate: this
// probe guards the builtin setup/repair commands (auth, config), and an
// unresolvable credential must never lock the user out of the commands that
// fix it. It falls back to the engagement probe, which answers the only
// question this function owns: is an extension provider holding credentials?
// external). Any other error is propagated to the caller.
//
// Returns ("", nil) when no extension provider is active (built-in keychain path).
// Safe to call multiple times: explicit-profile resolution uses sync.Once, while
// the probe path only consults providers.
// Safe to call multiple times — probes providers directly without the sync.Once cache.
func (p *CredentialProvider) ActiveExtensionProviderName(ctx context.Context) (string, error) {
// With an explicit profile, report the source that actually won the same
// arbitration used by commands. A matching APP_ID-only env block is not an
// external takeover once the selected profile supplies credentials/tokens.
if p.profile != "" {
if _, err := p.ResolveAccount(ctx); err == nil {
if p.selectedSource == nil {
return "", nil
}
if _, builtin := p.selectedSource.(defaultTokenSource); builtin {
return "", nil
}
return p.selectedSource.Name(), nil
}
// Resolution failed — fall through to the engagement probe.
}
for _, prov := range p.providers {
acct, err := prov.ResolveAccount(ctx)
if err != nil {
var blockErr *extcred.BlockError
if errors.As(err, &blockErr) {
// Align with formal arbitration: a misconfigured policy
// variable is the same typed validation error everywhere —
// not an external takeover of the provider that reported it,
// and not license to keep scanning and blame a later
// provider instead.
if blockErr.Code == extcred.BlockReasonInvalidPolicy {
return "", newInvalidPolicyError(blockErr)
}
if blockErr.Code == extcred.BlockReasonCredentialIncomplete {
if _, builtin := prov.(*envprovider.Provider); !builtin {
return "", newCredentialIncompleteProviderContractError(prov)
}
}
name := blockErr.Provider
if name == "" {
name = prov.Name()

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

View File

@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ import (
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/errs"
extcred "github.com/larksuite/cli/extension/credential"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/auth"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
@@ -24,7 +23,6 @@ type mockExtProvider struct {
err error
accountErr error
tokenErr error
tokenCalls int
}
func (m *mockExtProvider) Name() string { return m.name }
@@ -35,7 +33,6 @@ func (m *mockExtProvider) ResolveAccount(ctx context.Context) (*extcred.Account,
return m.account, m.err
}
func (m *mockExtProvider) ResolveToken(ctx context.Context, req extcred.TokenSpec) (*extcred.Token, error) {
m.tokenCalls++
if m.tokenErr != nil {
return nil, m.tokenErr
}
@@ -52,13 +49,11 @@ func (m *mockDefaultAcct) ResolveAccount(ctx context.Context) (*Account, error)
}
type mockDefaultToken struct {
result *TokenResult
err error
tokenCalls int
result *TokenResult
err error
}
func (m *mockDefaultToken) ResolveToken(ctx context.Context, req TokenSpec) (*TokenResult, error) {
m.tokenCalls++
return m.result, m.err
}
@@ -121,45 +116,35 @@ func TestCredentialProvider_AccountCached(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestCredentialProvider_TokenFromExtension(t *testing.T) {
for _, sourceName := range []string{"env", "authsidecar"} {
t.Run(sourceName, func(t *testing.T) {
cp := NewCredentialProvider(
[]extcred.Provider{&mockExtProvider{
name: sourceName,
account: &extcred.Account{AppID: "ext_app", Brand: "feishu"},
token: &extcred.Token{Value: "ext_tok", Source: sourceName},
}},
&mockDefaultAcct{account: &Account{AppID: "default_app"}},
&mockDefaultToken{result: &TokenResult{Token: "default_tok"}}, nil,
)
result, err := cp.ResolveToken(context.Background(), TokenSpec{Type: TokenTypeUAT, AppID: "ext_app"})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if result.Token != "ext_tok" {
t.Errorf("expected ext_tok, got %s", result.Token)
}
})
cp := NewCredentialProvider(
[]extcred.Provider{&mockExtProvider{
name: "env",
account: &extcred.Account{AppID: "ext_app", Brand: "feishu"},
token: &extcred.Token{Value: "ext_tok", Source: "env"},
}},
&mockDefaultAcct{}, &mockDefaultToken{result: &TokenResult{Token: "default_tok"}}, nil,
)
result, err := cp.ResolveToken(context.Background(), TokenSpec{Type: TokenTypeUAT})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if result.Token != "ext_tok" {
t.Errorf("expected ext_tok, got %s", result.Token)
}
}
func TestCredentialProvider_TokenFallsToDefault(t *testing.T) {
defaultToken := &mockDefaultToken{result: &TokenResult{Token: "default_tok"}}
cp := NewCredentialProvider(
[]extcred.Provider{&mockExtProvider{name: "skip"}},
&mockDefaultAcct{account: &Account{AppID: "default_app"}},
defaultToken, nil,
&mockDefaultAcct{}, &mockDefaultToken{result: &TokenResult{Token: "default_tok"}}, nil,
)
result, err := cp.ResolveToken(context.Background(), TokenSpec{Type: TokenTypeUAT, AppID: "default_app"})
result, err := cp.ResolveToken(context.Background(), TokenSpec{Type: TokenTypeUAT})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if result.Token != "default_tok" {
t.Errorf("expected default_tok, got %s", result.Token)
}
if defaultToken.tokenCalls != 1 {
t.Fatalf("default ResolveToken() calls = %d, want 1", defaultToken.tokenCalls)
}
}
func TestCredentialProvider_TokenDoesNotMixSourcesAfterDefaultAccountSelection(t *testing.T) {
@@ -174,7 +159,7 @@ func TestCredentialProvider_TokenDoesNotMixSourcesAfterDefaultAccountSelection(t
t.Fatalf("ResolveAccount() error = %v", err)
}
result, err := cp.ResolveToken(context.Background(), TokenSpec{Type: TokenTypeUAT, AppID: "default_app"})
result, err := cp.ResolveToken(context.Background(), TokenSpec{Type: TokenTypeUAT})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ResolveToken() error = %v", err)
}
@@ -196,7 +181,7 @@ func TestCredentialProvider_SelectedSourceWithoutTokenReturnsUnavailableError(t
t.Fatalf("ResolveAccount() error = %v", err)
}
_, err := cp.ResolveToken(context.Background(), TokenSpec{Type: TokenTypeUAT, AppID: "ext_app"})
_, err := cp.ResolveToken(context.Background(), TokenSpec{Type: TokenTypeUAT})
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("ResolveToken() error = nil, want unavailable error")
}
@@ -217,7 +202,7 @@ func TestCredentialProvider_ResolveTokenPropagatesNonBlockExtensionError(t *test
nil,
)
_, err := cp.ResolveToken(context.Background(), TokenSpec{Type: TokenTypeUAT, AppID: "ext_app"})
_, err := cp.ResolveToken(context.Background(), TokenSpec{Type: TokenTypeUAT})
if err == nil || err.Error() != "provider exploded" {
t.Fatalf("ResolveToken() error = %v, want provider exploded", err)
}
@@ -327,12 +312,12 @@ func TestCredentialProvider_ResolveIdentityHint_CachesResult(t *testing.T) {
func TestCredentialProvider_ResolveTokenTreatsEmptyDefaultTokenAsMalformed(t *testing.T) {
cp := NewCredentialProvider(
nil,
&mockDefaultAcct{account: &Account{AppID: "default_app"}},
nil,
&mockDefaultToken{result: &TokenResult{Token: ""}},
nil,
)
_, err := cp.ResolveToken(context.Background(), TokenSpec{Type: TokenTypeUAT, AppID: "default_app"})
_, err := cp.ResolveToken(context.Background(), TokenSpec{Type: TokenTypeUAT})
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "empty token") {
t.Fatalf("ResolveToken() error = %v, want malformed empty token error", err)
}
@@ -425,189 +410,17 @@ func TestCredentialProvider_ResolveAccountWarnsWhenExtensionIdentityVerification
}
func TestCredentialProvider_ResolveTokenDoesNotBypassFailedDefaultAccountResolution(t *testing.T) {
defaultToken := &mockDefaultToken{result: &TokenResult{Token: "default_tok"}}
cp := NewCredentialProvider(
nil,
&mockDefaultAcct{err: errors.New("config unavailable")},
defaultToken,
&mockDefaultToken{result: &TokenResult{Token: "default_tok"}},
nil,
)
_, err := cp.ResolveToken(context.Background(), TokenSpec{Type: TokenTypeUAT, AppID: "default_app"})
_, err := cp.ResolveToken(context.Background(), TokenSpec{Type: TokenTypeUAT})
if err == nil || err.Error() != "config unavailable" {
t.Fatalf("ResolveToken() error = %v, want config unavailable", err)
}
if defaultToken.tokenCalls != 0 {
t.Fatalf("default ResolveToken() calls = %d, want 0", defaultToken.tokenCalls)
}
}
func TestCredentialProvider_ResolveTokenRejectsUnboundAppBeforeExtensionIO(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
appID string
}{
{name: "empty app id"},
{name: "different app id", appID: "other_app"},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
for _, sourceName := range []string{"env", "authsidecar"} {
t.Run(tt.name+"/"+sourceName, func(t *testing.T) {
provider := &mockExtProvider{
name: sourceName,
account: &extcred.Account{AppID: "ext_app", Brand: "feishu"},
token: &extcred.Token{Value: "ext_tok", Source: sourceName},
}
httpClientCalls := 0
cp := NewCredentialProvider(
[]extcred.Provider{provider},
&mockDefaultAcct{account: &Account{AppID: "default_app"}},
&mockDefaultToken{result: &TokenResult{Token: "default_tok"}},
func() (*http.Client, error) {
httpClientCalls++
return nil, errors.New("unexpected user_info call")
},
)
_, err := cp.ResolveToken(context.Background(), TokenSpec{Type: TokenTypeUAT, AppID: tt.appID})
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("ResolveToken() error = nil, want app binding error")
}
assertInternalUnknownWithRetryHint(t, err)
if provider.tokenCalls != 0 {
t.Fatalf("extension ResolveToken() calls = %d, want 0", provider.tokenCalls)
}
if httpClientCalls != 0 {
t.Fatalf("httpClient() calls = %d, want 0", httpClientCalls)
}
})
}
}
}
func TestCredentialProvider_ResolveTokenRejectsUnboundAppBeforeDefaultIO(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
appID string
}{
{name: "empty app id"},
{name: "different app id", appID: "other_app"},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
defaultToken := &mockDefaultToken{result: &TokenResult{Token: "default_tok"}}
cp := NewCredentialProvider(
nil,
&mockDefaultAcct{account: &Account{AppID: "default_app"}},
defaultToken,
nil,
)
_, err := cp.ResolveToken(context.Background(), TokenSpec{Type: TokenTypeUAT, AppID: tt.appID})
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("ResolveToken() error = nil, want app binding error")
}
assertInternalUnknownWithRetryHint(t, err)
if defaultToken.tokenCalls != 0 {
t.Fatalf("default ResolveToken() calls = %d, want 0", defaultToken.tokenCalls)
}
})
}
}
func TestCredentialProvider_ResolveTokenRejectsNilAccountBeforeTokenIO(t *testing.T) {
defaultToken := &mockDefaultToken{result: &TokenResult{Token: "default_tok"}}
cp := NewCredentialProvider(
nil,
&mockDefaultAcct{},
defaultToken,
nil,
)
_, err := cp.ResolveToken(context.Background(), TokenSpec{Type: TokenTypeUAT, AppID: "requested_app"})
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("ResolveToken() error = nil, want nil account error")
}
assertInternalUnknownWithRetryHint(t, err)
if defaultToken.tokenCalls != 0 {
t.Fatalf("default ResolveToken() calls = %d, want 0", defaultToken.tokenCalls)
}
}
func TestCredentialProvider_ResolveTokenRejectsMissingSelectedSourceWithoutFallback(t *testing.T) {
extension := &mockExtProvider{
name: "env",
token: &extcred.Token{Value: "ext_tok", Source: "env"},
}
defaultToken := &mockDefaultToken{result: &TokenResult{Token: "default_tok"}}
cp := NewCredentialProvider(
[]extcred.Provider{extension},
&mockDefaultAcct{account: &Account{AppID: "default_app"}},
defaultToken,
nil,
)
cp.account = &Account{AppID: "selected_app"}
cp.accountOnce.Do(func() {})
_, err := cp.ResolveToken(context.Background(), TokenSpec{Type: TokenTypeUAT, AppID: "selected_app"})
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("ResolveToken() error = nil, want missing selected source error")
}
assertInternalUnknownWithRetryHint(t, err)
if extension.tokenCalls != 0 {
t.Fatalf("extension ResolveToken() calls = %d, want 0", extension.tokenCalls)
}
if defaultToken.tokenCalls != 0 {
t.Fatalf("default ResolveToken() calls = %d, want 0", defaultToken.tokenCalls)
}
}
func TestCredentialProvider_ResolveTokenMatchingExtensionDoesNotEnrichIdentity(t *testing.T) {
provider := &mockExtProvider{
name: "env",
account: &extcred.Account{AppID: "ext_app", Brand: "feishu"},
token: &extcred.Token{Value: "ext_tok", Source: "env"},
}
httpClientCalls := 0
cp := NewCredentialProvider(
[]extcred.Provider{provider},
nil,
nil,
func() (*http.Client, error) {
httpClientCalls++
return nil, errors.New("unexpected user_info call")
},
)
result, err := cp.ResolveToken(context.Background(), TokenSpec{Type: TokenTypeUAT, AppID: "ext_app"})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ResolveToken() error = %v", err)
}
if result.Token != "ext_tok" {
t.Fatalf("ResolveToken() token = %q, want %q", result.Token, "ext_tok")
}
if provider.tokenCalls != 1 {
t.Fatalf("extension ResolveToken() calls = %d, want 1", provider.tokenCalls)
}
if httpClientCalls != 0 {
t.Fatalf("httpClient() calls = %d, want 0", httpClientCalls)
}
}
func assertInternalUnknownWithRetryHint(t *testing.T, err error) {
t.Helper()
problem, ok := errs.ProblemOf(err)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("error type = %T, want typed internal error", err)
}
if problem.Category != errs.CategoryInternal || problem.Subtype != errs.SubtypeUnknown {
t.Fatalf("error problem = %+v, want internal/unknown", problem)
}
if problem.Hint != "retry the command." {
t.Fatalf("error hint = %q, want retry hint", problem.Hint)
}
}
func TestActiveExtensionProviderName_ExtActive(t *testing.T) {

View File

@@ -1,181 +0,0 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
package credential
import (
"context"
"testing"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/errs"
extcred "github.com/larksuite/cli/extension/credential"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/envvars"
)
// stubDecideProvider satisfies extcred.Provider for building providerAccount
// literals; decideIdentity only ever calls Name() on it.
type stubDecideProvider struct{ name string }
func (s stubDecideProvider) Name() string { return s.name }
func (s stubDecideProvider) Priority() int { return 0 }
func (s stubDecideProvider) ResolveAccount(context.Context) (*extcred.Account, error) {
return nil, nil
}
func (s stubDecideProvider) ResolveToken(context.Context, extcred.TokenSpec) (*extcred.Token, error) {
return nil, nil
}
func pa(providerName, appID string) *providerAccount {
return &providerAccount{
acct: &Account{AppID: appID},
source: extensionTokenSource{provider: stubDecideProvider{name: providerName}},
}
}
func appIDOnlyBlock(appID string) *extcred.BlockError {
return &extcred.BlockError{
Provider: "env",
Reason: envvars.CliAppID + " is set but no app secret or access token is available",
Code: extcred.BlockReasonCredentialIncomplete,
RequiredAnyOf: []string{envvars.CliAppSecret, envvars.CliUserAccessToken, envvars.CliTenantAccessToken},
PresentKeys: []string{envvars.CliAppID},
AppID: appID,
}
}
func uatOnlyBlock() *extcred.BlockError {
return &extcred.BlockError{
Provider: "env",
Reason: envvars.CliUserAccessToken + " is set but " + envvars.CliAppID + " is missing",
Code: extcred.BlockReasonCredentialIncomplete,
MissingKeys: []string{envvars.CliAppID},
PresentKeys: []string{envvars.CliUserAccessToken},
}
}
// TestDecideIdentity exercises the selection matrix as data: decideIdentity is
// pure, so every rule (precedence, conflict detection, error attribution) is
// table-testable without env vars or config fixtures.
func TestDecideIdentity(t *testing.T) {
tenantA := &core.MultiAppConfig{
CurrentApp: "tenant_a",
Apps: []core.AppConfig{{Name: "tenant_a", AppId: "cli_a"}},
}
noCurrent := &core.MultiAppConfig{
Apps: []core.AppConfig{{Name: "tenant_a", AppId: "cli_a"}},
}
invalidConfigErr := errs.NewConfigError(errs.SubtypeInvalidConfig, "invalid config format")
notConfiguredErr := core.NotConfiguredError()
cases := []struct {
name string
in identityInputs
route credentialRoute
source CredentialSourceKind
matched bool
subtype errs.Subtype // "" = success expected
}{
{
name: "managed provider wins over explicit profile",
in: identityInputs{profile: "tenant_a", profileSrc: SourceFlagProfile, managed: pa("sidecar", "sidecar_app"), config: tenantA},
route: routeManaged,
source: SourceExtension("sidecar"),
},
{
name: "profile conflicts with complete direct env app_id",
in: identityInputs{profile: "tenant_a", profileSrc: SourceFlagProfile, direct: pa("env", "cli_x"), directKeys: []string{envvars.CliAppID, envvars.CliAppSecret}, config: tenantA},
subtype: errs.SubtypeProfileAppCredentialConflict,
},
{
name: "matched complete direct env yields profile route",
in: identityInputs{profile: "tenant_a", profileSrc: SourceEnvProfile, direct: pa("env", "cli_a"), directKeys: []string{envvars.CliAppID, envvars.CliAppSecret}, config: tenantA},
route: routeProfile,
source: SourceEnvProfile,
matched: true,
},
{
name: "APP_ID-only block matching the profile yields profile route",
in: identityInputs{profile: "tenant_a", profileSrc: SourceFlagProfile, directBlock: appIDOnlyBlock("cli_a"), directKeys: []string{envvars.CliAppID}, config: tenantA},
route: routeProfile,
source: SourceFlagProfile,
matched: true,
},
{
name: "APP_ID-only block mismatching the profile is a hard conflict",
in: identityInputs{profile: "tenant_a", profileSrc: SourceFlagProfile, directBlock: appIDOnlyBlock("cli_x"), directKeys: []string{envvars.CliAppID}, config: tenantA},
subtype: errs.SubtypeProfileAppCredentialConflict,
},
{
name: "UAT-only block with a valid profile keeps the repair error",
in: identityInputs{profile: "tenant_a", profileSrc: SourceFlagProfile, directBlock: uatOnlyBlock(), config: tenantA},
subtype: errs.SubtypeAppCredentialIncomplete,
},
{
name: "block without profile is app_credential_incomplete",
in: identityInputs{directBlock: appIDOnlyBlock("cli_a"), directKeys: []string{envvars.CliAppID}},
subtype: errs.SubtypeAppCredentialIncomplete,
},
{
name: "complete direct env without profile wins",
in: identityInputs{direct: pa("env", "cli_env"), directKeys: []string{envvars.CliAppID, envvars.CliAppSecret}},
route: routeDirectEnv,
source: SourceEnvAppID,
},
{
name: "malformed config is not masked as profile_not_found",
in: identityInputs{profile: "tenant_a", profileSrc: SourceFlagProfile, configErr: invalidConfigErr},
subtype: errs.SubtypeInvalidConfig,
},
{
name: "absent config degrades to profile_not_found",
in: identityInputs{profile: "ghost", profileSrc: SourceEnvProfile, configErr: notConfiguredErr},
subtype: errs.SubtypeProfileNotFound,
},
{
name: "profile missing from a valid config is profile_not_found even with incomplete env",
in: identityInputs{profile: "ghost", profileSrc: SourceEnvProfile, directBlock: appIDOnlyBlock("cli_a"), directKeys: []string{envvars.CliAppID}, config: tenantA},
subtype: errs.SubtypeProfileNotFound,
},
{
name: "config default reports currentApp",
in: identityInputs{config: tenantA},
route: routeConfigDefault,
source: SourceConfigCurrentApp,
},
{
name: "config default without currentApp reports firstApp",
in: identityInputs{config: noCurrent},
route: routeConfigDefault,
source: SourceConfigFirstApp,
},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
d, err := decideIdentity(tc.in)
if tc.subtype != "" {
if err == nil {
t.Fatalf("decideIdentity = %+v, want error subtype %q", d, tc.subtype)
}
prob, ok := errs.ProblemOf(err)
if !ok || prob.Subtype != tc.subtype {
t.Fatalf("error = %v, want subtype %q", err, tc.subtype)
}
return
}
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decideIdentity: %v", err)
}
if d.route != tc.route {
t.Errorf("route = %d, want %d", d.route, tc.route)
}
if d.selection.Source != tc.source {
t.Errorf("source = %q, want %q", d.selection.Source, tc.source)
}
if d.selection.DirectCredentialEnv.Matched != tc.matched {
t.Errorf("matched = %v, want %v", d.selection.DirectCredentialEnv.Matched, tc.matched)
}
})
}
}

View File

@@ -74,13 +74,9 @@ func NewDefaultAccountProvider(kc func() keychain.KeychainAccess, profile string
func (p *DefaultAccountProvider) ResolveAccount(ctx context.Context) (*Account, error) {
// Load config once — used for both credentials and strict mode.
// LoadOrNotConfigured distinguishes an absent config (→ not_configured)
// from a malformed/unreadable one (→ invalid_config with cause), so a
// broken config is never masked as "run config init" — matching the
// explicit-profile path in doResolveAccount.
multi, err := core.LoadOrNotConfigured()
multi, err := core.LoadMultiAppConfig()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
return nil, core.NotConfiguredError()
}
cfg, err := core.ResolveConfigFromMulti(multi, p.keychain(), p.profile)
@@ -120,7 +116,6 @@ type DefaultTokenProvider struct {
tatOnce sync.Once
tatResult *TokenResult
tatAppID string
tatErr error
}
@@ -131,42 +126,21 @@ func NewDefaultTokenProvider(defaultAcct *DefaultAccountProvider, httpClient fun
func (p *DefaultTokenProvider) ResolveToken(ctx context.Context, req TokenSpec) (*TokenResult, error) {
switch req.Type {
case TokenTypeUAT:
return p.resolveUAT(ctx, req)
return p.resolveUAT(ctx)
case TokenTypeTAT:
return p.resolveTAT(ctx, req)
return p.resolveTAT(ctx)
default:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unsupported token type: %s", req.Type)
}
}
// checkTokenAppID refuses to hand out a token for a different app than the
// caller resolved. The token provider re-reads the config, so a concurrent
// profile edit between account resolution and token resolution could otherwise
// cross tokens between apps. TokenSpec.AppID is REQUIRED here: an empty value
// would silently disable the guarantee, so it is rejected rather than skipped.
func checkTokenAppID(req TokenSpec, resolvedAppID string) error {
if req.AppID == "" {
return errs.NewInternalError(errs.SubtypeUnknown,
"TokenSpec.AppID is required for %s token resolution", req.Type)
}
if req.AppID == resolvedAppID {
return nil
}
return errs.NewInternalError(errs.SubtypeUnknown,
"config changed during resolution: token requested for app %q but the saved profile now resolves to a different app", req.AppID).
WithHint("retry the command.")
}
// resolveUAT resolves a user access token. Not cached (unlike TAT) because UAT
// may be refreshed between calls and GetValidAccessToken handles its own caching.
func (p *DefaultTokenProvider) resolveUAT(ctx context.Context, req TokenSpec) (*TokenResult, error) {
func (p *DefaultTokenProvider) resolveUAT(ctx context.Context) (*TokenResult, error) {
acct, err := p.defaultAcct.ResolveAccount(ctx)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if err := checkTokenAppID(req, acct.AppID); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
httpClient, err := p.httpClient()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
@@ -183,36 +157,20 @@ func (p *DefaultTokenProvider) resolveUAT(ctx context.Context, req TokenSpec) (*
return &TokenResult{Token: token, Scopes: scopes}, nil
}
// resolveTAT resolves a tenant access token. The result is cached after the
// first mint via sync.Once — only the context from that call is used.
//
// The account is resolved and checked against the request BEFORE any token
// work: a mismatched request must not trigger a token mint (network call,
// quota, audit trail) for the wrong app. The cached result is additionally
// re-checked on every hit, so a token minted for one app is never served to
// a request that resolved another.
func (p *DefaultTokenProvider) resolveTAT(ctx context.Context, req TokenSpec) (*TokenResult, error) {
// resolveTAT resolves a tenant access token. The result is cached after the first
// call via sync.Once — only the context from the first call is used.
func (p *DefaultTokenProvider) resolveTAT(ctx context.Context) (*TokenResult, error) {
p.tatOnce.Do(func() {
p.tatResult, p.tatErr = p.doResolveTAT(ctx)
})
return p.tatResult, p.tatErr
}
func (p *DefaultTokenProvider) doResolveTAT(ctx context.Context) (*TokenResult, error) {
acct, err := p.defaultAcct.ResolveAccount(ctx)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if err := checkTokenAppID(req, acct.AppID); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
p.tatOnce.Do(func() {
p.tatResult, p.tatErr = p.doResolveTAT(ctx, acct)
p.tatAppID = acct.AppID
})
if p.tatErr != nil {
return nil, p.tatErr
}
if err := checkTokenAppID(req, p.tatAppID); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return p.tatResult, nil
}
func (p *DefaultTokenProvider) doResolveTAT(ctx context.Context, acct *Account) (*TokenResult, error) {
httpClient, err := p.httpClient()
if err != nil {
return nil, err

View File

@@ -4,15 +4,10 @@
package credential
import (
"context"
"errors"
"io"
"net/http"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/errs"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
)
func TestDefaultTokenProvider_Dispatches(t *testing.T) {
@@ -97,136 +92,3 @@ func TestClassifyTATResponseCode_CodeZeroOtherError_StillTyped(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("code-0 invalid_scope must not be a ConfigError, got %T", err)
}
}
func TestCheckTokenAppID(t *testing.T) {
if err := checkTokenAppID(TokenSpec{Type: TokenTypeUAT}, "cli_a"); err == nil {
t.Fatal("empty requested app must be rejected: it would silently disable the guarantee")
}
if err := checkTokenAppID(TokenSpec{AppID: "cli_a"}, "cli_a"); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("matching app must pass: %v", err)
}
err := checkTokenAppID(TokenSpec{AppID: "cli_a"}, "cli_b")
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("mismatched app must be refused")
}
var ie *errs.InternalError
if !errors.As(err, &ie) {
t.Fatalf("error type = %T, want *errs.InternalError", err)
}
}
// REAL-path regression for review F2: the token provider re-reads the config,
// so a profile edit between account resolution and token resolution must not
// hand a token minted for the new app to a caller that resolved the old one.
// Uses the real DefaultAccountProvider + DefaultTokenProvider; the HTTP stub
// makes the network step unreachable, so reaching it proves the app check ran
// and passed first.
func TestDefaultTokenProvider_RefusesTokenAfterConfigSwap(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
writeCfg := func(appID string) {
t.Helper()
multi := &core.MultiAppConfig{CurrentApp: "tenant_a", Apps: []core.AppConfig{{
Name: "tenant_a", AppId: appID, AppSecret: core.PlainSecret("your-secret"), Brand: core.BrandFeishu,
}}}
if err := core.SaveMultiAppConfig(multi); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("SaveMultiAppConfig: %v", err)
}
}
writeCfg("cli_a")
httpSentinel := errors.New("http client sentinel: unreachable in test")
tp := NewDefaultTokenProvider(
NewDefaultAccountProvider(nil, "tenant_a"),
func() (*http.Client, error) { return nil, httpSentinel },
nil,
)
// Matching app: the consistency check passes and resolution proceeds to
// the (stubbed) HTTP step.
_, err := tp.ResolveToken(context.Background(), TokenSpec{Type: TokenTypeUAT, AppID: "cli_a"})
if !errors.Is(err, httpSentinel) {
t.Fatalf("err = %v, want the HTTP sentinel (check must pass for a matching app)", err)
}
// The profile now resolves to a different app: the token request that was
// arbitrated for cli_a must be refused before any token work happens.
writeCfg("cli_b")
_, err = tp.ResolveToken(context.Background(), TokenSpec{Type: TokenTypeUAT, AppID: "cli_a"})
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "config changed during resolution") {
t.Fatalf("err = %v, want config-changed refusal", err)
}
}
// F1 regression: a TAT request for a mismatched app must be refused BEFORE
// any token work starts — no HTTP client construction, no mint, no cache —
// otherwise the CLI mints (and caches) a token for the wrong app and only
// then refuses to return it, leaving auth audit/quota side effects behind.
func TestDefaultTokenProvider_TATChecksAppBeforeAnyTokenWork(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
multi := &core.MultiAppConfig{CurrentApp: "tenant_a", Apps: []core.AppConfig{{
Name: "tenant_a", AppId: "cli_b", AppSecret: core.PlainSecret("your-secret"), Brand: core.BrandFeishu,
}}}
if err := core.SaveMultiAppConfig(multi); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("SaveMultiAppConfig: %v", err)
}
httpCalled := false
tp := NewDefaultTokenProvider(
NewDefaultAccountProvider(nil, "tenant_a"),
func() (*http.Client, error) { httpCalled = true; return nil, errors.New("http sentinel") },
nil,
)
// The profile resolves to cli_b, but the caller arbitrated cli_a.
_, err := tp.ResolveToken(context.Background(), TokenSpec{Type: TokenTypeTAT, AppID: "cli_a"})
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "config changed during resolution") {
t.Fatalf("err = %v, want config-changed refusal", err)
}
if httpCalled {
t.Fatal("token work started for a mismatched app: the check must run before any HTTP client is built")
}
}
// countingTATTripper serves a canned successful TAT response and counts calls.
type countingTATTripper struct{ calls int }
func (c *countingTATTripper) RoundTrip(*http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
c.calls++
return &http.Response{
StatusCode: http.StatusOK,
Body: io.NopCloser(strings.NewReader(`{"code":0,"access_token":"your-access-token"}`)),
Header: http.Header{"Content-Type": []string{"application/json"}},
}, nil
}
// TAT happy path: the first request mints the token over HTTP, the second is
// served from the sync.Once cache without another HTTP call.
func TestDefaultTokenProvider_TATSuccessAndCacheHit(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("LARKSUITE_CLI_CONFIG_DIR", t.TempDir())
multi := &core.MultiAppConfig{CurrentApp: "tenant_a", Apps: []core.AppConfig{{
Name: "tenant_a", AppId: "cli_a", AppSecret: core.PlainSecret("your-secret"), Brand: core.BrandFeishu,
}}}
if err := core.SaveMultiAppConfig(multi); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("SaveMultiAppConfig: %v", err)
}
tripper := &countingTATTripper{}
tp := NewDefaultTokenProvider(
NewDefaultAccountProvider(nil, "tenant_a"),
func() (*http.Client, error) { return &http.Client{Transport: tripper}, nil },
nil,
)
req := TokenSpec{Type: TokenTypeTAT, AppID: "cli_a"}
first, err := tp.ResolveToken(context.Background(), req)
if err != nil || first.Token != "your-access-token" {
t.Fatalf("first resolve = %+v, %v; want minted token", first, err)
}
second, err := tp.ResolveToken(context.Background(), req)
if err != nil || second.Token != "your-access-token" {
t.Fatalf("second resolve = %+v, %v; want cached token", second, err)
}
if tripper.calls != 1 {
t.Fatalf("HTTP calls = %d, want exactly 1 (second resolve must hit the cache)", tripper.calls)
}
}

View File

@@ -1,54 +0,0 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
package credential
// CredentialSourceKind is the wire-stable App/credential selection source.
type CredentialSourceKind string
const (
SourceFlagProfile CredentialSourceKind = "flag:--profile"
SourceEnvProfile CredentialSourceKind = "env:LARKSUITE_CLI_PROFILE"
SourceEnvAppID CredentialSourceKind = "env:LARKSUITE_CLI_APP_ID"
SourceConfigCurrentApp CredentialSourceKind = "config:currentApp"
SourceConfigFirstApp CredentialSourceKind = "config:firstApp"
// SourceExtensionPrefix prefixes the name of a managed extension provider
// that won selection outright (e.g. "extension:sidecar"). With it, an
// empty Source is left with exactly one meaning: not resolved.
SourceExtensionPrefix CredentialSourceKind = "extension:"
)
// SourceExtension reports the selection source for a managed extension
// provider by name.
func SourceExtension(name string) CredentialSourceKind {
return SourceExtensionPrefix + CredentialSourceKind(name)
}
// DirectCredentialEnv describes the state of direct app credential env vars.
// It never carries a secret value — only names and the non-sensitive app_id.
type DirectCredentialEnv struct {
Present bool `json:"present"`
Keys []string `json:"keys,omitempty"`
AppID string `json:"appId,omitempty"`
Matched bool `json:"matched,omitempty"`
ConflictsWithProfile bool `json:"conflictsWithProfile,omitempty"`
}
// IdentitySelection is the explainable result of credential selection.
// It carries NO secret value.
type IdentitySelection struct {
Source CredentialSourceKind
DirectCredentialEnv DirectCredentialEnv
}
// Explicit reports whether the identity was actively specified by the
// user/agent (flag or env), which governs no-fallback behavior.
func (s IdentitySelection) Explicit() bool {
switch s.Source {
case SourceFlagProfile, SourceEnvProfile, SourceEnvAppID:
return true
default:
return false
}
}

View File

@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
package credential
import "testing"
func TestIdentitySelectionExplicit(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
src CredentialSourceKind
explicit bool
}{
{SourceFlagProfile, true},
{SourceEnvProfile, true},
{SourceEnvAppID, true},
{SourceConfigCurrentApp, false},
{SourceConfigFirstApp, false},
}
for _, c := range cases {
sel := IdentitySelection{Source: c.src}
if sel.Explicit() != c.explicit {
t.Errorf("source %q: Explicit()=%v want %v", c.src, sel.Explicit(), c.explicit)
}
}
}

View File

@@ -52,24 +52,6 @@ func TestFullChain_EnvWins(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestFullChain_EnvRejectsDifferentApp(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv(envvars.CliAppID, "env_app")
t.Setenv(envvars.CliAppSecret, "env_secret")
t.Setenv(envvars.CliUserAccessToken, "env_uat")
cp := credential.NewCredentialProvider(
[]extcred.Provider{&envprovider.Provider{}},
nil, nil, nil,
)
_, err := cp.ResolveToken(context.Background(), credential.TokenSpec{
Type: credential.TokenTypeUAT, AppID: "other_app",
})
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("ResolveToken() error = nil, want app binding error")
}
}
func TestFullChain_Fallthrough(t *testing.T) {
// env provider returns nil (no env vars set), falls through to default token
ep := &envprovider.Provider{}
@@ -77,8 +59,7 @@ func TestFullChain_Fallthrough(t *testing.T) {
cp := credential.NewCredentialProvider(
[]extcred.Provider{ep},
&mockDefaultAccountProvider{account: &credential.Account{AppID: "app1"}},
mock, nil,
nil, mock, nil,
)
result, err := cp.ResolveToken(context.Background(), credential.TokenSpec{
Type: credential.TokenTypeUAT, AppID: "app1",
@@ -91,14 +72,6 @@ func TestFullChain_Fallthrough(t *testing.T) {
}
}
type mockDefaultAccountProvider struct {
account *credential.Account
}
func (m *mockDefaultAccountProvider) ResolveAccount(context.Context) (*credential.Account, error) {
return m.account, nil
}
type mockDefaultTokenProvider struct {
token string
scopes string

View File

@@ -21,7 +21,6 @@ const (
CliAgentName = "LARKSUITE_CLI_AGENT_NAME"
CliAgentTrace = "LARKSUITE_CLI_AGENT_TRACE"
CliProfile = "LARKSUITE_CLI_PROFILE"
CliProxyEnable = "LARKSUITE_CLI_PROXY_ENABLE"
CliProxyAddress = "LARKSUITE_CLI_PROXY_ADDRESS"

View File

@@ -1,142 +0,0 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
// Package deviceinfo collects the platform hardware product model and the
// platform values used by device-related risk-control headers.
package riskcontrol
import (
"runtime"
"strings"
"sync"
"unicode"
"unicode/utf8"
"golang.org/x/net/http/httpguts"
)
// OSType is the server-side risk-control operating-system enum.
type OSType string
// OS type enum values for X-Agent-Os-Type.
const (
OSTypeUnknown = "0"
OSTypeWindows = "1"
OSTypeLinux = "2"
OSTypeMacOS = "3"
)
const (
// TerminalTypePC is the fixed X-Agent-Terminal-Type value for the CLI.
TerminalTypePC = "1"
// Unknown is used when the hardware product model cannot be collected.
Unknown = "Unknown"
// deviceModelMaxBytes bounds the value added to X-Agent-Device-Type.
// Device models are short identifiers; a larger value is treated as
// malformed rather than truncated so the header never misrepresents it.
deviceModelMaxBytes = 256
)
// Snapshot contains the deliberately small risk-control signal set.
// ProductModel is omitted when the platform cannot provide a safe value.
type Snapshot struct {
OSType OSType
ProductModel string
}
// Source supplies one immutable process-level snapshot.
type Source interface {
Snapshot() Snapshot
}
// HostSource lazily reads host signals once, after outbound policy authorizes
// the first request. Failed probes are cached and are not retried per request.
type HostSource struct {
once sync.Once
value Snapshot
readModel func() string
}
// NewHostSource creates the production host signal source.
func NewHostSource() *HostSource {
return &HostSource{readModel: readDeviceModel}
}
// Snapshot returns the cached host signal snapshot.
func (s *HostSource) Snapshot() Snapshot {
if s == nil {
return Snapshot{}
}
s.once.Do(func() {
readModel := s.readModel
if readModel == nil {
readModel = readDeviceModel
}
s.value = Snapshot{
OSType: GetOSType(OSName()),
ProductModel: normalizeDeviceModel(readModel()),
}
})
return s.value
}
// normalizeModel removes non-printable characters and returns a model only
// when the remaining text is safe to use as an HTTP header value. Input that
// cannot produce a valid model is rejected so Get can fall back to Unknown.
func normalizeDeviceModel(model string) string {
if !utf8.ValidString(model) {
return ""
}
model = strings.Map(func(r rune) rune {
switch {
case r == '\r' || r == '\n' || r == '\x00':
return -1
case unicode.IsSpace(r):
return ' '
case unicode.IsPrint(r):
return r
default:
return -1
}
}, model)
model = strings.Join(strings.Fields(model), " ")
if model == "" || len(model) > deviceModelMaxBytes {
return ""
}
if !httpguts.ValidHeaderFieldValue(model) {
return ""
}
return model
}
// GetOSType maps a platform name to the X-Agent-Os-Type enum.
func GetOSType(osName string) OSType {
switch osName {
case "Windows":
return OSTypeWindows
case "Linux":
return OSTypeLinux
case "MacOS":
return OSTypeMacOS
default:
return OSTypeUnknown
}
}
// OSName returns the platform name used by GetOSType.
func OSName() string {
switch runtime.GOOS {
case "darwin":
return "MacOS"
case "windows":
return "Windows"
case "linux":
return "Linux"
default:
return runtime.GOOS
}
}

View File

@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
//go:build darwin
// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
package riskcontrol
import "golang.org/x/sys/unix"
// readDeviceModel reads the current product key first and falls back to the
// legacy model key. Trying both keys is more robust than branching on a macOS
// version because virtualized or restricted environments may expose only one.
func readDeviceModel() string {
return readDarwinDeviceModel(unix.Sysctl)
}
func readDarwinDeviceModel(readSysctl func(string) (string, error)) string {
for _, key := range [...]string{"hw.product", "hw.model"} {
model, err := readSysctl(key)
if err == nil {
if model = normalizeDeviceModel(model); model != "" {
return model
}
}
}
return ""
}

View File

@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
//go:build darwin
// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
package riskcontrol
import (
"errors"
"reflect"
"testing"
)
func TestReadDarwinDeviceModelPrefersProductAndFallsBackToModel(t *testing.T) {
t.Run("product available", func(t *testing.T) {
var keys []string
got := readDarwinDeviceModel(func(key string) (string, error) {
keys = append(keys, key)
if key == "hw.product" {
return "Mac16,1", nil
}
return "", errors.New("unexpected fallback")
})
if got != "Mac16,1" {
t.Fatalf("model = %q, want %q", got, "Mac16,1")
}
if want := []string{"hw.product"}; !reflect.DeepEqual(keys, want) {
t.Fatalf("sysctl keys = %v, want %v", keys, want)
}
})
t.Run("product unavailable", func(t *testing.T) {
var keys []string
got := readDarwinDeviceModel(func(key string) (string, error) {
keys = append(keys, key)
if key == "hw.model" {
return "MacBookPro18,3", nil
}
return "", errors.New("not available")
})
if got != "MacBookPro18,3" {
t.Fatalf("model = %q, want %q", got, "MacBookPro18,3")
}
if want := []string{"hw.product", "hw.model"}; !reflect.DeepEqual(keys, want) {
t.Fatalf("sysctl keys = %v, want %v", keys, want)
}
})
}

View File

@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
//go:build linux
// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
package riskcontrol
// readDeviceModel returns a stable device model for Linux. DMI and device-tree
// values vary widely and can expose the host or virtualization platform when
// the CLI runs in a container or sandbox.
func readDeviceModel() string {
return readLinuxDeviceModel()
}
func readLinuxDeviceModel() string {
return "linux"
}

View File

@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
//go:build linux
// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
package riskcontrol
import "testing"
func TestReadDeviceModelReturnsLinux(t *testing.T) {
if got := readDeviceModel(); got != "linux" {
t.Fatalf("readDeviceModel() = %q, want %q", got, "linux")
}
}
func TestReadLinuxDeviceModel(t *testing.T) {
if got := readLinuxDeviceModel(); got != "linux" {
t.Fatalf("readLinuxDeviceModel() = %q, want %q", got, "linux")
}
}

View File

@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
//go:build !darwin && !windows && !linux
// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
package riskcontrol
// readDeviceModel returns an empty model on unsupported platforms.
func readDeviceModel() string {
return ""
}

View File

@@ -1,143 +0,0 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
package riskcontrol
import (
"fmt"
"strings"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"unicode"
)
func TestHostSourceCachesNonEmptyModel(t *testing.T) {
calls := 0
s := &HostSource{readModel: func() string {
calls++
return " MacBookPro18,3\n"
}}
if got := s.Snapshot(); got.ProductModel != "MacBookPro18,3" {
t.Fatalf("first Snapshot().ProductModel = %q, want %q", got.ProductModel, "MacBookPro18,3")
}
if got := s.Snapshot(); got.ProductModel != "MacBookPro18,3" {
t.Fatalf("second Snapshot().ProductModel = %q, want cached model", got.ProductModel)
}
if calls != 1 {
t.Fatalf("read called %d times, want 1", calls)
}
}
func TestHostSourceCachesEmptyModel(t *testing.T) {
calls := 0
s := &HostSource{readModel: func() string {
calls++
return ""
}}
if got := s.Snapshot(); got.ProductModel != "" {
t.Fatalf("first Snapshot().ProductModel = %q, want empty", got.ProductModel)
}
if got := s.Snapshot(); got.ProductModel != "" {
t.Fatalf("second Snapshot().ProductModel = %q, want cached empty result", got.ProductModel)
}
if calls != 1 {
t.Fatalf("read called %d times, want 1", calls)
}
}
func TestHostSourceReadsOnceAcrossConcurrentCalls(t *testing.T) {
var calls atomic.Int32
s := &HostSource{readModel: func() string {
calls.Add(1)
return "ThinkPad X1 Carbon"
}}
const goroutines = 32
var wg sync.WaitGroup
wg.Add(goroutines)
for i := 0; i < goroutines; i++ {
go func() {
defer wg.Done()
snapshot := s.Snapshot()
if snapshot.ProductModel != "ThinkPad X1 Carbon" {
t.Errorf("Snapshot().ProductModel = %q, want %q", snapshot.ProductModel, "ThinkPad X1 Carbon")
}
}()
}
wg.Wait()
if got := calls.Load(); got != 1 {
t.Fatalf("read called %d times, want 1", got)
}
}
func TestNormalizeDeviceModel(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
model string
want string
}{
{name: "trims surrounding whitespace", model: " MacBookPro18,3\n", want: "MacBookPro18,3"},
{name: "trims device tree terminator", model: "Raspberry Pi 5\x00", want: "Raspberry Pi 5"},
{name: "allows printable Unicode", model: "联想 ThinkPad X1", want: "联想 ThinkPad X1"},
{name: "rejects empty", model: " \t\r\n"},
{name: "rejects invalid UTF-8", model: string([]byte{'M', 0xff, '1'})},
{name: "removes CRLF", model: "model\r\nname", want: "modelname"},
{name: "normalizes tab", model: "model\tname", want: "model name"},
{name: "removes NUL", model: "model\x00name", want: "modelname"},
{name: "removes control character", model: "model\x1fname", want: "modelname"},
{name: "removes DEL", model: "model\x7fname", want: "modelname"},
{name: "normalizes Unicode line separator", model: "model\u2028name", want: "model name"},
{name: "collapses whitespace", model: " model\t \u00a0 name ", want: "model name"},
{name: "accepts maximum byte length", model: strings.Repeat("a", deviceModelMaxBytes), want: strings.Repeat("a", deviceModelMaxBytes)},
{name: "rejects overlong value", model: strings.Repeat("a", deviceModelMaxBytes+1)},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
if got := normalizeDeviceModel(tt.model); got != tt.want {
t.Fatalf("normalizeDeviceModel(%q) = %q, want %q", tt.model, got, tt.want)
}
})
}
}
func TestNormalizeDeviceModelRemovesHTTPControlBytes(t *testing.T) {
for value := 0; value <= 0x7f; value++ {
if value >= 0x20 && value < 0x7f {
continue
}
t.Run(fmt.Sprintf("0x%02x", value), func(t *testing.T) {
model := "model" + string(rune(value)) + "name"
want := "modelname"
if value != '\r' && value != '\n' && value != '\x00' && unicode.IsSpace(rune(value)) {
want = "model name"
}
if got := normalizeDeviceModel(model); got != want {
t.Fatalf("normalizeDeviceModel(%q) = %q, want %q", model, got, want)
}
})
}
}
func TestGetOSType(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
want OSType
}{
{name: "Windows", want: OSTypeWindows},
{name: "Linux", want: OSTypeLinux},
{name: "MacOS", want: OSTypeMacOS},
{name: "unknown", want: OSTypeUnknown},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
if got := GetOSType(tt.name); got != tt.want {
t.Errorf("GetOSType(%q) = %q, want %q", tt.name, got, tt.want)
}
})
}
}

View File

@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
//go:build windows
// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
package riskcontrol
import "golang.org/x/sys/windows/registry"
// systemInfoRegistryPaths lists registry locations in device-model lookup order.
var systemInfoRegistryPaths = [...]string{
`HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\BIOS`,
`SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SystemInformation`,
`SYSTEM\HardwareConfig\Current`,
}
// readDeviceModel returns the first product name found in the Windows registry.
func readDeviceModel() string {
return readWindowsDeviceModel(readWindowsRegistryModel)
}
func readWindowsRegistryModel(path string) (string, error) {
key, err := registry.OpenKey(registry.LOCAL_MACHINE, path, registry.READ)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
defer key.Close()
model, _, err := key.GetStringValue("SystemProductName")
return model, err
}
func readWindowsDeviceModel(readRegistryModel func(string) (string, error)) string {
for _, path := range systemInfoRegistryPaths {
model, err := readRegistryModel(path)
if err != nil {
continue
}
if model = normalizeDeviceModel(model); model != "" {
return model
}
}
return ""
}

View File

@@ -1,78 +0,0 @@
//go:build windows
// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
package riskcontrol
import (
"errors"
"reflect"
"testing"
)
func TestReadWindowsDeviceModelFallback(t *testing.T) {
readError := errors.New("registry read failed")
tests := []struct {
name string
values map[string]string
errors map[string]error
want string
wantPaths []string
}{
{
name: "first path wins",
values: map[string]string{systemInfoRegistryPaths[0]: "Surface Laptop"},
want: "Surface Laptop",
wantPaths: []string{systemInfoRegistryPaths[0]},
},
{
name: "read failure falls back",
errors: map[string]error{
systemInfoRegistryPaths[0]: readError,
},
values: map[string]string{
systemInfoRegistryPaths[1]: "ThinkPad X1 Carbon",
},
want: "ThinkPad X1 Carbon",
wantPaths: systemInfoRegistryPaths[:2],
},
{
name: "empty normalized value falls back",
values: map[string]string{
systemInfoRegistryPaths[0]: " \r\n\x00",
systemInfoRegistryPaths[1]: "Latitude 7450",
},
want: "Latitude 7450",
wantPaths: systemInfoRegistryPaths[:2],
},
{
name: "all paths fail",
errors: map[string]error{
systemInfoRegistryPaths[0]: readError,
systemInfoRegistryPaths[1]: readError,
systemInfoRegistryPaths[2]: readError,
},
wantPaths: systemInfoRegistryPaths[:],
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
var paths []string
got := readWindowsDeviceModel(func(path string) (string, error) {
paths = append(paths, path)
if err := tt.errors[path]; err != nil {
return "", err
}
return tt.values[path], nil
})
if got != tt.want {
t.Fatalf("model = %q, want %q", got, tt.want)
}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(paths, tt.wantPaths) {
t.Fatalf("registry paths = %v, want %v", paths, tt.wantPaths)
}
})
}
}

View File

@@ -1,138 +0,0 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
package riskcontrol
import (
"net/http"
"net/url"
"strings"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/core"
internaltransport "github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/transport"
)
const (
HeaderProductModel = "X-Agent-Device-Type"
HeaderOSType = "X-Agent-Os-Type"
)
var restrictedHeaders = [...]string{HeaderProductModel, HeaderOSType}
// Transport is the feature's final outbound boundary. It removes caller- or
// extension-supplied signal headers first and writes trusted values only after
// authorizing an official SDK origin and authentication state.
type Transport struct {
next http.RoundTripper
source Source
}
// NewTransport creates the final SDK outbound policy boundary. A nil source
// disables collection and injection while preserving restricted-header
// stripping for opt-out and extension-credential requests.
func NewTransport(next http.RoundTripper, source Source) *Transport {
if next == nil {
next = internaltransport.Fallback()
}
return &Transport{
next: next,
source: source,
}
}
// RoundTrip implements http.RoundTripper.
func (t *Transport) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
req = req.Clone(req.Context())
if req.Header == nil {
req.Header = make(http.Header)
}
stripRestrictedHeaders(req.Header)
if t.source != nil && t.routeAllowsSignals(req) {
snapshot := t.source.Snapshot()
if isSupportedOSType(snapshot.OSType) {
req.Header.Set(HeaderOSType, string(snapshot.OSType))
}
if model := normalizeDeviceModel(snapshot.ProductModel); model != "" {
req.Header.Set(HeaderProductModel, model)
}
}
return t.next.RoundTrip(req)
}
func isSupportedOSType(value OSType) bool {
switch value {
case OSTypeWindows, OSTypeLinux, OSTypeMacOS:
return true
default:
return false
}
}
func stripRestrictedHeaders(header http.Header) {
for name := range header {
for _, restricted := range restrictedHeaders {
if strings.EqualFold(name, restricted) {
delete(header, name)
break
}
}
}
}
type origin struct {
scheme string
host string
port string
}
var officialFeishuOrigins = [...]origin{
apiOrigin(core.BrandFeishu, core.ResolveEndpoints(core.BrandFeishu).Open),
apiOrigin(core.BrandLark, core.ResolveEndpoints(core.BrandLark).Open),
apiOrigin(core.BrandFeishu, core.ResolveEndpoints(core.BrandFeishu).Accounts),
apiOrigin(core.BrandLark, core.ResolveEndpoints(core.BrandLark).Accounts),
}
func (t *Transport) routeAllowsSignals(req *http.Request) bool {
if req == nil || req.URL == nil {
return false
}
return isOfficialFeishuOrigin(originOf(req.URL))
}
func originOf(value *url.URL) origin {
if value == nil {
return origin{}
}
scheme := strings.ToLower(value.Scheme)
port := value.Port()
if port == "" {
switch scheme {
case "https":
port = "443"
case "http":
port = "80"
}
}
return origin{scheme: scheme, host: strings.ToLower(value.Hostname()), port: port}
}
func apiOrigin(brand core.LarkBrand, endpointURL string) origin {
endpoint, err := url.Parse(endpointURL)
if err != nil {
return origin{}
}
return originOf(endpoint)
}
func isOfficialFeishuOrigin(candidate origin) bool {
if candidate.scheme != "https" || candidate.port != "443" {
return false
}
for _, official := range officialFeishuOrigins {
if candidate == official {
return true
}
}
return false
}

View File

@@ -1,124 +0,0 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
package riskcontrol
import (
"net/http"
"strings"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
)
type roundTripFunc func(*http.Request) (*http.Response, error)
func (f roundTripFunc) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
return f(req)
}
type countingSource struct {
calls atomic.Int32
}
func (s *countingSource) Snapshot() Snapshot {
s.calls.Add(1)
return Snapshot{OSType: OSTypeMacOS, ProductModel: "Mac16,1"}
}
type staticSource Snapshot
func (s staticSource) Snapshot() Snapshot { return Snapshot(s) }
func TestTransportAuthorizesBeforeCollecting(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
requestURL string
authorization string
wantSignals bool
}{
{name: "authenticated official HTTPS", requestURL: "https://open.feishu.cn/open-apis/test", authorization: "Bearer token", wantSignals: true},
{name: "Lark official HTTPS", requestURL: "https://open.larksuite.com/open-apis/test", authorization: "Bearer token", wantSignals: true},
{name: "official explicit HTTPS port", requestURL: "https://OPEN.FEISHU.CN:443/open-apis/test", authorization: "Bearer token", wantSignals: true},
{name: "unauthenticated", requestURL: "https://open.feishu.cn/open-apis/test", wantSignals: true},
{name: "official non-OpenAPI origin", requestURL: "https://accounts.feishu.cn/open-apis/test", authorization: "Bearer token", wantSignals: true},
{name: "off domain", requestURL: "https://example.com/test", authorization: "Bearer token", wantSignals: false},
{name: "lookalike", requestURL: "https://open.feishu.cn.evil.example/test", authorization: "Bearer token", wantSignals: false},
{name: "plain HTTP", requestURL: "http://open.feishu.cn/test", authorization: "Bearer token", wantSignals: false},
{name: "non-default port", requestURL: "https://open.feishu.cn:8443/test", authorization: "Bearer token", wantSignals: false},
}
for _, test := range tests {
t.Run(test.name, func(t *testing.T) {
source := &countingSource{}
var received http.Header
base := roundTripFunc(func(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
received = req.Header.Clone()
return &http.Response{StatusCode: http.StatusOK, Body: http.NoBody}, nil
})
req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, test.requestURL, nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
req.Header.Set("Authorization", test.authorization)
req.Header.Set(HeaderOSType, "caller-value")
req.Header.Set(HeaderProductModel, "caller-value")
req.Header["x-agent-device-type"] = []string{"non-canonical-caller-value"}
resp, err := NewTransport(base, source).RoundTrip(req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
resp.Body.Close()
gotSignals := received.Get(HeaderOSType) != ""
if gotSignals != test.wantSignals {
t.Fatalf("signals present = %t, want %t; headers=%v", gotSignals, test.wantSignals, received)
}
wantCalls := int32(0)
if test.wantSignals {
wantCalls = 1
}
if got := source.calls.Load(); got != wantCalls {
t.Fatalf("Snapshot calls = %d, want %d", got, wantCalls)
}
if got := req.Header.Get(HeaderOSType); got != "caller-value" {
t.Fatalf("caller request OS header = %q, want unchanged", got)
}
if got := req.Header.Get(HeaderProductModel); got != "caller-value" {
t.Fatalf("caller request product-model header = %q, want unchanged", got)
}
if !test.wantSignals {
for name := range received {
if strings.EqualFold(name, HeaderProductModel) || strings.EqualFold(name, HeaderOSType) {
t.Fatalf("restricted header leaked as %q", name)
}
}
}
})
}
}
func TestTransportValidatesSourceSnapshot(t *testing.T) {
var received http.Header
base := roundTripFunc(func(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
received = req.Header.Clone()
return &http.Response{StatusCode: http.StatusOK, Body: http.NoBody}, nil
})
req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "https://open.feishu.cn/open-apis/test", nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer token")
resp, err := NewTransport(base, staticSource{
OSType: OSType("unsupported"),
ProductModel: "unsafe\nvalue",
}).RoundTrip(req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
resp.Body.Close()
if received.Get(HeaderOSType) == "" && received.Get(HeaderProductModel) == "" {
t.Fatalf("no signals collected: %v", received)
}
}

View File

@@ -17,13 +17,6 @@ func SafeInputPath(path string) (string, error) {
return localfileio.SafeInputPath(path)
}
// LocalInputPath validates a local input path without restricting it to the
// current working directory. It delegates to localfileio.LocalInputPath so
// command validation and shared local-file readers use one policy.
func LocalInputPath(path string) (string, error) {
return localfileio.LocalInputPath(path)
}
// SafeEnvDirPath validates an environment-provided application directory path.
// Delegates to localfileio.SafeEnvDirPath.
func SafeEnvDirPath(path, envName string) (string, error) {

View File

@@ -211,18 +211,6 @@ func TestSafeLocalFlagPath(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestLocalInputPath_AllowsLocalPathsAndRejectsUnsafeCharacters(t *testing.T) {
for _, path := range []string{"/tmp/report.pdf", "../report.pdf"} {
got, err := LocalInputPath(path)
if err != nil || got != path {
t.Fatalf("LocalInputPath(%q) = %q, %v; want unchanged path", path, got, err)
}
}
if _, err := LocalInputPath("report\n.pdf"); err == nil {
t.Fatal("LocalInputPath() unexpectedly accepted a control character")
}
}
func TestSafeUploadPath_AllowsTempFileAbsolutePath(t *testing.T) {
// GIVEN: a real temp file (absolute path under os.TempDir())
f, err := os.CreateTemp("", "upload-test-*.bin")

View File

@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ import (
"fmt"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"unicode"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/charcheck"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/vfs"
@@ -23,32 +22,6 @@ func SafeInputPath(path string) (string, error) {
return safePath(path, "--file")
}
// LocalInputPath validates an input path in the process local filesystem
// namespace. It intentionally does not impose cwd containment or canonicalize
// the path: absolute paths, parent-relative paths, and symlink traversal retain
// their normal OS semantics. Character validation remains mandatory because
// paths are user-controlled and may appear in errors or progress output.
func LocalInputPath(path string) (string, error) {
if strings.TrimSpace(path) == "" {
return "", fmt.Errorf("local input path must not be empty")
}
if strings.IndexFunc(path, unicode.IsControl) >= 0 {
return "", fmt.Errorf("local input path must not contain control characters")
}
if err := charcheck.RejectControlChars(path, "local input path"); err != nil {
return "", err
}
if err := validateLocalInputPlatform(path); err != nil {
return "", err
}
return path, nil
}
func isWindowsNonLocalNamespace(path string) bool {
normalized := strings.ReplaceAll(path, "/", `\`)
return strings.HasPrefix(normalized, `\\`) || strings.HasPrefix(normalized, `\??\`)
}
// SafeLocalFlagPath validates a flag value as a local file path.
// Empty values and http/https URLs are returned unchanged without validation.
func SafeLocalFlagPath(flagName, value string) (string, error) {
@@ -56,7 +29,7 @@ func SafeLocalFlagPath(flagName, value string) (string, error) {
return value, nil
}
if _, err := SafeInputPath(value); err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("%s: %w", flagName, err)
return "", fmt.Errorf("%s: %v", flagName, err)
}
return value, nil
}

View File

@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
//go:build !windows
package localfileio
func validateLocalInputPlatform(string) error { return nil }

View File

@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
//go:build windows
package localfileio
import (
"fmt"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
)
func validateLocalInputPlatform(path string) error {
if isWindowsNonLocalNamespace(path) {
return fmt.Errorf("local input path must not use a Windows network or device namespace")
}
cleaned := filepath.Clean(path)
volume := filepath.VolumeName(cleaned)
remainder := strings.TrimLeft(cleaned[len(volume):], `\/`)
for _, component := range strings.FieldsFunc(remainder, func(r rune) bool {
return r == '\\' || r == '/'
}) {
if component == "." || component == ".." {
continue
}
if !filepath.IsLocal(component) {
return fmt.Errorf("local input path contains a reserved Windows path component %q", component)
}
}
return nil
}

View File

@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
//go:build windows
package localfileio
import "testing"
func TestLocalInputPath_RejectsWindowsNetworkDeviceAndReservedPaths(t *testing.T) {
for _, input := range []string{
`\\server\share\report.pdf`,
`//server/share/report.pdf`,
`\\.\pipe\upload`,
`\\?\C:\Users\agent\report.pdf`,
`\\?\UNC\server\share\report.pdf`,
`\??\C:\Users\agent\report.pdf`,
`C:\Users\agent\NUL.txt`,
`CON`,
} {
t.Run(input, func(t *testing.T) {
if _, err := LocalInputPath(input); err == nil {
t.Fatalf("LocalInputPath(%q) unexpectedly succeeded", input)
}
})
}
}

View File

@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@
package localfileio
import (
"fmt"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
@@ -72,72 +71,6 @@ func TestSafeOutputPath_RejectsPathTraversalAndDangerousInput(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestLocalInputPath_AllowsLocalNamespaceWithoutRewriting(t *testing.T) {
for _, input := range []string{
"/tmp/report.pdf",
"../outside/report.pdf",
"./report.pdf",
"nested/../report.pdf",
`C:\Users\agent\report.pdf`,
"报告.pdf",
} {
t.Run(input, func(t *testing.T) {
got, err := LocalInputPath(input)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("LocalInputPath(%q) error = %v", input, err)
}
if got != input {
t.Fatalf("LocalInputPath(%q) = %q, want path preserved verbatim", input, got)
}
})
}
}
func TestWindowsNonLocalNamespace(t *testing.T) {
for _, input := range []string{
`\\server\share\report.pdf`,
`//server/share/report.pdf`,
`\\.\pipe\upload`,
`\\?\C:\Users\agent\report.pdf`,
`\\?\UNC\server\share\report.pdf`,
`\??\C:\Users\agent\report.pdf`,
} {
if !isWindowsNonLocalNamespace(input) {
t.Errorf("isWindowsNonLocalNamespace(%q) = false, want true", input)
}
}
for _, input := range []string{
`C:\Users\agent\report.pdf`,
`C:/Users/agent/report.pdf`,
`..\outside\report.pdf`,
`.\report.pdf`,
} {
if isWindowsNonLocalNamespace(input) {
t.Errorf("isWindowsNonLocalNamespace(%q) = true, want false", input)
}
}
}
func TestLocalInputPath_RejectsEmptyControlAndDangerousUnicode(t *testing.T) {
for _, input := range []string{
"",
" ",
"file\x00.txt",
"file\tname.txt",
"file\nname.txt",
"file\rname.txt",
"file\u202Ename.txt",
"file\u200Bname.txt",
} {
t.Run(fmt.Sprintf("%q", input), func(t *testing.T) {
if _, err := LocalInputPath(input); err == nil {
t.Fatalf("LocalInputPath(%q) unexpectedly succeeded", input)
}
})
}
}
func TestSafeOutputPath_ReturnsCanonicalAbsolutePath(t *testing.T) {
// GIVEN: a clean temp directory as CWD
dir := t.TempDir()

7
package-lock.json generated
View File

@@ -1,16 +1,15 @@
{
"name": "@larksuite/cli",
"version": "1.0.77",
"version": "1.0.11",
"lockfileVersion": 3,
"requires": true,
"packages": {
"": {
"name": "@larksuite/cli",
"version": "1.0.77",
"version": "1.0.11",
"cpu": [
"x64",
"arm64",
"riscv64"
"arm64"
],
"hasInstallScript": true,
"license": "MIT",

View File

@@ -1,13 +1,12 @@
{
"name": "@larksuite/cli",
"version": "1.0.77",
"version": "1.0.74",
"description": "The official CLI for Lark/Feishu open platform",
"bin": {
"lark-cli": "scripts/run.js"
},
"scripts": {
"postinstall": "node scripts/install.js",
"release:check": "node scripts/release-preflight.js"
"postinstall": "node scripts/install.js"
},
"os": [
"darwin",

View File

@@ -265,7 +265,10 @@ function getExpectedChecksum(archiveName, checksumsDir) {
const checksumsPath = path.join(dir, "checksums.txt");
if (!fs.existsSync(checksumsPath)) {
throw new Error(`[SECURITY] checksums.txt not found at ${checksumsPath}`);
console.error(
"[WARN] checksums.txt not found, skipping checksum verification"
);
return null;
}
const content = fs.readFileSync(checksumsPath, "utf8");
@@ -283,14 +286,7 @@ function getExpectedChecksum(archiveName, checksumsDir) {
}
function verifyChecksum(archivePath, expectedHash) {
if (typeof expectedHash !== "string" || expectedHash.length === 0) {
throw new Error("[SECURITY] Expected checksum is missing or invalid");
}
if (!/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/i.test(expectedHash)) {
throw new Error(
"[SECURITY] Expected checksum must be a 64-character hexadecimal SHA-256 digest"
);
}
if (expectedHash === null) return;
// Stream the file to avoid loading the entire archive into memory.
// Archives can be 10-100MB; streaming keeps RSS constant.

View File

@@ -52,12 +52,11 @@ describe("getExpectedChecksum", () => {
);
});
it("throws [SECURITY]-prefixed Error when checksums.txt does not exist", () => {
it("returns null when checksums.txt does not exist", () => {
const dir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "checksum-test-"));
assert.throws(
() => getExpectedChecksum("anything.tar.gz", dir),
{ message: /^\[SECURITY\] checksums\.txt not found/ }
);
// No checksums.txt in dir
const result = getExpectedChecksum("anything.tar.gz", dir);
assert.equal(result, null);
});
it("skips malformed lines and still finds valid entry", () => {
@@ -107,7 +106,7 @@ describe("verifyChecksum", () => {
verifyChecksum(filePath, hash);
});
it("accepts a valid uppercase 64-character hex hash", () => {
it("matches case-insensitively", () => {
const content = "case test";
const filePath = makeTmpFile(content);
const hash = sha256(content).toUpperCase();
@@ -115,40 +114,6 @@ describe("verifyChecksum", () => {
verifyChecksum(filePath, hash);
});
for (const [name, expectedHash] of [
["null", null],
["empty", ""],
["non-string", 123],
]) {
it(`throws [SECURITY]-prefixed Error for ${name} expected hash`, () => {
const filePath = makeTmpFile("real content");
assert.throws(
() => verifyChecksum(filePath, expectedHash),
(err) => {
assert.match(err.message, /^\[SECURITY\]/);
assert.match(err.message, /Expected checksum is missing or invalid/);
return true;
}
);
});
}
it("throws [SECURITY] format Error for an incorrectly sized hash", () => {
const filePath = makeTmpFile("real content");
assert.throws(
() => verifyChecksum(filePath, "abc123"),
{ message: /^\[SECURITY\] Expected checksum must be a 64-character hexadecimal SHA-256 digest$/ }
);
});
it("throws [SECURITY] format Error for a non-hex hash", () => {
const filePath = makeTmpFile("real content");
assert.throws(
() => verifyChecksum(filePath, "g".repeat(64)),
{ message: /^\[SECURITY\] Expected checksum must be a 64-character hexadecimal SHA-256 digest$/ }
);
});
it("throws [SECURITY]-prefixed Error on mismatch", () => {
const filePath = makeTmpFile("real content");
assert.throws(

View File

@@ -1,108 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env node
// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
const fs = require("node:fs");
const path = require("node:path");
const STABLE_VERSION_PATTERN = /^(0|[1-9][0-9]*)\.(0|[1-9][0-9]*)\.(0|[1-9][0-9]*)$/;
function isStableVersion(value) {
return typeof value === "string" && STABLE_VERSION_PATTERN.test(value);
}
function releaseError(message, observed, hint) {
return { ok: false, error: { type: "release_preflight", message, observed, hint } };
}
function validateReleasePreflight(packageJson, packageLockJson, tag) {
const packageVersion = packageJson?.version;
const lockVersion = packageLockJson?.version;
const lockRootVersion = packageLockJson?.packages?.[""]?.version;
const observed = {
packageVersion: packageVersion ?? null,
lockVersion: lockVersion ?? null,
lockRootVersion: lockRootVersion ?? null,
tagVersion: null,
};
for (const [field, value] of [
["package.json.version", packageVersion],
["package-lock.json.version", lockVersion],
['package-lock.json.packages[""].version', lockRootVersion],
]) {
if (!isStableVersion(value)) {
return releaseError(
`${field} must be a stable release version in X.Y.Z form`,
observed,
"Use the same stable X.Y.Z version in all package fields; prerelease and build metadata are not allowed for production releases.",
);
}
}
if (packageVersion !== lockVersion || packageVersion !== lockRootVersion) {
return releaseError(
"Package version fields do not match",
observed,
"Synchronize package.json.version and both package-lock.json version fields.",
);
}
if (tag === undefined) {
return { ok: true, data: observed };
}
if (typeof tag !== "string" || !tag.startsWith("v") || !isStableVersion(tag.slice(1))) {
return releaseError(
"--tag must use the stable release form vX.Y.Z",
{ ...observed, tag },
`Use --tag v${packageVersion}; prerelease and build metadata are not allowed for production releases.`,
);
}
const tagVersion = tag.slice(1);
if (tagVersion !== packageVersion) {
return releaseError(
"Tag version does not match the package version",
{ ...observed, tagVersion, tag },
`Use --tag v${packageVersion}.`,
);
}
return { ok: true, data: { ...observed, tagVersion } };
}
function writeResult(result) {
(result.ok ? process.stdout : process.stderr).write(`${JSON.stringify(result)}\n`);
if (!result.ok) process.exitCode = 1;
}
function main() {
const args = process.argv.slice(2);
let tag;
if (args.length === 2 && args[0] === "--tag") {
tag = args[1];
} else if (args.length !== 0) {
writeResult(releaseError(
"Expected no arguments or --tag vX.Y.Z",
{ arguments: args },
"Run release:check without arguments or pass exactly one --tag value.",
));
return;
}
const repoRoot = path.resolve(__dirname, "..");
try {
const packageJson = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(path.join(repoRoot, "package.json"), "utf8"));
const packageLockJson = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(path.join(repoRoot, "package-lock.json"), "utf8"));
writeResult(validateReleasePreflight(packageJson, packageLockJson, tag));
} catch (error) {
writeResult(releaseError(
"Could not read release package metadata",
{ reason: error.message },
"Ensure package.json and package-lock.json exist and contain valid JSON.",
));
}
}
module.exports = { validateReleasePreflight };
if (require.main === module) main();

View File

@@ -1,66 +0,0 @@
// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
const assert = require("node:assert/strict");
const { describe, it } = require("node:test");
const { validateReleasePreflight } = require("./release-preflight");
function metadata(version = "1.2.3") {
return {
packageJson: { version },
packageLockJson: {
version,
packages: { "": { version } },
},
};
}
function assertRejected(result) {
assert.equal(result.ok, false);
assert.equal(result.error.type, "release_preflight");
assert.equal(typeof result.error.message, "string");
}
describe("validateReleasePreflight", () => {
it("accepts matching stable package, lock, and tag versions", () => {
const { packageJson, packageLockJson } = metadata();
assert.deepEqual(
validateReleasePreflight(packageJson, packageLockJson, "v1.2.3"),
{
ok: true,
data: {
packageVersion: "1.2.3",
lockVersion: "1.2.3",
lockRootVersion: "1.2.3",
tagVersion: "1.2.3",
},
},
);
});
it("rejects non-stable or inconsistent package metadata", () => {
const prerelease = metadata("1.2.3-beta.1");
const topLevelMismatch = metadata();
topLevelMismatch.packageLockJson.version = "1.2.4";
const rootMismatch = metadata();
rootMismatch.packageLockJson.packages[""].version = "1.2.4";
for (const { packageJson, packageLockJson } of [
prerelease,
topLevelMismatch,
rootMismatch,
]) {
assertRejected(validateReleasePreflight(packageJson, packageLockJson));
}
});
it("rejects an invalid or mismatched release tag", () => {
const { packageJson, packageLockJson } = metadata();
for (const tag of ["1.2.3", "v1.2.3-beta.1", "v1.2.4"]) {
assertRejected(validateReleasePreflight(packageJson, packageLockJson, tag));
}
});
});

View File

@@ -3,48 +3,49 @@ set -euo pipefail
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
REPO_ROOT="$(cd "${SCRIPT_DIR}/.." && pwd)"
cd "${REPO_ROOT}"
VERSION=$(node -p "require('./package.json').version")
# Read version from package.json
VERSION=$(node -p "require('${REPO_ROOT}/package.json').version")
if [ -z "$VERSION" ]; then
echo "Error: could not read version from package.json" >&2
exit 1
fi
TAG="v${VERSION}"
node "${SCRIPT_DIR}/release-preflight.js" --tag "${TAG}"
echo "Version: ${VERSION}"
echo "Tag: ${TAG}"
CURRENT_BRANCH=$(git branch --show-current)
if [ "${CURRENT_BRANCH}" != "main" ]; then
echo "Error: releases must be tagged from main; current branch is '${CURRENT_BRANCH}'." >&2
# Check if tag already exists locally
if git rev-parse "$TAG" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "Tag ${TAG} already exists locally, skipping."
exit 0
fi
# Check if tag already exists on remote
if git ls-remote --tags origin "$TAG" | grep -q "$TAG"; then
echo "Tag ${TAG} already exists on remote, skipping."
exit 0
fi
# Ensure package.json changes are committed before tagging
if git diff --name-only | grep -q 'package.json' || git diff --cached --name-only | grep -q 'package.json'; then
echo "Error: package.json has uncommitted changes. Please commit before tagging." >&2
exit 1
fi
if ! git diff --quiet HEAD -- package.json package-lock.json; then
echo "Error: package.json or package-lock.json has uncommitted changes. Please commit them before tagging." >&2
# Ensure current branch is pushed to remote before tagging
CURRENT_BRANCH=$(git rev-parse --abbrev-ref HEAD)
LOCAL_SHA=$(git rev-parse HEAD)
REMOTE_SHA=$(git rev-parse "origin/${CURRENT_BRANCH}" 2>/dev/null || echo "")
if [ "$LOCAL_SHA" != "$REMOTE_SHA" ]; then
echo "Error: local branch '${CURRENT_BRANCH}' is not in sync with remote. Please push your commits first." >&2
exit 1
fi
git fetch origin main
# Create and push tag
git tag "$TAG"
git push origin "$TAG"
HEAD_SHA=$(git rev-parse HEAD)
FETCHED_MAIN_SHA=$(git rev-parse "FETCH_HEAD^{commit}")
if [ "${HEAD_SHA}" != "${FETCHED_MAIN_SHA}" ]; then
echo "Error: HEAD must exactly match origin/main before tagging." >&2
exit 1
fi
if git rev-parse -q --verify "refs/tags/${TAG}" >/dev/null; then
echo "Error: local tag ${TAG} already exists." >&2
exit 1
fi
REMOTE_TAG=$(git ls-remote --tags origin "refs/tags/${TAG}")
if [ -n "${REMOTE_TAG}" ]; then
echo "Error: remote tag ${TAG} already exists." >&2
exit 1
fi
git tag "${TAG}" "${HEAD_SHA}"
git push origin "refs/tags/${TAG}"
echo "Successfully pushed tag ${TAG}"
echo "Successfully created and pushed tag ${TAG}"

View File

@@ -12,23 +12,10 @@ import (
"github.com/larksuite/cli/shortcuts/common"
)
// maxFileListPageSize 是 file_list 分页上限,与后端 paas_storage checkMaxKeys 的 (0, 200] 契约对齐:
// page_size > 200 服务端直接返回 ErrInvalidRequest("maxKeys not in range (0, 200]")。CLI 前置校验避免无谓往返。
// 注:服务端对 page_size<=0 会兜底为默认值,但 CLI 默认已是 20、显式传 <1 属误用,故与其它 list 命令一致地按 [1, 200] 校验。
const maxFileListPageSize = 200
// validateFileListPageSize 前置校验 --page-size ∈ [1, maxFileListPageSize],与后端 checkMaxKeys 的 (0, 200] 契约对齐。
func validateFileListPageSize(n int) error {
if n < 1 || n > maxFileListPageSize {
return appsValidationParamError("--page-size", "--page-size must be between 1 and %d", maxFileListPageSize)
}
return nil
}
// AppsFileList lists files in a Miaoda app's storage (cursor pagination)。
//
// GET /apps/{app_id}/storage/file_list。过滤器--name / --path / --type / --size-gt /
// --size-lt / --uploaded-since / --uploaded-until精确或区间分页 --page-size(1..200)/--page-token。
// --size-lt / --uploaded-since / --uploaded-until精确或区间分页 --page-size/--page-token。
// file 域不分 dev/online无 --env。
//
// pretty 渲染 5 列file_name / path / size / type / uploaded_at空结果打 "No files found."。
@@ -54,17 +41,13 @@ var AppsFileList = common.Shortcut{
{Name: "size-lt", Type: "int", Desc: "filter: size less than (bytes)"},
{Name: "uploaded-since", Desc: "filter: uploaded at or after; relative (7d/2h/30s) | date (2026-04-15) | datetime (2026-04-15T10:00:00) | ISO 8601 w/ TZ (bare date/datetime read in local timezone)"},
{Name: "uploaded-until", Desc: "filter: uploaded at or before; relative (7d/2h/30s) | date (2026-04-15) | datetime (2026-04-15T10:00:00) | ISO 8601 w/ TZ (bare date/datetime read in local timezone)"},
{Name: "page-size", Type: "int", Default: "20", Desc: "page size (1..200)"},
{Name: "page-size", Type: "int", Default: "20", Desc: "page size"},
{Name: "page-token", Desc: "pagination cursor from previous response"},
},
Validate: func(ctx context.Context, rctx *common.RuntimeContext) error {
if _, err := requireAppID(rctx.Str("app-id")); err != nil {
return err
}
// page_size 前置校验:对齐后端 checkMaxKeys 的 (0, 200] 契约,避免 >200 触发服务端 ErrInvalidRequest。
if err := validateFileListPageSize(rctx.Int("page-size")); err != nil {
return err
}
// 设计原则三:<timestamp> 多格式 → 归一化为 RFC3339 UTC回写到 flag 供 buildFileListParams 透传。
for _, f := range []string{"uploaded-since", "uploaded-until"} {
if strings.TrimSpace(rctx.Str(f)) == "" {

View File

@@ -82,34 +82,6 @@ func TestAppsFileList_RequiresAppID(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestAppsFileList_PageSizeOutOfRange 验证 --page-size 超出 (0, 200] 契约时前置报 --page-size 校验错误,不发请求。
func TestAppsFileList_PageSizeOutOfRange(t *testing.T) {
for _, ps := range []string{"0", "201", "500"} {
factory, stdout, _ := newAppsExecuteFactory(t)
err := runAppsShortcut(t, AppsFileList,
[]string{"+file-list", "--app-id", "app_x", "--page-size", ps, "--as", "user"}, factory, stdout)
var ve *errs.ValidationError
if !errors.As(err, &ve) {
t.Fatalf("page-size=%s: err = %T %v, want *errs.ValidationError", ps, err, err)
}
if ve.Param != "--page-size" {
t.Fatalf("page-size=%s: Param = %q, want --page-size", ps, ve.Param)
}
}
}
// TestAppsFileList_PageSizeBoundaryOK 验证边界值 1 与 200 通过校验dry-run 不报错并把 page_size 下发)。
func TestAppsFileList_PageSizeBoundaryOK(t *testing.T) {
for _, ps := range []string{"1", "200"} {
factory, stdout, _ := newAppsExecuteFactory(t)
if err := runAppsShortcut(t, AppsFileList,
[]string{"+file-list", "--app-id", "app_x", "--page-size", ps, "--dry-run", "--as", "user"},
factory, stdout); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("page-size=%s: dry-run err=%v", ps, err)
}
}
}
// 过滤器 + 分页全部进 querysize-gt/lt 走 intuploaded_since/until 原样)。
func TestAppsFileList_DryRunSendsFiltersAndPagination(t *testing.T) {
factory, stdout, _ := newAppsExecuteFactory(t)

View File

@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ import (
"strings"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/errs"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/internal/cmdutil"
"github.com/larksuite/cli/shortcuts/common"
)
@@ -46,7 +47,21 @@ var AppsFileUpload = common.Shortcut{
if _, err := requireAppID(rctx.Str("app-id")); err != nil {
return err
}
return rctx.ValidateLocalFileFlag("file", fileUploadMaxBytes)
f := strings.TrimSpace(rctx.Str("file"))
if f == "" {
return errs.NewValidationError(errs.SubtypeInvalidArgument, "--file is required").WithParam("--file")
}
st, err := rctx.FileIO().Stat(f)
if err != nil {
return errs.NewValidationError(errs.SubtypeInvalidArgument, "--file: %v", err).WithParam("--file").WithCause(err)
}
if st.IsDir() {
return errs.NewValidationError(errs.SubtypeInvalidArgument, "--file must be a file, not a directory").WithParam("--file")
}
if st.Size() > fileUploadMaxBytes {
return errs.NewValidationError(errs.SubtypeInvalidArgument, "file size %d bytes exceeds the 100 MB upload limit", st.Size()).WithParam("--file")
}
return nil
},
DryRun: func(ctx context.Context, rctx *common.RuntimeContext) *common.DryRunAPI {
appID, _ := requireAppID(rctx.Str("app-id"))
@@ -61,9 +76,9 @@ var AppsFileUpload = common.Shortcut{
return err
}
localPath := strings.TrimSpace(rctx.Str("file"))
content, err := rctx.ReadLocalFileFlag("file", fileUploadMaxBytes)
content, err := cmdutil.ReadInputFile(rctx.FileIO(), localPath)
if err != nil {
return err
return errs.NewValidationError(errs.SubtypeInvalidArgument, "--file: %v", err).WithParam("--file").WithCause(err)
}
fileName := filepath.Base(localPath)
contentType := mimeByExt(fileName)

View File

@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ import (
"net/http/httptest"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"runtime"
"strings"
"testing"
@@ -59,17 +58,22 @@ func TestAppsFileUpload_RejectsDirectory(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestAppsFileUpload_DryRunPreUpload verifies that dry-run validates the local
// file and previews the pre-upload request without reading or uploading it.
// TestAppsFileUpload_DryRunPreUpload 验证 dry-run 输出 POST file_pre_uploadbody.file_name 取文件 basename。
func TestAppsFileUpload_DryRunPreUpload(t *testing.T) {
absolutePath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "logo.png")
if err := os.WriteFile(absolutePath, []byte("not-read-by-dry-run"), 0o600); err != nil {
// Validate 会 Stat --file在 DryRun 之前),故 dry-run 也需要真实存在的文件。
dir := t.TempDir()
if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, "logo.png"), []byte("x"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
oldWD, _ := os.Getwd()
if err := os.Chdir(dir); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = os.Chdir(oldWD) })
factory, stdout, _ := newAppsExecuteFactory(t)
if err := runAppsShortcut(t, AppsFileUpload,
[]string{"+file-upload", "--app-id", "app_x", "--file", absolutePath, "--dry-run", "--as", "user"}, factory, stdout); err != nil {
[]string{"+file-upload", "--app-id", "app_x", "--file", "logo.png", "--dry-run", "--as", "user"}, factory, stdout); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("dry-run err=%v", err)
}
var env dryRunAPIEnvelope
@@ -83,18 +87,6 @@ func TestAppsFileUpload_DryRunPreUpload(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestAppsFileUpload_DryRunRejectsMissingFile(t *testing.T) {
missingAbsolutePath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "does-not-exist", "logo.png")
factory, stdout, _ := newAppsExecuteFactory(t)
err := runAppsShortcut(t, AppsFileUpload,
[]string{"+file-upload", "--app-id", "app_x", "--file", missingAbsolutePath, "--dry-run", "--as", "user"}, factory, stdout)
var validationErr *errs.ValidationError
if !errors.As(err, &validationErr) || validationErr.Subtype != errs.SubtypeInvalidArgument || validationErr.Param != "--file" {
t.Fatalf("error = %T %v, want invalid_argument for --file", err, err)
}
}
// 三步直传pre-upload → 客户端 PUT 字节 → callback。
func TestAppsFileUpload_EndToEnd(t *testing.T) {
var putBody []byte
@@ -157,142 +149,6 @@ func TestAppsFileUpload_EndToEnd(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestAppsFileUpload_AcceptsAbsolutePath verifies that file-upload can read an
// absolute path outside the current working directory.
func TestAppsFileUpload_AcceptsAbsolutePath(t *testing.T) {
var putBody []byte
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Method != http.MethodPut {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
return
}
putBody, _ = io.ReadAll(r.Body)
w.Header().Set("ETag", `"etag-abs"`)
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
}))
defer srv.Close()
// Keep the process cwd unchanged so the temporary file is outside it.
dir := t.TempDir()
absFile := filepath.Join(dir, "report.pdf")
if !filepath.IsAbs(absFile) {
t.Fatalf("test setup: %q is not absolute", absFile)
}
if err := os.WriteFile(absFile, []byte("PDFBYTES"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
factory, stdout, reg := newAppsExecuteFactory(t)
reg.Register(&httpmock.Stub{
Method: "POST", URL: "/open-apis/spark/v1/apps/app_x/storage/file_pre_upload",
Body: map[string]interface{}{"code": 0, "data": map[string]interface{}{"upload_url": srv.URL, "upload_id": "up-abs"}},
})
reg.Register(&httpmock.Stub{
Method: "POST", URL: "/open-apis/spark/v1/apps/app_x/storage/file_upload_callback",
Body: map[string]interface{}{"code": 0, "data": map[string]interface{}{
"file_name": "report.pdf", "path": "/1858537546760999.pdf", "size_bytes": 8,
}},
})
if err := runAppsShortcut(t, AppsFileUpload,
[]string{"+file-upload", "--app-id", "app_x", "--file", absFile, "--as", "user"}, factory, stdout); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("execute with absolute path err=%v", err)
}
if string(putBody) != "PDFBYTES" {
t.Fatalf("PUT body = %q, want file bytes", putBody)
}
}
func TestAppsFileUpload_AcceptsParentRelativePathOutsideCWD(t *testing.T) {
var putBody []byte
srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
putBody, _ = io.ReadAll(r.Body)
w.Header().Set("ETag", `"etag-parent"`)
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
}))
defer srv.Close()
root := t.TempDir()
workDir := filepath.Join(root, "work")
if err := os.Mkdir(workDir, 0o755); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(root, "report.pdf"), []byte("PARENT"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
oldWD, _ := os.Getwd()
if err := os.Chdir(workDir); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = os.Chdir(oldWD) })
factory, stdout, reg := newAppsExecuteFactory(t)
reg.Register(&httpmock.Stub{
Method: "POST", URL: "/open-apis/spark/v1/apps/app_x/storage/file_pre_upload",
Body: map[string]interface{}{"code": 0, "data": map[string]interface{}{"upload_url": srv.URL, "upload_id": "up-parent"}},
})
reg.Register(&httpmock.Stub{
Method: "POST", URL: "/open-apis/spark/v1/apps/app_x/storage/file_upload_callback",
Body: map[string]interface{}{"code": 0, "data": map[string]interface{}{
"file_name": "report.pdf", "path": "/parent.pdf", "size_bytes": 6,
}},
})
if err := runAppsShortcut(t, AppsFileUpload,
[]string{"+file-upload", "--app-id", "app_x", "--file", filepath.Join("..", "report.pdf"), "--as", "user"}, factory, stdout); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("execute with parent-relative path err=%v", err)
}
if string(putBody) != "PARENT" {
t.Fatalf("PUT body = %q, want PARENT", putBody)
}
}
func TestAppsFileUpload_RejectsFileAboveLimit(t *testing.T) {
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "too-large.bin")
f, err := os.Create(path)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := f.Truncate(fileUploadMaxBytes + 1); err != nil {
_ = f.Close()
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := f.Close(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
factory, stdout, _ := newAppsExecuteFactory(t)
err = runAppsShortcut(t, AppsFileUpload,
[]string{"+file-upload", "--app-id", "app_x", "--file", path, "--as", "user"}, factory, stdout)
var validationErr *errs.ValidationError
if !errors.As(err, &validationErr) || validationErr.Param != "--file" {
t.Fatalf("error = %T %v, want --file ValidationError", err, err)
}
if !strings.Contains(validationErr.Error(), "limit") {
t.Fatalf("error = %v, want size limit context", validationErr)
}
}
func TestAppsFileUpload_RejectsDeviceWithoutReadingIt(t *testing.T) {
if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
t.Skip("/dev/zero is unavailable on Windows")
}
if _, err := os.Stat("/dev/zero"); err != nil {
t.Skipf("/dev/zero unavailable: %v", err)
}
factory, stdout, _ := newAppsExecuteFactory(t)
err := runAppsShortcut(t, AppsFileUpload,
[]string{"+file-upload", "--app-id", "app_x", "--file", "/dev/zero", "--as", "user"}, factory, stdout)
var validationErr *errs.ValidationError
if !errors.As(err, &validationErr) || validationErr.Param != "--file" {
t.Fatalf("error = %T %v, want --file ValidationError", err, err)
}
if !strings.Contains(validationErr.Error(), "regular file") {
t.Fatalf("error = %v, want non-regular-file context", validationErr)
}
}
// TestSanitizeUploadFileName_Cases 验证 sanitizeUploadFileName空格转 %20、去 TOS 非法字符、全非法兜底、非 ASCII 百分号编码。
func TestSanitizeUploadFileName_Cases(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct{ in, want string }{

View File

@@ -2435,14 +2435,16 @@ func TestBaseRecordExecuteReadCreateDelete(t *testing.T) {
Body: map[string]interface{}{
"code": 0,
"data": map[string]interface{}{
"fields": []interface{}{"Name"},
"record_id_list": []interface{}{"rec_1", "rec_2"},
"data": []interface{}{[]interface{}{"Alice"}, []interface{}{"Bob"}},
},
},
})
if err := runShortcut(t, BaseRecordBatchCreate, []string{"+record-batch-create", "--base-token", "app_x", "--table-id", "tbl_x", "--json", `{"create_records":[{"Name":"Alice"},{"Name":"Bob"}]}`}, factory, stdout); err != nil {
if err := runShortcut(t, BaseRecordBatchCreate, []string{"+record-batch-create", "--base-token", "app_x", "--table-id", "tbl_x", "--json", `{"fields":["Name"],"rows":[["Alice"],["Bob"]]}`}, factory, stdout); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("err=%v", err)
}
if got := stdout.String(); !strings.Contains(got, `"record_id_list"`) || !strings.Contains(got, `"rec_1"`) {
if got := stdout.String(); !strings.Contains(got, `"record_id_list"`) || !strings.Contains(got, `"rec_1"`) || !strings.Contains(got, `"Alice"`) {
t.Fatalf("stdout=%s", got)
}
})

View File

@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ var BaseFormSubmit = common.Shortcut{
Service: "base",
Command: "+form-submit",
Description: "Submit a form (fill and submit form data)",
Risk: "high-risk-write",
Risk: "write",
Scopes: []string{"base:form:update", "docs:document.media:upload"},
AuthTypes: authTypes(),
HasFormat: true,
@@ -39,7 +39,6 @@ var BaseFormSubmit = common.Shortcut{
`Example (no attachments): --share-token shrXXXX --json '{"fields":{"Service Rating":5,"Review":"Good service"}}'`,
`Example (with attachments): --share-token shrXXXX --base-token basXXX --json '{"fields":{"Service Rating":5},"attachments":{"Attachment":["./report.pdf"]}}'`,
`Cell values in "fields" follow lark-base-cell-value.md conventions; "attachments" maps field names to local file path arrays — the CLI uploads them in parallel and merges them into the submission.`,
baseHighRiskYesTip,
},
Validate: func(ctx context.Context, runtime *common.RuntimeContext) error {
return validateFormSubmit(runtime)

View File

@@ -801,8 +801,7 @@ func TestBaseJSONExamplesLiveInFlagDescriptions(t *testing.T) {
name: "record batch create json",
shortcut: BaseRecordBatchCreate,
wantHelp: []string{
"create_records contains one field map per record",
`{"create_records":[{"Name":"Task A","Status":"Todo"},{"Name":"Task B","Score":20}]}`,
`batch create JSON object, e.g. {"fields":["Name","Status"],"rows":[["Task A","Todo"],["Task B",null]]}; rows follow fields order`,
},
},
{
@@ -851,8 +850,8 @@ func TestBaseRecordWriteHelpGuidesAgents(t *testing.T) {
`{"Parent Link":[{"id":"rec_xxx"}]}`,
"do not look for parent_record_id or a separate child-record API",
"CellValue happy path: text/phone/url",
"select (multiple=false) -> \"Todo\"",
"select (multiple=true) -> [\"Tag A\",\"Tag B\"]",
"select -> \"Todo\"",
"multi-select -> [\"Tag A\",\"Tag B\"]",
"datetime -> \"2026-03-24 10:00:00\"",
"checkbox -> true/false",
`ID-based CellValue: user/group/link fields use arrays like [{"id":"ou_xxx"}]`,
@@ -866,11 +865,11 @@ func TestBaseRecordWriteHelpGuidesAgents(t *testing.T) {
name: "record batch create",
shortcut: BaseRecordBatchCreate,
wantTips: []string{
"Happy path field: create_records",
"create_records is an array of independent record field maps",
`{"create_records":[{"Name":"Task A","Status":"Todo"},{"Name":"Task B","Score":20}]}`,
"Happy path fields: fields is the column order",
"rows is an array of row arrays",
"may use null for empty cells",
"use +field-list to confirm real writable fields",
"Batch create supports max 200 records per call",
"Batch create supports max 200 rows per call",
"do not immediately +record-list the same table",
"CellValue happy path: text/phone/url",
`ID-based CellValue: user/group/link fields use arrays like [{"id":"ou_xxx"}]`,
@@ -2056,8 +2055,8 @@ func TestBaseFormSubmitShortcut(t *testing.T) {
if s.Service != "base" {
t.Fatalf("Service=%q want base", s.Service)
}
if s.Risk != "high-risk-write" {
t.Fatalf("Risk=%q want high-risk-write", s.Risk)
if s.Risk != "write" {
t.Fatalf("Risk=%q want write", s.Risk)
}
if !s.HasFormat {
t.Fatal("HasFormat should be true")
@@ -2357,7 +2356,6 @@ func TestExecuteFormSubmit(t *testing.T) {
"+form-submit",
"--share-token", "shr_exec1",
"--json", `{"fields":{"Name":"Alice","Rating":5}}`,
"--yes",
}
if err := runShortcut(t, BaseFormSubmit, args, factory, stdout); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("err=%v", err)
@@ -2426,7 +2424,6 @@ func TestExecuteFormSubmit(t *testing.T) {
"--share-token", "shr_exec6",
"--base-token", "bas_exec6",
"--json", `{"attachments":{"File":["./nonexistent.pdf"]}}`,
"--yes",
}
err := runShortcut(t, BaseFormSubmit, args, factory, stdout)
if err == nil {
@@ -2475,7 +2472,6 @@ func TestExecuteFormSubmit(t *testing.T) {
"--share-token", "shr_dedup",
"--base-token", "bas_dedup",
"--json", `{"attachments":{"FieldA":["./shared.pdf"],"FieldB":["./shared.pdf"]}}`,
"--yes",
}
if err := runShortcut(t, BaseFormSubmit, args, factory, stdout); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("err=%v", err)
@@ -2487,33 +2483,6 @@ func TestExecuteFormSubmit(t *testing.T) {
})
}
// TestFormSubmitRequiresConfirmation pins the high-risk-write classification:
// without --yes the runner's confirmation gate must fire before Execute runs,
// returning a typed confirmation_required error and touching no API.
func TestFormSubmitRequiresConfirmation(t *testing.T) {
if BaseFormSubmit.Risk != "high-risk-write" {
t.Fatalf("Risk=%q want high-risk-write", BaseFormSubmit.Risk)
}
factory, stdout, _ := newExecuteFactory(t)
args := []string{
"+form-submit",
"--share-token", "shr_confirm",
"--json", `{"fields":{"Rating":5}}`,
}
err := runShortcut(t, BaseFormSubmit, args, factory, stdout)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected confirmation_required error without --yes")
}
problem, ok := errs.ProblemOf(err)
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("expected typed error, got %T: %v", err, err)
}
if problem.Subtype != errs.SubtypeConfirmationRequired {
t.Fatalf("subtype=%q want %q", problem.Subtype, errs.SubtypeConfirmationRequired)
}
}
func TestUploadAttachmentsParallel(t *testing.T) {
t.Run("single file upload via execute path", func(t *testing.T) {
tmpDir := t.TempDir()
@@ -2550,7 +2519,6 @@ func TestUploadAttachmentsParallel(t *testing.T) {
"--share-token", "shr_para1",
"--base-token", "bas_para1",
"--json", `{"attachments":{"Doc":["./doc.txt"]}}`,
"--yes",
}
if err := runShortcut(t, BaseFormSubmit, args, factory, stdout); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("err=%v", err)
@@ -2585,7 +2553,6 @@ func TestUploadAttachmentsParallel(t *testing.T) {
"--share-token", "shr_err",
"--base-token", "bas_err",
"--json", `{"attachments":{"Bad":["./bad.txt"]}}`,
"--yes",
}
err := runShortcut(t, BaseFormSubmit, args, factory, stdout)
if err == nil {

View File

@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ var BaseFieldSearchOptions = common.Shortcut{
},
Tips: []string{
`Example: lark-cli base +field-search-options --base-token <base_token> --table-id <table_id> --field-id "Status" --keyword "Do"`,
"Use only for select fields, whether multiple is false or true.",
"Use only for fields with options, such as select or multi-select fields.",
},
Validate: func(ctx context.Context, runtime *common.RuntimeContext) error {
if err := validateLimitPageSizeAlias(runtime); err != nil {

View File

@@ -19,13 +19,12 @@ var BaseRecordBatchCreate = common.Shortcut{
Flags: []common.Flag{
baseTokenFlag(true),
tableRefFlag(true),
{Name: "json", Desc: `batch create JSON object; create_records contains one field map per record, e.g. {"create_records":[{"Name":"Task A","Status":"Todo"},{"Name":"Task B","Score":20}]}`, Required: true},
{Name: "json", Desc: `batch create JSON object, e.g. {"fields":["Name","Status"],"rows":[["Task A","Todo"],["Task B",null]]}; rows follow fields order`, Required: true},
},
Tips: append([]string{
"Happy path field: create_records is an array of independent record field maps.",
`Example: {"create_records":[{"Name":"Task A","Status":"Todo"},{"Name":"Task B","Score":20}]}.`,
"Happy path fields: fields is the column order; rows is an array of row arrays; each row must match fields order and may use null for empty cells.",
"Before writing, use +field-list to confirm real writable fields; do not write system fields, formula, lookup, or attachment fields as normal CellValue.",
"Batch create supports max 200 records per call.",
"Batch create supports max 200 rows per call.",
"After batch-creating known helper rows, use the returned record IDs and your submitted rows; do not immediately +record-list the same table unless you need server-normalized formula/lookup values or failure diagnosis.",
"Use the record-batch-create guide for command limits and edge cases.",
}, recordCellValueHappyPathTips...),

View File

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ const maxBatchGetSelectFieldCount = 100
const maxRecordSearchSelectFieldCount = 50
var recordCellValueHappyPathTips = []string{
`CellValue happy path: text/phone/url -> "text"; number/currency/percent/rating -> 12.5; select (multiple=false) -> "Todo"; select (multiple=true) -> ["Tag A","Tag B"]; datetime -> "2026-03-24 10:00:00"; checkbox -> true/false.`,
`CellValue happy path: text/phone/url -> "text"; number/currency/percent/rating -> 12.5; select -> "Todo"; multi-select -> ["Tag A","Tag B"]; datetime -> "2026-03-24 10:00:00"; checkbox -> true/false.`,
`ID-based CellValue: user/group/link fields use arrays like [{"id":"ou_xxx"}], [{"id":"oc_xxx"}], [{"id":"rec_xxx"}]; location uses {"lng":116.397428,"lat":39.90923}; null clears a cell when allowed.`,
"Do not guess user/chat/linked-record IDs or location coordinates; resolve them first with the relevant contact/im/record lookup flow.",
"Use lark-base-cell-value.md for complex CellValue shapes and special field types; do not invent values for fields not covered by the happy path.",

View File

@@ -250,8 +250,6 @@ var CalendarAgenda = common.Shortcut{
}
}
backfillDescriptionRich(e)
filtered = append(filtered, e)
}
}

View File

@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ import (
func buildEventData(runtime *common.RuntimeContext, startTs, endTs string) map[string]interface{} {
eventData := map[string]interface{}{
"summary": runtime.Str("summary"),
"description": runtime.Str("description"),
"start_time": map[string]string{"timestamp": startTs},
"end_time": map[string]string{"timestamp": endTs},
"attendee_ability": "can_modify_event",
@@ -32,9 +33,6 @@ func buildEventData(runtime *common.RuntimeContext, startTs, endTs string) map[s
if rrule := runtime.Str("rrule"); rrule != "" {
eventData["recurrence"] = rrule
}
if descriptionRich := descriptionRichToSend(runtime); descriptionRich != "" {
eventData["description_rich"] = descriptionRich
}
return eventData
}
@@ -120,8 +118,7 @@ var CalendarCreate = common.Shortcut{
{Name: "summary", Desc: "event title"},
{Name: "start", Desc: "start time (ISO 8601)", Required: true},
{Name: "end", Desc: "end time (ISO 8601)", Required: true},
{Name: "description", Desc: "deprecated: plain-text description; use --description-rich (Markdown) instead", Hidden: true},
{Name: "description-rich", Desc: "event description as Markdown (@file or - for stdin); the unified description field. Supports bold/italic/underline/strikethrough, links, headings (`#`..`###`), blockquotes (`>`), ordered/unordered lists, horizontal rules (`---`), GFM tables, and images (`![name](url)`; a remote URL is used as-is, and a local image path relative to and inside the current working directory is auto-uploaded to Lark drive and rendered inline — absolute/out-of-cwd paths are rejected). A Lark doc URL (bare or as a Markdown link) is auto-resolved to an inline doc-mention chip showing its title. Inside a GFM table cell, stack multiple lines with `<br>`; each line may itself be an ordered/unordered list item, image or styled text (e.g. `1. a<br>2. b`, `- x<br>- y`, `![p](url)<br>**bold**`).", Input: []string{common.File, common.Stdin}},
{Name: "description", Desc: "event description"},
{Name: "attendee-ids", Desc: "attendee IDs, comma-separated (supports user ou_, chat oc_, room omm_)"},
{Name: "calendar-id", Desc: "calendar ID (default: primary)"},
{Name: "rrule", Desc: "recurrence rule (rfc5545)"},
@@ -234,9 +231,6 @@ var CalendarCreate = common.Shortcut{
if err != nil {
return errs.NewValidationError(errs.SubtypeInvalidArgument, "--end: %v", err).WithParam("--end")
}
if err := resolveDescriptionRichImages(runtime, calendarId); err != nil {
return err
}
eventData := buildEventData(runtime, startTs, endTs)

View File

@@ -81,7 +81,6 @@ type calendarEvent struct {
OrganizerCalendarID string `json:"organizer_calendar_id,omitempty"`
Summary string `json:"summary,omitempty"`
Description string `json:"description,omitempty"`
DescriptionRich string `json:"description_rich,omitempty"`
StartTime *calendarEventTime `json:"start_time,omitempty"`
EndTime *calendarEventTime `json:"end_time,omitempty"`
VChat *calendarEventVChat `json:"vchat,omitempty"`
@@ -170,7 +169,7 @@ func buildCalendarEventOutput(event *calendarEvent) (map[string]interface{}, err
if status, _ := out["status"].(string); status != "cancelled" {
delete(out, "status")
}
backfillDescriptionRich(out)
return out, nil
}

View File

@@ -988,14 +988,9 @@ func TestUpdate_PatchEventOnly(t *testing.T) {
if err := json.Unmarshal(stub.CapturedBody, &body); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unmarshal captured patch body: %v", err)
}
// The deprecated, hidden --description folds into description_rich; the CLI
// never sends the plain description field (mutually exclusive downstream).
if body["summary"] != "Updated Meeting" || body["description_rich"] != "Updated description" {
if body["summary"] != "Updated Meeting" || body["description"] != "Updated description" {
t.Fatalf("unexpected patch body: %#v", body)
}
if _, ok := body["description"]; ok {
t.Fatalf("plain description must not be sent, got: %#v", body)
}
if body["need_notification"] != false {
t.Fatalf("need_notification = %#v, want false", body["need_notification"])
}
@@ -1369,63 +1364,6 @@ func TestAgenda_Success(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestAgenda_UnifiesDescriptionRich(t *testing.T) {
f, stdout, _, reg := cmdutil.TestFactory(t, defaultConfig())
reg.Register(&httpmock.Stub{
Method: "GET",
URL: "/events/instance_view",
Body: map[string]interface{}{
"code": 0, "msg": "ok",
"data": map[string]interface{}{
"items": []interface{}{
map[string]interface{}{
"event_id": "evt_rich",
"summary": "Rich",
"status": "confirmed",
"description": "[测试]\n友情提醒",
"description_rich": "友情提醒",
"start_time": map[string]interface{}{"timestamp": "1742515200"},
"end_time": map[string]interface{}{"timestamp": "1742518800"},
},
map[string]interface{}{
"event_id": "evt_plain",
"summary": "Plain",
"status": "confirmed",
"description": "just text",
"start_time": map[string]interface{}{"timestamp": "1742515200"},
"end_time": map[string]interface{}{"timestamp": "1742518800"},
},
},
},
},
})
err := mountAndRun(t, CalendarAgenda, []string{
"+agenda",
"--start", "2025-03-21",
"--end", "2025-03-21",
"--as", "bot",
}, f, stdout)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
out := stdout.String()
// Read keeps both fields: description (plain) and description_rich (rich).
if !strings.Contains(out, "\"description\": \"[测试]\\n友情提醒\"") {
t.Errorf("expected plain description retained, got: %s", out)
}
if !strings.Contains(out, "\"description_rich\": \"友情提醒\"") {
t.Errorf("expected rich description surfaced, got: %s", out)
}
if !strings.Contains(out, "\"description\": \"just text\"") {
t.Errorf("expected plain description retained for plain-only event, got: %s", out)
}
if !strings.Contains(out, "\"description_rich\": \"just text\"") {
t.Errorf("expected description_rich backfilled from plain, got: %s", out)
}
}
func TestAgenda_EmptyResult(t *testing.T) {
f, stdout, _, reg := cmdutil.TestFactory(t, defaultConfig())
@@ -3437,72 +3375,6 @@ func TestGet_Success_FlattensAndConvertsTimes(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestGet_UnifiesDescriptionRich(t *testing.T) {
// Read keeps both description (plain) and description_rich (rich).
t.Run("rich present", func(t *testing.T) {
f, stdout, _, reg := cmdutil.TestFactory(t, defaultConfig())
reg.Register(&httpmock.Stub{
Method: "GET",
URL: "/open-apis/calendar/v4/calendars/cal_test123/events/evt_rich",
Body: map[string]interface{}{
"code": 0, "msg": "success",
"data": map[string]interface{}{
"event": map[string]interface{}{
"event_id": "evt_rich",
"summary": "Rich",
"description": "[表格]",
"description_rich": "| a | b |\n| --- | --- |\n| c | d |",
"start_time": map[string]interface{}{"timestamp": "1742515200", "timezone": "Asia/Shanghai"},
"end_time": map[string]interface{}{"timestamp": "1742518800", "timezone": "Asia/Shanghai"},
},
},
},
})
if err := mountAndRun(t, CalendarGet, []string{"+get", "--calendar-id", "cal_test123", "--event-id", "evt_rich", "--as", "bot"}, f, stdout); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
out := stdout.String()
if !strings.Contains(out, "\"description\": \"[表格]\"") {
t.Errorf("expected plain description retained, got: %s", out)
}
if !strings.Contains(out, "\"description_rich\":") {
t.Errorf("expected description_rich in output, got: %s", out)
}
})
// When only a plain description exists, description_rich is backfilled from it
// and the plain description is still returned.
t.Run("only plain backfills rich", func(t *testing.T) {
f, stdout, _, reg := cmdutil.TestFactory(t, defaultConfig())
reg.Register(&httpmock.Stub{
Method: "GET",
URL: "/open-apis/calendar/v4/calendars/cal_test123/events/evt_plain",
Body: map[string]interface{}{
"code": 0, "msg": "success",
"data": map[string]interface{}{
"event": map[string]interface{}{
"event_id": "evt_plain",
"summary": "Plain",
"description": "just text",
"start_time": map[string]interface{}{"timestamp": "1742515200", "timezone": "Asia/Shanghai"},
"end_time": map[string]interface{}{"timestamp": "1742518800", "timezone": "Asia/Shanghai"},
},
},
},
})
if err := mountAndRun(t, CalendarGet, []string{"+get", "--calendar-id", "cal_test123", "--event-id", "evt_plain", "--as", "bot"}, f, stdout); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
out := stdout.String()
if !strings.Contains(out, "\"description\": \"just text\"") {
t.Errorf("expected plain description retained, got: %s", out)
}
if !strings.Contains(out, "\"description_rich\": \"just text\"") {
t.Errorf("expected description_rich backfilled from plain, got: %s", out)
}
})
}
func TestGet_CancelledStatus_PreservesStatus(t *testing.T) {
f, stdout, _, reg := cmdutil.TestFactory(t, defaultConfig())

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